

VIEWS OF THE CATALYSTS BETWEEN PROTEST AND REVOLUTION

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ABSTRACT

Humans evolved with inherent psychological defense mechanisms to notice differences between ourselves and other humans, and throughout human history these perceived differences in appearance, culture, or otherwise have proven to be incredible influencers in conflict. I believe this ability to perceive divides allows us to explore the opposite as well: how to bridge them, and to study this further I used research along the lines of Ted Gurr's frustration-aggression mechanism to isolate a controlled a particular human action when a divide is perceived, that is, in the field of state vs. people. Protest and revolution have permeated human history in much of the same manner, and by isolating the factors that distinguish simple protest from full, violent revolution, and seeing these catalysts in four separate case studies of their historical occurrence, we may infer further as to the human perception of divides, and what we do to exacerbate or mitigate them.

The city of Granada, Spain, has become known through time as a culmination of *la convivencia*: a notion of cohabitation and peace among those who are remarkably different. Situated in the southern state of Andalusia, its central area consists of three neighborhoods: el Centro, the historically Christian section, el Albaicín, the historically Muslim section, and Realejo, the historically Jewish section. Compare this extraordinarily peaceful residence to a similar demographic cohabitation in Jerusalem, and it is easy to see that differences as such can often breed extraordinary conflict. So what makes the Granada example different? In reality, it is less of a difference in reality, and more of a difference in how each situation is perceived.

Granada's current Christian, Muslim, and Jewish population split is not a relatively new characteristic. Christians and Jews inhabited the city since Roman times, and the latter half of the 1st century saw the Muslim conquest of all of Spain, with Granada soon to be a key base for such control. The over-1,000 years that followed saw conflict upon conflict. As the Christian Reconquista began and slowly crept south to the final bastion of Muslim control of Spain, the Muslim leadership began repression of the city's population, leading to the eventual siege by the Christians taking significantly less time, with the Christian and Jewish populations rife to support those who would liberate them from their oppressors. This situation was not unique. In subsequent years, Muslim coalitions in the neighboring mountains would lead up to three significant attempts at rebellion against the Christian government, which had turned to oppression as well, sowing discontent amongst the Jewish and Muslim inhabitants alike. Similar discontent would carry through even during the government of Francisco Franco in the 20th century. The common focus here is not that *la convivencia* is impossible, but that oppression of a people and dissatisfaction with the leadership can lead to forms of action against those in charge, whether in Granada, Jerusalem, or any location where human inhabit. Cohabitation amongst any people appears to be possible, which humans have proved as a social species. Nonetheless, one fault in the management of any collection of them, or even just the perception thereof, can result in action.

However, dissatisfaction manifests in different ways. "I hold it that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical." Thomas Jefferson's words in regards to reaction to government was a product of his environment. The United States of America came to be as a result of revolution: a people organizing with a certain degree of efficacy around simple, central tenets of belief, and then coming to the conclusion that violence is necessary to ensure those beliefs are achieved and the current political order is overthrown. With the advent of this, the French Revolution, and likewise political currents around the world, old systems of government found themselves under threat. Today, many governments in this growing democratic era live under a similar, constant guise. In America itself, protests happen with daily frequency at both state and federal level.

Around the world, governments can continually find themselves rocked with political activism if their actions are not conducive with the wills of the people who are able to organize, but as with some states of the Arab Spring in 2011, or even Venezuela most recently, these bouts of protest do not always generate the change merited. Fairly often, the change a protest encourages actually occurs, to varying degrees, and no further action is necessary. However, as with the United States in the late 18th century, Russia in 1917, or Cuba in the 1950s, sometimes the protest is not enough to generate change in the eyes of those attempting to accomplish it, which leads to our distinguishing between protest and revolution. Protest must then develop, with violence involved, into a full act of revolution. What I would like to discover is what leads political protests to turn into violent revolution, i.e. the catalysts that drive a simple demonstration into actual, successful regime change. By drawing on prior cases of revolution and protest, we can

identify different factors that cause protests to evolve into revolution. This paper will draw on cases of revolution to test hypotheses on the factors that lead to revolution. The study will analyze the following cases: Chile in 1973, Iran in 1979, Iran again in 2011, and Ukraine in 2014, in order to isolate potential hypotheses for future study. Overall, I want to test the degree to which these factors lead to revolution, along future discussion for understanding of the bigger picture: what divides us to such degrees that revolution is necessary.

Literature Review and Theory

Discussion of the transition from protest to revolution must first begin by describing what leads a group to perform acts of rebellion in the first place. Mass protest and revolution can occur from a variety of situations. Rather than first knowing what protest and revolution are in sociological terms, I find it better to approach from an overall language comprehension perspective, in order to clarify semantics later on. In the 1970 classic of political work, *Why Men Rebel*, author Ted Gurr examines psychological frustration-aggression theory, which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence. Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term “relative deprivation,” which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis is that “the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity.” If there is a significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they think they will get, there is a likelihood of rebellion.¹

The Arab Spring may provide a modern example of this hypothesis. During the Arab Spring, a divide emerged between the mass populace's understanding of their own autonomy and representation of such autonomy among those in power. As author Eva Bellin presents in her 2012 article regarding the conflict, “Internal variation in regime collapse and survival observed in the region confirms earlier analyses that the comportment of the coercive apparatus, especially its varying will to repress, is pivotal to determining the durability of the authoritarian regimes.”² In other words, a populace perceiving their own oppression by a greater hand (i.e., the state), and the attitude of that hand, are crucial to the likelihood to an action by those who are oppressed. In saying this, Bellin is almost making the same argument as Gurr makes for personal human conflict in these situations. This notion of psychological-sociological connection is what I hope to discover through this paper.

Looking deeper, I can examine the deeper psychological perspective, turning to evolutionary psychology and an understanding of our notion of humanity as a collective. Our species as a whole subsisted for thousands of years as migratory nomads prior to the advent of agriculture and therefore the advent of civilization. Nonetheless, our social notions persist. In Mauricio Papini's *Comparative Psychology: Evolution and Development of Behavior*, our greater concept of language within *homo sapiens* led to both our increased brain size as well as our greater capacity for social interaction and communication, unlike that of other animals. This production

¹ Gurr, Ted. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.

² Bellin, Eva. “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring.” *Comparative Politics* 44 (2) (January 2012): 127-149(23). City University of New York.

comes full circle with our creation of civilization, as our need for social integration for both individual and collective needs only seems to grow stronger with each generation.³ Modern psychologist Erich Neumann states similar discussions of human history that prove to isolate the propensity towards group motivations as well in his text, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, saying, “The group and group consciousness were dominant... [the individual] was not an autonomous, individualized entity with a knowledge, morality, volition, and activity of its own; it functioned solely as a part of the group, and the group with its superordinate power was the only real subject.”⁴ The key notion here is explored through the modern psychological concept of in-group / out-group behavior, which has a deep history in human behavior.

This concept takes its roots from our nature as tribes, where those who were members of our own tribe are held in highest regard, and those who are not of our tribe are seen as outsiders and therefore threats to our wellbeing. This highlights the individual factors behind how I view threats as a perception of *divide*; it is not the outsider itself that can be perceived as the threat, but rather the difference between them and what one sees as their own kind. On a modern scale, this becomes fundamental to political discourse and the aforementioned revolutions at play. Since I liken groups to being greater manifestations of ourselves, in a sense, I can then view group psychology in a very similar lens to how individual psychology can also perceive these effects. Those in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia saw a difference between themselves and those in power—a divide that needed to be managed.

Recognizing the divide is not enough to answer the question of revolution or mass protest. Before continuing, it is crucial to understand that our distinguishing factor between protest and revolution will be the use of violence, and in particular, concentrated and continued use of violence rather than small, miscellaneous acts. The Los Angeles riots of the early 90s would be characterized as a protest, for though there was significant and prolonged violence, it was not coordinated to the degree that violence was used in other examples, such as the Cuban Revolution.

Protests and revolutions together have their own subsets, such as social, ethnic, economic, and political revolutions, all of which may occur simultaneously. Social protests tend to be very common, with a myriad of issues at stake in the advent of the civil rights era, particularly in the West. This is also the variety that mostly can tend to stay simply as protest and not escalate to full on revolution, as political authors J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans describe, “Social movements that aim to alter social institutions and practices have to come into contact with the state, if only to consolidate their claims.”⁵ This explains the further vast array of issues that social protests can encapsulate, from women’s rights to environmental awareness. As political participation increases with growing democratization (or as democracy-advancing political scientists would hope), social issues would be more permeable and manageable.

Looking further, ethnic protest tends to fall very closely to the political spectrum, with exhibitions such as the Balkan conflicts at the fall of the Soviet Union, whereby individual ethnic groups perceive inequality in autonomy or treatment, and thereby protest or revolution is enacted. Due to the closeness of ethnicity to our psychological predispositions, per our previous psychological definitions of tribal structure and the high regard we hold our native “tribes”, eth-

³ Papini, Mauricio. *Comparative Psychology: Evolution and Development of Behavior*. Psychology Press, 2008.

⁴ Neumann, Erich. *The Origins and History of Consciousness*. Princeton University Press (English version), 1954.

⁵ Jenkins, J. Craig, and Bert Klandermans. *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*. NED - New edition ed., vol. 3, University of Minnesota Press, 1995.

nic protest tends to be very powerful and coercive, often leading to further revolution and instigation of violence if applicable in the slightest. In a 2010 study on the subject, authors Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min highlight the according factors to support that “representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.”⁶

For economic protest, there is also a variety of options. The October Revolution of 1917 which became the start of the Soviet Union could be classified as an economic revolution with the introduction of communism, though this is a crude comparison and it is with a great degree of difficulty that someone would put that in the same category of the economic protest that was the Occupy Movement of 2011, which saw Americans protesting in major cities to contest economic inequality and corruption. Economic factors are certainly at play in most protests and revolutions, however, and cannot be overlooked even for their broadness. For example, the “Occupy Wall Street” protests in the past decade in America reached a demise similar to other protests, contrary to full revolution, due to the immense scope and lack of cohesion in their demands.

Lastly, and where I will be focusing the great degree of our interest, is political protests and revolutions. Political protest is fairly common, and can technically encapsulate all three of the previous definitions as well. The key factor for our definition of political protest is its target: the state. Whereas social and ethnic protests may be geared towards other groups within the populace, and economic protest may be geared towards economic or political systems, political protest maintains a common focal point of aggression. Political protest may be motivated from a variety of issues as well, but the crucial difference lies in that it pits either the people or a subset of the people against the government in place. In order to simplify this as much as possible, I will introduce as reference the similar definition of political revolution per Leon Trotsky, as it is the most straightforward for defining revolution of the state vs. people dichotomy. *In The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where is It Going?*, he describes political disruption, in simplest terms, by which a populace rises to replace or reconfigure the previously-installed government, which is different from other Marxist theories in that it implies basic political replacement, rather than counter-capitalist, property-change, and class motivations, which play a part but go beyond our purposes here.⁷

For these reasons, I will use the definition for particular study insofar as it can more readily generate revolution considering the power the state holds over the people, as well as the power the people may realize they have. As a whole, most protests and revolutions have combinations of all four of these categories, as well as different goals for whether the group in contempt simply wants elite displacement or recognition, among other outcomes. Nonetheless, our purposes here will center around political protest and revolution, namely for its likelihood of being applicable for change to occur and the simplicity of the state-people dichotomy.

As a supplement to this differentiation, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy proves a curious place to explore the discussion, namely because of the absence of philosophy in this paper and rather the grounding in political and psychological factors that can be empirically examined. Nonetheless, the 2017 paper, “Revolution,” by Allen Buchanan makes the important dis-

⁶ Cederman, Lars, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis.” *World Politics* 62, no.1 (2010): 87-119.

⁷ Trotsky, Leon (American translation by Max Eastman). *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where is It Going?* Pathfinder Books. 1937.

inction in that non-violent resistance is an entirely separate category from revolution itself. Further, the author moves to describe that “[Revolution] is sometimes defined as a large scale armed conflict between state forces and one or more nonstate parties. This definition may be too restrictive, however, since it would exclude a large-scale armed conflict between two or more non-state parties under conditions in which the government had disintegrated entirely or still existed but was not capable of fielding forces.”⁸ This statement falls in play with our greater definitions of revolution, whereby violence is used by either states or non-state actors in order to achieve a larger effect than just within their state. Here is perhaps the most important distinction to be made within this paper, especially in regards to mass protest, as much of the literature on the subject sees no difference between mass protest and revolution itself. For purposes here, the distinction is crucial, in particular with regards to violence. Political author Charles Tilly completes this by defining both sides.

“1) Government: an organization which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within the population. 2) Contender: any group which, during some specified period, applies pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include challengers and members of the polity. A member is any contender which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the government; a challenger is any other contender.”⁹

The further research here is set on what leads to revolution or acts of violence, rather than simply mass protest, when the divide is perceived. The key discussion I can continue with this concept is both psychological and political. For this study, I will consider three factors I have found most evident through previous literature review and the particulars of political protests and revolution. They are: galvanizing individuals, outside influence, and chance for greater effect. On a smaller scale, I can consider what features lead individuals to create the beliefs that there is a divide, either through their own creation or by factors forced upon them by a governing body. To return to Gurr, he notes a key element in “just as frustration produces aggressive behavior on the part of an individual, so too does relative deprivation predict collective violence by social groups.”¹⁰ This explains our first factor of influence for why violence occurs, creating revolution, and the escalation from simple protest: individual, galvanizing leaders.

Many revolutions, such as the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, can be traced to singular individuals capitalizing on a wide belief. One may even say that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were able to facilitate a social “revolution” with themselves as the core tenets, as there surely is enough violence enacted by subsequent countries since to attest to the notion. Though there is text analyzing the greater factors at play that influenced the likes of Fidel Castro and other major players in such an example, by analyzing personal literature such as Che Guevara’s *The Motorcycle Diaries: Notes on a Latin American Journey*, written years prior, one can be led to believe that in cases as this, the individual players are looking at a larger picture. For Guevara, it was despising the imperialist policies he perceived from the United States’ exploitation of Latin American industry, resources, and basic humanity, as he discovered during the journey made in

⁸ Buchanan, Allen. “Revolution” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Ed.), Stanford University.

⁹ Castañeda, Ernesto and Cathy Schneider. *Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social Change*. New York: Routledge. 2017.

¹⁰ Gurr. *Ibid*.

his aforementioned journal.¹¹ Guevara found similarities in Castro's view of America as well, which led to their cooperation and eventual revolution. The first factor is just that: the galvanizing central figures or individuals around which a revolution becomes both relatable to other individuals and gains leadership. The crucial notion here is just that: the reliability to these leaders and particularly their causes, as we will explore in subsequent case study. Author Thomas G. Patterson reiterates similar points in his 1994 book, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*, namely in the explicit first lines which "examine the sources of bitter anti-Americanism of Castroism and the acrid American anti-Castroism that have coursed through U.S.-Cuba relations from the 1950s to the 1990s."¹²

Now we begin to see the second factor take form as well. In review, Castro took power in Cuba, aligning with the Soviet Union as well, but Guevara's addition as a supporting actor was crucial to the execution of such a revolution. Nonetheless, though Guevara's participation was significant, perhaps their ulterior motive was even of higher importance. Furthermore, this second factor, the assistance of the Soviet Union, was the last piece needed for eventual escalation from simple protest to a coordinated and cohesive revolution. The arrival of an outside influence for assistance gave the participants even more fuel for confidence at their overall mission, more confidence in their leaders, and more likelihood to engage in violence to achieve means rather than protest itself. Even with Latin American protest occurring already, I believe Cuba was a separate case that ended in revolution, because of these three factors at play.

Take, for example, the American Revolution. The assistance of the French was imperative to the eventual success of the colonists in their conflict against an aggressor, both quiet at first and then with the addition of force later in the conflict. Upon the signing of the Declaration of Independence, French support from both the population and aristocracy was considerable. Of course, the creation of a new, non-French nation state in the Americas was not of particularly great use to the French, but with recent losses to the British Empire in the French and Indian War as well as expanding British influence could be seen as factors to push their hand. Though with an ulterior motive, their assistance was vital, and the American Revolution was fruitful as such.

Even further in-depth, the Americans themselves soon developed ulterior motives of their own besides simply achieving autonomy or alleviating taxes. Gordon S. Wood's work on *The American Revolution, A History*, illustrates this through, "Unlike the French Revolution, which had been caused by actual tyranny, the American Revolution was seen as a peculiarly intellectual affair, as something not brought on by actual oppression but by the anticipation of oppression, by reasoning and devotion to principle, such as 'no taxation without representation'."¹³ Though the Castro-Guevara Cuban Revolution was one with stronger individual aspects, as the American Revolution was a different time period entirely and not necessarily an individualist society yet, thereby making the latter of outside influence and ulterior motive more exemplified, this example emphasizes the larger instance of collective belief amongst those in power at state levels. Even though Wood's view of the American Revolution cannot be all-encompassing, it nonetheless provides a basis for the study here. In both examples, however a larger outcome was recognized by either a state involved or an individual with cards to play, while also by an outside influence. The result of this realization was violence and revolution.

¹¹ Guevara, Ernesto. *The Motorcycle Diaries*. Verso Books, 1995.

¹² Patterson, Thomas G. *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution*. Oxford University Press, 1994.

¹³ Wood, Gordon S. *The American Revolution: A History*. Random House Publishing, 2002.

Finally, and as we have just started to discuss, the chance for greater influence, our last factor, is included. The expansion of communism was a tenet that fueled Guevara since his discovery and subsequent radicalization.¹⁴ The likewise influence on Castro can be inferred from his alignment and support with the Soviet Union. We can also consider Che's previous journey through South America which led to his despising of imperialism and desire to create a better livelihood for those around him. This factor explains itself further in subsequent examples to be highlighted later in the piece, but is nonetheless seen as a requirement when bridging the gap between protest and the actual drive for full revolution.

These lead to the understanding that though multiple factors can drive revolution, the primary ones for our focus will be the galvanizing individuals involved, the assistance of an outside state, and the chance for larger effect. Though there is a myriad of literature on the subject of causes of revolution as well as the psychology behind such actors, much of the former is restricted to cases where states are the primary actors at play, while the latter has the opposite problem of much of the evidence being restricted to individual cases. Indeed, on the American Revolution alone, there abounds literature on how France only became involved at the opportunity that the Dutch and Spanish were also in agreement to be aggressors towards Britain as well. In similar fashion, studies of Guevara and Castro's respective psychologies are just as plentiful. However, what the aforementioned cases hold in number of theories, they lack in consensus, especially among the factors at play. Some discuss specific individuals, some discuss the manipulation of outside states, while others discuss the greater effect to other countries, but none draw these factors together to determine a concise formula for revolution.

Still, why do these factors matter? As previously stated, much of the prior research done on the subject of protest and revolution has placed particular influence on singular factors to be the driving forces behind such occurrences. While they may include multiple sets of factors, prior research often uses them as support for still singular definitions. For example, many texts have focused on the spread of democracy amongst countries as a signal for revolutions in America and France during the 18th century, just as the spread of communism had similar outcomes in the 20th century. However, few are written to put subsequent factors together, such as our aforementioned inclusions of galvanizing individuals. By the same token, nonetheless, literature also focuses on the individuals who were at the helm of these revolutions, often glorifying or critiquing their leadership and involvement in a similar way to how one views royalty or celebrity. Individuals such as these are often able to negotiate the self worth of an individual with a group, such as studied with the 2004 Turner and Tajfel study, stating, "people derive a sense of self-worth and social belongingness from their memberships in groups, and so they are motivated to draw favorable comparisons between their own group and other groups."¹⁵ This has sense, being a human behavior that has been demonstrated for centuries, but is also inadequate to determine the exact ballast points for the transition from protest to revolution, for surely singular individuals cannot be held responsible for maintaining and executing such massive social changes. The importance of the study here is also not entirely in assuaging the presence of these factors, for as previously stated their presence can be determined already. The focus here will be testing the hypothesis of these factors and determining the degree to which they must be present, in various capacities, for revolution to occur and be successful.

¹⁴ Guevara. Ibid.

¹⁵ Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." *Political Psychology: Key Readings in Social Psychology* (2004): 276-293

Lastly, before I can delve into how the research will take shape, I need to discuss what to make of this entire literature review. In looking at the aforementioned literature, I see a great variance of political, psychological, and even philosophical viewpoints. These, in turn, require a great variance in thinking. However, no revolution is the same, and therefore I must use the wide variety of approaches to give a semblance of an accurate definition for what I plan to explore here. From a historical standpoint, the American Revolution and the Cuban Revolution are almost incomparable. However, from a human standpoint, the psychology underlying the individuals within them is not so hard to ponder. From a political standpoint, Gurr's frustration-aggression mechanism is likewise crucial to defining the motives of revolution for both an individual and a populace. Then, as a whole, while these seem to be disparate viewpoints, by combining them we can analyze revolutions as seemingly different as the American and Cuban revolutions.

Design

To begin designing the exact details of the research, I need to determine the key factors at play. The formula suggests that three main assets are ubiquitous in revolutions: 1) galvanizing individuals are involved and can be seen as the figureheads of the revolution, 2) outside influence or assistance is present either directly or indirectly, 3) there is a chance for a greater effect outside of the country currently experiencing the revolution itself. I can find significant examples of these three factors in two notable and previously-mentioned revolutions of the 20th century: the Bolshevik Revolution and the Cuban Revolution. The Bolshevik Revolution that turned Russia into the Soviet Union during the early 1900s experienced all three factors. Notable individuals such as Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, among others, were key figures at the head of the unrest. The United States, Britain, and Japan all threatened to intervene at various points but were repudiated by the Bolshevik mistrust of capitalist ideals (in this sense, outside influence did not directly assist the revolution involved but whose presence was key in galvanizing those in the state of revolution).¹⁶ Lastly, the greater purpose in mind was more than just an overthrow of government or more bread on the table, but rather the spread of communism itself and a new method of governing in civilization.

To echo this further, I can look at the Latin American example of the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, as cited earlier. To begin, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro maintained the positions of figureheads for the revolution. Further, the outside influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States contributed to the eventual outcome of the conflict, but also to its inception from simple protest. Lastly, and in accordance with previous examples, the greater achievement for some was a Latin American introduction of communism, while for others it was a fight back against Western imperialism. Either way, a greater purpose can be secured, and I see a common thread of three key factors at the heart of every progression of revolution from protest.

To examine how these factors affect the progression of protest to revolution, I will be looking at four particular situations of study, two of extensive length and two as brief yet in-depth glances. In chronological order, I will start by examining the 1973 Chilean Revolution which saw a progression from small outburst of protest violence to full revolution in that, through outside influence from the CIA, the socialist President Salvador Allende was ousted in favor of General Augusto Pinochet. Next, I will move to the Middle East and look at the 1979

¹⁶ Later case studies will highlight that the factors at play need not be on the side of those leading the revolution to be influential.

Iranian Revolution which saw the overthrow of a Western-installed regime after previously-overthrown millennia of Persian monarchy and replacement with an Islamic Republic. Next, I will stay in Iran and take a look at the uprising in 2011-2012 that coincided with the Arab Spring which swept the region. While some countries saw their leadership overthrown and intense acts of violence (which would classify as revolution), what I instead saw with Iran was simply protest and never any escalation beyond this. By paying specific attention to these two Iranian examples, I can see the exact same country go through similar processes of uprising, and yet experience two different results. Lastly, in order to capture both a contemporary and European aspect, I will examine the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, perhaps where I see the purest escalation from protest, to violence, to full revolution, and to government overthrow. Nonetheless, the later outcomes of these aforementioned situations is still indeterminate and nowhere near completion in regards to modern political climates. Today, all three countries operate in noticeably different manners than each other, and also to a certain degree with their neighbors.

To further elaborate on the reasons for such selections, I need to examine their temporal, regional, governmental, and cultural significance. The combined occurrence of the revolutions in Chile and Iran in the 1970s, along with the Iranian and Ukrainian incidents of the past decade, allow us to assuage whether such factors are applicable over time. Though previous examples such as the Cuban revolution and even American revolution have served to set the stage for our definitions of revolutions, the four prior case studies should present a more temporally relevant sample, with an eye towards the proximity of Chile's example to Cuba's, but focusing more emphasis on modern repetitions such as Iran in 2011 and Ukraine in 2014, as well as including more available data with which to research.

As far as regional significance, Iran has been a bastion of power in the Middle East for millennia, and its influence there grown once again since its revolution in the 1970s, perhaps even more following the Arab Spring. Further, Iran presents itself as a major global player for both the future of the Middle East and geopolitical situations internationally as well. With Ukraine, I see a nation torn between Western Europe and Russia, with both sides interested due to the country's vast resources and importance. Lastly, Chile presents a case as a major influencer of South American politics, especially in regards to the United States' need to involve itself during the rule of Salvador Allende. With these cases, I see significant, modern examples, but also a regional diversity to ascertain whether these factors could be global customs, not only regional.

The governments that were overthrown also represent varying forms of government and/or oppression. The example of Chile allows us to see a country move towards socialism though maintaining democracy, and then facing subsequent revolution. For Iran, especially in 1979, I see a vastly different exhibition as a country moved towards a theocratic state, and then the subsequent democratic backlash towards such rule in 2011. Lastly, Ukraine gives us a democracy, though one plagued with corruption and Russian influence that appears to carry with quasi-communist governments in former Soviet states.

With this in mind, the studies are able to cover vastly different state platforms, alongside varying levels of corruption as well. Further, the level of government repression within these countries holds a significant variance as well, with Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index (which rates countries based on the amount to which an individual in a said country can exhibit political and civil liberties mostly in accordance with the United Nation's Universal Decla-

ration of Human Rights) giving ratings to Chile, Ukraine, and Iran at 94, 62, and 17, respectively, in terms of the populace's general level of freedom, with 100 being most free.¹⁷ This aforementioned data holds importance in regards to assumptions of revolutions and protest being specific to opposite ends of the government spectrum, be it authoritarian to democratic.

Lastly, and perhaps most obvious, will be the cultural differences. Each of the three countries presents a different cultural expectation, from an Eastern European demographic to a Middle Eastern stalwart to a known South American nation. Even further, with the Iran example, I can see how culture has changed in just a few decades. This could also be useful in the applicability of the outside factor, such as how Chile was predominately influenced by the United States, a Western power, and likewise for Ukraine influenced by Russia, an Eastern power. Through these, I cover East, West, and Middle East with a somewhat a degree of efficacy.

With this in mind, I hope to find that by applying our three factors, I might determine the exact catalyst points for the progression of revolution from protest. Protest in itself, as discussed earlier, can occur with great frequency especially in an era of growing democracy as I have witnessed over the past century. I also see the varying issues at hand that lead to these situations, from social to economic to ethnic, and all encompassing in political. To reiterate from the beginning of the paper, however, the tipping point is what is of interest here. In the aforementioned examples for study, in South America, the Middle East, and Europe, I see varying cultures and varying histories, but nonetheless some similar situations that led to the escalation of groups of people to engage in such rebellious activities. Hopefully, by exploring these concepts in depth, I can determine to what degree these factors cause the acts of rebellion to elevate to levels of aggression. Individually, by examining these causes, I can also hope to attain a greater understanding of simple human psychology when faced with environments that generate this discontent. By seeing that, one can determine greater influences and prepare for similar situations that are present around the globe.

Expectations

The situations presented for study here have significant differences. The South American politics of the 1970s did not and have never experienced the religious divides that permeate the Middle East of the 1970s or of any other times. Nor do the Chilean or Ukrainian governments have the deep history that is the millennia of Persian monarchy and presence in the Middle East. Nonetheless, I find similarity in how they experience violence and revolution. The common thread is the humanity in each situation, from which I draw the psychological factors that create our response or willingness to engage in revolution. As Russian WWII veteran and author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn quotes in his classic, *The Gulag Archipelago*, "A person who is not inwardly prepared for the use of violence against him is always weaker than the person committing the violence."¹⁸ This brings us to the conclusion that even though revolutions occur in various environments and under various contexts, they all share the common thread that they are human creations and thereby held by the same constraints as would be expected of human capability through psychology.

As more in-depth analysis, the expected results for each case are as follows: for each situation I expect to find all three factors, but to varying degrees. The degrees to which these factors

¹⁷ Abramowitz, Michael J. "Freedom in the World 2018." *Freedom House* (accessed May 8, 2018).

¹⁸ Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr. *The Gulag Archipelago*. Éditions du Seuil. 1974.

are present will affect the eventual success of the protest moving to revolution or not. For the 1973 Chilean coup, I expect to find high levels of outside involvement, a high degree of ulterior achievement to be had, and a strong galvanizing figure in General Pinochet, and therefore a complete and successful transition from protest to revolution. For Iran in 1979, I look to see the same high degree of outside involvement, perhaps from varying sides, an even higher degree of ulterior achievement (with religion in the picture), and galvanizing figures such as Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and therefore likewise a complete and successful transition from protest to revolution. For Iran 2011-2012, different degrees will occur. Considering this did not erupt in to full, coordinated violence and large scale revolution, I can expect to find good degrees of outside involvement, especially through media and other new avenues, a conflicted yet present sense of ulterior achievement, and yet no central figures to make the revolution centralized and relatable. Lastly, looking at Ukraine 2014, I see strong outside involvement, a decent amount of ulterior motive besides state overthrow, and a galvanizing figure in the target president: Viktor Yanukovich. The end result here, as I see, was a successful transition from protest to revolution.

Conclusion

Perceptions of divides and the need for action to remedy these have been a case of human character since the advent of our species. For politics, this is an everyday grappling with complex issues in government management or in greater notions like social justice, ethnic representation, or economic reform. Nevertheless, since these divides and the actions used to address them are so common in human life, it would be beneficial to examine them on a grand scale, in revolutions, and make ourselves the microcosms. Violence as a means to achieve an end is a cornerstone of our primal beginnings, as well as other animals which I would not considered civilized. And yet, often it is used for causes as these, in the name of equality, justice, or peace. By looking in depth at revolutions, what moves great groups of people to achieve a means through this method rather than protest, I can further examine the divides the separate us, and hopefully work towards understanding the theory behind handling such situations, as well as preventing their inception, and making a world that is not built upon what we can destroy, but rather, what we can create.

Chile '73

*“What horror the face of fascism creates. They carry out their plans with knife-like precision. For them, blood equals medals. How it is to sing when I must sing of horror, in which silence and screams are the end of my song.”*¹⁹

To begin our section of case studies, I will start with the exhibition of the Chilean coup d'état in 1973. On the surface, this appears to be a study that will verify our formula for revolution overcoming protest, but through historical background and factor analysis, I will determine the deeper causes of the revolution which occurred here, as well as its implications for our hypothesis of factors that drive revolution.

Historical Background

On February 12, 1818, Chile officially signed a document of independence from their colonial founders: Spain. Though the latter did not recognize this independence officially until 1844, Chile soon became one of South America's most stable nations in the decades of independence wars that followed throughout the continent. With a few minor conflicts here and there, not unlike the stabilization of the United States that took place through the 19th century, Chile, “enjoyed more than 130 years of stable government,” wrote Federico G. Gil. He continues, “Of all the republics in the southern hemisphere, Chile has perhaps the best record in Latin America's continuing search for political stability... Chile's record of legal continuity is impressive even when compared to that of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and other Western European nations.”²⁰

In the 1920s, significant agrarian and industrial advances were made to such a degree that the desires of the workers became key factors in government affairs. Coupled with a booming economy, political disputes at the first half of the 20th century were largely negligible due to the advances made elsewhere in society. Nonetheless, their effects would be felt later on, especially in regards to how they serve our purpose here in distinguishing between protest (unsuccessful revolution) and actual revolution, despite the gravity of these disputes. In particular, as the Country Studies of the Library of Congress describe, “Chilean politics changed dramatically, however, as a multiparty system emerged... one in which strong Marxist parties vied with conservative parties, while pragmatic centrist parties attempted to mediate. In this polarized context, presidents governed with shifting coalitions, pushing the country alternately to the right or left, depending on the particular political configuration of the moment.”²¹ Much like the political climate of the United States today, this continued: a back and forth swaying of political mood from right to left.

When the Christian Democrat candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva won by absolute majority in 1964, he instituted many policies that benefited workers and echoed the economic and social reforms of now-communist Cuba. However, this was seen as an overreach of power by the right, and an imbalance of power that would soon tilt the scale to the other side in just as extreme

¹⁹ Victor Jara, Chilean songwriter and poet. Killed on September 16, 1973—five days after the coup overthrew the Chilean government.

²⁰ Gil, Federico, G. “Chile: ‘Revolution in Liberty.’” *Current History* (pre-1986); Philadelphia Vol. 51, 000303, (November 1966): 291.

²¹ Country Studies. “Development and Breakdown of Democracy, 1830–1973.” Country Studies. Library of Congress. March 31, 1994.

a fashion. With the close election of Salvador Allende in 1970 and a fragmented parliament, the wheels for revolution began to turn.

As I have defined, revolutions typically divide into a state versus people dichotomy. As with any case, the reality is never as black and white, but this example is fairly straightforward. The Chilean Revolution of 1973, or the Chilean coup d'état as it is more commonly known in Western literature, came to a helm on September 11, 1973, as jets from the Chilean military bombed La Moneda Palace, the main government building in the capital, Santiago, and where President Allende was in residence. I will walk backwards and describe what led to this event occurring, but its mention at first is crucial because it paints the picture of the divide here. In a simplest sense, this was a revolution of violence between right and left, but that definition does not do justice.

To more appropriately define the revolution, I will see it through a lens of the state government (aligned with the left, as I see from Allende's position as the head of power and the socialist reforms he attempted to place with the government) versus the military (aligned with the right, led by General Augusto Pinochet²², and representing those both in political positions and otherwise who wished to push back against reforms that increasingly resembled the communist reforms of similar countries). Of course, there are notable factions who also played crucial roles in the eventual culmination of government overthrow, but for the sake of simple understanding, military versus state will be used.

Presentation of Factors

With this established, I can begin the study of the factors I wish to test. Unlike in later cases I will examine, I begin with the understanding that this revolution occurred successfully and led to the overthrow of the existing regime, through violent means.

Galvanizing Individuals

For galvanizing individuals, none are as apparent as the faces of the state and military: President Allende and General Pinochet, respectively. With Allende, the left had a face around which to rally. In the ESPN 30 for 30 film, *The Opposition*, which focuses on the effect of the events of 1973 on the Chilean national soccer team, directors Ezra Edelman and Jeff Plunkett let various players on the team, themselves middle class workers on the side before the age of incredible athlete salaries, describe the hope and prosperity that Allende gave the average Chilean, whether they be in a farm village or industrial factory. Nonetheless, even with their strength in number, they find themselves incredibly vulnerable when compared under Solzhenitsyn's previous principle that "those who are not inwardly prepared for the use of violence against them will always be weaker than those committing the violence."²³

One of the military's key areas of disagreement with the government was their notion that, by enacting these drastic reforms, the Allende regime was acting in an unconstitutional

²² It should be noted that Allende installed Pinochet at the helm of the military, in an attempt at appeasement, which will be discussed later.

²³ Solzhenitsyn. Ibid.

manner. As a means of appeasing the military, Allende appointed Pinochet as General Chief of Staff of the Army on August 23, 1973. Though he later became the face of the regime that took power after Allende was deposed, the reality is that his presence was largely just that: a presence. Kyle Steenland offers that the left believed him to be a reformer, on their side, and for such reasons it makes sense for Allende to have put him in such a position of trust.²⁴

Steenland continues that Pinochet was fervently anti-communist and had previously collaborated with a military group known as *Línea Recta*, which had “engaged in more or less constant conspiratorial activity since the time of President Pedro Ibáñez [in 1950].”²⁵ Nonetheless, evidence is not strong for him being the galvanizing leader I look to see here, as the one who is taking the reins and standing at the pulpit, before, during, and after the revolution. Here, the revolution was largely the result of intricate and cohesive planning done by the military. As this is how armed forces work, it makes sense when their general interests are threatened for them to address the issue but in a manner no different than how they would accomplish a military objective. In this sense, the bigger galvanizing figure was Allende, as the target of the right and rallying cry of a left. However, this is not in the same sense that Che Guevara galvanized Cubans, but more how Guevara galvanized American military leaders to despise him. Allende’s galvanizing presence was, contrary to this paper’s predictions, largely in giving the Chilean military a focal point to place their aggressions.

In this case study, I have found that galvanizing figures are not necessary for the revolution to take place, especially when those making the revolution a reality are experienced military personnel against weakened state and weakened populace. It could be said that such a figure could have helped in this case, but as history shows, it was entirely unnecessary for those committing the revolution, unless considered as an antagonist for those completing the revolution, which we discuss in the conclusion.

Outside Influence

Here is where the obvious interference of the United States and the Soviet Union becomes applicable, as the battle for democratic or communist ideological spread permeated most of the globe. Having lost Cuba to communist influence, and seeing South America as a potential hotbed for regime change, Washington sought significant influence in Chile, especially when socialist reforms began taking place in the mid-20th century. Moscow, likewise, wanted much of South America to move towards autonomy, as authors Joseph T. Noguee and John W. Sloan point out. However, though they endorsed and expressed support of Allende’s *Unidad Popular* party, the U.S.S.R. was largely negligible in the events that unfolded, “given Russia’s limited resources, her global commitments, her expensive experiences in helping Cuba achieve autonomy from the United States, and her aspirations for detente with the United States.”²⁶

The U.S., on the other hand, can be discussed further. American influence in Chile can be traced back to the Chilean War of Independence, but for our purposes, the key involvement started in 1964, when the Special Operations Research Office at American University, along with the U.S. Army, began Project Camelot: an attempt to deeply research the structures and ele-

²⁴ Steenland, Kyle. “The Coup in Chile.” Kyle Steenland. *Latin American Perspectives* 1 (2), Chile: Blood on the Peaceful Road (Summer, 1974): 9-29.

²⁵ Steenland. *Ibid.*

²⁶ Joseph L. Noguee and John W. Sloan. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 21 (3) August, 1979.

ments of Latin American society, as a way of predicting what may occur in the countries' futures. Ryan Hunt writes a critical discourse analysis of the motives and results of this. Most telling is the conclusion of research, where Hunt describes a program that created a computer model of Chilean society, known as *Politica*, which "was first loaded with data about hundreds of social psychological variables...degrees of group cohesiveness, levels of self-esteem, attitudes toward authority, and so on... In the case of Chile... the game's results eventually gave the green light to policy-makers who favored murdering Allende in the plan to topple Chile's leftist government. *Politica* had predicted that Chile would remain stable even after a military takeover and the president's death."²⁷ With this known, further U.S. action becomes obvious.

However, the truth is not so simple. U.S. involvement continued directly through the CIA's Project FUBELT, an active plan that involved President Richard Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and other prominent U.S. military and intelligence officials. On September 11, 1998, 25 years after the coup in Chile, documents related to this project were declassified, illustrating the flagrant intent of the U.S. to prevent Allende's rise to power and, once that came up short, to cripple the country's economy in a manner that would lead to discontent among the people towards Allende's socialist policies, thereby making Chile ripe for revolution.

Contrary to popular belief, U.S. involvement stops here, besides a failed, small coup attempt aimed at preventing Allende from taking office directly after his election. Once the stage was set, American operatives on the ground were mostly CIA officers looking to influence media or keep tabs on the state of the country, says Jack Devine, former CIA operative in Chile. Devine describes the events of September 9, 1973, as a series of phone calls he received from various sources he had in Chile, before sending a cable to Washington, reading, "A coup attempt will be initiated on 11 September. All three branches of the armed forces and the carabineros [Chile's national police] are involved in this action. A declaration will be read on Radio Agricultura at 7 a.m. on 11 September. . . . The carabineros have the responsibility for seizing President Salvador Allende."²⁸

From this, I can conclude that U.S. involvement in Chile was sufficient enough to merit a significant factor on the final revolution. The involvement of the Soviet Union more directly may have changed outcomes, but the vast control the U.S. has over Western economic impacts cannot be understated. The Chilean military was disheartened at the occurrences in government over the past decades leading to revolution, but for the final product to occur so seamlessly, the U.S. had to be considerably involved. Had the U.S. not been in the picture and simply washed their hands of this, the Chilean economy may not have reached a tipping point, and the struggle of left and right may have simply stayed just a political discourse one.²⁹ When food shortages occur, action is soon to follow. The play that was the Chilean coup featured exclusively Chilean actors, but the stage production was by the U.S. significantly.

²⁷ Hunt, Ryan. "Project Camelot and Military Sponsorship of Social Research: A Critical Discourse Analysis." Doctoral dissertation, accepted by Duquesne University, November 2007.

²⁸ Devine, Jack. "What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup Against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet." *Foreign Affairs* 93 (4) (July/August 2014): 26-30, 31-35.

²⁹ United States Senate Report. "Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973." U.S. Government Printing Office Washington. D.C. 1975.

Chance for Greater Effect

Though U.S. involvement in the coup has some contested elements, it is fairly known around the world that the brutality of Pinochet's regime in the decades that followed was not an outcome desired by anyone. Devine contends that the original plan was for Pinochet to take power, depose the socialists, and then step aside for elections to take place and a return to American-approved democracy to follow. Nonetheless, this was not the case. Historian Rex A. Hudson states, "The military's primary goal was to revitalize the economy, while destroying the parties of the left and rendering obsolete the parties and leaders of other stripes."³⁰ The U.S. had not anticipated that Pinochet would stay in power, but nonetheless, it served its purpose. A possible communist regime in the Western hemisphere had been eliminated, and regardless of the human rights abuses that followed, the U.S. restored economic stability with Chile once more a fellow capitalist country.

The question remains, had this potential for greater effect not been present, would the revolution have occurred? Chile offers a perfect example for a number of these factors due to the abundance of protests in the months and years before the actual revolution, but for our purposes, it is quite clear that the U.S. was setting the stage for the revolution entirely out of desire for the outside influence, i.e. stopping the spread of communism, especially after losing Cuba. For the actual actors in the revolution, however, this requires more in-depth analysis.

Consider this: you are a Chilean military officer. Since the beginning of the 20th century, when many members of the military were also members of government, the influence of the military has declined. Your military is largely under-funded, and most of your time is spent exclusively with fellow members of the military, a set apart from the rest of society. In 1964, you witness the Brazilian military overthrow their government. In 1966, the same occurs in Argentina. In 1968, Peru. In 1969, Bolivia. Through this thought process, it becomes easy to realize that members of the military felt both disconnected with the rest of society and also more powerful. Couple this with military cooperation exercises with the U.S. which furthered anti-communist sentiment, and all it takes is a realization of what one can achieve for action to occur. To the military, the Allende government was a threat to Chile, so the actions of the armed forces were then very indicative of economic need for their families as well as a nationalistic vision for a better, non-communist Chile.

If this nationalist tendency had been realized, perhaps more precautions could have been taken to prevent the culmination of nationalism, which has a pertinent example in Pinochet's fascist regime. The absence of successful revolutions in the rest of South America could have significantly dented the Chilean military's confidence. Had Allende's economy not drastically affected an already-underfunded yet elite military, the likelihood for action is also diminished. Lastly, Chile's extremely-polarized political scene cast the military as their own sect in society, thereby allowing nationalism within their ranks to manifest in a way absent from much of the rest of society. Had Chile been a more homogenous community in this regard, perhaps the military would not have been able to effectively coordinate military force in their coup. With these thoughts in mind, the potential for greater effect was very much a factor in the revolution in Chile, and the absence of which would have possibly had great implication as well.

Conclusion

³⁰ Rex A. Hudson. *Chile: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994.

In this case study, I have found that two of the three factors are key for the revolution. Though figures that could be seen as galvanizing leaders are present, their positions were not indicative of those making the revolution a reality.³¹ For outside influence and chance for greater effect, however, I find abundant proof to our hypothesis, with the Cold War dynamic heavily influencing factors and the state of South American geopolitics also a key piece in the revolution taking place. Overall, this case supports our hypothesis more than it detracts from it.

³¹ In the conclusion of this paper as a whole, I will make significant note that Allende's presence as a galvanizing leader was critical, though entirely for the opposition, an outcome previously unexpected.

Iran '79

The Iranian Revolution of 1979, which later became known as the Islamic Revolution, marked a period of intense change within the Middle East, as well as establishing most of the semblance of order seen in the region today. Iran, originally ruled by the Western-backed³² Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, experienced an overthrow of power based on grievances with the clergy and many students, who supported the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini in his return from exile. Here, I want to explore how present our factors were in this successful revolution.

Historical Background

Considering this is a case study done on a country that is a noted American adversary, one that a sitting U.S. president referred to as being in the, “Axis of evil,” certain presumptions must be left behind.³³ To begin, this revolution is often seen as a religious testament, with those committing the revolution being labeled as simply the clerics and religious who wished to establish an Islamic republic. While it is true that following the 1979 revolution the Iranian people voted overwhelmingly to declare Shia Islam the official state religion, it must also be noted that the Iranian people cannot be categorized as a monolith in this regard. For this, historical context must be applied.

For one, it is crucial to note that this was not Iran’s first revolution. Persian civilization, centered in modern Iran, is one of the oldest civilizations in human history. Perhaps one of the more important revolutions in the country’s history, which helped set the stage for our discussion here, actually occurred in 1906. It will be covered briefly at a later point.

Second, it is crucial to distinguish that there are technically two revolutions at play here. The first (the one I am covering for our purposes here) is simply the overthrow of the ruling monarch, Mohammad Reza Shah. The second, led by Khomeini, is the actual transfer of Iran from a constitutional monarchy to the official Islamic Republic of Iran. For simplicity purposes, and because the latter is more of an internal and cultural movement, I will simply cover the overthrow of the Shah and actions that create the actual revolution here.

Though debate abounds over the causes and meaning of the revolution, two key factors are crucial to take away as far as causes go. For one, the revolution contained religious undertones. In 1906, during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, Shia Islam was declared the state religion through parliamentary procedure, which had been created following the revolution. Previously, Iran had simply been a monarchic state ruled by Qajar dynasty. However, the extravagance of the monarchy led to mismanagement of funds, and soon the people who provided those funds (the citizens) began protests and eventual revolt. The key takeaway from this brief revolution is that the clergy now emerged as a power within the state, leading to the creation of a constitution, constitutional monarchy, and a parliament through which the citizens of Iran began to have power and leverage against the monarchs.³⁴

Second, and often overlooked, this revolution was a statement on cultural autonomy. The monarchs stayed in power as the turn of the century brought wealth for the country in the discovery of oil. As with the current oil situation in the Middle East, this attracted the attention of world

³² The West, in this case, being the United States and Great Britain, among others.

³³ Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address”. Jan. 29, 2002.

³⁴ Axworthy, Michael. *Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*. Oxford University Press. 2014.

powers. Soon the likes of Great Britain, Russia, and later the U.S. began to establish ties with the monarchy in order to maximize profit from oil reserves in the country. The diplomatic situations that followed are far too complex to illustrate briefly, but nonetheless following World War II, the U.S. emerged as a world superpower and became a key player in Iranian oil negotiations. With investments in the country, soon American influence began to spread as well. This begins the counter-Western insurgence that is characteristic of Western depictions of the following revolution, particularly burning American flags and anti-American propaganda. Though the economy began performing fairly well due to the oil industry, even the democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh was unable to fulfill the desires of his Western influencers, and British and U.S. forces deposed him in a coup known as Operation Ajax in 1953; the CIA admitted involvement in the coup in 2013.³⁵

Here began the rule of Mohammed Reza Shah, the final shah of Iran. He began instituting reform through his known White Revolution, which was an attempt at modernization of the country both through nationalization of industries and cultural reforms. These reforms shook the clergy, as actions such as granting women suffrage and opening the possibility of accessing clerical assets, as Michael Axworthy details in *Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*.³⁶ However, the crucial trigger was many of the Iranian people felt their culture threatened, as Axworthy details in one citizen's quote, "American lifestyles had come to be imposed as an ideal... Americanism was the model. [It] swept over our country like a flood... We found ourselves wondering, 'Is there any room for our own culture?'"³⁷

Wealth began to be held mostly at the top, with trickle-down policies failing due to corruption.³⁸ To add to this, political parties were banned, and the people began to feel further disenfranchised. Further, the nationalization of industry had a very communist undertone, which the clergy and populace feared would soon lead to overall communist tendencies such as the abolition of religion. All of these factors together produced a country ripe for revolution.

Presentation of Factors

From here, I can begin the discussion of how our individual factors contributed or failed to contribute to the eventual successful revolution.

Galvanizing Individuals

Perhaps the easiest of the case studies to pin towards one leader, Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a leading Shia cleric during the White Revolution, most notably for his opposition to the Shah and reformist policies. He was arrested and exiled in 1963 following comments directly at the Shah. However, protests ensued almost immediately after his disposal. Though Khomeini spent much of the next two decades away from Iran, first in Najaf, Iraq, and after 1978, in Paris, the future Ayatollah was outspoken in his disapproval of the Shah, even going as far as to publish a

³⁵ Risen, James. "The CIA in Iran." *Secrets of History*. *The New York Times* - Archive. 2000.

³⁶ Axworthy. *Ibid*.

³⁷ Axworthy. *Ibid*.

³⁸ Graham, Robert. *Iran, the Illusion of Power*. St. Martin's Press. 1980.

series of lectures on the application of sharia law mixed with opposition at the Shah, referring to him as, “The American serpent.”³⁹

Due to a mixture of economic difficulty, clerical suppression, and perceived oppression due to government regulation of political freedoms, students took to the streets to protest in October of 1977, fueled by widespread possession of cassette tapes of Khomeini’s lectures. At first the Shah worked to appease the protestors, offering concessions, but protests continued as Khomeini’s influence spread. When the government began a crackdown and the first protestors were killed, the religious elements of the revolution took over. Towards the end of 1978, a rumor began to circulate that Khomeini’s face could be seen on the moon, which served to illustrate the leader as a quasi-prophetic figure, and gave the revolutionaries a sense of purpose which would be hard to dampen.⁴⁰ In January of the next year, after protests and clashes with state forces, the Shah would leave the country. Less than a month later, after Khomeini returned to the country, the provisional government was overthrown by armed revolutionary soldiers. He would become the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran that December.

Khomeini’s words and presence helped fuel the revolution. Though the clergy held immense power in the country, they were opposed by an equally powerful government which was backed by foreign powers like the United States. The Shah was an equally galvanizing figure, though mostly for opposition sake, for without him Khomeini might not have a figurehead at which to tear away. Even though the Shah began to share the same negative sentiments against Western powers, he could not shake the soon-to-be Ayatollah’s remarks.⁴¹ The country’s overwhelming vote to become an Islamic republic and install Khomeini as Supreme Leader only goes to show that the cleric was paramount to the revolution and its eventual success. Without him and his charisma in the equation, much of the clergy retains power but lacks a singular force, though it could be said another cleric may have been persecuted by the government and become the figure of struggle. Nonetheless, this supports our factor that galvanizing figures are crucial to revolutions occurring, rather than simply mass protest.

Outside Influence

Of the case studies I am discussing, this is more of an outlier in that it is difficult to describe the outside influencers as clearly. In a brief sense, there were two major outside influences that supported the government and the opposition respectively. For the government, the Shah had the influence of Western oil interests such as the U.S. and Great Britain, even though the U.S. asked him to step aside at the culmination of the revolution, not expecting Khomeini to rise so quickly.

For the opposition, this is harder to define, as Iran’s presence as a devout Shia country in a largely Sunni Middle East meant they lacked outside support from just about anyone. However, it can be said that the issue is deeper, and more psychological. Persian culture goes back to the fourth millennium BC, and the purveying influence of Persian culture is very stubborn in the face

³⁹ Taheri, Amir. *The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution*. Adler & Adler. 1986.

⁴⁰ Gözl, Olmo. “Khomeini’s Face is in the Moon: Limitations of Sacredness and the Origins of Sovereignty.” In: *Sakralität und Heldentum*, hrsg. von Felix Heinzer, Jörn Leonhard und Ralf von den Hoff, 229–244, Helden - Heroisierungen - Heroismen 6. Würzburg: Ergon, 2017.

⁴¹ Axworthy. *Ibid.*

of a rapidly-modernizing country with growing Western influence, as I have already discussed.⁴² Further, Theda Skocpol points out key elements of the combination of a rich Persian culture and the devout nature of Shia Islam,

“Shi'a Islam was both organizationally and culturally crucial to the making of the Iranian Revolution against the Shah. Radicalized clerics, loosely following the Ayatollah Khomeini, disseminated political ideas challenging the Shah. Then the networks, the social forms, and the central myths of Shi'a Islam helped to coordinate urban mass resistance and to give it the moral will to persist in the face of attempts at armed repression. All of this meant that a very ‘traditional’ part of Iranian life - albeit a traditional part fitting in new ways into a steadily changing modern sociopolitical scene - provided crucial political resources for the forging of a very modern-looking revolutionary movement.”⁴³

Indeed, the outside influence of Britain and the U.S. in fighting over their oil assets was key, though the Middle East was a complex issue in itself with oil prices fluctuating and the rise of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the latter of which became a galvanizing force for Iran considering Hussein’s anti-Shia movements. However, the key takeaway from the Western influence was that it changed the Iranian way of life rapidly and in a manner that threatened the identity of Persian culture. This gave rise to anti-American sentiment which also gave Khomeini a whipping post on which to place the Shah (who, for all intents and purposes, was much like a figurehead to the U.S. for all of the money he was accepting on oil revenues).

In addition, the role of Shia Islam and Persian culture is a very crucial, embedded influence for the revolutionaries. Skocpol details that,

“...The huge mass demonstrations were often led by men wearing white shrouds to symbolize their readiness to risk death at the hands of the army. It did matter that the Iranian crowds were willing to face the army again and again - accepting casualties much more persistently than European crowds have historically done - until sections of the military rank-and-file began to hesitate or balk at shooting into the crowds. Over time, the crowds would therefore grow while the army became less and less active and reliable as an instrument of repression.”⁴⁴

This sentiment not only fueled the revolution, but also wore down the military to a point that revolution permeated all facets of society, leading to the armed overthrow of the government in February of 1979 which facilitated a smooth transition to power for Khomeini.

This passage echoes our hypothesis that outside influence is a crucial factor in revolutions occurring. Without the U.S. and Western imperialism as a scapegoat, Khomeini could have possibly done more to subvert communist undertones and the fear of religion’s abolition, but having the West as a target to peg the Shah was key to fueling sentiments. Further, Iran’s rich history and the devout nature of Shia Islam only galvanized the people more, and perhaps gave

⁴² Sarkhosh Curtis, Vesta and Stewart, Sarah. *Birth of the Persian Empire: The Idea of Iran*. London: I.B. Tauris. 2005.

⁴³ Skocpol, Teda. “Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution.” *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*: 240–258. Cambridge University Press. 1994.

⁴⁴ Skocpol. *Ibid*.

them the most spirit of any of our revolutions here, especially with the weight that religion carries in individual's struggle to achieve righteousness.

Chance for Greater Effect

Here is one of the more easy to define principles within our parameters. Though I described in previous positions that Khomeini desired to remove the Shah and create an Islamic republic, many of the people of Iran did as well especially when their culture as Persians felt threatened. In addition, I described the outside factors of Western influence along with Shia undertones in elevating the Iranian people's desire for revolution. Though a great deal of this was due to economic mishandling and political oppression by the Shah's regime, the possibility of creating a Shia Islamic state and revitalizing the Persian ideal can be seen within the entirety of the revolution, especially in Khomeini's lectures in which he labels the Shah as anti-Islamic.⁴⁵

In the decade that followed the Iranian Revolution, Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded the country. Though reasons abound for this conflict as well, one cannot help but notice his persecution of Shia Muslims within Iraq and insist that the creation of a Shia state would also be a cause for alarm within a primarily-Sunni Middle East. The chance for greater effect within the Iranian Revolution is therefore obvious, though not necessarily the reason that all people of Iran participated in the revolt. Many had their own reasons, be it clerical, economical, or cultural. Special attention is often drawn to the Iranian Hostage Crisis in November of 1979, though this culmination of anti-Western sentiment is merely one part of a larger picture. Nonetheless, the general view of this revolution includes very key aspects of greater effect, such as creating the opportunity for a bastion of Shia Islam, countering Western cultural expansion in the Middle East, and making Iran a major player within global politics for more reasons than just its oil supply.

Conclusion

The Iranian Revolution ended in the overthrow of the Shah's government, Khomeini's ascension to power as Supreme Leader: Ayatollah, and the creation of the modern Iranian state, an Islamic Republic. In addition, it helped in creating the modern political landscape of the region, juxtaposing the Shia republic against its Sunni counterparts, as well as an outspoken opposition leader against the Western powers, particularly the United States. However, had the conditions not been right in 1979, one might predict that the Shah could have remained in power and altered the trajectory of the country. Nonetheless, this case serves to prove our point almost in entirety: a galvanizing figure in Khomeini was needed, the outside influence of Westernization along with the pull of Shia desire for righteousness and Persian custom, and the chance to create a state that was right by Sharia law (and a Shia state at that), was the perfect formula needed for a revolution to take place, rather than just mass protest.

⁴⁵ Taheri. Ibid.

Iran '11

Though the previous studies have been much more in length, for our two modern examples I will look strictly at the factors as they were presented, or not presented, in each case. To begin, I would like to look at the protests in Iran in 2011-2012, taking place after the catalyst that was the Arab Spring revolts, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia where governments were actually overthrown. This is perhaps our most interesting case study, mostly because it is both differential yet similar to the previous studies. For one, I have already covered Iran and the key revolution in 1979 that established this modern Islamic republic, so I have a general view of its societal make up from a historical perspective. However, Iran in 2011 is different in that this was solely a protest, not a revolution. Unlike some of its Arab neighbors, the Iranian government made no concessions, and the protestors eventually receded.

Presentation of the Factors

In 2011, the Tunisian president fled the country, marking the successful end to the Tunisian Revolution and lighting the fire that would become the Arab Spring. In 2009, controversial sitting president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was re-elected against the widely popular former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Ahmadinejad's distrust of the West and questionable human rights record was nothing out of the ordinary in Iranian politics even since the era of the Shah, but with the spread of social media, the scene was set for making this election even more controversial both within Iran and outside.⁴⁶

Galvanizing Figures

Mousavi immediately declared that the election was a fraud and that he had actually won, and soon protests broke out.⁴⁷ These continued quietly until the events in Tunisia, which were further amplified by social media and spread to Iran. Following January in 2011, Iran's opposition party, the Green Movement, began their wave of protests. February 14th became "The Day of Rage" both in Iran and numerous other Middle Eastern countries. Mousavi, the former presidential candidate, was integral to these protests occurring from the onset, but much of the planning was done through social media and individual groups, rather than political power players.⁴⁸ Whereas Ahmadinejad was the face of the government and those who supported the state, the opposition had themselves as the galvanizing figures.

Similar to Khomeini plastering the Shah as the face of what must be removed to save Iran, the Green Movement and fellow protestors used Ahmadinejad as the same. However, this also marked an era of individualism for Iran, as Somayeh Moghanizadeh points out, "Masses of Mousavi's supporters poured to the streets questioning the validity of the election's result with a simple slogan of where is my vote? This simple slogan was a powerful message against the apparently rigged election of M. Ahmadinejad to the presidency."⁴⁹ The statement, "Where is my

⁴⁶ ["UN: Hold Ahmadinejad Accountable for Iran Rights Crisis"](#). *Human Rights Watch*. September 17, 2008.

⁴⁷ ["Iran election protests turn violent"](#). *CNN*. June 13, 2009.

⁴⁸ Moghanizadeh, Somayeh. "The Role of Social Media in Iran's Green Movement." University of Gothenburg. May 2013.

⁴⁹ Moghanizadeh. *Ibid*.

vote?” echoes the individual aspect of this protest, rather than the need for one particular individual to follow. Iran’s subsequent banning of Facebook and crackdown on Twitter illustrates this as well.

Lastly, it is important to mention that the technology of social media was merely a component to this rise of individualism, rather than illustrating that social media was the entire cause and means for the protests. As Iranian editor Hamid Tehrani writes, “The west was focused not on the Iranian people but on the role of western technology. Twitter was important in publicising what was happening, but its role was overemphasised.”⁵⁰ He continues, however, “The importance of social media is perhaps best illustrated by the government’s response to it.”

Outside Influence

The Arab Spring itself was an experiment in outside influence, as I have already discussed. Iran’s protests in 2009 were crucial for the eventual protests in Tunisia, and the subsequent overthrow of that government was crucial in the continued protests that followed. Nonetheless, the outside influence factor is difficult to determine here, as it was largely a state issue on one side, and a global issue on the other.

Though Western media outlets were quick to declare the protests in Iran, “The biggest since [the 1979] revolution,” the extent of their aid to the operation stops there.⁵¹ Social media carried over from other Arab countries and even the West, with many users changing their locations in social media apps to show support, but the actual ramifications of such assistance fall short, as Tehrani continues, “Some people did provide updates from Tehran, but many didn’t check out. When someone tweeted that there were 700,000 people demonstrating in front of a mosque, it turned out that only around 7,000 people showed up.”⁵²

While the Green Movement could ally itself in solidarity with other movements in protest around the Middle East, the only outside influence to be had was on phone screens and computers. The Iranian government felt solidly in control with their police forces, and the subsequent crackdowns on social media took time to hinder the protests, but eventually were successful. Outside influence, at least in the regards I have seen, was largely negligible in this case.

Chance for Greater Effect

“In some ways, the successful uprisings of the Arab Spring replicated the Iranian Revolution of 1979 more closely than the Green Movement of 2009. They succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes, as the Green Movement did not, and they did so through general strikes, which the Green Movement never managed to spark.”⁵³ Charles Kurzman echoes the fraught nature of these protests: “In early 2011, when the Green Movement once again took to the streets, inspired by the Arab Spring, strikes were again sporadic, and they focused on economic rather than political grievances.” When Khomeini was illustrating the need for protest in 1979, he was

⁵⁰ Weaver, Matthew. “Iran’s Twitter Revolution was Exaggerated, says Editor.” *The Guardian*. June 9, 2010.

⁵¹ Athanasiadis, Iason. “Iran Protest Biggest Since Revolution.” *The Washington Times*. June 16, 2009.

⁵² Weaver. *Ibid*.

⁵³ Kurzman, Charles. “The Arab Spring: Ideals of the Iranian Green Movement, Methods of the Iranian Revolution.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44 (1). February 2012.

able to use economic, religious, and cultural factors together as a successful means for revolution, claiming that the Western nature of the Shah was a threat to Iranians, their religion, their economic prosperity, and their Persian culture.

The Green Movement was unable to attain this, for though numerous in participants thanks to social media communication, they were unable to focus on one great issue over which to ignite the revolution. Surely, the Iranian government's efficient crackdown methods were integral in stifling these developments, but from the onset the protests were about election integrity and soon divulged to economic complaints. The wide scope of issues was not the issue, but the lack of organization was. For all the power the protest had in numbers and fervor, it lacked a central rallying cry besides, "Death to the dictator," which might as well have been taken from either Tunisia or Egypt, though those respective revolutions were actually successful.

In all, there lacked a creation of an ideal for greater effect, which can be credited to the Iranian police forces keeping the protests constrained. Nonetheless, with the power of mass communication in their hands, the protestors were still unable to coalesce over a greater ulterior goal, such as restoring national identity or promoting a new form of government, as I saw in Chile and the Iran of old.

Conclusion

In a greater view, this protest had the characteristics to achieve a greater revolution, but many factors contributed to its lack of development into so. Besides a disgruntled presidential candidate, there lacked a galvanizing figure around which to rally. Nonetheless, the image of Ahmadinejad should have been just as sufficient as the Shah in 1979, so perhaps a figure for the opposition was what was needed. Further, outside influence was not concrete. Though social media offers significant power and reach, it is still being understood and cannot speak the same volumes as, say, the support of the CIA or deeply-rooted religious fervor. Finally, the chance for greater effect here was simply increased individualism, if anything at all, which pales in comparison to uniting around a singular flag, as I saw in the nationalism of 1979 or Chile. Overall, this protest had a tougher shot at achieving revolution, and without the right factors in place, it fizzled accordingly.

Ukraine '14

Finally, I see the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014, the country's violent overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovich prior to enacting sweeping reforms of the government. Though exact causes of the distress in this situation are mostly linked to corruption, there is speculation over the cause of such corruption, casting the situation as an identity struggle for Ukraine, with its Western European neighbors to one side, and the former Soviet bloc and Russia on the other.

Presentation of the Factors

Following the fall of the U.S.S.R, Ukraine's government experienced widespread corruption. Much of the populace began leaning towards greater connection with the European Union, while also being pulled by its history with Russia.⁵⁴ 2004's Orange Revolution granted the country only brief stability though not freedom from corruption. Following the election of Yanukovich in 2010, the pieces for revolution began to fall. With his ties to Russia, many in the public already were wary of where his own corruption may lead, and this came to a head in 2013, when he withdrew from a partnership agreement with the E.U., prompting the protests that would unfold into revolution. As the Ukrainian novelist Andrey Kurkov writes, "Many realised that Viktor Yanukovich would hold on to power to the last, but at the time few considered where this hatred of him came from, a hatred that roused hundreds of thousands of people from their usual state of political apathy and sent them to Kiev's Maidan to stand under the blows of police truncheons and the deadly aim of expert snipers."⁵⁵

Galvanizing Figures

For our purposes here, the argument can be divided into the pro-Russia side and the pro-Europe side, and no leader galvanized the former quite like elected President Yanukovich. Though, by the same token, no figure incited the pro-Europeans quite like him either. When he pulled from the E.U. association agreement in late 2013, opting instead for closer ties with Russia, protests began and continued to grow. When his government used violent force on protesters on November 29th, 2013, the revolution was triggered, as protesters returned with violence that carried well into 2014.

For the pro-Europe side, there lacked any single leader who became the face of the revolution besides career politician Yulia Tymoshenko. Starting after his election, Yanukovich's government began a series of prosecutions against Tymoshenko, eventually leading to her imprisonment. Though Yanukovich touted this as a means by which he was fighting corruption, both the E.U. and many people in Ukraine used her imprisonment as further fuel to their claims that corruption and silencing political representation were rampant in the government. When an occupied parliament voted to release Tymoshenko, during the midst of the most violent five days of the revolution where 80 people died, her presence speaking in Maidan Square in

⁵⁴ "[Frequently asked questions about Ukraine, the EU's Eastern Partnership and the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement](#)" (PDF). European Union External Action. April 24, 2015.

⁵⁵ Kurkov, Andrey. "Ukraine's Revolution: Making Sense of a Year of Chaos." *BBC*. November 21, 2014.

Kiev excited the protestors.⁵⁶ Further, Yanukovich then fled the country, marking the end of the revolution.

The presence of Yanukovich was crucial to the protestors' having a face on which to blame the rampant corruption in the government. The fact that Tymoshenko was released as soon as protestors occupied parliament is also a testament to their symbolic belief in her, though they did not have one single leader of their own around which to rally. This leads me to believe that this factor was crucial in causing the revolution

Outside Influence

In modern, globalized political struggles, it is hard to find a situation where outside influence is not applicable. For this, one need look no further than the exact situation of this revolution. The pro-Europe side obviously had the backing of Western powers, as I can conclude from the E.U.'s disapproval of the imprisonment of pro-Europe Tymoshenko by the Yanukovich government.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the pro-Russia side obviously had the backing of Russia, which takes no further proof than Yanukovich requiring Russian assistance to flee his own country.⁵⁸ Russia's influence in the region stems back to the Cold War, though perhaps the greatest asset Europe was able to provide was strictly media coverage, and in particular, molding the narrative to fitting this pro-European versus pro-Russian dichotomy.

Ukraine itself is a complex country, as I have described, with many citizens on either side of the Russia or Europe debate. One VICE News video includes an interview with a protestor who claims, "Some people who came to the [Independence] square believe that we have two evils. But we have to choose the better evil. And the better evil is the European Union, because there you have some institution, human rights institutions, this idea of laws and truths."⁵⁹ Further reports around the world illustrated the conflict in the similar dichotomy. Given Ukraine's historic industrial ties with Russia, tapping corruption to industry amongst Russian business owners and Ukrainian politicians is almost far too easy.

In all, the outside influence within this revolution is obvious, and one that is necessary to revolution actually unfolding here. However, the situation of Ukraine is complex in these outside influences, mostly due to its geographical situation. Nonetheless, it holds as a key facet of the revolution taking place, and one that most likely could have predicted a different outcome if otherwise.

Chance for Greater Effect

Once more, the extensive coverage of these modern revolutions leads this to be a simple dichotomy as well. At the onset of the protests, corruption was a core issue, though embedded within Ukraine's state of identity. The fact that President Yanukovich's refusal to sign an associations agreement with the E.U. triggered the first wave of mass protest is proof enough that the greater issue at hand here was the future of Ukraine as a member of Western Europe or its former Soviet counterpart.

⁵⁶ Higgins, Andrew and Cramer, Andrew (21 February 2014). "Embattled Ukraine President Signs Compromise Deal as Parliament Votes to Free His Imprisoned Rival". *New York Times*. February 21, 2014.

⁵⁷ "EU feels let down by Ukraine over Tymoshenko". *Euronews*. October 11, 2011.

⁵⁸ "Putin: Russia helped Yanukovich to flee Ukraine". *BBC*. October 24, 2014.

⁵⁹ Pool, Tim. "Ukraine Rising". *VICE News*. December 16, 2013.

Economic distress, political suppression, and other factors certainly played a part, but a surface look at this conflict and the demographics of the country present a compelling case that Ukraine's identity is truly what was at stake here, as well as why the outside influencers held so much stake in the conflict as well. Shortly after the revolution and restoration of parliament, Russia began its conflict in Crimea and Donbass, in southern and eastern Ukraine, which showed their hand in the revolution's implications. The West's condemnation of these events is only further proof that a greater pull was necessary for this revolution, rather than just a dispute over political honesty.

Conclusion

For Ukraine, I see a compelling testament towards our hypothesis. For one, the presence of both Yanukovich and Tymoshenko is crucial to the protestors organizing. Second, the outside influence played its part, pressuring the parliament and perhaps giving added resolve to the meaning behind the protestors' resolve. Lastly, the chance for greater effect pushed this revolution over the edge. As I have seen in both Chile and Iran already, national identity is a key component of an individual's inclination towards action in the face of distress. This explores certain psychological and sociological constructs which will have to be explained at another time, but nonetheless demonstrates that tapping the resolve of this nationalism is crucial to motivating an individual to achieve outside of what their means may indicate, such as the protestors of Ukraine against the armed guards and assault rifles of the government.

Concluding Thoughts

In order to present the findings in a concise manner, a figure is necessary. Below, Table 1 simplifies the results of the studies, with each case presented against each factor for testing. The rating system for each factor within each case is a Likert scale ranging from negligible, to slightly negligible, to mixed, to slightly significant, to significant.

	Presence and Pertinence of Galvanizing Figures	Presence and Pertinence of Outside Influence	Chance for Greater Effect Realized
Chile '73	<i>Mixed:</i> General Pinochet was nowhere near the galvanizing figure as expected, and his general presence as a figure-head for the military would be more accurate. However, a case can be made for President Allende as a galvanizing figure for the opposition, i.e. his presence and socialist tendencies fueled the military to act cohesively against one figure.	<i>Fairly Significant:</i> While the USSR would have liked keeping Allende in power, they did not have the resources to assist like they did in Cuba. Nonetheless, though the involvement of the US is often overstated, especially militarily, we cannot overlook the failed coup attempt (led by the CIA) after Allende took office and subsequent economic tightening which allowed for the Chilean military to seamlessly overthrow the sitting government.	<i>Significant:</i> The global fight between communism and capitalism of the USSR and US respectively played a crucial role in the presence of outside influence, but the proximity of Chile to other countries in South America also experiencing revolutions certainly had influence on the Chilean military's motivation, especially with the opportunity to create a new democracy and restore Chile as an economic and forceful power in the continent.
Iran '79	<i>Significant:</i> If I had made a category on the scale for "significantly significant", this would be it. From people's claims of seeing his face on the moon to his lectures being prized audio tapes, Ayatollah Khomeini is as galvanizing as a figure can be. This is further evidenced by his installment as Supreme Leader at the conclusion of the revolution. In all, if he is taken from the equation, we have a much different story here.	<i>Significant:</i> Besides the obvious influence of the US and Great Britain mostly being to secure their oil assets in the region, we also see an example similar to President Allende as a galvanizing figure in Chile: Iran's Persian history coupled with the threat of American imperialism gave Khomeini a whipping post against which to blast his teachings, thereby fueling a public that felt their way of life and nationalism threatened.	<i>Significant:</i> The crucial driver here is Shia Islam, as the opportunity to create a Shia state on the edge of the largely-Sunni Arab world was a fervent piece to the revolution, made especially more so when coupled with Persia's rich history as a mighty kingdom and empire at various points. The desire to restore this reflects a unique value of nationalism unknown in the other case studies, and perhaps the most powerful feature.

Iran '11	<i>Slightly Negligible:</i> Ahmadinejad gets some similar sentiment as the whipping post, much like Yanukovich and Allende, but this revolution marked a turn towards individualism in Iran, and the components of this revolution were mostly through social media where no individual person can take credit for inspiring the masses. Though the collective presence of Iran's youth as opposition could be described as one individual, it's hard to argue that a collective galvanized itself and stay within our parameters here.	<i>Negligible:</i> We see some CIA influence here, as well as the fact that other revolutions had begun occurring, but this does not reflect actual outside interference within Iran. As stated, this was a social media-driven attempt at revolution, at a time when social media was just beginning to be harnessed. The situation here is largely within Iran, as the capacity for influence was low.	<i>Slightly Negligible:</i> This is very close to being entirely negligible, but the sentiment for revolution itself could suffice as a central rallying cry here. The point is this: the Green Movement in Iran lacked a centralized rallying cry besides the similar sentiments for democracy that other countries like Tunisia were attempting to create. However, "Death to the Dictator," chants were largely borrowed, and the reasons for protest splinted on various issues, like economic instability, injustice, corruption, etc.
Ukraine '14	<i>Mixed:</i> President Yanukovich, much like Allende in Chile, was the face against which the opposition could direct attacks and impose blame for Ukraine's state of corruption. Without him as a singular figure, we may have a more clouded system of corruption with the government, and possibly a more confused and unfocused revolutionary front. Further, Julia Tymoshenko's perceived-unjust imprisonment made her a high-level hero of the opposition as well.	<i>Significant:</i> Put simply, without outside influence, we may not have had this revolution in the first place. The Russian vs. Western influence is largely apparent, though this begins to bleed over to our third factor of chance for greater effect. Nonetheless, Russia's influence with President Yanukovich and the Western media's depiction of the conflict as a revolution in the first place is key to stoking the fire here.	<i>Significant:</i> Corruption gets the main points here, as the opposition led revolt against President Yanukovich largely under an anti-corruption banner, but the economic impacts and general public support of the EU agreement (which Yanukovich denied) gave even more fuel to the notion that Ukraine must be taken into the hands of its people. Essentially, this was a testament on where the future of the country was headed, and who would be in charge when it got there.

Table 1

Now what does this mean? First, it demonstrates that the factors chosen do, in fact, find some universality in their application. That is, from Chile to Iran to Ukraine, the three factors are present in varying degrees, thereby contributing to revolution or lack thereof. This furthers the notion that these revolutions and protests, though varying in cause and scale, are still products of

human psychology and then sociological mechanisms, which is in accordance with the literature, especially regarding Gurr's frustration-aggression mechanism.

Second, the degree to which these factors are present is crucial, but they do not always fall into alignment with our definitions for political revolution, i.e. populace against state. By this, I mean that this study was begun with the understanding that galvanizing figures, outside influence, and chance for greater effect would be the forces behind the power of those performing the revolution. However, as we saw with both Chile and Ukraine, often the galvanizing figure can be an opponent around which to organize opposition. The key discussion here is what this means for both previous revolutions, as well as what this means for future revolutions. In an era where singular political figures carry major weight, e.g. Donald Trump in the U.S., Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, or Viktor Orbán in Hungary, these leaders' significance is almost as paramount as the significance of any opposition leaders. This has ramifications with the psychological components of this study. In other words, perhaps in a growing-individualist era, we may be more concerned with who we don't want to be than with who we would like to emulate.

Lastly, and in accordance with the direction of that final point, there remains the notion that these revolutions carry a weight both in a sociological sense as well as psychological. While we can often think of protest movements and great political accomplishments as largely group endeavors, maybe we can consider ourselves as similar to an average citizen in Granada, as mentioned in the introduction. How often do we find ourselves looking up to significant, galvanizing individuals, both with who we want to be as well as who we despise. Within that question, we may even delve further and ask if we are wishing to despise more than we are wishing to emulate. Further, perhaps we are experiencing outside influence to a great degree, from our neighbors or friends online, or perhaps where we get our media information or otherwise knowledge. We pride ourselves on being just that: ourselves. Nonetheless, what can we say about our own direction without being blown in the wind by our sources for knowledge or experience. Lastly, perhaps there are bigger factors at play that are overtaking our attention. Are we supporting a cause because of its greater influence on the national or international community, or is it merely a personal endeavor? Answering these questions, and more, are crucial to the understanding of the individual psychology of dissent and satisfaction, as well as governance in general as we head into the rest of the 21st century.

This study has been an explanation into the historical components of divide, i.e. what leads us apart. More importantly, however, this has been a study in what leads us to do something about what leads us apart. From the information gained in these case studies, I have discovered, with a reasonable degree of reliability, that revolutions are influenced by three particular factors, and the significance of those factors can be the difference between a mere, large-scale complaint (protest), or an all-out expression of dissatisfaction that leads individuals to take matters into their own hands and overtake the state. Obviously, there are numerous factors at play, which far outnumber those at hand here. We have not even begun to consider military strength, geopolitical stability as a whole, and the myriad of influences that impact every decision within a populace. Nonetheless, with this study we have scratched the surface on what leads us to engage in revolution, and therefore what it means to perceive a divide but also to perceive what we can personally do to ensure that divide is conquered.

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