WHEN DOES MILITARY INTERVENTION PRODUCE DEMOCRACY?
THE DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION FOLLOWING MILITARY INTERVENTION

by

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates why some interventions by the United States have resulted in democracy while others have not by examining the preconditions associated with successful democratization after military intervention. It employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine twelve different countries with unique instances of intervention from the period of 1982 to 2003 and two detailed case studies of US military intervention in Haiti (1994) and Panama (1989), highlighting the importance of economic growth, respect for the rule of law, and social homogeneity prior to the military intervention in the subsequent progress toward democracy. Through this mixed-method approach, this analysis finds support for the argument that economic growth, respect for the rule of law, and social homogeneity prior to intervention are important predictors of successful democratization after intervention. Case studies provide further partial support that growth in per capita GDP and a higher respect for the law in Panama produced a stable democracy after the US intervention in 1989, while in Haiti a stagnant economy and a lower respect for the rule of law resulted in a largely failed democracy after the US intervention in 1994.
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INTRODUCTION

After clearing the islands of the Pacific, dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and securing a Japanese surrender in September of 1945, the United States set to work molding Japan into a democracy. Further to the West and in the middle of Europe, US forces occupied Germany and hoped to turn the once fascist state into a democratic ally. These operations proved to be largely successful and today, Japan and Germany two stalwarts of democracy with dynamic economies and a high respect for the rule of law. Clearly, U.S. incursions with the goal of producing democracy can prove to be successful. With these fruitful interventions in mind, the United States looked to produce democracy elsewhere, and thus, has been involved in combat operations in a multitude of nations since the close of WWII.

In every decade since the 1940s, the U.S. has been engaged in some sort of conflict with the goal of attempting to produce a more democratic state. From Lebanon to Liberia, the United States spends vast amounts of resources and time trying to restructure countries into bastions of democracy. Some more modern success stories exist like Panama, but history is now replete with failures as well. Thus, beginning with WWII, the United States has a long history of intervention, but the results are now mixed. Even though the United States intervened militarily in many countries and engaged in nation building, why did only certain countries, like Panama or Germany, become stable democracies? Clearly, the question is not if democracy can be obtained, but rather, under what conditions does military intervention produce democracy? Stated differently, are there certain preconditions on the ground in a country that, given an intervention, are more likely to produce a democracy than others?
A CONFUSED BODY OF LITERATURE

Previous studies of the effects of military intervention on democracy fall into two opposing viewpoints: that military intervention does not result in democracy (Peceny 1999, Pickering and Kisangani 2006), and that military intervention does result in democracy (Meernik 1996, Downs and Bueno De Mesquita 2006, Pickering and Peceny 2006). Those who are skeptics tend to deemphasize the cases of Germany and Japan. In his article, “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy”, James Meernik posits that in most cases U.S. military intervention does not lead to increased levels of democracy. He writes “in the majority of cases regardless of the manner in which democratic change is measured, the majority of U.S. military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy” (Meernik 1996). In this way, Meernik finds that most countries have about the same level of democracy present both before and after U.S. military interventions. Meernik’s study ranged from 1951 and culminated in 1990, exploring intervention in various countries like Guatemala, Lebanon, the Congo, and Grenada. Although Meernik found that, on the whole, military interventions do not produce democracies, he found three large exceptions to the rule.

First is that countries that have experienced military interventions are actually more likely to experience growth in their democracies than nations that did not experience military interventions. While this may seem as though it runs counter to Meernik’s findings, it does not mean these countries democratized. However, it does raise the question that military interventions may indeed work in some cases. The next exception to his findings is that a Probit analysis Meernik ran generally supported the fact that countries did show an increase in in democratization when U.S. ground forces
intervened. This exception again ran Meernik’s established findings; however, it underscores how interventions might work. Finally, Meernik notes that when U.S. policymakers, most notably the President of the United States, make democratization a clear stated goal of military intervention, democratization generally happens. Although Meernik claims that, broadly speaking, military intervention does not lead to democratization, the inconclusiveness of Meernik’s findings is telling. Further, it may demonstrate the importance of who the intervening country is. Yet, a clearer picture of when military intervention produces democracy is still needed.

“Forging Democracy at Gunpoint,” by Jeff Pickering and Mark Peceny, also underscores that military interventions do not produce democracies. The authors find that intervening liberal states do not have an effect on democratization after 1945. Their study lasted fifty years between 1946 and 1996, but only eight cases in this time period had a potential correlation between liberal intervention and democracy. “Thus, nearly eighty four percent of the cases of democratization that occurred from 1946 to 1996 involved no liberal military intervention” (Pickering, Peceny 2006). Furthermore, they found that “ninety two percent of the cases of democratization in [their] sample involved no intervention by a liberal state actor” (Pickering, Peceny 2006). The crux of their argument is that of all the times countries became democratic from 1946 to 1996, liberal intervention very rarely played a role. However, they find a caveat as well. “It appears that the likelihood that a state will democratize increases both during a U.N. military intervention and in the first few years after the Blue Helmets arrive” Pickering, Peceny 2006). Again, there is an exception to the rule that military interventions do result in democracy, in effect this exception states that sometimes interventions do in fact lead to
democracy. This demonstrates the need for a comprehensive study on when exactly military interventions will result in democracy and when they won’t.

There are many exceptions to the literature arguing intervening militarily in a country will not bring about democracy. However, the debate intensifies among the authors who do believe military intervention will lead to democracy. The first author of the literature arguing in favor of military intervention producing democracy is Mark Peceny. Peceny finds that democracy will be produced in the aftermath of an intervention only when promoting democracy and holding elections was planned and intended at the outset. He writes that after an intervention, “states that have experienced U.S. sponsored elections are significantly more likely to be democracies than states that have not shared this experience” (Peceny 1999). Just like those arguing against military intervention producing democracy, Peceny has an asterisk. Here, military intervention will result in democracy if free and fair elections are also sponsored by the invading nation. Put another way, Peceny argues that military interventions trying to produce democracy have a large chance of failing if free and fair elections are not also sponsored. Again, with this statement Peceny acknowledges that military interventions may work in some cases but not in others, begging the question as to what factors lead military interventions to success in bringing about democracy.

Pickering’s piece, “Political, Economic and Social Consequences of Foreign Military Intervention,” offers further insight into how interventions can create democracies. In this piece, Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani argue that lower scale force, like military intervention, into non-democratic states can indeed produce democracy. Both Pickering and Kisangani note that there is a strong relationship between
military interventions and improving democracy in countries. However, this only occurs if the military intervention is into non-democratic states, it does not occur in states where they are already trying to develop democracy. Once again, an “only if” statement exists determining specific conditions where military intervention produces democracy.

**TAKING THE MIDDLE GROUND**

The topic of military intervention producing democracy is highly contested, but what information exists about military intervention democratizing nations? To summarize, democratization works in some case and not in others. Also, there are many cases where certain factors had to be met, like if the President declared democracy a stated goal of an intervention, free and fair elections were supported, the U.N. was involved etc. After conducting a thorough literature review, I found that there are not only discrepancies in if military intervention can actually result in democracy, but inside each argument as well. Some authors were on both sides of the issue, like Pickering and Peceny, underscoring just how complicated the issue is and how there is no single answer.

Each author of each reviewed piece acknowledged that sometimes their theory was wrong. They did this by attaching asterisks and exceptions to each case. In the case for military intervention not resulting in democracy, Meernik acknowledges that when Presidents make democratization a stated policy goal, military intervention will result in democracy. In the case for military intervention resulting in democracy, Peceny acknowledges that if free and fair elections are not supported, military intervention will not result in democracy. Therefore, each author attaches conditions to their claim; yet, no author has yet tackled the broader question of “under what conditions does military
intervention result in democracy?” Therefore, there exists a large gap between both those that argue military intervention can produce democracy and those that argue it cannot. This chasm needs to be filled because it is indeed possible that military interventions can lead to democratization in some cases while not in others. Thus, the aforementioned question does not ask if military intervention will result in democracy or not, it ponders the preconditions needed for military intervention to produce democracy. If these preconditions are present, democracy will occur, if these preconditions are not present, democracy will not occur, in effect it answers both sides of the argument.

The economies and societies of Japan and Germany, after the US interventions in WWII, offer insight into when military intervention might result in democracy. Based on these two cases, a growing economy, high social unity, and a high respect for the law will help produce democracy after an intervention. First is a strong economy. This factor is necessary in the formation of a democracy after military intervention because for a democracy to flourish, its citizens need higher incomes. Once the citizens start to obtain higher incomes, they can move away from simple agricultural subsistence and can set up their own businesses. With their own businesses, they are no longer dependent on the ruler’s benevolence. Once enough diverse groups of people begin to enter the bourgeoisie, this group will demand that they are represented in the government. If they are, democracy ensues, if they aren’t, revolution occurs and democracy ensues. The French Revolution is a remarkable example of this shift. Mark Peceny discusses how “extreme poverty and socioeconomic inequalities” in “El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Philippines, and Cambodia” threaten to undermine their democratic regimes (Peceny 1999). Thus, there is some literature that discusses this connection. Furthermore, this
precondition makes theoretical sense: if the citizenry have more disposable income each year because of a growing economy, they are more likely to support governmental structures, including democratic ones.

The next factor that must be present for democracy to result from military intervention is social unity. Both Japan and Germany, as the most successful cases of democratization, were both extremely homogenous nations before the U.S. intervened. Therefore, there might be a causal link between cultural unity and democracy. With more social unity, there will be more of a similarity of opinion in the country. With more similarities of opinion, the more acceptance of norms will occur. With more acceptance of norms, the more respect there will be for a constitution (a constitution is essentially a set of national norms and laws). The more respect for a constitution there is, the more acceptance of opposing leaders there will be. The more acceptance of opposing leaders and a constitution there is, the more democracy will take place. Again, this precondition seems to lend itself to logic because once a new government is put in place, there will be less groups in contention with each other. Further, there will be less opposing groups that feel marginalized, thus, there will be less conflict in societies that are more socially homogenous. Donald L. Horowitz discusses these marginalized groups in his seminal work “Democracy in Divided Societies,” emphasizing new democracies in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union. He states that “Democracy has progressed furthest in those East European countries that have the fewest serious ethnic cleavages,” in countries like Hungary or Poland (Horowitz 1993). However, democracy has progressed “more slowly or not at all in [eastern European nations] that are deeply divided,” like Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the former Yugoslavia (Horowitz 1993).
Finally, a high respect for the law is needed for democracy to result from military intervention. Michel Rosenfeld describes how the rule of law produces democracy in his work “The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy.” He believes the rule of law spurred the Eastern European transition “from authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to constitutional democracy” (Rosenfeld 2001). If the government respects the law, the rule of law will be enforced. With more enforcement of the law there will be less killings, kidnappings, disappearances, etc. Less killings and disappearances will result in more personal freedom for the country’s citizens. With more personal freedom, there will be more democracy. Presumably, much like a growing economy, the citizenry of countries that respect the rule of law will perceive the government as more of a legitimate force. This legitimacy is helpful when creating a new government as well. To achieve a successful transition to democracy, all three aforementioned preconditions are needed on the ground before the intervention. Ultimately, this theory can be broken down into three separate hypotheses:

H1: The more economic growth a country experiences before an intervention, the more democracy will ensue post intervention.

H2: The more respect for the rule of law a country experiences before an intervention, the more democracy will ensue post intervention.

H3: The more cultural unity a country experiences before an intervention, the more democracy will ensue post intervention.
RESEARCH DESIGN

To test this argument, I rely on a mixed-method approach combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis to gauge the impact of these preconditions on democratization.

Quantitative Analysis

I rely on quantitative analysis of 17 cases from 1982 – 2003 to gauge the association between the preconditions I have theorized and the impact of military intervention on democratization. For those cases, I rely on simple bivariate tests, since multivariate analysis was not possible due to a small sample size. The first step in performing the quantitative analysis was to pinpoint which cases of military intervention were to be used. Using the International Military Intervention (IMI) dataset as a starting place, the process of paring down the cases became necessary. In the IMI dataset, all types of military interventions are recorded by all countries in the world since WWII (even peaceful incursions to deliver aid), however, that is not the basis for this research.

This study focuses instead on United States interventions that actively and aggressively use troops to change a regime or force democracy. Thus, I selected only cases that the United States was involved in, either unilaterally or multilaterally. This provided some context for the United States. Next, I had to pare down the incursions to only those where, according to the codes in the IMI dataset, the troops on the ground employed “intimidation” or “combat” to forces in the country. This provided a strong pool of cases where the U.S. intervened and actively used its armed forces. Of course, this says nothing about what the forces were doing within the country. Thus, another cut had to be made using the descriptions in the dataset where the specific goal of producing
democracy was indicated. Finally, I screened out any case that did not include ground troops (like trident missile strikes in Kosovo or no fly zones in Libya). Ultimately, I was left with only cases where the United States intervened into a nation with ground troops to produce some sort of democracy.

However, I wanted to focus on the more recent “third wave” of democracies, thus all cases before 1975 were left out. (Huntington 1993). Therefore, a final cut was made in case selection because I only used cases that took place after 1975, in accordance with Huntington’s theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Universe of Cases

As demonstrated in Table 1, there are a total of seventeen different cases. I counted each incidence of intervention as a separate case, thus Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan all have multiple cases. Although there were twelve distinct countries, we were left with seventeen total cases.

Now that the three preconditions and the universe of cases had been determined, establishing how each variable would be seen on the ground became imperative. In operationalizing a “growing economy,” looking at Per Capita GDP from the World Bank
was essential. I measured this economic data for ten years prior to the U.S. intervention into each country to obtain a longer term view of the state of the countries’ economies. However, the following countries did not have a full ten years of data: Lebanon (6 years), El Salvador (7 years), Grenada (6 years), and Kuwait (4 years, 8 years). In order to really capture the precondition of a growing economy, it was necessary to calculate the annual percent change in the economy of each country for each case. This was accomplished by using the following equation:

\[
\frac{(\text{Last Observance GDP/PC} - \text{First Observance GDP/PC})}{\text{First Observance GDP/PC}} \div \text{Total Observations} = \text{AVG Annual % Change in GDP/PC}
\]

The final number represents, by a percentage, how much each individual’s personal wealth increased on average each year leading up to the intervention. Thus, the average annual percent change in gross domestic product per capita becomes a single number that can be used to pinpoint economic growth in each country.

Next, to operationalize respect for the rule of law, I use the Political Terror scale. This scale uses yearly reports from Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department regarding political violence and terror that a country experiences on a yearly basis. This scale captures our “respect for the rule of law” variable well because it is a single annual number that can pinpoint how well the country’s government respects its political opponents, how many people it imprisons or tortures etcetera.
Figure 1: Political Terror Scale Levels

Figure 1 depicts the political terror scale as running from one to five, with one representing countries that do not torture or kill for political reasons and that have a secure rule of law (i.e. United States). Five represents countries where murders and disappearances are commonplace with torture and terror widely employed (i.e. North Korea). I collected the political terror scale numbers for ten years leading up to the intervention, however, as with the economic data, some countries did not have a full ten years’ worth of data. In order to distill this series of numbers down to a single number like the economic data, I averaged all of the observances leading up to the U.S. intervention into one single number. Operationally, this made it easy to pinpoint each nation with a single number on the scale as to how well it respected the rule of law.

Finally, I operationalize social unity using the Alesina Fractionalization Index to determine how “fractured,” or how diverse, a nation in question really was. The index measures linguistic and ethnic differences in a country and expresses them as a single number. Each country, therefore, has a number that represents the percent of difference in language and ethnicity in that given nation. Most of the data in this index comes from the
Encyclopedia Britannica or the CIA during the 1980s and 1990s. Although I only collected one number for each country, ethnolinguistic data does not rapidly change. Therefore, the timeframe of the 80s and 90s worked well with each of our cases. Once again, I obtained a single number that helped us pinpoint exactly what each country’s social unity looked like.

**Qualitative Analysis**

Although the quantitative analysis can provide a general overview of whether or not my theory is correct, an in depth look at specific cases is necessary to determine the process of why this is true. Thus, I conducted a comparative process-tracing case study between Haiti and Panama. While the previous quantitative section proved to test whether my hypotheses were correct, the qualitative work looks to examine the causal mechanisms linking the preconditions to the democratization outcome. I studied the two countries from 1981 to present. Once again, I wanted to focus on the more recent “third wave” of democracies, thus, the case study only examines the differences between Panama and Haiti beginning in 1981 (Huntington 1993).

Both Panama and Haiti are located in the Latin American-Caribbean region, were former colonial holdings, and are relatively small both in landmass and population (CIA Factbook 1). However, most importantly, both countries were invaded by the United States within five years of each other (Panama in 1989 and Haiti in 1994) with the ultimate aim of establishing democracy and ridding the countries of tyrannical governments (Millet para. 60). However, and most importantly, Panama is now a democracy while Haiti is not (Freedom House 1). That is the main reason for comparing these two specific cases, because both were invaded to produce democracy, but only one
was turned democratic. This provides a perfect testing bed for my theory of the economy, the social unity, and the law and order factors of a country affecting a country’s democratization.

In order to find my variables in the wild in these two countries, they must be operationalized. In the case of the economic factors, I looked at the Per Capita GDP because it is a clear representation of how much money each individual has. The gross GDP numbers can be skewed by very high and very low earners, thus Per Capita GDP is a more true number of each individual’s economic status. These numbers were obtained from the World Bank from 1991 to 2012. Furthermore, the social fragmentation numbers come from the Greenberg Diversity Index, demonstrating how linguistically diverse a nation is. Finally, the Law and Order factors can be operationalized by looking at the CIRI Physical Integrity Index. This index demonstrates how many combined killings, tortures, disappearances and deaths occurred in a country. The data used was from 1981 through 1994. By using raw numbers and databases, the following case study was very systematic; it did not cherry-pick articles or specific events to try to prove a point. Instead, it focuses on large end data over many years.

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

Once I determined which cases to analyze and operationalized all three preconditions, I had to determine which countries in our universe of cases were actually free today. This was an essential part of the analysis because the goal was to compare the three preconditions between countries that were democratic and countries that were undemocratic. Again, given a military intervention, I believe that the presence of the
three preconditions (growing economy, respect for the rule of law, social unity) will produce more democracy in a given nation.

In order to obtain results from the previous operationalized data, I turned to Freedom House and used their scale to determine which cases were free or not free. The Freedom House scale runs from two to fourteen, with lower numbers meaning more democracy, for reference, the United States is a two. Table 2 shows which countries in our study are free, partly free, and not free today and their respective Freedom House democracy number before the intervention as well. The arrow demonstrates the change between the pre intervention number and the post intervention number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free (2-5)</th>
<th>Partly Free (6-10)</th>
<th>Not Free (11-14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grenada (8.0 → 4.6)</td>
<td>Lebanon (7.0 → 9.6)</td>
<td>Iraq (13.6 → 14.0, 14.0 → 11.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama (9.3 → 4.6)</td>
<td>El Salvador (8.0 → 6.6)</td>
<td>Somalia (14.0 → 13.6, 14.0 → 13.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (7.6 → 6.0)</td>
<td>Haiti (13.0 → 11.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait (9.3 → 10.0, 9.3 → 9.6, 10.6 → 9.0)</td>
<td>Afghanistan (14.0 → 11.3, 14.0 → 11.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor (11.0 → 7.3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia (11.0 → 7.6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Freedom House Democracy Levels**

Thus, according to Freedom House, only two of the nations that the United States has invaded over the last 33 years have ended up as free nations that experience full democracy while six have partial democracy and four have no democracy whatsoever. As Freedom House reports on an annual basis, I had to distill the numbers into a single digit in order to categorize each nation as free or not. Thus, I took a sample at one year, five
years, and ten years before and after the intervention. Each of these three democracy numbers on each side of the intervention was then averaged into a single democracy indicator for before and after the intervention respectively.

Again, comparisons could then be made between those countries that experienced democracy after an intervention and those that did not. There are some very interesting conclusions that the chart above demonstrates. Clearly, Grenada and Panama are the only two democracies today, yet, it is not merely that they are democracies today, but that they converted to democracies only after the intervention. Before the United States intervened in those nations, their Freedom House number was significantly higher, in the case of Panama, it was more than double.

Thus, both Grenada and Panama changed from “partly free” countries to “free” countries. There was movement for many of the other countries in question, but the results were mixed. Some nations became more democratic while others became less democratic after an intervention (as is the case in Lebanon). The above chart perfectly encapsulates our original research question of why some interventions are successful at producing democracy and some are not. After categorizing our cases into those that democratized after an intervention and those that did not, it was finally time to obtain our results. Table 3 shows the aggregate results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP/PC</th>
<th>Political Terror</th>
<th>Alesina Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Free</strong></td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partly Free</strong></td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>3.125</td>
<td>0.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Free</strong></td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>4.285</td>
<td>0.570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 3: Aggregate Results*
In order to determine the broader contours of the nations that were free, partly free, and not free, I averaged each individual country’s economic, rule of law, and cultural unity data into a single number that represented the category as a whole. Thus, for example, the free category numbers in the chart above are an average of both Grenada’s and Panama’s GDP/PC numbers, their political terror numbers, and their Alesina Index numbers. Averaging all of the countries within each category was necessary to determine what the preconditions looked like in each category. But how did my hypotheses hold up? Recall the three hypotheses that stated, given a military intervention, the following: higher economic growth will lead to more democracy, higher respect for the law will lead to more democracy, and more ethnolinguistic homogeneity will lead to more democracy.

All three hypotheses were confirmed based on the table above. Starting with hypothesis two, (respect for the rule of law) the average political terror scale number for “free” countries during the ten years before the intervention was 2.5. This means in the “free” countries political imprisonment was limited and political murder was rare. In “partly free” countries the average political terror number increased to 3.125 while “not free” countries scored 4.285 on the scale. In “not free” countries, political rights violations were widespread and murders and torture were common. Thus, the data demonstrates the countries that became democratized exhibited much lower political terror before the intervention, supporting my hypothesis. Next, the “free” countries that democratized after the intervention had an Alesina Diversity Index score of 0.409, meaning 40.9% of the nation was ethnically different from the rest of the nation. This number increased to 52.4% for nations that became partly free and 57.0% for nations that
were not free. Hypothesis three is therefore supported as well, where countries that
democratized after an intervention contained much higher ethnolinguistic homogeneity.

Hypothesis one, pertaining to economic growth, is the only hypothesis that did not
exhibit such a strong correlation between all categories. “Free” countries exhibited an
annual GDP/PC growth of 9.6% for the ten years leading up to the intervention. But,
“partly free” nations exhibited a higher annual GDP/PC growth of 12.0%. This runs
counter to my hypothesis because the less democratic nations actually exhibited higher
economic growth. A possible explanation can be that Kuwait is included three times
because of three interventions. However, when looking at the “not free” nations, the trend
reverses drastically. Those countries that did not democratize after an intervention
exhibited an annual GDP/PC growth of 0.8% for ten years prior to the intervention, a
number drastically lower than the democratized countries. Thus, hypothesis one, while
containing an aberration in the “partly free” category, seems to be supported when
comparing “free” and “not free” countries.

Taking into account that all countries experienced an intervention and that some
became free while others did not, my preconditions could be reasons why some
interventions produce democracy while others do not. Again, the countries that did not
become democracies had lower average annual percent change in GDP/PC, had higher
political terror index scores, and were more socially fragmented on the Alesina Index, the
inverse is true for the free countries in the table.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HAITI AND PANAMA

In order to fully understand when military interventions can change the course of a country from a non-democracy or regime-type state to a democratic state, I explored the cases of Haiti and Panama. The Caribbean country of Haiti formally declared its independence from France in 1804 (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). It had formerly been a French colony, but succeeded in a massive slave rebellion that broke ties with colonial France (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). It has been a free country for one of the longest periods in the Western Hemisphere, but it has never been able to free itself from repression by its leaders (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). Haiti transitioned from a colonial holding to a free republic overnight, but the long history of French domination over an impoverished majority left an indelible mark on the new nation (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). The French “slaveholding system had established the efficacy of violence and coercion in controlling others”, and this tradition continued on even under new leadership (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). This history of domination and the very underdeveloped economy of Haiti combined to form a perfect environment for strongmen and dictators (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). Even leaders who were supposedly elected by popular support consolidated their power and largely ignored the constitution (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.).

In 1986, the Haitian people revolted against President Jean-Claude Duvalier because of his strongman tactics; however, this simply reaffirmed a Haitian tradition: that violence has been the only successful path to change (Greene, Smucker, Boulos, and et al.). This tradition continued into 1991, when a military junta led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide through the use of force.
This prompted President Clinton and the United States and the United Nations to launch Operation Restore Democracy on September 19 1994 (Girard 2004). The mission was successful and President Aristide was able to return to power, but the main goal of the operation (and the main hope for President Clinton and the UN) was that this intervention would help “ensure Haiti’s democratization and its economic development” (Girard 2004). However, today Haiti is no better off than it has been in the past. Freedom House considers Haiti to be partly free while the Center for Systematic Peace considers Haiti to be a “failed democracy.”

Panama has a decidedly different history than that of Haiti. It was originally discovered and founded by Spain, but rebelled as a part of Colombia against its Spanish master (Knippers, Flores, Kluck, and et al.). The Panamanian people were still unhappy with the leadership of Colombia, and rebelled again to form their own state in 1903 (Knippers, Flores, Kluck, and et al.). It is at this point in history where the United States became extremely interested in Panama because it wanted to build a canal connecting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The United States has remained involved in Panama ever since. Due to the massive US presence, the main point of consensus in Panamanian politics has been a strong sense of nationalism, largely directed against the United States (Knippers, Flores, Kluck, and et al). This nationalism has helped Presidents get elected, as they direct popular resentment towards the United States and away from the Panamanian elite (Knippers, Flores, Kluck, and et al.). This elite consisted of a small group of aristocratic families who controlled the lower classes burdened by a lack of leadership (Knippers, Flores, Kluck, and et al.). The rule of these families ended in 1968 when the Panamanian National Guard seized control of the country (Knippers, Flores,
Kluck, and et al). This ultimately led to the election of General Manuel Antonio Noriega (commander of the Panama Defense Forces PDF) on December 15 1989 (US Army 4).

He was appointed as the “maximum leader” of Panama by his handpicked legislative assembly and declared that Panama was in a state of war with the United States (US Army 4). Relations between the United States and Panama continued to degrade over the following months as U.S. service members and Department of Defense personnel were harassed, beaten, or held up by PDF forces (US Army 5). Ultimately, the United States responded to the rising tensions and threats with Operation Just Cause, which was an armed incursion into Panama by US military forces (US Army 1). The operation was largely successful in deposing of Noriega and protecting US personnel and assets and ultimately resulted in the establishment of a fledgling democracy in Panama.

Both Haiti and Panama have long histories of non-democratic leaders and largely authoritarian regimes, are located in the Caribbean region, and were both invaded by the United States within a five year period. On the surface, they seem to fairly similar, however, today they are completely different. The US intervention in Panama has resulted in, according to Freedom House, a free country. Haiti after the US intervention, on the other hand, is considered to be partly free by Freedom House, why? Both countries maintained regimes and were invaded with the goal of setting up a democracy, so why the difference?

*Economic Growth vs Economic Stagnation*

Panama and Haiti have strikingly different economic pictures. Panama’s economy has been steadily increasing over the past several decades. This is largely due to receipts from the Panama Canal and the emergence of a strong banking center in Panama City.
This increasing economic growth drives a growth in per capita GDP as well (World Bank). People in Panama have been receiving more and more wealth because of this increase. Haiti, however, has been on a largely stagnant trend of economic growth. Hindered by lower income and less educated citizens and a lack of natural resources, Haiti has not had much opportunity for growth. Thus, the per capita GDP of Haiti remained very low (World Bank). Each individual in Haiti has not received much income, and their chances of improving their income are low due to a very static economy. Figure 2 demonstrates the discrepancies between the Per Capita GDP of Haiti and the Per Capita GDP of Panama using yearly per capita GDP numbers from the World Bank.

![Annual GDP Per Capita](image)

**Figure 2: GDP Per Capita by Year**

Figure 2 provides a clear visual representation of the differences in the economy between Haiti and Panama before the interventions. The red line (Haiti) remains relatively flat while the blue line, (Panama) reflects a steady increase. The slight dip occurs during the intervention of 1989 and is reflected by the yellow star. The residents
of Haiti do not see many year to year improvements in their take home wealth because the per capita GDP remains fairly constant. But, the residents of Panama do see large gains in their year to year take home pay because the per capita GDP is increasing at a steady rate. However, wealth stratification is not reflected in GDP/PC, which can potentially harm democratic institutions.

Linguistic Unity or Fragmentation?

Another place where both Haiti and Panama differ is their social unity. This figure can be measured in multiple ways: how racially fragmented a country is, how linguistically fragmented a country is, and how religiously fragmented a country is. According to the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, linguistic fragmentation is the most important factor in preventing social unity. In this regard, Haiti and Panama are very different. French is the main language in Haiti and creole is spoken in some places. However, in Panama, Spanish, English, and many indigenous languages are spoken. According to Ethnologue, Haiti has a diversity index of 0.000. The index used is Greenberg’s Diversity Index and it runs on a scale of zero to one. The resulting number is the probability that “any two people of the country selected at random would have different mother tongues” (Ethnologue 1). The Greenberg Diversity Index number for Panama is .266, meaning that Panama has a much higher linguistic diversity. However, according to the quantitative data, Haiti is largely an anomaly as an un-democratized nation with high social homogeneity.

High and Low Respect for the Law through the CIRI Index

Haiti and Panama also exhibit differences in how much their governments respect the rule of law. This is measured by the physical integrity each of their respective
governments maintains before the intervention. As demonstrated by Figure 4, created with numbers from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) human rights data project, Panama consistently has a higher physical integrity index, meaning there have consistently been less disappearances, killings, imprisonments, and tortures in Panama. The trend lines on Figure 4 clearly demonstrate Panama’s higher CIRI scores when compared to Haiti. In particular, Panama maintains much higher scores in the period before its intervention (1981 – 1988) than Haiti does before its intervention. Although both countries’ scores have downward trends before their respective interventions, Haiti’s is much more pronounced, decreasing from five to zero, while Panama’s trend line decreases less than one point. Thus, leading up to the intervention, Panama maintained much higher respect for the rule of law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Score</th>
<th>Disappearances</th>
<th>Killing</th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
<th>Torture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3:** CIRI Physical Integrity Index Scale
Figure 4: CIRI Physical Integrity Index

The CIRI graph is augmented by Figure 3, demonstrating how the CIRI scale operates, the higher the number the more respect for human rights the regime maintains. Thus, Panama has had, for the years of 1981 to 1988, a much higher score on the CIRI index. Thus, according to Figure 4 and its trend line, the Panamanian government had full respect for disappearances and partial respect for killings during the ten year lead up to the intervention. However, the Haitian government had no respect for any type of physical rights during the ten years before its 1994 intervention.

RESULTS OF THE PANAMA HAITI CLEFT

Originally, I hypothesized that with an improving economy, with more social unity, and with higher respect for the law, a nation would be more likely to succeed in democratizing after a military intervention. What I found in the process tracing case study of Panama and Haiti largely mimics the quantitative data. A growing economy and more respect for the law conformed to my original hypothesis, but social unity did not. As it
turned out, Panama exhibited significant growth in its economy from 1979 through 1988 (operationalized by Per Capita GDP) while Haiti did not. Also, Panama scored significantly higher on the CIRI Personal Integrity Index more consistently than Haiti. Meaning, for the years of 1981 through 1988, there were less killings, tortures, and disappearances in Panama than there were in Haiti before its intervention in 1994. However, there was significantly greater linguistic diversity in Panama than in Haiti. This did not conform to my theory that the more social unity there is the higher the chance for democratization there is. Table 4 demonstrates these findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Growth in Per Capita GDP</th>
<th>Linguistically Unified</th>
<th>More Respect for Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Panama and Haiti Case Study Aggregate Results

As Table 4 indicates, my theory held up fairly well, as Panama (the democratized country today) had a consistent growth in Per Capita GDP before the 1989 intervention. Further, its government exhibited more respect for physical integrity rights, as there were limited killings, disappearances, and tortures leading up to the intervention. On the flip side however, Haiti (the non-democratized nation today) had stagnant growth in Per Capita GDP and its government had less respect for physical integrity rights as defined by the CIRI index before its intervention. So, two parts of my three part hypothesis were correct. But, Panama exhibited more linguistic fractionalization as defined by the Greenberg Diversity Index. However, it is less of Panama having high fractionalization and more of Haiti having high homogeneity. In the quantitative analysis, Haiti proved to be an anomaly in the un-democratized nations with an abnormally high cultural unity.
compared to the rest of the nations in the category. Panama was normal in its democratized category with its cultural fragmentation.

It is not enough to merely state that two of these variables were different in Haiti and Panama however, it is necessary to state how these two variables affected the democratization of the nations in question. I will focus on the two variables that conformed to my hypothesis, economic improvement and higher respect for the law, and leave out Haiti’s abnormal cultural traits. First are the effects of a growing economy before a military intervention. Before a military intervention disposes of the old regime, it is essential for the citizens of the country to see personal economic improvement as they may trust government institutions more. With a growing economy, especially in the form of Per Capita GDP, Panamanians saw their personal incomes rising. In many places this was fostered by US investment, but, especially after the intervention, barrios began to rebuild with better homes than before (Clark Scott 1). Thus, citizens were more willing to accept democracy because it was better for their bottom line.

However, in Haiti, President Aristide largely rejected privatization of Haitian businesses (Girard 2004, para. 49). Thus, economic increases remained flat and citizens of Haiti saw no benefit to democracy because their economic conditions were largely the same as they were under a tyrannical government. This led to massive dissatisfaction and yet another coup toppled the Aristide Presidency in February 2004, perpetuating Haiti’s history of bloody undemocratic political processes and resulting in the failure of democracy (Girard 2004, para. 54). Thus, economic improvement before an intervention, in the case of Panama and Haiti, is important for democratization.
In the case of a higher respect for the law, this variable is necessary before a military intervention as well for largely the same reasons. If the citizens of a country have a government that has more respect for the law, they will once again be more trusting of government institutions. Once democracy is implemented, they will be more inclined to support this government type because their personal rights will increase as well. As evidenced by the CIRI physical integrity numbers, the government respect for physical integrity rights remained fairly constant, although on a slightly downward trend, before the intervention of Panama in 1989. With more personal rights because of a higher respect for the law, democracy was largely accepted in Panama because Panamanians were better off. However, before the intervention into Haiti in 1994, the government’s respect for physical integrity rights fluctuated wildly and dropped off quickly, just like it had done after the intervention in 1994. This resulted in citizen dissatisfaction and another coup occurred in 2004, destroying all progress towards democracy (Girard 2004, para. 54). Once again, through seeing the process on the ground in Panama and Haiti, countries with growing economies and more respect for the rule of law and physical rights will become stronger democracies after an intervention.

**FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND A WAY FORWARD**

The United States of the modern era has conducted many interventions, especially interventions to try to promote democracy. Some have been successful, like Japan and Germany, but many have not, like the Philippines. So when do military interventions produce democracy? Based on this body of research, (and taking into account the third wave of democracies and the case of Panama and Haiti) military interventions result in democracy when the target countries have economic growth, higher respect for the rule of
law, and are more culturally homogenous before the intervention occurs. If citizens of target countries have more take home pay each year and feel relatively safe from their government, they are likely to be more content with government structures. Combine this with a more homogenous society where less ethnic conflict is likely to occur and military interventions to produce democracy are more likely to succeed.

Again, the three preconditions, based on the above research, prove to be extremely important in determining the success of a military intervention to produce democracy. However, this research is not merely academic as it points to serious policy implications for the U.S. The United States has a long and bipartisan history of military intervention that is likely to continue well into the 21st century and beyond. Debating whether the U.S. foreign policy should consist of such interventions is beyond the scope of this paper, but the research does provide a guiding hand in determining which countries should be targeted for future interventions to produce democracy. My analysis suggests that unless a country has these features pre-intervention, the military intervention is not likely to produce a democracy afterward. Thus, the United States should avoid intervening in nations that are encumbered by flagging economies, by no rule of law, and by drastic ethnolinguistic differences. As a corollary, if the United States wishes to intervene in a nation that does not contain the three preconditions, it should work to improve upon them quickly for a better chance at democratization. As an example, when intervening in countries without these preconditions, the United States might offer some sort of foreign aid package to stimulate the economy, set up local police units and courts, and mediate conflict between ethnic groups.
Although this study only provides a broad level analysis of the three preconditions, with simple bi-variate analysis and simple case studies, it is a start. My research does have limitations though, it only looks at U.S. cases since 1982 and does not employ advanced data manipulation. Further, it does not provide concrete explanation as to why the preconditions are necessary. Ultimately, more in depth research must be conducted to determine if these three preconditions affect interventions of not just the United States during the third wave of democracies, but every case of intervention dating back to WWII and before. Further avenues of research into other preconditions necessary to produce democracy would be welcome as well. Unilateral versus multilateral intervention, previous experience with democracy and geographic differences are all preconditions this study does not address and are ripe for future study.
REFERENCES


