



**FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT**

**Supreme Allied Commander
Europe**



**SHAPE PARIS
2 April, 1952**





ANNUAL REPORT
to
THE STANDING GROUP
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

from
General of the Army
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Printed in Paris

*The Chairman,
The Standing Group,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*

2 April, 1952.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

One year ago today, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe assumed operational control of the forces dedicated to the defense of Western Europe. From that day onward, every member of this Headquarters has been dedicated personally to the cause of peace and security.

This anniversary provides a vantage point to review progress during the initial year of our joint enterprise, to take stock of our needs, and to present to member nations certain views that have developed in my Headquarters concerning our present security position. Though these observations reach beyond the purely geographical limits of this Command, we have found that no turbulence in the world scene fails to react directly on our common enterprise in Europe. The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one.

It would be disastrous if the favorable signs and developments recorded in this report were to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of adequate security, for there is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning.

Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold difficulties and shortcomings of our joint effort to date. For we have made progress in all aspects of security. The momentum must be continued with renewed vigor, and since moral force is the genesis of all progress, especially progress toward security and peace, we must give primary attention to this vital element.

We are competing with an ideological force, Communism, which has joined with the imperialistic ambitions of a group controlling all life and resources found between the Elbe and the China Sea. Throughout this vast region, unity is achieved

by the simple techniques of the police state. In this concert of action and power lies great danger for any single nation exposed directly or indirectly to the unrelenting, never-ending attacks of propaganda, subversion, force and the threat of force. If the free nations are to remain secure, our peoples must march together, agreed on common goals, and win that cooperative unity possible only in a free society.

We want peace. We want freedom, too, and the individual rights to which our whole civilization is dedicated. But to want these things is not enough. We can keep them only by work, selflessness, constancy, and sacrifice. The enormity of the present threat will never be met by halfhearted measures or by any superficial military facade. Required is the full awakening of the free world and the pursuit of energetic, far-reaching measures to insure our form of life—even our survival.

During the first fifty years of this century, the nations of the Atlantic Community have spent their strength and heritage in great conflicts which began in Europe and spread over much of the world's surface. As in all wars, a costly number of the natural leaders were killed. Destruction was widespread; public treasuries were emptied and family savings wiped out through inflation. Economic conditions inflicted such heavy punishment on the masses of citizens that social problems took on new and bitter prominence. In important areas of Africa and Asia, confidence in Western leadership was shaken.

As we look back over these developments, it seems almost as if the nations of the West have been, for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that could have been written by Lenin, prophet of militant Communistic expansion. This pattern of events, which points so surely to ultimate disaster, can be changed only if the peoples of the West have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past and show a willingness to do something new and challenging. NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past. But NATO's development is not automatic; action is the test.

To advance this great effort, unified action is required, not only among but within our nations. Yet, it has seemed more than once within our countries that political factions hold their own immediate gain higher than the fate of their nation or even that of civilization itself. Then there are elements striving to hold back the hands of the clock, and apparently placing profits above patriotism. At the same time, there are workers in our member countries still suffering the delusion that their interests are served by association with Communist-led labor groups. It is nightmarish that any free worker of the West could respond voluntarily to the same Kremlin voices that have dictated the elimination of free labor unions in Russia and satellite countries. In the free system, labor is a full-fledged partner and must share in responsibility as equally as it must share in productivity. We can thrive mightily in an era of good feeling. It can be brought into being by vibrant, selfless leadership at all levels of society.

The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing—the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation. The United States, for example, is furnishing much of the material resources of this project during the current year because it believes that America's enlightened self-interest is served thereby. Most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course. But they will continue to believe their own security interests are being served only as other participants show cooperation and enterprise in improving their own defenses.

Consequently, it would be fatuous for anyone to assume that the tax-payers of America will continue to pour money and resources into Europe unless encouraged by steady progress toward mutual cooperation and full effectiveness. To be sure, the citizens of all NATO countries are carrying heavy tax burdens, but even if these are at optimum levels, there still are many steps possible in Europe which would cost little and yet bring rich returns through increased strength.

Fundamentally, and on a long-term basis, each important geographical area must be defended primarily by the people of that region. The average citizen must therefore feel that he has

a vital stake in the fight for freedom, not that he is a bystander or a pawn in a struggle for power.

There is so much talk of national and international arrangements and interests that basic issues are often obscured from view. Fundamentally, we are fighting the battle of individual freedom for all. Before all men and before the world, our policies must be such as to inspire confidence in our strength and determination, and trust in our fairness. This is the moral foundation without which any military effort, any expenditure in lives and treasure, is fruitless.

By our actions, too, we must demonstrate in convincing form that we are masters of our own destiny. Within the Atlantic Community and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace—a central position of unity and strength for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration.

SITUATION ONE YEAR AGO

On 21st February, 1951, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe was physically established in temporary facilities at the Astoria Hotel in Paris. This step followed a period of preparatory actions, including a personal survey trip touching the capitals of the twelve nations then participating in NATO. As early as October, 1950, I had been advised by the President of the United States that he might find it necessary to return me to an active duty status to assume an Allied Command in Europe. While this information was not definite or official, it was sufficient for me to begin a study of all aspects of the military situation then existing.

From all information presented, it was clear that the difficulties facing the new enterprise were manifold. Problems and the doubt they bred were on every side. It is common knowledge that peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign nations have always found it difficult to discover common ground on which they

could stand together for any length of time. Nevertheless, we were expecting NATO members not only to agree on common objectives but to work and sacrifice together, over an indefinite period, in order to achieve common security.

The United States, aided by other members of the United Nations, was already heavily engaged in combat operations in Korea which were taking a severe toll in manpower and military supplies. Moreover, strong voices could be heard in America, disputing the NATO concept of collective security and opposing further U.S. reinforcement of the European area. France was engaged against aggression in Indochina in a bitter struggle that absorbed a large portion of her regular military establishment. This campaign in Southeast Asia was already draining off a significant share of the money and resources that the French Government could allocate to military purposes, even though the United States was providing assistance in the form of aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment. In Malaya, British forces, equivalent to more than two divisions, were engaged against guerrilla activities inspired by Communist agents.

There was serious question as to the state of public morale among the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They were living daily under the shadow of a powerful Soviet striking force, stationed in Eastern Germany and Poland, and possessing the obvious capability of overrunning much of Europe. It was extremely difficult for the average European to see any future in an attempt to build defensive forces which might offset this real and formidable threat. There seemed to be too much of a lead to be overtaken. The doubts of the European peoples gave birth to the false but glittering doctrine of neutralism, through which they hoped to preserve the things they had always held dear. Their fears were stimulated by ugly overtones of threat from Communist propaganda organs, and from traitorous outriders already in their own midst. Beyond all this, the cumulative effects of repeated failure to make any headway in conferences with the Soviets produced an intellectual defeatism, in some quarters bordering upon despair.

These were only a few of the obvious obstacles in the road leading to the collective security of the still free world. For my

part, the effect of the negative factors was largely cancelled by a stern fact which denied refutation : *the job had to be done*. For my own country as for every other nation joined in NATO, there was no acceptable alternative. Otherwise, nation after nation, beginning with the weaker and the more exposed, would be infiltrated, harassed, and browbeaten into submission. The threat of force is no less terrifying to the weak than force itself. Finally, as successive States were chipped away, Europe would indeed become indefensible. This key area would be doomed to regimented service for the advancement of Communistic imperialism. With Europe would go its skilled and productive population, its industrial resources, and also its traditional influence and relationships with other parts of the world. The transfer of this strength from the assets of the free world into Soviet resources would be a fearful blow.

Modern civilization creates more and more interdependence among nations. This is obvious in the case of all those which cannot produce the necessary foodstuffs for their own existence. But consider the United States—more fortunate, perhaps, than any other nation in the abundance, variety, and accessibility of her resources. The basic index of American industrial power is steel production. Currently, the United States produces almost one-half of the world total and, through such industrial strength, has been able to assist in arming the free world with heavy military equipment. Yet General Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, has reported that each new medium tank requires :

1,915 pounds of chromium of which 99 per cent of the ore is imported.

950 pounds of manganese of which 92 per cent is imported.

520 pounds of nickel of which 92 per cent is imported.

100 pounds of tin of which 78 per cent is imported.

6,512 pounds of bauxite (the ore of aluminium) of which 65 per cent is imported.

1,484 pounds of copper of which 29 per cent is imported.

The critical materials required in the production of a tank are needed not only for the weapons of defense but in the vast array of utensils, equipment, tools, and machines of modern life.

These things have become essential to the full productivity and well-being of an industrial nation.

If the continued advance of the Iron Curtain could eventually damage the economic and therefore the political system of America, how much more critical was the position of practically every other nation exposed to the threat. Truly there could be no question on the part of any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as to the overriding need for joint and vigorous defense action. Without it there was, in long-term sense, hope for none. For the continental nations, there was only the specter of a godless tyranny that would stamp out freedom with machine-like efficiency. The heritage of the past and the hope of the future would alike be buried under a monolithic mass of totalitarianism. For Britain, there was the prospect of a new enemy across the Dover Cliffs, an enemy who could bring back the rockets, submarines, and bombardment on an intensive scale. For the United States and Canada, the future could promise ever-greater danger of attack, requiring endless sacrifices and defense costs which would ultimately break their economies.

With these thoughts and convictions, I joined the first members of our international staff then gathering in Paris. Though new to each other and speaking six different tongues, we were united to a man in this belief : there could be no peace and security for any of our peoples without unity in purpose and action throughout the Atlantic Community.

THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Beyond the Iron Curtain, deployed from the Arctic Ocean to the Adriatic Sea, the forces menacing the free world were formidable. Just beyond the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe lay thirty divisions with their supporting squadrons of aircraft. These were only a fraction of available Soviet strength ; yet their employment was significant of the whole Communistic philosophy of force. While the Western Powers reduced their active forces to small occupation units which were concerning themselves with peacetime training, and becoming identified more and more

with the communities where they dwelt, the numbers and the status of the soldiers of the Soviet had remained unchanged since shortly after the end of the war. They were still confined in sullen isolation within their barracks and compounds ; they were still deployed and poised as for war.

Under duress, the satellite countries had been obliged to follow the policy of Soviet Russia. Their foreign masters had set them to work immediately to train for war and had merged their economy with that of Russia. By the beginning of 1951, these nations had been forced to produce, between them, a total of some sixty divisions, while their air forces were also under development. In Eastern Germany, in defiance of her obligations, Russia had organized a para-military force, the *Bereitschaften*.

Each side, the West and the East, possessed outposts beyond the frontiers of the other. Albania remained in the Soviet orbit, though isolated from it by the regained sovereignty of Yugoslavia. West Berlin and Vienna, with their devoted populations and garrisons of French, British and Americans, were still impervious to Soviet threats and blandishments alike. Apart from these exceptions, the Iron Curtain divided the continent into regimented and free Europe. East of it were 175 Soviet line divisions, one-third of which were either mechanized or armored, and an Air Force of 20,000 aircraft. The Navy at the same time stood at twenty cruisers and some 300 submarines. Behind all this was a vast, sprawling economy, still largely harnessed to war. Though inefficient by Western technical standards, Soviet industry had already demonstrated that it was producing atomic weapons.

Obviously, the problem of defending Western Europe was much greater than the mere tactical problem of how to counter the threat of the thirty divisions and their supporting air regiments which were displayed in the shopwindow set in the Iron Curtain itself. It was clear that these forces alone were strong enough to try, with a fair prospect of success, to thrust far into the weaker West. But the array of additional strength was indeed vast, even after subtracting the forces stationed in the Far East, or in and near the Caucasus, and those which the Soviet

Government was bound to retain in disaffected areas within its own borders.

To know that the aggregate capacity of the West, actual and potential, was greater than that of the Soviets in all these respects, was some comfort. At the moment, however, in Western Europe there were fewer than fifteen NATO divisions adequately trained and equipped for war. National Service programs, existing in all European member countries, had trained, or partially trained, a reservoir of manpower since the end of the war. Unfortunately, equipment was inadequate to convert this pool into effective reserve divisions. In the air the situation was no better, perhaps worse. We had fewer than 1,000 operational aircraft available in all Western Europe, and many of these were of obsolescent types. From the naval viewpoint we were much better off, although a tremendous effort would be required to offset the threat of submarine attack on vital sea routes. Naval carrier strength, as represented by the U. S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, could help the over-all air picture to some extent by providing highly mobile air strength to a threatened area.

The greatest concentration of Western air and ground strength was in Germany. Organized within American, British and French zones, the forces were deployed for the purpose for which they were designed—occupation and police duties. Their deployment had no relationship to what would be suitable in resisting attack. Airfields were crowded up in the forward areas, in some cases East of the ground troops that must cover them. Supply lines for British and American forces, almost parallel to the front, ran to the North German ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven, instead of rearward through France and the Low Countries. We know that before any division would be engaged more than forty-eight hours, it would require supply shipments of upwards to five hundred tons a day. For air units, the supply load was comparably heavy: the jet airplane burns more than a ton of fuel per hour. Obviously, a tremendous amount of depot and airfield construction would be required before our forces in this vital area were astride adequate communication routes.

To all these problems we now had to turn our minds. On

the one hand, there was the problem of how to persuade the nations of the free West to allocate afresh their resources in production and manpower, so as to build between themselves and the East the required shield. On the other hand was the strategic organization of the huge region, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, which the forces of the West must defend. It is with the latter problem that I shall deal first.

Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic—a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe and Asia combined. On the flanks of this long peninsula we have two main outcrops—apart from the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. The one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of Scandinavia, whose Western half, Norway, is among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend freedom. The Southern outcrop is Italy, projecting into the Mediterranean, and affording us a strong position for flanking forces with valuable air and sea bases.

We therefore conceived of Western Europe as an ultimate stronghold flanked by two defended regions : one comprising Denmark and Norway, and the other comprising Italy. All three of these countries are blessed by certain dispensations in the way of natural defensive advantages. Norway has its rugged coast and hinterland ; Denmark its many internal water-obstacles ; Italy her mountains with the narrow passes on the North and the Adriatic to the East. It seemed sound to divide the command of Western Europe into three main sectors : Norway and Denmark as the one buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure.

Along these lines, the SHAPE command structure was fashioned. The bulk of ground and air strength would of necessity be in the center and a smaller number of land and air forces, together with naval support, would defend the Northern and Southern flanks. Accordingly, in the spring of 1951, there was announced the formation of a Northern Allied Command under Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, with Major General Robert Taylor

as his Air Commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Hansteen Commanding Allied Land Forces Norway, and Lieutenant General Ebbe Görtz (later Lieutenant General Erik Möller) Commanding Allied Land Forces Denmark.

In the center, General Alphonse P. Juin was chosen to command Land Forces, with Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad in command of Air Forces. To insure the coordination of naval units operating in support of the center, Vice-Admiral Robert Jaujard was appointed. Flag Officer, Central Europe. These officers had the responsible duty of forging into single and redoubtable weapons the forces of the national contingents unified under their commands. There were to be units from France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. The air forces of the center were to be so developed and placed that they could operate with the Central Land Forces and also be able to undertake any needed action on the flanks with the least possible delay.

At the time of activation of the Central Headquarters, the organization for the command of the Southern flank was still not designated. Our immediate need was the protection of this flank with land and air forces and an effective naval force, including carrier-based aircraft. This need was intertwined with the problems of defense in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which made for complexities that would take time to solve.

The solution to the military problem was no more than begun with the development of the command structure and the various headquarters. The big task of «forging the weapon» remained—that is, the recruiting, training, and equipping of the standing forces and reserves, and of providing their support in the war of airfields, signal communications, and supply lines. All these necessary elements in men and equipment, the North Atlantic Treaty nations were called upon to contribute to the common defense.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The organizational framework of SHAPE was virtually completed in June, when Admiral Robert B. Carney was appointed

to command Allied Forces Southern Europe. Under him, Lieutenant General M. L. de Castiglioni was named Commander Land Forces South, and Major General David Schlatter assumed command of Air Forces. Subsequently, two sea area commands were organized by Admiral Carney, one under Vice-Admiral Leon Sala, and the other under Vice-Admiral Massimo Girosi.

Now, detailed planning could go forward in all sectors to measure ultimate defense requirements and to ensure efficient use, in an emergency, of forces already available. At SHAPE, planning was vigorously pursued by our international staff under the direction of General Alfred M. Gruenther. In this task, our officers profited greatly from previous work done by Field Marshal Montgomery and his associates in the Western Union Defense Organization and by the various Regional Planning Groups of NATO.

Very quickly after the establishment of the command structure we began to see definite improvement in the morale and readiness of troops. But first and foremost was the need for more forces. The United States and Great Britain alone possessed previously formed and disposable reserves, and they proceeded to deploy additional strength in Germany—four divisions from America and two from the United Kingdom. France already had the equivalent of four divisions in Germany. Air reinforcement, although sorely needed, had to await the accomplishment of major programs for air crew training, production of aircraft, and construction of additional airfields.

The timely strengthening of Allied Ground forces beyond the Rhine had a good effect on morale in Europe and on public confidence in the vitality of our joint effort. Yet the situation demanded far greater strength in being, not only in the center but on the vital flanks, North and South. This strength had to come largely from the continental Allies; they were on the ground and they had the manpower.

Building combat-worthy forces in Europe was certain to take considerable time. All seven of the continental members of SHAPE had been overrun in the war and occupied for long periods. Their military formations had been disbanded, and

the supporting industrial and organizational network, essential to military establishments, had partially disintegrated. Actually, several of the countries had never possessed a modern military establishment. With these, everything had to be built from the ground up.

My personal efforts, therefore, and those of my Deputy, Field Marshal Montgomery, and members of the SHAPE staff, were directed at the basic problem of getting more men under arms and under training in Europe. We made constant visits to military installations and to every capital, studying schedules and means for training and equipping field forces. Our aim was to insure a larger ready force and, additionally, to see a broader base established for the expanding programs for training and equipment planned for 1952 and subsequent years. The problem of greater forces could not be solved by mere extension of national military service in the various countries. There was an urgent need to enlist more career servicemen who could form the professional core for citizen levies and who would also fill the inescapable need for skilled leaders, specialists, pilots, and technicians. During his period of compulsory service, the European citizen gave his time to the nation, receiving a mere pittance as monthly pay. Improved pay scales and conditions of service were obviously needed to attract more men into the professional ranks.

Everywhere we turned, we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear: nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale—the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate.

In the general rehabilitation of European economy, the

Marshall Plan had achieved remarkable success in the years 1947-1950. The measure of its contribution to the well-being and stability of Europe could be fully appreciated only by one who had seen the situation there before and after. Nevertheless, the starting point had been so close to rock bottom that only a minimum level of economic strength had been regained. The Soviets, who wanted no recovery in Western Europe, had screamed that the Marshall Plan was a war measure, even though its terms offered economic assistance to the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on the same basis as that accepted by the free nations. In concept and application, the program was political and economic: to repair the chaos of war, to start industry on the road to health, and to raise production to a level consistent with minimum civil needs.

To assist free nations, in Europe and elsewhere, to build their own defenses against the persistent threat of aggression, the United States inaugurated the Mutual Defense Assistance Program late in 1949. The purpose of this program was to furnish items of military equipment which the other countries could not produce, and to assist in the training required for the effective use of these weapons. In the European area, the program also provided the countries some of the machine tools, materials, and various components needed to get the production of munitions started. The flow of materiel to Europe was under way during 1951, consisting for the most part of tanks, vehicles, aircraft, and guns from existing stocks. A number of light naval vessels of combat and support types were also transferred to European navies. For their part, recipient nations were to raise and maintain the forces and furnish the balance of equipment they needed. In addition, they were to prepare to cope with maintenance and replacement programs of the heavy equipment at the earliest practicable date. The United Kingdom, with her greater industrial capacity, was in the best position to furnish the bulk of her own needs in tanks, aircraft and communications equipment.

Despite this extensive aid, the rearmament program meant heavy budget increases in all European countries. Larger permanent establishments were required, and more extensive train-

ing programs. Facilities had to be created for new forces—airfields, depots, and all the requirements peculiar to military forces. Of these needs, airfields were by far the most critical and expensive category. For the 1952 airfield program then being planned, real estate and construction costs amounted to the equivalent of one-half billion dollars.

The effect of defense spending on national economies was greatly magnified by sharp worldwide increases in the cost of raw materials. Food, coal, and other basic necessities soared to new heights, kindling antagonism against governmental defense programs and the whole rearmament effort. In the village where I live not far from Paris, ordinary laborers averaged the equivalent of seventy dollars a month ; yet coal for their cookstoves ranged up to fifty dollars a ton. For the price of a pair of shoes, the average man in Italy was already working eight times as long as the American worker ; for a pound of butter, the French worker toiled five times as long as his American counterpart.

It is recognized, of course, that such comparisons reflect many factors, including resources, management, tools, and efficiency. Nevertheless, they show that, heavy as defense costs were to the American taxpayer, far lesser burdens could be felt seriously by the average European. Understandably, European governments were inclined to move carefully in such a political climate. As a consequence, all recommendations for augmenting forces, building airfields, or increasing budget items were closely examined and frequently subject to lengthy negotiation within the various parliamentary factions. However, the concerted effort toward greater strength made progress throughout the spring and summer months. The attitude of the governments was cooperative, but there did exist a general feeling that an accurate yardstick was needed within NATO to measure the scale and intensity of national effort. Obviously, this was an extremely complicated problem in view of the differences in natural resources, financial position, industrial potential, and standards of living of various nations. Yet, failure to meet the situation would eventually lead to dissatisfaction and friction among our membership.

There were other problems as well. Our planning estimates of SHAPE forces to be created over the next few years had been prepared largely from the standpoint of military requirements. These programs now needed a feasibility test to insure that they were within the economic capabilities of member countries. However, no one knew the price tags. Presumably, some program would in time be evolved to coordinate NATO-wide production. But aside from the equipment pledged by the United States, no country knew at the moment what weapons it should plan on making for itself, what specialities it might make for other allied nations, or what it should procure from others.

Concern was felt in many quarters over the apparent failure to put to full use existing production facilities of Europe. There had always been large munitions industries in France and Belgium; the Netherlands possessed unused capacity in the electrical and other technical fields; several large aircraft factories were idle in Italy. The Defense Production Board of NATO had made extensive surveys of European production capabilities and had verified that considerable additional military production was possible. Nevertheless, financial limitations and the lack of firm national programs prolonged this distressing waste of facilities.

Recognition of the specific problems impeding progress led to the appointment of the Temporary Council Committee at the NATO meeting in Ottawa during September of 1951. Headed by Mr. W. Averell Harriman of the United States, this Committee served NATO as an advisory group but nevertheless had power to investigate the broad military effort and the potential of each of the member nations. The primary task of the T.C.C. was to develop a plan of action reconciling the issues arising from an acceptable military program with the actual capabilities of the member countries. It also considered ways and means of reducing the cost of building effective defensive forces. In the process, the Committee surveyed the political and economic capabilities of each NATO country, as well as problems requiring attention in order to develop these capabilities.

The efforts of the T.C.C. represent a monumental achieve-

ment—an achievement which could only have been accomplished with the thoroughgoing cooperation of the member nations. SHAPE was a principal beneficiary of its labors. The operation of the Committee was truly an innovation in that sovereign nations permitted an international group to examine their defense programs and their capacity—financial, economic and military—of supporting heavier burdens. As a result, the true dimensions of the rearmament task could be seen for the first time in terms of an integrated military, economic, and financial effort. For the first time, positive recommendations could be made for a more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defense program. The recommendations of the T.C.C. were detailed and far-going. They were not all acceptable to the governments of the participating nations, but in large part they were. The final report of the T.C.C. was approved at Lisbon and represented one of the great advances made at that meeting.

A NEW SOURCE OF STRENGTH

Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless Western Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations. Here in the heart of Europe is an area of roughly 100,000 square miles, populated by nearly 50,000,000 industrious and highly skilled people. Rich in natural resources and production facilities, Western Germany alone produces one-half as much steel annually as the rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, is a prime economic fact in Europe.

As the geographic center of Europe, Western Germany is of great strategic importance in the defense of the continent. The Northern plain of Germany, with its extensive network of modern roads and railways, offers the best route of advance from the East. As of today, our forces could not offer prolonged resistance East of the Rhine barrier. Thus we might lose, by default, the considerable resources of Germany and suffer, at the same

time, direct exposure of Denmark and the Netherlands. With Western Germany in our orbit, NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defense; in the restricted area of Western Europe, it is mandatory. Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanized armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft.

At first glance, a military alliance between Germany and the European nations of NATO would seem to lose sight of history. Too recently has Germany been the destroyer of peace in the Western world. Under evil leadership, a strong and able people succumbed to the doctrine that the arbitrary exercise of force was their privilege, and early military successes gave their leaders proud hopes of becoming world conquerors. The thought of a rearmed Germany is a matter of grave concern to the nations of Western Europe, who have suffered much from the misuse of German power. Certainly, their anxiety is understandable.

However, the people of Western Germany have made substantial progress toward understanding and achieving self-government. This development should be further encouraged by bringing them into closer association with the freedoms of the West. Thus their contributions to the common defense must be made on the one possible basis, a voluntary one, with equality of treatment for all.

Surely, it would be foolhardy to assume that a great country like Germany could long remain a vacuum. Unless Germany becomes a partner of the West, we might, eventually, see a repetition of the disaster of Czechoslovakia. Consider the glittering blandishments held out to the Germans by Moscow during recent months—promises of German unity, renewal of her old trade with Eastern Europe, a German National Army, removal of occupation forces and restrictions. The sturdy determination of the German Federal Republic to ally itself with the freedoms of the West has been manifested by its refusal to be blinded by such tactics. For the good of the German people, this is certainly the only course. For them the choice is starkly clear—freedom or subjection.

Recognizing the importance of German participation, the

United States proposed to the North Atlantic Council in the fall of 1950 that a plan be devised to obtain a German contribution to Western European defense within the framework of NATO. At Brussels in December, 1950, the various aspects of this proposal were studied by members of the Council, who then invited the United States, the United Kingdom and France to discuss the matter with the German Federal Republic.

Meanwhile, the French Government proposed an appealing innovation : why not, they said, bring the Germans in as part of a unified European Defense Force ? For several years, France had been a leader in promoting unity in Europe and was, at the time, negotiating the Schuman Plan, a major expression of economic unity. It was felt that German participation within the framework of a European defense community would not only provide the safeguards desired by Germany's neighbors of the West, but would represent also a major step towards European federation. In this spirit, France met with Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Western Germany to evolve an acceptable formula for German participation. From these meetings the concept of a European Defense Force emerged.

No one has attempted to minimize the difficulty of the new and complex problems implicit in such a plan. On the contrary, the doubters and the critical have magnified these in the hope of halting progress. Partial loss of sovereignty, complexity in administration and maintenance, destruction of patriotic impulse, and dozens of other valid and invalid objections have been pleaded as establishing the futility of the proposal. Here, as in so many others of the arguments developing around NATO the answer is found in a simple test. It is : « If this plan is not adopted, what is the inevitable result on the peace and the security we seek to preserve ? »

A year's preliminary work spent in refining the original concept has brought negotiations to an advanced stage with six governments participating, the Netherlands in addition to the five original nations. At the Lisbon conference in February, the plan received the endorsement and support of all other NATO powers.

As presently conceived, the European Defense Force calls for

the pooling of forces into a common military organization for the defense of all. Initially the forces to be unified would be those allocated by the participating nations to the defense of Europe. Troops required to meet commitments outside of Europe proper would be retained under national control. The direction, support, and administration of the unified defense forces would be vested in a European Defense Community, including a European Assembly, a Council, a Court of Justice, and an Executive Group, along with agencies for military supply, procurement, and budget. Such integration of military forces, and particularly the integration of their supply and supporting agencies, would prevent any participating nation from embarking on a separate course of aggression.

The European Defense Force would include land, air and navals units and their supporting elements. Basic ground units would be called *groupements*, of about 12,000 men. The Air would be organized into Wing-size units. At this level, troops would not be mixed as to nationality, thus preserving the language, customs and esprit of the home peoples. These basic units would be combined in larger military formations such as army corps, made up of elements of different national origin. The practicality of such integration was proved many times during the last war and is currently being demonstrated by our U.N. troops in Korea.

When formed, the European Defense Force would be integrated under SHAPE in the same manner as purely national forces from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries not members of the European Defense Community. The new grouping would not modify, conflict with, or in any way supersede the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concept of a European Defense Force is the consolidation of military elements of five nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces from still another nation, Western Germany. It cannot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of our collective security and to facilitate the achievement of NATO aims.

Success would be a long step also toward the unification of Europe. This is the central goal and the only possible way of

creating reasonable security, and insuring, at the same time, the improvement in living standards that characterizes Western civilization. Therein lies the real answer to the threat of Communist inundation. It is not enough to know that our combined resources outweigh those of the Soviet dictators. What matters is our ability to use them in the best possible way for our security and well-being.

Such efficiency demands the closest kind of political and economic cooperation, particularly in the area of Western Europe. For if the free nations of this region were really a unit, tremendous benefits would accrue to them individually and to NATO. Few Europeans would quarrel with this concept; political and economic unity is a popular theme to millions who have suffered from past differences. Yet progress toward full cooperation has been limited by the intricate and artificial maze of national obstacles erected by man himself. Customs barriers, conflicting economic structures, currency regulations, and countless other road blocks curtail drastically the movement of men, manufactured products, raw materials, and money upon which Europe's economic life depends. They are expensive and wasteful encumbrances, pyramiding the cost of production with tariffs, overhead, taxes, and middlemen. In the political field, these barriers compound inefficiency with distrust and suspicion.

The advantages of political and economic unity can be demonstrated by such practical examples as the European Defense Force and the Schuman Plan, which embrace the same six countries. The Schuman Plan calls for the pooling and production of steel and coal—vital commodities of life and defense. The aim is to provide common objectives and common markets, to eliminate unreasonable customs barriers, to make the European economy more flexible and productive. To me this plan to work together in steel and coal is, with the European Defense Community, a promise of greater economic, military, and moral strength in Western Europe. It is tangible evidence of the desire to eliminate the weaknesses of separate little economies, which make it hard for Europe to arm for defense. In my opinion, the two plans, the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community, mark historic advances in European cooperation. If these could be

supplemented by a Schuman Plan for electric power and for agriculture, along with a system for standardizing money values, the benefits would be profound and far-reaching. These joint efforts would serve as practical laboratories for the development of that full political and economic unity which alone can make Europe self-sustaining and secure. Indeed, until this hope becomes an accomplished fact, or some miracle brings about a disappearance of the Soviet threat, there will be no confident peace and enlarging prosperity for any part of the free world.

SITUATION IN EUROPE TODAY

Although it is my conviction that a unified Europe offers the best hope for permanent stability in this critical area, respectable strength can nevertheless be achieved within NATO by wholehearted effort and cooperation. Much has been done towards that end in the past twelve months. Viewed separately, as military, economic, and political achievements, these gains may not be spectacular ; but taken as a whole, they have created a profound change in morale, the basic factor of all.

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions whether in service or quickly mobilizable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their coordinated efforts. Still far—disappointingly far—from sufficient for a determined defense, they nevertheless represent a fighting force

in whose spirit and increasing fitness our nations can take considerable pride.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee, our member countries have pledged to produce this year fifty divisions for European Defense, exclusive of those to be provided by the two new NATO nations, Greece and Turkey. Roughly, one-half of the fifty divisions will be standing forces ; the remainder are planned as reserve divisions available for employment at periods varying from three to thirty days.

The number of divisions pledged does not fully represent the magnitude of the effort required from the various member nations. Along with the divisions furnished, each nation must produce a variety of combat and service support elements, such as engineers, heavy artillery, communications, and transport, supply and maintenance units, to maintain these divisions in the field. When combined with other needs such as anti-aircraft defenses, these requirements raise manpower and equipment totals to twice or three times those represented within the combat divisions.

The building of these priority reserve divisions and similar forces to follow them represents one of the most difficult and urgent problems now before us. The nations of Western Europe will never be able to maintain under arms in peacetime the regular forces necessary to meet a Soviet invasion, to hold it, and to throw it back. It would entail permanent peacetime forces of a size they cannot afford. The defense of the West must necessarily be based on highly trained covering forces, backed by reserve units which can be brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Admittedly, this is the only system of defense which can be adopted without excessive cost or crippling damage to national economies. But to make the system work will demand far more attention than is now being given to the organization and readying of reserve forces on the continent.

Each nation must now organize its reservists so as to produce trained formations which will be fit to fight without a long period of training after mobilization. This means that the reserve

forces will have to receive field training as divisions and similar formations in peacetime. Moreover, adequate equipment must constantly be in the hands of these units, and strong permanent cadres assigned to provide the professional core essential to combat-worthy efficiency.

Air power is the dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a war alone, but without it, no war can be won. Our goal is to create air strength capable of answering immediately the onslaught of an aggressor and covering, at the same time, the mobilization of reserve forces. Since we cannot predict when an attack might be launched, air forces must be operationally ready at all times to rise to the defense of Western Europe.

Our air arm has gradually progressed in strength and effectiveness during the past year. But the development of air power is a long and complex process. It takes time to produce the aircraft, the fields from which they fly, and the skilled crews who operate and maintain them. The articulation of these various programs at the SHAPE level has been a primary concern of my Air Deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders.

There is still a long way to go in developing air strength in Western Europe. A major task has been and continues to be the provision of adequate air bases and communications to link them. The airfield problem stems largely from the fact that jet fighters require runways substantially longer than those in current use for even the largest commercial aircraft. During the past year, some thirty airfields have been put into use, but these were largely an inheritance from previous European construction programs and involved improvements on fields already in existence. A vast amount of new construction is needed to accommodate the air power necessary to the defense of the West.

One of the most heartening achievements of the Lisbon Conference was the approval by member nations of a cost-sharing scheme to build a large number of additional airfields in Europe. Action was also taken to provide headquarters sites and communication facilities for the common use of NATO forces. Without agreement on the fundamental and complex question of costs,

our whole defense project would have been crippled by the continued lack of adequate air facilities.

As presently scheduled, NATO's European air arm will include by the end of 1952 some 4,000 operational aircraft, a significant proportion of which will be modern jet fighters. When realized, this air strength will amount to a greatly improved situation over what we faced a year ago, but it will still be far from our ultimate requirements. Moreover, the operational value of the forces will depend in large measure on progress made in developing the Aircraft Warning System and the supply and maintenance organizations for air forces.

The naval equation in Western European waters is still weighted strongly in our favor. Deficiencies exist in mine sweepers, anti-submarine craft, and harbor defense installations, but efforts are being made toward filling these needs. The main advance on the naval side has been realized in the excellent coordination and common procedures evolved by Allied navies in European waters.

These developments will bring to all European defense problems—sea, air and land—the effective application of modern sea power and the wide range of weapons which its arsenal contains. This capability is of particular importance in the Northern and Southern regions of my command. With the extension of the Southern defense area some 1,400 miles eastward, a broad flanking position will be organized under Admiral Carney, combining SHAPE forces in Italy and the Central Mediterranean with those of Greece and Turkey. The essential role of sea power here is to link and support the defense forces of these countries while working in close cooperation with other Allied forces in the Mediterranean area.

Recently I have had the stimulating experience of visiting our two new NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Knowing the courage they have shown in the face of direct Communist pressure, we are proud at SHAPE to welcome them as allies. With their resolute, hardy peoples, these nations are a significant addition to European defense. They include between them an

army strength of more than twenty-five divisions, backed by efficient but relatively smaller air and naval forces.

The growth of military strength reported during the past year has derived from various sources. Certainly, it could not have been achieved without the arrival in increasing numbers of tanks, aircraft, and heavy equipment from the United States and Canada. But arms are useless without trained manpower, and during the past eighteen months every Western European nation represented in SHAPE has increased the length of its conscription period. Defense budgets were also raised, and among these continental members, military expenditures now average over twice the pre-Korean level.

A wide range of activities has been undertaken to bring the forces of the Western powers to a greater degree of effectiveness. Thousands of reservists have been called up for refresher training in the units to which they would be assigned in an emergency. It is expected that this practice will be greatly extended during 1952 and become standard practice in the future. Preparations are now in progress for a coordinated set of maneuvers during the coming year to weld standing and reserve forces into integrated battle-worthy commands.

Extensive field exercises, with air forces and ground troops representing eight nations, took place in Western Germany last fall. Naval exercises and operations have been conducted by Allied fleets in the Mediterranean, the Channel, and Northern waters. With soldiers, sailors, and airmen from many nations working together, the sense of comradeship, unity and common destiny has been strengthened. The merging of diverse procedures and many tongues is not an easy task; but techniques have been designed to overcome the difficulties, and Allied commanders have been able not only to test them but also to practice with valuable results the handling of international forces.

At this time, the forces assigned to SHAPE are not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of an aggressor. Of some comfort in this bleak realization is the existence of other military forces of the NATO countries in adjacent areas. At sea, there are the fleets directed by Admiral McCormick, Supreme Allied

Commander Atlantic ; there is the British Home Fleet, and other Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean and European coastal waters. From its bases in the United Kingdom, the RAF Fighter Command could contribute greatly in the air battle against Soviet attack. The U.S. Strategic Air Command, with bases in the United Kingdom and North Africa, possesses tremendous capability, acting both independently and in support of European defense forces. The resources of the British Bomber Command would also be of great value in war. These forces together not only add much to overall Allied strength but must certainly give food for thought to a potential enemy. Yet they can be used to the full only so long as continental bases remain securely in our hands

Military strength is of little worth unless backed by healthy, expanding economies. In this truth is found the source of many of our bitterest problems. Yet from the very beginning of our endeavor, we have been able to draw some confidence from the knowledge that NATO's economic potential is superior to that of the East. This potential springs from the productive peoples of the Atlantic Community who hold in their grasp the greatest economic production, the most advanced technology the world has yet seen. The task is to convert this potential into actuality, to organize and produce all that our situation now demands. Despite stresses and strains, shortages, delays and some outright failures, there has been a sustained rise in the production of goods for defense and non-defense purposes alike. But there is no lack of problems yet to be faced and mastered.

The shortage of coal has been one of the most serious weaknesses in Europe, imposing severe limitations on economic and military production alike. Steel is the very bedrock of our Western industrial machine and of modern military power ; coal is indispensable to its manufacture. The production of coal lagged behind the general level of industrial activity with the result that Europe is actually importing large quantities from the United States. Carrying American coal to Europe eats into the other vital dollar imports upon which the industrial life of Europe depends.

The process of channeling economic output into military ends,

though rarely easy, has seemed particularly hard in the present circumstances. Scarcity in Europe has been prolonged and severe. To deny even a part of the increased production to civil demands has been difficult ; to make such decisions effective has been burdensome. The changes in established patterns of consumption and distribution, of trade and income, brought on by expanded military requirements, have encountered resistance of many kinds. Governmental decisions in this part of the world must be made in an atmosphere of extreme financial stringency and under heavy pressure from various groups who feel acutely the impact of new taxes, controls, and higher prices.

Increasing defense budgets have posed real problems of fiscal and financial management. Hanging over the NATO defense effort has been the menace of inflation which, if unchecked, could wipe out all gains. The picture is by no means bright, and we are far from being able to regard the success of the military budgetary programs as already assured. In some countries the pressure of inflation has been effectively checked. In others, inflation is surging upwards and endangering the whole defense program.

From relatively small beginnings, European production of the equipment and supplies for modern armies, navies, and air forces has increased during the past year, and further increases will be undertaken. A significant and growing proportion of the military equipment being provided by the United States to its NATO partners is soon to be produced in European factories. The rate of production of equipment, such as aircraft engines, guns, ammunition, and radio sets, is rising and will continue to rise, with the object of re-establishing in Europe a level of production capable of satisfying future military requirements. Jet fighters, tanks, military vehicles and similar heavy equipment are now produced, on a small scale, in regions where, for several years, all such production had ceased.

After necessary initial armaments have been produced, Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the earliest possible date. The United States is currently making a tremendous effort to furnish a great portion of the capital

outlay in military equipment. Without this, there could be no effective forces on the continent within the next four or five years. But America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world. To do so would be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United States cannot long continue such expenditures without endangering her own economic structure. The soundness of that structure is of vital concern to the entire free world for its collapse would be a world-shaking tragedy.

Within NATO, our joint enterprise, we have seen progress toward increased strength and cohesion. Member nations are progressively adjusting their internal processes both to support and to benefit from NATO operations. Since the founding of NATO almost three years ago, its activities gradually have changed from planning to implementation. This operational characteristic and the broadening scope of NATO activities are reflected in the recent reorganization which provides a permanent body of NATO representatives and an Executive Group under General Lord Ismay, Secretary General. Because of their immediate availability and powers of decision, these new agencies will be a great help to the work in SHAPE and other NATO commands.

There is no precedent in peacetime for the NATO concept. At SHAPE, the basic relationships and the sweep of interest of a peacetime international command have evolved from day to day. I can state accurately that a great many of the problems referred to me, and often the most difficult, have been economic, political, and psychological rather than purely military. But even in the military field we have seen considerable change in the specific responsibilities and activities of this Command. SHAPE is an operational rather than an administrative headquarters; all the matters of pay, internal management, and supply of the various forces are the direct concern of the countries contributing them. Yet, in the light of a year's experience, it has been necessary for the North Atlantic Council to increase the authority and responsibility of this Headquarters with respect to logistics—the field of supply, construction, maintenance and

transport. This will mean a sizeable increase in staff but should insure better coordination and fewer delays in making vital supplies and services available to our forces.

As NATO develops, it is of the greatest importance to reconcile the need for flexibility with the need for firm plans. Master plans for the coordination of many related activities provide fundamental guidance and are an essential basis of confidence and economy. Yet where full effort is required, as in our case at present, that effort should be measured not against plans and predictions which have become frozen in documents, but against day-to-day possibilities and needs, and the determination of peoples to achieve their defense, together, as rapidly and effectively as possible.

The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. To this end an annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished. We are at the very point, for example, of seeing a whole sequence of fundamental changes made in response to development of new types of arms. The tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater range, penetrating power and destructiveness is accelerating. As a result, the balance between men and materiel is bound to shift, probably reducing the concentration of manpower on the battlefield, increasing the ratio of materiel to men, increasing the complexity of equipment—as the price of its power. There will be more and more demand for the highly skilled and specialized men in which our democracies excel. Military forces in the field may become lighter, faster and harder hitting, but the support which gives them these very qualities will become more elaborate and more costly.

This brings to both national and combined staffs the great responsibility of eliminating every trace of luxury in organization and in size and design of equipment. Utility, emphasized to the point of austerity, is the only guide to produce the required items at reasonable cost. We must be careful that we do not prove that free countries can be defended only at the cost of bankruptcy.

Should the tragedy of another war occur, the sweep of combat will be over broader and deeper areas. Thus the zone of battle, in its three dimensions will tend to expand, and every element contributing directly to the conduct or support of military operations will become a target for enemy action. The concept of the maintenance of national military forces by states of small geographical extent has already become outdated. The logic of larger groups and association is becoming increasingly impelling. In the NATO nations, especially, the resultant task is to reconcile the demands for association into larger groupings with the deep and spiritual ties to nationhood and sovereignty. It is problems of this sort, inherent in our union, that are now being studied at the NATO Defense College organized in Paris during the last year by my Naval Deputy, Vice-Admiral André G. Lemonnier. I look to this group—the officers of fourteen Allied nations—to find the right answers to many questions that today are unanswerable.

As months have passed, confidence has grown throughout the NATO community from the existence of greater and more effective forces and an organization to direct and support them. However, we have not yet succeeded in bringing the full force, the full moral potential of our freedom-loving peoples into the stark struggle for survival of priceless values. Our goals are simple; they are honorable; they can be achieved. Why, therefore, should there be confusion in the minds of millions of our own peoples as to the basic aims of our defense program, the necessity for it, and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts? Once these facts are established in the minds of our Atlantic peoples, there will be less bickering in our councils, and it will become progressively more difficult for self-seeking individuals to delay our progress by exploiting internal national divisions or minor grievances between our members. Once the truth is understood, once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less complacency concerning our present military situation and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen.

The Soviet Army casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. The satellite countries have increased the size and

combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Reports from behind the Iron Curtain indicate that the restiveness of these captive peoples has led to even tighter, tougher, more brutal measures of state control. The familiar technique of the purge, deliberate terror, and intimidation has forced a measure of unity—however unhappy—in this area.

The Soviet Air Force in Eastern Germany is currently replacing obsolescent aircraft with jet planes. Work on airfields, communications, and supply installations is being vigorously pursued in Eastern Europe. By the prolongation of the war in Korea and Indochina, by the constant attempts at erosion and subversion of effective government in the Far East and Middle East, heavy drains have been imposed upon the Western powers, which reduce the resources available to establish a balance in Europe.


Nevertheless, the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago. At Lisbon, our member nations made great headway on issues vital to our continued progress. They strengthened our Eastern flank by bringing into NATO the stout-hearted peoples of Greece and Turkey. They agreed to the concept of a European Defense Community and a close relationship with the German Federal Republic. They approved a program to establish this year a force of fifty standing and reserve divisions and 4,000 aircraft. When combined with the ready strength available in Greece and Turkey, this force—if properly armed and trained—should produce an encouraging degree of security. Considering training, organization, materiel, vital installations, and all the various factors which go to make up military proficiency, I personally would look upon completion of this program as clear material evidence that the basic goals of our combined enterprise are going to be achieved. Now our governments must convert the Lisbon program into actuality. It demands full and unstinting support, for only through positive action by all our nations can we ever achieve tranquility and security.

As we work together in the coming year, we are carrying out our pledge to each other. We are reaffirming our true beliefs in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the

rule of law. We are one in our desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. But we are steadfast in our determination to safeguard the freedom, the common heritage, and the civilization of our member nations.

This is a great task—a noble charge. In a world where powerful forces are working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our advance toward security. The task will require constant watchfulness, hard work, cooperation, and sacrifice, but what we do now can grant us peace for generations.

It can be done, given the will to do it. There is power in our union—and resourcefulness on land, sea and air. Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge. When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce « the diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources ». Then the Atlantic Community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world's most potent influence toward peace among men—the final security goal of humanity.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Dwight D. Eisenhower". The signature is written in dark ink and is centered on the page.

SHAPE
PARIS.

