Dear Mr. Carter:

As per our recent telephone conversation, enclosed please find memorandum outlining the situation as it exists today at Convair.

Please call me if you have any further questions in this matter as I will be more than happy to offer any supplementary information which you desire.

Cordially yours,

August C. Esenwein

Enc.
Convair Fort Worth Division now employs a total of 26,243 (July 1952). These employees comprise an experienced integrated engineering design, development, tooling, and manufacturing organization capable of producing airplanes for the USAF quickly and in adequate production quantities to support the defense effort and at favorable cost compared to any competitive aircraft manufacturer.

Convair Fort Worth is the only major aircraft manufacturer that in the year 1951 and to date has complied with the Finnster aircraft production schedules.

The run-out of present approved contracts for Convair Fort Worth Division will result in immediate loss of this trained highly skilled personnel in Engineering and Tooling departments with a decline in total employment beginning in August 1952 and expected to drop to a low of 11,400 in June 1954 even assuming early Air Force approval of expected additional contracts, but without any B-60 contracts. This represents a total decrease in employment of 11,843 employees within the next twenty-two months.

It means that at a time when the Air Force build-up is necessary to vital defense of the nation that the production ability and potential of the nation's largest and only "on schedule" (USAF owned facility) aircraft factory is being allowed to deteriorate. The rebuilding of this great engineering and production organization, once allowed to disintegrate, will take years and great expense to rebuild; years that may not be available in case of needed aircraft production.

It is extremely serious to lose these trained technical personnel in the Engineering and Tooling organizations because design and development work must be performed in these organizations many months prior to beginning production work and prior to employment of substantial numbers of people in the manufacturing organization. New airplane contracts involve several years of design, tooling, prototype, and flight test activity before realization of substantial production employment. For instance, the B-47 (Boeing) airplane was first approved for initial design in 1943 with first prototype flight in late 1947, but combat production airplanes are not yet available to the Air Force and are not expected until late in 1953. This substantiates the long period of time required for development of new airplanes and the long period between initial contract and transition into sizable production activity.

Delayed decisions for continuing contracts result in loss of trained employees.
Comparison of B-60 (Convair) and B-52 (Boeing).  
30 July 1952  
Page 3

to approximately 13% in favor of the B-52.

The growth potential for the two airplanes favors the B-60. By using a properly designed turbo prop engine, the B-60 can perform at better than 50,000 feet altitude and at a combat mission radius of 4,590 nmi.

Availability to USAF as a proven tactical bomber that can be maintained and successfully operated.

**B-60**

Convair Fort Worth Division can deliver the first B-60 production airplane in October 1953 with adequate quantities available for operation of combat wings in early 1954. Because of late engine availability however from USAF, the first B-60 airplane was actually scheduled for delivery in April 1954 with combat wings available to USAF in the Fall of 1954. This early combat availability of the B-60 is due primarily to the ability of the Convair Fort Worth Division to manufacture and produce this airplane quickly and cheaply, and because of the similarity of the B-60 to the proven B-36 it can be put into successful operation with minimum flight and maintenance crew training.

**B-52**

The B-52, produced by Boeing, Seattle, is a newly designed airplane with indicated delivery of first production airplane in early 1954, but with slow rate of production thereafter and estimated combat readiness not expected before 1956 or 1958 because of development problems associated with such a new airplane design and because of time required for base preparation, flight and maintenance crew training.

**Cost Comparison**

Information received on comparative costs for the B-52 and B-60 airplanes, assuming procurement of comparable quantities, can be summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total quantity of airplanes</th>
<th>B-52</th>
<th>B-60</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total program cost for contractor furnished items and GFP</td>
<td>$1,600,000,000</td>
<td>$800,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approximate cost per airplane</td>
<td>$13,300,000</td>
<td>$6,750,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is obvious from the foregoing cost comparison that the B-52 airplane will cost over twice as much per airplane as the B-60 airplane. For expenditure of $1,600,000,000 the Air Force can procure 120 B-52's or 240 B-60 airplanes. Not only would the B-60 airplanes be available to USAF at a much lower cost, but as previously indicated, much quicker. Stated another way, the cost comparison indicates that a premium of $800,000,000 is to be paid for procurement of 120 B-52 airplanes compared to the program cost for the same number of B-60 airplanes. For the procurement of smaller quantities of airplanes, the cost comparison is even more favorable for procurement of the B-60.