THE REBRANDING OF A MAJOR TOURISM CITY IN A POST-DISASTER ENVIRONMENT: A COMPARISON OF HURRICANE KATRINA AND SEPTEMBER 11

by

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ABSTRACT

Over the past fifteen years, the cities of New York, New York, and New Orleans, Louisiana, have experienced a devastating disaster. New York watched helplessly as terrorists crashed two airplanes into the World Trade Center in 2001, while New Orleans was submerged by the waters of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Both of these cities are consistently considered major tourist destinations within the United States, and both of these cities struggled significantly to bring tourists back after their respective disasters. The field of disaster recovery as it relates to tourism destinations has not been studied much, and these two disasters have not been compared. Each city adopted its own plans for recovery, yet both followed Faulkner’s framework, consisting of six different phases: pre-event, prodromal, emergency, intermediate, long term, and resolution. Ultimately, each city handled some situations better than the other. These two cities, as well as every city across the United States and around the world, can learn from the triumphs and pitfalls experienced in the aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. If a city hopes to recover in the tourism industry, it must first take care of the basic needs required of its locals. Cities must adopt disaster contingency plans before a disaster is ever impending. They must regularly test these plans through simulations and practice drills. Coordinated communication is key, as is a physical emergency office location. When it comes to developing a media plan to bring visitors back, the process must begin almost immediately after the disaster has struck so as to not delay the tourism industry recovery efforts. Every city must be prepared, for disaster can strike anywhere and at any time.
# Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1

REVIEW OF LITERATURE ..................................................................................................... 3
  Background .......................................................................................................................... 3
  Terms Defined ...................................................................................................................... 4
  Disaster Recovery in the Tourism Industry ........................................................................... 5
  September 11 and New York .............................................................................................. 8
  Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans .................................................................................. 11

DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................... 14
  Pre-Event Phase .................................................................................................................. 14
    New York .......................................................................................................................... 15
    New Orleans ..................................................................................................................... 16
  Prodromal Phase .................................................................................................................. 16
    New York .......................................................................................................................... 16
    New Orleans ..................................................................................................................... 20
  Emergency Phase ............................................................................................................... 22
    New York .......................................................................................................................... 22
    New Orleans ..................................................................................................................... 24
  Intermediate Phase .......................................................................................................... 24
    New York .......................................................................................................................... 26
    New Orleans ..................................................................................................................... 29
  Long-Term Phase .............................................................................................................. 30
    New York .......................................................................................................................... 31
    New Orleans ..................................................................................................................... 32
  Resolution Phase .............................................................................................................. 33
    New York .......................................................................................................................... 33
    New Orleans ..................................................................................................................... 34

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 35

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................... 38
INTRODUCTION

New York City, New York, and New Orleans, Louisiana: two cities located across the United States that may seem extremely different on the surface, but a closer look reveals that both of these cities have experienced a major disaster in the past fifteen years. On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes, two of which crashed into the World Trade Center buildings in New York City (National September 11 Memorial & Museum, 2015). The morning of August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina slammed into the Gulf Coast, ravaging the city of New Orleans (Whitten, 2015). After each disaster, America watched as these cities turned from vibrant, thriving tourist destinations to cities struggling to attract visitors. Each city adopted its own strategy and followed different steps in an attempt to bring tourism back to its economy. The widespread use of mass media did not help the cause. News stations played horrifying footage around the clock, prolonging the images of disaster in the minds of potential visitors long after the rubble was removed. The negative publicity had immediate effects on the tourism industry, but also led to ramifications on a long-term scale.

No extensive studies on crisis and disaster management and recovery were conducted until the late 1990s and early 2000s (Carlsen & Liburd, 2008). A framework for disaster management was not proposed until Faulkner’s research in 2001 (Scott et al., 2008). This framework still remains the most comprehensive plan for a business to recover after a disaster. It suggests six phases that businesses follow, including the pre-event phase, prodromal phase, emergency phase, intermediate phase, long-term recovery phase, and resolution phase (Scott et al., 2008). Despite Faulkner’s research in crisis and disaster management, the true definitions and differences between “crisis” and “disaster” are still disputed (Pforr & Hosie, 2008). Statistics describing the fall of the tourism industry in each city paint a picture of what the economy looked like immediately after the disaster, but little research has been conducted on the steps that
were in place before disaster struck and the steps that were followed post-disaster in terms of helping the tourism sector recover. Additionally, no research has been conducted drawing comparisons between these two disasters and the recovery processes followed in the aftermath. This lack of research prevents industry leaders from learning from the triumphs and pitfalls of others in similar situations.

Through a thorough review of literature, combined with personal interviews, this study explores the methods used to recover after a man-made disaster as well as with a natural disaster. With at least ten years of data for each city, this study analyzes the tourism industry both before and after each disaster and draws conclusions as to which tactics were most effective in reviving the industry. This research project begins with a presentation Faulkner’s framework for disaster recovery, followed by research findings to structure an ideal recovery plan for devastated major tourist destinations.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Background
The travel and tourism industry is one of the largest industries in the world and is certainly a driving force of the American economy. In 2014, the United States’ travel industry generated $2.1 trillion in spending from both domestic and international visitors, the majority of whom were traveling for leisure purposes. This spending contributed to 2.7% of the nation’s overall gross domestic product. Additionally, the industry helped support 15 million jobs, meaning that one out of every nine U.S. jobs was dependent upon travel and tourism. Travel consistently ranks as the top service export for the United States. In 2014, travel exports created a $43.7 billion surplus thanks to the 73.9 million international arrivals. Of these, the top five countries of visitor origin were Canada (23 million), Mexico (17.3 million), the United Kingdom (4 million), Japan (3.6 million), and Brazil (2.3 million). Domestically, Americans logged 2.1 billion person-trips, which can be defined as a person traveling 50 miles or more one-way away from home and/or overnight. The majority of these trips (78%) were for leisure purposes (U.S. Travel Association, 2014). Though the U.S. travel and tourism industry is a force to be reckoned with, it has experienced its fair share of trials and tribulations to get to where it is today. Despite significant setbacks such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters, the U.S. travel and tourism industry always seems to find a way to recover and continue growing even more than before.

When analyzing previous studies related to disaster and crisis management, especially in the realm of tourism, it becomes apparent that there is a major gap in research that has been conducted. In fact, there is very little information on disaster and crisis management prior to the year 2000. Of the research that has been conducted, very little focus has been assigned to the impact of and recovery strategies after a disaster or crisis. This is all despite the notion that tourism is often the first business sector affected by disasters and crises in a community and also
the first sector that leaders turn to when recovery efforts begin (Carlsen & Liburd, 2008).

Conflicting information exists as to whether the majority of crisis management exists in the form of reactive responses or if most of the emphasis is placed on crisis prevention and management before a catastrophe occurs.

There are five major categories of risk factors that tourists will take into consideration when making a travel decision. These factors are (1) war and political instability, (2) health concerns, (3) crime, (4) terrorism, and (5) natural disasters (Scott, Laws, & Prideaux, 2008; Lehto, Douglas, & Park, 2008). This study will focus on the final two factors, terrorism and natural disasters, and how a tourism destination mitigates these risks and recovers after the catastrophe has struck.

**Terms Defined**

To fully understand how a tourism destination recovers after a crisis or disaster, a clear distinction between these two terms and their definitions must be established. Though very similar and sometimes used interchangeably, a crisis is not the same as a disaster, and each requires a different recovery approach. Faulkner (2001) notes that a crisis is defined as a “situation where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-inflicted through such problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to adapt to change” (p. 136). This definition notes that a crisis consists of an event with negative repercussions caused by internal factors within the organization itself. Faulkner (2001) then goes on to distinguish the difference between a crisis and a disaster and defines disasters as “situations where an enterprise (or collection of enterprises in the case of a tourist destination) is confronted with sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has little control” (p. 136). In contrast to a crisis, an organization has little to no control over a disaster, such as a hurricane or volcanic eruption. Due to the nature of these definitions, it is more fitting to use the phrase “crisis
management” throughout this study to describe prohibitive measures taken and action plans formulated to prevent potential internally caused crises. Though an organization can plan for a disaster, a disaster cannot be controlled or managed; therefore, the phrase “disaster management” is rendered obsolete; however, the phrase “disaster recovery” is applicable in both situations analyzed in this study. Despite the fact that the definitions for “crisis” and “disaster” are distinct and separate from each other, the two do overlap at times. This is most evident in the case of natural disasters, where the damage that a city endures during and after a storm can often be partially attributed to human action (Faulkner 2001).

Faulkner (2001) goes on to expound upon the definition of a disaster caused by external forces and names several key characteristics of a disaster. These include:

- A triggering event
- A high threat with short response times and an element of surprise and urgency
- A short-term perception of an inability to cope by those directly affected
- A turning point involving significant change, including both negative and positive outcomes
- The inclusion of “fluid, unstable, dynamic” situations

**Disaster Recovery in the Tourism Industry**

No city wants to face a major crisis or disaster, yet such a crippling event is constantly a threat. In fact, McKercher and Hui (2008) argue that crises are inevitable, “episodic events that disrupt the tourism and hospitality industry on a regular basis” (as cited in Pforr & Hosie, p. 249). It is how individual cities or companies handle these crises that set them apart. Faulkner (2001) states the following:
The effectiveness with which the tourism industry in a disaster area handles a crisis, and therefore the degree to which it is prepared for it, has a bearing on how quickly services are restored to normal. However, the speed of the destination’s recovery ultimately hinges on the degree to which market communication plans have been integrated with disaster management strategies. (p. 142)

A city may take one of several different approaches when handling a crisis or disaster, yet Faulkner (2001) established a framework applicable in any recovery situation (p. 140). Faulkner’s framework (Table 1) outlines the phases before, during, and after a disaster.

The pre-event phase is the time during which an organization can take action and create a contingency plan to help prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disasters. The next phase is the prodromal phase. At this point in the process, a disaster is imminent and contingency plans must be activated. During the emergency phase, the crisis or disaster has made its effects felt. The primary actions taken are those to protect people and property. Rescue efforts are launched and emergency aid is provided to those in need. Short-term needs of the people are addressed during the intermediate phase as the organization attempts to restore services to normal. The more long-term effects are handled during the recovery phase. During this time, infrastructure is rebuilt, victims receive counselling, and business owners develop new investment plans. In the sixth and final phase of Faulkner’s framework, the resolution phase, routine is restored, and the management process is reviewed and improved where necessary (Faulkner, 2001; Pforr & Hosie, 2008).
Table 1. Faulkner’s Tourism Disaster Management Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pre-event</td>
<td>Actions are taken to prevent crises/disasters through management planning, scenario assessments, disaster contingency plans, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Prodromal</td>
<td>A crisis/disaster is inevitable. Emergency contingency plans take action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>The crisis/disaster has hit and effects have been felt. The major action is to minimize damage and protect people and property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Short-term needs of those affected must be dealt with. The main objective is to restore the community to a sense of normalcy as quickly as possible. An effective media strategy is crucial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Long term (recovery)</td>
<td>Major issues not addressed in the previous stage are the main focus here, such as the restoration of damaged infrastructure, handling environmental issues, reinvesting resources, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Resolution</td>
<td>Routine is restored. In some cases, the destination is even better than before the crisis/disaster. Existing contingency plans are improved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source based on Faulkner 2001 and Scott et al. 2008
Additionally, the degree to which a city with a large tourism industry is affected in the immediate wake of a disaster depends upon six different factors. Prideaux (2004) lists these factors as: “(1) the internal cultures and modus operandi of organisations responding to the disaster; (2) the ability of various organisations to work cooperatively to solve the problem; (3) the ability of normally bureaucratic hierarchical organisations to respond swiftly and decisively; (4) the manner in which the media cover the situation; (5) the resources available to the public sector to respond to the disaster; (6) and the ability of the private sector to continue to trade during and after the disaster” (p. 284). Businesses in tourism must pay close attention to all of these factors to mitigate the negative effects after a major disaster.

**September 11 and New York**

September 11, 2001, began as any other day in the United States. Not long after the day began, however, it became a day of tragedy that would remain emblazoned in the minds of Americans for eternity. On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four passenger airplanes, two of which would directly affect New York City. While in route from Boston to Los Angeles, American Airlines Flight 11 was purposefully flown into the north tower of the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan at 8:46 am ET. Not long after, United Airlines Flight 175, also traveling from Boston to Los Angeles, struck the south tower of the World Trade Center at 9:03 am ET. These attacks against the World Trade Center killed 2,753 people in the largest terrorist attack in U.S. history. As of September 2015, the remains of only 1,640 victims had been positively identified (CNN Library, 2015).

Though the emotional damage inflicted by these attacks took precedence, the economic impact was no trifling matter. It is estimated that the attacks caused a $123 billion economic loss during the first 2-4 weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center. This number does not include loss due to a decline in air travel. The estimated cost of the damage to the World Trade
Center site is $60 billion. This includes damage to surrounding buildings, infrastructure, and nearby subway facilities as well. During the $750 million cleanup process that took place over eight months, 1.8 million tons of debris were removed thanks to 3.1 million hours of labor (CNN Library, 2015). These numbers barely begin to scratch the surface of the economic impact caused by the September 11 attacks. The impact on the tourism industry alone reached catastrophic levels.

Though the attacks of September 11 rattled the nation, many Americans rallied behind the city to show the world they were not afraid. In fact, domestic tourism in New York City steadily increased in the years after 9/11 (NYC & Company, 2015). Some believed this was because fewer Americans were choosing to travel abroad for vacation and many were heeding the call to patriotism and visiting the shaken city (Blair, 2002). International tourism, however, did not fare nearly as well. The number of international visitors to the city steadily decreased from 2000 until 2003, dropping as much as 29%. In fact, international visitor numbers did not reach pre-9/11 levels until 2005, four years after the attacks (NYC & Company, 2015). Likewise, hotel occupancy experienced an overall decrease of 15% from the usual occupancy rates from 2000 to 2001 and did not reach pre-9/11 levels until 2005 (NYC & Company, 2015). Though overall visitor numbers hardly decreased, the amount of money that visitors spent in New York City decreased by nearly $1 billion in 2001. Domestic visitors were spending less by choosing to take day trips or stay with nearby family and friends instead of staying in a hotel. The number of business travelers, who spend a daily average of $241 compared with $145 for leisure travelers, greatly decreased. Additionally, international visitors, who spend more than six times the amount of domestic visitors, were also avoiding New York (Blair, 2002).
Perhaps the largest industry within the tourism sector affected by 9/11 was the airline industry. All air transportation in the United States was grounded from 12:16 pm ET on September 11 until September 13 (National September 11 Memorial & Museum, 2015; Floyd et al., 2004). The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reported a direct loss of $10 billion in the airline industry during the week after the attacks. Passenger levels for both domestic and international flights dropped drastically. Domestically, American Airlines reported a 33.7% decrease in passengers during September 2001, while Continental Airlines reported a 31% decrease, and Northwest Airlines reported a 30.7% decrease during the same time period. In the following month, October 2001, there was an overall decrease of 23% reported for domestic passenger volume (Floyd et al., 2004).

While the decrease in passengers nationwide was cause for concern, the affect that these horrific attacks had on the number of visitors to the city of New York would last for years to come. It would take tourism levels years to recover. A serious decrease in the number of plane movements to and from New York City lasted through the year 2003 (Table 2.) (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2013).
Table 2. Annual Aircraft Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic Totals</th>
<th>International Totals</th>
<th>Domestic &amp; International Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>969,468</td>
<td>182,468</td>
<td>1,151,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>983,372</td>
<td>187,787</td>
<td>1,171,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>956,356</td>
<td>199,177</td>
<td>1,155,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>958,134</td>
<td>206,224</td>
<td>1,164,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>968,656</td>
<td>211,499</td>
<td>1,180,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>904,106</td>
<td>197,637</td>
<td>1,101,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>866,934</td>
<td>188,982</td>
<td>1,055,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>870,450</td>
<td>191,708</td>
<td>1,062,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>947,043</td>
<td>210,264</td>
<td>1,157,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>967,503</td>
<td>219,562</td>
<td>1,187,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>991,039</td>
<td>232,596</td>
<td>1,223,635</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source based on The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2013

**Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans**

The city of New Orleans, Louisiana, is one that is constantly bustling with joy and life. The rich culture attracts millions of visitors every year who are hoping to experience the food, music, festivals, and sites of a world-class tourist destination. Merely seven months before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was the sixth most popular U.S. vacation destination among U.S. residents. Tourism has always been one of the city’s main economic drivers. Visitation numbers peaked in 2004, one year before the storm, with 10.1 million visitors who spent $4.9 billion. This booming tourism industry accounted for 80,827 jobs which generated over $30 million in state income taxes. A majority of the visitors to New Orleans were traveling for pleasure, but there was a significant number of business travelers as well. By August 26, 2005, more than halfway through the year and just three days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the city of New Orleans had attracted 6.6 million visitors who spent over $4.2 billion. These numbers were on track to overtake 2004 as the most successful year in the tourism industry for the Crescent City (Chacko & Marcell, 2008).
Table 3. New Orleans Annual Visitor Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Number of Visitors</th>
<th>Annual Visitor Spending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>8.5 million</td>
<td>$4.5 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10.1 million</td>
<td>$4.9 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (Jan-Aug)</td>
<td>6.6 million</td>
<td>$4.2 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3.7 million</td>
<td>$2.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.1 million</td>
<td>$4.8 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7.6 million</td>
<td>$5.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7.5 million</td>
<td>$4.2 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source based on Gill 2011, Chacko & Marcell 2008

Hurricane Katrina turned out to be the most expensive natural disaster the United States has ever experienced. Damage and recovery estimates ranged from $100 billion to $200 billion when economic impacts were considered over a long-term basis. Though the floodwaters receded from most neighborhoods within a week of Hurricane Katrina, the city was a long way from full recovery. In terms of implications for the tourism industry, it is estimated that the city of New Orleans was losing $15.3 million for every day there was no tourism. This economic loss stemmed from a lack of tourism operations as well as the loss of many festivals, parades, and events hosted yearly throughout the city (Chacko & Marcell, 2008).

The major beacon of hope shining through this ravaged city was one of the most iconic neighborhoods of New Orleans: the French Quarter. The oldest and best known area of the city, over 58% of tourists visiting New Orleans in 2004 made a trip to the French Quarter. After the storm, the French Quarter remained relatively unharmed from both wind and water damage. In addition, the city’s Central Business District (where most hotels are located) and Warehouse District (where most museums are located) also received minimal impacts from flooding (Chacko & Marcell, 2008). Though these popular areas for tourism did not greatly suffer from
Hurricane Katrina, it would be a significant period of time before the city was able to recover in the tourism industry.

As a foreboding sign of the lost revenue New Orleans would experience, major conventions planned to take place in the city began to make cancellations. Though short-term cancellations were expected, many conventions set to take place far into the future began to make cancellations as well. This showed that many event planners lacked the confidence that the city would be able to recover in time to handle a major event in the foreseeable future. Much of this doubt was attributed to the images displayed of the New Orleans Convention Center and Superdome being used as temporary shelters for evacuees. New Orleans would not host another major convention until June of 2006, almost an entire year after Hurricane Katrina made landfall (Chacko & Marcell, 2008).

Though many hotels experienced minor storm damage, hotel room inventory for the city was around 27,000 rooms by January of 2006, 11,500 rooms short of pre-Katrina availability. While many hotels were structurally sound, staffing was the biggest issue. Many hotel employees lived in the areas of the city that received the most damage and could not return to New Orleans for lack of a place to live. Those who could return found that their rent prices had increased dramatically, and along with that, the need for higher wages to cover expenses. This staffing issue also applied to the New Orleans restaurant industry, as many restaurants that were allowed to reopen after the storm could not do so because of a lack of employees and increased operational costs (Chacko & Marcell, 2008).
DISCUSSION

Pre-Event Phase

No organization wants to ever end up with a disaster or crisis on its hands, but no one can predict where, when, or to what magnitude an issue may occur. Because of this, organizations must assess potential risks and take action before a devastating event even has time to occur. Pforr & Hosie (2008) claim, “the preparation stage of crisis management in tourism is the actual beginning of any strategic response to recovery” (p. 249). Though an organization’s preparatory actions may not completely eliminate the threat of a disaster or crisis, it may help soften the blow if anything were to happen. In terms of Faulkner’s framework, organizations partake in the pre-event phase well before a threat arises. During this phase, steps are taken to “prevent or mitigate the effects of potential disasters” (Faulkner, 2001, p. 144). Though proactive measures may seem unnecessary at the time, the long-term benefits often outweigh the costs. Pforr & Hosie (2008) explain:

To become proactive in crisis management it is necessary to change an organization’s corporate culture. Proactive companies, it is argued, have a tendency to follow the principle of not harming any individual to guide their conduct. In contrast, reactive corporations, do what is right, but only if it is cost effective. (p. 258)

Pforr & Hosie (2008) proceed to explain how in the long run, proactive companies profit in both an ethical and business manner (p. 258).

To successfully make the most out of the pre-event phase, organizations must assess potential risk factors and create action plans accordingly. These disaster management response plans often include the creation of a disaster management team and the appointment of a team leader. The organization should also identify relevant public and private sector agencies that could prove helpful in the event of a disaster and establish lines of communication. Employees
and key stakeholders should be educated on the potential dangers and the actions that must be taken if a disaster were to strike. Finally, members within the organization must agree upon and commit to the activation protocols of the disaster management or emergency response plan (Faulkner, 2001, p. 144). This plan must be tested and reviewed regularly as changes may be necessary. As Pforr & Hosie (2008) state, “Preparedness for crises must become an integral part of the strategic consciousness of organizations in tourism” (p. 259).

New York

The following appears in the 9/11 Commission Report and clearly sums up the handling of the hijackings:

In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that

- the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
- there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
- the hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.

On the morning of 9/11, the existing protocol was unsuited in every respect for what was about to happen. (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 18)
New Orleans

A city prone to hurricanes year after year, New Orleans did have some measures in place to prepare for Hurricane Katrina. These measures, however, were not nearly enough. Though many city officials, both government and non-government, had been trained in emergency preparedness, this preparation could not combat what was left unattended. Studies conducted by FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers predicted that a hurricane that made a direct hit on New Orleans would result in massive flooding and thousands of deaths from drowning, the spread of disease, and dehydration. Despite these warnings, however, federal budget cuts left many projects meant to protect against major hurricanes unfinished. Even the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers worried that these cuts would leave New Orleans levees and pump systems inadequate (Fessler, 2005). Ultimately, this was the case. The city was nowhere near prepared to handle a hurricane with the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina.

Prodromal Phase

The prodromal phase of Faulkner’s framework signals the beginning of a disaster or crisis. This phase begins when a disaster is imminent. The situation has been identified and the emergency response plan is mobilized. During this phase, it is crucial that warning systems are established to inform key groups at risk of the impending danger. The disaster management team must take control. The team often establishes a command center where important team members can gather and mitigate the fallout. The organization must also work to avoid or minimize any more potential harm that could follow the initial disaster (Faulkner, 2001, p. 144).

New York

On the morning of September 11, 2001, the American people, and in particular the people of New York, had no idea that their lives were about to be forever changed. In fact, only one hour, four minutes, and eleven seconds passed between takeoff of the first plane involved in the
attacks on the World Trade Center and the crash of the second plane involved Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 32). At approximately 7:59 am ET, American Airlines Flight 11 (AA 11) took off from Boston Logan International Airport. The Boeing 767 was carrying the pilots Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinnes, nine flight attendants, and eighty-one passengers, including the five terrorists on board. At 8:14 am ET, AA 11 lost routine communication with Boston air traffic control. It was at this point that the hijacking is believed to have begun (Commission Report, 2004, p. 4). Two of the flight attendants on board, Betty Ong and Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, provided most of the information now known about the hijacking. The hijackers stabbed two flight attendants to gain control of the cockpit, sprayed an irritant such as pepper spray in the first-class cabin, and claimed they had a bomb on board. At 8:19 am ET, Ong contacted the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, by using an AT&T airphone. The call lasted approximately 25 minutes as Ong relayed information regarding the hijacking to authorities on the ground. This call was outside the scope of a flight attendant’s training in an emergency situation. In a hijacking, flight attendants are instructed to contact the cockpit, not personnel on the ground. At 8:23 am ET, the dispatcher responsible for the flight was instructed to contact the cockpit. There was no answer. Just before 8:25 am ET, FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Center became aware that there was a problem on AA 11. The hijackers attempted to communicate with the passengers; however they did not realize the microphone was broadcasting over the air traffic channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. The hijackers stated, “Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 6). Also at 8:25, Amy Sweeney was able to get through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston to report a medical emergency on board. She also began to relay
information regarding the hijacking to ground personnel, keeping the manager Michael Woodward up to the minute on what was happening on the plane. At 8:26 am ET, Ong reported that the plane was flying erratically. At 8:27 am ET, AA 11 turned south towards New York. At 8:38 am ET, Ong reported once again that the plane was flying erratically. Ong lost phone contact with ground authorities at 8:44 am ET. At about the same time, Sweeney told Woodward, “Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent…we are all over the place.” When Woodward asked if Sweeney could identify where the plane was located by looking out the window, she replied with, “We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are flying way too low.” A few seconds later she said to Woodward, “Oh my God we are way too low.” Woodward then lost contact with Sweeney. At 8:46:40 am ET, AA 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, pgs. 4-7).

The second plane involved in the attacks of September 11 in New York, United Airlines Flight 175, departed Logan Airport at 8:14 am ET, just 14 minutes behind schedule and only 15 minutes after the departure of AA 11. United 175, headed for Los Angeles, was carrying pilots Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks, seven flight attendants, and fifty-six passengers. By 8:33 am ET, United 175 reached cruising altitude at 31,000 feet. At 8:42 am ET, the flight crew from United 175 completed a report on a “suspicious transmission” overheard from another plane. This transmission turned out to have been from AA 11. This report was the last routine communication with United 175 and the ground. The hijacking of United 175 occurred at some point between 8:42 and 8:46 am ET. As in the case with AA 11, most of the information known about the hijacking of United 175 comes from calls made from the plane to the ground. One flight attendant and two passengers were able to make calls to authorities and loved ones before the plane crashed. Just like the hijackers of AA 11, the hijackers of United 175
used knives, pepper spray, and a bomb threat to gain control of the cockpit. At 8:51 am ET, the flight deviated from its normal altitude levels. About a minute later, New York air traffic controllers attempted to contact the flight. They were unsuccessful. At 8:52 am ET, passenger Peter Hanson called his father Lee and relayed information regarding the hijacking. Peter told his father to contact United Airlines and report what was happening. Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and informed them of the hijacking. Also at 8:52 am ET, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francisco. He relayed the information that “the flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and the hijackers were probably flying the plane” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, pgs. 7-8). The call lasted two minutes before the connection was lost. At 8:58 am ET, United 175 turned towards New York. At 9:00 am ET, Peter Hanson once again called his father Lee. Peter reported,

The plane is making jerky movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—Don’t worry, Dad—If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God. Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 8)

Lee Hanson heard a woman scream right before the call with his son was disconnected. He immediately turned on a television and watched as his son’s flight struck the World Trade Center. At 9:03:11 am ET, United 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, pgs. 7-8).

Both towers of the World Trade Center were struck within a time frame of one hour and three minutes from the takeoff of AA 11, the first plane involved in the attacks of 9/11. Only seventeen minutes passed between the first and second tower being struck. Around 9:00 am ET on the morning of September 11, the FAA, American, and United finally realized they were
dealing with multiple hijackings. Yet after the second plane crashed into the World Trade Center, no one warned other aircraft. None of the personnel at the FAA, American, or United that day had ever dealt with multiple hijackings, much less coordinated attacks. In fact, a plan of this scope had not occurred anywhere in the world in the 30 years prior to September 11, 2001, and never before in the United States (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 10). The last hijacking situation in the US was in 1993, when a Lufthansa Airbus was hijacked by a 20 year old man while the flight was in route from Frankfurt to Cairo. The hijacker ordered that the pilots route the plane to John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. The plane landed without incident after 11 hours. No one was harmed, and the hijacker surrendered peacefully (Jones & Goldman, 1993).

American Airlines initiated a nationwide ground stop between 9:05 and 9:10 am ET. United Airlines soon followed suit.

*New Orleans*

Unlike the situation in New York with the attacks of September 11, the city of New Orleans had time to prepare for the impending disaster of Hurricane Katrina. Katrina began to develop on August 19, just north of Puerto Rico. As atmospheric conditions changed, Katrina was updated to a tropical depression on August 23 and a tropical storm on August 24 as it moved through the Bahamas. Katrina finally reached the level to become classified as a Category 1 Hurricane late in the evening of August 25, just hours before making landfall in southern Florida. After moving across the tip of southern Florida and back into the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina strengthened into a Category 2 storm by August 26. In the hours between 1 p.m. CDT on August 26 and 1 p.m. CDT on August 28, Hurricane Katrina intensified into a Category 5 storm, the strongest hurricane ranking on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale (Johnson, 2006). On Saturday, August 27, two days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall in southern Louisiana, Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana requested that President Bush declare a state of
emergency. Later that day, President Bush declared an emergency for the State of Louisiana (United States, 2006). The next day, August 28, President Bush declared a major disaster for the State of Louisiana (United States, 2006). Evacuation procedures for southeastern Louisiana were soon put into play as contraflow was established by 4:00 p.m. CDT on Saturday, August 27. Some Louisiana parishes began mandatory evacuations, while others began with recommended evacuation orders and soon upgraded to the mandatory status (United States, 2006). Much controversy surrounds how Governor Blanco handled the impending disaster of Hurricane Katrina. Though experts estimated it would take up to 48 hours to evacuate the city of New Orleans using contraflow methods, Governor Blanco and Mayor Ray Nagin waited until 20 hours before Hurricane Katrina made landfall to issue a mandatory evacuation for Orleans Parish (Myers, 2005). In addition to ordering evacuations, Louisiana got Establishment of Command (EOC) up and running by August 25, and readied emergency shelters. The state EOC held conference calls with state agencies, federal agencies, key parishes that would feel the most impact from the storm, and the Red Cross in preparation for Katrina’s landfall. The emergency shelters were established along main evacuation routes. New Orleans also designated the Super Dome as a “shelter of last resort” available to the special needs population, as well as individuals who could not evacuate. The United States Department of Defense, National Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Coast Guard all took the necessary steps to prepare for landfall of a major hurricane (United States, 2006).
Emergency Phase
The majority of the fallout of a disaster or crisis occurs during the emergency phase. The way an organization handles this phase is crucial and can lead to either a quick recovery or even more damage. In fact, the potential exists during this phase for a natural disaster to turn into a more severe man-made disaster if proper actions are ignored or key mistakes are made. During this phase, the disaster has hit and the effects of the catastrophe have been felt. It is necessary for the organization to take action to protect people and property, as well as minimize any further damage. The first actions initiated are those key to survival. Rescue efforts are launched, emergency accommodations are provided, medical services are rendered, and food supplies are distributed. Additionally, the organization must attempt to maintain strong communications systems throughout the emergency phase. Communication is key to providing the emergency help needed throughout the disaster (Faulkner, 2001, p. 144).

New York
During the emergency phase in New York the morning of September 11, the greatest issue was poor management. The shock of such a sudden, yet major disaster stunned everyone and left those in charge with the massive task of controlling a situation for which they did not have time to prepare. The attacks occurred as many firehouses were changing shifts. Despite the fact that they were ordered to stay home, many off-duty firefighters caught rides to the scene of the World Trade Center in police cars, on city buses, or even via subway. Those who were answering the call to help others in a dire situation actually caused even more chaos on the scene. Most of the officers who responded while off-duty bypassed the makeshift command centers and went into the buildings without orders. They clogged the already crowded stairwells, had no communication with commanding officers, and left much of the rest of New York unprotected. If a secondary event had occurred elsewhere in the city, FDNY would have been hard pressed to
find firefighters to respond. To this day, the Fire Department does not know how many firefighters were actually inside the towers during the attacks (Dwyer, Flynn, & Fessenden, 2002).

Communication was also a fatal issue that day. Most of the communications issues applied to the Fire Department. In fact, the New York Times wrote “no other agency lost communications on Sept. 11 as broadly, or to such devastating effect, as the Fire Department” (Dwyer et al., 2002). Eight years before the attacks of 9/11, the Fire Department lost communications while handling the World Trade Center bombing of 1993. The Fire Department tried to solve these issues by installing devices known as repeaters to boost radio signal strength, yet on the morning of 9/11, one repeater after another failed. The Fire Department went into the World Trade Center with radios that were identical to the ones that failed eight years earlier, leaving many officers with absolutely no means of communication (Dwyer et al., 2002).

Even if the Fire Department’s radio equipment had worked properly, many firefighters may have never heard the warnings ordered to evacuate the buildings due to their impending collapse. This is because there was absolutely no coordinated communication between the New York Police and Fire Departments. The New York Times stated,

Nearly every state, including New York, and the federal government have adopted a structure for managing crises known as the incident command system, in which agencies agree in advance who will be in charge. New York City has not. The Police and Fire Departments did not work together that day, and they rarely did before. (Dwyer et al., 2002)

After the second plane struck the World Trade Center, NYPD sent helicopters into the sky. The pilots reported on their radios 21 minutes before the collapse of the North Tower that the
structure would not stand for much longer. Only the Police Department heard these warnings. The messages were never relayed to the Fire Department (Dwyer et al., 2002). Because of the Fire Department’s failure in communications and the lack of communication between the Fire and Police Departments, FDNY lost 343 firefighters and paramedics during the attacks of 9/11. NYPD lost only 23 officers (New York Magazine, 2014).

New Orleans

In terms of government response to the disaster of Hurricane Katrina, many people question the decisions made on both a state and federal level. The first indication of a lack of strong government support came when Governor Blanco waited until August 31, two days after Katrina made landfall, to request 40,000 troops from President Bush. Despite previously asking the president for help, Governor Blanco wasted a critical amount of time in adding specifics to that request. Blanco was also slow to deploy the Louisiana National Guard, which she commands, to establish security throughout the streets of New Orleans. The streets of New Orleans had absolutely no sense of order until four days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall (Myers, 2005).

Intermediate Phase

During the intermediate phase, an organization must take care of the short-term needs of the people. It is also crucial to implement a media strategy at this time. The goal during the intermediate phase is to “restore the community to normality as quickly as possible” (Faulkner, 2001, p. 140). Other than structural damage and staffing issues, the key concern for any recovering city attempting to attract tourists is the management of visitor perception (Lehto et al., 2008). Following a major disaster, perceptions of a city can change drastically. This is often caused by the juxtaposition of thoughts concerning tourism and disaster side-by-side. The two evoke seemingly opposite sentiments. Lehto et al. (2008) explain that tourism elicits positive
feelings of “enjoyment, pleasure, relaxation and safety” while disasters conjure the opposite feelings of “distress, fear, anxiety, trauma, and panic.” Prior research indicates that the perceived image of a destination is a critical selection factor when visitors consider making a travel purchase decision. In fact, the perceived image of the destination is more important than the destination itself. This perceived image is created in the visitor’s mind through the gathering of information over a period of time (Lehto et al., 2008). Because of the concern for a destination’s image, the city must place utmost importance on marketing messages intended to restore confidence and portray positive images in the minds of potential visitors. Along with creating positive messages, the city must also work to combat any negative images or misrepresentation portrayed in the media.

A common theme for a successful disaster recovery plan involves the use of mass media to the city’s advantage. Tourism is merely one activity in which individuals may decide to invest their disposable income. If tourists perceive a great amount of risk to their time and money for a particular destination, they are much more likely to choose an alternate city for vacation. In a post-catastrophe environment, confidence must be restored to potential visitors to a certain level so that their perceived risk is minimized (Scott et al., 2008; Lehto et al., 2008). One of the quickest and most efficient ways to minimize this perceived risk to a large audience is through the use of widespread national media.

Despite the inherent benefit of media when dealing with a destination’s recovery process, mismanagement of media can be debilitating and prevent full recovery long after the immediate threat is over. As Scott et al. (2008) indicate, “In contemporary society, the 24 hour news services such as CNN feature and repeat scenes of devastation and disaster, so that potential travelers rapidly become aware of incidents occurring literally on the other side of the world.
Thus the destination suffering a crisis becomes in effect ‘demarketed’ under a deluge of negative, if not hostile, publicity” (p. 10). Faulkner goes so far as to say that if mismanaged, a media strategy can be the deciding factor as to whether or not a “difficult situation” turns into a “disaster” (2001).

New York

In hopes of attracting tourists back to New York, the city launched a $40 million campaign in October of that year, merely weeks after the attacks of 9/11 (Heinzl, 2001). Wolf Group New York, a subsidiary of the Canadian company Wolf Group Integrated Communications, put a new spin on the “I Love New York” campaign previously used to draw in visitors to the city. The 60-second television advertisement shows many ordinary New Yorkers proclaiming that they love New York. TV hosts Regis and Kelly Philbin, actor Ben Stiller, and Yankees player Derek Jeter joined in proclaiming their love for the city as well. The spot ends with New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani and state Governor George Pataki exclaiming together, “I love New York!” (Jer540, 2010). To maximize the effect of the advertisement, a roadblock strategy was used in which the commercial aired on over 100 television stations at the same time on the same day (Heinzl, 2001). The ad aired across the northeastern United States, as well as in Toronto and Montreal. An additional spot was created which featured Broadway Stars singing Frank Sinatra’s “New York, New York” in Times Square. The commercial ends with a voiceover from Nathan Lane saying, “Come to New York, and let’s go on with the show!” (Heinzl, 2001).

In an additional effort to attract visitors, both foreign and domestic, back to New York, the city launched a major integrated advertising campaign titled the “New York Miracle Campaign” in November of 2001. BBDO North America, a division of Omnicom Group, put together six television commercials and a matching web component featuring celebrities closely
associated with New York. The television spots utilized humor and the uplifting message that anyone could contribute to the New York miracle. The campaign was initiated by New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani and completed as a pro-bono project by BBDO (Vagnoni, 2001). The city planned to purchase $15 million worth of national television advertising time and hoped that networks would willingly donate more (Goldman, 2001). Vagnoni (2001) explains that while the campaign “intended to buoy the spirits of New Yorkers in a way no other post-Sept. 11 campaign has, it also seeks to create a sense of vitality and exuberance that the city hopes will give a holiday boost to its beleaguered tourism, retail restaurant and entertainment industries.” Many New York celebrities were more than willing to join the cause. Barbara Walters graced the Broadway stage with a less than perfect audition. Henry Kissinger took the field at Yankee Stadium, rounded the bases, slid into home plate and exclaimed, “Derek who?” Woody Allen twirled and leaped across the ice at Rockefeller Center before confessing, “You’re not going to believe this. That was the first time I’ve put on ice skates in my life.” Yogi Berra took control of conducting the New York Philharmonic Orchestra and then wondered aloud, “Who the heck is this guy Phil Harmonic?” Ben Stiller and Kevin Bacon appeared in the Stage Delicatessen when a patron ordered one of the famous sandwiches named after Stiller with a side of Bacon. Billy Crystal and Robert De Niro dressed up as a turkey and pilgrim in Central Park, debating over who would be the better turkey in the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade. Al Roker looked at the camera and said, “Nice day for a jog,” as he crossed the finish line and won the New York City marathon. Finally, Vanessa Williams kicked a field goal for the New York Giants while dressed to the nines in a dress and heels (The Ad Show, 2011). At the end of each spot a narrator says, “Everyone has a New York dream. Come find yours.” Finally, Mayor Giuliani appears exclaiming, “The New York Miracle. Be a part of it.” (Goldman, 2001).
BBDO New York’s current president and CEO, John Osborn, was the director of integrated marketing for BBDO Worldwide at the time and took on the role of account leader for the New York Miracle campaign. Osborn explained that the campaign was well-received by those who viewed it. The worldwide campaign received over 100 million impressions, and the hype behind it lasted for over three months. The New York Miracle campaign aided in the quick recovery of New York City. By December of 2001, merely months after the attacks, overall tourism levels had rebounded to 90% of the numbers of visitors to the city before the attacks. Hotel occupancy began to increase once again. The lights turned back on and Broadway attendance skyrocketed to 95%. BBDO conducted a survey worldwide which revealed that New York City was the number one vacation destination, and over half a million people showed up in Times Square on New Year’s Eve (J. Osborn, personal communication, February 22, 2016). Osborn affirmed that the more difficult results to measure concerned the psyche and perceptions from both New Yorkers and the rest of the world. “The fact that we illustrated was that New York was and still is on its feet, which in and of itself is a miracle,” Osborn stated. “Everyone’s spirits lifted,” he added.

Osborn spoke of one of his favorite examples of the popularity of the New York Miracle campaign. Henry Kissinger, who starred in the Yankee Stadium spot, was traveling to Japan not long after the commercials aired. When he stepped off the plane in Tokyo, two separate individuals dove on the floor in front of him, imitating his slide into home plate, and repeated his line, “Derek who?” Kissinger got a kick out of the recognition. (J. Osborn, personal communication, February 22, 2016) The influence of the campaign had spread far and wide.
New Orleans

Compared to New York City, New Orleans suffered the most from misrepresentation in the media. The perceptions that potential visitors associated with New Orleans were far from the truth. Five months after Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans Tourism Marketing Corporation conducted a nation-wide telephone survey which demonstrated the skewed popular opinion of the city. Despite the fact that floodwaters receded weeks after the storm, 46.4% of respondents believed some neighborhoods still had standing water in the streets. Though the major tourism destinations of the French Quarter and the Convention Center went relatively unharmed by the storm, 47.6% of respondents believed that the historic districts of New Orleans, including the French Quarter, were severely damaged or completely destroyed. In terms of safety, 45.6% of respondents indicated that there was a lack of police presence in New Orleans due to layoffs after the storm. In reality, the number of police officers did decrease, but the ratio of police officers to residents increased from 1:289 to 1:130. This was caused by a decrease in population (Chacko & Marcell, 2008).

To combat low numbers in tourism and negate the lasting negative perceptions of the city, the tourism marketers for New Orleans realized they would have to implement a campaign focusing on a repositioning strategy. Several advertising campaigns were launched to call tourists back to New Orleans. Marketers realized that the most promising results would come from targeting visitors who had already traveled to New Orleans before. The strategy moving forward suggested that it would be easier to convince visitors to come back rather than attract first-time visitors. The New Orleans Tourism Marketing Corporation and the Louisiana Office of Tourism rolled out a $7 million campaign urging people to “Come fall in love with Louisiana all over again.” The campaign also used “New Orleans” instead of “Louisiana” in several instances. This print and electronic media campaign made use of New Orleans native celebrities such as
John Goodman and Emeril Lagasse, as well as other native actors, artists, athletes, and musicians. Television commercials were aired in nearby markets of Atlanta, Little Rock, San Antonio, Houston, Dallas, and Austin. The print ads were displayed in dozens of national newspapers and magazines, including “Food and Wine” and “Essence” (Plaisance, 2006).

The city of New Orleans, through the pooling of various public and private resources, created the New Orleans Media Center in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina as a means of disseminating its positioning strategy. This was the city’s way of broadcasting to the rest of the United States that much of the popular tourist areas of New Orleans remained relatively undamaged. The Center was organized at a downtown hotel and served as a central location where various media correspondents could access Internet service, cable news, and other general office resources. Reporters could give their regular broadcasts from the Center and received daily updates concerning the ongoing recovery of the city (Chacko & Marcell, 2008, p. 231). The New Orleans Media Center allowed various stakeholders in the tourism industry to take a proactive approach to informing the general public on a national news platform that the city of New Orleans was on its way to a full recovery.

**Long-Term Phase**

In a sense, the long-term phase is a continuation of the previous intermediate phase, but on a grander scale. Items that could not be addressed as quickly during the intermediate phase are taken care of during the long-term phase. This phase is also known as the recovery phase, as the area attempts to reestablish normalcy in a post-disaster environment. Restoration begins as damaged infrastructure is repaired and environmentally damaged areas are rehabilitated. Victims are counseled, and both business and consumer confidence is restored through the development of investment plans (Faulkner, 2001, p. 144).
New York

In terms of long-term recovery for New York, the city had to deal with many issues. Over 10,000 Ground Zero workers filed lawsuits against multiple government agencies after the attacks of 9/11, claiming the defendants did not take provide adequate equipment or sufficient supervision to prevent the workers from contracting serious illnesses while working to clear the site (Navarro, 2010). Most of the plaintiffs were firefighters and police officers.

Perhaps the most pressing issue that New York had to face in the long-term phase was dealing with the emotional damages dealt to the city. Many Americans did feel the need to rally behind New York as part of their patriotic duty, meaning that tourism levels did not stay below the norm for too long; however, Ground Zero left a large scar on the city, causing many tourists to give the area a wide berth, or shorten their stay in New York for fear of safety. New York worked quickly to begin plans for the National September 11 Memorial and Museum so that all of those in the city, both residents and tourists alike, could begin the healing process. The National September 11 Memorial was dedicated on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, and opened to the general public the day after. In 2011, ten years after 9/11, New York welcomed more visitors than ever to the city—50.2 million. Over one million of these visitors had paid their respects at the memorial merely three months after its opening (CBS New York, 2011). Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated, “The Memorial is now a part of the fabric of lower Manhattan, and its one million visitors have helped the neighborhood reemerge as a vibrant and bustling part of our great city” (CBS New York, 2011). The museum was dedicated in May of 2014. As of March of 2016, less than two years after its opening, the museum had welcomed over five million visitors from all 50 states and more than 150 countries (CBS New York, 2016). This memorial and museum has allowed Americans and foreign visitors alike to heal, pay their respects, and show their support for the city of New York.
New Orleans

New Orleans also had to deal with many legal issues following Hurricane Katrina. The major case was against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers over the levee breaches that caused most of the flooding throughout the city. More than 500,000 residents, businesses, and government entities filed claims against the Corps (Associated Press, 2013). While New York focused on repairing the emotional damage caused after 9/11, New Orleans did not follow suit. Though a Hurricane Katrina memorial was built, few people even know of its existence, much less visit it on a regular basis (Roesgen, 2015). Perhaps this is because New Orleans did not have a common enemy behind which to rally. Instead, New Orleans focused more of its long-term recovery efforts on rebuilding its infrastructure in hopes that visitors would return to the city in full force. Tourism levels have not recovered to pre-Katrina levels, and the city is constantly making improvements in hopes of boosting these numbers. New Orleans has developed more restaurants, cocktail bars, live music performance venues, cruise options, hotel options, and green spaces than ever before. The city has put a lot of money into renovating and redeveloping the Louis Armstrong International Airport, the New Orleans Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, the Four Seasons, the Louisiana Children’s Museum, and the National World War II Museum (M. Kowitz, personal communication, February 19, 2016).
Resolution Phase
The sixth and final phase included in Faulkner’s framework is the resolution phase.

During this phase, routine is restored or a new and improved state is established (Faulkner, 2001, p. 144). This phase also initiates a feedback loop. Existing disaster management and emergency response plans are assessed and any necessary improvements are made (Scott et al., 2008, p. 9). Organizations must identify what they did correctly, as well as the mistakes they made and how to improve upon those mistakes. Unfortunately, many organizations cannot understand every action they will need to take until after a disaster occurs and they have had to deal with the fallout. By improving existing contingency plans, an organization is investing in its future and ensuring that grave mistakes will be avoided at all costs.

New York
Following the attacks of 9/11, the United States government greatly increased security measures. Many of these improvements were specific to New York State’s office of Homeland Security. The state changed its structure and created the Office of Public Security (OPS) to meet changing homeland security needs. In 2004, OPS developed into the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) to broaden its mission and range of control. Most recently, in 2010, the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) was created to bring together the public safety offices of Counter Terrorism, Cyber Security, Emergency Management, Fire Prevention and Control, and Interoperable and Emergency Communications. The DHSES offers a more effective way of handling a crisis situation by centralizing channels of communication.

In addition to creating these new offices and divisions, the state of New York has passed laws to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as terrorist financing. The state has also updated identification technology for security purposes, increased the radio spectrum for first responders, and established a unified Incident Command Center.
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services, 2011). Additionally, the New York Fire and Police Departments can now contact each other directly via radio, and the two departments hold joint drills in high-risk areas (Hauser, 2008). These are just some of the changes the State of New York has made to help prepare for and prevent another attack similar to that of 9/11.

**New Orleans**

The city of New Orleans learned a great deal after handling the fallout from Hurricane Katrina, and New Orleans officials have taken many steps to reduce the city’s vulnerability to storms similar to Katrina in the future. One of the approaches that officials have adopted is rebuilding natural protection against large storms along the Louisiana coast. The state of Louisiana has taken greater notice of the positive impacts of wetland restoration since Hurricane Katrina. During the storm, wetlands along the coast slowed water speed from seven to three feet per second. Over the last 70 years, the state of Louisiana has lost an area of wetlands equivalent to the size of Delaware along its coastline (Angelle, 2010). The state could no longer ignore this depletion of resources after Katrina and created the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, which now works together with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to rebuild and maintain wetlands along coastal Louisiana that would act as a buffer against any future hurricane.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is also working to improve the city’s levee and pump systems. Many of the old levee walls that were not up to date at the time of Katrina have been improved with new walls that are reinforced with steel support beams. The Corps engineers have also increased the height of many of the levees. Finally, the pump stations located throughout New Orleans that were not equipped to handle the massive amounts of water that rushed into the city after the levees breached are being storm-proofed. All of these improvements, which amount
to $14.45 billion, are part of the most advanced flood defense system that New Orleans has ever put in place (Angelle, 2010).

Changes were also made in terms of logistics and management to minimize damage from a storm like Hurricane Katrina in the future. In 2006, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. This act made several changes in terms of organization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). It also included improved communication protocols during the evacuation process and after a storm has made landfall to help prevent loss of life (Senate Bill 3721, 2006). Both New York and New Orleans focused on improving protection against similar disasters in the future, but also how the situation would be taken care of from a management standpoint.

CONCLUSION

Though the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina had major differences, any large city, especially one that relies heavily on tourism for its economy, can learn from these two disasters. The first major step to bringing tourists back to a city after a major disaster is to take care of basic needs. These needs must be outlined in contingency plans before a disaster is ever imminent. If a city cannot protect its people and its infrastructure, a good media plan will not matter. If basic needs are not attended to, the city will not be able to support potential tourists. Additionally, coordinated communication is key before, during, and after a disaster. A city must include communication protocols in its contingency plans. As mentioned before, the severe lack of communication between New York Fire and Police departments, two departments that would obviously need to work together in the event of a major emergency situation, led to many unnecessary deaths. Coordinated communication plans that are developed before a major disaster strikes are necessary to reduce damages and ultimately bring business back to the city more quickly. A physical emergency office location is also an essential factor. A central location
fosters coordinated communication efforts, gives everyone involved in resolving the situation access to the same information, and allows individuals and agencies vital to recovery to easily access one another. New Orleans did a good job of this by establishing an emergency office, but New York did not. Because there was no central emergency office location, the city of New York lost many lives, especially throughout the Fire Department. Once a city has taken care of its basic needs, it does need to roll out a strong media plan as quickly as possible. New York wasted no time in contacting the right people to initiate an advertising plan merely days after the attacks of 9/11. By postponing its media plans until five months after the storm, New Orleans waited far too long to show the rest of the country that it was successfully recovering from a major disaster. Finally, routine testing is something that every major city should take advantage of. Cities should test their existing systems by running simulations on a regular basis. Testing these systems could point out weak spots and lead to improvements before a disaster ever even strikes.

Though many of these necessities seem like they do not necessarily pertain to bringing tourism back to a city after a major disaster, they are the routines that must be in place if a city ever hopes to regrow its tourism business. Once these needs are taken care of, a city can then focus on strengthening its media plan to grow tourism. The focus should not be on what is new or different, but that the city is just as appealing as it was before the disaster.

While these plans may seem necessary for a destination such as New York, an iconic city known worldwide and a potential terrorist target, or New Orleans, a low-lying city in southern Louisiana threatened yearly by hurricanes, every city must be prepared. Any city in the United States can learn from these two examples. No destination ever thinks it will be next to experience devastation. Yet Oklahoma City was vulnerable after a domestic terrorist attacked. Boston was
vulnerable after the marathon bombing. Dallas was vulnerable after a scare with the Ebola virus. The fact of the matter is that anything can happen anywhere at any time. Cities must have plans in place and begin the thought process of how to bring tourists back before a disaster ever even strikes.
REFERENCES


