

[attach 2/28/46]

# THE AIR POWER LEAGUE

INCORPORATED IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



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February 25, 1946

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Mr. Amon G. Carter, President  
Carter Publications  
400 West 7th Street  
Fort Worth, Texas

Dear Mr. Carter:

Knowing you may have use for material on unification, I am enclosing three copies of the booklets published last week.


These have been sent to all newspapers, radio stations, editorial writers, and others most directly concerned. However, some of your personal friends will no doubt be interested.

Sincerely,

Secretary

CDF:FC

Enclosures



## **Objection:**

Why break up a winning team? The Joint Chiefs of Staff functioned all right as the top body during the war. We should leave the two Departments alone and make the Joint Chiefs permanent by Act of Congress.

**Answer:** Remember that the Joint Chiefs act only by unanimous vote; one dissenter can block all action. This worked fairly well, but only fairly well, during the European war where a very strong enemy forced united action. But in the Pacific after V-E Day no supreme commander was ever appointed, and since V-J Day the Joint Chiefs have been in disagreement on the major post-war issues—size of the peacetime armed forces, budget, post-war organization.

## **Objection:**

Parity for air power can be achieved without a single department of defense through establishment of co-equal departments of Navy, Army and Air Forces.

**Answer:** True, and there is widespread agreement that air power has earned its co-equal status. But demonstrated

advantages of economy, and unified command in the field, together with elimination of senseless inter-service competitions in manpower, research and appropriations, compel choice of a single department.

## **Objection:**

National security requires coordination of the armed services with foreign policy and economic agencies. The President's plan therefore deals with only a fragment of the problem. What we need is a more comprehensive plan, like that proposed by the Navy, which brings in the State Department, the War Production board and other pertinent branches of the government in war and peace.

**Answer:** This is agreed to be desirable, but such coordination with policy, economic and scientific agencies will be much easier to organize and carry out when there is one Department of the Armed Services capable of speaking with authority for the total armed forces.

## **Objection:**

Although it is true that the teamwork of the services left much to be desired, at

Pearl Harbor and later, the remedy is not unification but more coordination by joint committees and boards where all services are represented and can discuss things.

**Answer:** From 1903 right up to December 7, 1941, there was a Joint Army-Navy Board. It was a failure and Pearl Harbor is one proof. True principles of command must be followed, with an authority able to demand compliance with its directives.

### **Objection:**

Unification would put the operations of at least one branch at any time in the hands of those who don't understand them.

**Answer:** On the contrary, actual operations are left with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force or (in case of war) with supreme commanders in the field as in the war just finished. The proposed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is a policy-and-strategy official, not a director of operations.

### **Objection:**

The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

would inevitably favor the Army if he is an Army officer or the Navy if he is a Navy officer.

**Answer:** The experience of the recent war has shown that when commanders are put in charge of composite forces they think in terms of the whole force, not the part whose uniform they wear. Eisenhower, MacArthur and Nimitz are living proof that scope of responsibility determines scope of vision. Besides, the plan provides that the top position, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, shall be rotated among the three arms.

### **Objection:**

But since there are three services and only one top position there will be times when two services will be left entirely in the cold, not holding the major post.

**Answer:** This applies equally to all. There is no chance that the views of any one branch will be unheard, inasmuch as the staff of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is Army-Navy-Air and the professional heads of all three would sit as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

### **Objection:**

The job of the Secretary of the Armed Forces is too big for any man.

**Answer:** By this reasoning no man is capable of being President. As a matter of fact, a unified department will relieve the President of the job of resolving disputes between the services in addition to all his other duties.

### **Objection:**

The plan weakens civilian control of the military organizations and gives dangerous power to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. He might become a "man on horse-back."

**Answer:** This is unjustified. Since 1921 the Army's Chief of Staff has held a similar position in the War Department without weakening the control exercised by the civilian Secretary of War. There would always be three layers of civilian control above any Chief of Staff—the Secretary of the Armed Forces, the President and Congress.

### **Objection:**

Unification would destroy the traditions, morale and esprit de corps of the present services.

**Answer:** It has not been proposed to "merge" the three forces; they would simply come under a single head. The Army Air Forces under the Army and the Marine Corps under the Navy in the past have not lacked spirit. The Navy, the Army and the Air Force will keep their separate identity.

### **Objection:**

Unification would eliminate healthy competition between the services.

**Answer:** Competition exists between battleships, armies and air forces; it can still exist between services. But it must be healthy competition regulated by control at the top, not wasteful emulation with duplicating functions.

### **Objection:**

It is true that unified command in the field

has proved essential but this does not require unified departments in Washington.

**Answer:** Unified command in the field was achieved painfully over many difficulties of unfamiliarity and conflicting directives from Washington. To eliminate such problems, a unified organization must exist at the top to train and supply fighting organizations accustomed to working together, led by commanders skilled in working under leaders of all services.

### **Objection:**

Germany had a single department of the armed forces and lost the war with it. Why should we give up an organization that won the war and take an organization that lost?


**Answer:** If we argue by analogy we will have no organization at all—Germany had one department, Japan two, and Italy three, and they all lost the war. It is more sound to evolve a system that fits our own special military problems.

[attach 2/28/46]

**“I urge this as the  
best means of  
keeping the peace”**

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*President Harry S. Truman*



**T**HE President advocates the unification of the Army, Navy and the Air Forces into one Department of National Defense under one civilian Secretary.

An overwhelming majority of U. S. military commanders who directed the overall strategy in Washington, and conducted the victorious battles in the various war theatres are supporting the proposal.

The majority of the people and press approve military unification.

Opposed to the plan is a small but active minority which is carrying on a determined campaign to block action.

Congress is now considering legislation providing for unification. Every man and woman has a direct interest in this matter. One of the surest guarantees for world peace is a modern, unified national defense prepared to repel any sudden attack that would utilize the newly developed instruments and techniques of warfare.

You and your family are directly concerned in this important question regarding your country's defense. This book presents the facts which will enable you to form a reasoned judgment on the merits of this cause.

**THE AIR POWER LEAGUE**

**Empire State Bldg.**


**New York 1, N. Y.**

**HOWARD W. ANGUS**

*Executive Vice-President*



# Plan Chart



**NOTE:** The President, Secretary and other civilian authorities are authorized to communicate directly with commanders of components on vital matters, as basic military strategy, policy and division of the budget.

# Major Benefits

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**1** Necessary teamwork can be had only under a single command.

Modern war requires the integrated and coordinated effort of all services and the joint employment of land, sea and air power in common purpose according to a single plan. This was the winning formula of World War II. Pearl Harbor was an example of separatism, a near fatal cleavage that normally increases in peace time. It can be prevented only by unification at the top level, with a single authority having power to *order* coordination. Joint boards, which work only by unanimous vote, cannot provide the answer.

**2** Equality for air power can be obtained under a single Department of Defense.

The role and responsibilities of air power are now equal to those of land and sea power. Our first line of defense against the modern weapons of an atomic age clearly lies in the skies. In order to establish air power on its required parity and to grant it necessary autonomy, we must reorganize our defense program under *three* departments or under *one*. The outmoded peace time establishment of two departments, with air power as an auxiliary, will no longer suffice. Other vital considerations compel the choice of the single department in preference to the three.

**3** Military security will cost less under a single department.

The tremendous savings in money, resources and manpower that can be realized through a unified military budget, common procurement and purchasing and elimination of duplicating and often cross-purpose efforts are obvious. Each service finds itself not only doing a job that could be done by a single agency, but in developing and hoarding surpluses and in *competing* with the others for the money, goods and manpower available. Such uneconomical disunity would be a senseless, if not impossible luxury, for the taxpayer in time of peace.

***Supporters  
of Unification***

**President of the United States**

**War Department and the Army Air Forces**

**Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee (appointed to study subject)**

**Joint Strategic Survey Committee (Senior body of Admiral, Ground General and Air General, under Joint Chiefs of Staff)**

**One-half of top Navy Commanders during combat**

**The Director of the Budget**

**The Wartime Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion**


**The American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States and other national organizations**

**75% of the Press (according to editorial comment)**

**Josephus H. Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, World War I**

# "I urge this as the best means of keeping the peace"

*President Harry S. Truman*



"We would be taking a grave risk with the national security if we did not move now to overcome permanently the present imperfections in our defense organization. However great was the need for coordination and unified command in World War II, it is sure to be greater if there is any future aggression against world peace. Technological developments have made the armed services much more dependent upon each other than ever before. The boundaries that once separated the Army's battlefield from the Navy's battlefield have been virtually erased. If there is ever going to be another global conflict it is sure to take place simultaneously on land and sea and in the air, with weapons of ever greater speed and range. Our combat forces must work together in one team as they have never been required to work together in the past.

"We must assume, further, that another war would strike much more suddenly than the last, and that it would strike directly at the United States. We cannot expect to be given the opportunity again to experiment in organization and in ways of teamwork while the fight-

ing proceeds. True preparedness now means not alone in armaments and numbers of men, but preparedness in organization also. It means establishing in peacetime the kind of military organization which will be able to meet the test of sudden attack quickly and without having to improvise radical readjustment in structure and habits.

"The basic question is what organization will provide the most effective employment of our military resources in time of war and the most effective means for maintaining peace. The manner in which we make this transition in the size, composition and organization of the armed forces will determine the efficiency and cost of our national defense for many years to come . . .

"It was obviously impossible in the midst of conflict to reorganize the armed forces of the United States along the line here suggested. Now that our enemies have surrendered, I urge the Congress to proceed to bring about a reorganization of the management of the armed forces . . .

"I urge this as the best means of keeping the peace."

**“The consideration of cost is of paramount importance. In time of peace, and increasingly so with each succeeding year, the dominating factor will be money—the size and character of the military budget. The strength of our armed forces in time of peace in the past has been controlled, not by forward planning or anticipated dangers, but by the size of the allowance for the services from the public funds.**

**“Yet we are all agreed that the United States must now and for some future years maintain in constant readiness such military strength as will impress the leaders and professional soldiers of other nations that this nation is really determined to achieve a lasting peace. This necessary strength must be maintained as economically as possible. We are all concerned that for each dollar spent for security we obtain as much security as that dollar can buy. Because of our high standards of living, our costs of maintaining an armed force are, man for man, the highest in the world. In the years to come, the expense will be far less than during the war, but it will still be large.**

**“We ought not then to tolerate in our budget for national security any items that relate to those duplications that are inherent in a separation of the services; duplications that no joint board with equal representation of the Army and Navy has been able to eliminate. We simply will not be able to afford two lines of supply, two hospital systems, two procurement agencies, two air transport systems, where one will do the job as effectively and for less money . . .**

**“The combination of the armed forces in a single department is business-like and will bring economy. The savings will not perhaps be realized at once. But in the evolutionary process more and more ways can be found to combine services and facilities and procurement and the like, and out of these combinations major economies are certain to be realized.”**

**“For each dollar  
spent as much  
security as that  
dollar can buy”**

*Secretary of War*  
**Robert P. Patterson**



# “Lack of Army and Navy cooperation probably delayed Victory”

*General of the Army  
George C. Marshall*

“Unification of the armed forces is a must for lasting peace . . . lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy probably delayed victory . . .

“It was a great struggle to attain the principle of unity of command in the Southwest Pacific. Without the tragic day-to-day pressure of events we never could have done it.

“The main purpose of maintaining a security establishment is to impress upon the political leaders and professional soldiers of other nations—both friendly and unfriendly—that no act of aggression against the U. S., however sudden, could succeed.

“Our national security is measured by the sum or rather the combination of the three great arms—the land, air and naval forces. The urgent need is for an overall, not a piecemeal, appraisal of what is required to solve the single problem of national security with the greatest economy compatible with requirements. Because of the weapons that would be used in a future war it is im-



perative that the U. S. be able to do in weeks, certainly months, what we previously took years to accomplish. We must be prepared for the sudden action now made possible by the plane, by the various types of bombs, and other means which can be brought to bear over great distances in a very short time.

“I am strongly convinced that unless there is a single department for the armed forces, within which the different and numerous complexities can be ironed out prior to a presentation of requirements to the President and Congress, there can be little hope that we will be able to maintain through the years a military posture that will secure us a lasting peace.”

# **“Lest we lose the Peace we have so dearly bought”**

*General of the Army*  
**DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER**  
*Supreme Allied Commander—  
War Against Germany*

**“I am convinced that unless we have unity of direction in Washington through the years of peace that lie ahead, we may enter another emergency in a time to come as we did at Pearl Harbor. It is in time of peace that this nation must preserve a balanced, adequate measure of our land, sea and air power lest we lose the peace we have so dearly bought.**

**“With integration we can buy more security for less money. Without it we will spend more money and obtain less security. It is my flash guess that a merger of the armed forces would make it possible to establish a defense establishment requiring only 75 per cent as many men as would be necessary if the Army, Navy and Air Force planned their requirements separately.**

**“If it is true that the task of a civilian secretary who would preside over a single department would be beyond the**



**capacity of any man, then it follows that no man has the capacity to assume the presidency of the United States.**

**“One of the most important and least understood factors in modern war is that it is essentially a matter of perfected teamwork. Perfected teamwork results as much from friendly association over a period of years as it does from the more obvious reasons of combined tactical training and doctrine . . .**

**“There is no such thing as a separate land, sea, or air war; therefore, we must now recognize this fact by establishing a single department of the armed forces.”**

# **“In Unity will lie military strength”**

*General of the Army*  
**DOUGLAS MacARTHUR**  
*Supreme Allied Commander—  
War Against Japan*

**“The great lesson for the future is that success in the art of war depends upon a complete integration of the services. In unity will lie military strength. We cannot win with only backs and ends. And no line, however strong, can go alone. Victory will rest with the team.**

**“The experience of this war has completely and absolutely convinced me that here should be a complete amalgamation of the various fighting forces.**

**“I believe that modern war, with the introduction of the enormous power of air and the great increases in the scope of all machine war, has made it impossible to conceive of war in what we know as the uncoordinated Army, the Navy and the Air Corps.**

**“To use a very trite but very familiar simile, I do not see how they can perform independently without singleness of direction any more than the backs and the line and the ends of the football team. And just as on a football team, each commander in the armed forces must know the complete basis of all the operations of the other men who function on the team.**

**“I believe that the intensity of the concentration that men put on one**



**branch of the services leads them to make other branches think they are jealous and critical.**

**“The loyalty of a man to his own family or his own tribe or his own service is one of the finest things in human nature, but it so happens that if it is applied with too great intensity to men at arms it leads to very disastrous results.**

**“I believe that the services are divided by lines of dissimilarity which we should go to any lengths to overcome.**

**“I believe there are, rightly or wrongly, deadly resentments. Instead of comradeship, the competition almost reaches the heights of envy or jealousy at times. I believe we shall have to eradicate this system.**

**“I believe we should be ONE family instead of three.”**

# What *you* can do

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**BE A LEADER** in "post-Hiroshima" thinking and planning. Demand that the vital issues of our national defense be no longer decided according to outmoded concepts.

**INFORM YOURSELF** so that you may enlist the interest and support of your friends and neighbors. Help develop in your community an enlightened public opinion on the need for speedy unification of our armed forces and a co-equal status for air power.

**ORGANIZE** for community discussion and action. Contact your local American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and other veterans' organizations; suggest unification as a timely topic for your civic forums, press and radio. It is vital that all citizens be fully informed.

**ACTION NOW** is the pressing need because the subject concerns the safety of every American and the future of our nation.

A wire or letter addressed as below will bring you additional information on request.

**THE AIR POWER LEAGUE**  
Empire State Bldg.  
New York 1, N. Y.