

REFINING LATINO STUDY: A STUDY ON THE IMPACT  
OF CULTURE ON LATINO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

By

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OF CULTURE ON LATINO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

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## ABSTRACT

The predictors of Latino political ideology have yet to be fully understood. In order to better fill in Latino political ideology studies, I focus on how Latino cultural values have the ability to influence Latino ideology. Specifically, the strong Latino cultural values of religion and marriage are studied. This study conducts regression analysis on Latino ideology against religiosity, Protestant identity, Catholic identity, marital status, and sex across both the Latino National Survey of 2006 and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study of 2012. Though the studies have different distributions of Latino ideology, the findings between the datasets are similar in nature. This study finds evidence of high religiosity, a Protestant identity, and being married increasing Latino conservatism. In this study, there is no conclusive evidence of Catholic identity or being male increasing Latino conservatism. Future research must dive into the intricacies of each of these variables so the literature can better reflect an understanding of why religiosity, Protestant identity, and being married increase Latino conservatism in the way that they do. These findings can be used to better messaging strategies in political campaigns in order to increase Latino support for presidential candidates.

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In 2014, the Census Bureau estimated over fifty-five million Latinos living in the United States. In the 2016 U.S. presidential election there will be over twenty-seven million eligible Latino votes, half of which are millennials (Krogstad et al, 2016). The potential of this group is only growing, yet the potential is still not fully harnessed by either political party. Understanding the ideological predictors of this seventeen percent of the population is necessary to better understand the concerns Latinos in the US. This paper asks: how do Latino cultural values, specifically marriage, gender, and religion, influence Latino ideology?

Studying Latino ideology in context of their cultural values adds to the previous literature that attempts to explain Latino ideology. Take for instance the relationship of conservatives voting as Republican. Thirty-two percent of Latinos identify as conservative, while twenty-five percent identify as liberal. Yet they do not translate into the typical Republican voters that we would expect to see in the rest of the electorate. A large majority of Latinos vote as Democrats (Changing Faiths, 2007; Lopez & Fry, 2013). In the past twenty years, the Republican Party has yet to appeal enough to Latino voters to gain a majority of the Latino vote (Lopez & Fry, 2013). This longstanding relationship of conservatives being Republicans and liberals being Democrats does not seem to translate well into the Latino context, which suggests more research is necessary to understand the predictors of ideology for Latinos.

Studies on Latino politics largely focus on voting behavior and on political participation. For example, studies show that Latinos use political marches for issues like immigration to show *solidaridad* through the unified front required in political demonstrations (Silber Mohamed, 2013; Barreto et al, 2009). Studies also posit that Latinos vote for other Latinos for office to ensure descriptive representation (Hero, et al, 2000; Pantoja, 2003; Sanchez, 2006). However, not enough is known about the ideology of Latinos. A component that must be tied into the study

of Latino political ideology studies is Latino cultural values. Latino cultural values, being typically a tradition-based culture, have the ability to sway and influence Latino's beliefs of how society should be run and therefore policy and political ideology. The studies on participation, partisanship, and office holding are necessary and essential to understanding the Latino population, but one facet is still understudied and missing: Latino ideology.

In order to better understand Latino ideology and ideology predictors, this study examines Latino ideology in context of Latino cultural values across two datasets, the Latino National Survey of 2006 and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study of 2012. Latinos' emphasis on religion and marriage, as well as the distinct experience of Latina women as compared to Latino men, prove to have the potential to influence Latino conservatism. This study finds that higher religiosity, being married, and identifying as Protestant increase Latino conservatism. In this study there is no evidence to support that being male and identifying as Catholic increase Latino conservatism. By better understanding these ideological predictors, messaging can be better framed to appeal to conservative and moderate Latinos in order to move them into the Republican Party, as well as set the stage for additional research on Latinos in the future.

### **CONSOLIDATING INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH**

The study of Latino ideology is largely understudied and complex, therefore requires a multidisciplinary approach to understand what Latino cultural values are and how they might influence political ideology. A further look into the Latino make-up of the U.S., their cultural values, traditional ideology predictors, and the way Latino cultural values may influence ideology is necessary.

### ***Who Latinos Are***

According to the Census Bureau, Latinos are of increasing importance in American politics. First, Latinos vary on national origin. A Latino can be of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Salvadorian, Dominican, Guatemalan, Ecuadorian, Brazilian, or other descents. Latinos come from Latin America, South America, and the Caribbean. A large majority of Latinos speak Spanish. In 2014, Latinos made up seventeen percent of total U.S. population. Sixty-four percent of the Latinos in the U.S. are Mexican, with Puerto Ricans following at ten percent. Over half of Latinos live in either Texas, California, or Florida, and eight states have a population of over one million Latinos (FFF, 2015).

More Latinos are now enrolling in college than they have in the past (Lopez & Fry, 2013). In 2012, a larger percentage of Latinos who graduated high school were enrolled in college than Whites. In the past forty years, the dropout rate has declined among Latinos from forty percent in 1972 to fifteen percent in 2012. Latinos also make up one in four students in public schools. Latinos continue to further their education.

Latinos are a highly religious population (Changing Faiths, 2007). Over two-thirds of Latinos are Roman Catholic with evangelical Protestants following at fifteen percent. Most Latinos, regardless of religious preference, pray daily. This daily prayer is due to the growing charismatic Christianity which views God as an intercessor in all daily occurrences (Changing Faiths, 2007). There is growing Latino population moving toward evangelical, born-again, Protestantism, and Christianity and away from Catholicism, because of the desire to have a closer relationship to God, charismatic and Pentecostal in nature; for example, a majority of Latino Catholics accept the label of “charismatic” or “Pentecostal,” but only one tenth of non-

Latino Catholics do (Changing Faiths, 2007). The increasing religious Latino population is leading to Latino-oriented or Spanish-speaking churches across America, especially in the Catholic Church (Stevens-Arroyo, 1998).

In regards to marital status, fewer Latinos are divorced than non-Latino Whites. The Census Bureau reported twelve percent of the non-Latino White population and eight percent of the Latino population being divorced (Marital Status, 2014).

Latinos have been lagging behind other ethnic groups when it comes to voter turnout in presidential elections. Only forty-eight percent of eligible Latino voters turned out to vote in the 2012 presidential election as compared to sixty-seven percent of Blacks and sixty-four percent of non-Latino Whites (Lopez & Gonzales-Barrera, 2013).

Latinos are an increasingly educated and growing population that has the potential to transform religion and cultural values in the U.S.

### ***Latino Cultural Values***

Cultural values influence a person's social location and the lens through which a person sees the world. Cultural values is a set of norms and beliefs in a society that influences what a person believes to be wrong, good and bad, important and unimportant, and other norms. A person grows in the context of set cultural values and norms and therefore develops a semi-unique and semi-predestined method of thinking and feeling about certain issues and life goals (Triandis & Suh, 2002; Han & Northoff, 2008). Thus, people's political ideology and stances are based, at least in part, on the cultural values of the society of which they were raised.

Studies find that the Latino culture is distinct from the general American culture. As a whole, "Latin America is higher in hierarchy and embeddedness," due to the collectivistic nature

of Latinos, as well as “lower in intellectual autonomy, presumably the main component of individualism” (Schwartz, p 161). In contrast, the U.S. profile is “assertive, pragmatic, entrepreneurial,” demonstrating the individualistic nature of America (Schwartz, p 158). These fundamental differences may point to the possibility of culture influencing political ideology differently in each society.

Latino countries have a tendency to value traditional values. As defined by the World Value Survey, traditional values “emphasize the importance of religion, parent-child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values” (World Values Survey, 2015). Those that value traditional values versus secular-rational values, reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide, are nationalistic and have national pride (WVS, 2015). As of recently, countries from which Latinos originate have become more similar in their value orientations, gradually moving more and more traditional (WVS, 2015). Interestingly enough, Latin America is the only cultural group that is distinctly traditional and self-expressionists, meaning while they value traditional family values, they also have a growing desire for gender equality.

Tradition is valued more in Latin American residents than U.S. residents. Over fifty percent of most Latin American country citizens say that tradition, or “to follow the customs handed down by one’s religion or family,” is important in their lives (WVS Online Analysis Wave 6, 2014). Only thirty-eight percent of U.S. respondents reply that tradition is important. Latin American countries and cultures place a high value on tradition and keeping tradition alive. Latinos living in the U.S. may work particularly hard to keep tradition alive, as they are in a different country than their country of nationality and origin.

Latin American countries also place a higher value on religion than does the United States. On average, over fifty-two percent of people living in Latin American countries say that

religion is very important in their life, while the U.S. averages around forty percent saying religion is very important in their life (WVS Online Analysis Wave 6, 2014). With the exception of Chile and Uruguay, Latin American countries averaged seventy-six percent of their population identifying as a religious person while the U.S. averaged at sixty-seven percent (WVS Online Analysis Wave 6, 2014). Religion is exemplified as one of the top cultural values in Latin American societies. These numbers reflect Latin American countries, but the results are similar with Latino U.S. residents and citizens.

In the U.S., Latinos are more religious and value religion at higher rates than the general U.S. population. Sixty-one percent of all Latinos say that religion is very important in their lives as compared to only fifty-eight percent of the general public (Taylor, et al, 2012). Increasingly, Latinos are more religious than other Whites. “Non-Latino Whites now account for smaller shares of evangelical Protestants, mainline Protestants and Catholics than they did seven years earlier, while Latinos have grown as a share of all three religious groups” (America’s Changing Religious landscape, 2015). Latinos are more religious than non-Latino Whites in the US, thus demonstrating how important religion is in the lives of Latino Americans. The Latino religious traditionalism in the U.S. mimics the culture in Latin American countries.

Marriage and being married are highly valued in Latino culture and are also related to religion and religiosity, the frequency of church service attendance. Thirty-nine percent of Latinos in the Pew Hispanic Center National Survey of Latinos in 2012 state that having a successful marriage is very important and one of the most important things in their life (The Pew Hispanic, 2012). Latinos overwhelmingly agree that “it is better to get married than remain single” at higher rates than to non-Latino Whites (Oropesa, p 55). This emphasis on being married may be due to the belief that a strong marriage translates into a strong family. Both

Protestant and Catholic Latinos believe in a much higher frequency that “marriage is an unbreakable vow before God” than do their non-religious counterparts (Ellison, et al, p 309). Religion transcends into the value of marriage in the Latino culture because religion is so highly valued and institutionalizes things like the sacrament of matrimony in the Catholic Church to teach Latinos that marriage is something that must be done.

Religion, marriage, and gender have a historical link between one another, especially in the context of politics. Church affiliation is linked to more conservative views. Wald notes that a congregation’s religious conservatism has a significant effect of increasing an individual’s political conservatism (Wald, 1988). Religion not only has the ability to influence political conservatism, but also can and does influence marriage expectations. A study on urban America found that religion encourages marriage amongst the population and especially new parents regardless of socioeconomic variables (Wilcox & Wolfinger, 2007). The intersectionality of marriage and religion in the Latino culture is overwhelming and must be studied in context of one another.

### ***Ideology Studies***

Ideology is based on how a person sees the world and what role the government should play in that world. Because ideology is what a person believes and not observable behavior, general U.S. political ideology is studied across multiple perspectives in order to find predictors of ideology. The liberal-conservative continuum is based on two different factors: “(a) advocating versus resisting social change... and (b) rejecting versus accepting inequality” (Jost et al, p 310). Ideology can be split into social and economic ideologies as well. This continuum largely defines how the American political ideology is understood. Factors that have been shown

to influence political ideology are sex, income, education, and religiosity (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

In the general U.S. population, gender has a large effect on social ideology. Women tend to be much more socially liberal than men though there is no significant evidence of differences between the genders when it comes to economic ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Overall all higher income relates to a more conservative ideology; specifically, an increase in income is related to increased economic conservatism more than it is related to an increased social conservatism (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). A higher income relating to increased economic conservatism is more closely related in lower incomes than it is in higher incomes.

Increased educational attainment relates to a more conservative political ideology, specifically higher economic conservatism and a slightly liberal social ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Increased education influences political ideology because of an increased political sophistication and knowledge.

A higher religiosity relates to a more conservative political ideology. A higher religiosity influences a stronger social conservative ideology and has virtually no effect on economic ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2014).

Overall, ideology becomes more conservative as income, education, and religiosity increases, and men tend to be more conservative than women in the general U.S. population.

### ***Culture Applied to Ideology***

Religion plays a transformative role in political party identity therefore has the potential to influence ideology. The Republican-Protestant phenomena in the U.S. electorate has become

almost “institutionalized in the public mind” in the recent years, through the social conservatism that religion brings and the Republican Party offers (Patrikios, p 385). In the US, the social conservatism that religion may emphasize then translates into overall favoring of conservative political beliefs.

Though religious preference does influence Latino partisanship, the results are not as definitive for Latinos than the greater U.S. population. Previous findings show that Latinos identifying as Evangelical increases the likelihood of identifying as Republican (Kelly & Kelly, 2005; Hritzuk, 2000). This Protestant-Republican relationship in Latinos is not as strong as the rest of the U.S. population because Latino Evangelicals do not vote exactly Republican, but rather are “committed to the candidate of their choice” no matter the party (Lee & Pachon, 2007). Later-generation Catholic Latinos are more likely to identify as Democrats than earlier generations (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2011; Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003). These later-generation Latinos may be more likely to be Democrats due to the correlation of liberalization from assimilation into the U.S. culture. Latino social conservatism by religion does little for the support of the Republican Party because Latinos generally believe the Democratic party to hold their beliefs better (Kelly & Morgan, 2007; Abrajano & Alvarez 2011). Because a conservative Latino population does not translate into a Republican-voting-Latino electorate, further research based on Latino ideology is warranted.

Specifically in Latinos, religiosity has the potential to have a larger impact on a Latino’s political ideology than the rest of the U.S. because being religious is a Latino cultural value. In a study focusing on how religion affects a Latino’s policy preference, Martini found that as religiosity increases, a Latino is more likely to be “supportive of religion being involved in politics” (Martini, p 988). Higher religiosity among Latinos also translates into higher political

participation rates among Latinos more than Anglos because Catholic churches encourage more electoral engagement than Protestant churches; a larger portion of Latinos are Catholic than Anglos, thus Latinos receive a larger push toward political participation through religiosity in the Catholic Church than Anglos (Jones-Correa & Leal, 2001). Furthermore Protestant Latinos “are the most regular church-goers” (Valenzuela, p 935). Therefore, Protestant Latinos being regular church attendees may have a larger potential for participation than other Latinos and thus their conservatism spread.

Marriage has the potential to impact Latino politics. In the greater U.S. electorate, being married increases the likelihood of a Republican identification which is traditionally a conservative leaning party (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2006; 1998). In the U.S., married people are more active in politics than singles because of their increased desire to better government for the future of their family (Plutzer & McBurnett, 1991). Latinos place a cultural value and emphasis on being married. Because there is this cultural norm, marriage has the potential to have a greater impact on Latino ideology than it does on the rest of the population.

Because marriage and religion are important cultural values to the Latino culture, the relationships between these factors and ideology may be stronger in Latinos than the rest of the U.S. electorate. Studying the impact of marital status, religious preferences, and religiosity on Latino ideology together is necessary in order to better understand the intersectionality of political ideology.

### ***Gender Differences***

Because Catholicism is a large part of Latino cultural norms, the patriarchy in the church has contributed in part to the different experiences that Latinas and Latino men have. This

difference can be seen through the effect that religion has on public opinion about gender equality. McKenzie in 2013 found that “among Latinos and Whites, greater religious conservatism depresses one’s interest in surmounting gender inequality” (McKenzie, p 226). Because Latinos are a highly religious culture, their conservatism may be holding back advancement in gender equality.

The gender roles in Latino culture have the potential to impact ideology. Latinos have cultural norms that lean toward more traditional roles in the home for example the supportive role that women play in the household coupled with the deep respect that all males have for the mother therefore creating different experiences for a Latina and a Latino (Ingoldsby, 1991; Kim et al, 2009). These norms are taught to the next generation, thus stabilizing gender roles and reducing the potential for changing ideologies (Ingoldsby, 1991). Because being married is of high importance, many Mexican women marry at younger ages than do non-Latino Whites, fifty-seven percent of twenty to twenty-four foreign-born Latinas are married while Latino men marry later in life (Landale, 2007). Latinas feel the pressure to keep the home and to get married earlier, thus potentially creating a disparity of political beliefs among the genders.

There is still uncertainty whether or not there is a gender gap in Latino politics and if so what gender identifies with which ideology. In Bejarano’s *Latino Gender and Generation Gaps in Political Ideology* article in 2014, Latinas in earlier generations, closer to the native country, are more conservative than Latino men as well as being more active in politics (Bejarano, 2014). Furthermore, public “opinions do not necessarily differ as a function of gender and assimilation” (Bejarano et al, p 537). This finding directly contradicts traditional studies, which show that in the general American public, men are more conservative than women (Pratto, et al, 1997; Norrande & Wilcox, 2008). This gender gap has been shown to transcend into on other issues

like social compassion, physical aggression, and emotional intelligence differences between the genders (Bedolla, 2007; Bedolla et al, 2006).

The lack of agreement on the Latino gender gap detailing Latino men to be more conservative than Latinas is due to most Latinos, both men and women, value traditionalism, which goes against a liberal ideology. This traditionalism does, however, affect the genders differently from one another in terms of gender roles, thus creating the potential for political ideology differences. This gender gap is largely complex, therefore calling out further research establishing its existence.

### *Hypotheses*

H1: Higher religiosity increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative.

H2: Identifying as Protestant increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative.

H3: Identifying as Catholic increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative.

H4: Identifying as Protestant increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative more than identifying as Catholic.

H5: Being married increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative.

H6: Being male does not increase the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative.

## **METHOD**

This paper studies the influence of religiosity, religious preference, marital status, and gender on Latino ideology as measured by the Latino National Survey of 2006 (LNS) and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study of 2012 (CCES). By studying ideology based on these two data sets, survey biases and shortcomings of one survey are made up for in the other.

The LNS was conducted by academics from University of Washington, University of Arizona, University of Notre Dame, Cornell University, and Texas Christian University. The LNS is a compilation of eight thousand six hundred thirty-four completed interviews of Latino residents of the United States. This survey, running from November 2005 to August 2006, looks into different demographics, social values, and political views of self-identified Latinos of 2005 and 2006. The sample was collected by stratifying geographic designations, states. The survey was collected using a computer assisted telephone interview program. Surveys were conducted in the language of the interviewee's preference. The LNS is used in this study because of its large Latino sample, its focus on Latino-specific issues, and its previous use in other studies. Unfortunately there has not been a solely-Latino survey as extensive as the LNS since then. To capture a more recent Latino population, this study also includes the CCES.

The CCES is a collaborative survey and dataset. This national stratified sample survey was administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. The data is based on forty-eight teams each purchasing a one thousand person national sample survey. The Common Content sample of the forty-eight teams is of fifty-four thousand five hundred thirty-five cases. Respondents were questioned in two waves, pre-election and post-election in the fall of 2012. This survey offers the opportunity to look into a large Latino sample as well as cross reference Latino trends with national trends. This additional dataset surveys all U.S. states versus the LNS at only eighteen. This added benefit gives insight to Latinos that live in states with smaller Latino populations. The CCES is also a relevant survey as it is of the last election cycle. A drawback that is unique to this dataset is that it was collected by different teams instead of one team of researchers like the LNS. For the CCES, I limit the dataset to only those who answer as Latino when asked about their race or

ethnicity. Future studies could compare the results of this survey to the general CCES population.

The variables in question — political ideology, marital status, religiosity, religious preference — are found in both the LNS and the CCES. The overlapping ability to measure certain variables in both the LNS and CCES proves helpful in comparing the significance of these variables. Both data sets were recoded to allow for more systematic comparisons of variables. Please see question wording and information regarding recoding in the appendix.

Regressions and cross tabulations are done through SPSS for each dataset. Ideology is the dependent variable of measure. For the LNS, the seven point ideology variable is regressed against gender, marital status, affiliation as Protestant, affiliation as Catholic, and religiosity. The CCES five point ideology variable is regressed against gender, marital status, affiliation as Protestant, affiliation as Catholic, and religiosity.

## **RESULTS**

In order to more fully grasp the results of the analysis, an examination of each dataset takes place and then a comparison of both datasets.

### ***Latino National Survey Findings***

I ran a linear regression with Latino political ideology as the dependent variable and religiosity, Protestant identity, Catholic identity, marital status, and sex as independent variables.

By first understanding the ideological distribution of Latinos in the LNS conclusions are better drawn. Latinos are fairly conservative in the LNS (see Figure 1). Twenty-five percent of Latinos identify as very conservative versus only thirteen percent identifying as a strong liberal.

Less than a quarter, twenty-two percent, identified as moderates. If ideology is collapsed into the three categories of liberal, moderate, and conservative, the distribution would be as follows: twenty-four percent liberal, thirty-two percent moderate, and forty-four percent conservative.

When examining the regression coefficients for each variable of study in the LNS, reference Table 3 in the appendix.

(H1) Religiosity is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis; there is a relationship between religiosity and Latino ideology. The coefficient for religiosity is 0.270, so for every unit increase in religiosity, there is a 0.270 unit increase in ideology. For example, a Latino that is moderate and attends church once a month would likely move past “leans conservative” and identify as conservative. As demonstrated in Figure 3, higher religiosity increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative. Over sixty percent of those Latinos that identify as conservative attend church at least once a week. Thirty-two percent of Latinos that identify as liberal attend church only on major religious holidays or never, but interestingly, of those who never go to church, nineteen percent are strong conservatives.

(H2) Protestant identity is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis; there is a relationship between Protestant identity and Latino ideology. The regression coefficient for Protestant identity is 0.422, so by identifying as a Protestant, there is a 0.422 unit increase in ideology. For example, a Latino that identifies as very liberal and not Protestant would likely identify as a conservative leaning moderate if that Latino becomes Protestant. As Figure 5 explains, identifying as Protestant increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative. Of those who are Protestant, fifty-eight percent identified themselves as either conservative or very conservative on the LNS.

(H3) Catholic identity is not statistically significant, therefore there is no support to reject the null hypothesis; in the LNS, a relationship cannot be proved between Catholic identity and ideology. The regression coefficient for Catholic identity is -0.054 meaning that by identifying as Catholic there is a -0.054 unit change in ideology. This coefficient means that a moderate non-Catholic Latino could identify as leans liberal if he becomes Catholic. As Figure 7 demonstrates, in the LNS identifying as Catholic slightly increases the likelihood of identifying as liberal, not conservative.

(H4) By taking into account the coefficients of Protestant and Catholic identity, identifying as Protestant does increase the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative more than does identifying as Catholic.

(H5) Marital Status is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis; there is a relationship between marital status and Latino ideology. The regression coefficient of marital status is 0.385 meaning that by being married, there is a 0.385 unit change in ideology. The impact of the influence marriage has on Latino ideology is demonstrated by the following scenario: a single liberal Latino would likely move to leaning conservative if married. Figure 9 demonstrates that there is a marital gap in Latino political ideology. Of those that were married, forty-eight percent were conservative or very conservative and only twenty percent were liberal or very liberal.

(H6) Sex is not statistically significant. In the LNS, a relationship cannot be proved between sex and ideology. The regression coefficient is -0.097 meaning that being male is correlated to a -0.097 unit change in ideology. There is virtually no difference between the likelihood of a male and female Latino to identify as conservative. As Figure 11 demonstrates, there is no evidence to prove that there is a relationship between sex and ideology in the LNS.

### *Cooperative Congressional Election Survey Results*

A linear regression with Latino political ideology as the dependent variable and religiosity, Protestant identity, Catholic identity, marital status, and sex as independent variables is also run in the CCES.

An examination of the distribution of political ideology for the CCES is needed (see Figure 2) In the CCES, Latinos are fairly moderate and slightly liberal. Thirty-eight percent identify as moderate, thirty-four percent liberal and twenty-eight percent conservative.

(H1) Religiosity is statistically significant at the .01 level; there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis. There is a relationship between religiosity and Latino ideology. The regression coefficient for religiosity in the CCES is .142, meaning a unit change in religiosity increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative by .142. A liberal Latino would likely become conservative if he increased church attendance from “a few times a year” to “once or twice a month.” As Figure 4 explains, of those that identified as very conservative fifteen percent said they attended church fewer than a couple of times a year. Of those that identified as very liberal nineteen percent went to church at least once a month.

(H2) Protestant identity is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis; there is a relationship between Protestant identity and ideology in the CCES. The regression coefficient for Protestant identity in the CCES is .470 meaning that being a Protestant moves ideology by .470 units. This finding means that a moderate non-Protestant Latino would likely become very conservative if he became Protestant. Figure 6 shows this relationship. Identifying as Protestant increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as

conservative. Of those that identified as Protestant, forty-eight percent are conservative or very conservative. Of those that are not Protestant, twenty-eight percent are liberal or very liberal.

(H3) The Catholic identity variable is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis; there is a relationship between Catholic Identity and ideology. In the CCES, the regression coefficient is .125 meaning that identifying as Catholic creates a .125 change in Latino ideology. This finding means that a moderate non-Catholic Latino would likely lean conservative if he became Catholic. Figure 8 explains this relationship. This relationship is most evident in the jump from liberal to moderate; the gap between Catholics and non-Catholics increased almost four percentage points.

(H4) In examining the coefficients for Protestant and Catholic identity, identifying as Protestant does increase the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative more than does identifying as Catholic.

(H5) Marital Status is statistically significant at the .01 level. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis; there is a relationship between marital status and political ideology. The CCES regression coefficient is .289 meaning that being married is related to a .289 unit change in Latino ideology. A single Latino that leans liberal would likely lean conservative if married. Figure 10 demonstrates this relationship. Of those that are married, thirty-four percent are conservative or very conservative. Of those that are not married, forty-one percent are liberal or very liberal.

(H6) Sex is statistically significant at the .01 level. In the CCES, a moderate gender gap exists. The regression coefficient in the CCES is .159 meaning that being male is related to a .159 unit change in political ideology. Figure 12 demonstrates that males are more conservative than Latinas. There is no evidence to either accept or reject H6.

### *Comparison and Discussion*

The datasets, though they have different ideological distributions, yield similar results. The difference in ideological distributions may be because Latinos could respond in English or in Spanish in the LNS while only having the test administered in English for the CCES. Those Latinos that only speak Spanish could have different belief systems and are acculturated to the American lifestyle less than those who can speak English.

Interestingly, while religiosity has a much smaller regression coefficient in the CCES than in the LNS, identifying as Protestant has a very similar regression coefficient in the CCES than the LNS. Across both data sets, increased religiosity increased Latino conservatism, and a Protestant identity also increased Latino conservatism.

Overall in both data sets, being Protestant increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative more than does identifying as Catholic, especially in the LNS. In the LNS, being Catholic is actually tied to liberalism. This gap could be due to the increasing number of Latinos converting from Catholicism to evangelical Protestants as of recent years. The conversion is due to the desire to be closer to God, therefore being more devote in their faith.

Being married increases the likelihood of a Latino identifying as conservative in both datasets. Marital status increases Latino conservatism in large units in both the LNS and the CCES. Being married is a strong predictor of Latino conservatism.

The gender gap of Latino men being more conservative than Latinas remains to be decisively confirmed. There is no gender gap in the LNS, yet there is one in the CCES. There not being a gender gap in the LNS could be due to the overwhelming conservative ideology in the LNS; being skewed conservative could have downplayed the impact of Latinas on ideology. The

more normally distributed CCES could be more accurate in describing the relationship because the normal distribution would not deemphasize Latina ideology. Future studies should do comparison of the impact of sex on Latino ideology across different datasets, skewed and normally distributed.

## CONCLUSION

### *Limitations*

One cannot draw conclusions of change over time though there is six years between the data sets because this study is not a time-series study. Without time-series data the differences between data sets cannot be attributed to a societal change during the six years between the surveys. Future research should explore conducting a time-series study, particularly in this changing political climate.

Future studies should also explore more deeply how different marital statuses may influence ideology. In this study, marital status was coded as married or not; there is a difference between a widow and a divorced person thus having the potential for influencing ideology differently. Doing a deeper analysis on marital status and the other variables could explain why marital status is such a strong predictor of Latino conservatism.

### *Implications*

By understanding these few predictors of Latino ideology, messaging could be better crafted to appeal to Latino voters. Studies have shown that when running an ad about the a candidate that describes the candidate's religious qualities, religious traditionalism and favorable priming take place within the observer when there is the absence of political information like

policy stances and platform; this relationship is especially true in uninformed voters (Weber & Thornton, 2012). By creating advertisements focused on the religious and moral integrity of the candidate, there is opportunity for targeted campaigns in Latino-heavy communities and Latino news outlets to be more successful in boosting candidate numbers amongst Latinos. Making the candidate favorable in the minds of Latinos is possible because of the priming effect, religiosity is a Latino cultural value, and religiosity is shown to influence Latino political ideology.

Here, marital status, religiosity, and Protestant identity all increase Latino conservatism across both datasets. Taking these three results and diving into the intricacies of each can better develop theory of why these particular variables have such a strong effect on Latino ideology.

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## Appendix

Table 1 – LNS variable coding and descriptives

LNS					
Variable	Description	Coding	N	Mean	SD
<i>Dependent Variable</i>					
Ideology	A consolidation of “Generally speaking, in politics do you consider yourself as conservative, liberal, middle-of the road, or don’t you think of yourself in these terms?” and similar branching questions	1 = Strong Liberal 2 = Liberal 3 = Leans Liberal 4 = Moderate 5 = Leans Conservative 6 = Conservative 7 = Strong Conservative	4358	4.5110	2.11408
<i>Independent Variables</i>					
Sex	Gender of the Respondent	0 = Female 1 = Male	8634	.4512	.49765
Marital Status	What is your current marital status?	0 = Not Married 1 = Married	8634	.5495	.49758
Catholic	With what religious tradition do you most closely identify?	0 = Non-Catholic 1 = Catholic	8634	.7131	.45234
Protestant	With what religious tradition do you most closely identify?	0 = Non-Protestant 1 = Protestant	8634	.1298	.33614
Religiosity	How often do you attend religious services?	1 = Never 2 = Only Major Religious Holidays 3 = Once a Month 4 = Once a Week 5 = More than Once a Week	8511	3.3448	1.25731

**Table 2 – CCES variable coding and descriptives**


<b>CCES</b>					
Variable	Description	Coding	N	Mean	SD
<i><b>Dependent Variable</b></i>					
Ideology	Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?	1 = Strong Liberal 2 = Liberal 3 = Moderate 4 = Conservative 5 = Strong Conservative	5052	2.9230	1.08490
<i><b>Independent Variables</b></i>					
Sex	Are you male or female?	0 = Female 1 = Male	5599	.4576	.49824
Marital Status	What is your current marital status?	0 = Not Married 1 = Married	5599	.4879	.49990
Catholic	With what religious tradition do you most closely identify?	0 = Non-Catholic 1 = Catholic	5583	.4517	.497771
Protestant	With what religious tradition do you most closely identify?	0 = Non-Protestant 1 = Protestant	5583	.2054	.40406
Religiosity	Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services?	1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = A Few Times a Year 4 = Once or Twice a Month	5505	3.0836	1.65038


**Table 3 – Factors Influencing Latino Ideology in the LNS**

	<b>Ideology</b>
Religiosity	0.270** (.010)
Protestant	0.422** (.045)
Catholic	-0.054 (.035)
Marital Status	0.385** (.029)
Sex	-0.097 (.029)
<i>N</i>	4358
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.051
Standard Errors in parentheses	
+ <i>p</i> < 0.10, * <i>p</i> < 0.05, ** <i>p</i> < 0.01	


**Table 4 – Factors Influencing Latino Ideology in the CCES**

	<b>Ideology</b>
Religiosity	0.143** (.010)
Protestant	0.470** (.045)
Catholic	0.125** (.035)
Marital Status	0.289** (.029)
Sex	0.159** (.029)
<i>N</i>	5052
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.137
Standard Errors in parentheses	
+ <i>p</i> < 0.10, * <i>p</i> < 0.05, ** <i>p</i> < 0.01	

**Figure 1 – Ideology Distribution among Latinos in the LNS**

**Figure 2 – Ideology Distribution among Latinos in the CCES**


**Figure 3 – The Impact of Religiosity on Ideology amongst Latinos in the LNS**



Pearson Chi-Square = 226.442

df = 24


**Figure 4 – The Impact of Religiosity on Ideology amongst Latinos in the CCES**



Pearson Chi-Square = 597.822


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**Figure 5 – The Impact of a Protestant Identity on Ideology amongst Latinos in the LNS**



Pearson Chi-Square = 83.265


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**Figure 6 – The Impact of a Protestant Identity on Ideology amongst Latinos in the CCES**

Pearson Chi-Square = 311.489

df = 4


**Figure 7 – The Impact of a Catholic Identity on Ideology amongst Latinos in the LNS**



Pearson Chi-Square = 57.677

df = 6


**Figure 8 – The Impact of a Catholic Identity on Ideology amongst Latinos in the CCES**



Pearson Chi-Square = 45.775


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**Figure 9 – The Impact of Marital Status on Ideology amongst Latinos in the LNS**



Pearson Chi-Square = 62.787


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**Figure 10 – The Impact of Marital Status on Ideology amongst Latinos in the CCES**

Pearson Chi-Square = 176.721


df = 4

**Figure 11 – The Impact of Sex on Ideology amongst Latinos in the LNS**



Pearson Chi-Square = 11.578

df = 6

**Figure 12 – The Impact of Sex on Ideology amongst Latinos in the CCES**

Pearson Chi-Square = 31.007

df = 4