

#TERRORISM: FACTORS SHAPING THE NATURE OF  
SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGNS RESPONDING  
TO TERRORISM

By

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SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGNS RESPONDING  
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**Abstract**

Terrorism is a prevalent problem across the globe. While many scholars focus on counterterrorism strategies and potential causes, little research exists about the reactions of civilians to terrorist attacks.

Civilians increasingly turn to digital platforms to generate social media campaigns in response to terrorism. To identify the elements of terrorist attacks that shape social media campaigns, this study assesses two cases: the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings on January 7, 2015, and the Paris attacks on November 13, 2015. By assessing the nature of the attacks in both cases and examining the news media and Twitter content surrounding both incidents, this study generates several hypotheses about the factors that influence civilian reactions to terrorism and the impacts of civilian-produced social media campaigns.

Exploring an area that is largely untapped by scholars, this study develops suggestions for further research into the effects of civilian responses to terrorism.

Terrorist attacks are one of the most prominent threats for any country today. Numerous states live in constant fear of being struck by invading antagonists like ISIS or al Qaeda. When these attacks do occur, though, civilians tend to strike back and band together to convey their collective sense of nationalism and pride. Their responsive social media campaigns showcase their ideas and values through use of modern technology. As we immerse ourselves further into the digital age, the tactics that civilians employ to publicly voice their opinions differ immensely. The methods of poster propaganda and physical rallies have slowly disappeared, replaced by “liking” and “sharing” politically charged articles or tweeting controversial opinions from behind the comfort of a screen. Once upon a time, the only way to effectively capture public attention on prominent issues was by staging sit-ins at a local Woolworth five-and-dime counter; now people of all ages and abilities can label themselves as “political heroes” simply because they press a button opting to filter their Facebook profile photos with the colors of a grieving country’s flag.

Although the threshold for political activism has lowered over time, there is still much to learn about the nature and impact of such mass activist movements. Now more than ever it is easier to create influence through social media campaigns due to the ease by which they virally disseminate. They quickly become juggernauts, with millions of people pledging their allegiance to a cause. Nonetheless, very little research has been conducted on current social media campaigns in response to terrorist attacks. Thus, it is crucial to understand their nature, the factors that shape them, and their effects. This raises an important question about the impact of modern terrorist movements: what factors shape the nature of social media campaigns that respond to terrorist attacks? In other words, what effect do these terrorist attacks have on modern day political activism? In addition to shedding light on the nature of social media campaigns, investigating these questions also results in the generation of further implications and hypotheses about their effects on subsequent government and terrorist group responses.

To answer the questions inspired by new waves of terrorism, the situation should be simplified (to an extent) to better focus on the nature of social media campaigns created by those living in the nations that are attacked. This study concentrates on both the conditions of terrorist attacks and the collective

group of citizens launching the campaigns. While it would be difficult to analyze every campaign created in response to all acts of terror, I limit my study to a single country: France. Since social media was not particularly prevalent until circa 2006, this study focuses on the more recent campaigns that occurred in 2015. France is diverse enough as a state to formulate a plausible and globally applicable theory, and it is also the site of some of the most current terrorist attacks. Technological and social advances within this country provide structures for the responsive social media campaigns that are conducive to generating hypotheses on the effects that these digital grassroots movements have on governments and even on the terrorist groups. The following section examines prevailing literature on terrorism and outlines the direction of this study considering previous research.

### **Literature Review**

Existing literature regarding modern terrorism—occurring within the last fifteen years—mostly addresses its causes, cures, and consequences. Although much ambiguity lingers within this field of study, scholars have begun to illuminate the topic, revealing many shades of gray in areas where we wish for simple black and white. The contemporary nature of terrorism and its rapid evolution make it somewhat difficult to draw conclusions about or predict behaviors of the groups committing these violent acts. However, the uncertainty surrounding this area draws many scholars to study terrorism and contribute substantially to the discourse regarding possible motives, solutions, and outcomes.

#### *Causes*

Terrorism has been defined as “the frightening of victims into surrendering to the will of the terrorist,” implying that it has psychological repercussions in addition to physical impact; however, this study’s references to terrorism will imply the “premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims.”<sup>1</sup> These terrorist groups—unlawful combatants—are those who do not possess the authority to initiate military action or violence and do not receive full protections of the

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<sup>1</sup> Sandler, “The Analytical Study of Terrorism,” 257-71.

Third Geneva Convention;<sup>2</sup> according to Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, an individual or group is not entitled to protection if that party “is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the States.”<sup>3</sup> In turn, these hostile acts evoke paralyzing fear and psychological troubles among those attacked.<sup>4</sup> According to Sandler, terrorists typically strike because of economic grievances, political motives, or identity concerns.<sup>5</sup> In terms of political motivation, Crenshaw suggests that one intent might be to provoke counterterrorism reactions from governments, thus gleaning publicity for the terrorists; it can also be a means to disrupt governments or discredit their processes.<sup>6</sup> Regarding culturally motivated attacks, Dorsey argues that groups like ISIS may use violence to aggravate pre-existing social identity tensions, then capitalize on those fissures in order to recruit followers.<sup>7</sup> Krieger and Meierrieks comprehensively summarize the determinants of terrorism as “economic deprivation, modernization strain, institutional order, political transformation, identity conflict, global order, and contagion.”<sup>8</sup>

While it may be difficult to conceive how a person might rationalize extreme acts of aggression targeting innocent lives, scholars have objectively examined the possible causes of terrorism. Both Crenshaw and Dorsey have found that there appears to be a political component for terrorists, with “random acts of violence” representing a bigger message from these groups. None of the scholars address the prospect of terrorism as retaliation towards certain responses or reactions of the targeted states or populations, which leaves room for future speculation.

### *Cures*

Many studies of terrorism are primarily focused on recommending and evaluating counterterrorism policies. For example, Romaniuk assesses the stability of multilateral counterterrorism efforts and determines the need for strong state powers’ participation in those activities.<sup>9</sup> Sandler weighs

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<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *Third Geneva Convention*, 75 UNTS 135.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Fourth Geneva Convention*, 75 UNTS 287.

<sup>4</sup> Sandler, “The Analytical Study of Terrorism,” 257.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 379–99.

<sup>7</sup> Dorsey, “Jihadists Seek to Exploit Wide Sense of Abandonment,” 67-9.

<sup>8</sup> Krieger et al., “What Causes Terrorism?,” 5.

<sup>9</sup> Romaniuk, “Institutions as Swords and Shields: Multilateral Counter-terrorism since 9/11,” 591-613.

the effectiveness of supplying foreign aid (specifically military assistance) to countries with terrorist residents; he suggests that this strategy is essentially irrational since it ultimately requires those countries to act against their own self-interests.<sup>10</sup> In terms of aggressive retaliation against terrorism, Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare propose that only unanticipated attacks will be effective in deterring terrorists, and they discuss the further complications with timeframes for retaliation.<sup>11</sup> As the threat of terrorism remains a reality, this segment of literature is still growing and attempting the discovery of proven, reliable counterterrorism methods.

### *Consequences*

Studies of terrorism's consequences emphasize effects on government policy, casualties, and impacted economic performance. Sandler notes that terrorism has costs involving damaged structures, injuries, death tolls, lost labor and wages, increased security, and compensation to protect high-risk areas.<sup>12</sup> Scholars and political leaders who focus on internal responses to terrorist attacks argue that retribution is destructive and view the employment of military force as collaborating with terrorism.<sup>13</sup> As with the Paris attacks in 2015, officials engage internal security measures banning public demonstrations, closing local facilities, or conducting electronic surveillance.<sup>14</sup> Government policy can be affected in ways that, according to Kampmark, are far too restrictive upon personal liberties; such policies are outlined in the *état de siège* of French law (the *state of siege* concept employed during a state of emergency).<sup>15</sup> Although these measures may be constrictive, Jenkins argues that a consequence of these domestic intelligence and surveillance efforts is the improved number of foiled terrorist attacks.<sup>16</sup> However, governments fear that ongoing crises in surrounding states put them at larger risk of being attacked, thus requiring reevaluation and debate regarding the validity of allowing foreign refugees into

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<sup>10</sup> Sandler, "Introduction: New Frontiers of Terrorism Research," 279-86.

<sup>11</sup> Brophy-Baermann et al., "Retaliating against Terrorism," 196-210.

<sup>12</sup> Sandler, "The Analytical Study of Terrorism," 261.

<sup>13</sup> Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism," 405-20.

<sup>14</sup> Kampmark, "Straining the Republic: France's State of Emergency," 113-15.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Jenkins, "New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts."

their nations.<sup>17</sup> Responding with military force is increasingly common, as was the case in the United States following the September 11 attacks and now France as it deployed 10 aircrafts to Raqqa within a week of being attacked.<sup>18</sup> Hardin claims that an actual attack is not even necessary for policymakers to warrant military action; rather, the idea of self-defense against possible attacks suffices to motivate conflict.<sup>19</sup> Hardin proposes that because two groups are vying for something that they both have interest in—terrorists and states both want land, power, or control of civilians—then these groups will aim to destroy one another in order to keep or obtain the thing that they want.<sup>20</sup>

While consequences to government policy are prominent, social and cultural consequences must be addressed as well. In the case of the November attacks in Paris—in a country with a population of nearly five million Muslims—the tendency of associating ISIS with Islam aggravated pre-existing religious and ethnic tensions.<sup>21</sup> By reacting strongly to these attacks, with both the government and social media calling for external global support, Dorsey argues that France may have further provoked social frictions.<sup>22</sup> Public response to terrorism is relevant because its impacts are large-scale. The voice of public opinion is increasingly amplified because of widely accessible social media platforms, and civilian reactions to terrorism are a driving force behind much of a nation's recovery.

Sandler outlines the costly consequences of terrorism, while Kampmark mentions an indirect sacrifice resulting from government actions. Both Plaster and Hardin point out the ways that government policies are affected in response to terrorism; Jenkins validates their arguments by confirming the necessity for these methods of modern counterterrorism. Particularly in Hardin's work, there is well-developed theory regarding the "why" and "how" of both groups in external conflicts. However, it is important to note that civilian reaction is an important missing link in the literature. It leaves significant gaps regarding how the public responds to terrorist attacks, as well as the subsequent effects of those

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<sup>17</sup> Plaster, "Letter from the Editor," 4.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Hardin, *One for All: Logic of Group Conflict*, 150.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Kampmark, "Paris, the Terrorists' Magnet," 92-3.

<sup>22</sup> Dorsey, 68.

responses. What kinds of responses do civilians put forward publicly? What do social media campaigns look like? Are campaigns created to increase support for these government policies by promoting solidarity, compliance, and peace? I examine the nature of social media responses to terrorism in order to understand their variations, the underlying factors that guide them, and their general effects.

### *Social Media and Public Responses to Terrorism*

Studies on the consequences of terrorism also note that attacks elicit public response. Although the literature discussing social media campaigns is scarce due to its relatively recent origination, there are a few arguments to be found regarding cyberactivism. Social media campaigns are the modern-day form of political activism or propaganda, and they are increasingly popular mediums for reacting to events like terrorist attacks. Just as with any kind of campaign or media representation, there are biases in these social media responses to terrorism.<sup>23</sup> Scholars such as Khair examine the “half truths” found within these social media campaigns, revealing that they need to be approached with the same caution as any other form of media.<sup>24</sup> It is also important to look at all the different campaigns within a state: Ahari points out that while the French majority sang *La Marseillaise* and broadcast their solidarity across the globe, French Muslims also publicly read verse 5:32 of the Quran, which condemned the acts of terror in Paris, to show that Islam does not support ISIS.<sup>25</sup> Vegh divides social activist campaigns into different categories: awareness/advocacy, organization/mobilization, and action/reaction.<sup>26</sup> These broad categories can help explain the motivation and direction of each public initiative.<sup>27</sup>

Different factors relating to terrorism might serve to either escalate or de-escalate the nature of civilian responses. One major influence on the nature of social media campaigns is civilian emotion. Sadler and her colleagues propose that civilians who are angry with the terrorist attacks promote increased military intervention and domestic surveillance, whereas those who are primarily saddened or

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<sup>23</sup> Khair, “Double Nature of Orthodox Truths,” 28-30.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ahrari, “La Marseillaise Versus the Quaranic Verse 5:32,” 73-4.

<sup>26</sup> McCaughey et al., *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice*, 72.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

fearful will be more likely to seek humanitarian aid and be reluctant to pinpoint any one cause of the attack.<sup>28</sup> Most pertinent to this study are the factors that shape public response to terrorism as outlined by the National Research Council of the National Academies. Their research suggests specific dimensions of an attack that influence civilian reactions: the suddenness of an attack, its scope, whether it is local or general, the degree to which the target is symbolically charged, and the degree to which the attack is grossly inhumane.<sup>29</sup>

The categories defined by Vegh are particularly useful in designing a research model, and his theories contribute to explaining the motivation behind civilian campaigns. Additionally, the factors shaping civilian responses assist in explicating my theory. Each scholar proposes slightly different angles for approaching a social media campaign, but all of them are comprehensive in their ideas. There is plenty of room for future research within this field, especially since none of the scholars address the outcomes and effects of campaigns.

### *Summary*

The existing literature provides a context for the causes, consequences, and cures of terrorism that I build on to understand the motivations behind each social media campaign and its projected outcome. This study focuses more on the internal responses to terrorism, since civilian campaigns originate from inside a state, but it is also important to address external responses if campaigns call for that type of action. Scholars present many variables to consider when explaining the nature of social media campaigns after terrorist attacks. For this study, social media campaigns are defined as the movements created by nongovernment (civilian) actors in direct response to acts of terror within a state. Drawing upon previous research, the campaigns are classified similarly to two of the groups mentioned by Vegh: static support (awareness/advocacy) and articulated aggression (organization/mobilization). Using these categories, I expand upon existing definitions of social media campaigns to identify and explain the nature and variants of campaigns and their further effects.

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<sup>28</sup> Sadler et al., “Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsement,” 249-58.

<sup>29</sup> National Research Council of the National Academies, *Making the Nation Safer*, 267-86.

## Theory

Terrorist strikes evoke reactions from several groups, particularly from the general public. Social media campaigns created by nongovernment actors—that is, the ordinary people living within a state—are susceptible to influence just as much as they are used to influence others. This study examines the stimuli that shape each social media campaign created as response to radical terrorism. Terrorist attacks that lead to strong civilian emotions and responses act as the independent variable for this theory, triggering the dependent variable: social media campaigns. Different considerations and emotions catalyze two types of media responses, with fear or sadness spurring static support campaigns and anger inspiring more articulated aggression campaigns (similar to Vegh’s awareness/advocacy and organization/mobilization classifications, respectively). Though not tested in this study, this theory posits that these two campaign categories lead to varying responses from the terrorist groups, corresponding with the demeanor of each campaign. These social media responses can be examined as a collective action problem in order to further predict the impact that civilians wish to have on the initial terrorist groups. The theory suggested by this study is visually demonstrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1: Theory

### *Attacks Evoke Considerations*

The opening part of this theory stems from the definition of terrorism found within the literature review section, where it can be defined as psychological warfare. When any person witnesses—or even hears about—something that is traumatic, the brain registers information and elicits emotional responses appropriate for that person’s perspective, pre-existing beliefs, and experiences. For example, if a person has seen a violent crime first-hand or lived through a time of war, his or her emotions may differ considerably from someone whose greatest brush with fear has been nearly stepping on a copperhead

snake. Sets of considerations are evoked depending on the schema through which a person learns about the terrorist attack. These considerations are elicited, producing and intermingling with emotional reactions. While responsive emotions may vary for those residing in an attacked nation, Sadler and her colleagues argue that the main two branches of emotion stimulated from terrorism are anger and fear or sadness.<sup>30</sup> These two branches drive citizens to react in ways amounting to more than just passive silence—the emotions triggered by the attack operate as an antecedent variable, stimulating a response greater than mere indifference.

#### *Motivation for Social Media Campaigns*

The second part of this complex chain is the responsive emotions that catalyze mass social media campaigns. The two main branches of emotions, anger and fear or sadness, essentially drive civilians to act—or at least to participate in a form of modern-day political activism through social media. Vegh's dichotomy of the campaign types supports the notion that the angrier public reaction is to an act of terror, the more likely the public is to produce responsive mobilization/organization-type social media campaigns, which this study refers to as articulated aggression. Likewise, the more fearful or sad public reaction is to an act of terror, the more likely the public is to produce responsive awareness/advocacy-type social media campaigns, which are called static support for this study. The purpose of an articulated aggression campaign is to band together public support for a defensive measure of action.<sup>31</sup> Conversely, static support campaigns attempt to promote support for humanity and extend a digital hand of solidarity.<sup>32</sup> This paper studies the essence of these two types of social media campaigns as its dependent variable.

Drawing on the studies of the National Research Council for the National Academies, I have streamlined four main factors that shape the nature of social media campaigns. First, whether the attack is provoked influences public response. Civilians may have differing views about whether an attack was

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<sup>30</sup> Sadler et al., 249-58.

<sup>31</sup> McCaughey et al., 72-4.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

substantiated or justifiable. Second, the magnitude of an attack produces corresponding emotions dependent on the number of deaths, injuries, and hostages; a larger scale attack would evoke a greater outcry for solidarity with the victims. Third, the identity groups that exist within the culture affect the way the attack is viewed. If some civilians chiefly identify with the victims, their reactions diverge from those who consider themselves members of the terrorist group. Finally, socio-political considerations are a main catalyst for civilian responses; this relates to whether the terrorists are acting in defense of a certain value or directly attacking an important social ideal. These four factors are used as criteria to judge the ways that social media campaigns are shaped.

#### *Campaign Dichotomy and Action*

The two different types of campaigns ultimately vie for the same outcome: an end to the era of terror. Civilians disagree on the methods that end terrorism, seen through the tactics within the distinctive campaigns. Drawing upon Sadler and her colleagues' studies on terrorism and psychology, people who primarily were angered in response to attacks favored counterterrorism methods of increased military intervention and domestic surveillance.<sup>33</sup> Civilians who initially responded to attacks with fear or sadness preferred to reach out to unstable areas to provide humanitarian aid and avoided blaming one sole group or cause.<sup>34</sup> It follows that civilians participating in an articulated aggression campaign most likely advocate for increased military action against potential terrorist threats. Conversely, civilians participating in a static solidarity campaign are most likely calling for humanitarian aid and outreach to areas harboring potential terrorist threats. Therefore, an articulated aggression campaign would call for leaders to initiate military intervention as a response to terrorism, while static support campaigns would promote leaders exploring peaceful options to combat terrorism. Although not analyzed in this study, it is important to note that terrorists are triggered by a variety of factors, including government action.

The assumptions about campaigns' aims coinciding with the actions of state leaders explain an extraneous variable: the government or leaders' roles in the theoretical chain. Civilians alone cannot

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<sup>33</sup> Sadler et al., 249-58.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

always instigate terrorism, although cases such as the 2015 *Charlie Hebdo* massacre in France serve as exceptions.<sup>35</sup> Thus in most circumstances, social media campaigns aim to attract the attention of three actors: other civilians, the leaders of their own state, and the terrorist group who attacked them.

This theory can be viewed through the lens of a collective action scenario. Terrorism is an issue that states wish to eliminate, but the high stakes and costly potential consequences lead many states to not act unless attacked. Ideally, each nation would like to watch terrorism and the radical groups responsible for it disintegrate at the hands of any other nation (at no cost to them). Since free-riders make this unrealistic and unlikely to occur, states have several options in this collective action situation: to coerce other states to join military action; to mobilize completely on their own, allowing other states to benefit; or to do absolutely nothing, risking future attacks. This study has established that social media campaigns responding to terrorist attacks have the goal of unifying individuals, regardless of political motive, under a banner of nationalism. In collective action cases, nationalism is often used to mobilize a population to wage war against another group.<sup>36</sup> However, this theory assumes that when analyzing terrorism as a collective action case, nationalism does not always need to be considered as a means for mobilizing violent conflict, since campaigns can call for different forms of action. If a social media campaign promotes nationalism, then it is used purely a mechanism to inspire political activism.

### **Data and Methods**

In this analysis, I conduct a hypothesis-generating case study.<sup>37</sup> To evaluate the nature and effects of public social media campaigns in response to terrorism, I focus on those stemming from two specific instances of terrorism in France in 2015. This study compares the campaigns, responses, and rhetoric surrounding both the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in January 2015 and the ones in Paris later that year. Narrowing the scope of this study allows for a more detailed examination of the relationship between attacks and social media, while paving the way for future research in a larger context.

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<sup>35</sup> Rose, “Resist the Tyranny of Silence After Charlie Hebdo Attack,” 40-4.

<sup>36</sup> Hardin, 150.

<sup>37</sup> Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” 1–18; Lijphart, “The comparable cases strategy in comparative research,” 133–77; Eckstein, “Case study and Theory,” 79-137.

To better understand the factors underlying social media campaigns, I collect a sample of data from Twitter using two different methods: the Advanced Search feature on Twitter for seven days following the attack, and a random sample of tweets for two days after the attack. Using the four factors to evaluate the attacks for both cases, I am able to better determine the role that those factors play in molding civilian responses and better differentiate the types of campaigns by parsing out language and rhetoric within the Twitter data.

### *Social Media Campaigns*

Civilians have adopted the use of modern technology to share their feelings, emotions, reactions, and sentiments after their state experiences terrorism. For example, in early January 2015 two gunmen identifying with a branch of al Qaeda shot and killed several victims in Paris, France.<sup>38</sup> In response, civilians used a hashtag to show their support for the Parisian magazine: #jesuischarlie. This form of cyberactivism is what I define as a social media campaign: any use of a social media site, webpage, or online forum (including online news outlets) to convey a message in response to an act of terror. This study applies Vegh's classifications of cyberactivism to help categorize social media campaigns into two groups: static support or articulated aggression.<sup>39</sup> A static support campaign simply does not call for any form of belligerence or military action. Instead, it acts as the digital equivalent of a bumper sticker or yard sign by promoting unity as a personal value. The hashtag campaign created after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks in Paris would be an example of static support. Conversely, an articulated aggression campaign calls for offensive or military action or justifies the terrorists' violence. While the campaign may not actually result in violence, it expresses explicit hostility. An example of this would be the digital footage of a United States-led military operation that freed nearly 70 Kurdish prisoners from ISIS captivity in Iraq. This video went viral—receiving over a million views—within a week after being leaked to the Kurdish media network “Rudaw”.<sup>40</sup> Due to the mission's success, the video campaign continued to trend

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<sup>38</sup> Rose, 40-4.

<sup>39</sup> McCaughey et al., 72-4.

<sup>40</sup> Lesaca, “Fight against ISIS reveals power of social media.”

on social media, advocating for persistent military operations against ISIS. The differences between static support and articulated aggression campaigns can sometimes be challenging to identify, but the primary distinction is each intended message.

Social media campaigns responding to terrorist attacks evolve from several different factors. To understand the nature of the public reactions to terrorism, it requires controlled cases that compare the different campaign types. A country like France functions as a prime location to conduct this study due to the number of terrorist attacks within 2015 and its citizens' widespread social media use. The shootings at *Charlie Hebdo* in early January 2015 serve as one point of study, while the attacks in Paris in November 2015 are the second. Both cases are assessed to determine the factors that could have influenced civilian response. This study proposes four explanatory factors that impact the nature of social media campaigns. First, the spirit of the terrorist attack evokes certain emotions, dependent on whether the attack was provoked. Second, the magnitude of an attack alters the way civilians react, contingent on the count of people killed or injured, number of witnesses to the incident, or the number of hostages. Third, the way that civilians identify themselves affects their perception of an attack. Those identifying predominantly with the victims react differently than those who consider themselves members of the terrorist group. Finally, social considerations are a chief component to civilian response; this relates to whether the terrorists are defending a certain value or directly attacking an important social ideal. These four factors are used as measures to assess the underlying elements shaping the social media campaigns.

Each incident generated emotions in civilians, inspiring campaigns on social media and online dialogue regarding the violence. Through a more holistic approach, this study examines a variety of civilian-produced content during the seven days following the initial attack. Using a bank comprised of 24 words—12 “hostile” and 12 “harmless”—civilian responses are assessed on a scale of aggression in order to see which type of campaign was more prevalent; this word bank is depicted in Table 1. In addition to a sample of Twitter activity, I assess news media response because it often corresponds with the attitudes found in social media discourse. The French newspaper *Le Monde*'s articles are evaluated for the media's tone responding to each attack; *Le Monde* is a key publication because of its prominence as a news outlet

in France and its arguably neutral stance. Using the LexisNexis Academic database to access *Le Monde* news archives, the content is reduced to the seven days following each attack and narrowed further by two case-specific key terms. Each applicable article is then combed for the “hostile” and “harmless” buzzwords, counting the frequency of each word in Table 1.

Table 1: Buzzword Bank

| Hostile Terms                   |                    | Harmless Terms                      |                  |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| guerre (war)                    | menace (threat)    | humanité (humanity)                 | aide (aid)       |
| agression (aggression)          | détruire (destroy) | reconstruire (rebuild)              | prière (prayer)  |
| militaire/armée (military/army) | tuer (kill)        | global/monde entier (global)        | espoir (hope)    |
| forcer/puissance (force)        | lutte (fight)      | triste/atristé (sad/saddened)       | deuil (mourning) |
| brutalité (brutality)           | venger (avenge)    | mort/défunt (dead/death)            | paix (peace)     |
| sang (blood)                    | briser (break)     | unité/solidarité (unity/solidarity) | craindre/crainte |

In both cases, the news media coverage sets up a baseline tone to compare against social media activity. I use the same key phrases and date ranges in Twitter’s Advanced Search feature to examine the tweets and shared posts about each attack. For basic-level analysis, I determine the frequency of the 24 buzzwords by adding each one to the key search terms. The word count is broken down by date and totaled to determine the overall sentiments on social media.

A major part of this exploration includes mining and evaluating Twitter data using the program R; this program permits a more comprehensive examination of data to determine the general sentiment of reactions and the overall rhetoric of language used on social media surrounding the incidents. I collect a random sample of tweets from Sifter’s Twitter API archives for the 48 hours following each case’s initial attack, which is then uploaded into R. After cleaning up the data—ensuring all the characters display correctly and are uniformly formatted—the tweets are classified by language. One challenge of using current Twitter data is that only a small portion of tweets are tagged with geolocation, making it difficult to pinpoint the global origin of tweets. Focusing solely on tweets in French attempts to restrict the data to social media users who are either in France or have close enough ties to the country that they use the French language on a relatively informal platform. To facilitate further analysis, stop words are filtered out, then text mining packages in R create a table of the top word occurrences from the French tweets dataset. Further data manipulation tools transform the top occurrences of word pairings into word clouds

and networks that provide better visualization of the social media activity. After analyzing the social media campaigns and examining their underlying factors, I use this information to generate hypotheses about the larger theoretical chain and the effects of public response to terrorism.

### **Analysis and Implications**

The above methodology is used to explore both cases. By assessing the cases independently, I am able to understand the factors that sculpt the social media discourse. The news media articles set a benchmark to compare the social media responses against; in both cases, the news outlets frame the attacks with more hostility than that found in the social media campaigns. While the vast majority of the public responses align with a static support campaign, dissenting undertones occur. The sentiments expressed through the social media campaigns speak in a strident unity that is difficult to ignore, thus meriting further discussion about the impacts of such campaigns.

#### *Case Study: Charlie Hebdo Attacks*

Chérif and Saïd Kouachi stormed the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in Paris, France on the morning of January 7, 2015.<sup>41</sup> Acting on behalf the terrorist group al Qaeda, they claimed to be avenging the Prophet Mohammed by destroying a magazine that had published controversial satirical cartoons of Islam's founder in both 2006 and 2011.<sup>42</sup> Over the course of 48 hours (January 7 through January 9), the Kouachi brothers and another terrorist, Amedy Coulibaly, killed 17 people and left countless frightened.<sup>43</sup> Using the four factors to analyze this case, I could see where some people might consider this attack provoked, whereas others view it as an unwarranted act of violence.<sup>44</sup> In terms of magnitude, the attack was restricted to the *Charlie Hebdo* offices and a standoff at a local kosher grocery store. The store was located in a Jewish community and was purposefully targeted, making the attack not only anti-liberty and anti-French, but anti-Semite as well. While any loss is impactful, a death toll of 17 is considerably smaller

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<sup>41</sup> CNN Library, "2015 Charlie Hebdo Attacks Fast Facts."

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Rose, 40-44.

than those resulting from other (more recent) terrorist attacks. Additionally, there is a large Muslim population in France; although they may not have overwhelmingly identified themselves with al Qaeda, that religious group may inherently have a more difficult time justifying the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed. Someone who is a part of the Muslim population might identify with someone whose actions are in defense of their religious values. However, France has a strong record of independent journalism, and its citizens historically uphold this political value of free press, as verified by recent Freedom House reports.<sup>45</sup> Thus, those who identify strongly with national values in France would likely condemn the attacks on *Charlie Hebdo*.

The content analysis of news media reactions reveals that *Le Monde* published 179 articles: 86 of them contained more hostile words, 79 contained more harmless words, and 14 were equal in hostile-to-harmless ratio. When counting single words, the hostile ones occurred just slightly more than the harmless. However, the content expressed added negativity; even the pieces that did not necessarily include more hostile buzzwords had titles reflecting an ominous tone, such as “*Vous allez payer car vous avez insulté le Prophète*”, translating to “You will pay, for you have insulted the Prophet.” Table 2 provides an individual count of the buzzwords for these *Le Monde* articles. Notably, the words *mort* (death), *unité/solidarité* (unity/solidarity), *guerre* (war), and *forcer/puissance* (force) appeared over 100 times each. ‘Death’ typically surfaced in conjunction with descriptive facts of the shootings, whereas the other three terms intermingled to explain France’s unification as a massive force against the terrorists who had, essentially, executed an act of war. A relatively objective source, the *Le Monde* articles did not provide a clear sense of public sentiment’s direction, but when considered next to the initial Twitter data, that direction is more apparent. The word count for Twitter Advanced Search makes a compelling argument for a static support campaign. Harmless words were used nearly three times more than hostile, reflecting the outpour of public grief and sorrow. The French saw this attack as a crime against freedom of speech—a valued liberty of their culture. Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of the harmless

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<sup>45</sup> Freedom House, Freedom House France: Freedom of the Press.

terms occurred within the first 24 hours following the attack, but the hostile terms lingered at relatively stable frequencies for almost the entire time frame. The sustained hostility implies that civilians were ruminating on the terrorists' motives and the greater significance underlying the violence.

Table 2: Buzzword Frequency in Articles and Twitter Search After *Charlie Hebdo* Attacks

| Hostile Term     | Article Count | Twitter Count | Harmless Term       | Article Count | Twitter Count |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------|
| guerre           | 150           | 1153          | humanité            | 9             | 843           |
| agression        | 11            | 107           | reconstruire        | 2             | 11            |
| militaire/armée  | 71            | 380           | global/monde entier | 19            | 1030          |
| forcer/puissance | 122           | 375           | triste/attristé     | 9             | 2324          |
| brutalité        | 2             | 3             | mort/défunt         | 180           | 4710          |
| sang             | 33            | 731           | unité/solidarité    | 105           | 8581          |
| menace           | 97            | 485           | aide                | 17            | 337           |
| détruire         | 6             | 128           | prière              | 20            | 118           |
| tuer             | 22            | 2695          | espoir              | 9             | 279           |
| lutte            | 46            | 293           | deuil               | 17            | 1787          |
| venger           | 3             | 852           | paix                | 46            | 1482          |
| briser           | 5             | 26            | craindre/crainte    | 21            | 88            |
| <b>TOTAL</b>     | <b>568</b>    | <b>7228</b>   | <b>TOTAL</b>        | <b>454</b>    | <b>21590</b>  |

Social media discourse initially appeared to reflect the population's anger at the terrorists' demonstration against *Charlie Hebdo*'s free expression, but further research illuminated a second, more nuanced discussion. The data sample in R from the 48 hours following the shootings displayed that words like *contre* (against), *liberté* (liberty), *attentat* (attack), *morts* (deaths), and *peur* (fear) occurred most often. The frequencies alone, though, cannot suffice to express the public sentiment; they must be put into context. For example, the word *défendre* could convey the value of defending freedom of the press, or an ideal such as this: "*En faite tout les gens qui [soutient] Charlie ils sont tous athée pour défendre quelqu'un qui se moque de nos religions*" (In fact all the people who support Charlie are all atheists to defend someone who mocks our religions). Pairs of words generate a richer perspective, revealing the rhetoric behind the most commonly tweeted terms. Figure 2 depicts the top occurring word pairs. As one might expect, the top pair is *attentat + contre* (attack + against), expressing views like "*Triste et en colère après cet odieux attentat contre Charlie Hebdo, contre la liberté de la presse. Ne jamais céder*" (Sad and angry after this odious attack against *Charlie Hebdo*, against freedom of the press. Never give

in). The pair *bien + fait* (well + done) poses an intriguing connection considering it is listed among the top word combinations. Upon closer investigation, *bien + fait* communicated notions like “*Perso m'en fou de Charlie Hebdo bien fait pour eux*” (Personally I don't give a damn about *Charlie Hebdo* well done for them). This particular tweet received 3697 favorites, indicating that a fair number of civilians agreed with the post. Conversely, the pairing appears in tweets expressing opposition by acknowledging anti-*Charlie Hebdo* arguments; for example, “*Les gens qui disent que c'est bien fait pour Charlie Hebdo vous avez vraiment rien compris vous. Bande d'abrutis*” (Those who said that it is well done for *Charlie Hebdo*, you really did not understand. Bunch of morons).




Figure 2: Frequency of Word Pairings on Twitter after *Charlie Hebdo* Attacks

The network of connections among the top occurring words is illustrated in Figure 3. The links between the terms are thicker in proportion to the number of times they occurred within the dataset. Most of the connections are logical, with associations between *hommage*, *victimes*, and *familles* (homage, victims, families) expressing condolences for the families and victims. Likewise, *attaque*, *12*, and *morts* (attack, 12, deaths) explain perceptible facts about the terrorists' actions. Notably, the relationship between *ça*, *bien*, and *fait* (it, well, done) proposes an interesting sub-dialogue on social media, the



The terrorists held the crowd hostage for nearly three hours until French police could intervene.<sup>50</sup> The terrorist group ISIS coordinated and claimed responsibility for all the attacks, leaving 130 people dead and hundreds wounded. In a statement issued by ISIS, Paris was referred to as “a capital of prostitution and obscenity” and was pronounced as a key target by the terrorist group.<sup>51</sup> The attacks focused on civilians, although French president François Hollande was amongst the targeted groups. These incidents were of much greater magnitude than the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks earlier in the year, directly affecting many more civilians and killing over seven times as many people. Parisians were targeted at random, without discrimination between any demographics, so it would be difficult for any one group to identify with the terrorists instead of the victims. Valuing their human right to life, the French overwhelmingly felt threatened by the attacks and some—including President Hollande—went so far as to declare them as an act of war against France.

A pattern of articulated aggression emerged in the 291 articles from *Le Monde* during the week after the Paris attacks from November 13 until November 20, 2015; this time, the key search terms were “terroriste” and “Paris.” Hostile words far exceeded harmless ones: 164 of the articles contained more hostile words compared to the 87 expending more harmless language, while 40 were equal in total count. *Le Monde* even reported on other countries’ reactions to the event, like United States President Obama’s remarks declaring the events “*une attaque contre toute l’humanité*” (an attack against all of humanity). As seen in Table 3, *guerre, militaire/armée, puissance/forcer, unité/solidarité,* and *mort/défunt* were employed most by the journalists. Based on the content analysis of *Le Monde* articles, one might initially conclude that the overall public sentiment embodied articulated aggression. Nevertheless, the word count from the Twitter Advanced Search (using the same parameters as the news archival research) indicates that nearly three times the number of harmless terms were used compared to

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Callimachi, “ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks 'First of the Storm'.”

hostile ones. The general conversation on social media seemed to include overtones of sadness and unity across the globe in support of the victims.

Table 3: Buzzword Frequency in Articles and Twitter Search After Paris Attacks

| Hostile Term     | Article Count | Twitter Count | Harmless Term       | Article Count | Twitter Count |
|------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|---------------|
| guerre           | 310           | 3937          | humanité            | 28            | 1565          |
| agression        | 15            | 40            | reconstruire        | 0             | 20            |
| militaire/armée  | 235           | 1525          | global/monde entier | 54            | 2258          |
| forcer/puissance | 217           | 191           | triste/attristé     | 18            | 7073          |
| brutalité        | 0             | 17            | mort/défunct        | 202           | 5407          |
| sang             | 51            | 2366          | unité/solidarité    | 119           | 8835          |
| menace           | 123           | 674           | aide                | 64            | 1004          |
| détruire         | 16            | 205           | prière              | 13            | 961           |
| tuer             | 38            | 1265          | espoir              | 21            | 764           |
| lutte            | 72            | 320           | deuil               | 22            | 248           |
| venger           | 5             | 85            | paix                | 34            | 3578          |
| briser           | 7             | 29            | craindre/crainte    | 32            | 114           |
| <b>TOTAL</b>     | <b>1090</b>   | <b>10654</b>  | <b>TOTAL</b>        | <b>607</b>    | <b>31827</b>  |

The trend of static support continued to surface through the analysis of the Twitter sample using R. The words *peur* (fear), *attentats* (attacks), *morts* (death), *fusillade* (shooting), and *victimes* (victims) occurred most frequently; *stade* and *bataclan* also appeared at the top of the word count, the locations of two of the main attacks. Placing these words into larger context, the top pairs revealed an outreach of support and sympathy online. Figure 4 shows the word pairs that most commonly occurred within the sample. The first few simply describe the facts of the events, addressing where and how the attacks transpired. Slightly further down the list, the pair *j'ai + peur* (I am scared) clearly expresses the fear that spread from the attacks. The pair *hier + soir* (last night) shows that the public continued to discuss the attacks heavily the day afterwards, as their social media campaigns reflected upon the events; for example, "*hier soir ma pote elle était au bataclan, un soir plus tard elle serait victime de la fusillade*" (last night, my buddy she was at the bataclan, one night later she would be the victim of the shooting). Pairs like *pensées + victimes* (thoughts + victims) and *hommage + victimes* (homage + victims) suggest that the public wanted to grieve those who were murdered, injured, or held hostage. Tweets like "*Hommage aux victimes, courage aux victimes et à leurs familles #FusilladeParis #JESUISPARIS #bataclan #CourageAuxFamilles*" (Tribute to the victims, courage to the victims and to their families)

express grief and the encouraging sentiments that the public extended to the victims and those affected by the terrorism.




Figure 4: Frequency of Word Pairings on Twitter after Paris Attacks

Looking at the larger connections between words (Figure 5), the nature of the social media campaigns becomes more evident. The pairing of *j'ai* + *peur* is put into further context by seeing the relation to *intérieur* and *bataclan* as well: “*j'ai tellement peur de ce qu'ils vont découvrir à l'intérieur du Bataclan*” (I am so afraid of what they will discover inside the Bataclan). That sort of fearful reaction, emerging from lack of available information as the attacks unfolded, characterizes the initial public responses on social media. I find it interesting that near the center of the word network is “prayforparis,” a phrase in English. Linked to a hashtag, the expression was accompanied by tweets using French for the majority of their text. This emphasizes that the attacks in Paris ignited social media responses from all over the world. Civilians wanted to reach out to as wide an audience as possible to share information about the incidents, their condolences, and support for France. Some even combined *#prayforparis* with



### *Effects and Implications*

The results of both case studies generate ideal data for comparison. In regard to news media coverage of the attacks, the rhetoric was much more aggressive after the Paris attacks in relation to the *Charlie Hebdo* coverage, possibly because this was the second major instance of terror within the same year. In both cases, it seems that news media coverage of the terrorist attacks responded in accordance with an articulated aggression approach. The tone used by the news media did not mirror public sentiments as closely, but from a brief analysis, the slightly more aggressive rhetoric matched patterns of speech used in the terrorists' statements. The media was not overwhelmingly hostile to the point of a clear classification, but there was an apparent contrast between the *Le Monde* articles' phrasing and the initial Twitter reactions.

An interesting phenomenon began with the *Charlie Hebdo* case and perpetuated into the later Paris attacks' aftermath—the notion of *Je suis* or “I am” captured the essence of tweets. *#JeSuisCharlie* was the first instance of the identification hashtag, and less than one year later *#JeSuisParis* topped Twitter's charts to become the most frequently tweeted hashtag for 2015. The hashtag for the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks is a substantial reason that many people worldwide are familiar with the event; it expresses static solidarity, as does *#JeSuisParis*. The rhetorical choice to explicitly associate oneself with a group (“I am Charlie/Paris) illuminates the underlying factor of identification and the way it shapes social media campaigns. Appealing to identity continues to be pertinent, with similar hashtags springing up after subsequent attacks in places like Orlando, Brussels, and Nice.<sup>52</sup> It has also seeped into other social media platforms such as Facebook, where people now can place overlays of different flags onto their profile photos to display their support and matriculate that flag into their digital identities.

While this sentiment is certainly intriguing since it has inspired a movement (several social media campaigns), the idea has not been without controversy; some people have lashed out in defense of smaller populations who, in the wake of terrorism, did not receive the same social media support as did places

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<sup>52</sup> Majdoub, “Hashtag “Je Suis épuisé” Emerges in the Aftermath of Nice Attack.”

like Paris or Brussels. Curiously enough, the development of #*jesuisépuisé* (“I am exhausted”) began after the terrorist attack in Nice, France on July 14, 2016 to express the frustration and utter fatigue that civilians feel about the relentless violence.<sup>53</sup> It is noteworthy that civilians initiated this campaign exercising the same language used in all of its precedents back to the original *Charlie Hebdo* campaigns. I also find it particularly remarkable that, regardless of the country attacked or the individual’s native language, each static support campaign with an identity hashtag continues to use *je suis*, the French “I am,” as a perpetual reminder of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks—possibly even in homage to those original victims. Some individuals have argued that the use of such *je suis* hashtags are empty words that fall short of any meaningful activism, with others claiming that failing to promote the same solidarity for all grieving nations is pseudo-racism.<sup>54</sup> Perhaps some of these counter-campaign ideas will give rise to more physical forms of activism and outreach, or result in greater diligence when creating static support campaigns across the globe. Regardless, the durability of this hashtag suggests that identification is an essential piece of the puzzle that shapes social media campaigns.

Public responses to the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks were much less unified in terms of the degree of sympathy expressed when evaluated against the responses after the Paris attacks. While several factors contribute to these discords, one noticeable element is that the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings were tied to a cherished socio-political value: free speech and press. The Paris attacks, on the contrary, were much less focused on civil liberties as they were on creating pure chaos and destruction. Nonetheless, this particular study found that the tone of reactions to both incidents was overwhelmingly more static support: in total, over three times as many harmless words were used as hostile ones. One possible explanation is that an affordance of Twitter is the ability for users to create hashtags, which can turn into trending topics and encourage others to use the same language when discussing that subject. For example, after the Paris attacks in November, social media users reacted by tweeting #PrayForParis or #PrayersForParis; these hashtags were often accompanied by the buzzword “*prière*” within the tweets’ text, even though the

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<sup>53</sup> Majdoub, “Hashtag “Je Suis épuisé” Emerges in the Aftermath of Nice Attack.”

<sup>54</sup> Verghese, “Je Suis Ankara? Non, Merci.”

trending hashtags were in English. Thus, the static support sentiments were able to propagate easier than the articulated aggression ideas, especially because much of the initial digital discourse was about promoting solidarity and standing with Paris. There is evidence of this in the aftermath of attacks in Nice, France on July 14, 2016. In an extremely symbolic act of terror, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a Tunisian man working for the Islamic State, drove into a crowd with a lorry during an Independence Day celebration.<sup>55</sup> For a day that evokes memories of the French revolution, it also conjured memories less than one year old. The attack resulted in over 300 civilian hospitalizations, leaving 85 dead.<sup>56</sup> Initial research suggests that the reactions on social media were overwhelmingly supportive of the victims and France, although #jesuisépuisé (I am exhausted) began to surface amidst public condolences.<sup>57</sup> The arduous sequence of three terrorist attacks spanning less than two years is reflected in the social media responses after the incident in Nice. These findings lead me to propose the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** *The more likely that civilians believe their state has provoked a terrorist group's attack, then the more likely they are to create an articulated aggression social media campaign in response to the attack.*

**Hypothesis 2:** *The larger the magnitude of a terrorist attack, the more likely that civilians will respond with a static support social media campaign.*

**Hypothesis 3:** *The more civilians personally identify with either the victims of the attack or the terrorist group, the more likely they are to create either a static support campaign or an articulated aggression campaign, respectively.*

**Hypothesis 4:** *If civilians perceive a terrorist attack as a threat to an important socio-political value, then there will be less unity throughout the social media campaigns.*

There is some evidence supporting the campaigns' effects on the French government. It appears that the outcries supporting French values and *Charlie Hebdo*'s freedoms were heard by political leaders,

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<sup>55</sup> BBC News, "Nice Attack: What We Know about the Bastille Day Killings."

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> John, "Nice Attack: Condolences and Offers of Help Flood Twitter."

considering that the Minister of Culture Fleur Pellerin announced a donation of one million euros to preserve the magazine.<sup>58</sup> This required extensive effort on behalf of Pellerin to change legal structures in order for the satirical magazine to receive government funds, as the former setup did not allow for this.<sup>59</sup> The campaigns after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks seemed to endorse the values of political freedoms. In combination with wanting to honor the victims of terrorism, the also government felt the need to promote these sentiments through a very tangible act economic support. Additionally, the French government made efforts to garner the cooperation of leading social media and technology companies to monitor and prohibit terrorist activities by immediately removing terrorist propaganda from online platforms.<sup>60</sup> Though this action may appear to impede the freedom of speech that is cherished by civilians, it may have been an effort to respond to the mournful emotions expressed through social media campaigns. The responses of the French government after the November attacks in Paris were much more constrictive of civil liberties. Capitalizing on the civilians' unity in support of France, the government passed an amendment allowing the interruption of any public communication online that is suspected or known to cause the commission of acts of terrorism.<sup>61</sup> The government also responded to the overwhelming expression of fear on social media by launching a campaign of their own that aimed to better protect and prepare citizens against threats of terror.<sup>62</sup> Not only were the aircraft-inspired safety instruction posters displayed in public spaces like stores, stadiums, and museums, but they were also published online and disseminated through social media; this mimicked the original form of outreach that civilians used when reacting to the terrorism.<sup>63</sup>

One idea generated by this research is that there might be a causal link between social media campaigns and terrorist response—that terrorists may react in various degrees of aggression depending on

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<sup>58</sup> Debouté, “Charlie Hebdo : Fleur Pellerin Veut Débloquent Un Million D'euros.”

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Homeland Security News Wire, “France Asks Social Media Companies to Help.”

<sup>61</sup> National Assembly of France, “Assemblée Nationale ~ PROROGATION DE L'ÉTAT D'URGENCE (no 3237) - Amendement No 50.”

<sup>62</sup> Buchanan, “Isis: French Government Launches Public Campaign 'in Case of Daesh Attacks'.”

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

the way that civilians respond to an initial attack. Do terrorists, upon seeing these campaigns, choose to strike again out of spite and anger, or are they deterred by the display of collective nationalism? For example, social media campaigns in France after the November Paris attacks called for global unification; millions of people changed their Facebook profile photos to the filtered red, blue, and white stripes of the French flag displaying their solidarity with the grieving nation. Since this campaign—November 2015 to the present date—there have not been any additional terrorist attacks of that same level of severity in Paris. However, several attacks for which ISIS claims responsibility have occurred within the same region as France, as seen in the cities of Brussels and Ankara. The social media campaigns focused on France could have unintentionally lit a fuse inside the radical groups to spark smaller incidents of chaos elsewhere.

If states' civilians are calling to mobilize against terrorism in one form or another through social media campaigns, then their actions will certainly elicit a response from terrorist groups. Analyzing the groups' reactions is useful for combatting global terrorism in a small-scale manner. Future studies might examine the link between the two types of social media campaigns and the possible reactions of terrorist groups: to attack the state again, leave the state alone in peace, or attack another nation. Hardin recalls that actors faced with aggression often respond with aggression,<sup>64</sup> which leads to this set of hypotheses:

***Hypothesis 5:*** *If a state's civilians create a static support social media campaign in response to an act of terror, then that terrorist group will not act violently towards that state.*

***Hypothesis 6:*** *If a state's civilians create an articulated aggression social media campaign in response to an act of terror, then that terrorist group will likely act violently towards that state.*

These two hypotheses rely on the assumptions that each campaign type will itself be enough to ignite responses from terrorists, keeping the actions of state leaders outside of this theory's causal chain.

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<sup>64</sup> Hardin, 160.

Systematic analysis of terrorist responses is not readily permitted by available resources. Although I was not able to obtain thorough data to methodically analyze the terrorist responses, I did conduct a basic content analysis in a similar manner as was used for the *Le Monde* articles. Additionally, I assessed any physical actions that were taken by the terrorist groups after the creation of civilian social media campaigns. Since time and planning is required in order to carry out any retaliatory violence, a possible response for the terrorists, I look at the twelve weeks after civilians have launched their campaigns; this brings the time frame to one week following the attack until thirteen weeks after the attack. If no acts of terrorism occur again within France, that is noted, as well as any terrorist attack within the same region—defined by the United Nations’ regional classifications—or within France itself.<sup>65</sup> This investigation also includes a qualitative analysis of statements made by the terrorist groups. Due to the difficulty in obtaining translated terrorist propaganda, the publication *Al Jazeera America* is analyzed using the same methodology as the buzzword counts in the *Le Monde* articles; the only difference is that the time frame broadens to twelve weeks instead of one. *Al Jazeera* has reportedly worked with terrorist groups to release their content in the past, thus the outlet provides an accessible source for terrorist-centered news.<sup>66</sup> To access published terrorist responses associated with particular attacks, the articles or news releases from *Al Jazeera America* are reviewed for a basic count of the same 24 buzzwords used in the prior analyses. The Islamic State’s propaganda magazine, *Dabiq*, is a second source for consideration. The Clarion Project has archived these publications, which I use to determine the tone and language employed by terrorist groups after each attack.<sup>67</sup> Both sources produce a foundation for content analysis easily paralleled with that of the civilian responses. Evaluating the overarching sentiments from the terrorist groups against those from civilians, this study hypothesizes about the link between successive regional attacks and the campaigns themselves, which is strengthened if responses issued by terrorists include language or rhetoric that mimics the original social media campaigns.

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<sup>65</sup> UN Statistics Division, United Nations Statistics Division- Standard Country and Area Codes.

<sup>66</sup> Bockstette, *Jihadist terrorist use of strategic communication management techniques*, 12-13.

<sup>67</sup> The Islamic State's (ISIS, ISIL) Magazine | Clarion Project, *Dabiq*.

The terrorist response after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks was difficult to sort through. While several reports of possible terrorism within France occurred, these instances were typically small-scale and unlikely linked to al Qaeda. In fact, many of the accounts were demonstrations of anti-Muslim sentiments, such as the fire set to a mosque in Poitiers, France on January 11, 2015.<sup>68</sup> Of the 20 reported instances within the greater region, only the initial shootings involving terrorists from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula were linked to that same group. One incident of a man attacking soldiers with a knife in Nice on February 3 was claimed by ISIS, while a fire set to the town hall in Henin-Beaumont on March 25 left no one claiming responsibility, although notes left inside the wall by the assailants read “Charlie is dead.”<sup>69</sup> In examining the content of *Al Jazeera* and *Dabiq*, it appears that the harmless language of the civilian static support campaigns was not necessarily mirrored by terrorists: 267 words fell into the hostile terms bank with only 148 categorizing as harmless (a breakdown of the word count is shown in Table 4). Even phrases like “satanic newspaper” are used when referencing *Charlie Hebdo*, and *Dabiq* declares that any support for the magazine’s satirical content is “apostasy.” The statements in *Dabiq* use further aggressive language when referencing the attack, such as “slaughter,” “revenge” and a “blessing for Allah”; the terrorists mention their victims as “hypocrites,” “heretics,” and “deviants.” A reoccurring theme was a mission to eliminate the “grayzone,” which often referenced the victims and the leaders of secular countries and parties. The statements instructed radical terrorists to behead or kill anyone who speaks or acts against Allah, as perceived in the case of the *Charlie Hebdo* content. Other than the hostile remarks that vengefully reiterate the shootings and the group’s obligation to kill, it seems that the terrorists did not result to physical violence after the civilian content supporting *Charlie Hebdo*’s actions.

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<sup>68</sup> START, Global Terrorism Database.

<sup>69</sup> START, Global Terrorism Database.

Table 4: Buzzword Frequency in *Al Jazeera* and *Dabiq* After *Charlie Hebdo* Attacks

| Hostile Term  | Al Jazeera | Dabiq     | Harmless Term    | Al Jazeera | Dabiq     |
|---------------|------------|-----------|------------------|------------|-----------|
| war           | 30         | 18        | humanity         | 0          | 0         |
| aggression    | 5          | 2         | rebuild          | 0          | 0         |
| military/army | 12         | 1         | global           | 13         | 2         |
| force         | 5          | 3         | sad/saddened     | 2          | 1         |
| brutality     | 4          | 0         | death            | 41         | 2         |
| blood         | 3          | 6         | unity/solidarity | 26         | 2         |
| threat        | 19         | 1         | aid              | 0          | 3         |
| destroy       | 1          | 6         | prayer           | 1          | 3         |
| kill          | 84         | 17        | hope             | 4          | 2         |
| fight         | 19         | 15        | mourning         | 1          | 0         |
| avenge        | 11         | 1         | peace            | 6          | 8         |
| break         | 1          | 3         | fear             | 17         | 14        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>194</b> | <b>73</b> | <b>TOTAL</b>     | <b>111</b> | <b>37</b> |

After the attacks in Paris, 19 additional instances of terrorism were reported in the region.<sup>70</sup> Some of these included anti-Muslim demonstrations, like the attacking of a Muslim civilian in Marseilles on November 28 and the launching of petrol bombs towards a mosque in Enschede, Netherlands on February 27. However, only four of the reported incidents were claimed by the Islamic State, most notably the bombings at the airport and metro station in Brussels, Belgium on March 22, 2016. This set of attacks killed 35 civilians and left 340 more injured. In *Dabiq*, the terrorists alert that “Paris was a warning. Brussels was a reminder. What is yet to come will be more devastating and more bitter by the permission of Allah.” By explicitly connecting the two major attacks, the Islamic State’s reaction in Brussels undoubtedly relates to the civilian aftermath in Paris nearly four months prior. The content analysis of *Dabiq* and *Al Jazeera* reveals that the terrorists used a total of 301 hostile and 172 harmless terms, the breakdown of which is shown in Table 5. The information provided by *Al Jazeera* focused more on the terrorist-created destruction, using phrases like “a vision of chaos in Paris.” Alternatively, *Dabiq* issued statements addressing the way that the terrorists viewed Parisians as “wicked crusaders” upon which they “will take revenge.” The overall tone of this content is much more threatening and ominous, which could be explained given the magnitude of the attacks.

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<sup>70</sup> START, Global Terrorism Database.

Table 5: Buzzword Frequency in *Al Jazeera* and *Dabiq* After Paris Attacks

| Hostile Term  | Al Jazeera | Dabiq     | Harmless Term    | Al Jazeera | Dabiq     |
|---------------|------------|-----------|------------------|------------|-----------|
| war           | 28         | 11        | humanity         | 13         | 0         |
| aggression    | 0          | 2         | rebuild          | 1          | 0         |
| military/army | 61         | 4         | global           | 10         | 0         |
| force         | 24         | 2         | sad/saddened     | 2          | 0         |
| brutality     | 1          | 0         | death            | 55         | 7         |
| blood         | 8          | 5         | unity/solidarity | 20         | 0         |
| threat        | 31         | 0         | aid              | 1          | 1         |
| destroy       | 3          | 4         | prayer           | 6          | 1         |
| kill          | 66         | 9         | hope             | 4          | 1         |
| fight         | 24         | 7         | mourning         | 16         | 1         |
| avenge        | 0          | 10        | peace            | 4          | 1         |
| break         | 1          | 0         | fear             | 23         | 5         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>247</b> | <b>54</b> | <b>TOTAL</b>     | <b>155</b> | <b>17</b> |

The key implication in this study is that all parts of the theoretical chain come back to social media campaigns. Several reasons exist for this newfound form of activism's rising popularity. Shirky compares the way that people gravitate to social media networks to the way that a hive is shaped by and shapes a colony of bees; the networks are tools for both communication and coordination that inevitably change the way society functions as they evolve themselves.<sup>71</sup> Since social media has become an integral part of society (in most places), it logically follows that the public employ it to communicate on both individual and larger scales. Online platforms are tools that people use to build their digital identities, sharing aspects of their everyday lives ranging from the food consumed during breakfast that morning to a blog post that they resonate with. In times of crisis, the public turns to their social media networks to express their feelings and contribute their thoughts to the larger electronic conversation. Thus, social media campaigns develop because of the human need for connection; feeling like a part of a group or something greater than just the individual reflects the idea that humans crave social interaction.<sup>72</sup> The term 'campaign' implies orchestration and organization, which is precisely what civilians do in the "process of symbolic construction of public space which facilitates and guides the physical *assembling* of a highly dispersed and individualised constituency."<sup>73</sup> Civilians construct social media campaigns to

<sup>71</sup> Shirky, *Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations*, 17.

<sup>72</sup> Cook, "Why We Are Wired to Connect."

<sup>73</sup> Gerbaudo, *Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism*, 5-7.

inspire opportunities for more tangible forms of activism.<sup>74</sup> Social media arguably increases the speed of group actions and leads to innovative formations of new groups.<sup>75</sup> This idea generates another possible reason for the creation of social media campaigns after terrorist attacks: it is inherently easier to assemble and mobilize groups with social media. When terror strikes, solitude does not provide much comfort, but a public sphere expressing a “we’re all in this together” mentality might. Lastly, social media campaigns surface after terrorist attacks because of “slacktivism”—activism for slackers.<sup>76</sup> Surrounded by destruction and chaos, people want to feel as though they are adding to society and making a meaningful impact; however, the threshold of contribution lowers as the dependence on technology rises. Therefore, it is possible that social media campaigns emerge from the rubble of terrorism because they are the least-demanding form of what society considers “activism.”

## Conclusions

The data gathered shows that public emotions cause political cyberactivism, with anger from politically charged attacks spurring articulated aggression campaigns, and sadness or fear after large-scale incidents resulting in static support campaigns. Upon investigating each case of terrorism, there are patterns relating to the factors that shape the nature of campaigns. Additional implications of public response could be in the form of varied government or terrorist reactions. An initial review of terrorist rhetoric suggests that there may be a connection to civilian social media campaigns, but perhaps not a direct one. The proposal that governments react to public response could serve as the intermediary between social media campaigns and terrorist response—after an attack, civilians react using social media, their government responds to the public outcry and acts in ways that influence or provoke terrorist responses. An additional implication relating to government—and one that warrants further study—is the participation of political leaders in social media campaigns. If a campaign is endorsed or dismissed by an important politician, this may sway the public responses either in accordance with the leader or in

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

divergence, depending on the public's perception of the leader. A nation's leader also has an augmented global platform compared to the average civilian, thus a politician's social media commentary could have arguably more weight or substantially greater impact. Tweeting politicians holding high governmental positions could have sizeable implications for future social media campaigns.

This study lends itself to further research into those implications. One possible hypothesis worthy of future study is that the more conciliatory a social media campaign—that is, the more it trends towards static support—the more the government will heighten security internally. While this seems counter-intuitive, the larger-scale, highly fatal attacks against innocent civilians elicit wider-spread static support. The Paris attacks were arguably more destructive and threatening than the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings that generated articulated aggression counter-campaigns and much more hostile discourse on social media. Perhaps if the nature of a terrorist attack is trivial enough for a substantial group to contest supporting the victims (thus creating articulated aggression campaigns), then the government might not implement as stringent of counterterrorism policies or react as severely in general.

This study was limited in part by a lack of available data. The contemporary nature of this research made it difficult to complete all the analyses that could better contribute to the generation of hypotheses; for example, a natural language processing program could have parsed out distinct sentiments by comparing the Twitter data to a pre-existing lexicon. Systems like that are still being developed and fine-tuned, and unfortunately they were unavailable at the time of this study. Obtaining terrorist data posed another obstacle, since much of the terrorist statements and communications are restricted from the public. There are too few public resources for a systematic analysis of terrorist responses, but I expect more to become available in the future. Further studies might also collect data for a broader time frame to track the ongoing development social media trends. Only additional investigations will be able to provide definitive claims.

This topic of study is extremely relevant due to the prevalence of terrorism in the international community. As this field consists of several modern components with very little existing research, continuing to explore terrorism and mitigating methods is necessary for ensuring global security.

Examining public response—its nature and its effects—highlights the notion that rhetoric is a powerful instrument. Not only is public response malleable, shaped by the context of a terrorist attack, but it matters and has significance to a greater chain of events. Words, images, and overall ideas expressed through reactions on social media disseminate quickly and widely to reach a broad global audience. As an integral part of modern culture, social media content has heavy impacts. Thus, it is important for people to use discretion and careful thought when creating campaigns and producing new posts in response to terrorism, since the effects of social media campaigns are still largely undetermined. Given that the context for terrorist attacks is crucial in molding social media response, and that different campaigns have varying implications for what follows, it would be beneficial to allocate additional attention to this topic of study in the future.

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