



THE HOLLOW PACT:  
PACIFIC SECURITY AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

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To my father

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ANZAC	Australia - New Zealand Agreement
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DDE	Dwight David Eisenhower Papers
DSB	<i>Department of State Bulletin</i>
FRUS	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i>
GMD	Guomindang
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFD	John Foster Dulles Papers
JSP	Japanese Socialist Party
LDP	Japanese Liberal Democratic Party
MSA	Mutual Security Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NYT	<i>New York Times</i>
OCB	Operations Coordinating Board
PRC	People's Republic of China
SEACDT	Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty

SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SEATOGSE	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Graduate School of Engineering
SLP	Skilled Labor Project
TCA	Technical Cooperation Administration
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	White House Office



## INTRODUCTION

On 8 September 1954, delegates from the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in Manila. This treaty, often called the Manila Pact, created the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in an attempt to form a viable collective security system that would protect the Western Pacific region from feared communist aggression. The driving force behind the treaty, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, considered the treaty the cornerstone of America's Asian policy.<sup>1</sup> Despite Dulles' convictions about SEATO and the immense role he played in directing the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy, historians have dismissed the Manila Pact as insignificant, a failure, or even a "zoo of paper tigers."<sup>2</sup> Few scholars have given it serious attention, and it typically appears as little more than a footnote in books about the Cold War or Vietnam.

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954*, vol. 13 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 1259.

<sup>2</sup> Sir James Cable, *The Geneva Conference of 1954 on Indochina* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), 139. Cable also decries SEATO as "a fig leaf for the nakedness of American policy."

Indeed, only one book length study of SEATO has been published since the collapse of the organization in 1977, Leszek Buszynski's *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy*. Buszynski claims "SEATO was established as part of the same strategy that gave birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," and he goes on to explain that "the Manila Treaty was an effort, more than anything else, at deterrence without the basic conditions for a convincing strategy of deterrence being satisfied."<sup>3</sup> Arguing that the creation of SEATO came about solely as an American response to the French collapse at Dienbienphu, Buszynski sees SEATO as nothing more than a failed military alliance. He supports his argument with a discussion of regional crises that SEATO could not prevent: the 1960-61 Laotian Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the 1965 Pakistan-India border clash. Buszynski's account demonstrates problems with the United States' Asian policy, but it does not fully examine Dulles' vision for SEATO. Neither does it demonstrate the shift in the nature of SEATO planning that took place when John F. Kennedy replaced Eisenhower in the White House. Further, in evaluating the creation of SEATO in 1954, Buszynski

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<sup>3</sup> Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO: The Failure of an Alliance Strategy* (Kent Ridge, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), x-xi.

fails to distinguish between Dulles' public rhetoric and the administration's actual plans.

*Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* contains a number of essays that expand on the discrepancy between the public persona of figures in the Eisenhower administration compared to their private planning sessions. Editor Martin Medhurst explains, "For Eisenhower, rhetoric was a weapon with which to wage Cold War... rhetoric was thought of as a strategic art of selection, invention, arrangement, word choice, nuance, tone, implication, timing, and audience adaptation."<sup>4</sup> Robert Ivie's "Eisenhower as Cold Warrior" expands the discussion by illustrating the roles played by Dulles and his commander-in-chief where the bellicose Dulles provided the counterpoint to Eisenhower's peace crusade. Gregory Olson's "Eisenhower and the Indochina Problem" continues the discussion with an examination of the events that led to SEATO. Olson demonstrates that Eisenhower intended for Dulles' militant speeches about the need for SEATO and United Action in 1954 to pressure the Senate into accepting the treaty when it came time for the ratification vote. Further, Eisenhower overstated the problems in Southeast

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<sup>4</sup> Martin Medhurst, ed., *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1994), 1-2.

Asia in order to ensure that Congress would continue to fund American projects in the region. In other words, Eisenhower used fear of communism as a tool to convince Congress to rubber stamp his administration's initiatives in Asia, and "by rhetorically overstating the importance of South Vietnam to US Security, Eisenhower helped lay the trap that would engulf that nation in the quagmire of the 1960s and 1970s."<sup>5</sup>

Buszynski certainly does not stand alone in his failure to acknowledge the illusion of rhetoric surrounding SEATO. *New York Times* journalist Cyrus L. Sulzberger set the tone for the majority of these misguided accounts with his 1962 article "The Alliance that Never Really Was." Lacking access to the secret decisions of the Eisenhower administration, Sulzberger took the bombastic public rhetoric of Dulles at face value. Seeing that SEATO clearly failed to measure up to the example set by NATO, Sulzberger charged that "SEATO is not a going concern but a sham" without the ability to offer security to the region.<sup>6</sup>

Sulzberger's article reflected the common view of SEATO at the time, and the majority of later accounts

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<sup>5</sup> Gregory Olson, "Eisenhower and the Indochina Problem" in *Eisenhower's War of Words*, 128.

<sup>6</sup> Cyrus L. Sulzberger, "The Alliance that Never Really Was" in *New York Times* (NYT), 30 May 1962.

followed the same line of thought. Of these interpretations, Townshend Hoopes' biography of Dulles, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, stands as one of the most critical. Citing SEATO as a symptom of "Dullesian pactomania," or the rabid desire to cover the world with collective security treaties, Hoopes compared the organization to NATO and argued that Dulles sought to create "a military pact with teeth in it."<sup>7</sup> Hoopes did recognize that Dulles envisioned SEATO as a means to justify future American action in Southeast Asia, but he claims that no one ever invoked the SEATO treaty as a means of defending Vietnam against communist aggression. Since Dulles failed to create a powerful Asian military alliance and since SEATO seemingly fell short of justifying American intervention in Vietnam, Hoopes regarded the entire enterprise as a complete fiasco.

The majority of Vietnam and Cold War books that touch on SEATO follow a similar pattern as the one outlined by Hoopes.<sup>8</sup> Even so, a few make some significant observations.

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<sup>7</sup> Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Atlantic, 1973), 241 ff.

<sup>8</sup> For a few of these accounts, see: Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Richard J. Barnet, *The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan; Makers of the Postwar World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983); Andrew Rotter, *Path to Vietnam* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Howard Jones, *Quest for Security* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996); Gary R. Hess, *Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War*, rev. ed. (New York: Twayne, 1998).

For example, Walter LaFeber's survey of the Cold War, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, points out that SEATO did not begin in a vacuum after the fall of Dienbienphu. Instead, he explains that there had been discussion concerning the creation of an Asian pact since the Japanese peace treaty in 1951. LaFeber also credits Dulles with putting together a collective security treaty that faced none of the Senate debates that had threatened acceptance of the NATO treaty.<sup>9</sup> John Lewis Gaddis' *Strategies of Containment* makes another salient point by insisting that despite the notion of pactomania, Dulles only expanded US defense commitments to four nations. Further, Gaddis asserts that Dulles formed alliances to define American defense commitments, not to expand American military capability. Gaddis demonstrates that Dulles stood ready to act without allies and that force commitments from SEATO allies remained irrelevant to American defense planning.<sup>10</sup>

Gaddis describes a more elaborate defense policy than critics recognize, and George Herring and Richard Immerman's "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu" provides more evidence to support that view. They argue that though

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<sup>9</sup> Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1975*, 3d ed. (New York: Wiley, 1976).

<sup>10</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

many early accounts regarded Dulles as a hawk pushing for war, in reality he remained cautious. Further they point out that the concept of United Action, which led to the creation of SEATO, existed to allow the United States the freedom to intervene in East Asia under conditions that it found favorable rather than as a means to bolster American defenses. Indeed, they express the view that the Eisenhower administration engaged in no serious plans about a defense of Vietnam. Instead, Eisenhower and his advisors concerned themselves with a possible intervention in what they perceived as the principal regional threat, the People's Republic of China.<sup>11</sup>

Even though these accounts have challenged aspects of the traditional view concerning the origins of SEATO, none of them examines the organization beyond its creation. Dulles biographer Frederick W. Marks remains virtually alone in investigating SEATO beyond 1954. Marks argues in *Power and Peace* that Dulles viewed SEATO as one of his most important achievements as Secretary of State. He describes SEATO in laudatory terms and claims it as one of Dulles' most significant diplomatic successes. He even sees SEATO as the key to the East Asian policy of the United States in

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<sup>11</sup> George Herring and Richard Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: "The Day We Didn't Go to War" Revisited," in *Journal of American History* 71 (Sept. 1984): 343-363.

the 1950s and 1960s and credits the organization with such diverse accomplishments as the economic restoration of Japan, the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and improvements in education throughout the Western Pacific. Though Marks claims a variety of successes for SEATO, he does not follow through and examine these achievements in detail. Rather, his study provides the foundation for a more in depth examination of SEATO.<sup>12</sup>

Marks overstates the successes of SEATO, but he does clearly demonstrate the need for further study of the organization. Further, he provides evidence of the importance of the organization to the Eisenhower administration's plans for East Asia. Nevertheless, historians have overlooked the importance of SEATO because they consider it a military failure. Nothing could be further from the truth, and those who make such assumptions base their evaluations on faulty reasoning, such as calling SEATO the Asian counterpart to NATO or presuming that SEATO failed because the United States lost the Vietnam War. Ultimately, SEATO did fail, but not due to military reasons. The treaty failed because the Eisenhower administration mismanaged its Asian policy.

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<sup>12</sup> Frederick W. Marks III, *Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles* (Westport: Praeger, 1995).



During the 1950s, the State Department had two competing visions concerning the handling of US-Asian relations. American policy makers believed that the United States should treat Asian countries with respect as sovereign nations on an equal footing, and the United States took great pains after the end of World War II to separate itself from the taint of European colonialism. The State Department correctly believed that pushing Asian nations into following American plans in the region would result in resentment and policy failures. Furthermore, the United States exerted pressure on Britain, France, and the Netherlands to end their colonial practices in Asia and supported the establishment of independent nations free of the colonial blemish.

Such a policy seems sound, but at the same time, the United States had an overwhelming fear of communism and the threat of Soviet aggression. Opposition to communist ideology generated an "us versus them" mentality within the Eisenhower administration, and the United States sought to limit the expansion of communism at almost any cost while many Asian nations, notably India, had a policy of neutralism. Due to a dread of being drawn into the Cold War, these neutral powers feared aligning themselves too closely with either of the superpowers. The Eisenhower

administration's bipolar worldview held no room for neutralism, and the United States attempted to compel Asian nations to avoid communism and align with the free world.

These two competing visions produced a schizophrenic Asian policy. Americans praised freedom of choice and an end to colonialism, yet at the same time, they attempted to force Asian nations into accepting their interpretation of Soviet communism. Seemingly, Eisenhower's administration failed to notice that Asian nations had difficulty trusting American motives when the United States refused foreign aid or friendship to sovereign nations that sought nothing more than peace and prosperity through neutralism and nonalignment.

This dualistic policy kept the administration from ever committing fully to either vision. The United States failed to give trade and aid freely to nonaligned nations in the region, and it balked at forcing nations in the region to sever ties completely with the communist powers. As a result, nations like Burma straddled the fence, never fully trusting the United States either to respect their independence or to protect them from aggression.

Prior to becoming Secretary of State, Dulles seemingly understood this problem. He knew that the United States had a tendency to impose its world vision on others and

that other nations resented it. In a *Capitol Cloak Room* interview in 1951, he even pointed out that "the United States is a good country to run anybody's affairs, but everybody likes to run their own."<sup>13</sup> During the 1952 presidential campaign, Dulles criticized the Truman administration for its lack of attention to Asia, but his own policies suffered from the same lack of cohesiveness. The principal difference seems that Dulles trusted himself to pick the best times to give and take, but he did not trust others, especially Truman and Dean Acheson.

Dulles began building a Pacific security organization while putting together the Japanese Peace Treaty after World War II. The notion of a Pacific pact did not originate with Dulles, but once he began laboring on the peace treaty, he became the champion of a collective security arrangement in Asia. Acheson even referred to the idea as the "Dulles Plan."<sup>14</sup> Dulles envisioned a broad Asian membership that would include a reinvigorated postwar Japan, and during the peace treaty discussions, he helped create the ANZUS alliance between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Later, he founded the expanded

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<sup>13</sup> *Capitol Cloak Room Transcript*, 15 May 1951, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty and Security Correspondence, John Foster Dulles Papers (JFD Papers), Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, microfilm roll 18 (Willimington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993).

<sup>14</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 150.

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, but SEATO was not supposed to be the final stage of the plan. Dulles always visualized a greater collective security treaty that would cover Japan and other Asian nations like Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This enlarged treaty would have created a regional economic group that might have led to greater industrial development in the free nations of East Asia, and social and cultural development were supposed to follow in the wake of economic strength. Dulles' vision was nothing short of an American-led utopia for Asia and the Western Pacific islands, but it never materialized because these nations trusted neither American motives nor leadership. It also seems reasonable to expect that Asian nations saw something of Imperial Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in Dulles' plan. For his part, Dulles dismissed any sort of relationship between the two regional concepts because he believed Japan had compelled compliance with its plan for regional integration through force whereas the United States would achieve similar goals through diplomacy and cooperation. Unfortunately Dulles' tactics proved insufficient, and the inability to create greater Asian economic cooperation is the true failure of SEATO, not its supposed military weakness.

Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the State Department pushed for the development of a greater East Asian cooperative treaty. The primary tools of persuasion included propaganda, military assistance, and technical aid, but the dualistic American vision caused the misapplication of these tools. To compound the problem, US officials believed that Asians lacked the capability to make responsible political decisions. The National Security Council even went so far as to blame the lack of progress on the deficiencies of "chopstick culture" when compared to "knife culture."<sup>15</sup> When Eisenhower sought reasons why Laos had become a landlocked nation rather than being absorbed into Thailand some centuries before, CIA Director Allen W. Dulles used this analogy to explain the backwardness of Laos. To his credit, Eisenhower found the explanation rather strange and ordered a study of language and ethnic differences in the region, but the willingness of high level administration officials to oversimplify the diverse cultures found in Southeast Asia by simply grouping them into categories based on their eating utensils demonstrates a severe paucity of cultural awareness on the part of Americans in the 1950s. This lack of respect for

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<sup>15</sup> Minutes of NSC Meeting 374, 31 July 1958, NSC Series, box 10, Dwight David Eisenhower Papers as President (DDE Papers), Eisenhower Library.

the developing world blinded the Eisenhower administration to its own deficiencies, and as a result, American leadership in Asia lacked effectiveness.

SEATO failed due to its inability to develop into a greater organization that could link the economies of the free nations of East Asia, but it is primarily regarded as a military organization. As a result, others have judged SEATO on the basis of its military performance, and compared to NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization certainly comes up lacking. SEATO did not possess a powerful central council that could coordinate military planning, and Asian members lacked the military technology and equipment to make substantial force commitments. It is easy then to look at SEATO and see an uncoordinated military nightmare that did little more than overcommit the United States to the defense of a distant part of the world. Even so, judging SEATO by these standards results in a flawed interpretation.

One does not have to look very far to understand this popular confusion about SEATO's military purpose. American propaganda and rhetoric about collective security and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, much of it spewed by none other than Secretary Dulles, harped on the concept of deterrence and the strength of joint action. Critics

easily point out the absence of cooperative strength in SEATO; whatever military power the group possessed came almost entirely from the United States. As a result, SEATO never developed into a viable military organization, but critics have failed to realize that Dulles never intended to establish SEATO as a true collective security organization. Instead, the military side of SEATO was a means of upholding American preponderance through the concept of deterrence.

The Departments of State and Defense worked together closely to ensure SEATO's weakness as a military organization. They designed the military aspects of SEATO to produce one result: the ability for the United States to react to perceived communist aggression in whatever manner it saw fit. American officials had no desire for equal partnership with the nations of the Pacific region. They sought an organization that would give the United States freedom to apply military force throughout the region if it ever felt the need to do so. After Korea, American defensive planners knew that they could not match Chinese numbers in an Asian land war. America's military advantage over the People's Republic of China consisted of the striking power and mobility of air and naval forces. As a result, the Eisenhower administration never attempted to

build a powerful military organization like NATO in Asia. Instead, SEATO had two different military goals. First, the organization needed to deter the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China from waging a war of aggression in Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands. Second, it had to allow the United States to enter any future Asian wars without a mandate from the United Nations (UN). The Soviet Union failed to attend the UN meeting when the organization voted to commit UN forces to the defense of South Korea, but Dulles knew that Soviet leaders would not repeat the mistake. So, he designed SEATO to allow the United States to overcome a possible future Soviet veto.

Critics point to the Vietnam War to show SEATO's failure as a military organization. Pakistan dropped out of the organization because of the war, and several members never committed any troops to the war effort. Worse, the United States did not win the war, and the organization collapsed in 1977. Still, none of these factors mitigated SEATO's military effectiveness. The organization fulfilled the military goals set by the Eisenhower administration. Based on the SEATO treaty, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution allowed the United States to wage war in Vietnam and fight as American leaders saw fit without a UN vote, and most importantly, Vietnam did not escalate into a nuclear



conflict involving the United States, China, or the Soviet Union. Certainly, the United States fell well short of victory in Vietnam, but that loss stemmed from factors unrelated to the original American intent for the SEATO treaty.

The military aspect of the SEATO treaty suffers from the same dual vision that spoiled the economic aspects of a greater Pacific organization. The United States failed to give Asian member nations significantly better economic deals than nonmembers because Eisenhower and Dulles wanted to avoid creating the impression that the United States had become an imperial power that treated its Asian allies like dependent colonies. At the same time, the American fear of communist aggression permeated SEATO meetings and discussions. American leaders continually invoked the specter of communist aggression during the 1950s, and to gain domestic support, they stressed the defensive nature of SEATO. The anticommunist rhetoric coupled with a seeming lack of desire for true military cooperation caused Asian members of the organization to question the reason for their membership. They did not receive substantially better economic concessions than other Asian nations, and they endangered their own security by aligning with the United States in the war against communism. Furthermore,

nonaligned nations observing the situation saw little reason to consider joining an expanded treaty. The economic prospects of aligning with the United States seemed dim, and America's obsession with communism struck many as dangerous.

The fear of being seen as a colonial power clashed with the desire to halt the spread of communism at any cost, and by attempting to have it both ways, John Foster Dulles ensured that SEATO would never develop into his vision for a greater East Asian organization that would bring prosperity to the people of the region. Because of the dual policies, Asian leaders questioned the benefits of an association with the United States. They questioned American loyalty and leadership, and they failed to see the connection between their economies and an organization that on the surface seemed to be a weak militaristic group. As a result, the United States never generated an increased interest in the expansion of an Asian alliance, and SEATO wasted away as little more than a hollow pact.

## CHAPTER I

### THE DULLES CONVERSION

The world underwent significant changes in the years immediately following World War II. The victors redrew the maps of Eastern Europe. Bombs and guns destroyed the manufacturing capacity of industrial Europe, and colonialism fell into a state of decline as Third World nations struggled for independence from the weakened European powers. From this wreckage, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world's superpowers. Clearly, these two great nations held fundamentally divergent world views. The Soviets championed international communism, and the United States espoused liberal capitalism. Each nation viewed the other as its enemy, and the Cold War rose from the ashes of World War II's devastation.

The Cold War changed the nature of international relationships. Nations made new alliances, and the desire for third world allies, as opposed to colonial dependents, became increasingly important. The fact that the United States allied with both West Germany and Japan within less

than ten years after the end of World War II demonstrates the dramatic obviousness of these changes. The former Axis powers went from being the two most despised and demonized nations in American history to being America's friends in the stand against communism. Apparently, it was easier to forgive the Nazis, the Holocaust, and Pearl Harbor than to coexist with Joseph Stalin and the Red Menace. Likewise, it was not difficult for the West Germans to forget Dresden when faced with the fate of East Germany, nor did the Japanese seem to have much trouble forgiving the United States for dropping two atomic weapons on their homeland. In 1943, probably no one in the world would have predicted such a radical realignment, but such was the enormity of the Cold War.

As a result of the new way of thinking about the world during the Cold War, the United States increased its involvement in Asian affairs. In the years following World War II, America developed closer ties to East Asia than it had ever possessed before. Certainly, Americans had some dealings with Asia prior to the Cold War. The United States claimed the Philippines in 1898, had bickered with the Germans over the Samoas, and had avidly supported the Open Door Policy for trade with China. Even so, prior to World War II, Asia ranked as a minor concern for the

American government. The United States may have sought trade and economic benefits with the eastern world, but American leaders did not regard Asian nations as sovereign equals worthy of such signs of friendship as military alliances. That situation changed dramatically in the mid-twentieth century.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into World War II, and after the war, the United States had increased Asian responsibilities. The US directly controlled a number of Pacific territories, like the Marshall Islands, that it labeled as trusteeships. It also maintained a large military presence in Japan and other areas, notably the Philippines and Korea. Due to this postwar position and the threat of an expanding communist monolith, the United States ensured the welfare of portions of East Asia and the Western Pacific until it could improve regional stability and establish a satisfactory peace treaty with Japan. After achieving both goals, American leaders reasoned that a rebuilt Japan would inherit much of the burden for Asia's development. Initially, drafting a successful peace treaty seemed a more difficult task than establishing regional security because the United States and the Soviet Union had divergent views on how to treat postwar Japan, and the Cold War division of

Germany demonstrated the possible problems with a Japanese peace treaty. Instead, the hostile climate of the Cold War and events such as the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War made the question of how to engineer regional stability and security the more significant problem.<sup>1</sup>

The Japanese treaty progressed slowly. In the late 1940s, rebuilding Western Europe and dealing with the division of Germany held greater priority for the Truman administration, but when Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War and declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949, Asia rapidly turned into a focal point for the American government.

Following on the heels of the first successful Soviet atomic weapons test, the "loss" of China seemed catastrophic in the United States. Many Americans panicked, and Joseph McCarthy rose up to lead the new red scare. In response, the Truman administration reorganized the Asian desk of the State Department, and it expanded the policy of containment to include Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made this policy public on 12 January 1950 when he announced the creation of a "defensive perimeter"

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<sup>1</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 1, 614-15; *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1215-1220; Hal Friedman, *Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2001), xii-xviii.

in Asia.<sup>2</sup> Essentially, Acheson drew a line that demarked the territory the United States would protect from Communist expansion. Acheson's defensive zone did not include Korea, and on 25 June 1950, communist North Korean troops invaded the Republic of Korea to the South. The United States committed troops to defend South Korea, and soon American soldiers found themselves waging a land war on the Asian mainland. After that, few American leaders failed to regard Asia as a strategically significant area.<sup>3</sup>

Even as the United States clashed with international communism, Western European powers faced the hard fact that their system of colonial dominance of East Asia faced imminent collapse. During World War II, Imperial Japan extended its control throughout East Asia and the Western Pacific. In building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese conquered many nations that Western powers had formerly controlled, notably Indochina, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. After the United States defeated Japan, the future status of these nations became a major issue in world politics. Driven by the same impulse that had caused the United States to declare its

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<sup>2</sup> Statement of Dean Acheson, 12 Jan. 1950, box 47, fol. Acheson, Dean, roll 15, JFD Papers.

<sup>3</sup> Statement of Dean Acheson, 12 Jan. 1950, box 47, fol. Acheson, Dean, roll 15, JFD Papers; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford UP, 1987), 73-74.

independence from England in the eighteenth century, formerly dependent East Asians sought to control their own borders and destinies, but the western colonial powers had other plans. After the economic devastation of war, Europeans felt the need to reassert control of lost colonies and the profits attached to them.

Driven by a longstanding hatred of the word "colonialism" and the fear that the Soviet Union would gain ascendancy through anti-colonial propaganda, the United States placed pressure on its European friends and allies to relinquish control of their colonies, and the United States set the example by granting independence to the Philippines in 1946. Other people in the region expected similar treatment from America's allies, but Britain, France, and the Netherlands proved reluctant to let go of control. In turn, these nations' colonies demanded their independence.

Britain lost control first. The nonviolent protest movement led by Mahatma Gandhi in India proved mightier than the gun, and Britain gave freedom to its largest colony in 1947. After that, the British understood that their days as a globe spanning colonial empire had come to an end, and they quietly granted independence to Burma and Malaysia in 1948. The British held on to colonial control



as long as possible, but ultimately they bowed out of the game with dignity rather than engage in decades of warfare to maintain control. Despite this example from Britain, France and the Netherlands continued to struggle to retain dominance.

The Dutch met the cry for independence in Indonesia with military action, but guerrilla fighting in Indonesia quickly proved to be a higher price than the Dutch could pay. Additionally, the United States placed heavy pressure on the Dutch to forget their colonial pretensions. Faced with a bleak situation, the Dutch granted independence to Indonesia in 1949, which left France as the only significant colonial power remaining in Asia. Unfortunately, violence continued to plague Indonesia as various national groups struggled for political dominance following the Dutch withdrawal.

In Indochina, the French faced problems similar to those of the Dutch in Indonesia. Desperate to somehow retain its status as a world power, France proved utterly unwilling to grant independence to its Indochina colonies. Initially, the United States implored France to relinquish control, but the French refused and desperately clung to power. The situation grew steadily worse, and by the early 1950s, Vietnamese forces clashed with French troops in

full-scale military action. Naturally, revolutionaries turned to the enemies of France for help, and as the Indochina War dragged on, it became apparent that if France lost control of the colony then Indochina, especially Vietnam, would enter into the communist orbit. Faced with that prospect, American leaders slowly came to support the French military. Though eager to end colonialism, American leaders found it preferable to the growth of international communism, and the blending of nationalist desires with communist ideology turned Vietnam into a diplomatic nightmare for France and the United States.<sup>4</sup>

During the chaotic period of the early Cold War and the decline of European empires, the United States attempted to draft a peace treaty with Japan. Indeed, John Foster Dulles, the Special Consultant to the State Department in charge of the peace negotiations visited South Korea only days before the outbreak of hostilities, and talk of the war in Korea occupied his first days in Japan. For good or ill, the timing of these events caused Dulles to link Japan and the peace treaty to the greater concept of Asian security. Of course, regional plans for

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<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed examination of the collapse of European colonialism in Asia, see Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

an Asian security system did not begin with John Foster Dulles, but largely due to the timing of his involvement in these matters, he rapidly became the chief proponent for an Asian collective defense treaty.

The first proposals for a collective defense arrangement for Asia or the Western Pacific region predated Cold World chaos, but the initial attempts to create a security system determined much of the direction that Dulles would take while working on collective defense planning and the Japanese peace treaty. The original push for collective security in the Pacific did not even come from the United States. Instead, Australia and New Zealand began the dialogue in the midst of World War II. During the war, it became obvious to Australia and New Zealand that the British Empire scarcely had the resources to defend its Pacific colonies and Commonwealth members. Instead, these two isolated nations had to turn to the United States for assistance in fighting the Japanese. This fact caused their leaders to begin thinking seriously about their position in the world.<sup>5</sup>

Australia and New Zealand held an ill-defined standing in the world power structure at this time. Both had

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<sup>5</sup> Sir Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan* (New York: New York University Press, 1969), 9, 130.

declared independence from the United Kingdom in the early 1900s and helped form the British Commonwealth in 1931. Thus, they no longer ranked as colonial possessions, but neither state had developed into anything resembling an industrial power. Each still relied upon England for defense, and their economies depended upon ties to the Commonwealth. During World War II, Britain reasonably focused on Europe, and Australia and New Zealand became acutely aware of just how far they stood from the center of British defense concerns. As a result, the two sought to increase control of their own defense and economic planning.

Australia and New Zealand took their first steps toward greater military autonomy in January 1944 when they entered into the Australia-New Zealand Agreement (ANZAC). The ANZAC pact represents the earliest form of a modern collective defense arrangement in the Pacific region. A relatively simple treaty in its conception, it stated that Australia and New Zealand had like-minded interests in the areas of defense and economic development and contained pledges of mutual cooperation. The treaty also had something of the tone of America's Monroe Doctrine. It stressed that Australia and New Zealand had a profound interest in the Pacific region and stated that changes in

the sovereignty of any Pacific island nation required their consent.<sup>6</sup>

The treaty demonstrated that Australia and New Zealand would no longer willingly rely almost entirely upon the United Kingdom for their defense, and it established their desire for inclusion in regional defense and economic planning. ANZAC seems inoffensive, but neither the United States nor the United Kingdom favored the treaty. The Americans believed the Australians wanted to restrain the United States from Pacific expansion, and the British took offense because the treaty excluded them. The Australians and New Zealanders did not intend to cause outrage, but they did want some degree of control over their own backyard. By providing a basis for joint action between Australia and New Zealand in foreign affairs, ANZAC served as the statement to that effect.<sup>7</sup>

In the late 1940s, the ANZAC powers sought to improve their international status and their economies and came to view a better relationship with the United States as the key to achieving both goals. For that reason, they desired a military alliance with the United States. The Australians especially hoped for a treaty with the United

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<sup>6</sup> Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics, 1941-1959* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 45-47.

<sup>7</sup> Colbert, *Southeast Asia*, 45-47.

States, and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served as an additional incentive.<sup>8</sup>

Australia had legitimate concerns about the creation of NATO. Since it was not an Atlantic nation, Australia was not invited to participate, and the NATO powers reasoned that England would represent Australia and the other Commonwealth nations in the NATO council. At once offended and concerned, Australia did not like being treated as a second tier nation, but it also feared that England's NATO commitments would thrust Australia into an unwanted war. Unlike many other nations, Australia had no concerns about the possibility of an unjust war with the Soviet Union. Australian leaders instead feared that a war would find their defense forces untrained and unprepared without adequate consultation with the American military. With the clear military superiority of the United States, close ties to the United Kingdom no longer seemed sufficient, and even before completion of the NATO treaty, Australia began pushing hard for a defensive alliance with the United States.<sup>9</sup>

American leaders did not fully understand the nature of Australian concerns. Instead, they believed that the

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<sup>8</sup> Spender, *Exercises* 98-99.

<sup>9</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 151.

Australians exhibited signs of what many called "Me Tooism."<sup>10</sup> In other words, they thought that Australia wanted to jump on the NATO bandwagon, and they discounted Australia's reasons for wanting an alliance. Some State Department officials believed Australia's desire for an alliance with the United States "boiled down to a desire by Australia that the United States should underwrite its security," yet the Australians wanted something more.<sup>11</sup> They wanted a seat at the table and acceptance into the power structure of the Western world. American leaders failed to see the difference, and even if they had, it is unlikely they would have acquiesced for Australia. Instead, they casually dismissed what they saw as a "pipe dream of Australian politicians."<sup>12</sup>

With the creation of NATO, other nations also began asking the United States to participate in a Pacific Pact. The Philippines, South Korea, and the Republic of China stood at the front of this movement, and the United States viewed them much like Australia, as part of the "Me Too" School. In this instance, the Americans held sound suspicions. The Koreans and Nationalist Chinese wanted

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<sup>10</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1123.

<sup>11</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1134.

<sup>12</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1134.

nothing more than an American commitment to help fight their communist enemies, and the Philippines wanted the United States to shoulder the burden for Filipino defense.<sup>13</sup>

President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines took the lead in pushing for the creation of an Asian counterpart to NATO, and he instructed the Philippine Ambassador Joaquin Elizade to meet US State Department officials in March 1949 to discuss the possibility of a Pacific Pact. The United States gave the query a cool reception and refused to make any sort of commitment. Elizade took the hint and told State Department officials that the matter should not be taken seriously. He informed his superiors of the unfavorable reaction in Washington, but Quirino did not let the matter drop. Instead, he took it upon himself to convince Asian leaders to form a pact.<sup>14</sup>

While the State Department remained cool to the idea, it investigated the possibility of an Asian security organization in the spring of 1949 due to the continued pressure from the Philippines and Australia. In principal, State Department officials favored the concept of an Asian security organization, but they wanted to avoid charges of imperialism in the region. American planners feared that

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<sup>13</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1160-65.

<sup>14</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1126.



the communists would label an alliance between the United States and Asian nations as aggressive imperialism, and they wanted to deny the Soviets the chance to use a defensive alliance as propaganda throughout the Pacific region. As a result, the State Department remained aloof and took the official stance that Asian nations should take the lead in creating a Pacific security organization without American involvement. If Quirino's attempts proved successful, then the United States would happily support him, but the United States would take no part in the creation process.<sup>15</sup>

Quirino loudly promoted the organization among his neighbors but found little support. Australia had no desire to join an alliance without the United States, and India flatly refused military participation. India's Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru adequately summed up the problems with Quirino's vision by pointing out that disparate Asian nations lacked the common ground necessary for an alliance. They had too many internal disputes, divergent economies, and no basis for seeing eye to eye on many issues. The problem over the Chinese Civil War alone convinced Nehru of the poor timing for creation of a Pacific Pact. An alliance with either Mao or Jiang would plunge the

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<sup>15</sup> *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1128-33.

prospective member nations into the icy waters of the Cold War, and the exclusion of China would so dilute the economic power of the organization that it could not provide significant benefits to its members.<sup>16</sup>

American leaders agreed with Nehru, and consequently on 18 May 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the United States would not consider the creation of any more collective defense treaties. In his statement, he reasoned that "Nehru's view appears to be an objective appraisal of the actual, practical possibilities at the present time," and he withheld American support for an Asian pact until the resolution of the region's internal conflicts.<sup>17</sup>

Undeterred, Quirino continued to push for a Pacific alliance and found support from Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Jiang Jieshi in China. Rhee supported the idea first and condemned Acheson a few days after the 18 May press conference. Rhee claimed that Asia could take action without the United States and proposed a pact that would include the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Thailand, Canada, and Latin America. Rhee's pronouncement proved to be

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<sup>16</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1142.

<sup>17</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1142-43.

nothing but bluster. Neither he nor Quirino had the power to influence all of these areas to join in a common cause. Still, Rhee and Quirino continued to push for a Pacific security organization, and in July 1949, Quirino began a series of talks with Jiang Jieshi. Eager for allies since losing the Chinese Civil War, Jiang readily lent his support and joined the clamor for a Pacific security organization.<sup>18</sup>

By yoking himself to Rhee and Jiang, Quirino virtually ensured that nothing would come of his push for a Pacific security organization. American leaders saw the writing on the wall once Jiang began actively supporting a Pacific pact. They easily recognized what Quirino did not: any involvement in the Chinese Civil War doomed an alliance to failure because "Jiang's inclusion saddles the embryonic union with a military problem it cannot hope to solve, and will probably repel other countries essential to an effective association."<sup>19</sup>

Quirino continued his efforts on behalf of a Pacific security organization, but with the Philippines, South Korea, and Jiang's China forming the nucleus of the proposed organization, other countries lacked interest.

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<sup>18</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1144-46.

<sup>19</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1162.

India even refused to consider discussing the idea with the Filipino Ambassador. Australia and New Zealand ignored the whole affair, and watching from Europe, the United Kingdom reasoned that the inclusion of China would "reduce the whole thing to absurdity."<sup>20</sup> Even Rhee questioned the inclusion of Jiang, and he never seriously pursued a formal agreement with the Nationalist Chinese.<sup>21</sup>

By the end of the summer, the push for a Pacific Pact died. It never moved beyond the exploratory stage, and Mao's announcement of the creation of the People's Republic in October 1949 ensured that the talks would go no further. Quirino continued to give lip service to the idea, but without American support, no one seemed interested in pressing forward. Quirino's plans for an Asian security organization had not progressed any farther by 6 April 1950, when President Harry S Truman appointed John Foster Dulles the Special Consultant to the Secretary of State in charge of helping create a Japanese peace treaty. As a prominent Republican, Dulles was neither Truman nor Acheson's first choice for this position, but political realities forced Truman to choose a Republican. Truman needed to show some support for bipartisanship if he wanted

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<sup>20</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1177.

<sup>21</sup> *FRUS 1949*, vol. 7, pt. 2, 1173-74.

to ensure passage of the Japanese Peace Treaty when it came to the Senate floor, and Arthur Vandenburg flatly demanded Dulles' inclusion in the peace talks. Since Vandenburg led the internationalist Republicans in the Senate, Acheson deemed his support as essential, and Truman grudgingly appointed Dulles.

Truman objected to Dulles for personal reasons rather than his opinions about the Japanese peace treaty. Dulles avidly supported internationalism. Indeed, Dulles received a replacement appointment to the US Senate and served briefly in 1949 during the deliberations over NATO. At that time, Dulles spoke vigorously in favor of NATO and supported the Truman administration's effort to get the treaty passed. Dulles had also enthusiastically backed the creation of the United Nations (UN) and had even helped draft the portions of the UN treaty that dealt with collective security concepts. On those issues, Dulles fervently defended the Democrats' foreign policy efforts, but Dulles had also been Thomas Dewey's right hand man for foreign affairs during the 1948 election. Dulles and Dewey refrained from attacking Truman's foreign policies too severely because they did not wish to upset the NATO negotiations, but he had blasted the domestic policies of the Fair Deal with gusto. The extraordinarily close race

caused many observers, notably the *Chicago Daily Tribune*, to expect an easy victory for Dewey.<sup>22</sup>

Truman held a grudge against Dulles for trying to push him out of office, and to compound the insult, Dulles had ostentatiously expected to become the next Secretary of State under Dewey. He even had several meetings with Truman's first Secretary of State George Marshall in which Marshall discussed plans to hand the office over to Dulles. Since the election, Dulles compounded Truman's dislike by becoming increasingly vocal in his complaints about Truman's lack of progress in Asian affairs and the Japanese treaty in particular. Indeed, a few days after Acheson's defensive perimeter statement, Dulles claimed that "No Republican leader knows, and the American people have no knowledge whatsoever, as to what is contemplated with regard to a peace treaty with Japan or what our policy program is in the Far East."<sup>23</sup> Dulles lent his support to Truman in regard to NATO, but after the China collapse, America's Asian policy became another matter entirely.

Dulles' smug performance thoroughly irritated Truman, but he needed the internationalist Republican vote and

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<sup>22</sup> Hoopes, *Devil*, 85-88.

<sup>23</sup> "US and Russia Could Agree but for Communist Party's Crusade: An Interview with John Foster Dulles," *US News and World Report*, 21 Jan. 1949.

acquiesced to Vandenberg's demand. Truman demonstrated his dislike of Dulles by only appointing him as a special consultant rather than naming him ambassador at large, the title typically reserved for someone carrying out a task as important as the one entrusted to Dulles. The diminished title also meant that Dulles did not have the authority to negotiate on his own without specific instructions from the State Department, and the lack of power irked Dulles throughout the negotiations.<sup>24</sup>

The Truman administration primarily sought to use the peace treaty as a means of ensuring an anti-communist orientation in Japan, which would deny Japanese trade to the Soviet Union. To ensure success, American leaders believed that the peace treaty could not be punitive and had to allow Japan the ability to reestablish its industrial base. American planners also believed that Japan needed to rearm after the establishment of a peace treaty so that its military strength could help offset communist power in the region. To further these goals, Dean Rusk pushed the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss the possibility of establishing a collective security treaty that would provide for the defense of Japan

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<sup>24</sup> Memo of Conversation with Truman, 28 Apr. 1950, box 48, fol. Japan, roll 16, JFD Papers; Hoopes, *Devil*, 88.

in the case of a communist attack, and in late February 1950, the NSC agreed to investigate the possibility of such an organization. The council's plan limited membership for this treaty to the United States, Canada, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. Such a group would keep the United States from significantly expanding its defense responsibilities, but the NSC believed it could strengthen the ability of Japan to resist Soviet pressure. Further, such an association would allow the United States to maintain a regional presence after the conclusion of the peace treaty.<sup>25</sup>

While this proposed security arrangement seemed similar to the ones suggested by Pacific nations in 1949, it had a different planned membership and purpose. With the exception of the Philippines and Japan, no Asian members would receive invitations to join. American planners chose to exclude Asian nations so neutralist nations like India and Burma could sign the Japanese peace treaty without admitting to collusion with either of the superpowers. They also did not want to include European powers like Britain in order to avoid the anticipated Soviet accusations that they sought to extend colonialism in Asia. The NSC believed that a bilateral treaty with

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<sup>25</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 1139-49.



Japan would serve these purposes, but they predicted Asian fears about the rearmament of Japan and thought a multilateral treaty would ease those concerns.<sup>26</sup>

When Truman and Acheson brought in Dulles to help with the treaty negotiations, American planning still envisioned a non-punitive treaty that allowed Japan to rearm. If a collective security organization could help in the achievement of those objectives, then the United States should pursue the creation of a Pacific Pact. Even so, actively pursuing the creation of a security accord was not a priority. On 7 April 1950, the day after his appointment, Dulles met with State Department officials, and W. Walton Butterworth outlined these objectives to the Consultant. Dulles supported a non-punitive treaty, but he "expressed grave doubts about a Pacific Pact."<sup>27</sup>

Dulles believed that excluding Asian nations would cause resentment throughout the region, and he thought that the proposed membership plan would damage American prestige by showing disdain for Asians. He also doubted its military necessity since any armed force required to defend the treaty members would come from the United States. Other State Department officials shared concerns similar to

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<sup>26</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 1139-49.

<sup>27</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 1162.

Dulles' reservations, and when Dulles met with Truman on 28 April to receive his official orders, he was only instructed to investigate the many plans for a regional defense organization if it seemed necessary in order to ensure the acceptance of a Japanese peace treaty. Dulles' instructions made his first priority the establishment of a peace treaty, and the development of a bi-partisan position on US-Asian relations constituted his second mission. Development of a regional security plan had less importance and ranked only fifth on Dulles' list of appointed tasks. However, its importance to Dulles soon changed, and he became the most prominent voice pushing for an Asian security organization.<sup>28</sup>

After accepting his appointment from Truman, Dulles studied the situation in Japan and the Pacific. In the course of his investigation, he corresponded with General Douglas MacArthur, then serving as the Supreme Commander for Allied Forces in the Pacific. Dulles quickly came to respect MacArthur, and the general's advice tended to mesh well with Dulles' own political views. At that time, the general refused to make any public political statements,

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<sup>28</sup> Undated note listing Dulles' departmental duties, box 47, fol. Appointment of Dulles, roll 15; Memo of Conversation with Truman, 28 Apr. 1950, box 48, fol. Japan, roll 16, JFD Papers; *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 82.

but he believed the Truman administration had a misguided Asian policy and suggested that someone with a political rather than a military background should come to Japan to replace him and "unify and direct all our policy in the Orient."<sup>29</sup> Dulles most likely considered himself for the role.

MacArthur advised giving Japan full autonomy after a peace treaty. He reasoned that forcing Japan into a collective security arrangement should not be part of the Japanese treaty discussions because he believed such an arrangement would look like a dictated peace, but he thought that continuing to handle Japanese security with an occupying force would be even worse. Self-rule should include the ability for Japan to recreate its military, and then Japan should be given the option of joining in discussions on a security treaty as an equal partner. Despite having fought the Japanese during World War II, MacArthur had no problem with rearming Japan. Indeed, he stated that he "would help the devil, if he would come to this earth and offer to help fight the communists."<sup>30</sup> It was a sentiment that other American leaders shared, but

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<sup>29</sup> William R Matthews to Dulles, 5 June 1950, box 49, fol. Douglas MacArthur, roll 16, JFD Papers.

<sup>30</sup> William R Matthews to Dulles, 5 June 1950, box 49, fol. Douglas MacArthur, roll 16, JFD Papers.

MacArthur still recognized that rearming Japan would be met with "convulsions" throughout the Pacific region.<sup>31</sup> As such, he did not believe that rearming Japan was possible, even if desirable, and the outspoken general was at something of a loss for how to negotiate a treaty that reintroduced Japan to the family of nations while keeping its former conquests satisfied.

The task of creating a workable peace treaty and answering MacArthur's questions fell to Dulles. Initially, his views reflected those of the general. Dulles simply did not believe that a collective security arrangement in the Pacific could work, but the events of June 1950 changed his mind. On the way to Japan, Dulles stopped in South Korea to receive an honorary doctoral degree from Seoul National University on 20 June 1950. At the event, Dulles spoke to reporters and quite clearly pointed out his opposition to a Pacific security treaty:

I don't think a Pacific Pact is necessary to secure world peace, no. As I said in a speech before the National Assembly, the strongest compulsion to defense springs from a feeling of common destiny. The United States for 125 years successfully prevented invasion of the American hemisphere without any pact. When relationships are put in writing there are many complications. Sometimes after nations are intimate for many generations a mutual pact may be useful to

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<sup>31</sup> MacArthur to Dulles, 14 June 1950, box 49, fol. Douglas MacArthur, roll 16, JFD Papers.

reflect that association. Examples are the Rio Pact and the North Atlantic Pact but if there is not a long association among nations, it is better that they not place their relationships on a legalistic basis.<sup>32</sup>

Dulles did not believe such intimacy existed between the nations of Asia, and he left South Korea on 21 June. North Korea invaded the South four days later.

When the war broke out, Soviet propaganda charged the "warmonger" Dulles with responsibility for the conflict, but the attack took Dulles completely by surprise.<sup>33</sup> While arguing that collective security was not necessary in Asia, Dulles had even stated, "Korea demonstrates that it is at least possible to contain the tide of Communism in the East."<sup>34</sup> When North Korea invaded the South and rendered his argument invalid, Dulles stood dumbfounded. He immediately cast about for a reason why the North Koreans had been so bold, and he sought a solution to keep the rest of the free world safe from a future attack.

Pondering the problem, Dulles drew the conclusion that American policies lacked any sort of "dynamism." Well before the invasion, Dulles had expressed his views about

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<sup>32</sup> USIS Seoul to Everett Drumright, 22 June 1950, box 48, fol. Korea, roll 16, JFD Papers.

<sup>33</sup> "Dulles' Book Blueprint for Warmongers," USSR Home Service Translation of *Pravda* article, 7 Dec. 1950, box 47, fol. Book, roll 15, JFD Papers.

<sup>34</sup> Seoul 658 to Department, 23 June 23 1950, box 48, fol. Korea, roll 16, JFD Papers.

the necessity of an active foreign policy in *War or Peace*, published in early 1950. His book made the case that the Truman administration had done nothing but react to events while the communists set the pace for the Cold War. Mao had taken control of China. The Soviets had tested an atomic weapon. Even the heroic Berlin airlift had been nothing more than a reaction to Soviet malfeasance. Korea seemed part of the same pattern. The communists had acted first once again.<sup>35</sup>

To compound the problems of American inaction, Dulles, like many others, frequently charged that the Soviets vigorously sought to expand their influence throughout the world. Dulles studied Joseph Stalin's *The Foundations of Leninism* religiously since he believed it served as the "bible that is taught to Communists."<sup>36</sup> As a result of his studies, he claimed to "know why the Russian bear ticks the way he does."<sup>37</sup> In short, Dulles viewed the Soviet people as blameless, but nothing would stop the criminal Soviet leadership's desire to expand their worldwide power. To counteract their activity and organization, Dulles argued that the United States must adopt a more energetic, more

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<sup>35</sup> John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, 2nd ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1957), ix, 145-148, 165.

<sup>36</sup> John Foster Dulles, "What I've Learned about the Russians," *Colliers*, 12 Mar. 1949, 25.

<sup>37</sup> Dulles, "What I've Learned," 57.

active foreign policy. It had to force the communists to react. In his book, Dulles prescribed the establishment of regional security organizations to restore vitality to American foreign policy. When he wrote *War or Peace*, Dulles' argument served as little more than a defense of NATO. Indeed, he stated in *War or Peace* that "it would seem wiser for the United States to avoid any initiative" in creating an Asian collective security arrangement.<sup>38</sup> In the wake of Korea, he reconsidered.

In addition to its lack of initiative, Dulles also believed that the Truman administration had made two serious blunders that increased the threat of communist expansion throughout Asia. First, Acheson made his misguided 12 January defensive perimeter statement. Dulles did not stand alone in his conviction that Acheson's careless statement that the United States would protect any territory behind a declared line had led the communists to believe that they could invade territory on the other side with impunity. The United States could not afford such mistakes. Second, the industrialized western nations treated most Asian states as little more than children. The great powers issued directives and proclamations to Asian countries and expected them to toe the line. Dulles

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<sup>38</sup> Dulles, *War*, 206.

found the situation troubling, and speaking specifically about Nationalist China, he complained to Arthur Vandenburg, "We ought to have some respect for the six or seven million people in Formosa who... have been dealt with from the standpoint of the strategy and prestige of the great powers without regard to their own welfare or desires."<sup>39</sup> Dulles held that when compounded with the memory of colonialism, the failure to treat third world nations as sovereign equals severely damaged American credibility. With the Soviets continually spewing propaganda about the evils of American imperialism, Dulles reasoned that the United States could not appear to be even remotely like a colonial power forcing its will on others.

Dulles had not believed in the utility of an Asian pact before the invasion of Korea, but afterward, his views changed. In the creation of defensive organizations, Dulles found his panacea for American inactivity. The creation of an Asian security organization seemed to meet all of his concerns. If the United States entered into a pact with a significant Asian membership, then it could meet Pacific nations on an equal footing in consultation and planning meetings and disprove charges of colonialism.

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<sup>39</sup> Dulles to Vandenberg, 6 Jan. 1950, box 48, fol. Formosa, roll 16, JFD Papers.



Further, the alliance of nations would send a message to the Soviets that the United States would oppose expansion of the Communist system to any part of the globe. Finally, and most importantly, by organizing a pact, the United States could take a proactive, dynamic step to counter communism in Asia and could then set the conditions that would force the communists to react to the free world.

Dulles sold himself on his own vision, and while he had opposed a Pacific Pact when meeting with Truman in April, he soon became the leading advocate for an Asian security arrangement. In fact, over the course of the Japanese peace treaty negotiations, State Department officials began referring to a possible Asian collective security arrangement as the "Dulles Plan."<sup>40</sup>

Establishing a significant Asian security organization became one of Dulles' chief occupations for the next decade. While working on the Japanese peace treaty, he helped create a trilateral security pact with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States known as ANZUS. Bilateral treaties between the United States and the Philippines and Japan supplemented then the ANZUS treaty, and after he became the Secretary of State, Dulles pushed for the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

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<sup>40</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 150.

to enlarge the previous arrangements. Even after the foundation of SEATO, Dulles continued to support the creation of a larger Asian collective defense treaty that would cover a greater area. However, Dulles never managed to expand SEATO beyond its initial membership largely because he made the same sorts of mistakes that he blamed Acheson and Truman for making.

Dulles failed to develop fully the dynamic Asian policy that he espoused. Instead, he reacted to communist maneuvers in Asia, and worse, he failed to reach out to Asian nations as equals. To compound the problems, he never seemed to realize that he failed to follow his own prescription.

## CHAPTER II

### THE DEPENDABLES

John Foster Dulles promoted a collective security plan for Asia and the West Pacific as a way to restore initiative to American foreign policy. Believing the Truman administration only reacted to communist actions, Dulles saw the organization of a regional pact as the first step of a new dynamic policy intended to bring the friendly nations of Asia into common cause with the United States. Unfortunately, Dulles seemed blind to the reactionary nature of his plan for a defensive association. Only days before North Korea invaded the South, Dulles and many others believed that Asian nations had too many differences, such as the border trouble between Pakistan and India, to come together and create a defensive alliance. Those difficulties remained after the outbreak of the Korean War, but Dulles did exactly what he accused the Truman administration of doing. He reacted to events and overlooked the inherent problems that would trouble the creation of an Asian alliance.

Additionally, Dulles thought the Truman administration failed to treat Asian nations as sovereign equals, thereby damaging US-Asian relations. Despite this view, in the matter of collective security, Dulles assumed that "resistance [to communism] cannot be organized except around the United States."<sup>1</sup> Acceptance of this tenet kept Dulles from ever extending full partnership to the nations of Asia. If they completely accepted American leadership, then Dulles treated them as equals. Otherwise, he bullied them into submission, and Asian leaders grumbled about the lack of American respect. Dulles may have been correct in his theories about dynamism and the sovereignty of nations, but he failed to heed his own recommendations. Due to these contradictions, his attempts to create a regional security organization in Asia continually met with failure.

After the onset of the Korean War, Dean Acheson ordered Dulles to postpone work on a Japanese peace treaty until warfare in Korea ended. The delay gave Dulles ample time to pontificate about Japan's future, and by autumn 1950, he had turned US-Japanese relations into a microcosm representing the entirety of the American struggle against communism in Asia. Dulles' belief in what he called

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<sup>1</sup> Dulles to Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 Feb. 1949, box 43, fol. Nehru, roll 13, JFD Papers.

"dynamism" made him think that allowing the communists to take over nations without opposition represented ultimate failure for the United States. Therefore, nothing worse could happen to Japan than the creation of a power vacuum in the Japanese government. In the absence of strength, communism would creep in and subvert the Japanese people. If the communists destabilized Japan, Dulles believed they could easily spread into other areas. Considering the problem, he reasoned, "The Japanese peace treaty is not an isolated problem. It must be considered within the framework of a larger problem, namely, the prevention of the overpowering of the free world by the Soviet World."<sup>2</sup>

Dulles also thought the Communists had attacked South Korea in an effort to make the Japanese question American power in Asia. The United States therefore had an obligation to meet any armed attacks in Asia with force in order to keep Japan aligned with the free world. This led him to the conclusion that the United States had to ensure Japanese security, preferably with a "dependable system of collective security for the Far East."<sup>3</sup> If Japan firmly

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<sup>2</sup> Council on Foreign Relation Study Group Reports, 23 Oct. 1950, box 48, fol. Japan, roll 16; Dulles to Acheson, 30 Nov. 1950, box 47, fol. Dean Acheson, roll 15; Transcript of Remarks by Dulles in Canberra, 15 Feb. 1951, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty- Related Material: Speeches and Statements, roll 18, JFD Papers.

<sup>3</sup> Council on Foreign Relation Study Group Reports, 23 Oct. 1950, box 48, fol. Japan, roll 16, JFD papers.

aligned with the United States, then the Japanese could provide an anchor for an Asian collective security system, but prior to that eventuality, he had to accomplish several other tasks. Concluding the peace treaty would only mark the beginning. Rearmament would allow Japan to share a role in military defense, and the Japanese economy needed to be rebuilt so that it could contribute to a regional prosperity that would keep Asians from embracing the Red Menace.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles' entire vision of Asian collective security hinged on Japan, but Dulles also foresaw the need for reliable friends in the Pacific. To obtain them, he urged that Acheson turn to Australia and New Zealand, "the only two dependable countries in the Pacific area."<sup>5</sup> Dulles saw firm anticommunist allies in the Australians, and he suggested that an early agreement with them could initiate a genuine working collective security system for the rest of the region. Several members of the Truman administration, notably Dean Rusk, concurred with Dulles' assessment, and the State Department's tone became more

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<sup>4</sup> Council on Foreign Relation Study Group Reports, 23 Oct. 1950, box 48, fol. Japan, roll 16, JFD papers.

<sup>5</sup> Dulles to Acheson, 30 Nov. 1950, box 47, fol. Acheson, roll 15, JFD papers.

accepting about the possibility of some sort of security accord.<sup>6</sup>

With American leaders seemingly more open to the possibility of a Pacific Pact, Percy Spender, the Australian Foreign Minister, visited the United States in September and October 1950 to discuss Australia's view of the Japanese treaty and a collective defense plan. During his discussions, Spender again pushed the United States to consider an alliance with Australia, New Zealand, and other amenable Pacific powers. Spender's plea eventually resulted in the creation of the Treaty of Mutual Security between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS). Historians have often asserted that the United States created ANZUS in order to convince the Australians and New Zealanders to accept a generous peace with Japan. This argument holds that Australia and New Zealand needed a guarantee of American protection from a possible future attack by a remilitarized Japan, but Spender's private statements with State Department officials suggest an entirely different reason.<sup>7</sup>

Spender pressed for the creation of an Australia, New Zealand, United States alliance vigorously when he met with

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<sup>6</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 122, 147-48.

<sup>7</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 150-51.

American officials. The Australian Foreign Minister argued that a pact had nothing to do with Japan. The Australian government feared that a revitalized Japanese industry would smother Australia's economic efforts, but they had little fear of Japanese rearmament. On this matter, Spender claimed the Australian government had faith in the United States. Australia had pushed for an alliance with the United States in 1949 due to fears of Soviet expansion, but the American response to Korea proved that the United States would not sit idly by when enemies attacked its friends. With Korea as evidence, Spender trusted that the United States would come to the aid of Australia if the Soviet Union or Japan attacked it, and he imagined that the United States would do so whether it had an alliance with Australia or not. Spender went on to point out that Australia fervently supported American policies in Asia and would continue to do so. It defended US efforts in Korea and committed its own troops to the cause. Furthermore, Australia would stand with America in the postwar world because Australia understood that its economic prosperity and security required American friendship.<sup>8</sup>

Despite this insight, Spender maintained that when it came to American foreign policies, "friends don't get the

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<sup>8</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 150-51.



same consideration as weak sisters."<sup>9</sup> Complaining about the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, Spender wanted to know why the United States entered into an alliance with those nations but avoided collusion with Australia and New Zealand. Spender claimed that even Luxembourg had more say on world strategy than Australia, and Australian leaders found the situation unacceptable.<sup>10</sup>

The American response held that the United Kingdom represented the interests of Australia and New Zealand, but Spender argued that Australia had tried that system before and "got caught with its pants down" during World War II.<sup>11</sup> Australia participated in that war but lacked the necessary military intelligence and cooperation to safeguard its people. In the early Cold War years, Britain possessed even less information about the Pacific than before, and Australia wanted direct military council with the United States. Nothing else about a military alliance between Australia and the United States truly concerned Spender.

Spender and his Liberal Party government wanted some sort of high level military planning apparatus with the United States so that a future war would find Australia

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<sup>9</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 152.

<sup>10</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 215-16.

<sup>11</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 151.

prepared. The Liberals believed the United States would help with Australia's defense under any circumstances, so they had few worries about specific defense arrangements. Spender argued if war ever came to Australia again, then the United States would almost certainly involve itself, so prior military planning only made sense.<sup>12</sup>

As for the pact's membership, Spender did not care. As long as it included the United States and Australia, his government would view the arrangements as satisfactory. Spender suggested that New Zealand, Canada, Britain, and the Philippines would all make admirable choices, and he considered Chile or other Latin American nations. He even reasoned that Japan should join after reintegration into the family of nations.<sup>13</sup>

In the course of his conversation, Spender did make a few comments that one could misconstrue as support for the long held notion that Australia demanded an alliance in exchange for support of a lenient Japanese peace treaty. The Australian Foreign Minister explained that his Liberal Party government needed to demonstrate to the electorate that it was making progress with US relations. An easy peace with Japan lacked popularity with most Australians.

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<sup>12</sup> Spender, *Exercises*, 133.

<sup>13</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 151, 215-25; Spender, *Exercises*, 127.

The government would accept it, but without some sort of consolation, the United States might find the friendly Liberal Party government replaced by the left leaning Labour Party. The promise of a pact with the United States would make such a lenient treaty more palatable for the Australian electorate, but this type of political capital served as an added benefit and not Australia's prime motivation in its request for an alliance.<sup>14</sup>

Spender maintained the same types of arguments throughout the ANZUS negotiations, and Frederick Doidge, New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs, made similar assertions when he complained that it was "unfair that there was no reciprocal guarantee for New Zealand."<sup>15</sup> Like Spender, New Zealand's international status and influence concerned Doidge more than the threat of a rearmed Japan. Doidge did refuse to rearm Japan without an alliance with the United States, but despite an American desire that Japan do so, Japan never built up its military to levels anywhere near what it had during World War II. Both Australia and New Zealand wanted an alliance with the United States for the benefit of Cold War planning, and

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<sup>14</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 151-53.

<sup>15</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 1323.

neither nation had serious concerns about renewed Japanese aggression despite persistent claims to the contrary.<sup>16</sup>

During Spender's October visit to the United States, President Truman flew to Wake Island to meet General MacArthur and other military leaders. They met to discuss events in Korea but also discussed general military plans for Asia and the Pacific. In the course of their discussion, Truman asked MacArthur about the army's view of a Pacific Pact. MacArthur answered, "a Pacific Pact would be tremendous, but... it is not possible."<sup>17</sup> The general suggested that a unilateral pronouncement similar to the Truman Doctrine would suffice, and Admiral Arthur Radford concurred. Dulles admired MacArthur, but he scoffed at the notion that a unilateral declaration could solve the problem of Asian security. Still, the military did not feel that a Pacific Pact would be a wise pursuit until Asian nations could develop more common ground with the United States.<sup>18</sup>

In the weeks and months after the Wake Island Conference, the Department of Defense continued to resist the notion of a Pacific Pact, but the State Department

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<sup>16</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 6, 1323.

<sup>17</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 7, 956.

<sup>18</sup> *FRUS 1950*, vol. 7, 956-57.

began to favor it more outspokenly. Dulles pressured the Truman administration to work out some sort of security arrangement with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Since Dulles had the support of Vandenberg and the internationalist Republicans, his opinions carried more weight than Acheson would have liked. By January 1951, Dulles had tired of sitting on the sidelines, and on 4 January, he wrote Acheson a letter reasoning that it no longer seemed practical to wait until the conclusion of the Korean War to proceed with the Japanese peace treaty. He included a possible security treaty with his letter. Despite Dulles' appeal, the military still resisted the plan, and only two days before Dulles' note to Acheson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett informed Truman that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were "strongly of the opinion that current United States capabilities will not admit new arrangements or any extension of present arrangements in the Pacific area."<sup>19</sup>

Clearly, Defense opposed a collective security treaty in Asia, but with the added pressure from Australia and New Zealand, Acheson recommended Dulles' plan to Truman who accepted it. On 9 January 1951, Dulles received new orders telling him the United States was willing to make mutual

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<sup>19</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 262-63.

security arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, and possibly Indonesia - all of the nations included in his proposal. The instructions also reiterated that Dulles lacked the authority to make any final commitments on behalf of the Truman administration. Acheson refused to give Dulles any more power than he needed too.<sup>20</sup>

Dulles only required the dim green light, and he raced forward to carry out his plan. Dulles believed that to avoid a debate like the one over NATO, Congress needed to come on board as soon as possible, and for his first order of business, he met with the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees on 11 and 12 January. Dulles told the committee members that the communists had made stunning advancements in Asia. Already China, Manchuria, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles had entered the Communist orbit. South Korea could possibly fall next. Building on these already established McCarthy era fears, he added that the situation put Japan in a vulnerable position, and saving Japan required the solution of two problems: Japan's security and economic stability. Improving Japan's economy would be the subject of future

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<sup>20</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 132-36, 781-88; Truman to Dulles, 10 Jan. 1951, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty Correspondence, roll 18, JFD papers.

discussions, but Dulles presented his draft of a Pacific Pact as the method of ensuring Japanese security.<sup>21</sup>

The most important part of Dulles' early arguments in support of the draft eventually became known as the ANZUS language. This so-called ANZUS language stated that in the event of an external attack on one member, the other pact members would respond with appropriate constitutional "action to meet the common danger."<sup>22</sup> This simple phrase embodied Dulles' effort to avoid the problems that plagued the NATO treaty when it went to the Senate for debate. The NATO treaty reads, "An attack on one is an attack on all."<sup>23</sup> Isolationists in the Senate objected to the NATO phrasing because a strict interpretation would require the United States to declare war on the Soviets if they attacked any NATO member, such as Denmark. Antagonists of the treaty felt that the NATO language ran roughshod over the constitutional requirement that only Congress could declare war. Dulles wanted his treaty to avoid these problems, and "action to meet the common danger" provided enough leeway that war on an ally did not automatically require a war

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<sup>21</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 139, 790.

<sup>22</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, 666-69.

<sup>23</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, 666-69.

declaration. War might seem the obvious choice, but the loose wording would still allow Congress to decide.<sup>24</sup>

As Dulles met with legislative leaders, the State Department floated the treaty draft by the British who instantly complained about their exclusion. They feared the United States would supplant their position in Australia and New Zealand, and the lack of defense for Hong Kong and Malaysia worried them. Defending his position, Dulles argued that the treaty protected Japan and the offshore island chain from the Aleutians to Australia and New Zealand. Since the British had no territory in that chain, they did not need to participate. Regardless of the reason, exclusion chafed British sensibilities, and they refused to support a treaty that left them in the cold.<sup>25</sup>

The State Department contemplated allowing Britain to join, but both Dulles and Acheson worried that including Britain might cause France and the Netherlands to desire membership. Due to their regional colonial possessions, the Americans had grave reservations about allowing them membership. Despite Percy Spender's comments that the

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<sup>24</sup> "Treaty Making and National Unity," 11 Apr. 1952, box 58, fol. Bricker Amendment, roll 21; "Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 82nd Congress Second Session on Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to the Security in the Pacific" 21, 22, 23, & 25 Jan. 1952, box 61, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty Speeches, roll 22, JFD papers.

<sup>25</sup> *FRUS* 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, 144.



American fear of the "white man's club" constituted "so much damned nonsense," the potential for anti-imperial Soviet propaganda against such an arrangement caused alarm.<sup>26</sup> Further, a pact that did not extend protection to nations on the mainland seemed worthless to the British. They did not want to join an offshore pact, but they felt offended by the suggestion that the United States would ally with Australia and New Zealand without them.<sup>27</sup>

With some apprehension about the lack of British approval, Dulles resolved to meet with the prospective member nations. More correctly, he chose to talk to representatives of Australia and New Zealand. Despite Japan's importance to his plans and his instructions, on 5 February 1951, he instructed his staff to avoid informing Japanese leaders about the security treaty. Further, Dulles apparently did not seem to have even considered discussing the matter with officials from the Philippines or Indonesia. Dulles presumed Japan and the Philippines would join an organization on whatever terms the United States offered, and he wanted to work out the details with the "dependable" nations first.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 158.

<sup>27</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 150.

<sup>28</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 858.

Not overly worried about the prospective Asian members, Dulles met with Percy Spender and Frederick Doidge on 16 and 17 February. Dulles outlined his plans and the American desire for a forgiving peace with Japan stating that they must "drive with a light rein because the temptation for Japan to bolt and go over to the other side is great."<sup>29</sup> The choice of words does not demonstrate that Dulles cared a great deal about Japanese sovereignty or equality of status with the United States. During the conversation, Dulles mentioned American concern about the lack of British approval. Spender casually dismissed Britain's objection. Australia ran its own affairs and not Britain. The British had no right to object to anything Australia chose to do. The British response troubled Doidge more than Spender but not enough to change New Zealand's desire for an arrangement with the United States. Somewhat reassured, Dulles pressed the pair about their views on collective security.

Spender responded to Dulles' inquiry with the same sorts of comments that he had made the previous autumn. His government did not fear Japanese aggression, but without a US-Australian security arrangement, the Liberal Party would face "political oblivion" if they consented to

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<sup>29</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 161.

a generous peace with Japan.<sup>30</sup> Australia would throw in with the United States no matter what, and it just wanted the favor returned. Doidge, though a bit more concerned about Japan, made similar comments. Indeed, Spender and Doidge had met with each other to outline a common argument because, as Spender wrote in his memoirs, "to hold a common front before Dulles was essential."<sup>31</sup>

Dulles' instructions authorized him to negotiate one security pact in Asia, but as he spoke with Spender and Doidge, he came to understand that popular sentiment in Australia and New Zealand would prohibit those nations from aligning themselves with Japan until their relationship improved. Therefore, Dulles began to speak of a trilateral treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The United States could then make bilateral treaties with other nations in the region.<sup>32</sup>

Spender recognized that Dulles was a shrewd negotiator who never "put all his cards on the table," and he always had trouble reading the American.<sup>33</sup> As a result, the Australian thought Dulles wanted a trilateral pact, but Dulles actually had instructions to the contrary. The

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<sup>30</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 158.

<sup>31</sup> Spender, *Exercises*, 147.

<sup>32</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 164-65.

<sup>33</sup> Spender, *Exercises*, 85.

possibility of a trilateral treaty had already been discussed and rejected by the State Department, but when Doidge suggested that an initial trilateral treaty would provide time to "condition the minds of our people to the bigger concept," Dulles ran with the idea.<sup>34</sup> The notion that he could begin with a small pact and expand it when it seemed more practical resonated with Dulles.

Despite having dismissed the need for other nations in his previous discussions, Spender wanted a bigger treaty if possible and complained that the United States did not seem to care about genuine collective security in the Pacific. Instead, he believed the United States only sought its own best political advantage. Dulles pacified him by claiming a trilateral treaty would not make up the final result for security in the Pacific. It would instead form the cornerstone of a future alliance, and by the afternoon of the second day of meetings, Spender agreed that the three-power pact seemed the proper course. After all, alliance with the United States would fulfill Australia's primary goal. Further, the plans for enticing other members seemed incomplete. The aftermath of the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War still divided the region, and several nations retained deep-seated fears about participation in the Cold

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<sup>34</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 163.

War. Even the Philippines seemed only to want the possible economic benefits of a treaty. It could offer no real military assistance, and Japanese inclusion loomed as a political nightmare for his Liberal Party.<sup>35</sup>

The three men laid the groundwork for a trilateral treaty during these February conversations, but as Dulles informed the pair, his instructions envisioned the creation of a wider treaty for the Pacific with an enlarged membership. Dulles' resentment of his impotence showed plainly, and Spender could see that the American chafed at not having the authority to negotiate an arrangement on his terms without approval. Even so, after the February discussions, Dulles pushed the Truman administration to make a trilateral treaty with Australia and New Zealand the foundation of a future Pacific security system.<sup>36</sup>

Dulles spoke to Spender and Doidge as if the planned ANZUS treaty would make the foundation of an eventual Asian alliance, but he still had concerns about Japanese security. Japan required protection from communist subversion at all costs. The United States could not simply leave Japan to its fate after ending its military occupation. Therefore, he proposed that the United States

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<sup>35</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 169-71; Spender, *Exercises*, 85, 127.

<sup>36</sup> Spender, *Exercises*, 148-49.

enter into a bilateral security treaty with Japan, and he pitched the pair of treaties as the solution the Truman administration desired. The notion that Australia and New Zealand needed a pact with the United States to guarantee their approval of a Japanese peace treaty became Dulles' justification for the split treaties, but the argument held little truth. Spender even claimed in his memoirs that there "never was a deal of any kind," and notes of conversations during the negotiations support his statement.<sup>37</sup> Instead, the threat that Australia and New Zealand would protest the peace treaty became a piece of political propaganda. It gave Dulles a way to prove the necessity of the trilateral treaty to the Truman Administration and Congress, and it gave the Australian Liberal Party political capital during the closely contested 1951 elections.

Using Australian fears as justification, Dulles received tentative approval to create a trilateral treaty with Australia and New Zealand and a bilateral treaty with Japan. Indeed, the Department of Defense found the pair of treaties more acceptable than the creation of a large multinational Asian security organization. With acceptance of the new plan, discussion of including the Philippines or

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<sup>37</sup> Spender, *Exercises*, 133.

Indonesia quickly dried up. After brief debate, Acheson gave Dulles approval to continue working on the Dulles Plan.<sup>38</sup>

Armed with a slightly new agenda and an agreement with the Dependables, Dulles finally decided the time had come to discuss a security treaty with the Japanese. America's goals for the future of Japan had little to do with the welfare of the Japanese people and everything to do with the alignment of Japan in the Cold War. American intelligence judged that by 1951, Japan's industrial capacity equaled fifty percent of the capability of Soviet industry. Certainly as Japan rebuilt, its industrial strength would only increase, and the United States could not allow the Soviets to gain access to Japan by subverting the Japanese government. In order to keep the Japanese from being lured by the soothing words of the communists, the State Department thought it had to help boost the Japanese economy while increasing Japan's external security. For his part, Dulles believed that an Asian collective defense arrangement would eventually fulfill both of those goals. The military aspects of a treaty would help with Japan's external security, and the close

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<sup>38</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 193-99; Council on Foreign Affairs Study Group, 26 Feb. 1951, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty (Correspondence), roll 18, JFD papers.

economic ties created by the friendship and mutual understanding of an alliance, would transform Japan into an economic powerhouse.<sup>39</sup>

While meeting with the Australians and New Zealanders, Dulles had run into difficulties with his original plan. He came to understand the impossibility of a large collective security organization in 1951. Without the ability to create a strong organization, he probably should have waited until conditions proved more favorable for meeting his goals. Instead, he attempted to force the issue in the hopes that the Australia-New Zealand treaty and a bilateral Japanese treaty would eventually merge as part of a larger Asian pact. Thus, he held laying the groundwork for a future arrangement as his objective when meeting with the Japanese to discuss the peace treaty. Dulles believed fulfillment of this goal required an equitable arrangement with the Japanese that would allow them to begin rebuilding their industry while making economic partnership with Japan attractive to other nations in the region. He also assumed that Japan should rearm so

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<sup>39</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 35, 41-42; Capitol Cloak Room transcript of Dulles interview, 15 May 1951, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty (Correspondence), roll 18, JFD Papers; T. J. Pempel, "Japanese Domestic Politics and Asian Regionalism," in *Japan and East Asian Regionalism* ed by S. Javed Maswood (New York: Routledge, 2001), 26.



that it would be able to contribute militarily to the future pact.

Dulles actually came late to the Japanese rearmament debate. George Kennan had strongly recommended rearmament as a defense against Soviet aggression since the mid-1940s, but stripping the defeated enemy of its power to wage war seemed more important to Douglas MacArthur and his staff when they wrote the Japanese constitution in 1946. As a result, the document forbade the creation of a standing military. In addition to the constitution, MacArthur instituted reforms that decentralized the Japanese government and weakened the privileged classes. His sweeping land reforms proved especially popular, and the Japanese middle class enjoyed a surge of power during the American occupation as Japan's traditional, near-feudal structure foundered. Many Japanese came to appreciate the reforms and the lack of militarism in their country. Accordingly, the constitution written by a conquering power turned into a cherished document, and ironically, MacArthur the Conqueror became something of a hero in Japan.<sup>40</sup>

By the time Dulles became involved in the treaty discussions, many American officials had second thoughts about Japanese rearmament, and Kennan's view became the

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<sup>40</sup> Barnet, *Alliance*, 84-89.

dominant one for both State and Defense. Even General MacArthur came to believe in the necessity of rearming Japan. Dulles differed from the rest who desired rearmament because he believed security required more than rearmament alone. Principally, he hoped to see Japan as the cornerstone of an Asian alliance, and he hoped to lay the groundwork during the peace treaty negotiations.<sup>41</sup>

When approaching the treaty, Dulles negotiated with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Having worked with MacArthur during the American occupation, Yoshida had become quite skillful at manipulating Americans. His most useful technique consisted of the invocation of the communist threat facing Japan. Yoshida had a genuine dislike of communism, but he frequently overstated the threat to persuade the Americans to come over to his way of thinking. Using "the red peril" as justification, he ably convinced the American occupiers to reverse some of their attempts at decentralizing Japan. He managed to reverse American positions on Japanese education, the police system, and industry. The traditional Japanese system had a high degree of control over these institutions, and the Americans had sought to liberalize the Japanese system by passing control from Japanese elites and central government

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<sup>41</sup> Spender, *Exercises*, 127.

into the hands of the people and municipalities.

Initially, MacArthur wanted decentralization in order to remove elements of fascism from Japan, but Yoshida claimed the reforms gave power to the communists. Slowly, he reversed the American positions while at the same time gaining a reputation for himself in the American government as a staunch ally against communism.<sup>42</sup>

Judging that Yoshida supported a strong centralized government, Dulles thought the prime minister would eagerly support remilitarization. Yoshida even spoke in favor of rearmament, but Dulles soon discovered that the prime minister's vision of rearmament differed significantly from his own. Dulles envisioned a massive rearmament that would give Japan a significant defensive and offensive capability. This force would include a large army, substantial navy, and a modern air force. Yoshida, on the other hand, merely wanted a strong security force, something like the American Coast Guard. He saw the need for a few small ships to patrol Japan's coastal waters and a small air force to provide for a modicum of self defense, but he could not envision the Japanese people rebuilding a large modern military. Dulles attempted to persuade Yoshida that Japan had a right to a substantial defensive

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<sup>42</sup> Barnet, *Alliance*, 89-91.

force, but the able prime minister responded that rearmament like Dulles envisioned would in fact provide Japan with an offensive capability. Yoshida placated Dulles by pointing out that he and his supporters did want to rebuild the military, but the Japanese people had their fill of war and militarism.<sup>43</sup>

Dulles never managed to convince the Japanese to expand their military beyond a small defensive force, and until he could, Japan could not function as the cornerstone of an Asian military alliance. The subject came up numerous times over the next decade as Dulles attempted to persuade the Japanese of their need to rearm. Consistently, Japanese leaders rejected any discussion of rearmament with the claim that their constitution did not permit a standing military. Dulles pushed so hard that he even offended Japanese leaders with suggestions that the Japanese constitution could be amended or rewritten to accommodate the need for a powerful defensive force. The Japanese may not have written their own constitution, but they came to like it. Dulles' proposal that it could be rewritten seemed insulting to the Japanese. Dulles did not understand the objection since an occupying power dictated

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<sup>43</sup> Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's Statement, 11 Feb. 1951; Prime Minister's Report to the Diet, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty (Correspondence), roll 18, JFD Papers.

the Japanese constitution, but the Japanese had already accepted American terms once. They were not going to change their governmental structure every time it suited American whims.<sup>44</sup>

Unable to persuade the Japanese to rearm, Dulles at least hoped Japan could become a regional economic power, but Dulles' vision of how to accomplish Japanese economic prosperity differed from the Japanese view. The Americans wanted Japan to avoid trade with the communist bloc and argued that Japan should content itself with free world trade. Conversely, the Japanese did not see how they could rebuild their economy without close economic ties to the People's Republic of China. Mainland China's size and geographical proximity to Japan made economic collaboration sensible, and the Japanese government wanted desperately to establish trade with the communist Chinese. The Americans feared that an open economic relationship between China and Japan would lead to the communist subversion of Japan, and American leaders threatened to deny the nation's good will if Japan instituted trade with Red China. Dulles could not force rearmament, but he did compel Japan to restrict its Chinese trade. To ensure Japanese cooperation, he drafted

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<sup>44</sup> John Foster Dulles, "Peace without Fear," *DSB*, 7 May 1951, 726-31; Background Meeting of Japanese Peace Treaty, 23 Aug. 1951, box 53, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty (Related Material), roll 18, JFD Papers.

a letter that promised Japan would follow a strict embargo on Chinese goods. Threatening that Republican Senators would veto the Japanese peace treaty unless Japan complied with the trade restrictions, Dulles demanded that Yoshida sign the letter. Grudgingly, Yoshida complied.<sup>45</sup>

For over a decade after this forced agreement, Japan followed a more strict China trade policy than America's NATO allies, and the slight stung Japanese pride. Dulles had promised to treat the Japanese with respect as equals, but when Cold War fears of communism got in the way, sovereign respect went out the window. This action did not escape notice in Asia, and other nations that Dulles hoped would join a future Pacific pact continually doubted American sincerity.

Dulles concluded the bulk of arrangements with Japan in the spring of 1951. Negotiators actually created two treaties, the peace treaty and a mutual security treaty for defense. The defensive agreement lacked any strength. Unlike the Australia-New Zealand treaty, it had no provision for a military planning council. It simply pledged that if attacked the United States would come to Japan as its constitutional processes allowed. This hardly fulfilled Dulles' vision for a Pacific Pact, and he

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<sup>45</sup> Barnet, *Alliance*, 92-93.

recognized that even coupled with the ANZUS treaty, it provided little in the way of regional defense. Still, he continued to tout the Japanese and ANZUS treaties as the basis for a future alliance. At least the peace treaty proved more successful. The American military ended its occupation, and nations friendly with the United States rapidly accepted Japan with a rather lenient peace accord. Japan had to make minor reparations payments to nations it had attacked during World War II, but these amounts fell well short of the expectations of nations like the Philippines. The easy terms strengthened the defeated enemy, and Filipinos wondered why the United States rewarded enemies more than friends.<sup>46</sup>

On learning the results of the Japanese treaty negotiations, the Philippines complained bitterly that the United States had ignored its long standing American friendship. Dulles had abandoned the notion of including the Philippines because the concept of a larger alliance had been impossible in 1951, but ignoring the outcry in the Philippines before the Japanese peace treaty proved impossible. The Defense Department again recommended that the United States avoid entering into a formal agreement with the Philippines and instead issue a unilateral

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<sup>46</sup> Colbert, *Southeast Asia*, 175.

declaration like the Truman Doctrine that would state the United States would defend the Philippines from communist aggression. Dulles retorted that unilateral declarations may have worked for President Monroe, but they had little utility in the modern world. Mutual respect formed the foundation of friendship, and that required a bilateral treaty. With pressure from Dulles and his Republican friends, the Truman administration grudgingly agreed in August that they would enter into a bilateral arrangement with the Philippines.<sup>47</sup> During the brief negotiations on the Philippine Security Treaty, the Filipinos sought the most advantageous treaty possible. They wanted the use of the NATO language instead of the ANZUS language, and they sought a consultation council like the one agreed to in the ANZUS treaty. The United States flatly refused. The bilateral arrangement did not require a council since the two members could easily consult through normal diplomatic channels, and the NATO language caused too many problems to make it usable. The Filipinos accepted the ANZUS style language, but they fought hard for a council to demonstrate that the Philippines was not inferior in American estimation to Australia. Despite Dulles' rhetoric of equality, the US continued to refuse. There would be no

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<sup>47</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 230-42.



consultative council. It seemed the Americans did value Australia and New Zealand more than its Asian friends.<sup>48</sup>

With the draft treaties already agreed upon, Dulles led the American delegation at the San Francisco Japanese Peace Conference in early September, 1951. At the conference, the United States made peace with Japan, and it entered into security arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan. Dulles succeeded in creating a successful peace treaty that reintegrated Japan to the family of nations and laid the groundwork for Japan's economic growth. He accomplished less with the security treaties.

Dulles achieved the most with the ANZUS treaty. Over a decade later, the Australians claimed it as one of the more important aspects of their foreign policy, and despite a quarrel between the United States and New Zealand in 1985 when New Zealand banned US nuclear ships from its territorial waters, the treaty remains in force. New Zealand no longer actively participates due to the naval dispute, but in a show of solidarity, Australia invoked the treaty in 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States.

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<sup>48</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, 1247.

Through ANZUS the United States came into more intimate contact with Australia and New Zealand and built up a genuine friendship, but the Asian security treaties failed to significantly improve the regional image of the United States. Dulles understood the need to avoid the appearance of a "white man's club" and the need to put Asian nations on an equal footing, but despite this enlightened notion, when Asian views clashed with American motives, Dulles followed the American pattern he railed against. He bullied Asian nations into accepting American plans or simply ignored their pleas.

Despite not creating a large collective security alliance, Dulles still envisioned the creation of such a pact in Asia with Japan as its regional anchor, and he continued to work on the plan after he became Secretary of State. Unfortunately, in 1951 he almost guaranteed that the pact would never materialize. Because of the Korean War, he pushed for a Pacific Pact overly soon. He attempted to cobble something together before other nations could readily accept Japan into a military alliance. Unable to put the defense treaty together the way he wanted, he offended the Japanese by pressuring them to remilitarize and avoid trade with China, and he affronted the Filipinos by disregarding their sincere requests and

handing them a near useless treaty that demonstrated they had little real importance to the United States. The Asians learned their lessons, and when Dulles began trying to create a larger Asian collective security system during the Eisenhower administration, his past transgressions came back to haunt him.

### CHAPTER III

#### INITIAL STEPS

On 3 October 1951, President Harry S Truman offered John Foster Dulles the first postwar ambassadorship to Japan. Truman intended the honor to reward Dulles for successfully negotiating the Japanese Peace and Mutual Security Treaties. Though pleased to receive the offer, Dulles declined. As Truman undoubtedly knew, accepting the ambassadorship would force Dulles out of the country during the 1952 elections, but Dulles intended to fight for a Republican victory. His work on the peace treaty had bolstered his reputation as a Republican foreign policy expert, and he had high hopes of becoming the next Secretary of State.

Dulles kicked off the election season by ensuring the passage of the September treaties. The peace and mutual security treaties went to the floor of the Senate for a vote in January 1951, and Dulles appeared before his former peers and the press to offer favorable testimony for his efforts. He preached friendship for Japan, "the only important industrial nation of Asia," and he lauded the

ANZUS language as most important component of the security treaties.<sup>1</sup> Arguing the desirability of the ANZUS language, he claimed that the wording delivered a classical American statement in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine that made it far superior to the language of the NATO treaty. During the course of their inquiry, the Foreign Relations Committee asked Dulles if these treaties represented the precursor to a Pacific version of NATO. Dulles replied that it did not though he wished that a more comprehensive treaty system had been possible. Even so, he offered up his hope that "there should be a further evolution in that area because I do not think what we have now done should be regarded as final."<sup>2</sup>

As Dulles promoted his treaties in the United States, some Asians began complaining about them, especially the security treaties. In fact, protestors in Manila burned Dulles in effigy, and a poll of Japanese students showed that over seventy-five percent opposed adoption of the security treaty. Despite the distant outcry, Dulles' testimony in combination with his earlier consultations

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<sup>1</sup> Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 21-25 Jan. 1952, box 61, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty: Speeches, roll 22, JFD Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 21-25 Jan. 1952, box 61, fol. Japanese Peace Treaty: Speeches, roll 22, JFD Papers.

with Congress ensured an easy passage for all four treaties. Asian discontent received little attention in the American press, and Dulles' role as champion of the peace and security treaties put him in the foreign affairs spotlight as potential Republican presidential nominees began planning their campaigns.

Dulles wanted desperately to become Secretary of State in the event of a Republican presidential victory, but despite his high profile, he could not depend on an appointment from the prospective list of nominees in 1952. Dulles had risen through the Republican Party ranks on the coattails of Thomas Dewey, but Dewey refused to seek the 1952 nomination. Arthur Vandenberg, one of Dulles' chief supporters in the Senate, died in April 1951. Dulles had close ties to Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., but despite a famous legislative name and a long record of service, Lodge did not have enough influence to obtain the nomination. Instead of these friends, the isolationist Robert Taft emerged as the Republican front runner. Dulles tried desperately to remain in Taft's good graces, but their views on foreign policy differed greatly. Thus, when Dwight D. Eisenhower allowed supporters to enter his name into the New Hampshire primary in January 1952, Dulles felt a sense of relief. Few knew much about Eisenhower's

political views at the time, but for Dulles, any choice offered more hope than Taft.

Dulles wrote Eisenhower in February in an effort to learn the general's opinions on foreign policy and discovered to his relief that Eisenhower supported internationalism and collective security. Further conversations demonstrated that Eisenhower held views similar to those of Dulles on other foreign policy issues with the exception that Dulles placed more emphasis on limiting military spending by stressing nuclear armament. Eisenhower saw a need to curtail the Truman administration's spending, but he encouraged Dulles to consider the fact that not all conflicts required nuclear force to obtain victory.

Dulles naturally favored Eisenhower over Taft, but uncertain about which man would obtain the Republican nomination, he attempted to avoid offending either man. As a result, Dulles endeavored to steer a middle course between the two and attacked Truman's foreign policies while avoiding statements that would displease Eisenhower or Taft. During this period, Dulles made a number of public appearances and wrote a variety of campaign pieces, but "A New Foreign Policy, A Policy of Boldness" printed by

*Life* magazine in 1952 encapsulates his most important arguments.

This article contained many of the same complaints that Dulles had already leveled at the Truman administration. He accused the Democrats of failing to develop dynamic, positive foreign policies. Instead, they reacted to events while building up large armies in Europe that had no hope of matching the massive Soviet army at any point on the globe. He portrayed this view as dangerous by reasoning that if war came, the Soviets would act first, and by taking the initial action, the Soviets could attack with their combined force at one location while American forces would still be spread out around the world. Dulles rationalized that the United States needed a simple way to match the Soviet military that would allow the nation to spend its time and resources following more active pursuits. To accomplish this goal, Dulles advocated a doctrine that reporters later termed "massive retaliation." Dulles assumed that in the event of a Soviet attack, the free world needed the ability "to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red Armies, so that if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it



hurts, by means of our choosing."<sup>3</sup> Dulles understood the means of our choosing to be the use of nuclear weapons.

Prior to the article's publication, Dulles presented a draft to Eisenhower for the candidate's approval. The general complimented Dulles on the tone of his arguments but complained about their simplicity. Eisenhower argued in favor of a more mature view of foreign policy and suggested the need to build up crippled economies and strengthen foreign governments so that they had the strength to resist communism from within. Eisenhower supported the principle of collective security as a protection against external threats, but he reasoned that the likelihood of internal political subversion outweighed the threat of open warfare and encouraged Dulles to alter his view. Dulles only made slight alterations to his draft before *Life* published it, but Eisenhower slowly brought Dulles around to his way of thinking. Consequently, methods of dealing with internal aggression received little play in the electoral rhetoric, but combating subversion became an issue of great importance to Dulles as Secretary of State, especially when creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

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<sup>3</sup> John Foster Dulles, "A New Foreign Policy, A Policy of Boldness," *Life*, 19 May 1952.

Dulles' *Life* article provoked a great deal of controversy within the press and general public because it seemed overly militaristic, but even after securing the Republican nomination, Eisenhower let Dulles continue making bellicose statements. In this way, Dulles became Eisenhower's political lightning rod on foreign policy issues. Dulles' argumentative temperament made him a perfect figure to test the waters of public opinion with aggressive statements without involving Eisenhower. When Dulles crossed the line, Eisenhower could soothe the public with a smile and the promise of moderation. The relationship continued into the Eisenhower presidency and formed one of the key components of what Fred I. Greenstein termed the "hidden hand" presidency.<sup>4</sup> Dulles made few statements without Eisenhower's explicit approval, but Eisenhower remained outside the blast radius of unpopular public or international opinion.

It would be overly simplistic to subscribe Eisenhower's victory in the 1952 election solely to debate over foreign policy, but during the nervous days of the early Cold War, foreign affairs certainly proved a major issue. Indeed the Republicans portrayed Adlai Stevenson, a

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<sup>4</sup> Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1982).

fervent Cold Warrior in his own right, as weak and ineffective. Plus, Dulles argued that the Democrats failed to make world-affecting policies. They had spent too much time focusing on Europe, and the communists had started a war in Korea. He claimed US Secretaries of State had visited Europe seventeen times since the end of World War II without a single visit to Asia, and he found the situation deplorable. Arguing that the United States had to treat Asians as equals if it wanted their respect, he complained, "We have virtually ignored the vital interlocking of European and Asian defense."<sup>5</sup> Speaking about Korea, he went so far as to charge, "war would never have occurred had not the Administration been utterly careless and blind."<sup>6</sup>

Dulles' statements combined with the lack of progress in Korea and Joseph McCarthy's outrageous statements about Truman's State Department certainly made the Democrats look weak on security, but despite defaming the opposition, the Republicans offered up no substantive plan for how they would improve the world situation or US-Asian relations. Dulles espoused the benefits of collective security and

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<sup>5</sup> "A Positive Foreign Policy," 15 May 1952, box 62, fol. Massive Retaliation, roll 22, JFD papers.

<sup>6</sup> Korean Speech Draft, 3 Sept. 1952, box 61, fol. Korea, roll 22, JFD Papers.

decried the lack of Democratic attention to Asia, but during a "Meet the Press" interview, he admitted, "I don't think it is feasible on any quick timetable to put together the countries of Asia in the same way as the countries of the Atlantic."<sup>7</sup> Even Eisenhower's famous statement that he would visit Korea proposed nothing even resembling a plan for correcting the Democratic Party's supposed mistakes. The lack of substance apparently did not matter to the public, and Eisenhower handily won the election. Soon after his victory, Eisenhower selected Dulles as his Secretary of State even though he retained some concerns about Dulles' propensity for bombast.

Given the lack of a well developed strategy, the new administration did not immediately start improving Asian relations upon entering the White House in January 1953, but the situation appeared better. The Korean War ended with an armistice agreement on 27 July 1953, but the Eisenhower administration does not deserve sole credit for the cease fire. After the war ended, the United States also signed a mutual security treaty with the Republic of Korea, but the accord did nothing to enhance American prestige or security in the region. Similar to the

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<sup>7</sup> Transcript of "Meet the Press," 10 Feb. 1952, box 65, fol. Speech: Meet the Press, roll 23, JFD Papers.

Philippine Mutual Security Treaty, it failed to create a military planning council, and the tensions surrounding Korea guaranteed that South Korea could not join Japan, the Philippines, or Australia and New Zealand in a larger collective security treaty. Like the others, it existed as a stopgap measure until the accomplishment of something more significant.

Apart from the weak Korean treaty, the new administration took no positive actions to improve Asian security or US-Asian relations during Eisenhower's first year in office. Despite campaign rhetoric about the lack of action, the Republicans offered up no specific policies. Even so, portions of the American public credited Eisenhower with ending the Korean War based on his veiled threats to use nuclear force in Korea if the war dragged on. If he deserves credit for bringing peace, then his administration did indeed make quick progress in Asian affairs, but it could also be argued that the Eisenhower administration simply witnessed the end of the Korean War rather than doing anything substantive to create peace. In any event, the Republicans attempted to establish neither a collective security system nor any other dynamic policies like the ones Dulles so often stressed during the campaign.

Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC) did frequently discuss the subject of collective security in Asia, but it only came up with more questions and problems. Shortly after his inauguration, Eisenhower began the Project Solarium reorganization of the NSC, and he turned the body into his chief planning organization for matters of foreign policy relating to the Cold War, the external communist threat, and collective security. Much of their first year's planning dealt with how to reshape American foreign policy into what became known as the New Look. This policy shift focused on decreased military spending with greater reliance on Dulles' massive retaliation concept. Rather than attempt to match the Soviets man-for-man and tank-for-tank around the globe, the New Look promised increased reliance on nuclear power and mobile striking power from air and naval forces. In short, it sought more bang for the buck. Collective security promised to be a feature of the New Look because ideally it would allow foreign governments to boost allied troop numbers and free the United States to focus on developing retaliatory striking power, but even though the NSC discussed the issue, it remained nothing more than a concept. They made no progress, nor even an attempt, toward achieving collective security in Asia.

Despite no attempts to create an expanded security arrangement, the new administration did take some steps to counter communist activity in Asia. Indeed, one of the principal issues discussed during those winter 1953 NSC meetings was how to reduce military spending while simultaneously halting the spread of communism. In a special meeting of the NSC on 31 March, Dulles argued that while the threat of overt Soviet aggression always loomed in the background, it did not seem likely that the Soviets would force war with the United States. Internal take over through communist sponsored groups like the Viet Minh in Indochina seemed to be an imminently greater threat. In an early formation of the Domino Theory, Dulles reasoned that the nations around the Soviet periphery, most importantly Indochina, Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran, and the members of NATO, had to remain within the free world at all costs. Losing one to the communists would jeopardize the entire free world. The notion seems rather exaggerated, but Eisenhower and the NSC accepted the basic premise. Perhaps left to his own devices Dulles would have sought an expanded alliance system to deal with this threat, but Eisenhower focused the NSC on the political threat of communism. Thus, rather than working to develop open alliances with America's friends, the NSC plotted methods

of using propaganda, covert activity, and economic assistance to keep the free world safe from the taint of communism.

During the spring and early summer, the NSC targeted several areas of Asia that it wanted to ensure would remain free of communism. Japan and its industrial potential stood at the front of the list. As a result, Asian policies during the Eisenhower administration focused on rebuilding and rearming Japan. Above all things, Japan had to be kept out of Soviet hands. To ensure that Japan did not succumb to communist subversion, the United States needed to aid the Japanese economy by improving general East Asian participation in international trade. To help accomplish this goal, Eisenhower appointed former Minnesota governor Harold Stassen as the director of the Mutual Security Administration (MSA).

Begun in 1951, the MSA was an outgrowth of Harry Truman's Point IV assistance programs that promised economic and technical aid to developing countries. The MSA provided similar types of support, but it made a direct link between American security and foreign aid dollars to ensure congressional budget approval. Upon taking office, Eisenhower selected Stassen as the new director, and Stassen recommended quick changes from the Truman era



policies. Reflecting the NSC's concerns about communist subversion, Stassen stressed assistance programs that promised fewer funds on a yearly basis but that offered assistance for longer periods of time. This setup provided a number of benefits for the Eisenhower administration. First, it kept yearly costs down, which made it easier to obtain congressional funding. Second, it had propaganda value in the developing world because even though the MSA paid over a number of years, the United States was able to offer larger dollar amounts. Third, since Americans administered the programs, the longer duration ensured that the nations would have ties to the United States for a number of years.

Stassen also redirected the flow of aid dollars. The new director reasoned that the US currently dumped too much money into Jiang Jieshi's corrupt military and into a nonexistent Japanese remilitarization program. Corruption and poor administration wasted many of the funds given to Nationalist China, and money given to Japan did not increase Japan's military readiness or its international trade, which Stassen believed the Japanese economy really needed. Stassen also reasoned that the US gave large amounts of money to Thailand and the Philippines, but these areas faced little danger of actually falling to the

communists. Instead, he recommended that funds to these areas should "become a mere trickle" in order to divert more to the French in Indochina.

The NSC recognized that after Korea, Indochina seemed the area of Asia most likely to succumb to communism since the French had been fighting communist Viet Minh troops led by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap since reacquiring the colony. Ho and Giap fought for an end to colonialism, but Ho gave the impression of embracing a communist ideology that made his revolution distasteful to American leaders. By 1953, the French position looked precarious at best, and on 25 March 1953, Dulles informed the NSC that the situation in Indochina had gone beyond the capability of the French military. The announcement hardly came as a surprise. Douglas MacArthur had even predicted a French collapse when he met with Dulles in Japan in 1951. MacArthur stood aghast at the decline in the French military from World War I to the early Cold War, and Eisenhower's NSC voiced the same concerns judging that the French lacked the material and the will to carry on the fight against a determined enemy.

Despite the obviously poor situation, the NSC felt that the French insistence on colonialism tied America's hands. Vice President Richard Nixon put his finger on the

pulse of the problem by pointing out that the Vietnamese would not lift a finger to fight communism in an effort to maintain colonialism. To them, communism represented nationalism and freedom from oppression, and this view doomed the French cause. The United States could not support France in a war to maintain control of a colonial possession, but neither could it sit by and watch as another portion of Asia fell to communism. The Americans encouraged the French to grant independence to its colonies at every opportunity, but the French maintained a fear that without the colonial connection, Indochina would trade its precious resources with Japan instead of its old colonial masters. The US desire to increase Japan's trade with the mainland gave these fears a rational basis. Indeed, Dulles stated on 8 April 1953, that any policy that kept Japan from trading with the mainland could not be viable for longer than five years. In order to revitalize the Japanese economy in the way that Dulles envisioned, Japan had to supplant France as Indochina's leading trade partner. To make matters worse, the United States needed France as a staunch European ally and could not openly denounce French colonial policies.

Due to the compromised position, Eisenhower used the MSA to provide technical and military assistance to French

controlled Vietnamese military forces. US dollars flowed into Vietnam as Eisenhower and Dulles approved giving money to the French in support of a bankrupt policy that they did not agree with because they saw no other alternative to keeping Ho from taking power without damaging US-French relations to the breaking point. Aid only postponed the French collapse while feeding Soviet propaganda denouncing the Western imperialists. Dulles understood that the administration faced a losing situation, but despite promises of a dynamic, positive Asian policy, neither he nor anyone else in the Eisenhower administration could ascertain how to steer things in a favorable direction.

Aid dollars to the developing world could have possibly created the good will necessary to create the collective security system Dulles believed Asia needed. Indeed, many Asian nations, notably the Philippines and Thailand, clamored for an Asian counterpart to the Marshall Plan. By only extending the Marshall Plan to Europe, the Truman administration had sent a message to Asians that the United States did not hold them in the same regard as Europeans, but during the 1952 campaign, Dulles had stressed the equality of nations and the need to include Asia in more American policies. The Eisenhower administration claimed an interest in speeding up the

modernization of Asia, and it maintained that it distributed economic and technological aid based on need rather than Cold War concerns. The statements fooled very few. Americans clearly earmarked aid dollars for allies and friends. Free assistance that genuinely stressed rebuilding and technological advancement could have possibly moved events in the right direction, but the Eisenhower administration, and Dulles in particular, continued to rate Asia behind Europe. American aid for Asian nations came with too many strings, and the United States only distributed funds when its leaders believed that money could help in the fight against communism.

The 1954 Yangtze River flood provides one of the best demonstrations of the link between aid dollars and the war on communism. In early August, China's Yangtze River overflowed its boundaries in the worst flood of a century. It devastated China's rice crop and destroyed rail lines and airfields. During a 5 August 1954, NSC meeting, Eisenhower brought up the flood and reasoned that aiding the Chinese people in their hour of need would show the humanitarian spirit of the American people. He thought demonstrating a friendship for the Chinese people despite profound US differences with the communist government would

be the "neatest trick of the week."<sup>8</sup> Stassen objected to the idea reasoning that helping communist China when other nations had problems would only create confusion and anger amongst America's friends. Dulles went a step farther with the remark that the People's Republic "might make a good target for an atomic bomb" rather than aid.<sup>9</sup> Eisenhower wanted the matter studied anyway, and the NSC returned to the issue on 12 August. After examining the situation in some depth, the Secretary of State still opposed aiding China. Arguing that the American people had not shown any interest in China's plight, he claimed that aiding China would not have any domestic value. He also felt it would not provide any foreign propaganda value. He suggested that the Chinese people were too ignorant to appreciate Eisenhower's trick of the week, and he contended that American aid to China would cause the Japanese to exert more pressure to initiate Chinese-Japanese trade if they believed the United States had softened its policies on Red China. Dulles opposed the establishment of a trade relationship between Japan and communist China on the basis that it could provide an inroad to the political subversion

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<sup>8</sup> Record of 209th NSC meeting, 5 Aug. 1954, NSC Series, box 4, DDE Papers.

<sup>9</sup> Record of 209th NSC meeting, 5 Aug. 1954, NSC Series, box 4, DDE Papers.

of Japan. Allen Dulles, John Foster's brother and director of the Central Intelligence Agency, then pointed out that US aid should go to South Vietnam instead. By August 1954, the French effort to hold onto Indochina had collapsed, and Allen Dulles feared that the communists would take over if the French completely withdrew. Thus rather than giving aid to flood devastated China, the NSC recommended sending more money to South Vietnam to help in the fight against communist insurgents. The Eisenhower administration continued to make similar decisions as it spread aid dollars through Asia.

To compound the problem, when the United States did render assistance to Asian governments, it maintained control of assistance programs, especially when those programs provided military aid. Americans told Asians what they could and could not buy, and purchased items typically came from American corporations. Thus, federal aid dollars had a tendency to bolster American businesses as much or more than the Asian nations they should have helped. With a heavy US military presence and the large naval base at Subic Bay, the Philippines experienced these backhanded deals regularly. As a result, the Filipinos frequently complained loudly about US bases on their soil. Admiral Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quipped

that if the Filipinos wanted protection from communists or even the Japanese, then they should let the Americans do what they wanted. Dulles' State Department held a less cavalier attitude than Radford, but foreign governments tended not to notice the difference. American aid came with strings, and because of that fact, Asian governments tended to distrust American motives.<sup>10</sup>

Despite aid agreements and the Korean Mutual Security Treaty, the Eisenhower administration made little progress in improving US-Asian relations during its first year. Even though Republican campaign rhetoric in 1952 had stressed the need for a policy that allowed the United States to control events in Asia rather than policies that reacted to the communists, Asia remained a relatively low priority. The situation changed as French fortunes in Indochina grew steadily worse, but the failure to create a dynamic Asian policy in its first months in office ensured that the Eisenhower administration would continue reacting to communist moves in Asia.

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<sup>10</sup> Record of 191st NSC meeting, 1 Apr. 1954, NSC Series, box 4, DDE Papers.



CHAPTER IV  
UNITED ACTION

By June 1953, the United States paid half the expenses of France's Indochina War. Even so, Vietnam remained a minor concern for the American government. A handful of people, such as US Minister to Saigon Donald Heath, realized that the lack of a well-developed policy for the region could quickly prove troublesome, but pleas for a re-evaluation of the State Department's East Asian policy fell on deaf ears until the end of 1953 when the situation finally began changing.

French forces in Vietnam had congregated at the fortress of Dienbienphu, and US military planners analyzing the French position realized that the Vietminh stood an extremely good chance of defeating the French. As a result, the National Security Council decided in a 23 December 1953 meeting that Indochina had become more important "from the standpoint of strategic interests" than Korea.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 2, 930; Cable, *Geneva Conference*, 13.

With this decision made, the Eisenhower administration began to formulate a new Asian policy based on the premise that France might lose its Indochina war. General Henri Navarre, the French commander in Vietnam, assured American leaders that the loss of Dienbienphu would be militarily insignificant, and French forces could still maintain control after a defeat. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, agreed with the substance of Navarre's statement, but he also pointed out in a NSC meeting held on 8 January 1954 that such a loss would crush French morale on the home front. Furthermore, the CIA director suggested that the Vietminh realized the potential psychological effect of a victory at Dienbienphu. Therefore, he reasoned that Vietnamese leaders believed they could force a French withdrawal, regardless of the military significance of the territory. After hearing the estimate of the situation from the CIA, the National Security Council considered possible plans that might allow the US to circumvent a French defeat.<sup>2</sup>

During this meeting, President Eisenhower stated in certain terms that he could not imagine placing US troops anywhere in Southeast Asia. Such an action, he surmised, would simply cause the Vietnamese to hate the United States

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<sup>2</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 937, 948.

instead of France. Eisenhower even dismissed clandestine military action by rejecting a plan to fly unmarked combat planes off American carriers to knock out Vietminh artillery. With this guidance from the president, American planners began to formulate an Asian policy that would check communist expansion without committing US forces.<sup>3</sup>

Just over a week later on 16 January 1954, the National Security Council adopted NSC-5405 as the basis for its planning in Southeast Asia. This document primarily concerned itself with the French position in Indochina, but it also officially applied the Domino Theory, or the notion that if Indochina fell to communism, then the rest of Asia, including Japan, would also fall. NSC-5405 declared Communist China to be the principal disruptive force in Southeast Asia, and it expressed the opinion that the Vietminh could not defeat the French without direct assistance from the Red Chinese military. The NSC reasoned that China would not intervene unless the United States took direct military action in the region, and so it predicted a speedy settlement between France and Vietnam while also recommending increased American covert action in the region.

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<sup>3</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 948-51.

Indeed, the NSC felt that internal communist subversion would continue to plague the region after whatever peace settlement the French accepted. As a result, NSC-5405 also focused on plans to deter the spread of communism through Southeast Asia. The council viewed Thailand and Burma as stabilizing forces in the region, and it recommended that the United States should channel increased amounts of military and economic aid to those nations with the understanding that Thailand and Burma could be counted as allies against communism. NSC-5405 also mentioned the possibility of a coordinated regional defense system as a method of halting further communist expansion without directly committing troops. This idea built on the preexisting mutual security treaties and came to fruition in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).<sup>4</sup>

The Eisenhower administration helplessly watched as the French position in Vietnam declined, and during a 25 March 1954 NSC meeting, a dismayed Eisenhower opined, "the people of Vietnam must want communism" because guerilla activity in Vietnam had increased to the point where French troops had difficulty moving about the countryside.<sup>5</sup> The

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<sup>4</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 362-76; *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 971-73.

<sup>5</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1164.

Secretary of State agreed, stating the world was about to see "the collapse or evaporation of France as a great power."<sup>6</sup>

A troubled Eisenhower saw no way to stop the loss of Vietnam to communism without directly replacing the French military, but he viewed that option as unacceptable. Discussing these issues, John Foster Dulles encouraged the NSC to consider seriously what he called "United Action." Dulles described United Action as an Asian collective security arrangement or an expanded version of ANZUS like that already mentioned in NSC-5405, and he argued that a regional pact could give the United States the international support necessary to stop the spread of communism beyond Indochina, which he and Eisenhower feared the French had already lost.<sup>7</sup>

As a result of a meeting with French general Paul Ely, Dulles had already presented the concept of United Action to Eisenhower prior to the NSC meeting, and he knew he had presidential support. On 23 March 1954, Dulles and other American leaders had met with Ely who was in Washington to seek increased American support for France in Vietnam. A frustrated Ely demanded to know how America

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<sup>6</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1166.

<sup>7</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1163-1168.

would respond if communist China sent jet fighters against French troops. While Admiral Arthur Radford had indulged Ely with discussion of possible American air action, Dulles demurred and answered that the United States could not involve itself without a significant chance for victory and more equal partnership in deciding the fate of the French colony. Dulles discussed the conversation with Eisenhower the next day, and the president agreed that the United States could not become involved without congressional and international approval of American intervention. Borrowing a phrase that Eisenhower had used previously to discuss Korea, Dulles suggested that "United Action" could provide these necessary preconditions. Eisenhower favored Dulles' reasoning and asked him to float the idea to the press in order to gauge the public's reaction.<sup>8</sup>

To that end, Dulles gave a speech entitled "Threat of a Red Asia" to the Overseas Press Club on the 29th. In his address, Dulles explained that Southeast Asia served as the "rice bowl" of Japan, and in a statement of the Domino Theory, he claimed that communist control of Southeast Asia would endanger Japan as well as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Noting that Eisenhower viewed the

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<sup>8</sup> Chronology of Actions on the subject of Indochina prior to the Geneva Meeting, box 82, fol. Indochina, roll 32, JFD Papers.

situation as one of "transcendent importance," the secretary suggested that France fought to preserve freedom and independence rather than to feebly hang on to the last vestiges of a colonial empire. Because of this situation, the fall of Indochina would be "a grave threat to the whole free community."<sup>9</sup> As a result, Dulles maintained, "the United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by United Action."<sup>10</sup>

Dulles' initial statement contained few details about just what United Action would entail, but the plan soon started taking shape. Shortly after his speech to the press, he met with British Ambassador Roger Makins to discuss a common US-UK position that would keep France from "a sell-out of Indochina." During this conversation, Dulles outlined a basic concept of United Action and included ten nations that he believed should be involved. Makins gave the idea a cool reception, but an undeterred Dulles followed the presentation with similar exchanges with the ambassadors of France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand during the first week of April. Thailand and the Philippines almost instantly supported any improvement of their relationship with the United States,

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<sup>9</sup> Speech to Overseas Press Club, 29 Mar. 1954, box 82, fol. Indochina, roll 32, JFD Papers; *DSB*, 12 Apr. 1954, 539.

<sup>10</sup> *DSB*, 12 Apr. 1954, 539.

but the other nations seemed less certain. France questioned anything that might reduce the effectiveness of the upcoming Geneva peace talks, and New Zealand and Australia worried about damaging their relationship with Britain.

Dulles also briefed congressional leaders, including John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, on United Action in a series of meetings between 3-5 April. The legislators expressed initial approval, but during a Senate debate led by Kennedy on 6 April, the senators expressed concern for the decline of the French position. Despite some unease, the majority agreed they could not support any American military action in the region without substantial international support. After obtaining assurances that United Action would satisfy the senators' requirements, Dulles came to view a regional grouping as an even greater necessity.

With presentations made, Dulles returned to the concept of United Action at an NSC meeting later in the day on 6 April 1954. Endorsing the United Action concept, the council adopted NSC Action 1086 on Indochina, which officially abandoned discussion of military intervention and shifted the focus to the creation of a regional defense grouping. Eisenhower remarked that Vietnam would probably



adopt communism, but he hoped drawing a proverbial line in the sand would save the rest of Southeast Asia. Dulles argued that United Action seemed capable of accomplishing that purpose while providing congressional and international support should the US wish to later involve itself directly in Southeast Asia.

Dulles explained to the NSC that the government had to create conditions that could allow the President to argue the United States had an obligation to protect Indochina from communism due to its participation in an international coalition. An important precondition for Congress, this step would allow the United States to become militarily involved in Vietnam if and when it chose to do so. Critics have charged that the push for United Action proves Dulles' belligerency or that the Eisenhower administration wanted to intervene in Vietnam, but Dulles and Eisenhower seemed to view United Action as a plan to establish conditions that would allow the United States to act in Asia as it chose in the event that the president deemed action necessary. In other words, United Action represented an attempt to prepare for the future rather than a plan for immediate action, but the reactionary nature of United

Action caused critical observers to view it as warmongering.<sup>11</sup>

In fleshing out the United Action concept, the NSC first looked at possible membership. It felt Australia and New Zealand would continue to follow the American lead in the region. France should be included due to its colonial activity in Vietnam, and Dulles hoped to include Britain in order to compel the British to support the Asian policy of the United States. Eisenhower desired some Asian participation in order to free the US from the colonial label, and Dulles recommended the inclusion of the Philippines, Thailand, and "Free" Southeast Asia.<sup>12</sup> With the exception of Pakistan, which joined for its own reasons, the NSC had already determined the future membership of SEATO.<sup>13</sup>

To initiate support for United Action, Eisenhower made a televised presentation on the strategic importance of Southeast Asia on 7 April. Arguing that the free world could not stand to lose another nation to the same fate as China, he claimed that the loss of Indochina to communism

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<sup>11</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1254-55, 1266; Herring and Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu," 350.

<sup>12</sup> Free Southeast Asia was the American Government's term for whatever parts of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam remained free of communist influence.

<sup>13</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1254-65.

would cause the rest of Southeast Asia to fall like a "row of dominoes." The speech reiterated points made in previous announcements by Dulles, but the language created the term, "Domino Theory." More importantly, some observers, notably Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill, viewed the speech as alarmist with little basis in reality.

With the United Action plan officially underway, Dulles set out to convince the British and French of the need for joint action, and he immediately arranged for meetings with British and French leaders in London and Paris. While setting up the meetings, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden disturbed Dulles with his failure to see the seriousness of France's Indochina plight. Believing that American leaders grossly exaggerated the importance of Vietnam, Eden told Dulles, "the French cannot lose the war between now and the coming of the rainy season however badly they may conduct it."<sup>14</sup> Irritated by the weak British position, Dulles arrived in London on 11 April ready to bully British leaders into accepting his outlook, but he did not find Eden any more receptive to the concept in person. After three days of meetings, Eden only agreed to examine the possibility of regional defense, and even

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<sup>14</sup> Chronology of Actions on the subject of Indochina prior to the Geneva Meeting, box 82, fol. Indochina, roll 32, JFD Papers.

then, Eden refused to act until after the Geneva conference had a chance to consider the issue.

On 15 April, Dulles traveled to Paris to make his pitch to Foreign Minister Georges Bidault. Though, eager for assistance with prosecution of France's war, Bidault resisted discussion of granting independence to Vietnam and the Associated States, which Dulles deemed necessary for increased American support. Further, Bidault noted that while France wished for immediate relief at Dienbienphu, it did not want to engage in long-term planning that might mitigate its future colonial dominance. Disheartened, Dulles left Paris railing about French stupidity and British weakness.

When leaving for Europe, Dulles had expected ready agreement from America's allies. Instead he found Britain reluctant and France panicked. In fact, the British and French positions stood out as complete opposites. Britain refused short-term action but would consider the possibility of future planning, but France wanted immediate assistance without any subsequent interference in its colonial affairs. Compounding the difficulties, Beijing radio initiated a propaganda program in early April that attempted to undermine the United States' position in Asia. The broadcasts accused the Americans of planning to

sabotage the upcoming Geneva Conference on a Korean peace arrangement. Furthermore, the Red Chinese declared that the United States intended to develop a "military crescent" strategy that would encircle China with a string of bases from Pakistan to the Republic of Korea.

Unable to persuade Britain of the immediate need for proper preparation and determined not to give the Chinese political ammunition at Geneva, American planners slowed down regional defense preparations. The US also delayed official public announcement of possible membership in the United Action pact until the end of May and continued to maintain that Korea remained the most important topic at Geneva.<sup>15</sup>

The coming conference quickly occupied the bulk of the State Department's Asian resources, and United Action planning declined in importance. Initially, the United States did not want to discuss Indochina at the conference and preferred to only focus on Korea, but as their military position worsened, the French lobbied to include their war in southeast Asia. So, the Geneva Conference actually became two sets of talks, one on Korea and the other on Indochina.

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<sup>15</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1288, 1308-09; "News Conference Statement by the President," *DSB*, 17 May 1954, 740.

Though concerned with United Action and the development of a strong Asian policy, American planners also had more mundane concerns going into Geneva. The question of how to handle communist Chinese participation stood out as one of the most troublesome. Clearly, the communists had to participate, especially in the Korean conference, but US refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) made negotiations difficult since doing so would confer some legitimacy on Mao Zedong's government. As a result, the State Department busied itself with administrative matters about the format of the conference, but on 7 May 1954, just a day before the scheduled beginning of the Indochina portion of the conference, Dienbienphu fell to Vietmanese troops.

Fearing that a complete French withdrawal would "provide a road to a Communist takeover and further aggression," John Foster Dulles declared, "If this occurs... then the need will be even more urgent to create the conditions for United Action."<sup>16</sup> With this in mind, the State Department established the goal of bringing peace to Indochina while arresting the further spread of communism. The Geneva conference seemed the appropriate avenue for ending the war between Vietnam and France, but Dulles

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<sup>16</sup> "The Issues at Geneva," *DSB*, 17 May 1954, 744.

believed the United Action concept offered the best chance to stop communism from creeping into other areas. So, the United States pursued both topics in Geneva.

For a successful conference, American diplomats believed the fighting in Vietnam had to end, and they hoped the French would relinquish their colonial claims. Even so, American leaders did not want France to withdraw completely, nor did they wish to see communists in control of Vietnam. Facing a situation almost impossible to resolve on favorable terms, they instead endeavored to divide Vietnam while creating a security treaty outside the conference that would keep the communists from expanding their influence.<sup>17</sup>

Even as the Geneva participants discussed how to resolve the conflict between the French and the Vietnamese, the United States started planning the creation of a Southeast Asian regional pact that could go into effect after the end of the conference. Knowing that collective security planning could potentially disrupt the Geneva Conference, the State Department designers quickly adopted reasons beyond simple defense for any regional security arrangements and expressed concern for the welfare of

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<sup>17</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 13, 1467-70, 1513-15; Cable, *Geneva Conference*, 112.

Southeast Asia and a belief that all nations have the right to be free from foreign domination. Furthermore, they propagandized that a security arrangement symbolized a collective effort for peace, independence, and economic progress. The diplomatic realities of Geneva forced the United States to tie collective security to concepts like economics, but Dulles had mentioned similar factors when creating ANZUS and the mutual securities that grew out of the Japanese peace treaty. Unfortunately while Dulles seems to have genuinely desired such magnanimous goals, the circumstances surrounding creation of a Southeast Asian pact ensured future observers would doubt American sincerity.

Certainly, decisions about Indochina made at Geneva would play a large part in determining the final outcome of a collective security pact, and American planners established three possible plans based on potential results of the conference. The first scheme concerned the actions to take if hostilities continued in Indochina. Under these circumstances, the United States would use the pact to defeat the Vietminh. The second formula considered what to do if the Vietminh defeated the French and communists took control of Indochina. Should this have happened, the member nations would have pledged to stop future communist



expansion and protect other Asian nations when faced with communist attack. The third possibility dealt with actions to take in the event that the Indochina conflict ended with an acceptable peace settlement. This plan called for cooperation between the involved nations on economic and social problems.<sup>18</sup>

As these planning groups met, the Joint Chiefs also privately discussed the role of the US military if committed to a Southeast Asian defense arrangement. They saw two possible actions in case of war in Southeast Asia, running a static defense in the invaded nation or attacking the source of the problem. The JCS reasoned that any aggression in the region would ultimately come from the People's Republic of China, and defending portions of Asia against the Chinese army seemed impractical. Therefore, by the dictates of military logic, in the event of any Asian war, the United States needed to attack Red China and use nuclear weapons if necessary. Prior to formulating any defensive treaty arrangements, the NSC adopted the JCS report as its policy in case of war in Southeast Asia, but Dulles recommended keeping the policy secret from the other western powers. After all, it might scare them.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 446-49, 490-92.

<sup>19</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 514-16, 522-25.

By the end of June, plans toward a regional security treaty had advanced enough to allow the United Kingdom to take part in the creation process. After Dienbienphu, the British finally agreed that the region needed a collective defense system, but they emphasized that as many Asian states as possible -- especially Burma -- should join. The two nations then began a joint study group that worked from the end of June until mid July to create a draft treaty for what they termed the South East Asian Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT). The planners quickly agreed that any treaty should guard against overt or subversive communist activity in the region, and neither the British nor Americans wished to participate in a non-communist related fight. They also decided that Japan, Nationalist China, the Republic of Korea, and Hong Kong or any other colonial possessions should not be allowed to join in order to obtain the largest possible body of neutral Asian membership. Additionally, they would not create an organization like NATO because they believed they already had sufficient strength to deal with the Soviets and the Chinese. So, American and British planners envisioned Asian collective security as a means of keeping the nations in the region from adopting communism, and neither had any

illusions that the pact would increase their military readiness.<sup>20</sup>

The Americans and the British agreed on many issues, but by the end of the planning sessions, they took opposite sides on one seemingly minor point. The British objected to the use of the words "communist aggression" in the treaty. They instead favored something along the lines of "subversive activities directed from without." The Americans had difficulty understanding the British position since the British accepted the American view of the dangerous nature of international communism, but the English insisted that since the phrase had no international legal meaning it should not find its way into a binding treaty. They also believed including the phrase would keep many Asian states from joining. The conflict reached no suitable conclusion by the end of the planning sessions, and to the UK's chagrin, the phrase remained in the treaty draft.<sup>21</sup>

The United States conferred with other nations about a possible treaty in the early summer of 1954. It also met with Australia and New Zealand under the auspices of ANZUS. Leaders from both nations believed in the necessity of a

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<sup>20</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 569-81, 606-14, 624-26, 633-44.

<sup>21</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 617, 638.

regional grouping, but the economic possibilities of the treaty interested them more. The US agreed that the economic situation should constitute part of the treaty but would not commit to anything definite. The State Department also consulted Thailand and the Philippines, though to a considerably lesser extent. The Thais eagerly professed support for any type of anticommunist organization in the region, and the Filipinos hoped that such an organization would advance the principal of self-determination in Asia. Surprisingly US officials conferred little with the French because they feared that if the French knew too much about plans for the region that they might upset the peace process in Geneva.<sup>22</sup>

As plans for SEACDT progressed, the Geneva participants quibbled over a variety of issues such as which government would control Vietnam or where to draw a dividing line, if any, between North and South Vietnam. These issues took weeks to settle, but finally on 21 July 1954, the conference reached agreement when eight of the nine nations attending signed the Geneva Accords. The final Geneva declaration actually had thirteen parts, but only three receive much attention: the division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, the demand that French troops

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<sup>22</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 652, 661.

withdraw to the south, and a mandate for national elections within two years. The United States accepted these arrangements, but rather than acknowledge the legitimacy of the People's Republic of China, it refused to sign the Geneva Accords. Instead, the Americans issued a separate protocol accepting the validity of the agreements and promising not to violate them with military force.

Accounts of the Geneva Conference generally list the above aspects of the final treaty as the most significant, but another declaration in the agreement actually posed more trouble for the United States. The fifth accord stated that neither section of Vietnam could "constitute part of any military alliance."<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, Cambodia and Laos could not "join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations."<sup>24</sup> These statements, included due to Chinese insistence, specifically referred to America's collective security plans in the region.

Zhou Enlai, the leader of the Chinese delegation, demanded the clause and threatened that if the United States granted the Indochinese states membership in a

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<sup>23</sup> "The Final Declaration" in Cable, *Geneva Conference*, 146.

<sup>24</sup> Cable, *Geneva Conference*, 147.

security pact, then the People's Republic would not support any agreements reached.<sup>25</sup> Simply put, the PRC viewed a military alliance in Indochina as a deal breaker, and the Vietminh would likely have followed China's lead.

Chinese obstinacy on this point proved troublesome for the United States. After all, arresting the spread of communism in Indochina drove American plans for Southeast Asian collective defense. How could a security arrangement protect Indochina if those states could not join the organization? Dulles needed an answer for this question in order to pursue plans for a regional organization after the Geneva Conference.

In considering the situation, Dulles reasoned that the communists had won an advanced salient in Northern Vietnam. Furthermore, America's reputation in Asia had suffered as a result of Geneva. In effect, America lost face since the United States had supported France, and clearly the French had lost their war. The communists had gained the upper hand, and the secretary expected they would attempt to capitalize on their gains and increase anti-American propaganda throughout the region. In order not to lose more prestige, Dulles wanted to stabilize the region

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<sup>25</sup> Anthony Eden, *Toward Peace in Indochina* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), 3-4; William Duiker, *US Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 201.

quickly and prevent further losses to subversion or overt aggression. Indeed, he supposed that if the communists gained one more inch the dominoes would start falling.<sup>26</sup>

Believing that he already possessed the keys to the dilemma in United Action and SEACDT, Dulles laid out exactly what the State Department expected of such an arrangement during the Geneva Conference:

The situation in that area, as we found it, was that it was subject to the so-called "domino theory" ... If one went they all would go. We are trying to change it so that would not be the case. That is the whole theory of collective security ... As the nations come together, then the "domino theory," so-called, ceases to apply. And what we are trying to do is create a situation in Southeast Asia where the domino situation does not apply.<sup>27</sup>

Still accepting this position after Geneva, Dulles continued to recommend a regional security arrangement to Eisenhower and the NSC as the best possible way to prevent further losses to the communists, but after Geneva other officials in the Eisenhower administration, notably the Joints Chiefs of Staff, started to disagree.

On 23 July, just two days after the Geneva Accords, Admiral Arthur Radford informed Dulles that the Joint Chief's position had changed. Previously, they believed France and Vietnam would form the basis of military power

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<sup>26</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 697-700.

<sup>27</sup> "Concept of United Action," *DSB*, 24 May 1954, 782.

in an Asian collective security arrangement. The Geneva settlement ensured that they would not have that capacity. Radford declared the need for freedom to strike at China without bogging down defending little countries, and a treaty would only fool the people in the region to thinking the United States would protect them. Radford and General Matthew Ridgeway then agreed if China made any military move, they would strike China rather than defend the nations of Southeast Asia.<sup>28</sup>

Dulles had the opportunity to defend SEACDT at an NSC meeting the next day. The Secretary of State argued that a pact would give the president discretionary power to move against China before a war declaration, while securing foreign support in the event of such action. Following Dulles' defense, the NSC discussed the possibility of simply getting an economic treaty in the region, but Vice President Richard Nixon agreed with Dulles and asserted that only a military option could ensure that the communists honored the terms of the Geneva Accords. Ironically, Dulles had already declared that the United States would have to block the proposed 1956 elections in Vietnam to stop Ho Chi Minh from taking absolute control of

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<sup>28</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 653-56.



the nation. Despite the duality, the NSC accepted this argument, and the Joint Chiefs acquiesced.

After further approving the concept of an Asian alliance treaty, the National Security Council worked on the post-Geneva proposals and formulated them into NSC-5429 by the middle of August. This policy directive stated that the communists had scored a public relations victory at Geneva. Therefore the United States needed to create a Southeast Asian pact for the purposes of "peace propaganda." It stated that any regional economic focus had to include Japan, so SEACDT had to keep economic planning to a minimum. Instead, the treaty needed to give the president the authority to wage war in the region without explicit congressional approval while maintaining international support.<sup>29</sup>

In the event of war in the planned treaty area, NSC-5429 considered two different approaches. The first option, or Alternative A, recommended immediate retaliation against China in the case of any aggression in "Free" Southeast Asia. Alternative B instead followed Dulles' ANZUS language, or a committal from each member to act to meet the common danger according to their own constitutional requirements. In either case, NSC 5429

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<sup>29</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 698-702, 725-33, 773-74.

declared that in the event of any type of perceived aggression the United States should have the freedom to attack its enemies as it chose, including, if necessary, the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, any arrangement needed to allow action without a declaration of war, and it had to allow the United States to act with its allies or unilaterally as it wished.<sup>30</sup>

Some authors have cited NSC 5429 as proof of American belligerency charging that the Joint Chiefs and Dulles favored the more belligerent Alternative A. Indeed the JCS favored Alternative A from a strictly military standpoint, but they actually favored political action. On 11 August 1954, the JCS sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson stating their preference militarily for Alternative A, but they recommended an attempt to foster a rift between Red China and the Soviet Union as the proper political course in order to prevent any military action.<sup>31</sup>

One of the more recent treatments of this subject, William Duiker's *US Containment Policy* (1994), acknowledged the soft side of the JCS response, but Duiker, a former State Department official during the Kennedy administration, fully charged Dulles with supporting

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<sup>30</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 700.

<sup>31</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 720-23; Duiker, *Containment*, 202.

Alternative A. Indeed, in the memo Duiker cites as evidence, Dulles stated that he favored Alternative A, but only "as long as the decision to pull the trigger rested with the US and as long as President Eisenhower's administration was in office."<sup>32</sup> Since he could not guarantee those two conditions indefinitely, Dulles reasoned that Alternative B seemed the better option. Furthermore, Dulles explained that he invented the language of the second choice for the ANZUS treaty, and he continually argued that it formed the best possible basis for any collective security agreement. The failure to consider these qualifiers makes Dulles seem more like a warmonger than his own statements warrant.<sup>33</sup>

After adopting Alternative B for NSC 5429, the NSC turned its attention to the problem created at the Geneva Conference as they tried to determine just what they needed to defend. Dulles believed that legally Cambodia and Laos could join a defensive alliance, since America would certainly not create a system in violation of the UN Charter. Even so, he recognized that the United States probably could not keep communism out of southern Vietnam but even if the situation seemed hopeless, the United

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<sup>32</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 722.

<sup>33</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 727-28.

States could not abandon the area completely. Taking a firm stance could at least keep the communists from expanding into the offshore island chain to threaten Japan. Secretary of Defense Wilson disagreed arguing that a communist takeover in Indochina "would not be a loss to us."<sup>34</sup> Eisenhower took the position that any communist gains would result in an American loss and compelled the NSC to include Vietnam in its defensive plans.<sup>35</sup>

As the NSC planned US policy after Geneva, international planning for an alliance treaty also took place. On 14 August, just three days after the cease-fire in Indochina, Great Britain, the United States, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand declared that they would meet on 6 September to form a regional security pact, and they invited any interested Asian nations to attend. At that point, the United States and Britain initiated a joint working group in Washington that would build on the United Action discussion to hone a treaty to as near a final draft as possible before the conference began.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 731.

<sup>35</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 722-31.

<sup>36</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 705-7, 735.

Much work had gone into a possible draft treaty during the Geneva planning sessions, but the question of how to include Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam into a collective security organization developed into one of the most difficult problems after the conference. Determined to hold the communists to the line accepted in Geneva, State Department officials met with the British, Australian, and New Zealand Foreign Offices. The British tentatively agreed to include Laos, Cambodia, and free Vietnam, but Australia and New Zealand questioned such a move. Including South Vietnam seemed illegal and asking Laos and Cambodia violated the spirit if not the letter of the Geneva Accords.<sup>37</sup> Their arguments swayed the British negotiators who switched their position to adopt one much like that of Australia and New Zealand.<sup>38</sup>

The United States continued to desire inclusion of these states, but it received little support from its allies. The situation grew tense between the Western nations until the barely consulted French suggested attaching a special protocol to the treaty that would serve as an umbrella clause by extending the benefits of membership to Cambodia, Laos, and free Vietnam without

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<sup>37</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 742.

<sup>38</sup> Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War: Indochina, 1954* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 326.

requiring them to join the alliance. The Eisenhower administration accepted this solution since it allowed them to fulfill their objectives. They could simultaneously hold the communists in northern Vietnam, and they would also retain the freedom to intervene in the event the communists attacked southern Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.<sup>39</sup>

The planning sessions ironed out a proposed treaty into near final form by the beginning of the Manila conference scheduled for early September. The draft utilized the ANZUS language to establish a loose alliance, and it retained the phrase "communist aggression." The participating nations still held some objections to the rough version though. Australia wanted military responsibilities defined in the treaty, but the US objected. The Philippines desired the treaty to apply self-determination to the entire region, but the British disagreed. Despite not being decided before the conference, American planners viewed these as fairly minor points, but one major point of disagreement with the proposed treaty continued to threaten negotiations.<sup>40</sup>

The British remained "unalterably opposed" to the use of the word "communist" in the treaty, and the Americans

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<sup>39</sup> Devillers and Lacouture, *End of a War*, 327.

<sup>40</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 758-61, 776-78.

insisted that it remain.<sup>41</sup> Dulles could not understand Whitehall's refusal to cooperate since the British had agreed time and again that the purpose of the treaty was to fight communism. He argued that the Soviets specified the West in their treaties, so why should America and Britain not do the same? Furthermore, Dulles felt that the word needed to be in the treaty to ensure that the US did not become involved in an India-Pakistan war since Pakistan had shown interest in the treaty. The American arguments were to no avail. Even worse, the British won every participating nation, with the exception of Thailand, to their side. The general refusal to accept the word "communist" led Dulles to believe that the upcoming conference would collapse, but Eisenhower informed him that the US must not abandon the region without a fight. Dulles agreed with the president, but his doubts continued to plague him -- especially when he discovered on 30 August that the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, would not attend the conference in favor of attending a meeting on the proposed European Defense Community (EDC). Instead of succumbing to his fears at that point, Dulles determined that he had to personally guide the upcoming Manila

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<sup>41</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 791.

conference to an acceptable conclusion, and he flew to the Philippines without much hope for success.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 735, 740, 791-92, 797-98, 806-07, 820-22, 835-36.



## CHAPTER V

### MANILA PACT

On 5 September 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived in Manila, the Philippines, for a conference on the South East Asian Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT), but he had serious reservations about the treaty. He worried about Anthony Eden's absence, and he doubted that the nations of Southeast Asia had much to offer. Prior to leaving the United States, he even remarked to a friend, "these fellows are so weak and feeble, one wonders if it is good to have a treaty with them."<sup>1</sup> On arriving, he met almost immediately with the United States delegation to outline America's position at the conference. Besides the Secretary, the principal members of the US delegation included Senators H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey and Michael J. Mansfield of Montana as plenipotentiary representatives and Douglas MacArthur II as the delegation coordinator. The delegates anticipated few significant problems at Manila. For the most part, they expected

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<sup>1</sup> Phone conversation between Dulles and Carl McCardle, 31 Aug. 1954, Telephone Conversations Series, box 2, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower Library.

trouble over minor points of verbiage in the draft treaty. Yet, a handful of problems loomed large and threatened to upset the talks.

Most of the probable problems seemed almost negligible and caused few serious concerns. For example, Dulles wanted to ensure that Article III, which covered economics, remained broad in scope so that Japan could participate in the economic provisions of the treaty without membership in the security group. Dulles feared that Thailand or the Philippines would want to lock down the language in this section to define more clearly economic responsibilities because they wanted increased assistance from the US. More troublesome, the Australian delegation had informed the United States that they wished to change the language of Article V. This section provided that the SEACDT would provide for "consultation" on military matters, but Australia wanted the treaty to provide for some specific "machinery" to deal with military concerns. Dulles hoped he could easily sway the Australian delegation to adopt the American position because the United States did not intend to create any elaborate military organization with the SEACDT.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Phone conversation between Dulles and Percy Spender, 31 Aug. 1954, Telephone Conversations Series, box 2, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower Library.

In addition to these less troublesome concerns, Dulles worried that three more significant potential problems could disrupt the entire conference. He expected that Article IV of the treaty, which discussed the treaty members' obligations in the event of an attack, would prove the most problematic. First of all, the treaty did not cover Cambodia, Laos, and "free" Vietnam due to the provisions of the Geneva Accords. The treaty sprang into existence because the United States wanted to protect Vietnam from communism, but the peace settlement prevented the Vietnamese from direct participation. In order to cover South Vietnam, Dulles proposed that the treaty limits be defined by a geographical line rather than by country name. By delineating a general area, South Vietnam could be protected without being named to the treaty. Senator Mansfield agreed with the substance of Dulles's plan, but he cautioned against differentiating between the concerns of South Vietnam and those of Laos and Cambodia. To that end, Dulles ordered the delegation to draft a special protocol to the treaty that would extend benefits of membership to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.<sup>3</sup>

Another potential difficulty with Article IV threatened to disrupt the conference because the United

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<sup>3</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 846-47.

States wanted the treaty to specify that it would only band the members together in the event of communist aggression. Dulles apprised the delegation of the problems the United States had in the planning sessions with Great Britain regarding the inclusion of the word "communism" in the treaty. Senators Smith and Mansfield both agreed that the treaty should target communism, and they advised that removal of the word would most likely cause the Senate to attach a rider to the treaty that the United States could only act in the event of Communist aggression.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles also anticipated difficulty over the ANZUS language in Article IV. The ANZUS treaty specified that an attack in the treaty area would be met by the constitutional processes of the member nations. The Secretary assumed that some of the nations involved would request the more forceful NATO language that specified an attack on one would be considered an attack on all members. Smith and Mansfield assured Dulles that the Senate preferred the ANZUS language and would respond much more favorably to a treaty that avoided the potentially troublesome NATO wording.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 846-47.

<sup>5</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 846-47.

After identifying the potential problems of Vietnamese participation, the treaty's position on communism, and a possible controversy over the ANZUS language, the US delegation adopted a common front that it would use throughout the rest of the conference. With these internal matters decided, Dulles, Smith, Mansfield, and McArthur met with Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey at 4 p.m. on 5 September. Casey began the meeting by discussing Australia's position. His government wanted to support the United States, but in order to be able to earmark budget money for defense, Australia wanted to know its specific military commitments under the Southeast Asian treaty. Specifically, Casey asked to know "X number of land forces, Y number of air forces, and Z number of naval forces."<sup>6</sup> Casey also wanted to know what type of military planning would take place within the new treaty organization. Casey believed that military planning through ANZUS and joint planning with the UK and United States should be sufficient, but he doubted the Asian partners would feel this level of planning sufficed for them. Considering the issue, he proposed several possibilities, which even included having the United States alone responsible for the alliance's military planning. The nature of Casey's

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<sup>6</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 849.

comments indicates that Australia intended to follow the United States' lead in regional planning, but Casey needed information for voters. In that respect, Casey brought up the concern for "machinery." He stated that Australia did not want any elaborate military organization for the SEATO group, but he needed to have the ability to tell his party's constituents what level of commitment the United States expected from Australia. Dulles explained the US concept of mobile defense forces to Casey and stated that the United States did not even want the word "machinery" to appear in the treaty lest the other signatories try to later use the document as a basis for compelling the US to dedicate specific military units to Southeast Asian defense. He asked Casey if it would be acceptable for Australia if the treaty created a council that would "provide for consultation with regard to military planning as required by the situation."<sup>7</sup> Dulles believed this alternative left specific planning open while addressing the concerns of the Australians. Casey concurred that this solution would work temporarily, but he advised that the Australian electorate would ultimately want to know its specific force commitment. Dulles told Casey that the United States had an entirely different problem. It needed

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<sup>7</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 850.

to hold mobile striking power in reserve because it could not afford to make specific defense commitments to each region of the world it had pledged to protect. If the treaty delineated specific numbers from the powers involved, the United States would be unable to commit. Casey did not favor the American position, but he understood and accepted it. Casey then asked how the United States intended to handle the British reservations about word "Communist." Dulles answered that the United States would consent to leaving the word out of the treaty but would ultimately sign with the reservation that it would only act in the event of communist aggression. Again, Casey agreed, but after the meeting with Dulles he cabled the content of the discussion to his government. The instructions he received in return would disrupt the final sessions of the conference.<sup>8</sup>

The joint US-Australian meeting demonstrates the close connection between the two at the conference and in planning for military concerns of the region. The treaty had been written by a joint US-UK planning session, but at the actual conference, the United States conferred most closely with the Australian delegation. Since Anthony Eden elected to remain in Europe to work on West German

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<sup>8</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 848-852.

rearmament and the proposed European Union, the British delegation had to act on limited instructions from London, and Dulles felt a sense of reluctance from the British delegation to back the United States. As a result, the United States conferred closely with Australia, and the Australian delegation, rather than the typically friendly British, most often supported the United States in Manila.

The conference officially opened the next day, 6 September 1954. The delegates divided the conference into six plenary sessions, two sessions daily over three days. The first plenary session went smoothly. Essentially, an opening ceremony, it allowed the delegates to agree quickly on parts of the treaty not in contention. As head of the host nation's delegation, Philippines Foreign Minister Carlos Garcia opened the conference and acted as Chairman. During the opening session, the delegation heads stressed the need for a defensive deterrent against communism as well as improved economic cooperation. Anticipating some US concerns, Casey announced in the opener that he had heard a good deal of discussion about a NATO or an ANZUS style treaty. With this in mind, he commented, "It is not, I believe, a matter of substance whether the treaty language reads like a NATO or reads like ANZUS. What matters is the purpose and attitude of mind of the



signatories."<sup>9</sup> Beginning in this way, Casey addressed one of the principal concerns of the United States delegation without forcing the Americans to bring it up themselves. Australia acted in a similar capacity through the rest of the conference.<sup>10</sup>

The Philippines did introduce an unanticipated topic during the opening session. It wanted the conference to somehow recognize the principle of self-determination and the right to self-government, and Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay addressed the assembled conference to propose placing a proclamation in support of the self determination of nations into the treaty. Dulles regarded the statement as a good propaganda move for the United States, and he supported it rather than debating about adding something to the treaty at such a late date. Not all of the delegations, particularly the British, supported the proposal with as much enthusiasm as the US.

In the afternoon session, following a proposal by the Thai delegation, the delegates decided to address the articles out of order by first examining the least controversial. As a result, the delegates approved Articles I and VI without changes. Articles II, VII, IX,

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<sup>9</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 860.

<sup>10</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 860.

and X met quick acceptance after minor alterations. This left the preamble and articles III, IV, V, and VIII as the contentious sections.<sup>11</sup> Of these, the delegates first addressed Article III, on the economic relationships between the treaty members.

Dulles had feared the desired broad wording about economics would prove contentious, and indeed, it caused some difficulties. Article III stressed the need for economic collaboration between the treaty members. In general, all of the potential members agreed on the need for a provision dealing with trade, but the wording proved troublesome. Pakistan, in particular, objected to mentioning trade with "other free states" in the treaty. Zafrullah Kahn, the head of the Pakastani delegation, argued that entering into an alliance should give the members special trade status. If the treaty had no special economic provisions for members, he saw little reason to include the issue. The Thai delegation concurred and maintained that entering into such a treaty with the United States should entitle them to special economic considerations. The delegates did not find a suitable wording during the second plenary session, but when Dulles

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<sup>11</sup> See Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty in Appendix 1 for final text of articles.

wrote his report of the day's events, he mentioned that he believed everyone was in significant agreement and that finding acceptable verbiage constituted a fairly simple task.<sup>12</sup>

Rather than stall on the exact language of an article that most of the delegates essentially supported, the session turned to discussion of an Australian pre-conference proposal to add something concrete about military planning or the administrative machinery needed for the treaty organization. Since the discussion between Dulles and Casey had already addressed most of Australia's concerns, Australia withdrew support of its own position and supported the United States. Even so, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines had their own reservations about this section. These three nations wanted to keep the Australian suggestion and enhance it by including language that would give the proposed council the ability to carry out economic consultations so that there would be some sort of permanent apparatus for discussing both military and economic collaboration between member states. The United States did not want this article to include economics, and Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand agreed. For the first time at the conference, but not the last, the

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<sup>12</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 852-59.

more industrially advanced nations took up opposite positions from the developing Asian nations they sought as alliance partners, and the united front kept the conference from changing the treaty to accommodate the desires of the Asian delegations.<sup>13</sup>

After the first day's meetings, some of Dulles's pessimism regarding the conference had dissipated. Objections had been minor, and with support from the Australian delegation, Dulles finally believed that he could guide the conference to an acceptable conclusion. Furthermore, Dulles had also received unexpected support from the French delegation. The Secretary had anticipated some disputes with the French. In particular, prior to the conference the French had expressed concerns about the economic provisions in Article III, but they did not broach their reservations during the afternoon meeting. Unknown to Dulles, Guy La Chambre, the head of the French delegation, had received orders from President Pierre Mendes-France to follow the US on all major points and to only suggest minor verbal changes. The change in attitude

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<sup>13</sup> President Eisenhower later questioned Dulles about the reasons Australia and New Zealand sided with former colonial powers against the developing nations. Relying on his conversations with Casey, Dulles replied that they wanted to show a common front with Britain, and they were worried about the prospect of too much independence in the island nations nearby, particularly New Guinea. *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 905; 214th NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers.

demonstrates that the French had their fill of problems in Southeast Asia and willingly let the United States take charge in the region. Despite the feelings of reassurance created by Australian and French support, the most controversial sections of the treaty, notably Article IV with its controversial ANZUS language and the references to communism, had not been discussed.<sup>14</sup>

With events progressing smoothly, the US delegation worked that evening on a revision of the wording in Article III that it hoped would meet the objections of the attendees. Dulles presented the revised wording the next morning during the third plenary session. The revision read:

The parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward this end.<sup>15</sup>

The revised text consisted of language vague enough that the United States could consider it to include Japan, but it made specific mention of economic cooperation and technical assistance, thereby relieving the concerns of

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<sup>14</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 845.

<sup>15</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 862.

Pakistan and Thailand. The revision met quick acceptance, and freed the delegates to move forward.<sup>16</sup>

The conference next turned to Article V, which dealt with the establishment of the council that would coordinate the military concerns of the treaty organization. Based on his conversations with Dulles the previous day, Casey proposed a revised version that stated, "the council shall provide for periodic consultation with regard to military and any other planning."<sup>17</sup> The delegates debated the Australian proposal at length, but eventually accepted it with minor changes. With the acceptance of Article V, the United States obtained another of its goals. The treaty created no elaborate council mechanism and made no specific mention of exact military commitments. The simple inclusion of the word "consultation" satisfied the concerns of the developing nations attending the conference, and the Australian delegation had again assisted United States.<sup>18</sup>

The delegates next turned to discussion of Article IV, the most controversial part of the treaty because it included the specification that the treaty was designed to defend against communism and because it contained the ANZUS

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<sup>16</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 862.

<sup>17</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 865.

<sup>18</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 865-873.

language. Dulles initiated the discussion by trying to define the nature of the treaty in relation to communism, and he made it clear that the United States wanted this aspect of the treaty to remain. Even so, recent events had caused Dulles to adopt a more flexible position. The Secretary had gone to Manila determined to fight for a treaty that referenced communism, but on 3 September, the People's Republic of China began shelling Nationalist Chinese positions in Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits. This action troubled the delegations of the smaller nations, and Dulles feared that the treaty would dissolve before his eyes if he insisted that allusions to communism remain. He therefore abandoned his plans and announced that the United States would agree to remove all references to communism in the treaty, but a reservation that it only intended to become involved in a regional conflict in the event of communist aggression would accompany the US signature. Dulles justified the reservation by stating that the United States had no territorial interests in the region and so had different concerns than some of the other nations at the conference.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 873-75; Statement by Dulles, box 79, fol. Bipartisan Foreign Policy, roll 30, JFD Papers; 213th NSC Meeting, 9 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers.

Dulles' willingness to give ground on the inclusion of references to communism in the treaty met with initial favor, and the debate next turned to whether or not to use NATO or ANZUS language in the treaty. The small nations, especially the Philippines and Thailand, believed that the ANZUS language provided a loophole for the United States because the language allowed nations to fall back upon their constitutional processes, which meant that the US Senate would still be able to debate the course of action to take in the event of an attack on an Asian member. They desired as strong an alliance as possible and feared that the United States could use the ANZUS wording to avoid coming to their defense in time of need. NSC-5429 bound Dulles to avoid a NATO style commitment to preserve American freedom of action. Furthermore, Senators Smith and Mansfield had assured Dulles that the Senate would not ratify a treaty that contained the controversial wording. So, Dulles delivered an eloquent speech stating that the United States Constitution mandated that only the Senate could declare war, and there was a feeling that the NATO style language could commit the United States to war without consent from the Senate. As a result, he declared that the NATO phrasing "gives rise to constitutional debate in the United States Senate which we do not want to



repeat."<sup>20</sup> This wording had nearly blocked passage of the NATO treaty, and the Senate would not accept another treaty that followed the NATO pattern. So, the United States had to honor its constitution and insist on the ANZUS language. Dulles also argued that the ANZUS language came from the Monroe Doctrine. That being the case, everyone in the US would recognize its power and would act to defend any of the treaty members in the event of conflict, and the phrasing did not constitute a loophole. Despite Dulles' reassurances, the Thai delegation continued to balk, but again Casey stood by Dulles by recommending the ANZUS language and affirming its effectiveness. Casey proved persuasive, and the ANZUS language remained.<sup>21</sup>

After the discussion of the ANZUS language, the conference turned to the remaining points, mainly defining the treaty area in Article VIII and reaching agreement on the proposal to attach a protocol to the treaty that stated Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia could all benefit from the economic and military provisions of the treaty without official membership. The United States favored the protocol because it helped answer US concerns about how to

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<sup>20</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 877.

<sup>21</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 836-36, 876-79; Secret Understanding of the Philippines in Regard to Article IV, Sept. 1954, box 86, fol. SEATO Conference, roll 33, JFD Papers.

cover South Vietnam in the treaty, and despite fears of controversy, the delegates approved the protocol with relatively little discussion. They did engage in some lengthy discussion about how to define the treaty area, but compared to the debate over the ANZUS language, the delegates settled the matter quickly and defined the treaty area as Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific south of 21° 30" north latitude. This boundary insured that the treaty did not include South Korea or the Republic of China, but it covered the former French colonies in Southeast Asia as well as Burma, Malaysia, and Indonesia.<sup>22</sup>

The second day of the conference concluded with most details of the treaty nearly sorted out. The biggest issue looming for the third day promised to be the Philippines' desire to include a statement about self-determination. Even so, the delegates had not officially approved Article IV, and despite some agreements, it still loomed as a possible area of contention. In order to better reach a consensus, several delegates worked after hours on the self-determination issue. The attending nations essentially agreed with the Philippines about the

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<sup>22</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 874, 884-96, 900-01; Roger Dingman, "John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954," *International History Review* 9(2): 1987), 469-73.

importance of self-determination, but the British delegation did not feel that the actual treaty should be used to make a political statement that held no precise legal meaning. The controversy seemed relatively minor, and after some discussion, the Philippines agreed to relinquish their request provided that a separate Pacific Charter supporting the right of self-determination would be signed concurrently with the treaty. This brief document expressed the support of all attending nations for upholding the United Nations charter and its provisions on self-determination. Once the Philippine delegation agreed to remove these provisions from the treaty itself, the proposal met with ready agreement.<sup>23</sup>

With the issue of the Pacific Charter settled, it seemed that the final day of the conference, 8 September, would see speedy agreement and signature of the treaty. One problem still remained though, and it nearly caused the entire conference to unravel. Dulles' suggestion that the United States would include a special provision with its signature caused the Australian delegation to fear getting into a situation in which it might be left to fight in the region without American support. As such, the Australian

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<sup>23</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 897-98; Statement by Dulles, box 79, fol. Bipartisan Foreign Policy, roll 30, JFD Papers.

government instructed Casey to sign the treaty with reservations similar to those of United States. Casey informed Dulles of this position, just before the morning session on 8 September. Initially, the Australian reservations seemed to cause little alarm, but once Australia voiced its concerns, the Philippines followed suit and stated that it wished to sign with similar reservations. The attachment of reservations to signatures caused delegates from Thailand and Pakistan to doubt the sincerity of the other treaty members, and Zafrullah Kahn threatened to leave the conference without signing anything. The close ties between the American and Australian delegations had finally created problems for Dulles, rather than helping to solve them. Casey had attempted to follow the lead of the United States, but the plan backfired. As a result, Dulles scrambled to find a solution. During a session break, he met privately with the Australians and Filipinos and convinced them that they should sign without reservation. Casey's instructions permitted him to sign without reservation if the stipulation would cause the conference to break down, and Dulles assured him they faced such a situation. True to form, the Australian delegation supported the US and abandoned their reservations, and the Australian

willingness to sign without reservation persuaded the Philippine delegation to eliminate their reservations as well.<sup>24</sup>

The Manila conference had created some troublesome debates, but Dulles managed to guide the conference into accepting a treaty extremely agreeable with US interests, and the delegates formally signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT) at 4 p.m. on 8 September 1954. After the signing ceremony, the delegates relaxed over cocktails and discussed what they should call their new treaty. Someone joked that SEADCT was entirely unpronounceable, and a marketable name needed to be decided upon for press statements. The delegates had decided on the first day of the conference that "Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)" sounded too much like NATO. There was general agreement that their treaty was nothing like NATO, and to avoid confusion, they needed a new name. Dulles had already given the matter some thought, and he suggested the treaty be called the Manila Pact. This seemed suitable, and the initial official releases about the conference referred to the treaty by this name. To Dulles's chagrin, the name did not last long. The American press had already adopted the name SEATO before the Manila

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<sup>24</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 899-901.

conference even began. Furthermore, the presumed association with NATO seemed too strong, and the press continued to utilize the name SEATO. Even more troublesome for Dulles, many State Department officials had also adopted the name. As a result, SEATO had entered into common usage when the first treaty council meeting took place in February 1955, and the council adopted Southeast Asia Treaty Organization as the official name.<sup>25</sup>

Regardless of the naming issue, Dulles believed that the conference had been an immense success. He expected that the creation of the treaty alone would deter communist aggression, and he repeatedly stressed that this aspect should be considered the most important aspect of the treaty. He also thought that the adoption of the ANZUS language represented a triumph for the United States because it would allow the US to respond to aggression as it saw fit. Furthermore, he believed that not creating a formal military organization and instead relying upon periodic consultations of a security council represented a success for the United States. Like the ANZUS style language, the lack of a dedicated military force would keep the United States from having to specify specific force commitments. Examined collectively, Dulles felt that the treaty

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<sup>25</sup> "Successful Salvage," *Time*, 20 Sept. 1954.

demonstrated America's commitment to defend the region and that the treaty enhanced the United States' reputation in the region. SEATO would serve as a deterrent for communism, show the United States had a common bond with several developing nations, and give the United States the legal justification take military action in the region in the event of a future conflict. Furthermore, the treaty would compel congressional support for military action, thereby averting the problems that resulted when the United States could not intervene to help the French at Dienbienphu.<sup>26</sup>

Despite a feeling of success, a number of aspects of the treaty negotiations still troubled Dulles. Particularly, he worried about continued US-UK joint policy for East Asia. At the conference, Zafrullah Kahn informed Dulles that the British had discouraged him from attending the conference in an official capacity. Furthermore, Kahn believed that Ceylon had supported the treaty and had considering coming to Manila but had most likely been discouraged by the British. The US ambassador in Ceylon, P.K. Crowe, reinforced Kahn's message by reporting that the Ceylonese Prime Minister supported SEATO and hoped his country could join sometime in the future. The Australians

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<sup>26</sup> 214th NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers.

had proven extremely supportive, but Dulles still wanted to maintain strong ties to Great Britain.<sup>27</sup>

Dulles also believed that true success for SEATO required an accompanying economic organization. He recognized that in the Cold War only prosperity could truly demonstrate that Western democracies offered a better political system for nations escaping colonialism than communism. The United States could not fund every development project in Southeast Asia. The region needed to boost its own economic potential without handholding from the Americans or Europeans, but Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines did not have a sufficient industrial background to fulfill his vision. Japan clearly had the strongest economic and industrial potential in the region, and Dulles saw no other means to create significant economic growth in Asia than Japanese participation in an expanded version of SEATO. To that end, Dulles contemplated the creation of a North East Asian or a "horizontal Western Pacific"<sup>28</sup> security organization that would include Japan and other friendly states in the region and could eventually be merged with SEATO and ANZUS.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 901-02.

<sup>28</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 912.

<sup>29</sup> Address by Dulles, box 79, fol. Bipartisan Foreign Policy, roll 30, JFD Papers.



Despite his wishes, Dulles did not see a practical means to add Japan to SEATO in 1954.<sup>30</sup>

Somewhat worried about the future, Dulles left Manila and visited Taipei and Tokyo on his return trip to the United States. The Secretary first met with Jiang Jieshi in Taiwan on 9 September. Jiang discussed the Manila Pact and stated that the Chinese nationalists felt like they stood outside the scope of American security concerns since the United States had no security treaty with Nationalist China. Dulles laughed off Jiang's concerns and quipped that the Philippines had questioned the United States's defense commitments to them because the Seventh Fleet stood ready to protect Formosa but no fleet sailed in Philippine waters. Dulles assured Jiang that the United States would indeed protect Formosa under the executive orders issued by Eisenhower. Dulles made no specific commitments, and he explicitly stated that the United States would not engage in such a relationship with Nationalist China. Even so, the proposal essentially aligned with Dulles's desires to join SEATO to a northeast Asian group, and he revised his position before the end of the year.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 911-13; 214th NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers; Asian Pact, 1 Dec. 1954, box 82, fol. Japan, roll 32, JFD Papers.

<sup>31</sup> 214th NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers.

After Taiwan, Dulles flew to Japan for a brief visit with Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki. Economic concerns dominated the conversations. Pleased with their progress, the Japanese informed Dulles that they had made marked improvements to their rice industry and would be able to grow enough rice for domestic consumption without relying so heavily on imports. Japan had more than \$1 billion in trade deficit in 1953, but, due largely to rice, Yoshida expected a considerable reduction for 1954. The rest could be eliminated through expansion of foreign markets. Dulles encouraged Yoshida to focus on Southeast Asia and suggested that the United States would not make a good market because the Japanese simply did not make products that Americans wanted to buy. The Secretary suggested that the real key to economic growth would be the successful settlement of reparations. Recognizing that Japan could not make burdensome payments and develop its industrial sector at the same time, he encouraged Yoshida to only accept reasonable reparations offers and to consider them all with shrewd business sense rather than a feeling of debt about World War II.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> 214th NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers.

During his visit, Dulles also encouraged Japanese rearmament. Particularly troublesome for the United States, the Soviets had begun construction of an airbase in the Kuriles that would allow them to project more air power into East Asia than the United States could accomplish. Yoshida advised Dulles he did not welcome continued comments about Japanese rearmament, and Dulles realized the United States had been pressing too hard. Indeed after leaving Japan, he feared that continued discussion of military issues with Japan would result in a loss of Japanese political support for the United States. Furthermore, the Japanese expressed sincere displeasure that they could not trade with Communist China like the United States' European allies. Dulles understood the frustration, but he worried even more about the communist subversion of Japan.<sup>33</sup>

After meeting with the Japanese, Dulles returned to the United States. In just a few days, he had guided the Manila conference to an acceptable conclusion and produced the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. On his return, Dulles touted the trip as a success, but he also believed that the future success of America's Asian policy required the creation of an economic group that included Japan.

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<sup>33</sup> 214<sup>th</sup> NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers.

Unfortunately, Dulles' meetings with the Japanese found them reluctant to follow the United States in that direction, and as early as 10 September 1954, the expansion of SEATO appeared to be a difficult proposition at best.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> 214<sup>th</sup> NSC Meeting, 12 Sept. 1954, NSC Series, box 6, DDE Papers; Statement by Dulles, 10 Sept. 1954, box 82, fol. Japan, roll 32, JFD Papers; *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 903-12, 931.

## CHAPTER VI

### SEATO IN ACTION

John Foster Dulles believed the creation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEACDT) on terms acceptable to the United States represented a notable success, but a great deal of work remained to transform the Manila Pact into a viable alliance. The governments of the member states had to ratify the treaty. A governing council needed to be created, and once formed, it had to define the organization's operational structure. The governments had to reach agreements about the level of military commitment required and establish parameters for military interaction and training.

Considering these matters, Dulles first met with Richard Casey of Australia to discuss the interaction between ANZUS and SEATO. Meeting on 22 September 1954, Casey outlined a system for military planning to Dulles. He had already presented the idea to Admiral Arthur Radford, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and others. While Radford had not seemed interested in the idea, most others had expressed approval. This plan

supported the creation of a small, permanent secretary for SEATO with responsibility for military planning, and Casey hoped that specific member force contributions could be established. American planners had already dismissed the concept of a central military organization. Instead, they wanted to follow the ANZUS model in which military representatives met for periodic meetings but not as part of a formal group. Dulles advised Casey of these concerns. In any case, they agreed that SEATO would not supersede ANZUS, and they made arrangements for an ANZUS meeting to discuss SEATO and its ramifications in early October. Soon after, Dulles had a similar conversation with New Zealand Ambassador Leslie Munro.<sup>1</sup>

In the ANZUS meetings that followed, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand outlined their own plans for how SEATO should be structured. They decided that the principal SEATO council should consist of the foreign ministers of the member governments and should meet once per year. They also agreed that there should be no fixed meeting site with member nations taking turns as host for the council meetings. They outlined a policy for selecting a chairman, how meetings would be conducted, and even how working groups should be established. Then they drew up a

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<sup>1</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 915-920.

system for selecting military advisers and the relationship of the military to the central council. It is important to note that by making these arrangements less than a month after signing the SEACDT, the ANZUS powers essentially created the basic structure of the Manila Pact well before the first meeting for the organization. While their plans were sketchy, this did indeed become the basic operating structure for the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.<sup>2</sup>

The model of ANZUS creating SEATO policy, especially on military matters, continued throughout the life of the alliance. Indeed, after outlining the basic framework for SEATO, Casey suggested that ANZUS should continue to "serve as a cover for what would in effect be SEATO strategic planning -- its true purpose not being publicly known -- and that "make-believe" planning be undertaken bilaterally by the US with each of the other four countries."<sup>3</sup>

Ambassador Munro agreed. Dulles responded by arguing that simply creating the SEACDT already had a deterrent effect on communist aggression. As such, the United States wished to avoid heavy military planning. Neither did it want to shoulder the responsibility of coordinating military planning bilaterally with the other nations. Dulles had no

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<sup>2</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 936-946.

<sup>3</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 940. Casey's numbers included the United Kingdom as an unofficial ANZUS member.

objections to outlining SEATO policy through ANZUS, but he argued that issuing instructions to the Asian members without the illusion of consultation would make it appear that the United States dictated military policy to the other allies. The Soviets would watch for the opportunity to make charges of US imperialism, and he had to be careful to avoid such accusations. With this position in mind, they decided they could outline SEATO policy through ANZUS, but they would then present a united front at SEATO Council meetings to help direct the organization along the proper course.<sup>4</sup>

Dulles consulted with leaders of the ANZUS powers about military matters and the basic organization of the Manila Pact, but when considering economic policies for the organization, American planners met privately. The delegates at Manila had frequently raised the question of economic interaction but had come to no conclusions. Thus, the NSC began developing NSC 5506 as its guideline for East Asian aid. This plan followed the model Dulles had previously recommended. It suggested that any massive aid program needed to be designed by Asians, and prior to such an initiative the United States needed to limit its economic plans for the region to the extension of

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<sup>4</sup> *FRUS 1952-1954*, vol. 12, 938-946.



assistance for military forces and minor amounts for developmental and technical assistance. In other words, the United States should continue the same types of aid that existed before SEATO until Asians could develop their own economies. The policy paper also recommended special consideration for Japan and continued to stress the importance of linking Japan to SEATO in order to encourage economic growth.<sup>5</sup>

Not all voices in the state Department accepted Dulles' vision for economic planning. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Economic Affairs, Charles F. Baldwin prepared the briefing paper on NSC 5506, but he complained to Walter F. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, that the paper "appears to reflect preconceived ideas and opinion and an attitude of inflexibility."<sup>6</sup> He argued that the public statements by Dulles suggested the United States had some sort of bold new initiatives planned for the region, but he complained that the present positions followed the same worn-out methods. He further contended that the old techniques had not demonstrated any effectiveness and

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<sup>5</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 18-24; US Plans for Asian Economic Development, box 98, fol. SEATO, roll 37, JFD Papers.

<sup>6</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 6.

trumping them up with "tawdry showmanship or ballyhoo" would not solve any problems.<sup>7</sup>

Presumably, the accusations reached Dulles because he met with Mutual Security Agency (MSA) Director Harold Stassen to re-examine the policy four days after Baldwin's note. They agreed that countries in the region besides the SEATO members needed assistance, and the United States simply did not have the reserves or will to offer more than it already planned. They believed that there needed be some economic organization that included nations outside of SEATO, but Dulles did not believe that such an organization could be formed until the solution of other problems in the region. Their minds made up, they decided to implement no changes. As a result, rather than looking for a dynamic new solution, Dulles next met with several senior State Department officials to discuss strategies of avoiding specific economic commitments for SEATO because he knew that Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines wanted to adopt a well developed economic plan. President Eisenhower approved the recommendations during the 3 February 1955 NSC meeting, and these economic policies guided the US relationship with SEATO throughout the Eisenhower

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<sup>7</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 7.

administration. Unfortunately, Charles Baldwin's complaints would prove prophetic.<sup>8</sup>

While Dulles and others outlined commitments and the basic organizational structure of the Manila Pact, the governments of each member nation had to ratify the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Few had concerns about the ratifications, and most member governments quickly approved the SEACDT. Ironically, treaty ratification proved most troublesome in Australia because the US signature reservation targeting communism upset the Cabinet. They did not necessarily object to the American reservations, but they wished they had received time to properly advise Casey on the issue. They believed Dulles unduly rushed the proceedings of the Manila conference, but they also viewed supporting the United States as serving their best interests. Consequently, they heatedly debated including their own reservation with their ratification, but ultimately, they accepted the treaty without any conditions. The other nations followed suit.<sup>9</sup>

The United States was actually one of the last nations to ratify the treaty, but the late date owed more to the fact that Congress was not in session at the end of 1954

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<sup>8</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 6-9, 24-29.

<sup>9</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, Vol. 12, 934-36.

than to any controversy. Indeed, when the Senate did consider the SEACDT they debated very little over the treaty. Certainly none of the controversy that accompanied consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty hampered the SEATO treaty. Dulles had successfully anticipated the possible difficulties and kept Congress informed during every step of the treaty making process. At the beginning of regional defense planning, he discussed the concept of joint action with congressional leaders. He kept the Senate Foreign Relations Committee informed about the planning sessions after Geneva, and he brought senators from both parties to the Manila conference. Most importantly, the utilization of the ANZUS language in the SEACDT kept congressional complaints to a minimum. Finally, Dulles appeared before the Senate to answer questions about the treaty before the ratification vote, and the Senate ratified the treaty on 1 February 1955 by a vote of 82 to 1.<sup>10</sup>

After the ratification vote, Dulles addressed the Foreign Policy Association at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. As the subject of his speech, he discussed his vision for the future of US relations in Asia. Arguing that "the

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<sup>10</sup> Key Foreign Policy Roll Calls 83<sup>rd</sup> and 84<sup>th</sup> Congressional Sessions, box 79, roll 30, JFD Papers.

Manila Pact was our starting point," he claimed that the meeting in Bangkok would only serve as a foundation for an organization that would grow in size and scope.<sup>11</sup> Dulles discussed issues like military and economic planning without providing specific details, but the most important part of the speech was a discussion of the cultural activities of SEATO. He discussed the potential for interaction between educators and the establishment of SEATO funded universities. He concluded by stressing the need to improve health care throughout the region. Dulles may have included these details for their domestic propaganda value, but this speech is the first public record of Dulles outlining such possibilities for the organization. Furthermore, education and research activities ultimately proved more successful than other aspects of SEATO.<sup>12</sup>

All the member nations submitted their instruments of ratification to Manila by 19 February 1955, and the Southeast Asia Treaty organization officially came into existence on that date. The members scheduled the first official meeting for 22 February 1955 in Bangkok. Dulles

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<sup>11</sup> Outline for Secretary's Feb. 16th speech, 9 Feb. 1955, box 98, fol. SEATO Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers.

<sup>12</sup> Outline for Secretary's Feb. 16th speech, 9 Feb. 1955; "Our Foreign Policies in Asia," 16 Feb. 1955, box 98, fol. SEATO Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers.

left for Thailand with a list of desired military, economic, and cultural objectives. The representatives met from 22-25 February, and the bulk of the meeting concerned basic organizational concepts which Dulles described as "drab business."<sup>13</sup> During the meetings, the delegates established a basic structure for the Manila Pact that followed the guidelines drawn up by the ANZUS powers. At the top, they established a Council of Foreign Ministers. This council would set broad policy and be the final decision-making body for the organization. The foreign ministers of the member governments made up the council's membership. True to the ANZUS power's formula, they resolved that this body would meet but once a year, and the location of their meetings would rotate between the member governments.<sup>14</sup>

Beneath the Council of Foreign Ministers, they established two separate groups: the Council of Representatives and the Council of Military Advisers. The representatives would carry on the mundane business of the organization and meet every two weeks. After some debate about the location, the delegates selected Bangkok as the

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<sup>13</sup> SECTO 38 from Bangkok, 25 Feb. 1955, box 98, fol. SEATO Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers.

<sup>14</sup> Notes for Closed Session, 22 Feb. 1955; SECTO 38 from Bangkok, 25 Feb. 1955, box 98, fol. SEATO Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers; *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 45-46.

group's headquarters, and the Thai foreign ministry agreed to provide the initial support staff. The Council of Military Advisers consisted of senior military staff from each nation. These advisers had also attended the Bangkok meeting, and after their formal creation, they met separately during the final two days of the conference to outline SEATO's military agenda. Resolving to meet twice per year, they formed the Panel of Staff Planners tasked with studying the technical aspects of military cooperation and making recommendations to their superiors.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, the foreign ministers established three committees beneath the Council of Representatives that would meet as often as needed to consider matters related to their own specialization. The first of these, the Committee of Security Experts, received the task of dealing with problems of subversion in the member countries. While the military advisers had to consider external threats to the SEATO members, the Committee of Security Experts had received responsibility for uncovering internal dangers. As such, they worked closely with the police forces of the Asian members. The security committee particularly pleased Dulles because he feared the next wave of communist revolutions would begin as internal subversion, and the

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<sup>15</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 46-56.

establishment of this group proved that the other members took the threat seriously. They also established a Committee of Economic Experts. Rather than working on plans for fiscal interaction, the council tasked the economic experts with studying the impact of treaty commitments on the member states. For example, the group received responsibility for analyzing the effect of defense costs on the regional economies. Finally, the delegates created the Committee of Information, Culture, Education, and Labor Activities. This committee had the broadest scope, and its members submitted detailed reports on social and labor legislation in the member countries. They also examined the technical resources available to the organization to determine how those resources could best be utilized to benefit regional conditions.<sup>16</sup>

This organizational structure retained its basic format throughout SEATO's life span, but it did see some changes. Notably, at the second annual meeting of the SEATO council in Karachi, Pakistan, the Council of Foreign Ministers created the Permanent Working Group comprised of diplomatic officials from each of the member nations. Essentially a policy planning staff, members of the working

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<sup>16</sup> SEATO, *First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 1956* (Washington DC: Dept of State, 1956), 1-10.



group ultimately ran the day-to-day business of SEATO and kept the council representatives informed of their activities. The third council meeting in Canberra, Australia, made another significant change. This meeting created the post of Secretary-General. The delegates designed the secretariat as a civil organization tasked with oversight of the Bangkok headquarters which had grown into a full fledged bureaucratic outfit by 1957. They continually needed more and more staff, such as security personnel and a Public Information Office, and the Secretary-General managed these civil functions of the organization.<sup>17</sup>

Despite some later administrative changes, the basic operational structure created in Bangkok remained in place throughout the life of SEATO. Besides considering organizational matters, the Council of Foreign Ministers also spent a considerable amount of time discussing economics at the first council meeting. Prior to the official opening session, Richard Casey approached Dulles to inquire why the United States did not wish to create a substantial economic policy as an integrated part of SEATO. Dulles replied that United States recognized a number of

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<sup>17</sup> SEATO, *Collective Security: Shield of Freedom* (Bangkok: SEATO, 1963), 88-95.

economic problems in the region that were not limited to the treaty area. The United States did not want to ignore those problems by focusing on a handful of selected countries. While he had no wish to slight the SEATO members, Dulles claimed he felt the need to establish a broader regional economic organization. As such, the United States did not want to put the needs of the few ahead of the needs of the many. Dulles also reasoned that the United States would probably provide increased military assistance to the SEATO members, and this aid should be considered a type of financial support that others in the region would not receive. The same subject came up officially in the council meetings, and Dulles responded in much the same way. While this explanation may have seemed reasonable, it was not entirely popular, and the Asian foreign ministers hoped that SEATO could eventually be turned into a more elaborate economic organization.<sup>18</sup>

At the end of the planning conference, Dulles believed the results adequately reflected US interests. While members had discussed economic issues, they did not attempt to implement anything that upset American plans.

Considering the participation of the delegates, Dulles

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<sup>18</sup> Memo of Conversation between Dulles and Casey, 22 Feb. 1955; "US Bangkok Briefing Paper: Item 5, A 'US Plans for Asian Economic Development,'" box 98, fol. SEATO Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers.

noted that once again Australia and New Zealand had closely supported the US delegation and frequently placed pressure on the British to support American plans. On the other hand, he felt that British representative Anthony Eden was "listless and contributed little," and he complained that Henri Bonnet of France was "ill-prepared and does not play any major part."<sup>19</sup> Fortunately, he found Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines to be "highly cooperative," and their cooperation had helped to lay the groundwork for the type of temporary regional organization he envisioned.<sup>20</sup> He expected it would deter communist aggression in the region while providing the basis of some future, larger regional security grouping.<sup>21</sup>

Dulles did not wait long to explore options for increasing the number of SEATO nations. After leaving Bangkok, he traveled to Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam for a series of short meetings. In the former Associated States, Dulles primarily explained how SEATO would cover these nations through its protocol, and he advised their leaders of the willingness of all the SEATO nations to rush to their defense in the event of external

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<sup>19</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 45-46.

<sup>20</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 45-46.

<sup>21</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 62.

communist aggression. He had a slightly different agenda in Burma. There, he described some of SEATO's plans to the Burmese in the hopes that they would soon join the organization. He stressed steps taken toward economic and cultural collaboration, even though planning in those areas remained vague.<sup>22</sup>

The rest of SEATO's first year primarily consisted of implementing the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Work in the areas of economics and cultural interaction continued to be largely preparatory but promised great things for the future. The military side of the organization proceeded much faster. The United States already had military assistance programs with the members, and it continued giving MSA aid to Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The MSA gave bilateral aid agreements rather than official SEATO aid, and according to US policies, it would have been given to these nations regardless of SEATO membership. Indeed, South Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, and Nationalist China received similar packages. Even so, the United States claimed this aid as SEATO military cooperation and stressed that the Manila Pact powers used American funds to modernize their armies.

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<sup>22</sup> State Press Release, 16 Feb. 1955, box 98, fol. SEATO Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers.

Even though MSA assistance might not have truly been a benefit of the alliance, the United States did begin a SEATO training program. During 1955 alone, nearly 11,000 officers and noncommissioned officers from the treaty area came to the United States for military instruction. Furthermore, cadets from Thailand and Pakistan attended military school in France, and the United Kingdom taught naval personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Thailand. These training programs continued throughout the life of the organization, and the United States and Britain regularly offered instruction for SEATO military personnel.<sup>23</sup>

In early spring 1955, the Staff Planners also began meeting regularly for joint planning of integrated operations. The first Military Staff Planners conference met in Baguio, the Philippines on 2-5 March. Like Bangkok, this meeting proved largely organizational, so much so that the US delegates thought the meeting simply wasted time. The Staff Planners created eight subcommittees designed to study a variety of technical and specialized military fields. Additionally, standardization of equipment and the establishment of training facilities served as a central theme of the Baguio planning sessions. The planners also

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<sup>23</sup> SEATO, *First Annual Report*, 6.

initiated discussion of joint military training operations. To that end, every SEATO nation sent observers to participate in Commonwealth naval exercises in June 1955, and afterward they held another Staff Planners meeting. Such joint operations largely formed the basis of military operations throughout the life of the alliance.<sup>24</sup>

In order to demonstrate military cooperation, the Staff Planners organized at least one official joint operation each year. Indeed, SEATO held 25 cooperative exercises between 1955 and 1963. The first collaborative operation was codenamed FIRM LINK. Conducted near Bangkok 15-18 February 1956, this exercise demonstrated the basic military philosophy of the organization. Since the Manila conference, military plans for SEATO focused on the American use of mobile striking power. Hoping to avoid another war like Korea, American strategy focused on the range and maneuverability of air and naval forces and the introduction of nuclear arms if necessary. The United States would concentrate on directing an attack against China or the Soviet Union while the Asian members would fight in the regional arena. Most of the SEATO nations held suspicions about the American strategy and wanted to lay out military contributions for the alliance. To that

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<sup>24</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 21, 126.

end, the US Department of Defense designed FIRM LINK to demonstrate that the SEATO powers could better rely on mobility than on large numbers of troops, and the exercise consisted of nuclear capable Honest John artillery tests and joint amphibious maneuvers. The Council of Foreign Ministers held its 1956 meeting in Karachi shortly after, and Dulles believed that FIRM LINK had "infused real life into SEATO" because it had opened the eyes of the locals and convinced them of American military power.<sup>25</sup> Due to the success of the operation, complaints about force commitments dissipated, and future exercises followed similar guidelines, most often focusing on maritime exercises, air to ground deployments, sea to land operations, and air defense exercises.<sup>26</sup>

SEATO is probably most often remembered as a military organization, and the Asian members hoped most for economic collaboration when entering the alliance. Despite these views, the programs of the Committee of Information, Culture, Education, and Labor Activities ultimately proved to be some of the most successful of the organization's endeavors. The first years of SEATO primarily dealt with

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<sup>25</sup> Minutes of NSC Meeting 280, 22 Mar. 1956, NSC Series, box 7, DDE Papers.

<sup>26</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 1, 705-07; SEATO, *SEATO: 1954-1964* (Bangkok: SEATO, 1964), 8; Cabinet Meeting Minutes, 23 Mar. 1956, Cabinet Series, box 7, DDE Papers.

organization and military planning. As such, most of the cultural programs did not begin until the creation of the Secretary General's office in 1957, and the coordination of these enterprises occupied a major portion of the duties of the Secretary General's office.

While SEATO could support virtually any program that somehow enhanced the culture of the Southeast Asia, most of the Information, Culture, Education, and Labor Activities proved to be educational programs. For instance, the leading universities in Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand each maintained three SEATO professorships. These academic positions rotated annually, and the government of the host country selected what fields would receive the appointments each year. This program began in 1957 to encourage scholars working in the treaty area, and between 1957 and 1964, fifty-nine fellowships had been completed. The disciplines covered reflected the needs of the host nations and included geology, chemistry, veterinary science, and agricultural economics. In a related program, SEATO gave grants to twelve postgraduate scholars each year that would pay for education leading to a higher degree. The funds had to be spent at a university in one of the Asian member nations provided it was not the student's home country. This program began in 1958, and by 1964, SEATO



grants had produced nineteen masters degrees and two doctorates. The alliance also provided a number of lesser scholarships at undergraduate institutions operated within Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.<sup>27</sup>

As a part its university programs, SEATO also sponsored a series of conferences designed to boost cultural relations between the member nations. To that end, Bangkok hosted the first annual Round Table Symposium on Traditional Culture in 1958, which focused on technical progress in Southeast Asia. Attendance at these events was not limited to SEATO nations, and scholars from twelve countries attended the first one, which focused on technical progress in Southeast Asia. These programs lead to ever strengthening ties between the universities of Southeast Asia, and in order to break down barriers created by studying in foreign countries, SEATO hosted a series of university meetings in 1960 and 1961 designed to facilitate interchange between European and Asian universities. Those meetings produced a system of equivalencies that allowed universities in Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan to ensure that their courses would be competitive in western academic circles.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> SEATO, 1954-1964, 11-12.

<sup>28</sup> SEATO, 1954-1964, 12-13.

In addition to its direct work with universities, SEATO sponsored a variety of other cultural projects in the treaty region. For example, SEATO funds paid for the restoration of ancient Arabic, Persian, and Urdu manuscripts by the University of Dhaka. The university in turn made the manuscripts available for scholarly study of the region's history. Not all of these cultural activities were reserved for higher education, the city of Bangkok used SEATO funds to open a museum dedicated to Thailand's Hill Tribes. The funds could also be used by religious groups, and Filipino Muslims used a SEATO grant to create an exhibition of Islamic artifacts at the national Museum of the Philippines.<sup>29</sup>

SEATO made a number of contributions to cultural activities and education in the treaty region, but the creation of the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering (SEATOGSE) in 1959 represented its most ambitious undertaking. SEATO's first Secretary General, Pote Sarasin, conceived of the school as a means of ensuring a supply of valuable engineers for Southeast Asia. The United States embassy put Sarasin in contact with Thomas H. Evans, dean of the College of Engineering at Colorado State University, and Evans and his colleagues proved

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<sup>29</sup> SEATO, *Shield of Freedom*, 108.

instrumental in helping to establish the new school. Each of the member nations also proved extremely supportive of SEATOGSE and provided much needed funding and equipment. Located approximately forty miles north of Bangkok, the university initially offered master's degrees in structural, hydraulic, transportation, or public health engineering. The school added electrical and sanitary engineering in 1963. In its inaugural year, eighteen students attended SEATOGSE, but the number of students the school could accommodate quickly increased. Evans became the first dean, and the initial faculty for the school came from the United States, Thailand, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines. In addition to its degree offerings, the graduate school also offered extension programs so that practicing engineers in Southeast Asia could attend seminars and short courses to keep their technical education current. The university renamed itself the Asian Institute of technology in 1967, but SEATO continued to support it until the end of the organization. Today, the school remains one of the leading institutes of higher education in the region.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> SEATO, *Shield of Freedom*, 101; SEATO, *1954-64*, 10; Asian Institute of Technology website, <http://www.ait.ac.th>, 28 July 2006.

While the graduate school was certainly the largest, SEATO also created a number of other schools. Notably, it funded the Teacher Development Center in Bangkok, which offered a variety of courses to those wishing to be teachers. SEATO also sponsored the Thai Military Technical Training School. Originally a training facility for instructors in the Royal Thai military, the school began offering a three-year technical program for supervisors and workmen. Together, the Teacher Development Center and the Thai Military Technical Training School led to the creation of the SEATO Skilled Labor Project (SLP). The SLP implemented artisan training facilities in Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Instruction at SLP centers varied according to the needs of the host country. Pakistan used SLP funds to offer instruction for machinists, electricians, and wood workers, and the Philippines trained textile workers. Thailand took the most advantage of this project and established ninety-one instruction workshops with areas of emphasis ranging from automotive mechanics to telecommunications. While much of the funding for the SLP training centers came from SEATO, the more developed nations also provided instructors and equipment. For example, Australia supported the Thai

Military Technical Training School, and the United States supported training centers in Karachi and Dhaka, Pakistan.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to establishing a variety of different types of educational centers, the alliance also sponsored a variety of research projects. The organization provided a number of grants that supported research in such fields as agriculture and veterinary science, but the most celebrated SEATO research came out of the medical field. SEATO began sponsoring regional medical research with the creation of its Cholera Research Laboratory in Bangkok in 1959. Due to the humid climate, much of Southeast Asia had long been a breeding ground for cholera, and outbreaks frequently troubled the region. The Bangkok cholera facility proved so successful that SEATO broadened its mission in 1960. The laboratory was renamed the SEATO General Medical Research Laboratory, and the organization funded the creation of a new Cholera Research Laboratory in Dhaka in 1960. Operated by Pakistani, American, and British scientists, the Dhaka laboratory soon became a world leader in cholera research. After Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1967, the Dhaka cholera facility received private

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<sup>31</sup> SEATO, 1954-1964, 9.

international funding and is now the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B).<sup>32</sup>

While the Dhaka facility focused on cholera, the Bangkok lab focused on a number of diseases. Their most important research was on hemorrhagic fever and malaria, but they also studied typhus, anthrax, leptospirosis, trichinosis, and kidney and liver problems. With the dissolution of SEATO in 1977, the US and Royal Thai militaries took over joint operation of the General Medical Research Laboratory and renamed it the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS). Considered an official foreign service branch of Walter Reed Medical Hospital, the laboratory remains a leading facility for the study of enteric diseases.<sup>33</sup>

The success of the medical laboratories and the Skilled Labor Project eventually led to the creation of the SEATO Clinical Research Center in Bangkok in 1963. This new facility blended SEATO's training facilities with its sponsorship of medical research by providing training programs for doctors to better recognize major diseases

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<sup>32</sup> SEATO, *Shield of Freedom*, 104.

<sup>33</sup> AFRIMS: Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences, <http://www.afirms.org/>, date of access 31 July 2006; ICDDR,B, Dhaka Hospital Moving from Strength to Strength, <http://202.136.7.26/pub/publication.jsp?classificationID=3&pubID=3325>, date of access 31 July 2006.

common to the region. The center also provided continuing education for doctors, so that they could learn how to better treat patients. Furthermore, doctors who attended courses at the facility qualified as teachers in the field of medical education so that they could help educate their fellows.<sup>34</sup>

When John Foster Dulles initially pushed for acceptance of the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty, he imagined a stopgap measure that could be used as a deterrent to communist aggression until a larger, more powerful collective defense organization could be established for the region. Early plans for SEATO, designed by the United States and the ANZUS powers focused on this vision for the organization. At the first council meeting in February 1955, many of the SEATO members lamented that the United States did not seem to have a firm military or economic commitment to the region, and indeed these remained minor concerns for the United States. After all, it had already obtained its primary objective for SEATO. Even so, after the establishment of the Secretary General's office, SEATO became a working organization. While it may have never had the military and economic components that many of its members desired, it developed

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<sup>34</sup> SEATO, 1954-1964, 10.

important cultural and educational projects that its founders had not envisioned. As a result, the education and research activities of SEATO proved to be notable successes even though the organization failed to live up to the major objectives set forth by the Eisenhower administration.



## CHAPTER VII

### STRUGGLE FOR BURMA

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke of SEATO and other regional defense commitments in Asia as unfinished projects. Since designing ANZUS and the Japanese peace treaty, Dulles always maintained that he wanted a larger organization, and after creating SEATO he continued making these claims. His vision for growth consisted of two parts. First, he believed that a larger organization would need to have a strong regional economic component. Since poor regional economic conditions fueled communist propaganda, improved industrial and economic conditions seemed the best defense against subversion, but Dulles believed only Japanese participation could make an Asian economic grouping successful. Second, Dulles understood that an enlarged defense organization needed to have greater Asian membership. It could not be an organization dominated by the United States and its Western European allies. When designing ANZUS, Asian participation had been a large concern and a reason why the United States had not pursued a larger organization at that time. Dulles

reasoned, and rightly so, that so soon after World War II, it would have been hard to find common ground in the disparate nations of eastern Asia. The conflict between the nationalist and communist Chinese and the Korean War exacerbated the difficulty.<sup>1</sup>

The French loss at Dienbienphu caused the Eisenhower administration to believe that it needed to have some sort of collective security organization in the region, but the problems that had prevented a larger Asian membership when writing the Japanese peace treaty had not gone away. Consequently, only three of SEATO's eight members, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan came from the region. The Vietnamese situation and the lackluster conclusion of the Geneva conference had forced the creation of a hastily made treaty organization without significant Asian membership. Therefore, SEATO, like ANZUS and the bilateral security treaties before it, primarily served as a stopgap measure to deter communism before the creation of a larger, more powerful organization.

Dulles still believed that a larger association should be controlled primarily by its Asian membership, and

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<sup>1</sup> Report 5516 US Policy toward Japan, 29 Mar. 1955, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1; Progress Reports on US Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to SEA NSC 5405, 4 Aug. 1954, 24 Mar. 1955, 21 Dec. 1955, and 11 July 1956, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 9, fol. NSC 5405, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.

throughout Dulles' tenure as Secretary of State, the Eisenhower administration examined the possibility of increasing the size of SEATO. The most obvious countries to add seemed to be Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but the Geneva Accords prevented their membership. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Burma also seemed likely candidates. After the creation of SEATO in 1954, Indonesia was politically unstable, and the British had not finalized the independence of Malaysia. While there would be later discussion of adding these two countries, especially Malaysia, it did not initially seem to be a viable choice. As a result, the Eisenhower administration considered Burma as the most likely addition for SEATO in late 1954 and early 1955. From an American perspective, Burma seemed a good choice. Its leaders rejected communist doctrine, and compared to other non-aligned nations in the region, it was economically stable and had fair memories of its colonial past.<sup>2</sup>

Prior to World War II, the British controlled Burma, and the colony enjoyed a degree of success. One of the principal rice exporters in the world, Burma was commonly

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<sup>2</sup> Phone conversation between Dulles and Walter Judd, 14 Sept. 1954, Telephone Conversations Series, box 2, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower Library; Briefing by Malcolm MacDonald, 14 Oct. 1954, OCB Central File, box 79, fol. OCB 091.4 SEA (File #2)(3), WHO NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library.

known as the "Rice Bowl of Asia." The colony also produced significant amounts of rubber and teak. World War II ravaged the country, but the British promptly began to rebuild. When the Burmese declared independence in 1948, all signs seemed to suggest that Burma would soon regain her prewar economic stature. Many Burmese leaders and businessmen were educated in the West and English speaking.<sup>3</sup> These elites maintained good relations with Britain's economic sector while developing ties to the United States. Postwar developmental loans from the United States coupled with reparations in the form of technical assistance from the Japanese gave a measure of fiscal stability. Furthermore, Burma's constitution seemed to be a model for the world. It provided for such modern ideals as full equality for women and minorities, granted a high degree of social welfare for all its citizens, and outlawed war as an instrument of foreign policy. Certainly some of Burma's constitutional laws leaned heavily toward socialism, but the democratic minded leadership followed the British parliamentary form.<sup>4</sup>

The Burmese had every reasonable expectation to believe in their success after they established their

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<sup>3</sup> F.S.V. Donnison, *Burma* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 237.

<sup>4</sup> Maung Maung, *Burma's Constitution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), 99, 145, 197-8, 290-96.

independence, but unfortunately, they fell victim to the Cold War maneuvering of the superpowers. Even as the Eisenhower administration began developing an interest, the Soviets also looked to expand communism into Burma. The superpowers did not trample Burmese soil with armies nor burn its fields with napalm, but the United States and the Communist powers waged an economic war in Burma. The purpose of this economic war was to entice Burma to abandon its neutral position and then join one power bloc or the other, but instead this financial battle unintentionally destroyed the fledgling nation.

Burma's principle difficulty in surviving the Cold War proved to be its policy of neutralism. Led by Prime Minister U Nu, the Burmese government believed it could have it both ways. Nu's neutralist policy had widespread roots. The one that went deepest grew out of his devout Buddhism, but the State Department believed that Burmese neutrality stemmed from fear of Red China.<sup>5</sup> Nu sincerely believed that only when the "great powers are in harmony will the peace of the world be secured."<sup>6</sup> To accomplish

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<sup>5</sup> U Nu, *U Nu: Saturday's Son* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 49-54; Sebald to Dulles, 29 Dec. 1952, box 64, fol. Sebald, William, roll 23, JFD Papers.

<sup>6</sup> *Peace and Democracy* (Rangoon: Burma Ministry of Information, 1947), quoted in William C. Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the RAND Corporation), 1963), 45.

this peace, Nu believed that he and his government had a moral obligation to take every available step toward bringing world peace. Therefore Nu embarked on an active neutralism and sought to use the United Nations as an instrument to encourage world peace. Far from taking an isolationist view, the Burmese took an active role in the UN, and voted on the serious issues of the Cold War during the 1950s including the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, and the Soviet assault on Hungary. Burma's neutral role on these events can quickly be seen by the nation's votes on each issue. On Korea, the Burmese supported military intervention but refused to label Red China as the aggressor in the conflict. In the Suez Crisis, Burma condemned what it viewed as British aggression, but the same year, the Burmese openly condemned harsh Soviet tactics in Hungary.<sup>7</sup> Nu believed that by carefully reasoning through each issue, the world would come to see Burma as a valuable neutral power that exercised wise independent judgment.<sup>8</sup> Instead the power blocs viewed Burma's policies as naive, and each attempted to pull the Asian nation firmly into their camp.

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<sup>7</sup> Maung, *Constitution*, 204; Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy*, 68; Maung Maung, *Burma in the Family of Nations* (Amsterdam: Djambatan Ltd., 1956), 145.

<sup>8</sup> Maung, *Family*, 144.

In the first years of the Nu government, these neutralist policies seemed a viable option primarily due to the Korean War. The Burmese believed that the Korean War proved the UN offered them protection against outside attack without the need to rely on one of the blocs for protection. Furthermore, the Burmese economy boomed as the war artificially doubled the price of rice. Burma established elaborate development plans during the war and sought to take out a number of development loans based on the prospect of continued high rice prices. The Burmese willingly accepted loans provided the lenders did not attach any strings to the money. In the early 1950s, the Soviets proved unwilling to give money freely, and the principal lender quickly became the United States, which gave substantial aid through the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA).<sup>9</sup>

In the early 1950s, the Burmese economy grew due to foreign loans and huge rice profits, but the positive outlook soon disappeared. In October 1952, the United States changed the name of the TCA to the Mutual Security Administration (MSA). The Burmese Parliament believed that the name change indicated recipients of MSA funds had an understood alignment with the United States because the

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<sup>9</sup> Maung, *Family*, 140.

United States called its bilateral security treaties "mutual security treaties." To make matters worse, leftist opponents of the government raised the charge that the Nu government's reliance on American funds proved that Nu leaned toward the Western democracies. Indeed, many Americans believed the same thing. The charges proved difficult for Nu, and his cabinet discussed terminating the American aid program. The benefit of the funds outweighed the criticism, and the Burmese continued with the American aid program. The situation would not last.

In late 1949, Jiang Jieshi's Guomindang (GMD) troops fled Mao Zedong's Red Chinese forces. The bulk of the GMD forces followed Jiang onto the islands off the coast of China and set up the Nationalist Chinese government in exile on Formosa. Significant numbers also fled into Thailand and Burma. The warlord Li Mi led the Burmese group, and it appeared obvious that he had no intention of leaving. The Nu government feared that Red Chinese forces would eventually pursue the GMD and invade Burma. To ward off this threat, the Burmese entreated the UN to condemn the GMD invasion. They also feared that Burma would become an extension of the Korean War, and so, they rejected any



use of outside force to expel the Nationalist Chinese troops.<sup>10</sup>

By the time the Eisenhower administration entered office, the GMD had become firmly entrenched in Burma. To make matters worse, Li Mi violently controlled opium production in the region, engaged in arms sales to insurgents, and terrorized villagers. The Burmese government begged the United States to use its influence over Jiang Jieshi, but the Americans quickly discovered that Jiang had little control over his former warlord. Furthermore, Jiang felt little reason to compel Li because, in his view, Nu was a communist sympathizer since Burma was one of the first to recognize the Maoist government.<sup>11</sup>

The Burmese had difficulty understanding that the United States could not force Jiang's hand, and rumors swept through Rangoon that the United States secretly supplied the GMD rebels through a covert CIA operation based in Thailand.<sup>12</sup> The presence of GMD troops combined with rumors of American aid and the apparent inability of the Eisenhower administration to influence the Nationalist

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<sup>10</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 12-18.

<sup>11</sup> Maung, *Family*, 145; *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 62.

<sup>12</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 53.

Chinese finally led the Burmese to cancel their Mutual Security aid program with the United States in March 1953.<sup>13</sup>

The Burmese government wanted to keep receiving American funds, but Nu believed that he could not accept aid from a nation that the Burmese masses believed was aiding their enemy. The decision infuriated Dulles, and he instructed Ambassador William J. Sebald to inform the Burmese that "aid cannot be turned on and off like a faucet pending solution of [an] extraneous problem... Burma is doing us no favor in accepting aid."<sup>14</sup> The presence of GMD troops hardly seemed extraneous to Nu, and he stood fast on his refusal to take further loan funds from the United States.

The Burmese government believed the cancellation of aid was unfortunate but hardly devastating. High rice prices during the Korean War had boosted the Burmese economy, and the cabinet expected the high prices to continue. Unfortunately for the Burmese, the end of the Korean War led to a sharp drop in the international demand for rice. The Burmese government had issued price controls on rice during the war to inflate the market, but when prices dropped, it incorrectly believed the situation was

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<sup>13</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 74-5.

<sup>14</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 76.

temporary and did not adjust the inflationary policies. As a result, Japan and India, the chief importers of Burmese rice, looked elsewhere for a cheaper supply.<sup>15</sup>

By the time the government managed to adjust its prices, it had lost two of its biggest customers. All of Southeast Asia produced bumper rice crops in 1954, and the outlook for Burma's economy looked bleak. Burmese farmers had several hundred thousand tons of extra rice, and they desperately looked for a market for their surplus. They even begged the United States to buy some of their rice, but the United States had a 200,000 ton surplus of its own and could not purchase any for fear of upsetting domestic rice growers.<sup>16</sup>

Then in the fall of 1954, the United States passed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act. The act had provisions to sell American surpluses abroad at reduced rates thereby aiding needy countries and American farmers at the same time. The Burmese Cabinet labeled the act a "dumping scheme for agricultural surpluses" and believed that reduced American prices on rice and grain throughout Asia would worsen the impact of the rice market's

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<sup>15</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 77.

<sup>16</sup> *FRUS 1952-54*, vol. 12, pt. 2, 233-34, 242-43.

deterioration.<sup>17</sup> U Kyaw Nyein, considered by the US State Department to be the most powerful anticommunist in the Burmese government, scoffed at the US Embassy's insistence that humanitarian motives to feed hungry people prompted the agricultural act. He also warned that if the situation did not change, Burma would have to turn to the communists for aid. Dulles took the warning to heart, and a small battle erupted between State and the US Department of Agriculture. Dulles warned that surplus sales would force the Burmese into the communist camp, but Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson insisted that the American prices were fair and not designed to upset world markets. Nevertheless, the Rangoon embassy predicted an "emotional and illogical Burmese reaction" similar to the GMD problem if something was not done quickly.<sup>18</sup>

Dulles cobbled SEATO together during the rice crisis, and the Burmese could not view the creation of a collective security organization as a separate type of relationship with the United States. Conflict over agricultural policies and Burma's neutralist position kept Nu from even considering joining SEATO in September 1954, but the United States and Britain had hoped for Burmese participation.

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<sup>17</sup> *FRUS* 1952-54, vol. 12, pt. 2, 233.

<sup>18</sup> Dulles to Ezra Taft Benson, 13 Aug. 1953, box 67, fol. Benson, Ezra Taft, roll 24, JFD Papers; *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 4-5.

Unfortunately, Burma's refusal to attend the Manila Conference or join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization exacerbated the agricultural problems with the United States. Perhaps Dulles could have persuaded Benson to support a change in the handling of the US rice surplus if Burma had allied itself through SEATO, but he had little hope of changing the policy while Burma distanced itself.<sup>19</sup>

While the Americans bickered internally over the impact of their agricultural sales in Asia, the People's Republic of China offered to aid the Burmese. On 3 November 1954, Burma signed an agreement with the PRC in which the Chinese would offer technical assistance and commercial goods to Burma in exchange for rice. China had its own rice surplus, but as Dulles noted the PRC quickly took the "opportunity to claim that it came to Burma's relief after [the] US dealt its economy a crippling blow."<sup>20</sup> After the Chinese deal, Burma signed agreements with other communist nations, and by July 1955, Burma had arranged

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<sup>19</sup> Gustav Burmeister to Kenneth Landon, 26 Oct. 1956, OCB Central File, box 81, fol. SEA 5, WHO NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library; *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 10-11; U Nu, *Saturday's Son*, 248-250.

<sup>20</sup> *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 3-4.

barter deals with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup>

The barter agreements allowed Burma to once again continue rice production, and on the surface Burma's problems appeared solved. Burmese rice sales increased by fifty percent, but due to the nature of the barter deals, receipts only increased twelve percent because the Soviets designed the deals to pull Burma into the communist power bloc rather than to actually improve the Burmese economy. A few of the programs, such as a Chinese textile mill and a Soviet tractor factory, did improve Burma's industrial infrastructure, but by and large the deal featured grand, glorious projects designed to look impressive whether or not they contributed to economic growth.<sup>22</sup>

The National Security Council believed that Burma's acceptance of communist trade packages represented a serious and sudden shift in Burma's world alignment, but the Burmese government believed they took the steps necessary to survive.<sup>23</sup> U Kyaw Nyein assured the American government that Burma first looked to the West for aid, but

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<sup>21</sup> Proposal for SEATO initiated famine alleviation organization, 17 Aug. 1956, OCB Central File, box 81, fol. OCB 091.4 SEA (file #5) (5), WHO NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library; *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 12-13.

<sup>22</sup> Johnstone, *Burma's Foreign Policy*, 85.

<sup>23</sup> U Nu to Eisenhower, 22 May 1956, International Series, box 5, fol. Burma, DDE Papers.

the liquidation of the American rice crop in Asia forced them into barter deals with the communists. He even informed Ambassador Sebald that the government understood that communist aid did little more than temporarily shore up Burma's financial problems, and he feared that the barter agreements would ultimately prove fatal. He expected Burma would have to commit more and more to the communists to meet its needs, and he predicted that Burma would be sucked into the Soviet orbit within five years unless the United States aided with the rice market. Armed with this information, the Department of State attempted to change American agricultural policies but accomplished little.<sup>24</sup>

Since the Americans proved unwilling to aid them in the rice market, the Nu government finally asked the United States for a direct loan of \$50 million in late August 1955. The Burmese viewed aid from the United States as a possibility in 1955 because the State Department had finally pressured Jiang into an official condemnation Li Mi. The GMD troops remained in eastern Burma, but the people stopped associating them with Formosa and the United

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<sup>24</sup> Report on Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1), 28 May 1957, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 25, fol. NSC 5809: Policy in SEA, WHO Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library; *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 12-13.

States. The embassy in Rangoon promoted approval of the loan noting that Burma would undergo elections in the spring of 1956. It seemed clear that unless the United States extended some aid, Nu would likely be forced out of power. Ambassador Sebald argued that any other government would doubtlessly be more anti-American and suggested that the communists stood a good chance of winning the election. Sebald also viewed the request for a loan as the first break in Burma's rigid neutralism since withdrawing from the aid program in 1953.<sup>25</sup>

Dulles agreed and wanted the loan approved, but domestic politics stood in the way. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1954, popularly called the Battle Act, forbade the United States from supplying enemy nations with any type of war material. Since the Burmese avoided any semblance of an alliance with the United States, they fell under the provisions of the act. The difficulty lay in the fact that Burma shipped sizeable amounts of rubber to Red China, and according to Burma's neutralist policy, they would not take aid that had strings attached. Acceding to an American request to stop selling rubber to the PRC seemed an unreasonable expectation, and the Burmese

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<sup>25</sup> *FRUS 1955-57, vol. 22, 20-22.*



refused to concede. Dulles had no choice but to follow the law.<sup>26</sup>

In order to sidestep the Battle Act, the State Department offered Burma aid through the PL 480 program created by the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act that had caused so many problems with the rice market. The details of this arrangement took several months to complete, but finally on 8 February 1956, the US and Burma signed a PL 480 agreement. Under the provisions of the bargain, Burma received \$21.7 million in agricultural commodities, primarily cotton. Burma would then pay for these goods with Burmese kyats, which the American government would then loan back to Burma for their economic development. Ironically, a mill constructed by the PRC would process the American cotton.<sup>27</sup>

The United States completed an agricultural aid package, but it lagged behind in the economic war. In January 1956, the Soviets made a bid to take another 500,000 tons of Burmese rice through barter. This offer promised to solve Burma's immediate rice surplus problem and made the US program look like little more than a token

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<sup>26</sup> Progress Report on US Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia, 29 Nov. 1955, OCB Central File, box 80, fol. SEA 4, WHO NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library; *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 25-27.

<sup>27</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 25-27.

gesture. In fact, just before completion of the Soviet deal, the United States had refused to take even 10,000 tons of rice due to perceived pressure from the domestic agricultural community. The day after completing the PL 480 agreement, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson realized that the Soviet barter agreement seemed better to the Burmese populace, and he cursed the "success of Communist economic warfare tactics."<sup>28</sup> To make matters worse, the Soviets gave the rice to the Vietminh to further increase their influence in Vietnam.<sup>29</sup>

U Nu sincerely desired an end to barter deals and wanted Burmese farmers to compete in cash markets, but analysts expected Burma's rice production in 1956 to exceed market demand by 600,000 tons. Seeing little other option, Nu accepted a four-year deal with the Soviets on 1 April 1956 in which the USSR would take 400,000 tons of rice per year in exchange for an estimated \$160 million of technical assistance to Burma. Following the Soviet pattern, the arrangement had more value as propaganda than as

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<sup>28</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 36.

<sup>29</sup> Progress Report on US Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia, 11 July 1956, OCB Central File, box 81, fol. SEA 5, WHO NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library.

developmental aid. Indeed, a new athletic stadium complex made up the bulk of the Soviet technological contribution.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the Soviet willingness to absorb Burmese rice, the United States continued to view agricultural policy as a primarily economic issue that effected domestic farmers, and the Department of Agriculture made plans to sell 500,000 tons of rice to Japan in 1956. When this arrangement became common knowledge, the State Department feared they were finally about to lose Burma to the communists.<sup>31</sup> Counselor Douglas MacArthur II cautioned Dulles:

We are now faced with no problem in the field of Foreign Affairs which is any more important having in mind the long-term implications of the decision we make with respect to aid for Burma. Burma... stands at the crossroads. Our decision may well be decisive in leading Burma down the path of closer relations... towards the West or... dependency on the Communist Bloc... [Burma] is the key to the prevention of Communist domination of Southeast Asia.<sup>32</sup>

Dulles agreed and put heavy pressure on the Department of Defense to ignore the provisions of the Battle Act that would hamper a MSA loan to Burma. The fear of losing more of Southeast Asia to the communists superseded the legal requirements, and on 28 June 1956, Dulles informed the

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<sup>30</sup> *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 36-40.

<sup>31</sup> *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 52-53.

<sup>32</sup> *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 71-72.

ambassador that the Battle Act had been reinterpreted to only apply directly to the US government because of the perceived threat to Burma's Cold War alignment. Burma could do whatever it wished while receiving these funds. With the removal of strings attached to American aid deals, regular loans to Burma became possible. An improved rice market in 1957 coupled with these loans allowed the Burmese to avoid further barter deals with the Soviets. The financial crisis seemed to have passed, but Burma had a long climb to return to its 1953 economic status.<sup>33</sup>

The next predicament for Burma proved to be the one that finally contributed to its undoing. Since obtaining independence in 1948, Burma had grave difficulty with rebel forces. The country contained several dissident groups, including ethnic minorities, communists, and lingering GMD forces. Fortunately for the Nu government, none of the insurgent groups acted in unison, which had led American observers to view Burma's government as stable. By the fall of 1956, these insurgent groups posed an increasing threat to the Burmese government, and the threat of rebellion delayed the realization of aid benefits. Focusing on the communist rebels, the State Department wanted to give \$5 to \$10 million in direct military aid. Not only

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<sup>33</sup> *FRUS 1955-57, vol. 22, 75-77.*

would these funds be used to fight communists, they would also bolster the military since the American government viewed the local defense forces as the "most important anti-Communist grouping in Burma."<sup>34</sup> Dulles believed that military assistance given to combat rebels could lead to Burmese membership in SEATO, but despite his views on the subject, the Department of Defense opposed giving military aid to a nation that refused alliance with the United States. Unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion, State and Defense brought the matter to Eisenhower for a final ruling in September 1956. Eisenhower sided with Dulles and approved military assistance to Burma, but to appease the Department of Defense, he required that an informal US military mission accompany any weaponry.<sup>35</sup>

The Americans committed to give the head of the Burmese military, General Ne Win, military hardware, but the general did not want the hardware that the Americans offered. The delay gave the Soviets an opportunity to try to woo the Burmese military. Offering to help against the remaining GMD rebels, Marshall Georgyi Zhukov visited Burma in February 1957 and invited Ne Win to send a military mission to Russia to look at their equipment before picking

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<sup>34</sup> *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 80.

<sup>35</sup> *FRUS* 1955-57, vol. 22, 84-85.

the type and quantity that he felt he needed. Ne Win hated the Soviets, but he used the offer as leverage on the United States. Suggesting that if it could not give significant aid in an "expeditious manner," he threatened that he would be forced to deal with the Soviets.<sup>36</sup> To counter, the United States sent General Graves Erskine to meet Ne Win in March 1957. In a gesture of friendship, Ne Win revealed all aspects of Burma's military operations, including its intelligence school, to the Americans, and the United States made funds available for police equipment. Afterward, Ne Win still complained that he wanted something more substantial. Specifically, he wanted American helicopters. The negotiations took some time, and while hashing out the particulars, Ne Win came in ever-closer contact with the American military.<sup>37</sup>

Finally, events in Burma came to a head in the spring of 1958 when there was a catastrophic failure of the rice crop. Due to the financial crisis, Burma's insurgents posed an immediate danger. The most serious threat came from the Shan State where the local ethnic population, supplied with GMD arms, threatened secession, but the

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<sup>36</sup> *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 92-93.

<sup>37</sup> Report on Southeast Asia (NSC 5612/1), 28 May 1957, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 25, fol. NSC 5809: Policy in SEA, WHO Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library; *FRUS 1955-57*, vol. 22, 92-93, 97-98.

communists in Burma also made a vigorous stand against the government at the same time. U Nu had finally ended barter deals with the Soviets and begged for American aid during the crisis, but without the impending possibility of Burma falling into a communist orbit, the United States placed more pressure on Burma to abandon its neutralist policies. The State Department decided that further aid was useless as long as the country had a sizable procommunist element and resolved to avoid anything that constituted more than a show.<sup>38</sup> Since Nu seemed unable to deal with the problems, the United States built closer and closer ties to Ne Win and the military. By August, an American military attaché regularly accompanied Ne Win, and the State Department hoped the general would "exert [a] strong influence for stability in [the] present turmoil."<sup>39</sup>

As the situation worsened in September 1958, Ne Win received assurances of support from the United States, and on 26 September 1958, he forcefully took control of the government and named himself prime minister. In an effort to avoid further instability, Nu stepped aside and publicly

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<sup>38</sup> *FRUS 1958-60*, Microfiche Supplement 15/16, #27.

<sup>39</sup> *FRUS 1958-60*, Microfiche Supplement 15/16, #42.

agreed to a temporary Ne Win government.<sup>40</sup> The United States supported the coup and made hasty arrangements for the military equipment that would "assist [the] Burmese Army in fulfilling its mission."<sup>41</sup> To this end, the US finalized the Burma Military Sales Agreement on 29 October 1958. The package gave Burma's new military regime \$25.5 million in military hardware without any requirement for repayment. Ne Win promptly engaged in an active program of crushing all of Burma's rebels.

The Eisenhower administration accomplished its goal of keeping Burma free from communist influence, but the price was high. By early March 1959, the US Embassy in Burma believed that Ne Win had indeed cleaned up Rangoon and eliminated corruption. Even so, the local press would not speak out against the military government for fear of reprisal, and Burma's financial situation grew steadily worse due to the Ne Win "government's failure to grasp economic policy issues."<sup>42</sup> Ne Win also arrested 371 politicians who had supposedly aided various insurgent groups and taken advantage of Nu's "benevolent soul."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> For a kinder treatment of Ne Win's takeover, see Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962).

<sup>41</sup> *FRUS 1958-60*, Microfiche Supplement 15/16, #51.

<sup>42</sup> *FRUS 1958-60*, Microfiche Supplement 15/16, #75.

<sup>43</sup> *FRUS 1958-60*, Microfiche Supplement 15/16, #76.



Relations between Ne Win and the US Embassy in Rangoon spiraled so far downward that in late March 1959, the general demanded a replacement ambassador. The State Department refused but instructed Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy to "lend a sympathetic ear to their soliloquies."<sup>44</sup>

The United States quickly lost any influence it might have ever had over Ne Win, and the military government retained control. U Nu briefly regained his office in 1960, but Ne Win, his power never significantly diminished, removed him from office permanently in 1962. Again, the United States immediately recognized the legitimacy of Ne Win's government.<sup>45</sup>

Dulles frequently argued the need for treating developing nations as sovereign equals, but when faced with the possibility of a communist alignment for Burma, the United States intervened in Burmese politics and allowed General Ne Win to establish himself as a dictator. While Ne Win certainly did not possess communist sympathies, he failed to support the democratic ideals that the United States claimed to champion. After receiving the military

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<sup>44</sup> *FRUS 1958-60*, Microfiche Supplement 15/16, #78.

<sup>45</sup> "United States Recognition of the New Government of Burma," 6 Mar. 1962, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962* (Washington: USGPO, 1966), 1001.

equipment that allowed him to consolidate control of the government, he had no further interest in American assistance. Consequently, Burma never joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Furthermore, other nations in the region watched the situation unfold with a profound sense of disapproval. Malaysia, in particular, witnessed America's lack of respect for U Nu's government and remained suspect of American motives. Combined with no clear economic advantage to SEATO membership, Malaysians saw few benefits and never joined the organization despite American advances. Dulles' vision of the equality of nations went out the window when those nations did not support American views. U Nu did not support communism, but neither did he shun it sufficiently. As a result, the United States shifted its support to General Ne Win, and his military regime ran roughshod over Burmese freedoms for decades. The United States had turned a blind eye to sovereignty and self-determination when confronted with the possibility of communism. These policies certainly helped reduce the spread of communism, but they also prevented the United States from increasing its number of allies and tarnished America's image in Southeast Asia well before the outbreak of the Vietnam War.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> OCB Report, 3 June 1958, NSC Series, box 10, fol. 368, DDE Papers.

## CHAPTER VIII

### ADDING JAPAN

During the spring and early summer of 1960, the streets of Tokyo filled daily with demonstrators opposing the ratification of the second United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Literally hundreds of thousands called for a rejection of the treaty and the resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. At times, the protests turned violent with raids on the Japanese Diet and clashes with the Tokyo police seeming commonplace. Hundreds received injuries in the battles, and one female college student died. The riots did not stop ratification of the treaty, but they did lead to Kishi's resignation. The prime minister had enough strength to push the treaty through the parliament, but it was his last act as head of the Japanese government.

Certainly, the raging anarchy and the downfall of the Prime minister mark this as a major event in Japanese history, and indeed it has received suitable recognition. There are many writings on the Tokyo protests, most notably George Packard's *Protest in Tokyo* (1966). Unfortunately,

the majority of the scholarship tends to portray the events of 1960 as a wholly Japanese event or simply a rough spot in US-Japan relations, but the ratification of the second security treaty was much more than an isolated Japanese situation. The protests served as a trial of Japan's allegiance to the United States and its western allies. The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) directed the anti-treaty movement, and it sought nothing less than the separation of Japan from the West. Furthermore, the event pounded the final coffin nails into the Eisenhower administration's attempts to build a larger East Asian collective defense organization.

The first US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty signed as part of the San Francisco peace conference in September 1951 allowed the United States almost unrestricted military use of Japan, and it committed the US to the defense of Japan in case of aggression. The agreement had no expiration date and only the United States could terminate it.<sup>1</sup> Due to both treaties being signed the same day, the Japanese always connected the security treaty to the peace settlement. In fact, many viewed acceptance of the defense

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<sup>1</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, 86; Robert E. Osgood, *The Weary and the Wary: United States and Japanese Security Policies in Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1972), 39; Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 49.

pact as a requirement for the official end of hostilities. As such, there was little initial resentment of the security arrangement. Instead, most Japanese expressed happiness to have the war finally behind them. If that meant US military bases in Japan, then so be it. At least the occupation forces would return home, and everyone expected the security treaty to be a temporary arrangement.<sup>2</sup>

The United States had a much different view of the security treaty. In the midst of fighting a war in Korea, it had an immediate need for military bases located in Japan. Additionally, the USSR and the People's Republic of China entered into an alliance in February 1950 before the outbreak of Korean hostilities in June. The United States hoped to create a Pacific Pact that would establish an offshore defense line through Japan, the Ryukus, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.<sup>3</sup> Prior to the creation of this alliance, the US needed to "assist Japan to become a self-reliant nation friendly to the United States, capable of maintaining internal security and

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<sup>2</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, 993-8; George Packard, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 11.

<sup>3</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 34-38; Howard B. Shonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: Kent State, 1989), 259; Kajima Morinosuke, *Modern Japan's Foreign Policy* (Rutland, Vermont: Charles Tuttle, 1969), 18.

defense against external aggression."<sup>4</sup> Dulles determined that the creation of a bilateral treaty with Japan coupled with a regional defense agreement with Australia and New Zealand would best meet this goal while maintaining Asian military strength. Thus, the United States created both the mutual security treaty and ANZUS at the San Francisco conference. In essence, the US viewed the security treaty as a temporary expedient to meet immediate needs, but Dulles hoped that eventually Japan would join ANZUS to create a larger defensive system which would serve as a Pacific version of NATO. After the creation of SEATO, Dulles continued to hope for an enlarged organization that would link Japan to America's other allies in the region.<sup>5</sup>

Dulles hoped that Japan would eventually rearm and that its renewed military capacity would serve as a substantial component of a strong Asian security pact, but even more, Dulles believed that the region needed Japan's economic strength. Rhetoric surrounding SEATO frequently stressed economic cooperation between the members, but Dulles believed that in the absence of Japanese participation, economic cooperation meant American aid dollars. The Asian SEATO nations frequently asked the

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<sup>4</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, 36.

<sup>5</sup> *FRUS 1951*, vol. 6, 36, 178, 994-99.

United States for improved economic arrangements. Thailand, in particular, complained that non-aligned nations like Burma and Malaysia received as much, if not more, American aid as SEATO members. Thai leaders believed that their alliance with the United States should entitle them to improved concessions, but Dulles believed that economic progress in Asia would start with Japan. The United States already gave more aid than Congress could bear, and he believed Japan could contribute much more to the region.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of his views on economics and his hope for a more powerful pact, Dulles viewed the 1951 Japanese mutual security treaty as a temporary step. The Japanese also viewed it as temporary but for entirely different reasons. They connected the security treaty to the peace settlement, and they viewed it as something they must endure for a short period until the United States regarded them as ready for more equal treatment. They did not connect the treaty to American regional defense plans, but Dulles continued to see the security treaty as a step toward that eventual goal. To that end, he persuaded the

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<sup>6</sup> Notes for Closed Session, 22 Feb. 1955; "Summary of NSC 5506: Future US Economic Assistance for Asia"; SECTO 38 from Bangkok, 25 Feb. 1955, box 98, fol. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Council Meeting, roll 37, JFD Papers.

NSC to adopt his point of view, and NSC 5516, adopted shortly after the creation of SEATO in January 1955, listed the creation of a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement that linked Japan to ANZUS and SEATO as the primary goal of US-Japanese policy.<sup>7</sup>

Between the creation of SEATO in September 1954 and Kishi's appointment in February 1957, Japan went through three prime ministers and five cabinet administrations. The volatility of the Japanese government and refusals to consider rearmament kept Dulles from advancing his agenda, but he hoped for stability. Furthermore, in 1957, revision of the mutual security treaty became a popular subject in Japan. Most Japanese did not object to an alliance with the United States, but many felt that they had outgrown the old arrangements. Specifically they opposed the open-ended nature of the treaty. Only the United States could cancel the alliance, and they believed they should have the same ability. They also feared that the US would bring dreaded nuclear weapons into their country without their ability to object. By 1957, the Japanese felt they had earned a better relationship with the United States than the one dictated as part of a peace settlement. They had vastly

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<sup>7</sup> Report 5516 US Policy toward Japan, 29 Mar. 1955, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.



improved their economy, and with the negotiation of peace with the Soviets in 1956 and their subsequent entry into the United Nations, they had rejoined the international community. As a result of these events, there was an outpouring of nationalism in Japan. No longer were they the losers of World War II or the first victims of the atom bomb. They were a nation reborn, and they wanted their reward, an end of the dictated alliance.<sup>8</sup>

At the same time that the nation clamored for a new treaty with the United States, Kishi became prime minister and took control of Japan. The fourth Japanese prime minister the Eisenhower administration dealt with, Kishi seemed preferable because others had followed Shigeru Yoshida's lead and blocked conversation about Japanese rearmament. Inability to negotiate the creation of a standing military ensured that "the major US objective - a firm alliance in the Pacific - is not being achieved."<sup>9</sup> Despite the American view, many Japanese had a distaste for Kishi because he had been Hideki Tojo's Minister of Commerce and Industry, and he had even been jailed, though

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<sup>8</sup> I.M. Destler, et al, *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of US-Japanese Relations*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), 20; John K. Emmerson and Harrison M. Holland, *The Eagle and the Rising Sun: America and Japan in the 20th Century* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1988), 123; Reischauer, *US and Japan*, 49; Packard, *Protest*, 41-47.

<sup>9</sup> Progress Report, 6 Feb. 1957, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.

never tried, as a war criminal. Nevertheless, he was an astute politician, and he deftly maneuvered himself into the leadership of Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). With the realization that the people hated the US-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty, he used it as an election tactic and became Prime minister on the basis that he would institute a new relationship with the United States.<sup>10</sup>

Upon obtaining office, Kishi quickly set out to fulfill his promises, and he flew to Washington to meet with Dulles and Eisenhower about the prospect of revising the security treaty. The Americans still held a vastly different opinion of the treaty than the Japanese. The old treaty, greatly favored the US, and Japan was not in a position to fulfill American requirements for a new treaty. Specifically Japan still did not have a sufficient military presence to join an expanded version of SEATO. As such, Dulles wanted Japan to rearm before renegotiating. Luckily for Kishi, Dulles also believed that due to his fervent anticommunist disposition, "Mr. Kishi was not only the 'best bet,' but the 'only bet' ... in Japan for the foreseeable future."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 47-54.

<sup>11</sup> *FRUS 1955-1957*, vol. 23, 339.

Dulles developed this view after studying the results of Japanese public opinion polls conducted by the United States Information Agency before Kishi's appointment as prime minister. The polls demonstrated that only 27% of Japanese had even heard of SEATO by January 1956. Furthermore, only 14% knew that Japan was not a member. Despite this lack of knowledge about SEATO, the poll indicated that the Japanese trusted most of the SEATO members, with 71% indicating they trusted the United States. Indeed, the polling demonstrated more faith in the United States than in any other nation. Furthermore, the polls indicated that public sentiment in Japan favored rearmament by a slight margin. The data led Dulles to the opinion that Japan might finally be ready to rearm itself and could look favorably on an alliance with the existing SEATO members. Consequently, he advised Eisenhower, "after a period of drift, sentiment in Japan is now beginning to crystallize, and we stand on the threshold of a new era in our relations."<sup>12</sup>

As a result of Dulles' viewpoint that Kishi promised an improvement over previous prime ministers and that

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<sup>12</sup> Dulles to Eisenhower, 12 June 1957, International Series, box 34, fol. Japan 1957-59; Japanese Public Opinion on International Issues, 25 Apr. 1956, International Series, box 33, fol. Japan 1953-56; Japanese Public Opinion: Mid 1956, 27 Sept. 1956, International Series, box 33, fol. Japan 1953-56, DDE Papers.

public sentiment in Japan finally favored rearmament, the Eisenhower administration was predisposed to aid Kishi as much as possible. Thus when Kishi visited in late June 1957, Dulles informed him that the US did not wish to replace the treaty, but he had no problem issuing a formal statement that the US did not intend the treaty to be permanent. Furthermore, the military would pull ground forces out of Japan within a year, and Kishi could claim credit for negotiating these concessions when he returned to Japan. In return, Kishi proposed the creation of an Asian Development Fund led by Japan that would provide economic assistance in Southeast Asia. Despite the US desire for Japanese participation in an economic group that benefited Southeast Asia, Dulles advised Kishi that it was impractical at the present time. Japanese economic assistance could have proven beneficial to the region, but Dulles wanted it to accompany Japanese participation in a regional military alliance.<sup>13</sup>

Kishi failed to convince the US to rework the security treaty, but the Japanese hailed his visit to America as a success. The removal of troops seemed a major step, but

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<sup>13</sup> *FRUS 1955-1957*, vol. 23, 345; Japanese Public Opinion: Mid 1956, 27 Sept. 1956, International Series, box 33, fol. Japan 1953-56; Kishi Visit Communique, International Series, box 34, fol. Japan 1957-59, DDE Papers; Progress Report, 25 Sept. 1957, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.

the excitement did not last long. In October 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik. The Japanese had essentially the same reaction as many Americans: panic. The Japanese sided with the US after World War II largely because the Americans looked to be the stronger side in the upcoming Cold War. Sputnik caused them to reconsider the assessment, and many felt that they had made a grave mistake. Objections to the treaty began anew, and Japanese leftists organized themselves to coordinate a campaign against the treaty.<sup>14</sup>

Several left wing organizations existed in Japan. These groups rarely acted in unison, but the treaty issue proved an exception. All the leftists opposed the treaty, though for different reasons, and they coordinated their protests against it. The largest leftward leaning political party, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), made up the largest minority faction in the Diet but never seemed able to control more than one third of the seats. The JSP hoped to use the treaty issue to wrest control from Kishi's Liberal Democratic Party, but it framed its objection around military issues. The socialists argued that in the beginning the United States possessed a decided advantage in the Cold War, but with Soviet advances in

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<sup>14</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 59.

space and missile technology, the differences no longer seemed so clear. Now the security treaty guaranteed nothing but Japan's insecurity should a war between the Great Powers develop. Based on these thoughts, the JSP recommended an end to the security treaty and a shift toward neutralism. Nothing else, they argued, could guarantee Japan's safety.<sup>15</sup>

The second major leftist group, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), naturally supported the Soviets and the People's Republic of China and would have liked for Japan to side with the communist nations. The communists made up a small minority in Japan, but they saw the treaty issue as a chance to advance their cause. As a result, the JCP became the most vociferous agents for abolishing the security treaty, and formed an organization called the People's Council to direct the anti-treaty campaign. Leftists from a variety of backgrounds joined the People's Council, but the communists controlled the leadership and planned its activities.<sup>16</sup>

With the resolution of the Kishi government to create a new treaty and declining support for the original, US State Department officials finally decided the time had

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<sup>15</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 82-87.

<sup>16</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 91-94.

come to negotiate a new treaty. In late 1958, the United States announced its willingness to create a new agreement and began the long process of treaty negotiations with Japan. Unfortunately, John Foster Dulles died of cancer on 24 May 1959, well before the end of the negotiations. Dulles had championed improved American relations with Japan, and he continuously advocated Japanese inclusion in a regional security organization. Shortly before his death, Eisenhower selected Undersecretary of State Christian Herter as Dulles' replacement. Herter accepted Dulles' views on Japan, but despite his claim that the "same team will carry on," he did not actively attempt to pursue his predecessor's vision.<sup>17</sup> Though Herter does not deserve the blame, US-Japanese relations nearly completely unraveled during his tenure as Secretary of State, and the declining relationship caused Dulles' dream of an enlarged Asian pact to disappear.

Despite its importance to the Eisenhower administration, Dulles' death had little impact on leftist groups in Japan who tended to direct their rhetoric at America in general. They organized frequent protests during the long period of negotiations, but they did not gain true national attention until 27 November 1959. At

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<sup>17</sup> "The New Secretary," *Time*, 27 Apr. 1959.

that point, the Zengakuren, the national organization of student unions, became more active in the anti-treaty movement. Though open to all, radical communists dominated the Zengakuren. Also called Trotskyites, the student leaders detested the advancement of socialism in one country and the more peaceful tone of the Khrushchev government. Instead, they advocated immediate worldwide revolution. By November 1959, the final draft of the security treaty had been circulated in Japan. The older leftists had staged some small protests, but the Zengakuren wished to organize a dramatic event that would begin Japan on the road to revolution. They pushed the People's Council to conduct a massive protest at the Diet. This demonstration took place on 27 November 1959, and it escalated the protest against the treaty to a new level.<sup>18</sup>

Zengakuren had been straining against the ropes since the summer of 1959. They wanted a major demonstration, but the older, more reluctant leaders of other leftist groups would not commit. By late November, the radicals decided time had almost run out. Soon Kishi would sign the treaty, and their opportunity would disappear. They convinced the other groups to hold a massive petition at the Diet in the

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<sup>18</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 94-101; Progress Report, 8 Apr. 1959, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.



hopes that the Diet members would turn against Kishi and the treaty. All the groups decided to turn out in force for a peaceful demonstration at the Diet, but Zengakuren had other plans.<sup>19</sup>

The students planned an assault on the Diet itself. Approximately 3:30 in the afternoon, about an hour and a half after the beginning of the rally, a horde of students rushed the Diet guards and pushed through the gates. Their initial act prompted others to follow suit and soon an estimated 12,000 were in the Diet grounds. They made no attempt to enter the parliament building itself, but the protestors would not leave. Finally near 6:00 that evening the crowds dispersed. Amongst the last to go, the Zengakuren stayed until the end.<sup>20</sup>

The raid on the Diet met with immediate disapproval from the majority of the Japanese. The people viewed the assault as a disgraceful act, but ironically, they placed most of the blame on the Japanese Socialist Party. Most Japanese incorrectly believed that socialist Diet members had initiated the assault. After all, they led the rally and should have controlled the Zengakuren. Feeling growing public support for the treaty, Kishi's conservative LDP

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<sup>19</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 153-160.

<sup>20</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 161-167; Reischauer, *US and Japan*, 318.

reacted forcefully against the socialists in the Diet. They tried to diminish the JSP's political and popular influence, and they managed to fragment the fragile leftist alliance. The communist party's role in the affair received little attention, and as a result, they assumed even greater control of the anti-treaty movement.<sup>21</sup>

Despite communist strength on the People's Council, socialists still had greater numbers and more popular support. They had used their political power to keep the anti-treaty movement focused primarily against the Japanese government. After 27 November that began to change. The socialists lost a great deal of prestige, and the communists had the freedom to advance their own agenda to diminish American prestige in Japan. The tone of the protests became more anti-American, and communists called for increased relations with the "peaceful" Soviets and Chinese.

Despite the protest, Kishi and Herter signed the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security on 19 January 1960. While the United States hailed the treaty signing as a major event, protest in Japan against the treaty increased. Early 1960 saw no rallies that could compare to November's storming of the Diet. Even so, the Zengakuren

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<sup>21</sup> Packard, *Protest*, 167-173.

still lurked in the background hoping for a chance to topple the established order, and the socialists remained opposed to the treaty in favor of a more neutralist position. The communists retained leadership of the People's Council and directed much of the movement, and they continued to give an anti-American tone to the protests. They also kept the Zengakuren on a tight leash while they waited for the proper moment to make another major statement. In May 1960, they found their opportunity.<sup>22</sup>

In the spring of 1960, the treaty went before the Diet for ratification. The approval process for treaties in Japan's parliamentary system differs from the one in the United States. All treaties come before both houses. First the lower house must approve the treaty, and then the upper house has thirty days in which to veto it. Should the upper house not act within the time limit, the treaty automatically goes into effect. This system provided the communists with the opportunity they had awaited.<sup>23</sup>

On 19 May 1960, the lower house convened to consider the revised security treaty, but the JSP attempted to block

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<sup>22</sup> Report on Japan, 4 May 1960, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.

<sup>23</sup> Destler, *Managing*, 20-21; "Japanese House Votes US Pact," *NYT*, 20 May 1960.

the vote by barricading speaker Ichiro Kiyose in his office. They literally piled furniture in front of his office door and linked arms in the hallway to keep anyone from letting him out. If Kiyose could not initiate the voting, then the treaty issue would not be decided until another day. As childish and illegal as this practice might seem in the US, the Japanese viewed such episodes as commonplace, but the LDP's reaction crossed the line of acceptability. Trapped in his office, Kiyose telephoned the police, and 500 officers forcibly removed all the socialists from the Diet. The government had never used the police in such a manner. As such, the LDP's reliance on them would have likely sparked negative comments, but the LDP did not stop there. Their subsequent reaction initiated a storm of protest that ultimately led to Kishi's downfall.<sup>24</sup>

After expelling the JSP from the Diet, the LDP agreed to meet back in the Diet for a midnight vote. No one informed the JSP, and even if they had found out, they would not likely have gained readmittance to the building. The LDP then reassembled shortly after midnight, quickly voted unanimously for the treaty, and dispersed. The next

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<sup>24</sup> "Japanese House Votes US Pact," *NYT*, 20 May 1960; *FRUS 1958-1960*, Microfiche Supplement 17/18, #514.

day the Japanese reacted violently to what they regarded as a unilateral action. Most people cared little what the JSP had done the day before. They expected the minority to use such stalling tactics, but a secret vote overstepped the bounds of decency. To make matters worse for the LDP, the treaty would automatically go into effect thirty days later on 19 June - the same day President Eisenhower planned to visit Japan. The communists immediately exploited the connection claiming that the United States was somehow responsible, and many Japanese accepted their arguments.<sup>25</sup>

Even with the timing of the Eisenhower visit, the communists would not have so successfully stirred up anti-Americanism had it not been for the general world situation in May 1960. On 1 May, the Soviets shot down an American spy plane in Russian airspace. The event created a near panic in Japan. The United States claimed the aircraft was simply gathering weather information, but the Soviets promptly produced CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers and his U-2. Then on 15 May, Eisenhower and Khrushchev met in Paris for summit talks, but on 18 May, the conference

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<sup>25</sup> *FRUS 1958-1960*, Microfiche Supplement 17/18, #514; "128 Hurt in Tokyo Riots on Pact," *NYT*, 24 May 1960.

suddenly broke up because of a clash between Khrushchev and Eisenhower over the U-2 incident.<sup>26</sup>

These events alone would have upset the Japanese who feared involvement in another war, but the situation deteriorated further. Many Japanese recognized the U-2 spy plane as a type of aircraft that flew out of Tokyo on a regular basis. The Americans assured the Japanese that the U-2s in Japan truly did limit their activities to weather observations, but the Japanese held understandable suspicions. Their skepticism turned into fear when the Soviets issued a warning through Ambassador Suemitsu Kadowaki cautioning the Japanese that their nation was a potential nuclear target due to American air bases located in Japan. Should American aircraft based in Japan illegally enter Soviet airspace, then Japan could be the target of retaliation.<sup>27</sup>

Due to the LDP's unilateral action in pushing the security treaty through the lower house and paranoia over the U-2 incident, the Japanese Communist Party had a great deal of success creating anti-American sentiment in Tokyo. Almost immediately protestors appeared outside the American

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<sup>26</sup> "Summit Talks Open Today," *NYT*, 16 May 1960; "US-Soviet Clash Disrupts Summit Talks," *NYT*, 17 May 1960; "Summit Conference Breaks UP in Dispute," *NYT*, 18 May 1960.

<sup>27</sup> "Pact Rift Perils Eisenhower Visit," *NYT*, 22 May 1960; Packard, *Protest*, 229-233.

embassy chanting, "Ike don't come," and singing the Communist Internationale. In order to keep the populace at a fever pitch, the communists continued to stress that acceptance of the security treaty could possibly bring war to Japan. Red Chinese propaganda enhanced the message by denouncing the plan as an "out-and-out aggressive treaty of military alliance."<sup>28</sup>

Despite the animosity in Japan, Eisenhower did not wish to cancel his visit. Designed to show Republican success in foreign affairs since coming into office in the midst of the Korean War, Eisenhower wanted his Asian tour to shine as one of the last major events of his presidency. Unfortunately, the Soviets withdrew Eisenhower's invitation to visit Moscow during the U-2 incident. If leftists managed to scare the president from visiting Japan, America's most important Asian ally, then Eisenhower feared his tour would look more like a communist victory than a triumphant display of his successful administration. Therefore, he wanted to visit Japan at any cost, but reports of the conditions in Tokyo that reached the American newspapers sounded truly appalling. Many advisors, including J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate

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<sup>28</sup> *Support the Just Struggle of the Japanese People Against the Japan-US Treaty of Military Alliance* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), np; "Japanese Stage Massive Protest," *NYT* 27 May 1960.

Foreign Relations Committee, urged the president to cancel his trip. Eisenhower remained resolute and believed that abandoning the visit would imperil the future of US-Japanese relations. Emboldened by his response, the *New York Times* even boasted that the president might cancel a round of golf with Kishi, but he would go to Japan.<sup>29</sup>

Kishi also wanted to ensure that Eisenhower would visit, and he sought to ensure the president's safety by having Emperor Hirohito greet him at Haneda Airport and escort him to the palace. Kishi hoped that bringing Hirohito into the picture would decrease the protest over the treaty by linking the riots to disrespect for the emperor, but most of the leftists opposed the monarchy as much as they opposed so-called US imperialism. They continued calling for abolition of the treaty, the resignation of Kishi, and the disruption of Eisenhower's visit. Even so, their numbers seemed to diminish during early summer, and by 9 June, Kishi had enough confidence to promise that he would personally guarantee Eisenhower's safety.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> "Kishi May Stress Hirohito as Host," *NYT*, 6 June 1960; "Fulbright Bids President Delay his Trip," *NYT*, 6 June 1960; "Eisenhower firm on Visit," *NYT*, 8 June 1960; *FRUS 1958-1960*, Microfiche Supplement 17/18, #517.

<sup>30</sup> "Kishi May Stress Hirohito as Host," *NYT*, 6 June 1960; "Kishi Gives Guarantee of Safe Visit," *NYT*, 10 June 1960.



Kishi made his promise prematurely. The next day, Eisenhower's press secretary, James Hagerty, landed in Japan to make final preparations for the presidential visit. The communists saw the chance to confront the American imperialists, and they staged the largest demonstration up to that point. As Hagerty and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II left Haneda, a swarm of screaming Japanese attacked them. They had more than sufficient numbers to stop the American limousine, and for an hour and a half, protesters pelted the car with stones, beat on the trunk and hood, and even danced on the roof. The demonstrators broke the car's windows but did not attempt to open the doors or pull Hagerty or MacArthur from the vehicle. Nevertheless, a US Marine helicopter arrived to airlift the Americans to safety.<sup>31</sup>

The next day the story hit the American papers complete with photos of Hagerty calmly smoking in the backseat while surrounded by a sea of protesters. The events cast a dim light on the chances for Eisenhower's visit, yet the president remained undeterred. He would not yield to the communists, and he left for his Asian tour on 12 June. Eisenhower's determination stemmed in part from a

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<sup>31</sup> "Hagerty Beseiged By Stone Throwing Mob," *NYT*, 11 June 1960; *FRUS 1958-1960*, Microfiche Supplement 17/18, #533.

telegram from Ambassador MacArthur to Secretary Christian Herter on 8 June, which urged that the president visit Japan at all costs because:

It [is] crystal clear that [the] security treaty is not the fundamental question. Underlying all other issues is [the] question of Japan's alignment with the free world and the continuing development of closer US-Japanese cooperation. It is against this development that [the] organized left-wing, powerfully supported and subsidized by [the] Soviet Union and Communist China, has unleashed its campaign of force, agitation and intimidation.<sup>32</sup>

MacArthur viewed the situation the same way even after the the 10 June attack, and he relayed a message to Eisenhower through Hagerty that the visit remained important.<sup>33</sup>

As the date of Eisenhower's visit approached, the communists made their final effort to cancel the trip. Propaganda engines such as *Pravda* claimed the US intended to launch a new war in Asia. Meanwhile, the Zengakuren planned another massive protest, and on 15 June 1960, they attacked the Diet once more. More violent than the previous demonstrations, fighting quickly broke out between the protestors and police. The riots ended on a tragic note with the discovery of a dead female college student, Michiko Kamba. Apparently, the massive crowds storming the Diet crushed the twenty-three year old girl underfoot as

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<sup>32</sup> *FRUS 1958-1960*, Microfiche Supplement 17/18, #531.

<sup>33</sup> *FRUS 1958-1960*, Microfiche Supplement 17/18, #531, 536.

they struggled with the police. Kamba's death caused Kishi to relent, and he officially requested that Eisenhower cancel his visit.<sup>34</sup>

With the cancellation of Eisenhower's visit, the communists felt that they had won a victory. The Soviets rejoiced and touted the retraction as a triumph, and the Chinese praised the Japanese for "disrupting the plan of the god of plague Eisenhower - the most vicious enemy of the peoples all over the world."<sup>35</sup> The protests almost immediately abated even though time still existed for the treaty to be vetoed by the upper house.<sup>36</sup>

On 19 June, the Japanese House of Councilors approved the treaty, and on 23 June, Kishi resigned his office. After the Prime minister's resignation, the protests stopped, and the Japanese Communist Party again claimed a triumph despite the fact that the dreaded treaty passed. They had found in the mutual security treaty an opportunity to diminish American influence in Japan, and they successfully played on fears that the United States could force Japan into a war of nuclear proportions. The demonstrations initiated by the communists caused Kishi to

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<sup>34</sup> "Japan Cancel Eisenhower Trip," *NYT* 17 June 1960.

<sup>35</sup> *Support the Just Struggle*, np.

<sup>36</sup> *Support the Just Struggle*; "Soviet Jubilant at Cancellation," *NYT* 17 June 1960.

rescind Eisenhower's invitation to visit Tokyo, and soon after the prime minister resigned. At first glance, it appeared that the communists had won a battle toward their ultimate goal of detaching Japan from the Western camp, but the JCP failed to reign in the radical Zengakuren. Their message of immediate revolution backed up by their violent tactics caused many Japanese to question the wisdom of shifting their allegiance away from the United States.

The Zengaguren's zeal and revolutionary fervor diminished the effectiveness of the JCP's efforts. Many Japanese feared that the United States would pull them into an unwanted war, but the choice offered to them by the Zengakuren seemed worse. The communists had rejoiced and claimed victory too soon. A backlash of resentment against them occurred almost immediately after the violence of 15 June. The majority of Japanese regarded such behavior as unacceptable. The communist boycott of Michiko Kamba's funeral compounded their disgust.

Ironically, the LDP emerged stronger than before, and the new government of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda further boosted the Japanese economy while maintaining a strong tie to the United States. The communists may have managed to block Eisenhower's visit, but they did not diminish America's prestige in Japan. Instead, they decreased their

own popularity by overstepping the bounds of what the majority found acceptable.

For its part, the Eisenhower administration hailed the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security as "the single most important event of the past year in US-Japanese relations."<sup>37</sup> The treaty kept Japan allied to the United States, but the protests against the treaty demonstrated just how difficult it would be to obtain Japanese participation in an enlarged regional security treaty. The simple bilateral security treaty had proven more controversial than Americans would have expected, and the concept of an enlarged collective security system in Asia disappeared from American rhetoric.

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<sup>37</sup> Report on Japan, 4 May 1960, NSC Series, Policy Papers, box 15, fol. 5516/1, WHO Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, Eisenhower Library.

## CONCLUSIONS

John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961, and his administration soon abandoned discussions of enlarging SEATO. During his short time in office, Cuba and Europe seemed much more pressing concerns. New Secretary of State Dean Rusk worked with Dulles during the Truman administration and certainly knew of the Eisenhower administration's plans for the region, but even if he desired an enlarged organization the opportunity never presented itself. Communist activity in Laos and Vietnam proved much larger Asian concerns for the new administration than any attempt to enlarge SEATO or ANZUS. As a result, Kennedy came to view SEATO as more of a military organization than Dulles and Eisenhower. During his time in office, the frequency of SEATO military council meetings increased, and the SEATO powers conducted more joint training exercises.

The vision of SEATO expansion disappeared during the Kennedy administration, but the organization did fulfill its primary military purpose in August 1964. Following attacks on US Naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin,

President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed Congress on 5 August to ask permission for American military action in Vietnam. He justified the request with an invocation of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and claimed that the treaty and its protocol on the former Associated States "obligated" an American response. Congress responded with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on 7 August, and the United States soon became embroiled in its longest war since the American Revolution.

The Vietnam War subsequently destroyed SEATO. Britain and France refused to give any substantial military assistance, and Pakistan withdrew from the organization entirely. After the war, the need for SEATO disappeared, and the remaining members disbanded in 1977. The lack of unified action during the first test of SEATO caused many people to dismiss the alliance as a failure. If the purpose of the organization had been the promotion of allied military strength, the condemnation would indeed seem accurate, but the Eisenhower administration had intended a different military purpose for SEATO. They designed the treaty to provide the justification needed to persuade Congress to support military action in the region in the event the president deemed it necessary. Eisenhower's National Security Council had even assumed

that the United States would shoulder the organization's military burden. As such, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution fulfilled their original goal.

SEATO failed but not because of military reasons. It was unsuccessful because it never developed into the larger organization that John Foster Dulles envisioned. In his 1950 book *War or Peace* and again in the 1952 presidential campaign, Dulles charged that the Truman administration failed to conduct a successful Asian strategy because their policies lacked "dynamism." He claimed Truman and Acheson continually reacted to communist plans. From the creation of the Truman Doctrine to entering the Korean War, the Democrats had acted in response to something the communists had done. Dulles found the situation unacceptable and resolved to force the Soviets and Chinese into countering moves made by the United States.

Dulles intended a dynamic, bold foreign policy, but SEATO actually boiled down to one more reaction on behalf of the United States. As Secretary of State, Dulles had grand plans for the type of regional security organization that he believed East Asia and the Western Pacific needed. He wanted a powerful organization with members from Australia to Japan, but he also recognized the impossibility of obtaining such a grouping so soon after



World War II, the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War. He planned to build the organization slowly, but the revolution in Vietnam against the French and the subsequent Geneva Accords caused him to believe that the situation required immediate attention. As such, he cobbled SEATO together with lukewarm British support when most nations in the region had no interest in aligning with one another. Dulles' major foreign policy initiative for Asia suffered from the same problem that he had labeled the chief weakness of the Truman administration. The communists had forced him to react.

As an organization, SEATO had some positive accomplishments, but by creating the organization as a response to the Geneva Accords, Dulles scared neutral nations like Burma from seeking membership. Still nations like Thailand joined expecting improved aid and technical packages from the United States due to the alliance. Their reasoning seemed sound, but Dulles argued that the United States should avoid the appearance of colonialism and always treat sovereign nations as equals. A fine philosophy, but Dulles strove to prove that the US had no colonial ambitions by limiting aid to the SEATO allies due to fears that communist propaganda would use massive aid as evidence of American imperialism. The Thais, Pakistanis,

and Filipinos could not comprehend this reasoning and questioned why they had joined an American led alliance if it did not produce more substantial economic benefits. Non-aligned nations like Malaysia wondered the same thing.

Dulles had a rather strict understanding of what it meant to treat Asian nations as equals, but he also chose to abandon the concept of national equality when faced with fears of communism. In Burma in particular, the United States reacted to perceived communist aggression by stretching American law and assisting a dictatorial regime to take control of the government. Choosing sides in local matters and applying economic pressures on nations that did not accept American views of communism generated the charges of imperialism that he hoped to avoid by not giving too much fiscal assistance. It also caused further resentment in the region and kept other nations from joining SEATO.

Though Dulles advised not giving too much American aid to avoid charges of colonialism, he recognized that Southeast Asia needed financial assistance. He believed that Asians needed to join together and take care of their own financial futures. The United States could provide assistance, but the initiative needed to come from Asia. Judging the Japanese economy and industrial capacity as the

strongest in Asia, Dulles assumed that any economic grouping needed to include Japan. As such, American policy focused on creating an enlarged alliance that would link Japan to SEATO and ANZUS, but Dulles' unwillingness to accept the fact that the Japanese did not wish to recreate a powerful military prevented Japan from joining. Even when presented with the suggestion that Japan could create an economic assistance organization for Asian development, Dulles rejected the concept because it did not fit his own agenda.

After Dulles' death, the Japanese protests over the 1960 mutual security treaty ensured that Japan would never join SEATO, but little hope of an enlarged Asian pact existed even before the anti-American demonstrations in Tokyo. The Eisenhower administration had grand expectations for East Asia and the Western Pacific, but Dulles failed to follow his own prescription and never developed a dynamic Asian policy. Worse, the United States put fears of communism ahead of the interests and concerns of its allies and would-be friends in the region. As such, SEATO never had a chance of developing into the organization that Dulles imagined.

APPENDIX 1

SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY AND PROTOCOL

THE PARTIES to this Treaty,

RECOGNIZING the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

REITERATING their faith in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

REAFFIRMING that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities,

DESIRING to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the treaty area,

INTENDING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the Parties stand together in the area, and

DESIRING further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security,

THEREFORE agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice

are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

#### Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and affective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

#### Article III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed both to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

#### Article IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

#### Article V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

#### Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

#### Article VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

#### Article VIII

As used in this Treaty, the "treaty area" is the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not including the Pacific area north

of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the treaty area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the treaty area.

#### Article IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the other signatories.
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

#### Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

#### Article XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding on the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America is executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

[Signatures not reproduced here.]

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PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY

DESIGNATION OF STATES AND TERRITORIES AS TO WHICH  
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IV AND ARTICLE III ARE TO BE  
APPLICABLE

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above-mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

DONE at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

[Signatures not reproduced here.]



APPENDIX 2

PACIFIC CHARTER, SEPTEMBER 8, 1954

The Delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America;

DESIRING to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific;

CONVINCED that common action to this end, in order to be worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest principles of justice and liberty;

Do HEREBY PROCLAIM:

First, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities;

Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance with their constitutional processes;

Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;

Fourth, as declared in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity.

PROCLAIMED at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

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ABSTRACT

THE HOLLOW PACT:  
PACIFIC SECURITY AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

by John K. Franklin, Ph.D., 2006  
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John Foster Dulles regarded the creation of a powerful Western Pacific collective security organization as the cornerstone of America's East Asian policy, but the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) fell well short of his vision. SEATO never had the military might of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the alliance crumbled when the United States entered the Vietnam War. Even so, SEATO failed because the Eisenhower administration mismanaged its East Asian policy, not because of any perceived military inadequacy. The Department of State under Dulles had a dualistic approach to its East Asian relations. It sought to treat developing Asian nations as sovereign equals in order to disassociate the United States from charges of colonialism. At the same time, it rabidly opposed communism and sought to limit its spread throughout the nonaligned nations of Asia. The two policies competed



with one another and kept Asian leaders from trusting American motives. Furthermore, Dulles pushed for the creation of SEATO in response to the 1954 French defeat at Dienbienphu. The time was not right for the creation of a multilateral alliance, but Dulles believed he had no other option available to halt the growth of communism in the region. The reactive nature of SEATO's creation combined with America's dualistic Asian policy kept nations in the region like Burma and Japan from joining, and as a result, SEATO never grew into the more powerful collective security organization that Dulles wanted.