BEYOND OUTPOST: FORT WORTH, 1880-1918

by

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My parents, Hugh and Edith Rich, never saw the inside of high school classroom but worked and sacrificed all their lives to provide me with opportunities they lacked. They supported me emotionally, physically, and financially beyond any standard of expectation. They are my betters.

Dr. Todd Kerstetter deserves a large measure of credit for agreeing to direct this effort under less than ideal circumstances that would have put off a less secure and less motivated person. He has the rare and attractive ability to command standards without losing empathy and the patience to endure pettiness in others.

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At the close of my formal education I find myself both elated and humbled but also looking forward to life’s next adventure, whatever and wherever that may be.
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Introduction

In 1880 Fort Worth faced an uncertain future. What had begun as an army fort only thirty-one years earlier had grown to a railroad town of 6,663 on the strength of post-Civil War cattle drives but the decline in that trade beginning in the 1870s left the economy in shambles. The lack of commercial diversity, a serious limitation that had doomed many frontier communities, was aggravated by the local geography. Fort Worth sat in a landlocked area of north central Texas adjacent to the Trinity River, which often ran so shallow as to hardly deserve the nomenclature, existing on the poor side of a clear divide between the East Texas green belt and the arid, brown landscape of West Texas, a huge section where (before irrigation) agriculture became more subsistence than commercial and ranching required such vast acreage that only large operations proved cost effective.\(^1\) To the south and southwest substantial cotton production offered hope for commercial development but other railroad towns, not remarkably smaller or less naturally endowed, lay closer to that production than Fort Worth. In 1876, when the first railroad arrived, Fort Worth’s population stood at 1,500 while Waco, less than ninety miles south and with rail service since 1874, boasted 6,000.\(^2\) Neither enterprise nor natural advantages suggested that Fort Worth would not become just another unremarkable burg of limited population and influence. Many Texas cities, including Jefferson and New Braunfels, declined following the Civil War when the state underwent economic and transportation transformations that shifted the centers of commercial activity.\(^3\)
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to a brighter future lay not within the Fort Worth city limits or to the west or south but thirty miles to the east. Dallas, an older, larger, and richer settlement strategically located in the East Texas greenbelt, enjoyed overwhelming advantages over the western upstart that would ensure its superiority in population and commerce but successful development of two closely-situated urban areas was not unknown. Louisville, Kentucky and Cincinnati, Ohio; Chicago, Illinois and St. Louis, Missouri; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Baltimore, Maryland; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and Tulsa, Oklahoma; Minneapolis, Minnesota and St. Paul, Minnesota; as well as Houston, Texas and Galveston, Texas all competed for regional supremacy in what most saw as a zero-sum situation, that success for one would mean failure for the other. In a very important way that competition centered on railroads, especially in North Texas where no viable river route existed. Dallas acquired the Houston and Texas Central in 1872, four years before the Texas and Pacific arrived in Fort Worth, giving the former a large lead in commercial development. In practice, the competition inspired Fort Worthians, suggesting the ironic conclusion that the Dallas’ proximity contributed to Fort Worth’s eventual success.4

Competition may have driven the city and its citizens, but economic development and transportation improvements represented the critical factors in Fort Worth’s transition from a frontier settlement of a few thousand to a nationally ranked urban metropolis. That process would not have happened, or would have been remarkably different, without several key commercial events. Fort Worth’s beginnings and its early survival depended on the timely intervention of commercial stimuli, which often arrived
just in time to ward off obscurity. Many historians, both professional and amateur, have recognized the link between commerce and Fort Worth’s growth.  

Boardman Buckley Paddock was Fort Worth’s most enthusiastic promoter and its first historian. Paddock, who left Mississippi looking for a “coming” place to relocate, settled in Fort Worth in 1873 as editor of the *Democrat*, a local newspaper. As a newspaperman, lawyer, state legislator, mayor, and businessman he worked and sacrificed to advance his adopted home. In a 1911 regional history Paddock pointed to the early 1880s as the period when Fort Worth stopped being a town and became a city, crediting the transition to an economic boom stemming from railway development, a perspective reflecting Paddock’s Gilded Age belief in the importance of railroads. That prosperity funded a series of municipal improvements, such as a water works system, street paving, sewers, bridges, schools, and a fire department, that provided the foundations of a modern urban environment. The incipient water works proved particularly important and problematic for a community on the edge of parched West Texas.

Although Paddock clearly believed in the significance of those improvements he also practiced candor concerning problems, admitting that economic development prior to the twentieth century was periodic, not continuous. In 1884 and 1885 the cattle trade slumped but rebounded sufficiently to justify the establishment, in 1890, of the Fort Worth Dressed Meat and Packing Company, including stock pens and a small packinghouse in what is now the Northside stockyards area (then not a part of Fort Worth). Economic troubles, which Paddock blamed on a decline in West Texas migration, quickly returned and lingered throughout the 1890s, so depressing the
livestock market that in 1898 the packinghouse closed temporarily. The poor economy stunted Fort Worth’s growth to the extent that its population increased from 23,076 in 1890 to 26,668 in 1900, a difference of only 3,592 or sixteen percent. Paddock admitted that population growth had waned in the 1890s but argued that a more convincing standard of municipal greatness lay in the aggregate amount of material and civic resources, that Fort Worth had developed an array of commercial and industrial enterprises that justified its standing as one the Southwest’s great cities—a clear example of enthusiasm overcoming reality. In a more logical moment, he admitted that it was not until Armour and Swift formed the cornerstone of greatness in 1903 that Fort Worth experienced the conservative material growth and development necessary for a city of diversified resources. That admission revealed Paddock’s understanding of Fort Worth’s limited commercial development prior to 1903.8

Oliver Knight, to whom all local historians owe a large debt, took up Paddock’s perspective, arguing that “1883, with its era of public improvement, caused a revolution in social affairs.” Knight saw the manifestations of that change in more attractive homes, the appearance of landscaping and sidewalks, and the growth of churches, all signs that “the roughness of frontier life was passing away,” and that “[a] frontier town had blossomed into a cosmopolitan city.” He also cited the successful drive to establish a library as a sign that “(s)ix-shooter culture had come to an end.” Knight drew his remarks primarily from an 1887 Fort Worth Gazette special issue that trumpeted the prosperity of 1883 for doubling the population and funding civic private improvements. However, like Paddock, Knight realized that the economic structure of the 1880s remained critically weak, that the lack of commercial diversification had left
Fort Worth vulnerable to vagaries in the cattle trade and transportation commerce. He noted limited development that included ice plants, cigar factories, and assorted machine shops, but lamented that the only sizable businesses added were the Texas Brewing Company, established in 1890, and flour milling. Knight’s study, the only general discussion of Fort Worth in the twentieth-century, suffers from attempting too much in too few pages. *Outpost on the Trinity* spans the founding of the original United States Army fort in 1849 to the post-World War II era, covering over a century in only 223 pages with approximately half devoted to the seventy years between 1880 and 1950.13

Others have also contributed to the debate. In 1956 Robert H. Talbert, a sociologist, offered a solid academic treatment that touched on most issues, including economic development. Talbert emphasizes the importance of citizen involvement in municipal growth, arguing that local leadership formed a significant variable for community development. Julia K. Garrett’s *Fort Worth: A Frontier Triumph* studies the period from the arrival of Spanish conquistadors to 1872, agreeing with Talbert about the impact of Fort Worth’s elites while crediting post-Civil War cattle drives for revitalizing Fort Worth after it came very close to withering away. Fort Worth, the last settled community between North Texas and the Kansas cattle towns, developed an impressive commercial foundation supplying the drovers’ material needs and an infamous vice district meeting their other needs. Hell’s Half Acre, Fort Worth’s red-light district of saloons, casinos, and prostitution houses, arose south of Ninth Street and east of Main Street. The twin developments quickly developed a nexus that endured for decades. In 1879 some 300 citizens attended public meetings and many wrote to the newspaper complaining that police raids had become so onerous that trail hands remained camped
outside of town, reducing the trade of not only the Acre’s vice purveyors but also legitimate downtown merchants. Acceptance of that linkage helped the Acre survive until well into the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{14}

Garrett was not the first to recognize the importance of post-Civil War cattle drives. Clarence Thompson’s 1933 thesis identified the trail trade as the area’s first economic stimulus but recognized that the effect was evanescent, that cattle drives passing Fort Worth peaked in 1871 then declined dramatically, in part due to the opening of the Western Trail through Fort Griffin, Texas, that provided a route with fewer farmland crossing (see Table Introduction-1).\textsuperscript{15} In 1968 Sandra Myres wrote that Fort Worth faced a dire situation in the late 1860s, that its population declined so dramatically that Indian raids drew much closer, including an 1869 incident in which a man died at Marine Creek, just two miles north of town.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Year  & Number of Cattle Driven Past Fort Worth, 1866 to 1876  \\
\hline
1866 & 260,000  \\
1867 & 35,000  \\
1868 & 75,000  \\
1869 & 350,000  \\
1870 & 350,000  \\
1871 & 600,000  \\
1872 & 350,000  \\
1873 & 404,000  \\
1874 & 166,000  \\
1875 & 151,618  \\
1876 & 204,438  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Introduction-1 Number of Cattle Driven Past Fort Worth, 1866 to 1876}
\end{table}

Others have echoed the emphasis on the 1880s, sometimes with amplification and expansion. Caleb Pirtle narrowed the critical period to 1881 when Fort Worth hovered on the edge of uncertainty as to whether or not it would become a city or remain an overgrown village while the favorable resolution of that dilemma at the end of the year made Fort Worth Texas’ most prosperous town. Pirtle, like Knight, identified the manifestations of that transition in internal improvements, but also suggested that the process was not complete, that elements of Mexico and New York remained closely mixed, that “Broadway and ranch brush against one another.”

Janet Schmelzer also noted a duality, seeing refinement in the business center where permanent residents congregated and roughness in Hell’s Half Acre where transients and others satisfied carnal appetites. Leonard Sanders argued that the Gazette’s observations in 1887 had proven astute but too shortsighted, that the effect continued past 1883 into the 1890s, a point first suggested by Knight.

J’Nell Pate, who studied the cattle industry so important to Fort Worth, agreed that a significant transition occurred in the 1880s but tempered that acceptance with a realistic appraisal of the problems of the 1890s. According to Pate, the vision of city leaders in the 1880s “had changed Fort Worth from a frontier village to a city” but the depression of the 1890s brought challenges that destroyed the hopes of many businessmen. Studying and writing about the livestock trade, Pate chronicled hard times following the Panic of 1893 when the stockyards struggled to survive. From that critical period sprang the impetus that brought the Swift and Armour packinghouses in 1903, which “completely fulfilled” civic ambitions and propelled Fort Worth to industrial greatness. The importance of the packinghouses remains indisputable.
Richard Selcer, though not advancing his own theory, disagreed that the early 1880s marked a significant departure. Selcer questioned the description of 1880s Fort Worth as “a town of gentility and decorum,” charging that Knight’s statement did not bear up to examination because the Acre “was still wide open” and that “[a]part from growing larger, the town had not changed much in ten years.” Selcer also charged that Knight had overestimated reform efforts when he concluded that city government had been able to “clean up the Acre between 1887 and 1889,” suggesting that newspaper and court records showed that the same activities were practiced with the same zest, a point that touched on another meaningful issue.

Selcer’s work not only suggested that municipal accoutrements remained incomplete after the 1880s but also that the longevity of a large red-light district spoke volumes about the lack of civic progress. The Acre, from its beginnings after the Civil War, always enjoyed the support of many otherwise solid citizens who believed its presence drew trade downtown. That commercial link enabled the Acre to survive numerous clean-up campaigns, making it a living anachronism reflecting an enduring frontier mentality. Although Selcer recognized the existence of that relationship and its implications, he mistakenly believed that the Acre suffered from a change of fortunes around 1901, struggling to last rites in 1919. In fact, no permanent change prior to 1918 affected the existing arrangement. If anything changed at all it was that the relationship between tawdry and respectable became more pronounced as the Acre remained vibrant right up to its abrupt end during World War I.

Some recent scholarship has refocused on railroads as the critical element behind development. In 1996 Jill Jackson credited the boosterism that brought a vast rail service...
for pushing Fort Worth from outpost to thriving metropolis, a view closely seconded by
Leta Scheon’s position that citizen involvement had been the key to attracting railroads,
which she termed the most important economic stimulus prior to World War II that
transformed a landlocked town from a mere stop on a cattle drive to a multi-faceted urban
center. The evidence suggests that Jackson and Schoen gave too much credit to the
transformative effect of railroads, that Fort Worth suffered from an obvious lack of
industrial diversity until the late 1910s.\(^{25}\)

The scholarship to date has developed two broad historical themes into consensus. First, scholars agree that a handful of individuals drove development, recognizing that
local boosters provided a salient force distinguishing Fort Worth from other cities. The
contribution was multi-faceted but to a very large extent involved financial backing. The
best estimates of citizen-funded support to railroads run as high as $3,000,000, half in
cash and half in land. Historian Daniel J. Boorstin used the term “Go-Getters” to
describe community leaders whose efforts transformed their towns, finding that a
disproportionate number of their ranks were lawyers, a trait shared by Fort Worth’s great
men such as Paddock, John Peter Smith, and James J. Jarvis.\(^{26}\) Second, scholars
acknowledge the importance of several events for Fort Worth’s successful development:
the establishment of the military outpost in 1849, the influx of Confederate veterans after
the end of the Civil War, the advent of trail drives of the late 1860s, the arrival of the
railroad in 1876, the railroad boom of the early 1880s, the building of the Armour and
Swift packinghouses in 1903, the Texas oil boom that began around 1917, and the
construction of the massive Consolidated aircraft plant in 1942.\(^{27}\)
Those traditional interpretations, all carrying strong arguments and deserving of recognition, suffer from an important failing. They suggest that the only significant economic events between the end of the 1880s and 1918 concerned the arrival of packinghouses in 1903 and the Ranger oil fields of 1917. That view can not be sustained, not because Armour and Swift and oil were unimportant, but because it is myopic. After 1903 Fort Worth strengthened its existing railroad economy, added commercial and ethnic diversification, achieved substantial population increases, developed military bases, and ended the reign of vice in Hell’s Half Acre. Many of those events took shape after the mid-1910s when World War I spurred a sustained period of economic progress that was intensified by major army training facilities at Camp Bowie and three army airfields. The war effect was pervasive, offering not only economic, but also social ramifications in that military pressure proved instrumental in closing the Acre, ending a semi-official relationship between city and vice that had endured since the late 1860s. Those impacts represented a major departure from the city’s frontier heritage and a giant step towards its future that have been too long ignored. Susie Pritchett, archivist for the Tarrant County Archives, recognized as much in her conclusion that “the building of Camp Bowie and three air fields pulled us into the 20th century like no other event and changed us from provincial to worldly in outlook.”

Walter Buenger adopted a similar thesis in his study of eleven northeast Texas counties from 1887 to 1930. Buenger attacked the prevailing historical interpretation that the significant transformation of the South (including Texas) into mainstream American prosperity occurred during federal intervention in the New Deal and World War II. He argued that thesis underestimated the importance of changes occurring prior to 1930,
particularly economic developments that separated Texas from the rest of the South. Buenger found that as late as the 1890s nothing of significance distinguished Texas from the rest of the South, but by 1930 differences between Texas and other Southern states became manifest, suggesting that the significant transition had occurred before and not after 1930. The beginning of that transformation lay in improved economic conditions that removed northeast Texas from the retrograde cotton economy of the South. That process was facilitated by a dynamic political landscape and cultural fluidity but the crux of the change was economic development, that Texas became less Southern because it enjoyed greater general prosperity. Most of the development of northeast Texas occurred after 1914 when a broad middle class began exerting considerable political muscle just as World War I brought unparalleled prosperity, giving impetus to cultural changes that effected a major paradigm shift. The effect Buenger described is closely related to what happened in Fort Worth during the same period, a transition to a modern city with a more diversified economy but a less diversified moral code.

A perspective that stresses the formative period during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also allows a discussion of Fort Worth’s place in the broader historiography of urbanization of the American West, a field that has defined several major themes relevant to local development. Richard Wade’s *The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis* deals with a period of urbanization predating Fort Worth but it still remains significant. Wade contends that the early pattern of Western urban development represented not a bold and fresh approach, but a concerted effort to transplant well-known institutions, a pattern that succeeded so well that travelers often commented on the similarities of Western and
In addition, Wade noted that the new towns of the West struggled among themselves for regional economic supremacy. 32

In 1968 Robert Dykstra in *The Cattle Towns* studied five Kansas towns involved in the cattle drives of the late 1860s to mid-1880s: Dodge City, Wichita, Ellsworth, Abilene, and Caldwell. Dykstra’s provoking analysis agreed with Wade that Western towns struggled among themselves for regional supremacy but expanded the discussion by adding that the competition reflected human ambitions and that the human factor was the prime determinate of success. Don H. Doyle presented a similar perspective in his 1990 study on Southern urbanization, *New Men, New Cities, New South: Atlanta, Nashville, Charleston, and Mobile, 1860*. Dykstra saw boosterism as quite effective in obtaining settlers, transportation facilities (railroad terminals), capital investments, and commerce and noted that the battle for a piece of the cattle business was particularly energetic as the towns used advertising, economic incentives, and lax enforcement of vice laws to lure the cow herds. 33

Dykstra used the appendix to challenge the work of Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick. In “A Meaning for Turner’s Frontier,” appearing in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Elkins and McKitrick adopted a Turnarian view of the frontier’s effect on democratic structures in Western urbanization, arguing that democracy had evolved in towns as it had in throughout the non-urban West. Dykstra did not contest that point, but disputed their view that democratic institutions developed most fully in towns with homogeneous populations who resolved issues through cooperation. 34 Dykstra suggested that the most important format for democratic growth was conflict rather than cooperation and that liberal structures arose out of controversy and opposition. The
disagreement seemed a tempest in a teapot in that both sides admitted the presence of both cooperation and conflict in the formative period of municipal development, simply disagreeing on the relative weight of each to the result. \(^{35}\)

Lawrence Larsen’s *The Urban West at the End of the Frontier* avoided the case study approach traditionally used by urban historians in favor of a comparative analysis relying heavily on data from the 1880 Census, local histories, and secondary sources. Larsen compared several older communities to twenty-four Western towns (five in Texas) with a population of 8,000 or more in 1880. He agreed with Wade that little was unique or new about the West’s young cities, calling them carbon copies that mirrored the emerging social, economic, and political values of the Gilded Age in the truest tradition of American urbanization, but for Larsen the effect extended even further to mold Western architecture and design. \(^{36}\)

Larsen opened a fresh perspective for studies of frontier urbanization. Using extensive statistics on population trends he proposed that the cities of the West represented an expression not of democracy but of capitalism, that economics drove exploration and settlement. \(^{37}\) He suggested that city building was neither a proving ground for democracy nor a response to geographic or climatic conditions, but the creation of the capitalist spirit. Therefore, Western urbanization was nothing more than a process of uncontrolled commerce practiced by entrepreneurs who established societies mirroring earlier forms, regardless of the unique characteristics of the area. \(^{38}\)

In *Cities of the American West: A History of Frontier Urban Planning*, published in 1979, John Reps, a political scientist, established that the earliest Western towns were planned communities, allowing that planned did not mean well designed. He accepted
the argument of Wade and Larsen that town plans followed common styles, adding that they usually featured a gridiron street system with rectangular blocks and lots. Those communities also closely resembled towns east of the Great Plains in the manner of services provided and in their ties to the region’s economy. Reps explained the commonalities as the result of vigorous men from Eastern cities who became the major forces behind Western urbanization, transplanting their traditions along with their ambition. Reps offered one of the more complete dismissals of Turner’s frontier thesis. Turner viewed the closing of the frontier as the turning point of the nation’s history, suggesting that it had serious implications for the character of American life but Reps argued that Turner failed to grasp that by 1890 a significant part of the West’s population resided in towns and that those urban dwellers dominated culture and civilization, creating the West’s distinctive characteristics.  

Reps followed in 1981 with a related study, *The Forgotten Frontier: Urban Planning in the American West Before 1890*, that continued his argument that Western urbanization in the nineteenth century shaped the region’s future. Reps noted of thirty-one Western cities with a 1970 population of 200,000 or more, all but one had been founded prior to 1890. He also repeated his earlier points, that Western towns differed little from their Eastern counterparts, that urban residents dominated Western culture, that promoters or speculators founded many towns, and that Western towns began as a planned development, not as spontaneous, random events. Reps supplied early maps, drawings, plans, and plats to support the existence of early urban planning and continued his anti-Turner agenda by adopting Larsen’s idea that preoccupation with the frontier
thesis had led historians to miss the importance of city building, that they had minimized the roles towns played in the process of Western expansion.\textsuperscript{40}

In 1979 Ronald L. F. Davis made the rather remarkable leap from agreeing with Wade and Larsen to arguing that the urban history of the American West was largely a set of urban biographies without an analytic framework or a broad synthesis. Davis’s article, “Western Urban Development: A Critical Analysis,” in \textit{The American West}, suggested that few historians had attempted to extend their understanding of the frontier as a process in the analysis of urbanization, leaving those studies to social scientists. However, he then accepted Wade’s argument that towns preceded farming and were the spearheads of settlement, but contended that the discussion about which came first was interesting, but revealed little about the urbanization process. Davis suggested that the answer was a perspective of urbanization as a process of private enterprise in a capitalist mode of production, the basic premise of Larsen’s work. He also agreed with Larsen that cities in the West, like those in the East, were part of a process of exploitation for private gain and that cities west and east of the Mississippi arose as a means to exploit wealth. Davis agreed that the overall urbanization pattern remained remarkably constant, but insisted that variations in local resources often resulted in slightly different forms.\textsuperscript{41}

In 1987 Patricia Limerick Nelson offered her influential work \textit{The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West}. Nelson remained aloof from the mainstream of Western urbanization debates, preferring to focus on Turner’s theme of discontinuity. She attacked Turner’s idea that the frontier’s closing in 1890 marked a clear historical divide, arguing that federal involvement created a clear continuity of dependency.\textsuperscript{42} The idea that settlers entered the West tied to government apron strings
hit at the prevailing idea of hardy, independent types civilizing the West and spawning
democratic institutions in the process. Limerick suggested that conceiving the West as
a place rather than a process allowed a view of the region as a meeting ground for diverse
cultures tied together by the working of conquest, a faint echo of Larsen’s and Davis’s
theory emphasizing Western urbanization as a struggle for property, profit, and cultural
dominance.

In 1990 Char Miller and Heywood T. Sanders, editors of *Urban Texas Politics
and Development*, suggested that historians had overemphasized the importance of the
state’s frontier and rural areas to the neglect of its urban centers. Each of the nine essays
examined the urbanization process in a single Texas city in the grand perspective of
chronological periods: the first period, 1836-1880s, when cities were isolated and
operated independently; the second, from the 1890s to the Great Depression, when cities
competed for regional supremacy, reshuffling the urban hierarchy; and the third, the years
following the depression, when Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio successfully extended
their resource base.

*River Towns in the Great West: The Structure of Provincial Urbanization in the
American Midwest, 1820-1870* by Timothy R. Mahoney chronicled the rise and fall of a
regional urban economic system across the upper Mississippi and Ohio river valleys
during the middle of the nineteenth century, focusing on explaining the economic-
geographic dynamics which created and transformed the regional urban system.
Mahoney concentrated on the spatial dimension of the rise of a market economy in the
West through a social scientific analysis of the area from unsettled frontier to a regional
urban system. From that data he asserted the need to understand local history in a
regional context by examining how various cities adapted or failed to adapt to change, incorporating Larsen’s and Davis’s theme that settlers and entrepreneurs transferred the forces of capitalism across the West in a manner that reordered economic arrangements and stimulated urban development. That process existed clearly in the development of St. Louis as a market center for a dynamic system of river towns structured around the interaction of settlers, entrepreneurs, steamboats, regional topography, and the environment. In the 1850s railroads penetrated the system, overcoming transportation inefficiencies that had stymied economic development and triggering a rapid centralization of market and industrial activity at Chicago and, to a lesser and later extent, St. Louis. By 1860 the rise of those cities, along with westward expansion and development, undermined and restructured the regional urban system of the Great West. This structuralist approach of intertwined forces fit well with local histories that integrated diverse systems, allowing a broader view.46

Mahoney also agreed with Wade and Larsen that Easterners moved West hoping to recreate the lives they had known. Pioneers settled towns and forged their way through intense local competition to expand into the regional market, securing their own and their town’s success. However, he disagreed with Dykstra, insisting that the contributions of individuals was limited, that many critical decisions were made outside their control. Towns followed a general pattern of development but each area’s potential was different and its regional system dictated economic interaction and compromise, doing much to determine each town’s place in the regional order.47

Mahoney’s Provincial Lives: Middle-class Experience in the Antebellum Middle West, published in 1999, strove to provide a framework for the integration of local,
regional, and national studies as they moved from the East, through the Midwest, and into the West. Mahoney used the perspective of selected individuals to track the shifting patterns of social change and the interplay between individual experience and social change. He believed that each community was “layered” by the arrival of different groups but that locals contoured social development through resistance, acceptance, or accommodation to those newcomers. Therefore, the various histories interacted with and explained each other, allowing historians to fuse any narrative into a regional social history.48

For Mahoney the emergence of a distinctive regional middle class was the critical center of Western society. Early pioneers who considered themselves part of “good society” laid the foundation and they, along with later arriving merchants and professionals, intertwined good society with boosterism in the 1830s and 1840s. Those groups merged with later arrivals from Eastern towns and cities and, at each stage of assimilation, the new groups grafted some of their values to the work-in-progress, developing a regional definition of gentility and establishing class lines. Local town boosters fused collective action to self-interest to construct community while gentility provided a style and code of behavior that clarified group identity.49

The distinctively urban middle class subculture that developed served as the framework for society formation for Western immigrants. Through the cultural system of gentility, those who rose up in local society developed a larger network of relationships in “trans-local communities” that went beyond local concerns. Mahoney suggested that those regional groups set the framework for a more integrated regional social-economic processes which dramatically rearranged power and intra-regional relationship among
towns through competition, harking back to Larsen and Davis. That process not only defined Western urbanization, but also gave the middle class broader power and enabled it to control the mainstream of American society.\textsuperscript{50}

Mahoney suggested that railroads rearranged the structure of the regional system and the power focus of regional development. The arrival of train service shifted the urban network of settlement away from rivers and to the interior while allowing large firms to control vast markets, triggering centralization and metropolitan development. The rise of large metropolitan areas reordered and integrated social power, elevating the metropolitan society to the arbitrator of regional life and local societies. While centralization and integration established social control and homogenization they also contributed to the unraveling of the cohesive worlds of community life. Local society as a reflection of the larger society eroded, leaving in its wake scores of fractured communities without identities. The result was that the first “Great West” in the antebellum Middle West was multi-centered, loosely defined social network undermined by diversity, racked by internal tensions and so weakened that it was vulnerable to new forces of organization.\textsuperscript{51}

From the literature several broad categories emerge that relate to Fort Worth. Wade, Larsen, Reps, and Mahoney stress the degree to which Western urbanization recreated that of the East, an idea congruent with Fort Worth practice of sending representatives to assess services and facilities in older cities before embarking on new projects, the water works being a prime but not sole example. Mahoney also cited the importance of railroads in providing regional development opportunities for interior
communities removed from viable river routes, a set of circumstances directly applicable to Fort Worth.

Many scholars focus on the role of individuals in urbanization. Dykstra, Limerick, Larsen, Davis, and Miller and Sanders see Western urbanization as defined, at least in part, by struggles for regional supremacy. The earliest records reveal a stark competition between Fort Worth and Dallas, a rivalry that carried over well into the twentieth century and which became a major force behind exaggerated boosterism. It would be hard to think of a better example of urban competition than that between the twin cities on the Trinity River. That condition necessitated human involvement since cities cannot be competitive, only their populations may. Dysktra, identified the business community as the dominant force in cattle towns, arguing that their involvement became the prime factor in developing the commerce and investment necessary for a city to thrive. Dykstra’s stress on boosterism rings true for Fort Worth. From the first railroad in 1876 to the military camps of World War I Fort Worth has always depended on the kindness of its citizens.

Some have questioned the worth of individuals. Mahoney argued the limited nature of their contributions, that many critical decisions were made outside of local control. However, he admits that the emergence of a distinctive middle class was critical, that the Western bourgeois laid the foundations of good society and boosterism. Larsen, Davis, and Mahoney contend that capitalism, not individuals, shaped Western cities, that urbanization was a process of exploiting regional wealth and the frontier thesis stopped at the city limits where private enterprise took over while Limerick argues the same for the West in general, not a contradictory position. The discussion between the two groups
remains more academic than real. Both seek to explain development, one stressing
individual initiative and the other an economic system, but both eventually rely on human
involvement, making the difference moot.

The existing Fort Worth scholarship has some very large holes. The city’s early
period through the arrival of the Texas and Pacific Railroad in 1876 and its aftermath has
been well documented, leaving little justification for further study without the
development of significant new resources. In contrast, the years after 1880 have received
so little attention as to be left begging for scholarly analysis. Selcer and Pate dealt with
issues within the period and Knight presented a cursory treatment, but no study of depth
dокументs the incredible developments of the four decades between 1880 and the end of
World War I. In addition, the existing scholarship has focused on the indubitable
significance of the national packinghouses to municipal development to the exclusion of
everything that occurred between 1903 and 1918, ignoring a period when the Fort Worth
area achieved industrial dominance in North Texas. The importance of that period has
been too long ignored.

2 *Fort Worth Gazette*, May 29, 1887, p. 3.


7 Paddock, *Central and Western Texas*, pp. 262-263, 267. Fort Worth, the most westernmost Texas city north of Austin, was the center of West Texas commerce.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., p. 154.


Correspondence Folder; Typescript: Early Fort Worth: A Frontier Triumph: 1873-1874, p. 402 GA 141; Folder with Notebook for 1874, pp. 404-406, GA 141, pp. 404-406; Julia Jenkins Garrett Papers, Special Collections of the University of Texas at Arlington, Arlington, Texas; Vernon G. Spence, “Colonel Morgan Jones: Master Builder of Texas Railroads,” West Texas Historical Year Book, XLIV (October 1968), pp. 15-25; Fort Worth Democrat, April 18, 1879, p. 4; April 25, 1879, p. 4; April 26, 1879, p. 4; April 27, 1879, p. 4; April 29, 1879, p. 4.


17 Pirtle, Civilized West, p. 74.


21 Ibid., p. 21-54.


23 Selcer, Hell’s Half Acre, p. 163; Knight, Outpost, p. 123. Selcer’s citation is incorrect, in Hell’s Half Acre he lists pages 115-117 in Knight’s 1953 edition, the quote is actually found on page 136 in the 1953 edition and page 123 in the 1990 edition.


27 Knight, Outpost, p. 214; Carol E. Roark, Fort Worth Then and Now (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University, 2001), pp. 2-9; Alexis Wilson, “Moments that Changed Our City,” Fort Worth, Texas, 7 no. 12 (December, 2004), pp. 54-61 and Alexis Wilson, “Moments that Changed Our City,” Fort Worth, Texas, 8 no. 2 (February, 2005), pp. 36-41; Talbert, Cowtown—Metropolis, pp. 22-23; Schoen, “The O. B. Macaroni Company,” p. 22.
28 Wilson, “Moments that Changed Our City,” *Fort Worth, Texas*, 7 no. 12 (December, 2004), p. 61.


30 Buenger, *Path to a Modern South*, pp. 70, 163, 194.


37 Ibid., p. 121.

38 Ibid., pp. 18-19.


43 Ibid., p. 323.


49 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

50 Ibid., pp. 4-6.

51 Ibid.
In the first five years of the 1880s Fort Worth would begin its journey to city status on steel rails. At the decade’s start the Texas and Pacific’s one daily departure and arrival constituted the sum of Fort Worth’s railroad traffic, by 1884 five trunk lines ran nine arrivals and departures daily with others under construction or in serious planning stages. Railroad development had a multiplier effect, increasing construction and trade and expanding opportunities in other fields, especially the dressed beef industry which made a serious effort to develop a national and a European market. The economic surge also spurred the beginning of a modern municipal infrastructure in water and sewage systems as well as street and bridge improvements. Railroads would prove insufficient in and of themselves to make Fort Worth a great city but they provided the economic critical mass upon which all other advances would rest.

The frontier had not receded far at the beginning of the 1880s. The distance between civilization and mayhem could often be measured in miles. In August 1880 an Indian attack killed four men traveling southwest from Fort Worth. Within the city limits remnants of the frontier persisted, most visibly in high levels of violence aggravated by the pervasiveness of firearms (despite state laws), saloons and vice dens. Many of Fort Worth’s thirty-one saloons, approximately one for every 225 residents, offered gambling, including three on a single downtown block that operated night and day. Most ran seven days a week, ignoring laws mandating that most businesses close from midnight Saturday until midnight Sunday thanks to an “unholy alliance” between saloon owners and city
administrators that allowed a lively back-door trade on Sundays in return for regular fine payments.¹

Occasionally, especially around elections, the police launched crackdowns with great fanfare only to achieve little. An April 1881 enforcement effort was notable for two reasons. It resulted in the arrest of Fort Worth Alderman H.P. Shiel, a saloon owner and sometime city police officer who had pushed for formal recognition of the unofficial back-door policy. Shiel admitted serving beer on a Sunday but argued the legal technicality that he had not collected until Monday. Moreover, the 1881 raids extended beyond saloons, taking in others who worked on Sundays, including tradesmen and an employee of the Advance, a local newspaper that often criticized the police’s poor enforcement. In all likelihood the inclusion of more legitimate businesses carried a hidden agenda of discrediting the effort. Complaints soon appeared, including a letter to the editor signed “Six Teetotalers” that described the campaign as “obnoxious” and “ineffective at reducing drunkenness.” The truth was that neither the police nor city aldermen nor businessmen objected to the Acre or its Sunday operations, they just went through the enforcement motion occasionally.² By July 1881 a litany of complaints about the Acre signaled that the latest aberration had been replaced by business as usual.³

The Acre survived the occasional crackdown because many respectable citizens believed it contributed to a vibrant urban center. That support overcame the occasional outcry, even the recommendation of Marshal William Rea in July 1883 to eliminate the Acre and its endemic violence. Rea’s idea was not original, many had made the plea using different motivations, but the Acre enjoyed a historic record of support based on assumptions of its worth to legitimate commerce. In April 1879 a group of 300 citizens
publicly asked for more enlightened enforcement after increased police activity so
curtailed activities to the extent that ranchers and cowhands avoided Fort Worth entirely,
including its supply houses. That perspective affected the council’s amendment of the
law so that it applied only to saloons and only between the hours of 9:00 A.M. and 4:00
P.M. on Sundays. The more moderate statutes also resulted in upping the ante as the city
began assessing $25 fines weekly instead of monthly.4

The local criminal justice system displayed a frontier mentality in the
administration of justice by demonstrating little concern for basic rights. In 1881 two or
more police officers were accused of pistol whipping reporter J. W. Putnam after he
criticized an arrest. Mayor John T. Brown responded to the allegations by stating that he
was glad to have an officer who would club a reporter since “they all deserved to be
beaten on general principles.”5 The lack of restraint was more pronounced when
African-Americans were involved. In 1880 several white men who attempted to lynch an
African-American accused of assaulting a white female were acquitted after an editorial
called for leniency. On March 16, 1881, another alleged rapist was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death one day after the assault.6

For all the its roughness Fort Worth had achieved some level of development,
allowing residents to contrast the present with Fort Worth’s past and with adjacent towns.
In 1879 Paddock remarked while traveling through Comanche, Texas, 120 miles to the
southwest, that the town reminded him of “primitive days” in Fort Worth (just six years
prior) when he and other leaders used “adjurations” to overcome apathy and attract a
railroad. Also in 1879 the editors of the two local daily newspapers, the Democrat and
Advance, lamented the passing of the “old days” when cowboys raising general mischief
provided no shortage of sensationalism to report. In 1880 longtime police officer W. B. Thomas seconded that sentiment while lauding Fort Worth’s remarkable progress from the days when railroad gangs and cowboys came into town bent for trouble.\(^7\)

By 1881 the accoutrements of an urban commercial city existed, if only in primitive forms. Phone service, which had arrived years earlier, boasted sixty-nine subscribers and the post office handled an average of 2,000 pieces of mail daily, but the local water, supplied by seventy-five artesian wells, continued to be sold by the barrel from wagons. The commercial sector achieved listed 358 professions and businesses, including twenty-five lawyers, fifteen carpenters, eleven doctors, eight blacksmiths, seven butchers, three dentists, as well as sixteen dry goods shops, fifteen saloons, eleven hotels and wagon yards, seven stables and restaurants, six liquor suppliers, three banks, two newspapers, and a single variety theater and street railway.\(^8\) In the fiscal year that ended September 1881 some 160 businesses shipped $2,303,000 in goods, the Tidball and Van Zandt Bank handled $20,000,000 and the City National Bank $40,000,000, and the “mammoth” grocery wholesaler of Joseph H. Brown bought and sold $1,500,000 in goods. The future offered hope for continued growth; in January 1880 the nation’s eighth largest cotton compress, capable of reducing bales to seven inches (standard had been forty-two inches), began operation. The need for such a device was evident in 6,428 bales waiting for railcar space in December 1880. In addition, the Fort Worth Ice Company contracted for new equipment capable of producing twenty tons of ice daily.\(^9\)

For all the advances, Fort Worth’s population and economic growth lagged behind the surrounding area. From 1870 to 1880 the population of Tarrant County grew 426 percent, from 5,788 to 24,678, the largest increase of all Texas counties. Its assessed
valuations of taxable property were also impressive, rising from $1,079,627 in 1870 to $4,830,163 in 1880, or over 347 percent. While sources lack comparable municipal figures, the 1880 Census showed that Fort Worth contributed only twenty-seven percent of the county’s total population, some 6,663 (526 foreign born, 5,606 “whites,” 1,054 “colored,” and 3 Chinese), ranking it seventh statewide behind Galveston, San Antonio, Houston, Austin, Dallas, and Waco.\textsuperscript{10} Fort Worth’s small population reflected its underdeveloped industrial base. The manufacturing section of the \textit{1882 City Directory} listed only the Fort Worth Packing Company and a large iron foundry under construction, admitting that “Our manufacturing interests are just in their infancy.” With little industrial production Fort Worth relied heavily on trade in agricultural products. Of the $2,303,000 shipped in 1881 only $200,000, or 8.7 percent, involved manufactured goods, largely flour and ice. The other 91.3 percent included 43,460 bales of cotton, over 26,000 cattle, 300,000 pounds of wood, 310,000 pounds of hides, 500,000 pounds of bone, 21,000 bushels of grain.\textsuperscript{11}

Fort Worth’s poor state of industrialization became obvious in comparison to its eastern neighbor. According to statistics in Table 1-1 drawn from the 1880 Census, Dallas County had a 35.7 percent larger population than Tarrant County while the city of Dallas was fifty-five percent larger than Fort Worth.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & Dallas County & Dallas City & Tarrant County & Fort Worth \\
\hline
Population & 33,488 & 10,358 & 24,671 & 6,683 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{1880 Population Statistics for Dallas and Fort Worth and for Tarrant and Dallas Counties}
\end{table}

A comparison of industrial development revealed differences that were disproportionately larger than the population. Table 1-2 indicates that, compared to Dallas County, Tarrant County in 1870 had 39 percent fewer manufacturers, 59 percent fewer manufacturing employees, paid 92 percent less in manufacturing wages, had 87 percent less capital invested, and produced 87 percent less.

Table I-2 1870 Manufacturing Statistics for Dallas and Tarrant Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dallas County</th>
<th>Tarrant County</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Percentage Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>$25,715</td>
<td>$2,050</td>
<td>$23,665</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$106,332</td>
<td>$13,940</td>
<td>$92,392</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Products</td>
<td>$279,983</td>
<td>$37,625</td>
<td>$242,358</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1880 Dallas remained significantly superior in all categories, increasing its lead in number of manufacturers to fifty-four percent and in number of employees to seventy-one percent but losing ground in wages paid to seventy-four percent, capital invested to sixty-six percent, and in value of products to sixty-seven percent (see Table I-3).
Table I-3  1880 Manufacturing Statistics for Dallas and Tarrant Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dallas County</th>
<th>Tarrant County</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>$221,680</td>
<td>$56,832</td>
<td>$164,848</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$450,125</td>
<td>$152,741</td>
<td>$297,384</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Products</td>
<td>$1,459,362</td>
<td>$476,087</td>
<td>$983,275</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, in 1880 Dallas County had had twice the taxable valuation, $8,441,330 to $4,830,163. Little wonder that the initial meeting in 1882 of the Fort Worth Board of Trade, similar to a chamber of commerce, focused on the need to attract new businesses.\(^{12}\) Fort Worth’s focus on industrialization rested on a realistic evaluation of what was needed to become a major city. The Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was primarily responsible for a corresponding rise in urbanization. During that first wave of industrialization America’s urban sector increased from 10.8 percent of the total population in 1840 to over fifty-one percent in 1920 and the number of cities grew went from 131 to 2,722. Fort Worth in the 1880s would begin to realize that its future was linked to commercial expansion.\(^{13}\)

Railroads had been the city’s salvation in 1876 and would be its first major industry. In January 1880 Fort Worth had limited rail service with one arrival and departure daily, not counting local service to Willis Point, but by July the schedule doubled to two eastbound trains and two westbound. In September 1880 a rapid expansion of rail services began that would make Fort Worth the railroad enter of Texas.
and the American Southwest. First, the Missouri-Pacific Railroad line from Sherman opened following a $10,000 subsidy and donations of rights-of-way, followed by a proposal from the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe Railroad for a Fort Worth to Galveston road running through Cleburne, Waco, and Austin. The original plan, according to Major Walter Gresham of the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe, called for a junction near Buffalo Gap but Colonel John Peter Smith’s relentless entreaties swayed the company to switch to Fort Worth, contingent on a $75,000 subsidy and rights-of-way from the Johnson County line. Smith arrived in Fort Worth in the 1850s and served as teacher before becoming a lawyer and a banker, making a fortune off real estate to become the city’s richest man and one of its great boosters. To make a great month incredible, the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad offered an extension of their Denison line contingent on a $10,000 subsidy, giving Fort Worth a major line from the gulf to St. Louis. The success of that venture gave the city three new rail lines, raising hopes for a successful economic future.  

Thanks to the work of city leaders Fort Worth had little trouble raising the subsidies and land donations required to complete the railroad transactions. For example, the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe required Cleburne and Fort Worth to contribute $100,000 and land for depots. Cleburne quickly subscribed its share, $25,000, and Fort Worth took only three days to raise $75,000, largely thanks to Smith who donated $5,200 and signed bonds guaranteeing rights-of-way and depot grounds. That level of commitment and involvement served as a tremendous asset aiding Fort Worth’s development. Supporters gloated that Fort Worthians subscribed $75,000 in three days while it took Waco weeks to raise only $30,000 and that Dallas, seeking eastern and
northern rail routes in 1880, had only collected $9,000. The *Democrat* did not attempt to hide its glee concerning Dallas’ poor showing.\(^{15}\)

Altruism did not rule the day completely as some tried to profit off the transactions. In January 1881 officials of the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe and the Texas and Pacific threatened to move their juncture east after property owners sought $12,000 for rights-of-way the railroad estimated worth not more than $4,000 and which they believed would be donated. A group of the city’s “great men,” Captain M. B. Loyd, Dr. C. M. Peak, Captain Sidney Martin, A. J. Chambers, and C. L. Holloway, expressing regret that a few “sordid” citizens had upset the efforts of so many, agreed to fund $10,000 of the added cost and the less wealthy made smaller contributions that totaled $5,000.\(^{16}\) Opportunistic valuations by property owners represented just one variation of a system open to abuse. The willingness of citizens to subsidize rail lines touched on several considerations, including unethical manipulation of information. The cozy world of Gilded Age politics and business often witnessed the merging of finances and politics into coalitions behind such funding as railway companies commonly used inducements, such as free rail passes, advertising dollars, and even direct payments, to ensure the support of the local press.\(^{17}\)

Railroad growth continued into the 1880s, again with the encouragement of boosters such as A. M. Britton, Captain Ephriham Daggett, W. A. Huffman, Joe Terrell, Dr. C. M. Peak, and Colonel A. J. Chambers. In April 1881 a solicitation drive sought a $25,000 subsidy and funding for rights-of-way for the Fort Worth and Denver slated to run northwest through Wise County. Although the estimated cost for rights-of-way was only $7,500 the railroad asked for a bond of $12,500, payable in five monthly
installments. Mayor John Brown argued for the economic sense of the proposal, noting that taxable property values had increased $500,000 in just one year thanks to railroad investments. Due to the number of subsidies the collection proved difficult, requiring some serious cajoling to gather $4,000. Construction began quickly once the finances were finalized, spurred by a contract specification mandating the laying of one and one-quarter miles of track per day.\textsuperscript{18}

In the flush of the railroad boom a group of twenty-six local citizens, each pledging $10,000, formed the Fort Worth and Southwestern Railway Company with John Peter Smith as president and Paddock as secretary. The original plan envisioned a southwest line covering Granbury, Stephenville, Comanche, and Brownwood but soon expanded to make Laredo the terminus, which changed the name to the Fort Worth and Rio Grande. The line’s backers believed that construction would be relatively cheap with only light grading needed and one major bridge over the Brazos. The enterprise almost stalled over the affected cities’ reluctance to subsidize a railway they saw as ultimately benefiting Fort Worth. Colonel W. W. Lawrence, the company’s field man, pointed out that Fort Worthians had invested $250,000 in rail subsidies and had reaped great rewards. His message succeeded, at least in Stephenville, where a hundred-gun salute greeted the survey crew.\textsuperscript{19}

The effect of so much activity was obvious and pervasive. By 1882 four rail lines radiated out of Fort Worth: the east-west Texas and Pacific, the north-south Missouri-Pacific, the Fort Worth and Rio Grande to the Mexican border, the Gulf, Colorado, and the Santa Fe’s limited service to Galveston. In addition, construction had begun on the Fort Worth and Denver line. The Missouri-Pacific and the two new lines would
eventually provide a direct route to St. Louis but even in their initial phase to Cleburne and Denison they covered a five county trade area and portions of thirty more, an area larger than Pennsylvania. The extension to Galveston provided a direct route to the Gulf of Mexico, reducing transport costs that had made shipment of goods overland to Galveston more expensive than the sea route from Galveston to New York. Railroad expansion offered many advantages, including construction and maintenance facilities which employed well-paid artisans, creating an urban rail infrastructure unequalled in the state. The south end of Fort Worth underwent radical changes from the Missouri-Pacific freight depot and Union Passenger Depot, an L-shaped building of two stories that also housed offices of the Missouri-Pacific and the Texas and Pacific, and from roundhouse facilities that were transferred in 1881 from Marshall, Texas. The *Galveston News* editorialized that Fort Worth was on its way to becoming an important railroad town because Jay Gould had designated it a point of intersection for his railways, the Missouri-Pacific and the Texas and Pacific.

The effect was seen rather quickly in increased arrivals and departures. In May 1881 eight regular passenger trains, four with Pullman cars, came and went; two Texas and Pacific trains going eastbound and westbound and the Missouri-Pacific that ran two trains northbound and southbound. In January, 1882, service began on the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe and by February the line offered both express and local service daily, giving Fort Worth nineteen daily arrivals and departures: nine Texas and Pacific, four Missouri-Pacific, two Transcontinental, two Colorado, Gulf and Santa Fe, and two Forth Worth and Denver. The rapid growth overwhelmed the side tracks, the largest in Texas since 1882, requiring the laying of a two-track line from the Union Depot to just
south of the Vulcan Iron Works, a distance of three-fourths of a mile. Railroad expansion contributed to a building boom that included 180 new homes, three elementary schools and a high school, and the Knights of Pythias’ plans for a new hall. Much of the growth involved grand homes south of the railroad reservation, an area so removed that no streetcar service existed.

Even at this early stage many realized that railroads could offer more than just great transport, that they created opportunities for manufacturers that were “beyond computation.” Business promoters were quick to point out Fort Worth’s advantages: excellent rail service, access to fuel from the coal fields of northwest Texas, a plentiful supply of lumber, and a location beyond the reach of a yellow fever epidemic affecting much of the nation. The campaign had some success. A $100,000 solicitation for a cotton factory garnered $25,000 quickly and the Vulcon Iron Foundry, with a capacity to employ 1,800 making Rigby railcar wheels, opened on November 21, 1881, on land donated by Captain Ephriham Daggett. The foundry was needed due to the Texas railway boom that required fifteen locomotives and 220 cars each month. The rush of development led over-exuberant boosters to claim that Fort Worth would become “the Lowell of Texas.”

At the same time Fort Worth’s cattle trade reached a level that justified expansion. Texas had been, since the end of the Civil War, a primary cattle supplier thanks to cattle drives, many of which passed through Fort Worth on their northern trek. The end of those drives did not mean the end of Texas cattle going north. In one day fifty-one rail cattle cars bound for St. Louis and Chicago left Fort Worth’s three acre stockyards located just south of Leuda Street and east of Main Street. In fact, most Texas cattle went
out of state due to a serious lack of facilities. In 1880 Texas had only three small
slaughterhouses producing just $213,000 and employing 132, miniscule in comparison to
Illinois’ 143 plants with 10,217 employees producing $18,000,000, much of which came
from Texas beef. The first attempt to correct that disparity came in 1881 when Paddock
convinced W. E. Richardson, an East St. Louis businessman considering a Dallas
location, to build a pork packinghouse on six acres donated by Smith. The plans
specified a facility capable of employing 350 and processing 100,000 hogs annually. By
November the Fort Worth Packing Company began operation but faltered due to poor
supply.  

In 1883 another, grander effort emerged. In that year the Texas Continental Beef
Company in Victoria, Texas, announced intentions to build a North Texas slaughterhouse
capable of handling 250 head daily with an estimated annual trade reaching $2,000,000.
Representatives from several Texas communities sought the plant, including a Fort Worth
group led by H. C. Edrington, president of Traders’ National Bank. The acquisition of
the facility would, according to Edrington, be the “longest stride” for growth and
prosperity and bring thousands of new residents, a large stockyards, fertilizer plants, an
oleomargine factory, and, perhaps, a tannery. In addition, area farmers and ranchers
would benefit in the increased demand for grain to fatten cattle and in the elimination of
the cost to ship their livestock to Chicago. The potential seemed immense. So little
effort had gone into an interstate trade of Texas processed beef, other than to New
Orleans, that all of the South lay open, as well as Philadelphia and New York and the rest
of country, except the cattle regions of West.
Fort Worth won the battle, but lost the war due to many problems. In August Captain Higgs of Continental Beef and Fort Worth “capitalists” reached a deal specifying that locals would fund fifty percent of the estimated $120,000 construction cost. After Fort Worth subscribed its share, $60,000, construction began on twenty-seven acres on the southeast quadrant with operations starting in February 1884. The plant lasted only a year before going bankrupt and being taken over by Isaac Dahlman, who also failed despite a plan to ship beef to the east coast and to England. The packinghouse faced formidable challenges, including a depression in the cattle market, but the most serious factor may have been opposition from New York butchers, who united to shut out western dressed beef as a threat to their livelihood, and from railroads who feared a loss in revenue because dressed beef reduced shipping weight by one-third. Even with those obstacles Dahlman might have survived if the initial English shipment had not arrived spoiled.27

The vulnerability of a one-dimensional economy was demonstrated in January 1880 when the Texas and Pacific announced an extension to El Paso, a distance of 750 miles. The westward construction would end Fort Worth’s favored position as the line’s terminus, which had fueled a healthy western wagon trade supporting local warehouses and wholesale shops. The Dallas press returned earlier schadenfreude by suggesting that every spike in the new line constituted a nail in Fort Worth’s coffin. Locals tried to put on a brave face, noting that the route would bring transcontinental access and the Democrat, in “Fort Worth The Young Giant of the Southwest,” argued that the change would offer advantages that Fort Worth, due to its lack of debt, its natural advantages, and its leading men, was in the best position to exploit. Still, others were not so
sanguine. The City Mills Company’s announcement of new equipment capable of producing 200 barrels of flour a day said it made the purchase despite “discouraging circumstances” regarding the westward rail extension.  

The loss of terminus status did result in a noticeable faltering. Fort Worth’s population declined by 2,500 to 3,000, a sizable chunk of only around 7,000. Times were so difficult that in February 1880 the Democrat suspended publication for several months and the city council delayed opening public schools until January 1, 1881, due to insufficient funding for more than three months operation. The decline was short-lived. The newspaper resumed publication on July 4, 1880, and in September the Missouri Pacific arrived. The upswing quickly restored confidence so that predictions of renewed prosperity appeared and the population soared to an estimated (generous) 10,000.  

The depression’s lasting impact was to increase a general awareness of a new stage of development involving changes in both the citizenry and the municipal infrastructure. As early as 1881 the press suggested that Fort Worth was a city, not a town, and that citizens should dress in modern fashions to present a proper image, that its streets should have sidewalks and be cleaned and lighted, and that a proper waterworks should be built to replace the use of wagon entrepreneurs selling a barrel’s measure for ten cents. The city council sent Mayor Brown and an alderman on an inspection tour of several cities, including Hyde Park and Evanston in Illinois, Peoria, Ohio, and Sedalia, Missouri. On their return they recommended the standpipe system used in South Bend, Indiana, and Bloomington, Illinois, arguing that it provided smooth pressure without delays. The proposal called for a $60,000 system with a standpipe of 200 feet on a bluff or the high point south of city with water distributed via five miles of piping not less than
six inches in diameter. The system promised not only to provide safe drinking water and 
free water for city government but to further fire safety by supplying sixty fireplugs with 
enough pressure to shoot a 125 foot stream from a one and one-half inch nozzle.\textsuperscript{30}

The proposal encountered serious opposition from many fronts. The council 
appointed a committee to select well locations and authorized a bond issue that included 
an additional $10,000 for street and crossing improvements. Immediately opponents 
questioned the need, arguing that the approximately fifty artesian wells already provided 
an unlimited supply. They suggested that if a new system were needed, that it would be 
better to leave it to private enterprise, thereby avoiding a $70,000 debt when city’s annual 
income averaged only $16,000. Another sticking point concerned funding the system 
using a one-cent sales tax that state regulations limited to cities of 10,000 or more when 
even the mayor admitted that Fort Worth’s population did not exceed 9,000. Others 
thought the system too limited. One citizen complained that the city sent “excursionists” 
to Illinois and Missouri at a cost of hundreds of dollars (travel expenses: $235.10) only 
to have them recommend an impractical, “toy” system too small for needs. In the face of 
opposition from all sides the council reversed itself and tabled the bond package.\textsuperscript{31}

The impetus returned following a large fire that destroyed several businesses on 
Houston street, doing $85,000 in damages, more than the cost of the rejected system. 
The extent of damage was attributed to the lack of firefighters and poor water pressure. 
The council responded to the former by establishing a $2.50 payment per volunteer per 
fire and to the latter by considering a private waterworks provider. In December 1881 the 
council reviewed a privately-funded $54,000 Holley system using four piston pumps 
capable of providing 1,500,000 filtered gallons from the Trinity River with sufficient
pressure to simultaneously shoot six streams of water over the courthouse tower. Once built, the city would operate the system, repaying the investors with its revenue. In February 1882 the council reopened discussion on funding its own system, either by changing the state law or verifying the 10,000 population level, preparing a bond issue totaling $150,000 to $200,000 if either effort succeeded.\textsuperscript{32}

Instead, in May 1882 the council granted a franchise to the Fort Worth Water Works Company, an organization formed by Paddock that same month. The company promised to install a Holly system built by Drake and Orton that would make the Fort Worth waterworks one of only two first class systems in Texas (Austin had the other). The contract, which ran for twenty-five years, stipulated eight hydrants, no less than nine miles of piping, and free water for city government with monthly user rates established by guidelines. Under the plan barber shops paid $8.50 for first chair and $3.50 for each additional, billiard halls $1.00 per table, hotels $1.50 per room, restaurants $10.00 plus $1.25 per room, livery stables $2.50 per stall, breweries $.05 per keg of beer, and family homes of up to four rooms, $6.00. Meters were also available with a base rate of $.045 per 100 gallons for the first 5,000 used monthly, with declining rates for larger quantities.\textsuperscript{33}

The decision was far from the end of the matter as water remained a major problem dogging the city for decades. In March 1883 the council granted a request for sixty-day extension for completion with the stipulation that the company would be fined if they did not repair streets damaged in construction. The system became operational on April 24, 1883, with six miles of piping and a pump station at the juncture of the Clear and West Forks of the Trinity River capable of supplying 6,000,000 gallons daily. In
September 1883 a major fire strained the new system, doing $10,000 in damage because it took fifteen minutes to build water pressure, then was so erratic that most of spray fell short of the blaze. Still, the council began buying the system in 1884, completely taking it over in 1885.34

Some serious issues remained concerning streets, sidewalks, and sewers. The local press reported that younger and bolder residents blamed a slow pace of development on a group of “old fogeys” on the city council who stymied improvements because they feared increasing taxes. That parsimony may have been rather costly. Developers claimed that if not for the intransigence Main and Houston streets would have been graded and paved in 1879 and by 1882 would have been lined with tax-paying businesses. To get around financial disincentives some suggested utilizing an unenforced state law requiring males between eighteen and forty five to provide one day’s labor each month or pay a $1 fine. Instead, the aldermen stipulated that residents desiring their streets graded or graveled or sewer line connections would have to fund two-thirds the cost. In 1883 a successful $190,000 street and sewer bond election accelerated the process of providing paved streets and sewage service.35

Fort Worth would struggle with the basics of municipal services for many years, achieving some limited success in developing water and sewer systems but accomplishing very little in garbage collection. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many emerging cities faced those challenging environmental crises as a byproduct of their urbanization. The first level of technical expertise that would confront the challenges developed with the rise of municipal water systems in the late nineteenth century as the number of municipal systems grew from 136 in 1860 to 598 in 1880 and
the miles of municipal sewers grew from 8,199 in 1890 to 24,972 in 1909. The technicians who developed those systems eventually gravitated into refuse collection and disposal but it took several years for their contribution have an effect, largely because most cities avoided complex solutions in favor of the quick and inexpensive alternative of dumping, either into water ways or on any available plot of land. As much as any issue, municipal officers struggled with problems in waste collection and disposal without a real solution. By 1918 Fort Worth would be well along in developing water and sewer systems but had made little in progress in garbage disposal.  

The need for proper waste collection and sewers became especially evident during outbreaks of smallpox and other contagious diseases. In 1882 a major smallpox epidemic led city health officials to set up a treatment tent south of the city hospital and to place yellow flags around quarantined homes. By May 1882 City Physician Ed Broiles reported eleven cases, all removed to a “pest house” outside of city. The link between disease and poor sanitation seemed evident to many, including “TP” who wrote in May 1882 that heavy rains had swept waste into the muddy streets, making the city stench almost unbearable, and C. C. Cummings, a candidate for city council, who called for an end to stagnant pools around “crowded tenements,” opining that a viable sewer system ranked second in importance only to education. To relieve the immediate problem the council ordered stringent enforcement of sanitation ordinances but a long-term solution awaited greater utilization of city sewers, which many residents avoided due to cost. On July 17, 1883, the council mandated connection, straining the old, under-sized system. In September 1883 a humorous sign in a Main Street pond lamented a poor soul who drowned while crossing the street.
For all the problems Fort Worth had made many notable public and private improvements. They included donations for the establishment of a public reading room, a precursor to a library; the completion of the first true water works system with nine miles of mains; the addition of four miles of mains to the gas works and two miles to the streetcar lines; Telford-Macadam pavement laid on principal streets; the contract with Smith Bridge of Toledo, Ohio, for an iron bridge spanning the Clear Fork of the Trinity River that would be 120 feet long, 18 feet wide, and 19 feet high with a load capacity of 100 pounds per square inch; as well as $104,916 spent on streets and sewers; $25,000 for new schools; and $12,000 on the fire department. Other metropolitan touches included a $45,000 Opera House, a $10,000 convent, four banks, two papers, and expanded telephone and telegraph service. The economy showed vibrancy with an annual cotton trade amounting to 50,000 bales and smaller quantities of wool, gain, and hides, but the city’s industrial sector remained unimpressive, adding only planing mills and a slash and blind factory. The *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* described Fort Worth as a place of 12,000 with four important railroads, seventy-five artesian wells, a conspicuous courthouse, and street cars connecting all of the city to the Union Depot.\(^{38}\)

In 1883 Fort Worth also established a public school system serving 1,200 students. The school board, given power by the city council to run schools “as they think propper (sic),” was largely composed of aldermen, such as C. B. Daggett, M. C. Clarke, K. M. Van Zandt, Joseph L. Hatcher, John Nichols, and C. C. Cummings, as well as Mayor John Peter Smith. By 1886 the board oversaw 1,362 students and thirty-nine teachers in seven elementary schools and separate high schools for boys and girls. The overall pupil-teacher ratio stood at approximately thirty-five to one but in the “colored
school” (Number Six), with 294 students and six teachers, the ratio was forty-nine to one. The disparity between the races was even more pronounced if African-Americans were removed from the general statistics, making the pupil-teacher ratio for whites only thirty-two to one, compared to forty-nine to one for blacks.\(^{39}\)

Medical care also reached a higher level of service in 1883. In January complaints appeared that many indigents from Dallas, Waco, El Paso, and Mexico—which did not take care of their sick poor—cost Fort Worth residents $7,000. The outlay created serious discussion of closing the city hospital but that became problematic due to the facilities use, especially by many aldermen who continued to refer indigent patients. Faced with unabated demand but a desire to escape from charity care, the council appointed a committee to entice the Sisters of Charity take over operations.\(^{40}\)

In July 1883 the Missouri Pacific and the Texas and Pacific offered to build a railroad hospital for their employees who paid thirty-five to fifty cents a month for medical coverage. The offer required the city to provide land at no cost or lose the facility to Dallas, Denison, or Marshall, all waiting to donate space. A site was found two miles south of the courthouse down Main Street just east of the city hospital. Care began in June with the first 500 to 600 patients kept in six tents before the building opened in November 1883 with fifty-five patients, twenty suffering injuries from accidents. Later, the Sisters of Charity from San Antonio took over, buying the land and building a three-story building that became St. Joseph’s Infirmary (later St. Joseph’s Hospital) with sixty beds. The new facility admitted its first patient in 1889.\(^{41}\)

Both the progress and problems of 1883 carried over into 1884. In January 1884 a committee of five, including Paddock and W. J. Boaz, initiated a $200,000 fund drive
for a woolen mill and contracts were signed for a cotton seed mill with a forty ton daily capacity. Later, the City National Bank presented a design by local architect M. R. Sanguinet for a four-story building, the city’s tallest, to be built at Third and Houston streets with completion set for June 1, 1884. Unfortunately, old problems also resurfaced. An editorial complained of prevailing odors and outbreaks of typhoid blamed on poor to no sanitation enforcement, especially the failure of all but 200 to 300 of the city’s over 3,000 buildings to comply with mandated sewer connections. Other city infrastructures showed noticeable problems. A reporter traveling down city streets noted a surfeit of potholes, especially on Houston Street, a main thoroughfare, and in the area south of the railroad tracks, the extreme southern boundary, where over 100 homes and a “mammoth” Texas Continental Meat Company had sprung up.42

Historians, like Paddock and Knight, who saw 1883 as a watershed for Fort Worth were not wrong. Remarkable progress occurred, thanks to the work of men like Smith and Paddock. Oliver Knight credited Smith for first putting city government on a sound footing through the implementation of four major improvements: a waterworks, an organized fire department, a street-paving program, and the first sanitary sewers. Of the four, the waterworks was by far the most important and would remain a critical issue for decades. But all of the progress would not have been possible, let alone imaginable, without the rapid and huge expansion of the commercial base occurring in the first half of the 1880s. To a very large degree, the municipal infrastructure that took shape constituted only a manifestation of that economic advance. The importance of the period from 1880 to 1884 was not that the transition to city was completed, but that it was begun.43
Chapter One Endnotes

1 James H. Baker and Raymond E. Cagle, II. *Indians in the History of Tarrant County, Texas* (Fort Worth: Tarrant County Archeological Society, 1962), p. 23; *Fort Worth Star Telegram*, April 23, 1931; *Fort Worth Democrat*, February 22, 1873, p. 2; July 7, 1880, p. 4; August 20, 1880, p. 1; August 27, 1880, p. 1; January 4, 1881, p. 2; *General Directory of the City of Fort Worth for 1882* (Dallas: Gillespie, Work, and Walton, 1881), pp. 154-155; *Fort Worth Democrat*; September 23, 1881, p. 3; April 10, 1881, p. 4; March 5, 1881, p. 4; April 26, 1881, p. 4; March 29, 1881, p. 4; April 2, 1881, p. 3.

2 *Fort Worth Democrat*, April 20, 1881 p. 4, April 24, 1881, p. 3; April 27, 1881, p. 4; April 26, 1881, p. 4.

3 *Fort Worth Democrat*, July 12, 1881, p. 3; July 9, 1881, p. 4; December 21, 1881, p. 4.

4 *Fort Worth Gazette*, July 7, 1883, p. 4; July 11, 1883, p. 4; September 19, 1883, p. 4; November 4, 1883, p. 6; Harold Rich, “Twenty-Five years of Struggle and Progress, the Fort Worth Police Department, 1873-1897” (M.A. thesis, Texas Christian University, 1999), pp. 90-92; *Fort Worth Democrat*, April 18, 1879, p. 4; April 25, 1879 p. 4; April 26, 1879, p. 4; April 27, 1879, p. 4; April 28, 1897, p. 4; April 29, 1879, p. 4.

5 *Fort Worth Democrat*, February 5, 1881, p. 4; February 8, 1881, p. 4; February 11, 1881, p. 4; February 15, 1881, p. 4; February 16, 1881, p. 4; March 3, 1881, p. 4; March 30, 1881, p. 4; May 6, 1881, p. 4.

6 *Fort Worth Democrat*, January 8, 1881, p. 4; January 9, 1880, p. 4; March 17, 1881, p. 4; March 19, 1881, p. 4; March 20, 1881, pp. 3-4. When an appeal led to a new trial, the local Klu Klux Klan distributed a circular signed by Grand Cyclops Fang Foo Flop stating “Negro Rapist Must Die.” Many African-Americans fought to overcome the overt racism and to improve their community. In 1881 two African-American men petitioned the city council for appointment as Third Ward special policemen to deal with shootings and other disturbances detracting from church attendance (the aldermen tabled the motion). Dr. Trabue, a medical doctor who came to Fort Worth as a slave but turned to medicine, was cited as “a shining example of what hard work could do for his race.” See *Fort Worth Democrat*, November 16, 1881, p. 4; April 20, 1882, p. 4; September 9, 1881, p. 4; March 15, 1882, p. 4.

7 *Fort Worth Democrat*, July 29, 1880, p. 4; August 16, 1880, p. 4; December 2, 1879, p. 2; December 3, 1879, p. 3.

8 *Fort Worth City Council Minutes*, Volume B, August 2, 1881; *Fort Worth Democrat*, June 8, 1881, p. 1; August 27, 1881, p. 4; *General Directory, 1882*, p. 6; *Fort Worth Democrat*, January 2, 1880, p. 4.

9 *Fort Worth Democrat*, September 3, 1881, p. 4; January 2, 1880, p. 4; January 4, 1880, p. 3; January 28, 1880, p. 3; November 24, 1880, p. 4; December 18, 1880, p. 4.


12 *Tenth Census*, pp. 1017, 1020; *Fort Worth Democrat*, June 3, 1882, p. 4.

14 Van Zandt, Force Without Fanfare, pp. 165-169; Fort Worth Democrat, January 2, 1880, p. 4; July 14, 1880, p. 3; September 23, 1881, p. 3; September 25, 1880, p. 4; February 8, 1880, p. 4; City Directory, 1882, pp. 6-9; Fort Worth Gazette, January 3, 1883, p. 8; January 24, 1884, p. 6; August 14, 1883, p. 6; November 3, 1883, p. 6; Fort Worth Democrat, April 5, 1882, p. 4; Fort Worth Record, August 27, 1905, p. 7; Fort Worth Bohemian, (November, 1899, Vol. I), p. 57; Knight, Outpost, p. 139.

15 Fort Worth Democrat, September 21, 1880, p. 4; September 22, 1880, p. 4; September 24, 1880, p. 3; September 28, 1880, p. 4; October 5, 1880, p. 2; General Directory, 1882, pp. 6-9.

16 Fort Worth Democrat, January 20, 1881, p. 4; January 21, 1881, p. 4; January 22, 1881, p. 4; January 25, 1881, p. 4.


18 Fort Worth Democrat, April 2, 1881, p. 4; April 5, 1881, p. 4; April 9, 1881, p. 4; May 8, 1881, p. 4; May 10, 1881, p. 3; June 10, 1881, p. 4; April 30, 1881, p. 2.

19 Fort Worth Democrat, June 24, 1881, p. 4; June 25, 1881, p. 4; June 26, 1881, p. 4; November 30, 1881, p. 4; December 23, 1881, p. 4; July 7, 1881, p. 2; July 12, 1881, p. 4; July 14, 1881, p. 4; June 27, 1882, p. 4; August 22, 1881, p. 4.

20 Fort Worth Democrat, February 11, 1882, p. 4; July 11, 1882, p. 4; May 3, 1881, p. 3; May 28, 1881, p. 1; April 9, 1881, p. 3; May 8, 1881, p. 4.

21 Fort Worth Democrat, September 24, 1880, p. 2; October 1, 1880, p. 3; September 23, 1881, p. 2; May 1, 1881, p. 3.

22 Fort Worth Democrat, May 10, 1881, p. 3; May 13, 1881, p. 4; January 5, 1882, p. 4; February 7, 1882, p. 4; Fort Worth Gazette, January 3, 1883, p. 6.

23 Fort Worth Democrat, September 23, 1881, p. 3; September 28, 1881, p. 3; Fort Worth Gazette, July 11, 1883, p. 4; July 25, 1883, p. 8; August 1, 1883, p. 6; February 25, 1884, p. 6.

24 Fort Worth Democrat, May 6, 1881, p. 3; September 21, 1881, p. 2; September 23, 1881, p. 3; May 24, 1881, p. 3; July 7, 1881, p. 1; November 22, 1881, p. 4; August 8, 1881, p. 4; Fort Worth Gazette, January 3, 1883, p. 6.


26 Fort Worth Gazette, August 11, 1883, p. 4; August 15, 1883, p. 8; August 17, 1883, p. 4; Hendricks, “History of Cattle and Oil in Tarrant County,” pp. 15-16; Pate, Livestock Legacy, pp. 13-14.

27 Hendrick, “History of Cattle and Oil in Tarrant County,” pp. 16-18; Research Data: Fort Worth and Tarrant County (Fort Worth: Texas Writers Project), pp. 549-551; Fort Worth Gazette, March 31, 1884, p. 6; Paddock, ed., History of Texas, pp. 657-659.
28 Fort Worth Democrat, January 4, 1880, p. 1; July 13, 1880, p. 2; January 12, 1880, p. 4; January 24, 1880, p. 4; September 24, 1880, p. 2; July 7, 1880, p. 4.

29 Fort Worth Democrat, September 23, 1881, p. 3; July 4, 1880, p. 4; July 11, 1880, p. 4; July 16, 1880, p. 4; July 20, 1880, p. 3; July 23, 1880, p. 4; September 22, 1880, p. 4; September 19, 1880, p. 1; March 23, 1881, p. 4; September 23, 1881, p. 3.

30 Sam Smith, Things I Remember about Early Days in the History of Fort Worth (Fort Worth: n.p., 1965), p. 5; Fort Worth Democrat, April 16, 1881, p. 4; May 18, 1881, p. 4; July 10, 1881, p. 3; April 28, 1881, p. 4; May 4, 1881, p. 4; May 6, 1881, p. 4; June 11, 1881, p. 4; May 29, 1881, p. 3; August 6, 1881, p. 4; July 10, 1881, p. 3.

31 Fort Worth Democrat, June 16, 1881, p. 4; July 10, 1881, p. 3; August 20, 1881, p. 4; September 23, 1881, p. 4; September 28, 1881, p. 4; October 8, 1881, p. 4; Fort Worth Gazette, February 28, 1883, p. 5.

32 Fort Worth Democrat, October 9, 1881, p. 4; October 27, 1881, p. 4; October 28, 1881, p. 4; November 3, 1881, p. 4; December 10, 1881, p. 4; February 11, 1882, p. 2; February 22, 1882, p. 4; March 8, 1882, p. 4.


34 Fort Worth Gazette, February 28, 1883, p. 5; March 13, 1883, p. 5; September 10, 1883, p. 5; Fort Worth Star Telegram, February 4, 1945, Section 1, p. 2; Knight; Outpost, pp. 141-142; B. B. Paddock, History of Texas: Fort Worth and the Texas Northwest Edition (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1922), pp. 623-624.

35 Fort Worth Democrat, February 4, 1882, p. 4; February 8, 1882, p. 4; February 11, 1882, p. 4; March 1, 1882, p. 4; January 2, 1882, p. 6; Fort Worth Gazette, January 2, 1883, p. 5; January 14, 1883 p. 5; January 16, 1883, p. 5; January 23, 1883, p. 6; January 25, 1883, p. 4; August 23, 1883, p. 8.


37 Fort Worth Democrat, February 8, 1882, p. 4; February 25, 1882, p. 4; May 10, 1882, p. 4; April 30, 1882, p. 4; May 6, 1882, p. 4; May 11, 1882, p. 4; Fort Worth Gazette, March 28, 1883, p. 5; February 12, 1884, p. 6; September 25, 1883, p. 6.

38 Fort Worth Gazette, January 28, 1883, p. 5; July 7, 1883, p. 4; January 24, 1883, p. 4.

39 Fort Worth Gazette, January 3, 1883, p. 7; September 25, 1883, p. 6; December 13, 1883, p. 6; August 1, 1883, p. 1; December 3, 1883, p. 6; May 2, 1886, p. 3.

40 Fort Worth Gazette, January 18, 1883, p. 8; March 7, 1883, p. 5; Garrett and Luke, Historic Trails, pp. 6, 18-21.

41 Fort Worth Gazette, July 10, 1883, p. 4; September 28, 1883, p. 5; November 5, 1883, p. 6; Garrett and Luke, Historic Trail, pp. 6, 18-21.

42 Fort Worth Gazette, January 1, 1884, p. 6; January 20, 1884, p. 1; January 24, 1884, p. 6; January 30, 1884, p. 6; February 12, 1884, p. 6; February 25, 1884, p. 6; March 31, 1884, p. 6.
43 *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 3, 1883, p. 8; January 24, 1884, p. 6; August 14, 1883, p. 6; November 3, 1883, p. 6; *Fort Worth Democrat*, April 5, 1882, p. 4; *Fort Worth Record*, August 27, 1905, p. 7; *Fort Worth Bohemian*, (November, 1899, Vol. I), p. 57; Knight, *Outpost*, p. 139.
Throughout the 1880s Fort Worth, still barely out of its swaddling clothes, maintained an existence on the ragged edge of uncertainty as to whether or not it would remain an overgrown village or become a grand city. The dilemma involved nothing so pedestrian as reaching a certain population, the standards of which were neither static nor universal. The 1880 United States Census distinguished urban by a population of 8,000 overall, 4,000 in some cases, but by 1920 the threshold declined to a mere 2,500, a level Fort Worth had passed years before. The lack of consensus did not imply intellectual anarchy. Like the United States Supreme Court and pornography, Fort Worth’s leaders knew the characteristics of urbanity even if they could not provide a definition. Their vision extended beyond the North Texas area where Fort Worth’s credentials had long been established by its county seat designation and the arrival of the railroad in 1876. The city they envisioned would be an urban center of regional, state, and even national standing, preferably attained while eclipsing Dallas.¹

Some observers, including Paddock, thought the beginnings of mature city services during the first half of the 1880s marked the critical step turning Fort Worth into something grander than just another town. They pointed to subtle touches, such as shrubbery and shade trees, that provided adornments of delicacies and comforts suggesting the passing of frontier roughness. The 1885-1886 City Directory proclaimed that “A frontier town had blossomed into a cosmopolitan city” and that “Fort Worth is no longer a town, a place of strained existence and uncertain future; it realizes the full
significance of the title city.” In 1885 the Daily Mail went further, bragging that Fort Worth could snap her fingers at the “village” on the three forks of the Trinity (Dallas).²

While significant progress did occur it lacked a critical element. Achieving major city status required advancement on many fronts, including population and city services, both dependent on economic growth, the primary force propelling urbanization. Many boosters thought that railroad expansion would provide an economic base sufficient for a vibrant economy. As the decade waned they continued their efforts, bringing even more rail companies and making Fort Worth the railroad center of Texas and the Southwest. At the same time, many began to recognize that a railroad economy carried certain limitations, that it provided too few jobs and too little value added compared to manufacturing. That realization became a critical epiphany leading to the economic diversification that would push Fort Worth beyond a one-dimensional economy.

Fort Worth also continued to struggle with other problems, including the excesses of the Acre where little to nothing changed. A local minister blamed the prevalence of open vice on Fort Worth’s lack of backbone but the evidence suggested that the existence was more a preference than a failing, that, given the option, most Fort Worth residents would reject imposition of moral restraints. For example, a statewide prohibition referendum lost within Fort Worth 1,242 to 1,274, but carried Tarrant County 3,126 to 2,988 (it failed badly in state returns, 128,273 for to 221,627 against). Furthermore, the Acre experienced such steady growth that by 1886 it covered a dozen blocks clustered around the streets of Twelfth and Thirteenth between Main, Calhoun, and Rusk. That expansion did not happen because saloons, casinos, and prostitutes lacked trade. The district’s influence extended well beyond its geographic boundaries. In 1886 Dallas
officials filed 400 gambling cases against twenty-five Fort Worth gamblers who had ventured east for the state fair. One of those charged, Luke Short, killed "Longhair Jim" Courtright on February 8, 1887, on Main Street, in North Texas’ most famous gunfight. The incident made headlines because of the notoriety of the participants, not because of its uniqueness. Less than a month later another dispute between two “sporting men” in front of the same saloon had the same tragic result. In both cases the grand jury refused indictments based on self defense. Short tempted fate again in 1890 when another violent dispute left him suffering shotgun wounds to his thigh and hand.\(^3\)

Violence was not confined to the Acre, it sometimes took place in staid settings. In 1889 B. C. Evans, owner of B. C. Evans Company Dry Goods and worth over $250,000, died at the hands of an six-year employee of his clothing department. On July 10, 1889, J. W. Davis, incensed at being passed over for promotion, arrived at work clearly under the influence of alcohol. After Evans issued an ultimatum to either quit drinking or find another job, Davis stormed out but soon returned with a .41 caliber handgun, shooting Evans five times as he sat reading at a desk. Davis received a death sentence with execution set for August 10, 1891, but died in his jail cell, allegedly from self-inflicted head injuries suffered during an epileptic seizure.\(^4\)

In 1885 an embezzlement scandal struck at the city’s financial heart. The story begin to unravel after John Nichols, vice-president of City National Bank and treasurer for the city of Fort Worth, died in his office during a bank audit, most likely from ingesting the strychnine he had purchased thirty minutes earlier. An investigation revealed that Nichols had recently transferred real estate holdings to his wife, had several large debts, and had made $80,000 in fraudulent withdrawals from both private and
municipal accounts. The incident cast a pall over the bank, precipitating a run on reserves despite assurances of solvency. Eventually the Nichols estate settled some $75,000 in debts at fifty cents on the dollar, including $41,950 owed to the bank and $9,000 of the $17,000 the city of Fort Worth had deposited.\(^5\)

Nichols’ fraud aggravated the city’s already strained financial condition. The municipal treasury suffered, in part, because the waterworks system hemorrhaged money, losing $11,000 since the 1885 takeover and continuing to lose at the rate of $1,500 monthly with no sign of relief. A proposed solution involved expanding the customer base by adding more mains, which would require more expenditures before realizing any returns. Most agreed with the need to increase investment, including an 1886 mayoral candidate who excoriated outgoing Mayor Smith for buying the waterworks. Smith agreed that the $56,000 cost plus assumption of $200,000 in bonded debt had been large but claimed that the system’s value had grown to $300,000 with an annual income of $40,000 derived from 1,000 users. The man who would become mayor, Dr. H. S. Broiles, rose to Smith’s defense, calling the system part of a package of improvements that were making Fort Worth the “Chicago of Texas.” Broiles’ reference rested on more hope than reality, particularly on efforts to establish a Fort Worth packinghouse and a significant livestock trade that would resemble Chicago’s huge stockyards. He was right but about seventeen years ahead of schedule.\(^6\)

Budgetary difficulties made increased spending difficult. In August 1886 estimated annual expenditures totaled $91,966 when the treasury held only $28,735 to fund operations for nineteenth months. The cash flow difficulties stemmed from several issues. Interest payments on $200,000 in waterworks bonds ran $14,000 annually, not
including interest due on $34,000 in floating debt and $320,000 in street improvements bonds. The debt load became so large that it exceeded the city’s annual income by a factor of sixteen at the same time that tax revenue declined from $111,073 in 1886 to only $57,348 in 1887 before rebounding to $106,559 in 1888. In addition, fine income fell as a result of an anti-vice campaign. Prior to 1885 revenue from the Recorder’s Court (the city court) over funded police wages and prisoner costs to the degree that the council transferred $7,360 to other departments. After 1885 that income declined fifty-seven percent when a police enforcement drive effectively closed saloons on Sundays, thereby eliminating weekly fines that contributed $140 to the city coffers. Charges against saloons constituted the bulk on court income while most other arrests involved tramps who sat out their sentences in jail, thereby costing the city money for care and board. The combination of reduced income and increased costs created a $7,500 shortage in the police budget. 

In response, the council took several steps. They cut the regular police force from fourteen to eleven, eliminated the fire chief, two special policemen, an assistant engineer, and most street crews, although they later reinstated the chief’s position at a token $10 annual salary. They also increased the tax rate to $1.80 per $100 valuation and assessed an occupation tax, an annual fee that varied from $2.50 to $50, according to trade or profession. Still, the budget remained unbalanced, forcing the council in January 1886 to borrow $935.40 from the street fund to fund wages for police officers who had gone unpaid for two months. Eventually, the aldermen resorted to issuing scrip for wages, which merchants usually discounted at least fifteen percent.
Scrip and indebtedness remained unresolved issues throughout the 1880s. Scrip added to the debt burden because the council raised its standard daily wage from $1.50 to $1.75 to compensate for discounting. Since the city remained obligated for the full face they were, in effect, funding the discount to the benefit of merchants. Scrip also increased indebtedness, reducing the city’s overall credit rating, which pushed bond interest to rates as high as ten percent. In addition, state laws limited municipalities to a total debt of not more than six percent of their assessed valuation, which set Fort Worth’s 1888 credit maximum at $510,000 on tax assessments of $8,500,000. Unfortunately, the city’s existing debt totaled $275,000, leaving only a $235,000 credit potential, insufficient to cover some $465,000 in needed improvements. The city council responded by raising tax valuations to their true market levels, or $16,365,790, which increased the allowable debt ceiling to over $900,000. To compensate property owners they lowered the tax rate from $1.85 to $1.00 per $100 evaluation but city tax revenue still increased from $157,000 in 1888 to $163,000 in 1889.  

A smallpox epidemic put further demands on resources while also exposing urban rivalries. In mid-February 1886 Fort Worth health offices reported eight confirmed cases, serious enough for the council to offer free vaccinations for indigents, a rare act of largesse when the budget strained to meet the mundane. Dallas sent its own health officer to investigate, then quarantined Fort Worth. Mayor Smith questioned the action, noting that smallpox had struck three times in four years without prompting a similar action. The State Health Office agreed, ruling the quarantine unnecessary. Smith, along with many Fort Worthians, suspected economic motivations, that Dallas was making a covert attempt to discourage buyers from trading at Fort Worth. That position was
bolstered by an incident on an eastbound train in which Dallas health officials put three Fort Worth visitors off in the middle of nowhere, leaving them to walk, while not bothering well-known Fort Worth residents also traveling. The local papers fought back, running lists of out-of-towners buying supplies and asserting that the quarantine would not affect the underlying cause of Dallas’ envy, that of many railroads locating in Fort Worth.10

Serious disease outbreaks spurred an expansion of medical services. During the smallpox event of 1886 the lack of dedicated care facility left most patients at home, many in high density population areas. The exposure risks that represented caused an alarm verging on panic, convincing the county and city to share $5,000 construction costs for a “pest house.” In addition, in 1887 three doctors, Beall, Adams, and Walker, offered to build a hospital if the city turned over the five acres on which the city hospital sat, an area off Main Street two miles south of the county courthouse. John Peter Smith led a group supporting the transfer, arguing that the city hospital, a single-story frame building of six rooms holding twenty patients, was too small. Supporters included railroads not served by the railroad hospital who promised to send their patients to the facility.11

The city fathers also wrestled with waste disposal, an important facet of city sanitation. In 1887 the owner of the existing dump site, the Chowning property, closed it for further use. At first the council leased land across the river, but scavengers seeking to dump city refuse were turned back by shotgun-armed neighbors. The council then considered burning waste but rejected that option after learning that furnaces would cost $65,000. As filth and lawsuits piled up the aldermen secured a temporary dump for sixty days and appointed a special committee to search for a permanent site, granting it the
power to buy grounds without prior approval. For all its problems Fort Worth remained parsimonious in sanitation, spending only $2,000 in 1890 compared to $24,000 spent by Dallas. Martin Melosi, among others, has documented the twin issues of urban waste collection and disposal during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, finding that they constituted major problems that remained largely unresolved, which was certainly true for Fort Worth.\textsuperscript{12}

Development continued on the infrastructure. In October 1885 Fort Worth Light and Power Company contracted to provide service using an eighty-five horsepower engine. In December arc street lamps shone, at least until 10:00 P.M., before interference with telephone reception forced a change in wiring. The system quickly outgrew its capacity. In 1888 construction began on a $60,000 facility with a boiler producing 350 horsepower capable of illuminating 3,500 incandescent and 1,000 arc lights. Future plans envisioned a motor circuit that would power machinery.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1885 the struggle for economic development became formally organized. Twelve of the most active boosters, including Khleber Van Zandt (a founder of the Fort Worth National Bank), Smith, and Paddock, formed the Fort Worth Commercial Club to advance business causes. Membership soon reached 175, causing Paddock to urge construction of a permanent building in the business district. That initiative languished until 1888 when the board adopted plans for a six-story building at Houston and Seventh streets to be financed by borrowing $50,000 and raising another $50,000 through 500 shares sold for $100 each with generous terms requiring only $25 down and $10 a month. The contract that let on June 5, 1888, totaled just $85,000, the reduction possibly due to
defaulting investors, many of whom were sued by the board, including one set of partners who subscribed twenty shares without making any payments.  

Railroad development still dominated most commercial efforts. In October 1885 extensive infrastructure adjustments were needed around the Texas and Pacific reservation, an extensive railroad support network of machine shops and roundhouses south of Front Street (Lancaster Avenue). Paddock, Daggett, John Peter Smith, et al., traveled to the company’s St. Louis headquarters to discuss improvements to street crossings and bridges as well land condemnation needed to make the area passable.

Meanwhile expansion continued. While company and city leaders met, work began on the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe line to Gainesville, Texas, with connections to Tulsa in the Indian Territory (now Oklahoma) and on to St. Louis. In addition, the Fort Worth and New Orleans reached Mansfield, just eighteen miles southwest of town, followed by the arrival of the line’s first locomotive into Fort Worth on January 26, 1886. In the spring of 1886 the Texas and Pacific expanded its repair facilities, adding 200 skilled jobs that paid high wages ($2.50 daily) and 500 to 1,000 new residents.

Paddock remained actively involved in railroad expansion, traveling widely to sell $40,000 in bonds to finance the Fort Worth and Rio Grande Railroad. In March 1886 he traveled to New York City and that August took several prospective northern investors over the initial segment that ran 140 miles southwest to Brownwood, Texas. On May 1, 1887, the first passenger train ran to a point twenty-three miles southwest of the Tarrant County courthouse and sixteen miles northeast of the Hood County courthouse in Granbury. The arriving locomotive sported a sign “On to Brownwood” and the famous Tarantula Map, a projection of future rail service published first published on July 26,
1873 (it received its name because the lines radiating from Fort Worth resembled a spider’s legs). Paddock, who rode with the first passengers, remarked that the map seemed ambitious at the time but had now been eclipsed.\textsuperscript{16}

Dallas entered a head-to-head competition for several railroads. The two cities fought over a proposed extension of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe to the northeast. The struggle added importance to the subscription drive, which some Fort Worth people described as the decade’s most important since a Dallas victory would embolden their future efforts. According the company’s president the decision for Fort Worth swung on a sense of permanence imparted by its superior streets and sidewalks. Despite the loss Dallas did not surrender, sending sixteen boosters to Texarkana in 1887 to woo the St. Louis, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas Railroad with a $125,000 bonus. John Peter Smith convinced the company to bypass Dallas by offering $35,000 in cash plus rights-of-way and thirty acres for a depot.\textsuperscript{17}

Possibly due to subscription fatigue, the pace of cash donations faltered, leading to a large-scale campaign that barely succeeded. A common tactic used to persuade reluctant boosters involved playing on the interurban rivalry, warning that Dallas would willingly snap up any offer Fort Worth declined. In 1889 Fort Worth encountered difficulty in raising $40,000 for the Fort Worth and Northwestern Railroad, a planned northwest route to coal fields that would provide access to cheap energy needed for industrial expansion. Paddock pushed the proposal by suggesting that failure would open the way for a Dallas route around Fort Worth. On the other hand, a Dallas link was often enough to cool local investors. The Fort Worth and Albuquerque Railroad encountered a
poor response for their proposed route because it ran through Fort Worth to terminate in Dallas.\(^{18}\)

Throughout the 1880s Fort Worth added railroads at a rate that outdistanced every other Texas city. In 1886 the city’s massive facilities served five trunk lines: the Missouri-Pacific; Texas and Pacific; Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe; Fort Worth and Denver; and the Houston and Texas Central. In addition, the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe and the Fort Worth and Rio Grande were works in progress and the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe was well along in the planning stages. Fort Worth offered or would soon offer direct service from the Gulf to St. Louis via the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe; from Mexico to St. Louis on the Missouri-Pacific line; and from the Atlantic to the Pacific on the Texas and Pacific. The proliferation of lines gave Fort Worth service monopolies to the Texas panhandle via the Fort Worth and Denver and to the southwest with the Fort Worth and Rio Grande and access to most other regions. That concentration effect meant that most travelers coming into, leaving from, and or traveling across Texas passed through Fort Worth. That was also true for substantial amounts of goods. In three months in 1886 (April, May, and June) Fort Worth received 14,873,714 pounds via rail and shipped out 10,991,561 pounds. By 1888, when Dallas had just nine railroad outlets and Houston ten, Fort Worth counted eleven with the St. Louis, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas extension from Mount Pleasant, Texas, and the Fort Worth Western chartered to run to Albuquerque and Santa Fe scheduled for completion in 1889. Fort Worth’s rise to railroad prominence was all the more remarkable considering that the first locomotive had arrived only one decade earlier, an anniversary
saluted by a parade downtown and an eighteen-page special section appearing in the
Democrat on July 18, 1886.\textsuperscript{19}

Great achievements often carry the risk of great problems, and so it was with
railroads. An integral facet of industrialization concerned the struggles of American
labor unions for recognition and advancement. After years of relative silence a
significant labor movement developed in 1884 as businesses enjoyed substantial
prosperity while their working poor struggled under widespread pauperism.\textsuperscript{20} Fort
Worth’s rise to become a railroad center put it in the middle of the Great Southwestern
Railroad Strike that began in March 1886 after a union worker at Marshall, Texas, was
terminated for attending a Knights of Labor meeting during work hours (the worker
claimed he had received management’s permission). The stoppage quickly spread to Big
Spring Creek, Texas, and Dallas. On March 8, 1886, twelve Fort Worth area affiliates
met at the Knight Hall at Fifteen and Throckmorton streets, then marched 480 strong led
by a brass band to the county courthouse where a crowd of up to 3,000 listened to union
speeches. The local union effort focused on shutting down the Missouri Pacific, the
city’s second largest railroad presence, which would have crippled most railroad service,
including that of the Texas and Pacific. In the early stages authorities took a watchful but
subdued stance, including a Texas Ranger captain, who claimed he was only visiting
friends and relatives. Considerable labor support existed in the city administration.
Mayor Broiles publicly endorsed the strikers and every councilman elected in April 1886
was a Knight. Despite the wide base of support the companies remained defiant and were
so successful at hiring replacement workers that labor’s effectiveness waned.\textsuperscript{21}
Frustrated by the stalemate the strikers increased in aggressiveness. On March 31, 1886, an estimated 500 picketers took over the Missouri-Pacific yards, blocking a Missouri, Kansas, and Texas train to Denison by uncoupling several cars and applying brakes. More serious violence was barely averted when strikers backed away from the locomotive under threats to shoot from armed company men. The next day union men stopped an eastbound train and then shouted down the mayor’s call for calm. On April 2 the company secured and circulated 500 copies of a restraining order forbidding trespassing, leading to a standoff with fifty well-armed officers and a posse of armed citizens facing 3,000 strikers and sympathizers, many armed or with arms hidden nearby.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite the threat of violence the company resolved to move the trains at any cost, making a confrontation almost certain. On April 3 a Missouri-Pacific train successfully pulled out, thanks to the entire Tarrant County Sheriff’s Department and most of the city police force. As the train departed a woman ran onto the tracks waving a red flag, staying until the engine almost touched her dress. Around 12:45 P.M. a turned switch forced the train to stop two miles south of the county courthouse near the junction of the Fort Worth and Denver and Fort Worth and New Orleans lines. As workers reset the switch, the train’s guards, a group of city police officers and railroad agents that included Jim Courtright (who would die at the hands of Luke Short within a year), spied four men near the tracks and another five armed with Winchesters 100 yards away. The officers arrested the first four and were approaching the armed group when a volley of gunfire erupted, killing one Fort Worth police officer and wounding two other guards.
The next day the body of Frank Pierce, a known union man, was found near Sycamore Creek.23

As tensions ran high and more violence seemed probable Fort Worth took on the appearance of armed camp. Seven to ten squads of militia arrived, including three from Dallas, two from Austin, and others from Sherman, Decatur, and Alvarado. The militias joined a contingent of ten Texas Rangers led by the captain (still visiting?) and up to 2,000 armed citizens committed to ensuring peace and operational rail service. Strike supporters also seemed to be bracing for a fight. The following notice appeared around town:

“To Trainmen of Freight Department: Please do not sacrifice your lives by being moved out on freights by government officers or Gould’s petty officers. Last Call. Fair Warning. Determined.”24

Fortunately, the Knights’ leadership intervened on the side of conciliation and non-violence. Two trains were able to peacefully leave for Alvarado, one with a sheriff’s posse of eighteen and sixteen Grayson Rifles commanded by Captain Lee Hall and the second with ten militiamen. Both arrived without incident and were met by a Knight spokesman who publicly condemned violence. At a conciliation meeting with Fort Worth citizens, union representatives admitted that they had erred in allowing an out-of-stater to incite rancor but promised they would prosecute anyone committing violence. As calm returned the crowds and militias left, except for two companies of Rangers who vowed to remain until certain all was quiet. By mid-April everything appeared normal with the railroads returning to full operation and merchants assuring customers that goods arrived daily. On May 1 the Knights’ national executive leadership officially ended the
strike, saying it did so to ease suffering for the workers and the nation. That same day the union began a general strike in Chicago seeking an eight-hour work day. Three days later, May 4, 1886, a bomb exploded at a Haymarket Square labor rally, killing seven policemen and dealing a crippling public relations blow to the labor movement.²⁵

The Great Southwestern Railway Strike’s aftermath had several repercussions. The violence involving the police’s officer’s murder led to several indictments and a life sentence for H. Hemming as well as the formation of Fort Worth’s own militia, the Fencibles, commanded by Captain W. B. Ford. The adversity and hostility endured by the strikers negatively affected what had been a rather vibrant local labor movement. Several local units of the Knights of Labor existed prior to 1886, including a “Colored” lodge that hosted a Christmas day gathering at the Knight’s Hall at Houston and Fifteenth streets. Even earlier, local carpenters had demanded an eight-hour day with no reduction in pay and city laborers struck over scrip devalued thirty percent (they compromised on fifteen percent devaluation). After 1886 that sort of resolve was less likely. In 1894 Fort Worth workers ignored the call of Eugene Debs, the president of the American Railway Union, to join Galveston and Dallas locals striking the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe, a refusal that the New York Times deemed “important, as nearly all roads center there.” On a broader scale the Fort Worth stoppage shared in basic concepts the great railroad strikes of July 1877, described by Walter Licht as a direct challenge to the growing political and economic power of concentrated capital. While those on the picket lines may not have formalized their connection with the larger perspective they would have understood that the issues involved redressing an imbalance of power favoring railroads over workers. The setback labor suffered in 1886 delayed the resolution of that disparity.²⁶
Railroads remained the dominant industry but by the mid-1880s Fort Worth was developing a livestock trade that many ranked second in importance. The two were not necessarily competitors since ranchers depended on rail service for feed and to ship livestock, from which the railroads reaped financial rewards. The developing local market benefited from a general livestock boom that lasted from the mid-1870s to the mid-1880s in which the price of steers increased 300 percent as well as from substantial British investment. In 1882 a corporation formed by a British family bought out the Matador Land and Cattle Company of Fort Worth, formed in 1879 by locals Henry H. Campbell, Alfred Markham Britton, and L. W. Lomax, *et al.* By the end of 1883 the company controlled 374,717 acres, earning an annual profit of over 15,000 British pounds. The company expanded operations by 1890 to cover 444,657 acres on which they pastured thousands of cattle. The British contributed to one of Fort Worth’s few non-railroad enterprises by providing investment funds; developing technologies in wire fencing, windmills, and deep wells; and becoming involved with the Espuela Land and Cattle Company in cross breeding shorthorns.27

The end of the livestock boom played havoc with the Fort Worth economy. The market began coming undone after a twenty-three month drought (began in the summer of 1885) dried up grassland, forcing farmers and ranchers to flood the market, dropping cattle prices from $35 to under $5 a head. The situation was aggravated by a severe winter in 1885-1886, then by a series of natural disasters that killed many livestock and ended the careers of many cattlemen. Even the Matador Company, which had been so successful in 1883, lost money in 1887 and eventually liquidated. The slump continued until the 1890s when the livestock population reached such low levels that prices revived.
In 1887 the *Gazette* blamed the cattle bust for stopping growth, suggesting that but for it Fort Worth would have been a city without equal. 28

The hard times emphasized the degree to which Chicago packers controlled the nation’s livestock trade. While the downturn stemmed from several factors—a reduction in grazing lands due to lumbering and other industries, a run of severe winters that killed many cattle, and a grasslands-destroying drought that forced herds to market prematurely—many blamed the stranglehold exercised by the two giants of meat production, Armour and Swift. Armour and Swift controlled so much of the market that they could dictate prices, a power that they exercised to the detriment of suppliers. The *New York Post* reported that cattlemen received only three of the twenty to twenty-eight cents a pound consumers paid for beef, with most of the rest going to the packinghouses. That realization spurred the development of regional slaughterhouses that first threatened the Chicago monopoly. Regional slaughterhouses eliminated or decreased the need to ship live animals via rails, which reduced transport costs and the travel stress that caused a 1,500 pound steer to lose 150 pounds during a 1,000 mile train ride. 29

In 1887 time and circumstances seemed to favor the establishment of a large packinghouse in Texas. Many cities, including Dallas, expressed considerable interest in securing an industry with the potential to rocket its host to a level of importance approaching that of Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Louis. Fort Worth seemed a likely choice, thanks to its superior railroad facilities and its large refrigeration plant, rivaled only by Chicago and Kansas City (the closed plant had been part of Dahlman’s grand export plan), but it suffered from the lack of a large union stockyards. To correct that deficiency a group of leading citizens organized, electing a board of directors heavily
weighted with railroad men: John C. Brown of the Texas and Pacific; Morgan Jones of the Fort Worth and Denver; R. C. Kerens of the St. Louis, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas; L. D. Voak of the Missouri-Pacific; and J. J. Mulane of the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe. Financing came from 2000 shares sold for $100 each, with only a $25 down payment required. The Missouri-Pacific; Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe; Fort Worth, and Denver; and Texas and Pacific bought half of the $200,000 subscription but the drive stalled $30,000 short. A grand public meeting successfully closed the deficit, largely thanks to Paddock who bought the last $5,000, allowing construction to begin immediately on 258 acres located two miles north of the courthouse at the confluence of the Trinity River and Marine Creek.30

The enthusiasm that drove the project simulated development on a much wider scale. The Union Stockyards, described as the finest south of Chicago, opened on January 2, 1890, with pens capable of holding 5,000 cattle, 10,000 hogs, and 1,500 horse and mules as well as a “mammoth” exchange covering seventy-five acres. Several railroads, including the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe; St. Louis, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas; Missouri-Pacific; and the Fort Worth and Denver secured rights-of-way and began running tracks from Union Station. Support industries also appeared, such as the Fort Worth Tannery Company and the Dixie Wagon Company of Indiana, as well as the Texas Rolling Mill and Iron Works employing seventy just south of the pens. The stockyards began the process that would make Fort Worth a beef processing center. Unfortunately, realization of that potential would take longer than most imagined.31

The stockyards also resulted in considerable development in municipal services. They were a major factor bringing streetcar service north, which required construction of
an iron bridge over the Trinity River since the existing wooden structures could support only pedestrians and light wagons. The city council, county, and company agreed to share equally the $24,500 bid by Smith Bridge Company of Toledo, Ohio, for a crossing thirty-four feet wide and 930 feet long. The expenditure stirred considerable opposition but proponents pointed out that the line would not only serve the stockyards but also the St. Louis, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas terminal and some 200 acres within the city limits lying north of the Trinity River.\(^{32}\)

The dispersion effect carried over into other suburban development. In 1887 H. B. Chamberlain began Arlington Heights on 2,000 acres west of Fort Worth advertised as healthier due to its superior elevation of 150 feet. Chamberlain promised that the addition would become the city’s most elegant with a grand boulevard and streetcar service, a resort with a hotel and a two-story pavilion, and an amusement area at Lake Como. Streetcar service was especially important for suburban growth in the pre-automobile age, allowing the development of new communities removed from the city core, many of which, like Arlington Heights, exhibited clear class and economic distinctions. At the same time the East Fort Worth Company, a group of investors that included several prominent railroad men, bought 414 acres north of East First Street, then a virgin forest, for the Sylvania addition. The group dug their own well, set aside fifteen acres for a park and pond (Lake Crystal), let contracts for two miles of graded streets, and planned for a streetcar line. The venture got off to good start when an auction sold $12,000 in residential lots in ninety minutes.\(^{33}\)

Just as all seemed to run so well an old issue reappeared in complaints about water department operations as well as poor water quantity and quality. Detractors
charged that some major users, including the Missouri-Pacific and Texas and Pacific railroads, had evaded paying their bills and that rebates issued to compensate for supply failures had been distributed unfairly. In addition, the fire department blamed some fire losses on water problems. Their annual report showed thirty-eight alarms (eight false) from April 1, 1887, to March 31, 1888, with total losses of $62,980 but argued that inadequate supply and pressure were responsible for a $26,000 loss on October 16 and a $25,000 loss on December 1. Complaints about the system’s quality arose after muddy river water was used to compensate for declining well production. Dissatisfaction over drinking brown water forced many residents to dig their own wells, which aggravated the issue by reducing water department receipts. The council briefly considered purifying river water but opted for a gang-well system that promised adequate artesian water. By February 1888 ninety-six wells supplied clear, wholesome water, bringing a positive cash flow that put the waterworks on firm financial footing with an outstanding debt of only $2,300 and $17,500 in operating expenses against annual revenues of $28,000. Like previous fixes, the latest was of the moment and would not last.34

The problems of 1888 raised questions about the city’s 1885 purchase of what was proving to be a grossly inadequate waterworks. Mayor Broiles, who had supported the purchase, charged that he and others had been misled by the corrupted influence of an unidentified former alderman, no longer living in Fort Worth, who received $900; a journalist, also no longer in residence, paid $1,000; and the law office of Hogett and Greene, which accepted $600, from unidentified sources. That degree of corruption suggested a lack of mature administration existing at very high levels.35
Broiles, who broke the fraud allegations, had a contentious mayoral tenure that included disputes with the press, aldermen, and other city officials. He broke early with the *Gazette*, threatening in November 1886 to boycott the paper because of alleged false statements. By August 1887 tempers had cooled to the extent that the same paper claimed that rancor on the council had declined and partisanship disappeared. The egregiousness of that assessment became evident in the fall when Broiles ordered pharmacists arrested for selling non-medicinal merchandise on Sunday, sparking accusations from druggists that the mayor was imposing his personal morality. When the city attorney and police agreed and refused to prosecute violators, Broiles organized his own police force. In September G. J. Mable, arrested for carrying a pistol, presented a special policeman’s identity with only the mayor’s signature. When questioned, Broiles admitted that he had secretly appointed four special policemen on August 12, 1887, to combat offenses ignored by the regular police but then disbanded the group after outcries condemned the use of a special police force.  

Broiles remained truculent. He vetoed more council motions than any of his predecessors, including payments due the Fort Worth Iron Works, claiming that the position of an alderman as a stockholder constituted a technical violation of codes prohibiting council members from conducting business with the city. When the council overruled the veto Broiles refused to sign payment warrants, leading the city secretary to issue scrip payment. Broiles then ordered Recorder R. H. Orr (the recorder was judge of the city court) and Marshal Sam Farmer not to collect fees assessed by the secretary, claiming he lacked the legal right of assessment, a position disputed by the city attorney. In 1887 Broiles conspired in the indictment of five councilmen for engaging in city
business transactions while on the council, with one of the five also charged with buying
claims against the city (One alderman, Tatum, was acquitted). The unseemly rancor
displeased many but Broiles apparently maintained a solid base of popular support,
winning reelection in 1888.\textsuperscript{37}

For all the dissensions, drought, and depression, the last half of the 1880s brought
strong prosperity. At the end of 1888 the \textit{Gazette} argued that economic downturns had
passed and a bright future seemed assured, that more had been accomplished in the
preceding twelve months than in 1886 and 1887 combined. Boosters claimed a
population of 35,000 (optimistic), some $1,200,000 in new construction, telephone
communication to 132 places in Texas, and 460 businesses, including the state’s largest
iron and brass foundry, beef refrigeration system, and wholesale grocery trade with sales
exceeding $10,000,000. Private construction boomed with as many as twenty-seven
projects in the works, including the Union Stockyards, the First Baptist Church at Third
and Taylor streets, and the St. Stanislaus Catholic Church costing $80,000. The city
infrastructure developed 149 artesian wells, including 115 in gang-well system, and a
school system that operated ten months a year with three buildings under construction,
including a three-story high school. In addition, the first electric railway in the
Southwest, scheduled for completion within ninety days, was an ambitious plan involving
ten miles of track over four routes, the Belt Line, Belknap, Main, and North Side, all
powered by two eighty-five horsepower engines.\textsuperscript{38}

Fort Worth displayed its pride in an 1888 production of \textit{The Capitalist or the City
of Fort Worth}, a take-off of \textit{The Mikado}. The musical, written by Ed. J. Smith, literally
sang the praises of Fort Worth, including claims that its population of 30,00 would
double in two years. The cast of characters included three sisters, “wards” of the Lord Chief Excursionist, “Kokonut” who assured all that he had three other wards just as pretty (the city had six wards). Dallas suffered repeated insults, including a description as a “a dull, dead town” waiting for a railroad “to give it some renown.” The male lead, “Yankee-Doo,” is threatened with banishment to Dallas, a fate “Push-More,” the real estate agent, described as horrible and that “Kokonut” warned would ensure that he would never smile again. The boasting was even displayed in the program. A foldout map pictured Fort Worth in outsized proportions larger than any Texas city and equal to Chicago and San Francisco.  

The economic revival caught the attention of many but railroads still garnered most of the notice. A city map appearing in the Gazette on May 25, 1887 (see Illustration II-1), reflected the degree of railroad domination. Even allowing for disproportionate scales, the space taken by rail yards and rail lines overwhelmed the urban geography. On April 4, 1887, the Chicago Inter-Ocean described Fort Worth, which it called the only Texas city with all the characteristics of a booming urban center, as a young commercial giant that was the wholesale trade and railroad center of the Southwest. According to the article the existing eleven railroad routes ran eighteen passenger trains daily (with twice the ticket sales of any other Texas city) with four more under construction: the Fort Worth and Denver to Quanah, the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe to Kansas; the Fort Western to coal deposits in Young and Jack counties, and the Fort Worth and Rio Grande.

All the bravado could not hide a serious lack of industrial development. Even booster publications, such as the 1885 City Directory, described the industrial base as
“immature,” with only three planing mills, a door and blind factory, two flour mills, a pork packer, and a few producers of light consumer goods: brooms, soap, ice, clothing, etc. In 1887 the only heavy industry, the Fort Worth Boiler and Machine Works (later Fort Worth Iron Works), employed a grand total of forty with a monthly payroll of just $4,000. Many attributed the industrial void to an opportunity cost associated with the focus on railroads, that the determination to become a major rail center had sapped all initiative. In 1887 Paddock admitted that most energy and capital had gone into railroads, securities, land, and cattle, enterprises which returned great profits but brought few jobs. He contrasted that with Dallas’ diversified approach that had created a thriving manufacturing sector of 100 factories, the salient factor making Dallas superior in wealth and population.41

From that realization a subtle but important philosophical shift began that de-emphasized railroads in favor of factories. In 1886 the Daily Mail called on the city’s monied men to realize that the future lay in manufacturing, that they could build railroads to every point on the compass but without factories Fort Worth would remain impoverished and provincial. One of the first expressions of change came with a proposed expansion of the Boiler and Machine Works that would raise employment to the 125 to 150 level, contingent on a $9,000 subsidy. The plan drew wide support as the nucleus of a transition that would begin channeling investment out of railroads and into manufacturing.42

The turn to industrialization formalized in 1889. Paddock presided over a public meeting on July 22, 1889, that called on all supporting the “upbuilding of the city” to take the first steps in the new industrial era. Attendees listened to charges that Fort Worth had
given railroads hundreds of thousands of dollars but the more it gave the worse it had been treated. They agreed that the remedy to such ingratitude lay in switching focus to bricks and mortar, a process that would begin funding bonuses of $100,000 for a woolen mill and $250,000 for a cotton mill. Paddock embraced the new cause as actively as he had wooed railroads. While in Boston seeking investors he complained of homesickness and of late hours talking Fort Worth mills but maintained his resolve, writing “I must lay the foundation for doing some business this time, in a line that won’t worry, harass and annoy the life (unreadable) me as that Railroad [sic] has.”

Railroads were not completely abandoned, either as an industry themselves or as tools promoting other industrial forms. Rail service had always complemented commerce, providing wide access for livestock dealers and wholesale merchants and, beginning in the late 1880s, to cheap coal. For years Dallas had enjoyed the advantage of substantially lower energy costs due to its access to coal at $3 to $4 a ton, arranged by its manufacturing association, giving it an edge that certainly contributed to the successful attraction of more manufacturing. Little wonder that Fort Worth placed such importance to an 1887 proposal for a Fort Worth Western route to the coal fields in Young and Jack counties or that in 1889 the Fort Worth and Albuquerque line was deemed the city’s most important agenda item because it included Thurber, Texas, where coal sold for only $2 to $3 a ton. Cheap coal provided affordable energy to run water pumps and electric generators but the salient force driving Fort Worth’s interest lay in its contribution to industrialization. The matter was considered so vital that some suggested cheap coal would mean Fort Worth would not have to solicit factories, that it would not be able to keep them away, an assertion that represented little, if any, exaggeration. Walter Licht’s
remarkable study argued that the importance of coal for nineteenth-century American industrialization could not be overstated, that a direct connection existed between the two.44

As their focus shifted from railroads to industries boosters looked for ways to herald the change. A public meeting in January 1889 appointed a committee of fifty, including Smith, Van Zandt, and many railroad men to consider suitable means of promotion. Their report recommended a grand exhibition of local products that would become Fort Worth’s Spring Palace of 1889 and 1890. The idea was not a committee original. General R. A. Cameron of the Fort Worth and Denver Railroad, drawing inspiration from the Corn Palace of Sioux City, Iowa, and the Ice Palace of St. Paul, Minnesota, had pushed for such an exposition for months. Cameron, who became known as the father of the Spring Palace, had a profound understanding of the problems facing Fort Worth and the whole state. He described Texas as a large land mass with little urban development, no city of 50,000, no building of nine stories, and no factory worth $2,000,000. He might have added that no Texas city was listed in the nation’s twenty-two largest despite the state’s sixth ranking in population. That lack of urban development suggested that neither cotton, the South’s premier agricultural product, nor railroads could bring urban prosperity, that significant growth required factories. Cameron’s proposal quickly gathered support, much of which was rather passionate, including claims that the exhibit would be more important for Texas than the 1876 Centennial celebration for the United States or the then current Paris Exposition was for France.45
Of necessity the project developed rapidly. Planners scheduled the Texas Spring Palace for three weeks in June, Texas’ best month, when grasses are green, flowers bloom, and fruits and vegetables ripen (some consideration even went into naming it the Texas June Palace), leaving only a few weeks to erect a suitable facility. Estimates for construction ranged from $26,000 to $35,000, reasonable considering that the Sioux City’s facility had run $30,000, with another $20,000 needed in contingency funds. Financing came from selling $10 shares with the full amount due at purchase. The organizing assembly named Paddock president, Smith vice-president, and Walter Huffman treasurer. Paddock and Smith started the campaign by each buying $300 in shares, Paddock then bought $500 more. Fundraisers were also held, including an Opera House event netting $6,160 that featured a “machine” projecting pictures of Great Britain and historical figures on a “mammoth” screen.46

The facility would be grand in dimensions and appearance. Various site proposals were considered, including locations in Sylvania and the Northside but the organization selected lot 26 just north of the Texas and Pacific reservation (near the intersection of east Lancaster and Jennings avenues), offered for $5,000 cash or $6,000 paid out. Following the design of Armstrong and Messer Architects the Fort Worth Loan and Construction Company began work in March, allowing only forty days for completion. The project required 528,000 feet of lumber, 192 kegs of nails, and provided work for 106 laborers. The finished product, constructed of Texas products and modeled on Denver’s Corn Palace, contained 60,000 square feet. The front and rear walls stretched 200 feet with towers at the four corners and a sixty-foot center dome rising 125 feet high surrounded by eight small towers. Agricultural products covered all the interior
and exterior surfaces, wheat lined the dome, cotton and corn the sides and some of the towers with the others using either wheat, sugar cane, beef horns, sheep pelts, or sea shells. The first floor showcased mineralogy, stressing that Texas had more copper than Michigan, more lead than Missouri, and more iron than Wisconsin. The second floor displayed various fruits and vegetables, manufacturing products, other agriculture goods, and exhibits covering Texas’ flora, fauna, and history.\textsuperscript{47}

The Texas Spring Palace opened on time and enjoyed a successful run. The inaugural procession on May 29, 1889, stretched two miles and featured the governors of Texas and Nebraska. Special attractions included a parody of \textit{HMS Pinafore} and music provided by a Chicago band as well as the local fire department band, which spent $100 for new music. The exhibition averaged 3,000 patrons daily for a total attendance of 100,000 but reports that President Benjamin Harrison would attend proved false. At the closing on June 27 promoters expressed elation at an unqualified success.\textsuperscript{48}

As the decade closed Fort Worth saw some limited results of its turn to manufacturing. In November 1889 the foundation of the Dixie Wagon factory, a 15,224 square-foot building managed by H. L. Nichols of New Haven, Connecticut, lay almost complete and its residential district had sold all but ten lots. In addition, a club house worth $50,000 and a St. Paul rolling mill employing seventy-five were planned for the Northside. For the week ending January 19, 1890, Fort Worth led the nation in percentage growth in clearing house receipts with an increase of 110 percent over the same week in 1889 ($1,449,880 to $3,046,586) and even ranked above Dallas’ total $2,858,409, an impressive but isolated aberration. In 1890 Tarrant County’s property
tax assessments reached just $14,000,000, less than half of Dallas County’s $29,000,000, which led the state.\textsuperscript{49}

The 1880s represented a breakout period in which Fort Worth became more than just another county seat. That transition was largely due to its remarkable railroad development that made Fort Worth the transportation hub of the Southwest, with lesser but notable contributions from wholesale and livestock trades. Economic development made possible an incipient municipal infrastructure, including a water works system, however flawed it may have been. Two other events had less tangible contemporary effects but offered major implications for the future. The Northside stockyards seemed to be failure in that they did not attract a major packer in the 1880s or the 1890s, but their contribution was only delayed until 1903 when they would be the catalyst for Fort Worth’s first major factory. In addition, the years from 1885 to 1889 witnessed an incipient recognition that railroads were not sufficient for the level of urban development envisioned by Fort Worth boosters, an epiphany that switched Fort Worth’s focus from transportation to industries. In essence, the decade’s second half brought the realization that the work of the first half was not sufficient. That was, in its own way, just as important for Fort Worth as railroad development or the stockyards. The new emphasis would face rough sledding in the 1890s but in it lay Fort Worth’s future.
Chapter Two Endnotes


3 Fort Worth Gazette, August 12, 1887, pp. 4-5; September 16, 1887, p. 1; June 26, 1886, p. 8; February 28, 1886, p.8; September 7, 1886, p. 8; November 20, 1886, p. 8; February 9, 1887, p. 8; February 11, 1887, p. 8; March 17, 1887, p. 8; April 15, 1887, p. 8; December 1, 1887, p. 2; December 2, 1887, p. 2; October 11, 1886, p. 8; New York Times, December 25, 1890, p. 2.


5 New York Times, August 22, 1885, p. 2; August 23, 1885, p. 1; August 25, 1885, p. 1; August 28, 1885, p. 2; October 9, 1885, p. 3; Fort Worth Gazette, November 29, 1888, p. 8.

6 Fort Worth Gazette, October 31, 1885, p. 8; December 4, 1885, p. 8; March 13, 1886, p. 8; Knight, Outpost, pp. 141-142; Fort Worth Star Telegram, February 4, 1945, Section 1, p. 2; Fort Worth Daily Mail, January 21, 1886, p. 2.

7 Fort Worth Gazette, August 18, 1886, p. 8; August 19, 1886, p. 8; August 20, 1886, p. 8; September 14, 1886, p. 8; September 16, 1886, p. 8; September 22, 1886, p. 8; Fort Worth Daily Mail, January 21, 1886, p. 2; Hammond, History of Municipal Departments, pp. 267-269.

8 Fort Worth Gazette, October 18, 1885, p. 5; January 15, 1886, p. 8; February 3, 1886, p. 3 8; February 4, 1886, p. 3; October 18, 1885, p. 5; January 15, 1886, p. 8; June 23, 1886, p. 3; December 4, 1885, p. 8; August 18, 1886, p. 8; August 19, 1886, p. 8; August 20, 1886, p. 8; September 14, 1886, p. 8; September 22, 1886, p. 8; Fort Worth City Council Minutes, Vol. E, April 25, 1886.

9 Fort Worth Gazette, August 21, 1889, pp. 102; September 14, 1889, p. 8.

10 Fort Worth Gazette, February 4, 1886, p.p. 4, 8; February 10, 1886, p. 8; February 19, 1886, p. 8; February 23, 1886, p. 8; February 25, 1886, p. 3; February 26, 1886, pp. 2, 8; Fort Worth Daily Mail, February 24, 1886, p. 4.

11 Fort Worth Gazette, January 3, 1887, p. 8; March 2, 1887, p. 8; August 3, 1887, p. 8; August 4, 1887, p. 8; Fort Worth Daily Mail, December 16, 1885, p. 4.

12 Fort Worth Gazette, May 12, 1887, p. 8; July 6, 1887, p. 8; July 10, 1887, p. 8; November 2, 1887, p. 8; Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 27, 2002, p. 6B; Melosi, Garbage in the Cities, p. 241. Unfortunately, Melosi’s study focused on the East and Midwest with little attention devoted to the South and West.

13 Fort Worth Gazette, October 13, 1885, p. 5; October 16, 1885, p. 8; December 3, 1885, p. 8; December 6, 1885, p. 8; December 25, 1885, p. 8; October 14, 1888, p. 8.

14 Fort Worth Gazette, October 7, 1885, p. 5; October 16, 1885, p. 5; January 10, 1888, p. 6; February 1, 1888, p. 8; June 5, 1888, p. 5; November 28, 1888, p. 8.
15 *Fort Worth Gazette*, October 22, 1885, p. 8; March 6, 1885, p. 8; January 27, 1886, p. 8.

16 *Fort Worth Gazette*, December 23, 1885, p. 8; August 1, 1886, p. 8; October 28, 1886, p. 1; May 6, 1887, p. 8; Letter, Paddock to wife, March 29, 1886, *Paddock Papers*, GA 194 Folder 8.

17 *Fort Worth Gazette*, April 14, 1886, p. 1; April 15, 1886, p. 2; May 7, 1886, p. 2; May 13, 1887, p. 8; May 16, 1887, p. 8; May 20, 1887, p. 2; *General Directory of the City of Fort Worth for 1888-1889* (Fort Worth: Morrison and Fourmy, 1889) pp. 1-3.

18 *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, July 25, 1889, p. 2; October 24, 1889, p. 8; *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 25, 1889, p. 5; July 21, 1889, p. 5.

19 *Fort Worth Gazette*, October 11, 1885, p. 5; July 16, 1886, p. 3; July 17, 1886, p. 1; July 18, 1886, p. 2; March 11, 1888, p. 2; *City Directory, 1888-1889*, pp. 1-3.


22 *Fort Worth Gazette*, April 1, 1886, p. 3; April 2, 1886, p. 1; April 3, 1886, p. 3; *New York Times*, April 3, 1886, p. 1; Smith, *Things I Remember*, p. 8.


25 *New York Times*, April 3, 1886, p. 1; April 5, 1886, p. 1; April 7, 1886, p. 1; July 10, 1894, p. 2; *Fort Worth Gazette*, October 1, 1894, p. 6; April 7, 1886, p. 1; April 6, 1886, p. 1; April 9, 1886, pp. 1, 8; April 13, 1886, p. 8; May 4, 1886, p. 1; May 5, 1886, p. 1; July 26, 1886, p. 8. James L. Merriner, *Grafters and Goo Goos: Corruption and Reform in Chicago, 1833-2003* (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois Press, 2004), pp. 48-49. An interesting postscript, Martin Irons, the Tyler employee whose firing began the strike, was arrested in 1894 for attempted sexual assault of a six-year old girl occurring at his grocery on Main near Fourteenth Street. See *Fort Worth Gazette*, October 1, 1894, p. 6.

26 *Fort Worth Gazette*, October 1, 1894, p. 6; October 8, 1885, p. 8; December 9, 1885, p. 8; May 1, 1886, p. 8; March 22, 1887, p. 8; May 12, 1886, p. 8; April 25, 1887, p. 8; May 10, 1887, p. 8; June 17, 1887, p. 8; August 15, 1887, p. 2; Walter Licht, *Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995), p. 168.


29 *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 4, 1887, p. 8; January 12, 1887, p. 2; May 19, 1887, p. 2; December 1, 1886, p. 8.

30 *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 12, 1887, p. 2; November 11, 1887, p. 2; December 4, 1887, p. 8; December 23, 1887, p. 8; December 24, 1887, p. 8; March 6, 1888, p. 8; Craig, *Fort Worth Stockyards*, pp. 18-19; *General City Directory, 1888-1889*, pp. 3-4.

31 *Fort Worth Gazette*, March 6, 1888, p. 8; February 23, 1890, p. 7; April 24, 1890, p. 7; September 30, 1891, p. 8; Craig, *Fort Worth Stockyards*, pp. 18-19; *General City Directory, 1888-1889*, pp. 3-4.

32 *Fort Worth Gazette*, September 4, 1887, p. 4; January 9, 1888, p. 8; March 7, 1888, p. 8; March 28, 1888, p. 8; May 4, 1888, p. 8.


34 *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 5, 1887, p. 8; January 3, 1887, p. 2; April 29, 1888, p. 8; July 10, 1887, p. 8; October 29, 1887, p. 2; September 18, 1887, p. 8; September 19, 1887, p. 8; February 21, 1888, p. 8; March 7, 1888, p. 8; May 2, 1888, p. 8; May 5, 1888, p. 8; May 9, 1888, p. 8


36 *Fort Worth Gazette*, November 1, 1886, p. 2; August 3, 1887, p. 8; August 21, 1887, p. 8; August 22, 1887, pp. 7, 8; August 25, 1887, p. 8; September 1, 1887, p. 8; September 7, 1887, p. 8; September 21, 1887, p. 8.

37 *Fort Worth Gazette*, December 8, 1887, p. 8; October 17, 1888, p. 5; October 18, 1888, p. 8; October 1, 1888, p. 8; November 8, 1887, p. 8; November 25, 1887, p. 4; November 15, 1887, p. 2.

38 *Fort Worth Gazette*, November 26, 1888, p. 2; March 18, 1893, p. 10; January 1, 1889, p. 14; August 3, 1889, p. 8; June 17, 1888, p. 8; October 15, 1888, p. 8; October 23, 1888, p. 8; *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, November 14, 1889, p. 2; January 1, 1889, p. 1; February 1, 1889 p. 2.


40 *Fort Worth Gazette*, April 23, 1887, p. 5; July 11, 1889, p. 8; May 25, 1887, p. 5.

41 *General City Directory, 1885-1886*, p. 8; Farman, *Fort Worth Club*, pp. 17-18; *Fort Worth Gazette*, May 25, 1887, p. 2-3; March 18, 1887, p. 8; March 27, 1887, p. 8; November 25, 1887, p. 4; July 21, 1889, p. 5.

42 *Fort Worth Daily Mail*, January 12, 1886, p. 2; *Fort Worth Gazette*, March 18, 1887, p. 8.


45 *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 31, 1889, p. 5; May 16, 1889, p. 4; January 15, 1889, p. 2; March 21, 1889, p. 4; April 18, 1889, p. 8; E. D. Allen, *The Texas Spring Palace: A Complete and Categorical Description of this Marvelous Temple* (Fort Worth: Texas Printing and Lithographing Company, 1889), pp. 4-10


47 *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, February 15, 1889, p. 2; March 7, 1889, p. 5; March 21, 1889, p. 4; March 22, 1889, p. 3; May 16, 1889, p. 2; *Fort Worth Gazette*, February 21, 1889, p. 5; Allen, *Texas Spring Palace*, pp. 4-10.

48 *New York Times*, May 30, 1889, p. 1; June 28, 1889, p. 1; *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, June 6, 1889, pp. 1-3, 7; May 2, 1889, p. 6; May 23, 1889, p. 4; July 4, 1889, p. 3.

49 *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, November 28, 1889, p. 8; December 26, 1889, p. 8; January 30, 1890, p. 4; February 13,1890, p. 4; September 30, 1891, p. 8.
Chapter Three: The Not-So-Gay Nineties, 1890-1899

The 1890s were not kind to Fort Worth. The transition to an industrial focus that began as the 1880s closed fell victim to the Panic of 1893, a national depression with aftereffects that plagued Fort Worth until the end of the nineteenth century. Paddock, always a keen observer, blamed the depth and length of the city’s economic troubles on Fort Worth’s dearth of industry, arguing that the lack of commercial diversity left the economy ill-prepared to weather declines in the cattle and wholesale trades. Knight agreed that poor industrial diversity contributed to economic vulnerabilities while J’Nell Pate saw the depression of the 1890s as a force destroying the hopes of many businessmen. Their perspectives shared a common thread linking Fort Worth’s limited industrial base to poor economic vitality.

That confluence of negatives prolonged and deepened Fort Worth’s depression experience while also aggravating other issues, many in dramatic fashion. Hard times contributed to the downfall of some highly-respected residents and in the waning of organized boosterism, although a new, more limited form appeared as the decade ended. In addition, declining revenues and increasing debts drove Fort Worth city government to the brink of bankruptcy, curtailing most initiatives, especially those dealing with reoccurring waterworks problems while transforming the city’s relationship with Hell’s Half Acre. The historic justification behind the Acre’s longevity rested on its indirect commercial effects, that vice stimulated downtown trade, but in the cash-starved 1890s the focus turned to direct revenue derived from fines.¹
The 1890 United States Census indicated that Fort Worth had grown, although its growth rate still trailed that of Dallas. Compared to 1880 the population increased 246 percent, from 6,663 to 23,076, an addition of 16,413 that accounted for all but fifty-eight of Tarrant County’s addition of 16,471 persons, a 66.8 percent increase from 24,671 in 1880 to 41,142 in 1890 (see Table III-1). The disparity in rates of growth between city and county meant that Fort Worthians now made up fifty-six percent of the county population, up from just twenty-seven percent in 1880. As impressive as the statistics seemed they failed to match projections. In 1880 local wags had confidently predicted 40,000 by the end of the decade and as late as 1890 the New York Times postulated that significant growth trends in Southern urbanization would push Fort Worth to 31,000 and Dallas to 39,000. Dallas came close to matching that expectation with an 1890 population of 38,067, a 267 percent increase that widened the gap between the two cities so that Dallas climbed from fifty-five percent to sixty-five percent larger than Fort Worth. Similar increases appeared for Dallas County, pushing it from thirty-five percent to sixty-three percent larger than Tarrant County. The uniformity of statistics favoring Dallas city and county suggested that Fort Worth’s advance relative to Tarrant County owed more to the county’s poor growth rate than a remarkable performance by Fort Worth.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1890 Population Statistics for Dallas and Fort Worth and their Counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dallas County</td>
<td>67,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas City</td>
<td>38,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarrant County</td>
<td>41,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>23,076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Still, many thought the present secure and the future bright. One analysis showed that Fort Worth enjoyed the state’s highest per capita wealth, $533, compared to $322 for Dallas and $388 for San Antonio while a later, larger report reduced the degree of separation but still showed Fort Worth’s per capita wealth at $466, ahead of Dallas’ $342, Austin’s $323, Galveston’s $423, San Antonio’s $400, and Houston’s $385 (see Table III-2). The statistics on wealth, derived by dividing tax assessments by population, were largely an effect of the raising Fort Worth’s property assessments to true market value in 1888 to increase borrowing potential while other Texas cities continued to assess at only a fraction of actual value. In 1890 Fort Worth’s assessed valuations totaled $22,000,000, more than Dallas at $20,000,000 and equal to San Antonio at $22,000,000, both larger and richer but assessed at lower rates. When statistical machinations could not explain Fort Worth’s smaller population boosters turned to history and geography. Fort Worth, they noted, was the “New Texas,” the state’s youngest major city, having incorporated just seventeen years earlier (1873) while Dallas had done so in 1856, Austin and Galveston in 1839, Houston in 1838, and San Antonio in 1837. In addition, Fort Worth’s city limits covered only four square miles compared to nineteen for Dallas or thirty-six for San Antonio. Over time the disadvantages of longevity and area would erode, leaving Fort Worth to reap the benefits of being the only large town in the Southwest located by army engineers. Such rationalizations helped explain away Fort Worth’s slower rate of population growth and offered hope for reversing that trend.3
Table III-2  1890 Per Capita Wealth for Texas’ Largest Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Per Capita Wealth</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>$466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston</td>
<td>$423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>$385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>$342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>$323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Gazette*, May 29, 1890, p. 4.

The municipal infrastructure also improved. In April 1890 outgoing Mayor Broiles listed the accomplishments of his four years in office: an increase in miles of paved streets from forty to fifty, of sewers from eleven to forty-six, of water mains from eleven to over twenty-six, as well as establishment of a city owned and operated electric plant that, along with two private generators, powered 200 arc and 1,000 incandescent lights. Broiles also bragged that the waterworks operated at a profit and that the gang-well system, complemented by 300 private artesian wells yielding 1,000,000 gallons daily, supplied all the city, including 175 fire hydrants and a natorium with a large indoor pool as well as Turkish and Russian baths. The positive cash flow contributed to the city’s cash reserve of $222,824 with another $225,000 due from bond sales.4

For all the advances, Fort Worth had not reached a level of refinement much removed from its beginnings. While the frontier was certainly in retreat it still survived alongside communities of energetic citizens working towards the future. Boosters bragged of residences with fragrant gardens and of the city’s fifty-eight miles of sewerage piping without mentioning that those sewers emptied into the Trinity River or that downtown was a patchwork of contrasts where multi-story granite retail giants stood next to dilapidated houses and tiny fruit stands. Gentility existed at such a low level that
a proposal to end the use of female prisoners on rock piles met serious opposition. The
criminal side of the frontier also remained on the municipal doorsteps. In December
1894 Sam Evans, the son of a prominent local family, and two other masked men made
off with up to $140,000 after robbing an eastbound Texas and Pacific train near Mary’s
Creek, just six miles west of town.⁵

The undeveloped psyche of the period tied success to racial purity. In 1889 the
Gazette opposed a proposal to guarantee African-Americans political representation at
three-fifths their population, the same ratio used in the Constitution for representation of
slaves. The editorial argued that whites should retain absolute political control, that they
“stood in a patriarchal relationship to the negroes [sic]” and had done everything that
could be done to give blacks an equal chance to succeed, including educating their
children. A link between assumed racial superiority and economic advancement was
blatant in an 1890 advertisement boasting that Fort Worth was “distinctively American,”
that it had the smallest percentage “of negroes [sic], Mexicans or objectionable
foreigners” of any Texas city. Also in 1890 John C. Ryan, a real estate developer, used
horse-racing terms to tout Fort Worth’s lack of racial diversity. Ryan declared “FIVE TO
ONE ON THE THOROUGHBRED CAUCASIAN, FORT WORTH” on the race for
urban supremacy, calling it Texas’ “whitest” city with a population ninety percent white,
six percent “colored,” and only four percent “foreign,” compared to Dallas with twenty-
five percent “colored” and fifteen percent “foreign.” Opposition to the some egregious
manifestations arose but received lukewarm responses. In 1894 Mayor Paddock
promised to speak in opposition to lynching before a meeting of all “good citizens” called
for the Mount Gilead Baptist Church at Jones and Thirteenth streets, located in the heart
of an African-American neighborhood. The local press probably considered itself quite gracious in describing the church’s pastor, J. Francis Robinson, as possessed of as high a degree of mental development as could be “found in a man of his race.”

The press might have saved its patronizing for several miscreant Anglos holding responsible positions in politics, religion, and business. For example, Mayor W. S. Pendleton, married with five children, left all behind on July 5, 1890, to marry Addie Cullen, a “pretty telephone girl” described as “a second Venus.” Pendleton had become involved with Ms. Cullen in August 1889 and sometime afterwards obtained a sham divorce using a New York City law firm, a fact he concealed from his wife for six months. Mrs. Pendleton first learned of their divorce the day her husband left town, taking $80,000 garnered from selling most of the family’s property. Pendleton wed Ms. Cullen in New Orleans, then mailed his resignation to the city council before the couple moved to New York City. In New York Pendleton sued to recover the $267 in legal fees charged for the invalid *ex parte* divorce, which Pendleton, a lawyer, should have realized was fraudulent. Eventually, Pendleton left New York to settle in Amarillo. Another incident occurred in 1894 when the alderman of Fort Worth’s third ward, Martin McGrath, shot and killed James Rushing inside Rushing’s saloon. McGrath received a nine-year sentence but escaped in March 1896, an act his attorney called foolhardy since the governor planned to issue a pardon.

In 1890 the religious community suffered from criminal fraud charges against a prominent Fort Worth pastor. Dr. W. Mitchell, pastor of Broadway Presbyterian Church, admitted forging the name of Martin Casey, a friend in the wholesale liquor trade, as a guarantor on loans totaling $2,500. Mitchell blamed the crime on a failure to live within
his means but claimed emotional insanity in court, a plea supported by the superintendent of a lunatic asylum and by revelations that Mitchell had previously been a patient at a New England asylum. The court, obviously unimpressed, handed down a two-year sentence.\(^8\)

The financial community had its share of misadventures. In 1891 L. B. Imboden, president of the local New England Loan and Saving Bank, received a four-year sentence for forging signatures on personal loans. Imboden came from a prominent Southern family that included an officer who had served under George Washington and a Confederate general while his own brother served as both Tarrant County district attorney and judge. That background probably contributed to the issuance of an executive pardon freeing him after only two years. Imboden left Texas but continued his life of crime, committing another forgery while president of Planters’ Bank of Kansas City, Missouri, being implicated in 1903 in a scheme to obtain credit by fraud in New Jersey, and conspiring to wreck the Denver Saving Bank in 1905. In 1894 a dispute between two bank officers ended in bloodshed when R. W. Page shot and killed A. B. Smith in a private room of the Merchants’ National Bank. The two had been involved in a long-simmering dispute that dated back to July 6, 1893.\(^9\)

Public malfeasance did nothing to hamper the maturation of Fort Worth’s railroad infrastructure into a force driving the local economy. In 1890 Fort Worth had more rail lines than any other Texas city and was the clear railroad center of the Southwest. The railroads not only were a great industry in themselves, but also offered collateral advantages. For example, the Fort Worth and Denver line gave Fort Worth access to Panhandle and West Texas grain fields, creating a grain trade that led to construction of
five grain elevators with a capacity of 500,000 bushels. Railroad development also keyed increases in tax evaluations from $16,000,000 in 1889 to $22,000,000 in 1890 and in municipal revenue that rose from a low of $57,348 in 1887 to $231,514 in 1890, more than twice the 1889 total of $106,559. The railroad effect also contributed to an inflation of real estate prices that saw the same city blocks that sold for $20,000 in 1887 commonly bring $200,000 in 1890. The rise in values encouraged speculation that replaced small buildings with grand edifices, such as the new eight-story Hurley Building at Seventh and Main, described as the finest south of St. Louis. In 1890 Fort Worth’s bank clearings, the total of checks and monetary exchanges, were estimated at $100,000,000 with weekly percentage increases that often led the nation.  

Despite all the positives the Fort Worth economy remained agriculturally-based with little manufacturing development. Wholesale trade constituted an important commerce but no major house was added between 1882 and 1890, suggesting stagnant conditions in which few large concerns dominated with approximately fifty jobbers serving smaller accounts. Industrial development occurred at a rather limited pace. In 1880 only 158 person in all of Tarrant County worked in manufacturing but in 1890 Fort Worth alone listed 2,368 industrial laborers earning $1,618,073 in wages, mostly in agriculturally-related enterprises. The 1890 City Directory list of significant businesses included five grain elevators, four flour mills, the stockyards, the iron foundry and little else (but sixty-nine saloons). The directory, not known for admitting shortcomings, commented that only a beginning had been made in industrial development. The year 1890 saw some improvement with the opening of a pork packer, a cotton mill, and Texas Brewing, located on Jones between Ninth and Eleventh streets, followed in 1891 by
twenty-one smaller businesses. Thanks to that growth the 1891 business list boasted four companies employing 100 or more: Fort Worth Packing (200), Fort Worth Rolling Mills (125), Fort Worth Iron Works (125), and Texas Brewing (120).¹¹

Texas Brewing, fourth on the list of large employers, became a significant success. Construction began on the $100,000 facility in September 1890 after Fort Worth citizens fully subscribed a $20,000 bonus. The brewery began distribution on May 20, 1891, selling 500 kegs by 4:00 P.M. that first day and 50,000 the first year, so dominating the Fort Worth market that a “foreign” brewery (Anheuser-Busch) tried to break the monopoly by offering dealers free beer. The success led to a $200,000 expansion that increased output to the largest in Texas.¹²

In the early 1890s Fort Worth tried once again to establish a packinghouse. The interest in beef processing traced back at least to an 1875 dressed meat plant built on six acres east of town (donated by Smith) that failed after a year and was converted into an ice house. In the mid-1880s Isaac Dahlman began shipping beef to Europe via New Orleans but the plan failed when poor refrigeration techniques allowed the meat to spoil. In 1890 thirty investors revived the dream, forming the Fort Worth Packing and Refrigeration Company to build a $250,000 packinghouse just southeast of the stockyards. The business plan appeared solid in that local processing eliminated the $12.00 per head shipping cost to Chicago, a substantial cost savings. Construction began in July with costs rising to $390,000, not including $181,000 spent on additions. The plant, which became known as Texas Dressed Beef and Packing Company, began slaughtering in November 1890 and was soon complemented by a refrigeration plant capable of holding 500 beeves and 600 sheep. After processing, the beef went via
refrigerated railcars to New Orleans where it traveled via ships to the east coast and Liverpool, England, part of another effort to open the European market.\textsuperscript{13}

The packery did well initially but eventually crumbled under the weight of supply problems. The operation dynamically searched for new markets, even sending a test shipment of six carloads to New York City, developing enough activity that in April 1890 Jay Gould arrived to assess the need for new rail lines. Gould found a busy market killing the 500 to 800 hogs arriving daily via rail and foot. In the first six months the packinghouse returned a profit of $35,000 but problems developed because producers could not sustain the supply of 1,500 hogs required each day for a profitable economy of scale. In hindsight, critics suggested that the ambition had been too great, that the plant should have been one-fourth the size and cost no more than $50,000.\textsuperscript{14}

Operations struggled on for several years, going through several owners in the process. On March 30, 1893, the packinghouse and stockyards consolidated to become the Fort Worth Packing Company with Colonel Greenleif Simpson of Boston as president and V. S. Wardlaw as manager. The two developed grand plans involving a $5,000,000 investment but were undone by tight credit during and after the Panic of 1893. Simpson, who did not admit defeat easily, remained confident that funds would be committed that would transform Fort Worth into the next Omaha, Nebraska (site of an important packinghouse operation). In November 1895 the Chicago Packing and Provision Company, described as one of the nation’s top three packinghouses, bought the slaughterhouse but left the stockyards under Simpson. Simpson continued the faith, even seeking another packinghouse that would, he assured, spur the type of urban growth seen in Omaha and Kansas City, Missouri. The \textit{Gazette} agreed, arguing that the stockyards
and packinghouse had developed such a solid trade base that it was time for a second packery. Unfortunately, their optimism could not overcome supply issues and other problems that reduced the enterprise to only a bare existence. Still, the dream of a bright packinghouse future did not die. At the 1899 opening of the new Union Depot, reputed to be the finest west of St. Louis, celebratory speeches predicted that Fort Worth would be the center of a great cattle market when Texas developed as a major consumer as well as supplier of beef. The prescience of those prognostications would finally be proven in 1903.15

Suburban residential development that had begun in the late 1880s continued. Arlington Heights, striving to become the aristocratic section, bragged of high-end homes and a $100,000 hotel in the works. Its developer, Chamberlain Investment Company, poured $500,000 into twelve miles of streets, including a boulevard 125 feet wide and three miles long graced by a triple row of trees, and an amusement area featuring the forty-acre Lake Como with a lighted pavilion that provided music every evening. After 1890 substantial residential growth occurred on 320 acres south of the main railroad lines that had lain undeveloped due to lawsuits contesting ownership rights. Some suggested that unavailability of such a large area adjacent to the vast railroad facilities had severely stunted growth, that with it Fort Worth would have grown much larger, much sooner. When the United States Supreme Court dismissed the challenge the area quickly developed into the Fairmont Addition; Lexington Heights (by John C. Ryan); Stanley Heights, an addition bounded on the west by the new Cleburne Road; and the Union Depot Addition, advertised as within a “stone’s throw of the Union Passenger Depot.”16
The growing importance of the city’s new southern neighborhoods stimulated an initiative for a new city hall “in keeping with the city’s grandeur.” The existing dilapidated structure stood in an old section of town at Second and Rusk streets but the new building plan, first proposed in 1887, called for moving to the southwest quadrant as an accommodation to the southern growth trend. The council adopted the plan for a site around Jennings Street over Mayor Broiles’ veto but construction was delayed by the Texas comptroller’s refusal to register $84,000 in bonds and by local opposition. In 1890 Smith, then mayor, revived the effort by proposing a $75,000 bond issue (payable on May 1, 1940) that would finance a three-story brick or stone building. Mayor Smith argued that rent savings alone would amount to $90 monthly, enough to cover one-third of the bond payments. Residents of wards one and two opposed moving the hall from their section and the Finance Committee objected to increasing the debt load at a time when $844,000 in bonds lay outstanding with another $300,000 scheduled for release. Despite those concerns work began in January 1892 on a lot occupying 125 feet on Jennings Street, 194 feet on Jackson Street, and 100 feet on Monroe Street.\textsuperscript{17}

In January 1890 discussions began on a second Spring Palace. The initial response was lukewarm, forcing supporters into aggressive solicitations based on the exhibition’s commercial benefits. Paddock worked hard to overcome the apathy, reminding one gathering that the first season had generated remarkable trade increases and had earned Fort Worth widespread publicity. He reported that on a recent New York trip several northern investors expressed an interest in attending the next production. Encouraged, the attendees subscribed $19,000, then raised the total to $26,000. Cameron also campaigned hard with optimistic predictions that attendance would double in the
second year, producing far more in gate revenues than the $60,000 in 1889 to allow a profitable return on investments. Supporters, who were not above strong-arm tactics if reason proved inadequate, urged a boycott of non-contributing merchants. The combination of reason and force pushed donations beyond the $50,000 level needed to begin renovating and enlarging the existing facility.  

Fort Worth’s second Spring Palace Exhibition, which opened May 10, 1890, seemed destined for another rousing success. Mayor Broiles request that businesses close from noon to 4:00 P.M. swelled the opening-day crowd while notices in the northern press brought in large numbers of out-of-staters. Twenty-three New Englanders arrived on one train while another carried more than twenty Chicagoans, including the mayor and the Cook County sheriff. The Board of Trade entertained and wooed visiting politicians and industrialists with elaborate dinners during which Paddock and other speakers lauded Fort Worth’s commercial opportunities.  

A fire turned success into disaster. On May 31, 1890, the final night, a crowd estimated at 4,000 that included the elite of Texas attended a grand dance. Around 10:25 P.M. an alarm sound just as an exhibit vice-president was reassuring a visitor who had expressed concern about the flammability of the structure and its exhibits. The warning came from the “Gold Room,” located in the building’s northern section, where Mrs. Harry Davis of Greenville discovered a blaze. The fire, which reportedly began when a boy stepped on a “parlor match,” spread rapidly, engulfing the structure in minutes. Most escaped unharmed, thanks to ten exits that permitted emptying of the building within thirty minutes, but thirty-three suffered injuries, such as burns or broken and sprained limbs. The building, valued at $100,000, was a complete loss with only $15,000 in
insurance. The only fatality, Al Hayne, collapsed while aiding the rescue of others and had to be carried out by Jesse Williams, described in press accounts as “A Brave Colored Man.” Private contributions funded a Hayne memorial commissioned to George Bowman, a local artist who was to study sculpturing in Paris, but the equally heroic efforts of Jesse Williams has lain unacknowledged for over a century. Afterwards, discussions conceived ambitious rebuilding plans for a copper-covered stone structure featuring a center dome fifty feet wide and 200 feet high with five star points radiating out, each 180 feet long and thirty-two feet wide at their base. That idea died, as did Cameron’s suggestion for an $82,000 Texas Spring Palace in Boston.

Fort Worth had other issues to deal with, including the latest water crisis. In September 1891 firemen blamed insufficient water pressure for the fiery destruction of the Ellis Hotel at Throckmorton and Third streets. Commercial engineering firms offered upgrades, but the council opted to forego private assistance in favor of assessing waterworks in Chicago and other cities. From that exposure the aldermen determined that refinements necessary to ensure a consistent pressure would cost at least $600,000, a huge sum for the day. The council accepted the challenge by authorizing a $650,000 bond issue that would provide twelve additional wells, some as deep as 900 feet, and a pump house, powered by four large boilers, for emergency supplies from the Trinity River. At the end of 1892, after only eleven months, the new system was up and running and, by the second quarter of 1893, the waterworks returned to a positive cash flow with an income of $20,962 versus expenses of $17,222. The improvements delighted Paddock, who called the Fort Worth system the most complete waterworks in the South.
The system may have been fine but the supply was not. By May 1894 Paddock, who had been so pleased, complained that daily output of wells, the primary water source, had decreased to around 1,000,000 gallons. To make matters worse, the secondary water source, the Trinity River, tended to be at its lowest during the high-demand summer months. To reduce usage the city begin fining for wastage and opened discussion on installing meters while also looking into increasing supply through three small dams adjacent to the pumping station and/or a large reservoir west of town.\(^{23}\)

Water issues directly affected potability and public safety but they also aggravated other conditions. The presence of contaminated water during a cholera outbreak led local physicians to petition for rigid enforcement of health ordinances and for establishment of a municipal health board. The council took its own actions, ordering the water committee to increase supplies of safer well water at any cost while and beginning consideration of filtering river water. The persistence and seriousness of water problems should be viewed in the context of Fort Worth’s geography as part of the American West. Norris Hundley described the West, except for the Pacific coast and isolated mountain regions, as a region of sparse rainfall and few rivers. He suggested that most Westerners understood the implications of that aridity, that providing adequate water was crucial for a region’s (or a city’s) future in industry, agriculture, and population distribution. Those in the forefront of Fort Worth’s efforts to attract industry recognized the negative effect posed by undependable and questionable water supplies. The council called water a “matter of supreme importance” if the city were to become “a commercial metropolis.” That understanding led to a commitment to correct deficiencies even at the risk of increasing the already large public debt.\(^{24}\)
Dealing with expensive issues like water became more difficult when the local economy began showing weakness. By 1892 reports appeared regularly of a decline in cotton prices depressing the Southwest and of constraints on Texas commerce stemming from the Texas Alien Land Law, which imposed limits on business investment by non-Texas residents. Wholesale houses were among the first to feel the pinch. In 1890 Fort Worth’s Bateman Brothers, one of the largest wholesalers in Texas, filed for bankruptcy with liabilities estimated at $400,000, including $50,000 for coffee, against assets of $125,000 and in 1891 Randall Chambers Dry Goods Company went under receivership. By 1892 “hard times” had clearly affected the level of citizen support for potential development, especially proposals for a federal district court and an army post of fourteen companies promising an annual payroll of $578,000, both of which floundered. At the end of 1892 and into 1893 many felt, or hoped, that the worst was over. An 1892 visitor remarked on how well Fort Worth had weathered the economic difficulties, a sentiment repeated in the mayor’s 1893 annual report.25

That optimism rested on very little justification. In 1892 Paddock, now mayor, vetoed a $12,750 property purchase for a new ninth ward school building, citing deficits in general fund of $40,000 to $50,000, the waterworks of $30,000, and the general improvement fund of $15,000. In part those predicted shortfalls stemmed from falling property assessment values, including a decrease from $20,103,243 in 1893 to only $16,663,832 in 1894. Pressure from declining property values reduced expenditures from $567,263 in the fiscal year spanning 1891/1892; to $441,636 in 1892/1893; and $333,543 in 1893/1894, a drop of forty-one percent in just two years.26
Reductions in tax revenue combined with a large debt load to create budget gaps. In 1892 bonded and other debts totaled $1,340,130, a level, according to Paddock, that exceeded the city’s ability to pay and which caused a local bank to refuse further loans. In the face of such huge debts, declining revenues, and the inability to meet existing bills the finance committee urged the utmost economy. In response the council reduced many salaries, including the mayor’s from $2,000 to $1,500 annually, but the treasury still failed to meet payrolls in December 1892 and problems continued as estimated expenditures for the last half of the fiscal year, running April 1, 1892, to September 30, 1893, totaled $67,000 against income of only $60,300 based on an assumed but unlikely 100 percent collection rate.27

City finances struggled under many challenges. In 1894 the council reduced more salaries, which were already low compared to other major Texas cities, and ordered personnel reductions in many city departments, including streets, fire, police, and schools. Paddock made two trips to New York City to save Fort Worth’s credit but he remained upbeat, arguing in the mayor’s annual state-of-the-city address that prosperity lay just around the corner. He was wrong. Economic deterioration worsened when the City National Bank’s failure wiped out one-third of the city’s annual revenue that had been on deposit. In January 1894 Max Elser, the city treasurer, refused to honor city-issued drafts or sell bonds, claiming they constituted too great a burden on the citizenry, forcing the council to resort to court orders directing his compliance.28

In July 1893 the Arlington Heights suburb also faltered. The Chamberlain Investment Company; with headquarters in Denver and offices in Fort Worth, San Antonio, and New York, closed, citing liabilities of $2,332,190 and assets of $2,940,691.
President Humphrey B. Chamberlain blamed heavy development costs in places such as Arlington Heights, especially those associated with building and maintaining electric railways. Streetcars were so vital for suburbs that many developers assumed the construction costs, a decision that had little to do with altruism or fare revenue but a lot to do with spikes in property values generated by accessibility. Serious financial problems arose when the depression decreased or eliminated the expected inflation in real estate values, leaving the company with large debts they could not pay.  

The Chamberlain Company’s problems may have been aggravated by fraud allegations. In 1894 Humphrey Chamberlain was arrested in New York City on fraud charges filed by a wealthy shoe dealer who invested $5,175 in the Fort Worth project. The investor alleged that he had been assured that the company owned over 400 acres in Arlington Heights but found that Robert McCart and William Capps actually owned the land. The charges were eventually dropped after Chamberlain explained that he formed a partnership with Capps, McCart, and Tallant to buy the land from Van Zandt for $188,240 ($429 an acre), paying $49,888 down with five years to pay the balance. Soon thereafter, in November 1894, Arlington Height’s Ye Arlington Inn, one of the state’s largest hotels, luxuriously appointed in the Queen-Anne style, was destroyed in a suspicious fire. The hotel, costing $300,000 with commensurate room rates but remotely situated, did well initially but occupancy fell after its novelty wore off, creating annual losses that reached $10,000. The negative cash flow made the recent purchase of $36,000 in insurance rather timely, if not suspicious. The owners had actually sought a higher value policy but were denied due to the hotel’s suburban location and the company’s receivership status.
The drive for new factories had some notable successes, but grander schemes faced serious obstacles. On February 1, 1893, the Gazette wrote that “FORT WORTH MARCHES ON to the Head of the Commercial and Manufacturing Column in Texas” announcing construction of a $100,000 distillery employing 100 on twenty-two acres located between the Cotton Belt Railroad tracks and the Trinity River in North Fort Worth. The company chose a riverside site not to draw water for its liquor, for that they relied on wells, but for waste disposal. Also in February the McCord and Collins Wholesale Grocery Company opened and work continued on a federal building and a new post office. In addition, General J. M. Clark, the Chamber of Commerce secretary, lured several wholesalers from St. Joseph and Chicago and from the R. T. Davis Milling Company with a grand scheme to make Fort Worth into the “Minneapolis of the South.” The plan relied on Fort Worth’s proximity and its railroad access to the Texas Panhandle’s wheat fields but would require a change in state laws that limited non-Texan stockholders in agricultural corporations to an investment of $500 without reducing their liability, meaning that small investments carried unlimited risk.31

In the meantime Fort Worth returned to its commercial roots, railroads, which seemed to weather the panic better than most industries. Some lines actually improved their earning in 1895 over 1894 and several continued to expand. In January 1893 the Rock Island offered, contingent on a bonus, an extension to Fort Worth to connect with the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas controlled by Standard Oil. In April the Gazette celebrated the successful subscription drive with a large edition listing all local railroad employees who, according to their estimates, put $100,000 in monthly wages into the
local economy. The start of Rock Island operations on July 30, 1893, gave Fort Worth twelve lines of service, compared to ten each for Houston and Dallas.¹²

A drive also began to replace the old train depot that had become an eyesore. In 1893 Fort Worth was the nation’s sixth most important railroad center with service from all the trunk lines west of the Mississippi River and south of the Rocky Mountains, more than Atlanta or any other city south of St. Louis and twice that of New Orleans, but its Union Passenger Depot resembled a “barn.” Plans for a larger, nicer facility moved along quickly at first using the Pueblo, Arizona, depot as a model, but the decision process became labored under the onus of coordinating each step among railroad executive offices spread across several states. As the initiative struggled into 1895, four major lines finally agreed in principle to contribute up to $30,000 each but even that proved unwieldy due to their constant squabbling. In 1897 the Bohemian Club, a local literary society with considerable civic presence, complained that Fort Worth still needed a first class rail facility. In 1899 a $125,000 contract was let for construction of a large Texas and Pacific Passenger Depot with 500 feet fronting on Front Street (now Lancaster Avenue) and 160 feet on Main Street.³³

The few instances of commercial advancement did little to cover the economy’s weakness. In 1893 real estate agent John F. Swayne conceded that business had not shown any great activity and even a press noted for blatant civic cheerleading admitted that advancement had slowed. The depression’s dramatic effect can be seen in monthly clearinghouses receipts, which declined steadily from $6,147,008 in January 1893 to $2,743,643 in September 1893 before rebounding to over $4,000,000 in October, over $5,000,000 in November, and $5,752,154 in December. Despite the year-end upsurge the
total for 1893, $56,018,282, was $2,668,879 less than in 1892. The trend downward continued in 1894, which fell sixteen percent below 1893 and twenty-six percent under 1892, to the lowest total in nine years.34

The Dallas press exulted in Fort Worth’s desperation. In 1896 the Dallas Times Herald argued that the “wind is out of Fort Worth,” that it was only a matter of time before businesses that had mistakenly built there would relocate a few miles east. The paper cited economic difficulties as clear evidence of the mistake of cattle and sheep interests and land speculators in building a town without substantial manufacturing, noting that “of industries there is none” and that Fort Worth’s business lay “paralyzed.” They argued that Fort Worth’s underdeveloped economy was in for certain deterioration now that “boom-ers” had stopped dipping into their own pockets to fund promotions, a fact supported by the Fort Worth’s daily newspaper going to its “long home,” or out of business. In the paper’s view North Texas had room for only one great city and Dallas, due to its earlier start and superior industry, would be that city. Dallas supporters moved to ensure that outcome by enticing Fort Worth’s railroads to relocate, which, they claimed, would make Dallas impervious to depressions. Dallas representatives approached the Fort Worth headquarters of the Rock Island, the Fort Worth and Denver, and the Fort Worth and Rio Grande as well as to the Houston and Texas Central at Ennis, Texas, and the Marshall, Texas, shops of the Texas and Pacific and the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas facilities in Denison, Texas. Dallas was in a position to do so because its economy had recovered quickly from the Panic of 1893. In 1899 a letter to the Register from “JLC” complained that Dallas bank clearings rose $80,000 compared to the same week the previous year while Fort Worth’s clearings continued to decline. Further, Fort
Worth’s 1898 annual report lamented that a “tidal wave of prosperity” had stopped just east of the city limits, suggesting that it had stalled at Dallas, although it did not define the termination point.\textsuperscript{35}

Fort Worth’s long road to full recovery was evident in fiscal and demographic statistics. Municipal tax revenues rose to a high of $312,816 in 1894, then declined to only $183,481 in 1897 before beginning a slow rebound. Tarrant County property tax rolls also declined slightly from $20,949,500 in 1896 to $20,909,957 in 1897 while city tax rolls for the same period decreased from $16,236,764 to $15,508,088. In 1897 uncollected taxes amounted to $80,037, almost half the total uncollected in the city’s thirteen year history from 1874 to 1896. In 1897 seven national banks with assets of $2,230,000 called Fort Worth home but by 1899 only six did so with a combined capital of just $1,375,000. In 1898 hard times and a drought depleting the hog supply, closed the Chicago and Fort Worth Packing Company. The plant reopened in 1899 as the Fort Worth Packing and Provision Company but struggled to stay afloat amid general instability in the meat-packing industry. Beset with so many economic problems the population stagnated to the extent that even notoriously generous civic estimates showed a population decline from 39,141 in 1895/1896 to 36,294 in 1896/1897, a loss of 2,847, or over seven percent.\textsuperscript{36}

The poor economy showed up in Paddock’s household finances. In a September 19, 1895, letter he advised his wife to charge purchases at Turner and Dingee because it was a large concern better able to wait for payment. Paddock expressed shame over the state of his personal finances but rationalized that many were in similar straits and that he, at least, still had the option of “sacrificing some property,” if worse came to worst.\textsuperscript{37}
Even boosters admitted problems. In 1897 the Bohemian Club complained that Fort Worth lacked textile mills but that Waco, a smaller city ninety miles south, boasted woolen mills worth $200,000. In addition, the slump forced some Fort Worth wholesalers out of business. The year of 1898 closed with some hope derived from slight trade increases, signaling that the economy, while struggling, might yet recover.\textsuperscript{38}

Mayor Paddock’s annual report for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1898, provided a candid and sweeping survey. Paddock saw many problems facing the city and was not shy about assigning blame, arguing that “it has seemed that every device which human ingenuity could suggest was being resorted to cripple and embarrass the administration of the business of the city.”\textsuperscript{39} He denounced court decisions that limited the city’s power to suppress crime by making the police force little more than an adjunct for the state and by diverting fine income to counties rather than municipalities.\textsuperscript{40} Paddock also faulted citizens for restricting municipal power, especially in economic matters. He charged that some well-meaning but misguided souls had amended the city charter so restrictively that it was next to impossible to conduct regular business.\textsuperscript{41} Paddock thought the charter outdated, that it had been framed for a city of 10,000, not 40,000, but expressed more regret that its amendments reflected “personal views, whims, or caprices of individuals,” creating such a mass of “contradiction, inconsistencies, and incongruities” that was unsalvageable.\textsuperscript{42}

Paddock was human and would, occasionally, display anger. He wrote his wife that machinations by unnamed persons raised his desire to resign the mayor’s office so he could tell “them” his opinion while in the 1898 report he assailed litigants, again unnamed, who dragged the city through “vexatious and harassing” lawsuits.\textsuperscript{43} Paddock
also marveled at the unreasonableness of citizens who opposed taxation but clamored for street improvements, more policemen, extension of the electric light system, greater water supply, and street sprinklers. Improbably, he then claimed that the city’s financial condition was better than ever, claiming that only seven of sixty-five cities between 25,000 and 40,000 had a smaller debt and less expenditure while also calling for strict economy, forecasting that before the fiscal year had ended the city would badly need resources due to reductions in the tax rate and assessed valuations.\textsuperscript{44}

Paddock also analyzed sections of the municipal government. He boasted that the Public Health Department was so effective that only a mountain resort in North Carolina had a lower death rate and that Fort Worth was the only Texas city that did not quarantine travelers during a yellow fever epidemic in October 1897. He then returned to the attack on judicial interference, suggesting that court rulings had subverted the city’s authority to enforce sanitary regulations and had encouraged “the improvident and careless in the violation of ordinances.” Paddock praised the police for making up in “activity and vigilance” for their limited numbers and the fire department for having “no superior, if indeed it has an equal,” and argued that the streets and alley were superior to many large cities, although admitting that they could be in better condition\textsuperscript{45}

The water department and schools received a mixed review but streetcar franchise operators got unmitigated scorn. The mayor boasted of the water department’s positive cash flow and described its machinery and pipelines as “ample and adequate” but that water pressure and supply had not reached a desired level. Paddock suggested that the answer to supply lay in a reservoir and basin, a solution he had advanced three years earlier. He found the school system hampered by “(a)n unfortunate friction, to which
your Mayor, the chairman *ex officio* of the Board of Trustees, was a party, that was not conducive to the welfare of the schools.” Regrettably, no details were provided on the grounds that they would serve no purpose since everyone knew the facts. Paddock mentioned that the schools faced a building space crisis but lamented that “(j)ust what we are going to do about it, I am at a loss to conceive.” In a particularly vitriolic review Paddock scolded street railway franchisees for criminal negligence and indifference for a defective and poorly maintained system that it was a menace “to the lives, limbs and property of the people.” To prevent a repetition he suggested selling future concessions rather than giving them away and using the proceeds to establish a victim’s compensation fund.46

Paddock’s complaints concerning petty amendments to the city charter may have been a reaction to an attempt to increase the power and responsibilities of the council and mayor. In January, 1897 the council proposed two popular charter amendments, to reduce council membership from two to one alderman per ward, halving the seats from eighteen to nine, and to limit the mayor’s voting privilege to breaking ties. A third proposal stirred intense opposition. The controversial amendment authorized the mayor, with council confirmation, to appoint most department heads; including the city marshal and his chief deputy, the fire chief and his chief deputy, as well as the city secretary, judge, auditor, engineer, waterworks superintendent, and inspectors of plumbing and electricity.47 Opponents submitted a counter proposal with more modest appointment privileges that included a reduction in the property tax rate and lowered salaries. On March 20, 1897, the Texas legislature adopted a mixed plan that reduced the number of
aldermen and the property tax but retained the police chief and superintendents of
waterworks and streets as elected offices.\textsuperscript{48}

Paddock’s comments concerning poor water supplies reached a receptive
audience but one beset with financial problems. Many continued to favor wells because
they offered a cheaper alternative or because they believed well water was purer but
others, including Water Superintendent A. W. Scoble and Paddock, came to the
realization that only a reservoir would solve supply difficulties. Scoble stressed that poor
water reserves and pressure had driven up fire insurance rates and that wells could never
supply the large quantities needed to operate Fort Worth’s forty-three mile sewer system
and its fifty-two miles of water mains. He noted that eight or nine years earlier an
obstructed pipe left the city without water for three days, warning that a repeat in 1897
would have been disastrous. A council-appointed investigating committee concluded that
the lack of natural water supplies made a “storage basin” the best option, recommending
a site west of town at the confluence of the Trinity River’s Clear Fork and Mary’s Creek
at an estimated cost of $100,000, including $16,000 to buy 300 acres.\textsuperscript{49} The problem lay
not in the proposal but in the treasury’s red ink. The only available funding source lay in
issuing bonds but Fort Worth already had difficulty meeting its existing obligations. For
example, in September 1897 American Water Works Company sued in federal court to
force payment of its $5,000 fee for providing plans and specifications for an improved
water system. The council settled out of court with a $1,000 down payment and a
promise to remit the remainder, plus interest, in eighteen months.\textsuperscript{50}

After several more months of discussion and investigation the reservoir
succumbed under the weight of impecunity. In September 1899 Paddock proposed a
$150,000 bond issue but too many remained committed to an artesian system. W. F. Cummings, a former state geologist, argued that a well 300 feet deep costing between $25,000 and $75,000 would be a quicker and cheaper option but reservoir supporters retorted that pumping costs would eliminate any construction savings. Another committee made up of Hyde Jennings, W. W. Humphreys and H. C. Edrington considered three water plans, eliminating a proposal for dams on the Trinity River adjacent to downtown due to the water’s poor quality but reporting favorably on both a giant well and a 400 to 500 acre reservoir on the Trinity’s West Fork west of town where hills and terrain formed a half-moon basin. The council voted to take bids on both before making its final decision but shallow pockets and deep debts forestalled more concrete action on either.\(^{51}\)

Liabilities became such a pervasive issue that they consumed most of the leadership’s energy. Paddock devoted considerable time and effort addressing the city’s difficulties making bond payments. In 1895 he traveled to Chicago, New York, and London pushing new loans to work out “these low questions on our bonds” while also seeking funding for some private enterprises involving coal fields and railroads. In July 1897, while Paddock was out of town, the council directed the city attorney to look for limits to the city’s liability for water bond repayments, but J. P. Nicks, the acting mayor, vetoed the resolution as an unseemly search for pretexts on which to repudiate debts, stating that the city should pay its just bills. When Paddock returned he tightened purse strings, citing the inability to meet bond obligations for a November 1897 veto of a $175 expenditure for typewriters and a piano.\(^{52}\)
Court decisions aggravated the problem. In November 1897 a state district court prohibited cities from mandating property taxes payments in gold. Many cities, including Fort Worth, had few other means to acquire the specie required for most bond interest payments. In addition, an appeals court ruled that the city’s Board of Equalization assessed property at excessive values. The lawsuit began after the council increased assessments to 100 percent valuation in 1888 to raise the city’s credit limit. As late as August 1899 Paddock voiced optimism that the city would meet its interest payments despite the setbacks. He was wrong. In September and November the council repudiated payments for the month, leading eastern investors to file federal court suits and to send James Baker, a Houston lawyer, to investigate Fort Worth’s financial condition.  

The other perennial issue, vice in the Acre, received limited attention in the 1890s with most efforts focused more on hiding then ending the problem. Exceptions existed, including the Gazette, which asked in 1892 how many victims had to be slaughtered and ruined before public sentiment demanded an end to the debauchery. Most others comments focused more on visibility, a problem because the Acre lay between the train depot on the south and the respectable north end, which forced railway arrivals on an unsavory tour. The city council decided against restricting the “disorderly houses” to secondary streets to reduce visibility, admitting it would simply move the problem closer to the suburbs. In addition, decentralization of the Acre faced serious opposition from the police, who argued that concentration allowed easier and more effective control. As a result, the Acre enjoyed a largely unfettered existence in the 1890s. Sam Smith, a life-long resident, reminisced that in 1897 saloons outnumbered all other businesses and even the Board of Trade admitted to at least 100.
The major Acre issue in the 1890s involved neither its control nor elimination but fine revenue. A major dispute involved the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Office, which had concurrent authority within Fort Worth and which, like the city police, limited enforcement to a set number of charges and fines each month. Problems developed in March 1897 when incoming County Attorney John Swayne refused to play along. Swayne stated the obvious, that allowing saloon owners to remain open Sundays and gamblers to ply their trade in return for three fines a month provided only the illusion of enforcement while swelling county revenues. An 1899 grand jury report agreed, finding that the chronic practice of periodic prosecutions of habitual offenders was “prostitution of the penal law for revenue, having no tendency to suppression, but rather the licensing of crime.”

Swayne’s criticisms may have inspired Fort Worth Magistrate J. H. Jackson to attack the city’s similar arrangement. In July 1897 the Fort Worth Register reported that “the best of feelings have not prevailed” between Judge Jackson and the police, that their war was “on good and strong” over the practice of allowing casinos to run openly while fining only three employees from each every month. The cited employees paid $6.00 each, which netted the city treasury $18.00 per month, per casino. Jackson acted on his conviction by refusing the city attorney’s dismissal request on three gambling charges, made ostensibly due to insufficient grounds but actually because the accused had already paid their quota of fines. When police officers tried to circumvent his stance by “forgetting” salient details, Jackson threatened to fine them. Jackson won that battle, trying all three, two of whom paid $10 fines while the third won a dismissal.
Jackson openly discussed his perspective, taking some pains to pose the matter in ethical terms rather than as a power struggle between him and the police. He stated that he entered office with no knowledge of the existing arrangement and with the conviction that gamblers should be prosecuted as vagrants and fined $5.00 plus $5.00 in court costs. His first knowledge of the sordid practice came when five casino employees he fined $10.00 complained that they were supposed to pay only $6.00. Jackson claimed he had no idea where, when, or how the system originated but that he did not feel bound by it. He also expressed concern that police officers practiced selective enforcements, that twelve gamblers from four “white” operations had paid fines during the first two weeks of July 1897 while three houses run by “colored [sic] gamblers” had not suffered any arrests.  

An unseemly dispute between the city and county provided further evidence of the importance placed on court revenue. On July 2, 1897, Swayne, who had opposed the use of fines for revenue generation, appeared before the city council to announce the appointment of an assistant district attorney dedicated to trying state cases in the municipal court, a move predicated on a Stewart vs. Harris County (Stewart was the city attorney of Houston) court decision that made city courts part of the state judicial system. That ruling, he argued, compelled the city judge to recognize the county attorney in all cases covering violations of the Texas Penal Code and, therefore, to collect the resulting fines.  

Despite the legal arguments Fort Worth aldermen saw only a brazen attempt to seize the city’s portion of court fines and fees. They threatened to discharge all city police officers, except for the marshal, an assistant, and a clerk, and require the sheriff to
police the city, an impossible task since the state limited Tarrant County to six deputies, or three per precinct (Tarrant County had only two precincts at the time). Realizing the impossibility of that option Swayne backtracked, denying any financial interest and assuring that municipal court income would continue to go to the city treasurer. Swayne still sent an assistant, James S. Farmer, to municipal court to try cases, claiming only an interest in avoiding double jeopardy in charges likely to reach county court. Mayor Paddock remained skeptical, reiterating that the sheriff would have to replace the city police if the county wanted all the fines and court costs.  

The issue resurfaced in 1899. On March 3, 1899, three aldermen proposed to discharge the police force, charging that the Court of Appeals had made exercise of enforcement powers impossible. The council carried over the motion to the next meeting to allow the police committee to confer with county officials then, on April 21, 1899, put the matter on hold pending an undescribed investigative report.

On May 5, 1899, Paddock’s state of the city address lambasted the court of appeals, charging that it had divested the city of its crime fighting ability to the extent it was impossible to punish offenders and effectively maintain law and order, arguing that the courts had made the city police “little short of an adjunct to the state courts.” Clearly fine income was the issue. Paddock noted that up to ninety percent of county and district court cases originated from Fort Worth arrests and that the loss of revenue arising from state law violations tried in municipal court would seriously reduce city services.

In 1899 the state legislature resolved the matter by giving municipal courts concurrent jurisdiction in petty state offenses, a change Paddock said would add $760 in monthly fines from the city’s estimated forty gamblers and sixty prostitutes. At the end
of the day little changed. In November 1899 the Tarrant Grand Jury returned 165 indictments, the majority for gambling. Although Swayne demanded that casinos close or face the consequences most maintained a justifiable skepticism, seeing the statement as more motivated by a recent influx of gamblers fleeing a Dallas crackdown than a true resolve at changing traditions.64

In the trying years of the 1890s the city’s love-hate relationship with the Acre was supplanted by crass economics. An economic side to the Acre’s had always existed but before and after the 1890s what was important was the Acre’s indirect effect, the ability of the a vice district to draw patrons to downtown merchants. When the Fort Worth city government reached such low financial straits that it had to struggle to maintain its fiscal life the emphasis became the direct impact of court revenue derived from fines. The switch in perspectives was clear and dramatic, and quickly reversed when the economy sweetened.

For all the bad economic news the reports of Fort Worth’s demise proved premature. Although affected, the city came out of 1893 with a few economic bright spots, especially when viewed against the backdrop of adverse national conditions. A new directory claimed an increase in population of over twenty-five percent in one year and boasted that the new Rock Island line had opened a large new territory to local businesses. Area merchants and businessmen echoed the positive, stressing that things were on the upswing. The City Directory of 1894-1895 claimed that Fort Worth had come out the worst panic ever known less affected than most cities and with only a few business failures. Optimists saw hopeful signs in the packinghouse revival and in the state’s largest brewery straining to serve ninety-eight full saloons and seven beer halls.
The *City Directory of 1896-97* kept up the stiff upper lip, stating that, despite little speculation and declining real estate prices during the previous two years, Fort Worth had maintained steady growth.\(^{65}\)

The state of the city offered guarded optimism. In 1897 the city of Fort Worth claimed four electric streetcar routes, eighty miles of graded and graveled roads, thirty-five parks, and a school system with nine wards schools, including a high school at Jennings and Daggett and two “colored” schools, Number 10 at East Ninth and Pecan streets and Number 13 at 1217 Arizona Avenue. Tarrant County reveled in its new courthouse, a magnificent building costing $467,966 and work began on a new federal building costing $200,000. In 1897 the new Union Depot opened and telephone subscribers increased from 327 in 1891 to 500, an absolute but rather limited addition of 173 or less than twenty-nine per year but telephone company income rose dramatically from $250 to $2,000 monthly, an 800 percent rise reflecting growth in commercial and governmental accounts. Two local businesses benefited from distant wars. In August 1898, as the Spanish-American War ended, Fort Worth flourmills shipped 1,000 barrels to Cuba and during the Boer War of 1899 to 1902, a struggle between Britain and Dutch settlers for control of South Africa, the British established the Fort Worth Stockyards as their Southwestern center for acquisition of army mules. In 1899 the Fat Stock Show was made into an annual event with a permanent organization.\(^{66}\)

The commitment to transition away from railroads to industrial development waned and transformed in the 1890s. For all that happened or did not happen in the 1890s it was clear that railroads remained the jewel in Fort Worth’s economic crown. Each month eight railroads running on twelve trunk lines brought 30,000 trains through
Fort Worth terminals, producing a monthly payroll of $125,000. Many still pushed for more railroads, including Paddock who labored to build a route to Albuquerque, New Mexico, but the depression of the 1890s sapped the life out of the grand industrial scheme. In November 1895 the Fort Worth Promotive Club organized with Paddock as chair. Paddock addressed the throng, delivering a positive interpretation of the city’s prospects and assuring attendees that discussions were under way with makers of plaster, vinegar, and ropes. T. J. Powell, who would become mayor in 1900, was less sanguine. Powell argued that public lethargy had set in, that no major public activity had developed since the packinghouse deal in 1893. He suggested that Fort Worth needed an aggressive economic strategy more than ever because the depression had taught northern capitalists the value of industries and they would fight their removal to the South. Despite Powell’s warning Fort Worth’s commercial efforts seemed uncoordinated and divided. Some suggested that suburban development to provide a mass of workers should consume efforts while others focused on promoting new manufacturers, hoping they would draw workers. The city council also joined in, hoping to encourage “much-needed factories” by proposing a five-year tax moratorium for new manufacturers but the plan died after City Attorney C. Templeton ruled it unconstitutional. Other initiatives appeared, including plans for a cotton or woolen mill and a shoe factory employing 200, but little of substance developed.

The proposals accomplished little, other than demonstrating the resurgence of positive attitudes. That revival contributed to the organization of the Men’s Home Industry League, a group of leading citizens dedicated to building the city’s industrial base. The group’s leaders, including Judge J. E. Martin, J. W. McGraw, and Charlie W.
Hoelzle, emphasized patronage of local businesses, the idea being to keep Fort Worth trade in Fort Worth. In the keynote address, Hoelzle claimed that the key reason so many Fort Worth residents remained poor was that seventy-five cents of every locally-earned dollar went outside the city limits. Paddock seconded the shop-at-home initiative and C. M. Brown read his own composition, a lengthy poem, *Forward, March*, which included the lines:  

"The factory’s lazy hum will cure our ills,  
And make us happy while we work and wait.  
And while we wait, and watch, and work and pray,  
To our dear city let us all be true." 

The effect of the buy at home movement was questionable. Hoelzle and the others worked diligently, often speaking at events, such as the opening of the new City Market, and the Bohemian Club backed the program, suggesting that patronage of hometown firms would develop funding for cotton and shoe factories. Yet, the only tangible evidence of its existence, other than public exhortations, involved charges leveled against Texas Brewing for failing to use local suppliers, which the company contested by providing receipts for local purchases. The buy at home effort was a well-intentioned but limited effort that accomplished very little.

The answer to the city’s lack of commercial development lay not in an insular campaign but in the attraction of new industry. The lethargy that Powell identified in 1895 still retarded Fort Worth’s development. In 1898 Alderman M. A. Spoonts traveled to Washington, D. C. seeking an army base. He reported that the War Department recognized Fort Worth’s health and transit advantages but that success would require strong citizen involvement. No sign of such activity or an army base appeared. Even the exaggerated boosterism of the Paddock’s annual message in 1899 admitted that securing
new factories required immediate attention. In 1899 an anonymous letter to the editor proved instrumental in resurrecting some of the lost zeal. The writer, later identified as Dr. J. L. Cooper, a local physician active in city affairs, summed up the town’s recent shortcomings, noting that Fort Worth had maintained steady growth in the past because of its railroads but had lost momentum because its citizens had done little or nothing in the previous few years. He proposed a new and dynamic organization. From that suggestion the city’s top 100 property owners formed the Businessmen’s League, which later became the Board of Trade. The members elected Paul Waples, a wholesaler, president and named thirteen directors. Mayor Paddock was nominated as a director but declined to serve, perhaps the result of comments by T. J. Skaggs, secretary of the Texas Real Estate Association, that Fort Worth as a one-man town, that everyone waited for Paddock to do everything. The Bohemian Club praised the new board but regretted that the absence of an organized effort had let many opportunities slip away during the previous five years.

At the end of the nineteenth century Fort Worth still remained more frontier than metropolis, suffering from economic stagnation brought on by the national depression and the failure of local leadership. Most city leaders realized the limits of the economy, although Paddock insisted as late as 1922 that Fort Worth in the 1890s had an array of commercial and industrial enterprises that qualified it as one the Southwest’s great cities, an argument more a product of overwhelming civic boosterism than facts or logic. For example, he also stated that not until Armour and Swift packinghouses formed the cornerstones of greatness in 1903, did Fort Worth experience the conservative material growth and development necessary for a city of diversified resources. Such admissions
clearly revealed Paddock’s doubts about Fort Worth’s commercial base prior to 1903. Those doubts were necessary precursors for bigger plans that come to fruition in the new century. For Fort Worth the end of the 1890s was good news.⁷⁵
Chapter Three Endnotes

1 Paddock, Central and Western Texas, pp. 262-263, 267; Knight, Outpost on the Trinity, pp. 123-125; J’Nell L. Pate, Livestock Legacy, pp. 21-23, 123-125. Fort Worth, as the most westward Texas city north of Austin, was the center of West Texas commerce, from which its merchants benefited.


3 Fort Worth Gazette, September 28, 1890, p. 3; February 20, 1890, p. 3; May 29, 1890, p. 4. Fort Worth began as an army fort. See Julia Kathryn Garret, Fort Worth: A Frontier Triumph (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1972).

4 Fort Worth Gazette, April 9, 1890, p. 8; Clarke, “The New South,” p. 541.

5 Fort Worth Gazette, March 14, 1894, p. 8; January 1, 1895, p. 6; February 2, 1895, p. 6; March 28, 1896, p. 2; New York Times, March 14, 1894, p. 1; January 1, 1895, p. 5; December 7, 1894, p. 1; December 10, 1894, p. 1.

6 Fort Worth Gazette, January 11, 1889, p. 4; May 29, 1890, p. 4; September 28, 1890, p. 3; September 5, 1894, p. 6.

7 New York Times, July 12, 1890, p. 1; July 15, 1890, p. 5; July 20, 1890, p. 5; December 23, 1890, p. 9; December 25, 1890, p. 2; December 27, 1890, p. 2; January 1, 1895, p. 5; Fort Worth Gazette, August 1, 1890, p. 2; August 3, 1890, p. 2; August 5, 1890, p. 1; August 13, 1890, p. 2; November 14, 1893, p. 6; January 1, 1895, p. 6; February 2, 1895, p. 6; March 28, 1896, p. 2; City Council Minutes, Vol L, August 5, 1890.

8 New York Times, July 16, 1890, p. 5; July 17, 1890, p. 5; January 30, 1891, p. 5.

9 New York Times, April 4, 1891, p. 5; September 27, 1899, p. 3; November 20, 1899, p. 3; July 15, 1903, p. 3; July 16, 1903, p. 3; March 14, 1894, p. 1; Fort Worth Record, December 20, 1905, p. 2; January 7, 1906, p. 9; Fort Worth Gazette, March 14, 1894, p. 8.


11 General City Directory 1890, pp. 297-298; “Gateway to the Panhandle,” pp. 7-13; Fort Worth Gazette, October 9, 1890, p. 8; April 21, 1891, p. 5; June 14, 1891, p. 8; September 4, 1890, p. 4; Clarke, “The New South,” p. 544; Talbert, Cowtown-Metropolis, pp. 120-122; Twelfth Census, Vol VIII, Manufactures, p. 994.

12 Fort Worth Gazette, April 15, 1890, p. 8; May 29, 1890, p. 4; September 20, 1890, p. 2; May 5, 1891, p. 8; November 6, 1891, p. 3; December 8, 1892, p. 8; Clarke, “The New South,” p. 542.

13 Ibid., Fort Worth Gazette, April 12, 1891, p. 5; April 17, 1890, p. 8; March 18, 1893, p. 17; New York Times, September 5, 1890, p. 1; Fort Worth Record, September 29, 1916, p. 4; Paddock, Fort Worth and the Texas Northwest, pp. 657-659. For the history of the stockyards and packinghouses see J’Nell Pate, Livestock Legacy: The Fort Worth Stockyards, 1887-1987 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1988) and

14 *Fort Worth Gazette*, June 15, 1888, p. 8; June 22, 1888, p. 8; June 5, 1888, p. 5; April 17, 1890, p. 8; June 24, 1890, p. 7; May 5, 1891, p. 3; March 18, 1893, p. 17; April 14, 1893, Section 2, p.p. 1-2; April 24, 1890, p. 7; *The Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, April 18, 1889, p. 7; *Fort Worth Record*, March 8, 1904, p. 2; *Southern Mercury*, November 19, 1891, p. 5; *New York Times*, March 10, 1890, p. 5; December 31, 1890, p. 1; Hendricks, *History of Cattle and Oil,* p. 19; Clarke, “The New South,” p. 542; Brogdon, Political, Economic, and Social Aspects,” p. 74; Pate, *Livestock Legacy*, pp. 13-21.

15 *Fort Worth Gazette*, June 3, 1893, p. 5; June 27, 1893, p. 8; September 6, 1893, p. 6; December 4, 1893, p. 6; December 17, 1893, p. 2; January 1, 1894, p. 2; November 2, 1895, p. 6; November 5, 1895, p. 6; April 2, 1896, p. 4; November 19, 1895, p. 6; December 26, 1895, p. 6; Hooks, “Struggle for Dominance” pp. 166-170; Pate, *Livestock Legacy*, pp. 19-32; *Fort Worth Register*, December 17, 1899, pp. 3, 8; Henrie Gorman and Clara Leclerc, “Fort Worth: Past and Present” *The Bohemian* Vol I (Spring 1898) p. 67; General Directory 1892-1893, p. 40.

16 Clarke, “The New South,” pp. 542, 547; *Fort Worth Gazette*, February 26, 1890, p. 5; June 16, 1890, p. 8; April 12, 1891, p. 5; September 7, 1890, p. 3; May 11, 1890, p. 24; May 25, 1890, p. 6; *Fort Worth Record*, May 19, 1907, p. 20. Title to the 320 acres, left to heirs of Fort Worth pioneer Ephriham Daggett, was challenged by claims that predated Texas independence.

17 *Fort Worth Gazette*, May 12, 1887, p. 8; June 2m 1887, p. 8; June 10, 1887, p. 8; July 13, 1887, p. 8; May 6, 1891, p. 2; March 11, 1888, p. 8; February 12, 1890, p. 8; March 6, 1890, p. 2; November 19, 1890, p. 6; April 10, 1891, p. 2; May 6, 1891, p. 2; March 2, 1892, p. 2; March 5, 1892, p. 5; September 10, 1892, p. 2; April 6, 1892, p. 5; January 29, 1893, p. 4; May 27, 1892, p. 8; June 1, 1892, p. 3.

18 *Fort Worth Gazette*, January 6, 1890, p. 8; January 7, 1890, p. 8; March 24, 1890, p. 5; January 14, 1890, p. 8; January 21, 1890, p. 4; January 28, 1890, p. 8; February 1, 1890, p. 8; *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, May 8, 1890, p. 8; *New York Times*, May 11, 1890, p. 8.

19 *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, May 8, 1890, p. 8; *Fort Worth Gazette*, May 6, 1890, p. 2; May 11, 1890, p. 7; May 15, 1890, p. 2; *New York Times*, May 11, 1890, p. 8; May 22, 1890, p. 1; May 23, 1890, p. 5.


21 *Fort Worth Weekly Gazette*, June 26, 1890, p. 4; *Fort Worth Gazette*, March 30, 1890, p. 16;

22 *Fort Worth Gazette*, September 21, 1891, p. 7; March 18, 1893, p. 15; July 27, 1891, p. 8; November 20, 1892, p. 4; March 17, 1893, p. 8; March 19, 1892, p. 8; April 20, 1892, p. 8; December 10, 1892, p. 2; December 14, 1892, p. 2; January 23, 1892, p. 5; February 3, 1891, p. 6; June 1, 1893, p. 4; April 19, 1891, p. 4; *Fort Worth Daily Mail*, June 2, 1891, p. 1.

23 *Fort Worth Gazette*, May 30, 1894, p. 6; October 24, 1894, p. 4; November 2, 1894, p. 6.

24 *Fort Worth Gazette*, September 9, 1892, p. 8; September 19, 1892, p. 8; September 22, 1892, p. 4; April 19, 1893, p. 3; May 30, 1894, p. 6; June 13, 1894, p. 5; August 22, 1894, p. 6; October 24, 1894, p. 4; November 2, 1894, p. 6; April 10, 1895, p. 3; November 21, 1894, p. 8; Norris Hundley, jr., *Water and the West: The Colorado River Compact and the Politics of Water in the American West* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. ix.
25 Fort Worth Gazette, August 31, 1891, p. 6; March 1, 1892, p. 2; April 28, 1892, p. 5; April 29, 1892, p. 5; May 29, 1892, p. 4; April 19, 1893, p. 3; New York Times, December 23, 1890, p. 4; December 25, 1890, p. 2; February 21, 1891, p. 1.

26 Fort Worth Gazette, June 8, 1892, p. 4; June 10, 192, p. 8; October 18, 1893, p. 6; April 10, 1895, p. 3; October 30, 1895, p. 6.

27 Fort Worth Gazette, March 9, 1892, p. 6; March 22, 1892, p. 5; June 8, 1892, p. 4; June 9, 1892, p. 5; October 18, 1892, p. 6; October 19, 1892, p. 2; December 4, 1892, p. 2; January 4, 1893, p. 1; May 3, 1893, p. 4; June 21, 1893, p. 1; October 19, 1893, p. 6.

28 Fort Worth Gazette, January 9, 1894, p.1; January 17, 1894, p. 5; February 28, 1894, p. 2; April 10, 1895, p. 3; March 7, 1894, p. 8; April 1, 1894, p. 6; October 30, 1895, p. 6.

29 New York Times, July 11, 1893, p. 5; Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, pp. 118-120.

30 New York Times, February 1, 1894, p. 6; February 2, 1894, p. 6; February 11, 1894, p. 6; November 12, 1894, p. 1; March 28, 1897, p. 24; Fort Worth Gazette, November 11, 1894, p. 6; November 12, 1894, p. 2;

31 Fort Worth Gazette, January 8, 1893, p. 2; July 15, 1892, p. 8; January 18, 1893, p. 2; January 23, 1893, p. 2; January 29, 1893, p. 4.

32 New York Times, January 12, 1893, p. 6; July 10, 1894, p. 2; February 14, 1895, p. 4; March 30, 1895, p. 4; May 11, 1895, p. 4; January 5, 1895, p. 9; October 17, 1895, p. 1; Fort Worth Gazette, July 2, 1891, p. 4; April 12, 1893, p. 6; April 14, 1893, Section II, pp. 1-12; July 27, 1893, p. 1.

33 Fort Worth Gazette, March 4, 1893, p. 6’ March 18, 1893, p. 10; June 5, 1895, p. 8; June 27, 1895, p. 4; August 4, 1895, p. 6; Gorman and Leclerc, “Past and Present,” pp. 67-69; Fort Worth Register, February 19, 1899, p. 5, December 23, 1898, pp. 10-11, Center for American History The University of Texas Austin.

34 Fort Worth Gazette, January 1, 1894, p. 1; November 14, 1893, p. 8; January 12, 1894, p. 8; April 11, 1894, p. 6; January 5, 1895, p. 1; New York Times, January 15, 1908, p. AFR45.

35 Dallas Times Herald, July 8,1896, p. 5; July 17, 1896, p. 5; Fort Worth Register, October 15, 1899, p. 8; B. B. Paddock and John T. Montgomery, Annual Report of the City of Fort Worth for Fiscal Year Ending March 21,1898 (Fort Worth: Fort Worth Texas Printing Company, 1898), p. 4 Texanna Collection, Vance Memorial Library, Dallas Baptist University, Dallas, Texas.

36 Graham Leader, February 12, 1898, p. 7; Paddock, Central and Western Texas, pp. 262-263, 267; Fort Worth Register, September 29, 1897, p. 8, October 29, 1897, p. 8; Gorman and Leclerc, “Past and Present,” p. 67; Pate, Livestock Legacy, pp. 39-41; Hammond, History of the Municipal Departments, pp. 367-369; Paddock and Montgomery. Annual Report 1898, pp. 7-9.

37 Letter Paddock to Wife, September 19, 1895. Paddock Family Papers, GA 194, Folder 16. Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington; Letter Paddock to Wife, April 16, 1897. Paddock Family Papers, GA 194, Folder 17. Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington.

38 Gorman and Leclerc, “Past and Present,” pp. 67-69; Fort Worth Morning Register, December 23, 1898, pp. 10-11, Center for American Studies The University of Texas Austin.


40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., pp. 9-10.


45 Paddock and Montgomery, Annual Report 1898, p. 5-7; Fort Worth Register, October 12, 1897, p. 1, October 13, 1897, p. 8, October 15, 1897, p. 8. The yellow fever scare began in New Orleans and spread to Houston and Galveston, which quarantined its residents after Texas State Health Officer Dr. R. M. Swearingen advised other Texas cities to refuse their refugees. Despite Paddock’s denial of an official quarantine there was a report of turning away travelers from the south. A train from Houston received permission from all counties to go through at full speed, except Robertson, which forced the train to stop at Waxahachie. Upon its arrival in Fort Worth five passengers were removed and placed on a southbound train after they could not convince questioners that they had gotten on at Waxahachie and not Houston. After a few days the scare subsided, giving way to questions if there had ever been an epidemic.

46 Paddock and Montgomery, Annual Report 1898, pp. 7-9.

47 Fort Worth Register, January 26, 1897, p. 8.

48 City Council Minutes, Volume N, March 22, 1897, April 6, 1897, April 14, 1897, May 4, 1897; Fort Worth Register, January 26, 1897, p. 8, February 9, 1897, p. 8, February 13, 1897, p. 8, March 3, 1897, p. 4, March 6, 1897, p. 5; March 23, 1897, p. 5.

49 Fort Worth Register, October 2, 1897, p. 6, October 20, 1897, p. 5; City Council Minutes, Volume O, November 1, 1897; Gorman and Leclerc, “Past and Present,” p. 68.

50 City Council Minutes, Volume O, September 7, November 1, 1897; Fort Worth Morning Register, March 3, 1899, p. 5; June 23, 1899, p. 2, Center for American History The University of Texas at Austin; Fort Worth Mail Telegram, August 23, 1899, p. 8, Center for American History The University of Texas at Austin.

51 Fort Worth Register, September 9, 1897, p. 8, September 12, 1897, p. 8, September 14, 1897, p. 8, October 5, 1897, p. 8, October 7, 1897, p. 8; Paddock and Montgomery, Annual Report 1898, p. 18; Knight, Outpost, p. 178.

52 Letter Paddock to Dr. Captain, September 7, 1895. Paddock Papers, GA 195, Folder 11. Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington; Letter, B. B. Paddock to Wife, September 21, 1895. Paddock Family Papers, GA 194, Folder 16. Special Collections, University of Texas at Arlington; City Council Minutes, July 20, 1897, Volume N; Dallas Morning News, November 7, 1897, p. 3.

53 Dallas Morning News, November 7, 1897, p. 3, November 17, 1897, p. 3, December 17, 1899, p. 3; City Council Minutes, November 21, 1897, November 16, 1897; Fort Worth Register, October 10, 1899, p. 8, October 21, 1899, p. 8, November 21, 1899, p. 8; December 17, 1899, p. 3; Fort Worth Mail Telegram, August 23, 1899, p. 8, Center for American History The University of Texas at Austin.

54 Fort Worth Gazette, September 28, 1890, p. 6; September 24, 1890, p. 2; July 13, 1892, p. 4; Smith, Things I Remember, pp. 3-8, 23.

55 Fort Worth Register, March 3, 1897, p. 5.
56 Fort Worth Register, December 3, 1899, p. 8.
57 Fort Worth Register, July 13, 1897, p. 1, July 15, 1897, p. 8.
58 Fort Worth Register, July 14, 1897, p. 1.
59 Fort Worth Register, July 3, 1897, p. 1, July 23, 1897, p. 8; Paddock and Montgomery, Annual Report 1898, pp. 21-22.
60 Fort Worth Register, July 24, 1897, p. 8, July 27, 1897, p. 8, August 3, 1897, p. 1, August 4, 1897, p. 1.
61 City Council Minutes, Vol O, March 3, 1899, March 17, 1899, April 21, 1899.
63 Ibid., Vol O, April 20, 1900; Fort Worth Register, August 27, 1899, p. 5.
64 Fort Worth Register, November 4, 1899, p. 8.
65 Fort Worth Gazette, August 29, 1895, p. 6; August 7, 1895, p. 6; September 5, 1895, p. 6; September 10, 1895, p. 6; Brogdon, “Political, Economic, and Social Aspects” p. 14; General Directory of the City of Fort Worth, 1894-1895 (Galveston: Morrison and Fourmy, 1893), pp. 3-4, 375-376; General Directory for the City of Fort Worth, 1896-1897 (Galveston: Morrison and Fourmy, Compilers and Publishers, 1896), pp. 1-2.
66 Fort Worth Register, September 12, 1897, p. 4, October 15, 1897, p. 8; General City Directory 1896-1897, pp. 18, 38, 50-52; Graham (Texas) Leader, May 21, 1896, p. 6; August 27, 1898, p. 6; Gorman and Leclerc, “Past and Present,” p. 69; Fort Worth Mail Telegram, March 26, 1899, p. 15, Center for American History The University of Texas at Austin.
67 Fort Worth Register, December 17, 1899, pp. 3,8; Gorman and Leclerc, “Past and Present,” p. 67; General Directory 1896-1897, p. 40.
68 Fort Worth Gazette, January 1, 1894, p. 1; November 14, 1893, p. 8; January 12, 1894, p. 8; April 11, 1894, p. 6; January 5, 1895, p. 1; November 13, 1895, p. 6; November 22, 1895, p. 6; February 14, 1896, p. 8; New York Times, January 15, 1908, p. AFR45.
69 Fort Worth Register, March 16, 1897, p. 8, March 17, 1897, p. 8, March 23, 1897, p. 5, May 23, 1897, p. 1.
70 Fort Worth Register, August 12, 1897, p. 8.
71 Fort Worth Register, August 12, 1897, p. 8.
72 Fort Worth Register, August 19, 1897, p. 4, October 13, 1897, p. 8, T. O. Bateman, “The Fort Worth Board of Trade,” The Bohemian, Volume I, Number 2, pp. 79-80.
73 General City Directory 1896-1897, p. 18.
74 Bateman, “Board of Trade,” pp. 79-80; Fort Worth Register, October 14, 1899, p. 8, October 15, 1899, p. 4, October 24, 1899, p. 8, October 27, 1899, p. 8, November 18, 1899, p. 8, Fort Worth Morning Register, December 28, 1898, p. 8, Center for American Studies The University of Texas Austin.
Chapter Four: Taking a Giant Step, 1900-1903

In 1900 the failures of the 1890s became evident, suggesting that Fort Worth had reverted to just another town along railroad lines, established well enough to survive but with stagnant growth and few signs of prosperity. Fort Worth remained a county seat, an important railroad center, and a regional trade center but lacked a well-developed industrial base. The extant manufacturing served a limited, regional area, employing, on average, a mere seven workers. In just over a quarter century since its incorporation Fort Worth had become an established community in which a limited economy clashed with dreams of urban greatness. In the late 1880s Fort Worthians had come to the realization that manufacturing was the key to economic well being, that factories would provide jobs, wealth, and population growth. That enlightenment fell victim to the Panic of 1893, which devastated Fort Worth’s economy and its government, effectively sapping the energy out of urban dreams. In the first years of the twentieth century Fort Worth endured the death of its great men and yet another expensive but ineffective fix for the waterworks while continuing to define its relationship with the Acre, the last two somewhat familiar stories. All were important but nothing equaled the impact of the two major packinghouses that arrived in 1903. At the time Swift and Armour seemed to answer to the prayers of the previous thirty years, promising to provide the economic force that would propel Fort Worth into national significance, from a have-not to a city on the move.¹

Fort Worth entered the twentieth century still recovering from the 1890s. The Panic of 1893 was a national depression but statistics suggested that other Texas cities
and the state as a whole achieved significant manufacturing growth while Fort Worth declined. Between 1890 and 1900 the number of Fort Worth manufacturers fell 33.9 percent, the average number employed fell 38.8 percent, average wages fell 47.7 percent, and the total value of products decreased 21.9 percent. The state of Texas and all four of the other major cities—Dallas, Galveston, Houston, and San Antonio—increased significantly in every category, with the single exception that Galveston declined 12.4 percent in value of products (see Table IV-1).

Table IV-1  Percentage Change in Manufacturing Measures Between 1890 and 1900 for Major Texas Cities (Negatives in Bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Businesses</th>
<th>Workers Employed</th>
<th>Wages Earned</th>
<th>Value of Manufactured Products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>-33.9</td>
<td>-38.8</td>
<td>-47.7</td>
<td>-21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>142.4</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>133.3</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The percentage decreases represented a drop in number of manufacturers from 316 to 290, in total capitalization from $3,194,032 to $2,668,045, and value of production from $6,826,083 to $5,332,804. (see Table IV-2).
Fort Worth’s manufacturing decline occurred during a period when Texas, the Southwest, and the nation experienced significant economic growth. Between 1890 and 1900 the value of manufactured products spiked twenty-six percent nationally, fifty-four percent in the Southwest, and sixty-nine percent in Texas. Texas’ increase was the nation’s fourth largest, trailing only Missouri, Louisiana, and Kansas (see Table IV-3). In addition, capital investment in manufacturing increased fifty percent nationally and seventy-five percent in Texas (see Table IV-4).³

Table IV-3  Manufacturing Values for Texas, the Southwest, and the Nation for 1890 and 1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>$70,433,551</td>
<td>$119,414,982</td>
<td>$48,981,431</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>$630,107,018</td>
<td>$962,828,620</td>
<td>$332,721,502</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Nation</td>
<td>$9,372,437,283</td>
<td>$13,040,013,638</td>
<td>$3,667,576,355</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table IV-4  Capital Investment in Manufacturing for the Southwest and the Nation in 1890 and 1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1890</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southwest</td>
<td>$357,943,090</td>
<td>$627,695,346</td>
<td>$269,752,256</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Nation</td>
<td>9,246,968,741</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The poor state of Fort Worth manufacturing can also be seen in a direct comparison between Tarrant and Dallas counties. According to the 1900 Census Dallas County was sixty-seven percent larger in population and in number of manufacturers but led by 146 percent in capital investments, 151 percent in factory workers, 116 percent in wages, and 108 percent in production (see Table IV-5).

Table IV-5  Manufacturing Statistics for Dallas and Tarrant Counties in 1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dallas County</th>
<th>Tarrant County</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>87,726</td>
<td>52,376</td>
<td>67 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishments</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>67 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$7,178,301</td>
<td>$2,922,090</td>
<td>146 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>3,891</td>
<td>1,551</td>
<td>151 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>$1,884,424</td>
<td>$872,896</td>
<td>116 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Products</td>
<td>$11,789,053</td>
<td>$5,669,886</td>
<td>108 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The results would have been even worse if not for wholesale trade and railroads. Fort Worth’s sixty wholesale houses and jobbers, with an annual trade estimated at $6,000,000, employed 1,350 in town plus 202 traveling salesmen. In 1900 Dallas had
just 328 railroad laborers but Fort Worth counted 755, the city’s second most common occupation, trailing only general laborers with 936 with another 3,937 Fort Worth workers were listed under the general category of Trade and Transportation. The total railroad workforce was estimated at 1,500, or five percent of Fort Worth’s population, with many of those employed at general offices for the Forth Worth and Rio Grande, Rock Island, and Fort Worth and Denver as well as at the Texas and Pacific’s machine shops and roundhouse with six stalls. The future also looked bright as railroads in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries enjoyed vigorous growth. From 1890 to 1900 track mileage increased twenty-three percent, from 29,162 to 35,813, with a lot of the expansion occurring adjacent to Fort Worth. In 1902 the Southwest added 1,245 miles of new track, more than half the national total of 2,314.4

The strength of those industries may have contributed to population percentage increases that actually exceeded those of Dallas. The 1900 Census counted 26,688 in Fort Worth, an increase of 3,612 since 1890, or sixteen percent, a rate considerably lower than the 246 percent increase in 1890 over 1880 but sufficient to make Fort Worth Texas’ fifth largest city, trailing San Antonio, Houston, Dallas, and Galveston, in descending order. Tarrant County polled slightly higher, adding 11,234, or twenty-seven percent, to reach 52,376. The disparity in growth reduced Fort Worth’s percentage of the county population to fifty-one percent from fifty-six percent. Dallas city’s population reached 42,638, an increase of just twelve percent that lowered it from sixty-five to only sixty percent larger than Fort Worth and Dallas County declined from sixty-three to fifty-eight percent larger than Tarrant (see Table IV-6). Both Dallas and Fort Worth rates appeared
sluggish compared to increases in New York City of almost thirty-eight percent (to over 3,000,000) or an incredible fifty-four percent for Chicago (to 1,700,000).\textsuperscript{5}

Table IV-6  Populations of Fort Worth and Dallas in 1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900 Population</th>
<th>Increase Over 1890</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dallas County</td>
<td>82,726</td>
<td>15,684</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas City</td>
<td>42,638</td>
<td>4,571</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarrant County</td>
<td>52,376</td>
<td>11,234</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>26,688</td>
<td>3,612</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The new century did not began much better. In 1901 Fort Worth suffered through a plague, a business closure, and the death of a one of its two most important boosters. In February another smallpox epidemic sent up to forty cases in the pest house with another six housed elsewhere. The same month the legendary White Elephant Saloon and Restaurant closed, citing debts in excess of $20,000. The Elephant had opened in 1883 on Main between Second and Third streets to acclaim as the finest saloon in Texas. In 1884 W. H. Ward, then a city councilman, bought the establishment and moved it to finer digs at 606 Main Street where it remained popular for years. Times and tastes changed so that by the turn of the twentieth century the White Elephant had declined into little more than a rendezvous for old timers. In On April 15, 1901, one of the city’s early settlers and a major booster, John Peter Smith, died. Smith succumbed in St. Louis where he had stopped enroute to Chicago to woo the Frisco Railroad to Fort Worth. On the evening of April 6 the ex-mayor left the Planters’ Hotel to see a friend off at the
Union Depot but returned several hours later in a dazed state, claiming he had been drugged and robbed of $30. Smith’s condition deteriorated overnight into delirium and he was removed to St. Mary’s infirmary where doctors diagnosed blood poisoning from infected lacerations to the tongue, probably caused by a broken tooth. Eventually swelling developed and spread to the neck, making breathing impossible. The Register called Smith the “Father of Fort Worth,” a title also given to Ephriham Daggett.⁶

Fort Worth mourned Smith as it struggled with deteriorating city finances. In 1900 municipal tax revenues reached $245,707 but expenditures totaled $317,072; in 1901 revenues dropped to $192,337 and expenditures to $283,758; while in 1902 income rebounded to $223,317 but outgo hit a new high of $357,209. In those three years the gap between tax revenue and expenditures increased from $71,365 to $133,892 (see Table IV-7). The actual budgetary shortfall would have been less due to the addition of other forms of revenue, such as water department fees and court fines. For example, in 1902 when tax revenue was $223,317, the city’s total income reached $330,290, which still left a deficit of $36,389. The city’s financial difficulties, stemming to a large degree from paltry tax revenues, provided a barometer of overall economic health. That Fort Worth’s tax revenues dropped between 1900 and 1901 suggested a lack of commercial vitality and that property assessments were relatively stagnant, rising less than two percent. The accompanying decline in tax revenue in 1901 below 1900 was probably an effect of tax defaults, another suggestion of economic weakness. The gap between income and revenue continued despite a rather high tax rate of $1.75 per $100 of assessed property (see Table IV-8).⁷
### Table IV-7  Fort Worth Budget Statistics 1900-1902

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City Assessment</th>
<th>Tax Revenue</th>
<th>Expenditures</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>$16,168,609</td>
<td>$245,707</td>
<td>$317,072</td>
<td>-$71,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>$16,482,035</td>
<td>$192,337</td>
<td>$283,758</td>
<td>-$91,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>$18,873,729</td>
<td>$223,317</td>
<td>$357,209</td>
<td>-$133,892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table IV-8  Fort Worth’s 1901 Tax Rate by Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount per $100 of Assessed Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waterworks</td>
<td>$.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viaduct</td>
<td>$.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>$.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Payments</td>
<td>$.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Expenses</td>
<td>$.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1.75</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Register*, October 5, 1901, p. 4.

Many reasons were cited for the poor fiscal outcomes, including a claim that other cities dumped their paupers, but the biggest factor remained an out-of-control debt load. The 1901 tax rate revealed the degree to which debt became a significant factor as interest payments alone consumed seventy-one cents, or forty-one percent of tax revenue (see Table IV-8). In 1902 bond interest amounted to $58,113 while the sinking fund (funds dedicated to reducing indebtedness) added $30,066, far more than $65,000 spent on the waterworks and $59,809 for schools. Faced with a large and growing debt Fort Worth began defaulting on interest payments. In 1900 the H. W. Sage and Company of New York sued in federal court over non-payment of bond interest. In 1901 the New York Security and Trust Company was organizing bondholders for legal action when it
reached an agreement for a relaxed bond redemption schedule, giving the city a brief respite. Still, the problem was not solved. The fiscal year ending March 21, 1903, carried a projected income of $400,000 against expenses of $532,089, including $153,738 budgeted for bond interest payments. Mayor J. T. Powell, who candidly admitted that the city had been bankrupt and unable to meet its bond interest payments since 1895, remained opposed to a tax increase, favoring instead cutbacks and lowered interest payments through debt refinancing. When that effort proved too slow for anxious bondholders the State National Bank came to the rescue by granting a $170,000 overdraft that enabled the city to meet its interest obligations.

In the face of municipal bankruptcy the waterworks experienced yet another supply crisis. The situation became especially critical during summer months when demand again exceeded well production, forcing the use of unfiltered river water that was distinctive by its brown hue. Questions about quality and quantity caused many residents to dig their own wells, aggravating a drop in annual revenues from $60,000 to $56,000 against operating expenses of $30,000 and bond interest and other costs estimated at $62,500, for a total of $92,500, or $36,500 more than income. In addition, residential wells affected supply problems because they drew from the same underground source, reducing the water available for city production. The state of the current system suggested that the existing underground pool had passed its peak production potential and had gone into an unalterable state of declining returns.

The council hired Daniel W. Mead, a nationally known water supply expert from Chicago, to assess strategies for developing adequate well supplies. Mead, who arrived on March 7, 1901, stayed for weeks before filing a fifty-page report of problems and
solutions. He estimated that Fort Worth used 3,360,000 gallons daily with 960,000 gallons coming from thirteen deep wells sunk in 1892 and 1893 and 2,400,000 from the Trinity River. Problems arose because both sources declined in production in the summer when need stood at its greatest. Mead recommended several modifications, including connecting wells with a shaft 170 feet below the surface, that, he claimed, would permanently increase the well flow to 5,000,000 gallons. The council’s waterworks committee recommended acceptance of the full plan costing $169,000, arguing that they could not continue indefinitely losing money. The council compromised, accepting a slightly reduced plan at $110,00 that would provide 3,000,000 gallons daily.11

Implementation began quickly and seemed to work fine, at least at first. By September 1901 two new wells produced 2,000,000 gallons, giving residents some immediate relief. Work continued for months on the connecting tunnel and the installation of four pumps capable of moving 4,000,000 gallons daily. In July 1903 the first test of the system using only one pump yielded water at a rate of 3,500,000 gallons per twenty-four hours. City administrators remained cautious, stating that they would wait a year to verify a consistent supply before paying Mead. The system also offered cost savings to the consumer, providing water at the rate of $.28 per 100 gallons for residential customers, compared to $.50 in Dallas and Texarkana. The abundance of clean well water spurred connections, which increased income. In 1902 waterworks revenue totaled $64,627, or $16,157 a quarter. In 1903 the annual receipts reached $91,861, an average of $22,962 per quarter, sufficient to cover both operating expenses of $40,851 and annual bond interest of $49,480 while leaving a surplus of $1,579. All
seemed fine for the moment, but the moment passed. In September 1903 the city physician, concerned about malaria and typhoid, urged citizens drink only private well water to avoid river water pumped into the municipal system.¹²

Fort Worth carried on a somewhat aggressive program of civic improvements despite its money woes. The most important paving project involved Main Street, the city’s principal commercial thoroughfare with solid store fronts stretching twelve blocks. By January 1901 vitrified brick pavement lay from the T&P passenger depot to Seventeenth Street with work in progress to Fifteenth Street and plans to complete all of the street. Other improvements included an agreement for the Texas and Pacific to pay $15,000 towards a wooden or $30,000 for a steel viaduct over the railroad reservation connecting the Southside to downtown. The bridge’s north end would begin on Jennings Street forty feet south of the Texas and Pacific property and extended 600 feet south.¹³

Privately funded infrastructure development also contributed, especially in the Fort Worth’s suburbs. J. B. Coffenberry of Cleveland bought the Fort Worth Street Railway Company and the Street Railway Company for approximately $400,000. Coffenberry, who already owned the Dallas and Fort Worth Electric Street Railway, spent $1,000,000 to complete the Dallas and Fort Worth Interurban. On June 18, 1902, officials from Dallas and Fort Worth celebrated the opening at Handley. The Interurban provided instant streetcar access for the new suburb of Sycamore, which had started in 1901 on 450 acres east of downtown known as the Bob Maddox Tract. In 1900 Arlington Heights, which had been largely abandoned after the hotel fire and the crash in property values following the Panic of 1893, revived, adding twenty new homes and a country club. In 1903 the Southside experienced such dramatic growth that Chief of
Police William Rea asked for more officers, arguing they were needed because half of the city that now lay south of the railroad tracks. The Register, certainly given to exaggerated boosterism, called 1901 the best year in history, crediting sewer and street improvements, the Mead system, and issuance of 180 building permits as well as a commitment for service from the International and Great Northern and the Frisco railroads. In that celebratory pose they could list but four new factories, all small operations, including two saddle and harness makers, hardly a growth field.14

The Acre survived but faced challenges. The city council loosened its Sunday closing ordinance by authorizing alcohol sales during food service, a change it rescinded when unscrupulous saloonkeepers set up “pretend restaurants.” Gambling thrived in many saloons, such as the White Elephant, Two Johns, Twin Brothers, Silver Dollar, Our Friend, Gray Mule, and Board of Trade (the saloon, not the chamber). In September 1901 Tarrant County began enforcing a new state law prohibiting slot machines, an involvement that led them, in 1903, to assume enforcement responsibility for all state gambling statutes. The Acre also offered “leg shows,” supposed variety theaters in which women displayed more flesh than talent. At two of the more notorious, the Crown at 1213 Calhoun Street and the Standard at 1301 Rusk Street, untold numbers of farmers and other visitors lost hard-earned cash to female “entertainers” pushing overpriced drinks.15

The city council considered establishing a designated prostitution area. On February 1, 1902, a proposed council resolution, complaining that Rusk Street lay “wholly abandoned to houses of prostitution,” stipulated that they be given thirty days notice to close. While that measure failed a second, presented in April 1902, proposed to
restrict “dissolute women” to the area bounded by Rusk, Eighth, and Front streets, the approximate Acre boundaries. The adoption of that plan included an agreement between Fort Worth and Tarrant County alternating fines so that prostitutes paid the $9.50 city fine one month, the $10.50 county fine the next. Many working women avoided that financial drain by moving out of the Acre and into other neighborhoods, stirring complaints that led the council to cease prostitution arrests within the Acre while accelerating enforcement in other areas. The willingness of the council to forego fine income suggested a degree of financial stability that had been missing at the end of the 1890s.  

Despite all the accommodations the reservation succumbed to its own excesses. Many held high hopes for the program’s success, including some aldermen who voiced optimism that the local system would become a model for the nation. Those hopes soon crashed into reality when the women, now freed from threat of prosecution, turned brazen. The Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) complained that prostitutes, who before had stayed discretely indoors, now sat openly in doorways and on porches in “flaring clothes and some even smoking cigarettes.” The city administration tried to quiet critics by ordering the police to ensure the observance of “proprieties” but a few months later a storm of protest greeted a discussion of designating one block of Calhoun Street outside city jurisdiction. Many objected that the plan would have created an unrestricted red-light zone, similar to one that had been recently established in Waco. The backlash coincided with the death of Fort Worth officer Andrew (Andy) J. Grimes, shot by a hack driver ordered to move from in front of the Union Depot. Although the incident occurred outside the Acre the death of a police officer often led to stringent
enforcement drives. Faced with moral outrage coming from two sources the council ordered all houses of prostitution closed.\textsuperscript{17}

The official and open reservation may have ended but little else changed. The perseverance of prostitution was clear in continuing council debates over non-enforcement of vice laws, which some aldermen blamed on the police while others, more attuned to the larger perspective, saw the police as simply pawns of a divided community. The latter group noted that legitimate businesses afraid of losing trade formed much of the opposition to enforcement, that they feared stringent police action would simply shift the Acre’s denizens to Dallas where wholesale buyers would follow. Some reason underlay their concerns. In 1903 a Dallas Grand Jury suggested establishing a sizable prostitution-protected reservation, complete with medical supervision. In addition, the concerns voiced by Fort Worth merchants were shared by merchants in other cities. William Cronon found that many Chicago wholesalers feared that customers would shop elsewhere if prostitution and/or gambling were removed. At this stage it appears that financial motives overcame the effects of Progressivism’s reform agenda directed at ending prostitution.\textsuperscript{18}

At the same time evidence appeared that the Acre’s survival also involved police corruption. In 1903 two officers faced charges of failing to enforce Sunday alcohol laws after a witness saw them enter Bennett’s Saloon at Fifteenth and Main streets where they joined several men in consuming alcohol with no money exchanged. A few months later Detective James W. (Jim) Thomason was charged with accepting bribes from William (Bill) H. Thompson, a known gambler. Thompson alleged that he paid Thomason in return for the freedom to operate, save for a mutually-agreed four arrests per year.
Thomason, attributing the allegation to retaliation, admitted taking from $5 to $50 on several occasions but claimed the money was either loans or fines, which he turned in later. The Police Committee found Thomason not guilty of accepting bribes but ordered him disciplined for accepting loans from a known gambler.  

Other problems went unabated. A letter to the editor from “A Newcomer” complained of sickening odors from gutters, of sidewalks so covered with expectorant that women could not let their dresses touch the pavement, and of nights filled with the constant rumbling and shifting of rail cars, the bumping and crashing of switch engines, and the excessive use of warning whistles. The writer also thought little of Fort Worth’s citizens, stating that parts of Main Street were covered by a “filthy lot” of black women in loud wrappers with dangerously low-cut tops and that residents too readily worshiped a few, long-term leaders. The complaint closed by ascribing to Fort Worthians a small-town provincialism that placed high values on the opinions of anyone bearing titles like “colonel” or “general,” even if they were ignorant of the facts.

Fort Worth tried to attract industries but had little success. In 1900 a proposed cotton seed mill required that locals invest $100,000 in its stock. The marketing plan, offering 400 shares at $25 each with weekly payments as low as $.50, stalled with $40,000 still needed. In 1901 a group of forty New York capitalists exploring Texas’ investment opportunities spent three nights in Fort Worth and two in Dallas but left without making any concrete commitments. In 1902 wholesale merchant A. N. Evans lamented that stagnant commercial growth had only added a few shops and manufacturers of horse collars and harnesses, sundries, and baking powder. Evans
suggested the city offer a twenty-year tax exemption for all manufacturers, an idea that never got off the ground.21

Despite an industrial lull Fort Worth’s leading men put on a positive face. In November 1902 Mayor Powell, speaking to Chicago investors, compared Fort Worth to the Windy City when it was the same size, arguing that both owed their successes to the work of a few great men. Powell also stressed the importance of Fort Worth’s rail facilities, bragging that of more railroad cars than Dallas, Waco, San Antonio, and Denison combined. The same month Board of Trade President Paul Waples described an ongoing struggle for urban supremacy between Texas’ four largest cities: Fort Worth, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio. Paddock, speaking after Waples, claimed Fort Worth enjoyed three of Texas’ four largest industrial payrolls—railroads, packinghouses, and the wholesale trade—but that it needed a hundred small businesses to complement the large.22

Civic energy found an organizational center in a revived Board of Trade. The board had disappeared during the economic crises of the mid-1890s but restructured after the turn of the century. One of the organization’s first acts was to form a committee dedicated to developing strategies for improving commerce. The committee offered three options: obtaining another packinghouse, building another Spring Palace, or holding a fat stock show. Their report favored a fat stock show but the full membership opted for another exposition, a choice Paddock supported, stating that it would bring factories while a stock show would not and that the addition of another packinghouse seemed unlikely in the short term. The grandiose plans called for a $35,000 building very similar to the original structure with a height of 100 feet and an area of 250 feet by 100 feet. The
project began with alacrity, receiving thirteen bids from potential sites and offering $10 shares on September 20, 1900. By October that eagerness dissolved under an apathy so pervasive that only two of thirty-nine subscription committees reported donations. The board’s general membership sparked a revival by appropriating $1,000, allowing the campaign to reach a $12,000 balance in 1901. The specifications expanded to include a brick or stone auditorium with spacious grounds, a racetrack, animal stalls for a fat stock show, and a combination baseball-football field that would also house a fall festival, similar to the state fair in Dallas, Waco’s Flower Carnival, and San Antonio’s International Fair.\textsuperscript{23}

Shortly afterwards the idea vanished, a development that may have been the product not of apathy but of attention being diverted to other options, especially those involving opportunities afforded by Fort Worth’s massive rail facilities and its proximity to an expanding agricultural production. During the 1890s Texas had emerged as a major supplier of agricultural products with a 114.8 percent increase in value of products, accounting for more than one-fourth of the Southwest’s total production (see Table IV-9).\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
\hline
\textbf{Table IV-9} & \textbf{Increase in Farm Production Values Between 1890 and 1900 for Texas, the Southwest, and the Nation} \\
\hline
 & 1890 & 1900 & Increase & Percentage Increase \\
\hline
Texas & $111,699,430 & $239,823,244 & $128,223,814 & 114.8 \\
Southwest & $439,354,647 & $933,222,075 & $493,867,428 & 89 \\
Rest of nation & $3,805,896,677 & $3,805,896,677 & $0 & 85 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Increase in Farm Production Values Between 1890 and 1900 for Texas, the Southwest, and the Nation}
\end{table}

Part of that increase derived from higher prices enriching the livestock trade, which was particularly good news for Texas. In the 1890s grazing acreage had declined due to conversion of land into lumber production, the public domain, and forest reserves at the same time that a drought reduced the productivity of available grasslands and that an 1899 blizzard destroyed up to fifty percent of the cattle of northwest Texas. The factors combined to radically decrease supply, which drove prices for beef on the hoof to six cents a pound, amounting to $30 to $40 for three-year old steers, an almost doubling in value. Texas and the Southwest stood to benefit disproportionately from that increase. Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico held one-fifth of all the nation’s cattle and Texas alone held fifteen percent of the nation’s livestock, including the most cows, hogs, and horses of all western states with almost half the cattle and more than one-fifth the hogs (see Table IV-10). Despite its large livestock herds Texas in 1900 counted only twelve slaughterhouses capitalized at $1,232,267, miniscule compared to fifty-one in Illinois worth $70,782,361 or even the thirty-one in Missouri worth $7,844,054.

Table IV-10   Livestock Populations in Texas and the West in 1902

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western United States</th>
<th>Texas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>20,609,000</td>
<td>10,024,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>5,519,000</td>
<td>1,266,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *New York Times*, January 5, 1902, p. AFR 18

Of all Texas cities Fort Worth was most favorably positioned to take advantage of the potential packinghouse expansion. As early as 1901 the cattle trade was recognized as one of the two pillars of local commerce (the other being the wholesale trade) and ties
between Fort Worth business and agriculture remained high. Three-fourths of Fort
Worth shop owners were in or had been in the cattle business and most Texas
commercial cattlemen resided in Fort Worth. The Fort Worth cattle service area stretched
from the Gulf Coast to New Mexico, an area so vast that only the Rio de la Plata of
Argentina rivaled it. Fort Worth also had a functioning stockyards that handled 403,475
head in of livestock in 1900 and a small packinghouse that ran an annual profit of
$50,000 despite being unable to process all the supply. The lack of slaughterhouse
capacity meant that Fort Worth remained more a shipping center than a processing
destination. According to 1901 railroad statistics 97.3 percent of cattle and 99.5 percent
of hogs entering Fort Worth via rail also left via rail (see Table IV-11). At the same time
the giant Chicago packers, facing increasing competition from more regional operations,
began decentralizing. The rise of successful meat-packing operations in Omaha and
Kansas City demonstrated that Chicago no longer offered optimal benefits for expansion.
The availability of supply and excellent transportation facilities, combined with the
commercial boom in beef production, made Fort Worth a strong contender for a regional
packinghouse that would also offer substantial saving in shipping costs. Another
consideration in Fort Worth’s favor may have been its proximity to ports on the Gulf of
Mexico through which meat could ship to the Cuban market.27

Table IV-11   Cattle and Hogs Entering and Leaving Fort Worth via Rail in 1901

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Hogs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Received</td>
<td>85,075</td>
<td>162,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Shipped Out</td>
<td>82,778</td>
<td>161,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Shipped Out</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Register*, January 7, 1902, p. 7.
In 1901 dreams became reality. In October 1900 Greenlief Simpson reported that Fort Worth was involved in negotiations for a packinghouse “worthy of her [Fort Worth’s] possibilities as the gateway to the great cattle-producing section of the Southwest.” Under the original scheme citizens would put up $200,000 with another $400,000 coming from the stockyards to entice one of the big four packers (Armour, Swift, Cudahy, and Morris) to build and guarantee three years operation of a facility capable of processing 1,000 hogs and 500 cattle daily. On May 26, 1901, headlines announced that the city had attained “the longing of her heart,” an Armour packinghouse “complete in every way,” capable of processing 500 cattle and 2,500 hogs daily and employing 500 who would live in company homes. The actual decision was made earlier but the announcement was delayed while a secret buyer bought land around the stockyards. The massive project was certain to have a multiplier effect similar to that seen at Kansas City and St. Joseph where new packinghouses had brought other factories and explosive population growth.28

The addition of Swift sweetened an already rich deal. In June 1901 rumors circulating of Swift’s interest were confirmed by the arrival of Swift representatives. Swift initially agreed to build based on assurances of equal inducements but the two packers compromised, agreeing to split the $100,000 subsidy. Headlines pronounced “Packing House [sic] Assured” and “Marks the Beginning of a New Era” after Swift and Armour signed contracts specifying plants that would employ over 1,000.29

Incredibly, collections for the subsidy did not go well. They began quickly with $40,750 committed in just four days but then slowed to only a trickle. Judge G. W. Armstrong, who headed the solicitation campaign, mused that the same offer in 1890
would have been met within an hour, especially since the packers would bring other factories, even those not related to animal trade. As grumbling arose rumors spread that Dallas representatives were in Chicago offering $300,000 for Swift and Armour to switch sites, a threat with some teeth since Dallas had opened its own Union Stockyards in April 1901. Those reports stirred the Board of Trade to organize its solicitation committees based on occupation, creating competition among the groups. Even then the fund lay short until a mass meeting at city hall on October 7, 1901, conducted by R. W. Hall of the Fort Worth and Denver Railroad. Despite his background, Hall emphasized the importance of factories, arguing that railroads were so insufficient for city building, that Fort Worth could add ten and its population would increase by no more than 10,000, leaving it just another overgrown town. He asserted that the time was ripe to aggressively pursue factories now that the Beaumont oil field had eased the burden of high fuel costs, warning that if the offer failed that Fort Worth would be known only as a place where railroads changed cars and that owls would roost in its buildings and coyotes would roam its lawns. Finally, the last $15,000 was raised, allowing the Register to proclaim “FORT WORTH NEVER FAILED.”

Work began quickly on a wide range of developments. In January 1902 Colonel H. C. Holloway, called the father of the stockyards, marked the start of construction by cutting down a tree, on March 12, 1902, both companies laid cornerstones, and on March 6, 1903, after just over a year later, they held their formal grand openings. Swift’s seven-story slaughterhouse began with 800 workers processing 750 cattle, 1,500 sheep, and 3,000 hogs daily. Armour’s capacity and employment were not listed but were deemed to be similar. The impact quickly moved far beyond the slaughterhouse walls. Swift’s
investment included $175,000 paid for 1,300 acres running on either side of Main Street from the Trinity River on south to the Ellis addition on the north where it built employee homes on half acre lots. In addition, work began simultaneously on a new Fort Worth Livestock Exchange Building costing $100,000, alleged to be the handsomest in world, and an expansion of the stockyards to 490 pens capable of holding 13,000 cattle, 10,000 hogs, 5,000 sheep, and 3,500 horses and mules. The stockyards covered one-quarter mile in width, bounded on the west by Marine Creek, and stretched one-half mile both north and south of the packinghouses. The yards held immense facilities, such as three hay barns holding 600 tons of feed and two scales capable of weighing 60 cattle at once, and its operations required five locomotives.\textsuperscript{31}

Even during construction the companies prepared for expansion, leaving one wall of each building unfinished to facilitate an anticipated increase in daily capacity to 1,500 cattle and 4,000 hogs. In part, those considerations were based on developing an international export trade. The cost of shipping beef to ports from Chicago and Kansas City ran $.60 per 100 pounds, three times the rate from Fort Worth to the Gulf. Fort Worth offered not only cheaper shipping but ample capacity with five railroads running to two ports: the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas; the Santa Fe; the International and Great Northern; and the Houston and Texas Central to Galveston and the Texas and Pacific to New Orleans. A desire to ward off competition also contributed to expansion. In 1903 Schwarzchild and Sulzberger of New York, Chicago, and Kansas City showed interest in a Texas site that many assumed would be either Fort Worth or Dallas. Dallas, which had secured the Armstrong Packing Company, actively sought a second facility as step furthering its hope of replacing Fort Worth as the packing center of the Southwest.\textsuperscript{32}
The packinghouses exerted an immediate economic impact of great proportions. In 1903 more than fifty times as many cattle and almost 120 times as many sheep were slaughtered as in 1902 and the number of hogs processed almost doubled despite chronic shortages (see Table IV-12). \(^{33}\)

Table IV-12  Livestock Sold to Fort Worth Packers 1901-1903

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Hogs</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>116,629</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4,787</td>
<td>81,202</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>274,316</td>
<td>143,000</td>
<td>51,850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Record*, March 8, 1904, p. 2.

The number of animals through the Stockyards also increased dramatically, more than tripling from 1902 to 1903, helping make the cattle trade the state’s largest industry in cash volume (see Table IV-13). \(^{34}\)

Table IV-13  Total Livestock Handled by the Fort Worth Stockyards 1902-1904

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>226,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>732,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,045,179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The economics of the two packinghouses dwarfed existing industries. In the first year their combined production values approached $8,000,000 and were projected to
exceed $10,000,000 in the second. In contrast, the nearest competitor, flour milling, produced 650,000 barrels with annual revenues of $3,000,000 and the next largest single employer, Texas Brewing, had a workforce of 180 compared to 800 each for Armour and Swift (see Table IV-14). 35

Table IV-14   Estimated Annual Revenues of Significant Fort Worth Industries in 1903

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Estimated Annual Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouses</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour Milling</td>
<td>$3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Brewing</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Metals</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windmills</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harnesses and saddles</td>
<td>$250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Telegram*, May 17, 1903, section 4, p. 6.

The economic impact was felt both outside and inside Fort Worth. Regional farmers and ranchers stood to benefit significantly. The packers needed 6,000 hogs daily which, at the then current rate of six cents per pound, would put $35,000,000 into their pockets each year. The area immediately adjacent to the development experienced a rush of residential development. Sam Rosen and a Beaumont investor paid $18,475 for 320 acres three-fourths of a mile west of the packinghouses where they developed the Rosen Heights Addition. Within Fort Worth a collateral effect drove a building boom as Fort Worth issued over 500 building permits in the six months after April 1902, driving the taxable value of city property from $16,495,535 in 1901 to $18,876,804 in 1902, and municipal tax revenues from $290,000 to $330,000. 36
The plants also had stimulated population increases. The settlement closest to the packinghouses, originally known as Marine, incorporated as North Fort Worth. Although the packinghouses remained outside their city limits, both North Fort Worth and Fort Worth experienced remarkable growth surges, fueling projections that within five years North Fort Worth would be a city of 10,000 and Fort Worth would have a population of 75,000. Some optimists envisioned Fort Worth becoming the Kansas City of Texas while others, including the Register, believed Fort Worth would become Texas’ largest city and even Dallas officials feared that its rival would reach a level of population equality. Early, unofficial counts seemed to justify the optimism. A census conducted by the General City Directory 1902-1903 claimed a population of 35,482, a 4,795 increase that trailed only the 4,854 increase of 1895/1896 and 5,223 in 1892/1893.37

The Fort Worth packinghouses had national implications regarding the meat monopoly. By the late 1880s four large Chicago packers, including Swift and Armour, dominated America’s beef supply, establishing a cooperative oligopoly capable of controlling cattle prices and assimilating smaller concerns. Swift took over the Anglo-American Company; Libby, McNeil, & Libby; the old Chicago Packing Company, and the St. Joseph and the Sioux City stockyards and Armour absorbed the Omaha Packing Company, reducing the number of significant producers to four. In the process the two developed a high level of cooperation evident in their shared control of Fowler Brothers Packing of East St. Louis, their agreements to build at Fort Worth, and their working alliances in Chicago, Kansas City, and St. Louis. Still, J. Ogden Armour denied a conspiracy between Armour and Swift to establish a Beef Trust, although he admitted
that the two had cooperated in expansions at Kansas City and, especially, at Fort Worth where their plants had made Fort Worth a major livestock market.\textsuperscript{38}

The impact of the Swift and Armour was impressive on many levels. Most notably, they fueled significant population and commercial increases that pushed Fort Worth beyond regional status, making it a city of national importance. A case can be made that railroads had accomplished that feat years earlier but that argument fails the test of achieving a critical mass. In the twenty-four years since the first railroad the population of Fort Worth only climbed to 26,688, in just seven years following the arrival of the packinghouses it would reach 73,312. The difference in effect lay in job creation, the essential building block of large municipalities. Railroads tended to be high capital industries with relatively few employees. In 1903 Fort Worth took a giant step in becoming a city rather than a town. However, success and failure share a common trait in that both require adjustments. It would take Fort Worth years to overcome the enormity of its progress in 1903.\textsuperscript{39}
Chapter Four Endnotes


2 Ibid.

3 *New York Times*, October 12, 1902, p. 33.

4 *Twelfth Census*, Vol I, pp. 558-559, 562, 565; *Fort Worth Register*, July 28, 1901, p. 7; *Fort Worth Record*, July 14, 1901, pp. 7, 10; *New York Times*, October 12, 1902, p. 33; April 30, 1903, p. 3.


6 *Fort Worth Register*, February 10, 1901, p. 8; February 26, 1901, p. 8; April 9, 1901, p. 2; April 12, 1901, p. 1.

7 *Fort Worth Telegram*, April 7, 1903, p. 8; October 2, 1903, p. 1; *Fort Worth Register*, April 1, 1902, p. 3; Hammond, *History of the Municipal Departments*, pp. 367-369.

8 *Fort Worth Register*, May 16, 1901, p. 7; April 1, 1902, p. 3; October 16, 1901, p. 2; April 20, 1901, p. 3; *New York Times*, January 6, 1900, p. 2; October 12, 1901, p. 13; March 18, 1903, p. 3.

9 *Fort Worth Telegram*, April 7, 1903, p. 8; October 2, 1903, p. 1; October 4, 1903, p. 1; March 8, 1903, p. 16; March 15, 1903, p. 8.

10 *Fort Worth Register*, February 2, 1901, p. 5; July 7, 1900, p. 3; July 28, 1900, p. 5.

11 *Fort Worth Register*, February 2, 1901, p. 5; March 19, 1901, p. 8; April 9, 1901, p. 8; July 6, 1901, p. 5; August 17, 1901, p. 4; April 20, 1901, p. 4.

12 *Fort Worth Morning Telegram*, September 17, 1902, p. 5; September 25, 1902, p. 8; December 11, 1902, p. 6; *Fort Worth Telegram*, July 12, 1903, p. 1; July 15, 1903, p. 8; October 4, 1903, p. 1; September 22, 1903, p. 4; September 26, 1903, p. 1.

13 *Fort Worth Register*, January 1, 1901, p. 8; May 1, 1901, p. 6; November 11, 1900, p. 5; *City Council Minutes*, Vol P, October 19, 1900; November 9, 1900.

14 *New York Times*, August 31, 1900, p. 1; *Fort Worth Telegram*, February 22, 1903, p. 4; *Fort Worth Register*, June 19, 1902, p. 8; August 7, 1900, p. 8; May 24, 1901, p. 7; *City Council Minutes*, Vol P, February 1, 1901.

15 *Fort Worth Register*, July 6, 1900, p. 3; July 7, 1900, p. 3; September 7, 1901, p. 5; September 9, 1901, p. 8; *Fort Worth Telegram*, March 30, 1903, p. 8; *New York Times*, November 15, 1901, p. 9; November 20, 1901, p. 6; November 21, 1901, p. 9; Harris Paxton Moore, “The Theater in Fort Worth, 1902-1903” (M.A. thesis, Texas Christian University, 1963), pp. 8-9.

16 *Fort Worth Register*, February 1, 1902, p. 4; April 5, 1902, p. 8; April 11, 1902, p. 5; May 13, 1902, p. 5; May 14, 1902, p. 8; June 3, 1902, p. 8.

17 *Fort Worth Register*, May 13, 1902, p. 5; May 14, 1902, p. 8; June 3, 1902, p. 8; *Fort Worth Telegram*, September 7, 1902, p. 8; June 23, 1905, p. 3.

19 Fort Worth Telegram, April 24, 1903, p. 1; September 16, 1903, p. 8; September 17, 1903, p. 8; September 19, 1903, p. 1.

20 Fort Worth Telegram, September 4, 1903, p. 5.

21 Fort Worth Register, July 15, 1900, p. 3; August 12, 1900, p. 5; May 31, 1902, p. 8; New York Times, April 7, 1901, p. 17; April 21, 1901, p. 26.

22 Fort Worth Telegram, November 7, 1902, p. 5; November 26, 1902, p. 5.

23 Fort Worth Register, September 1, 1900, p. 8; September 2, 1900, p. 8; September 9, 1900, p. 8; September 20, 1900, p. 8; September 21, 1900, p. 8; October 17, 1900, p. 8; October 23, 1900, p. 2; November 2, 1900, p. 8; November 3, 1900, p. 8; November 4, 1900, p. 5; March 5, 1901, p. 8.


25 New York Times, January 5, 1902, P. AFR 18, February 12, 1899, p. 2; Craig, Fort Worth Stockyards, p. 19; Fort Worth Record, July 8, 1906, p. 11.

26 Twelfth Census, Vol IX, Manufactures, pp. 399, 402, 403.

27 Fort Worth Register, October 14, 1900, p. 8; June 4, 1901, p. 8; July 21, 1901, p. 7, 10; August 1, 1901, p. 1; August 2, 1901, p. 8; Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, p. 375.

28 Ward, “Cowtown Success,” p. 86; Craig, “Fort Worth Stockyards,” p. 19; Fort Worth Register, October 13, 1900, p. 2; May 26, 1901, p. 3; May 30, 1901, p. 8; Fort Worth Record, September 29, 1916, p. 14.

29 Fort Worth Register, June 1, 1901, p. 8; June 4, 1901, p. 8; August 1, 1901, p. 1; August 2, 1901, p. 8; June 8, 1901, p. 8; August 18, 1901, p. 8; August 11, 1901, p. 3.

30 Fort Worth Register, May 26, 1901, p. 3; May 30, 1901, p. 8; August 21, 1901, p. 8; September 25, 1901, p. 8; April 2, 1901, p. 8; September 26, 1901, p. 8; October 8, 1901, p. 2; Thompson, “Factors Contributing to Growth,” pp. 112-115.

31 Fort Worth Register, November 1, 1901, p. 8; January 10, 1902, p. 5; March 12, 1902, p. 3; March 13, 1902, p. 2; March 8, 1904, p. 2; Fort Worth Telegram, March 5, 1903, p. 1; March 6, 1903, p. 4; March 7, 1903, p. 1; August 2, 1902, p. 6; March 7, 1904, p. 1; March 8, 1904, p. 2; Fort Worth Record, March 6, 1904, p. 35.

32 Fort Worth Telegram, February 3, 1903, p. 2; February 13, 1903, p. 2.

33 Fort Worth Record, March 2, 1904, p. 10; March 8, 1904, p. 2.

34 “Fort Worth, 1903,” (n.p., 19--), pp. 1-2. Local History Collection of the Fort Worth Public Library.

35 Fort Worth Telegram, May 17, 1903, section 4, p. 6.
36 Fort Worth Telegram, July 12, 1902, p. 8; Fort Worth Register, October 24, 1901, p. 5; October 26, 1901, p. 1; General Directory of the City of Fort Worth, 1902-1903 (Galveston: Morrison and Fourmy, Compilers and Publishers, 1902), pp. 2-3.

37 Fort Worth Telegram, December 7, 1902, p.8; November 16, 1902, p. 2; Fort Worth Register, August 11, 1901, p. 8; August 13, 1901, p. 8; August 21, 1901, p. 8; June 1, 1901, p. 8; April 22, 1902, p. 12; Fort Worth Record, January 25, 1906, p. 10; General City Directory 1902-1903, pp. 2-3.


By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century Swift and Armour had transformed Fort Worth. The packinghouse effect was vast, both directly, as the first large employers and indirectly, through attraction of ancillary businesses and stimulation of banking. However, by the 1909 some began to realize that Fort Worth had been a victim of its own success, that it had become complacent to the extent of losing zeal. At the same time indicators appeared suggesting that packinghouses alone offered neither the diversity nor the sheer trade mass that would enable a competitive economy even within North Texas as Dallas’ population and industrial superiority remained virtually unchanged. Other issues also continued. Hell’s Half Acre survived a serious setback only to again receive official recognition and the city water department continued to struggle from crisis to crisis.

In 1904 few saw any negatives as Fort Worth began developing into a major packing center. In 1906, after just two full years of packinghouse operations, the Fort Worth Stockyards ranked sixth nationally; trailing, in order, Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, Omaha, and St. Joseph; but seriously aimed for the third spot behind Chicago and Kansas City. In the first six months of 1906 local livestock receipts experienced the greatest increase of all major markets, including Chicago, and in the first four months of 1908 Fort Worth handled 28,603 more cattle than St. Louis, indications that seemed to assure a bright economic future (see Table V-1). Fort Worth’s output was the major factor behind an over 300 percent increase in the Texas meatpacking industry between 1899 and 1904 and its status as the state’s largest industry in 1909.1
Table V-1  Fort Worth Stockyards Livestock Receipts for 1904 and 1905

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>549,772</td>
<td>663,660</td>
<td>+20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>93,022</td>
<td>148,427</td>
<td>+ 9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>280,840</td>
<td>462,766</td>
<td>+64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>103,650</td>
<td>125,270</td>
<td>+21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses and Mules</td>
<td>17,893</td>
<td>18,033</td>
<td>+.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,045,179</td>
<td>1,418,156</td>
<td>+35.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In contrast to pre-packinghouses conditions most of the livestock entering the Fort Worth Stockyards after 1903 never left the Northside environs. In 1905 Swift and Armour bought over fifty-seven percent of the 1,418,156 animals received, in 1906 they consumed over eighty-eight percent of all livestock arriving by trains, excluding horses and mules. The stockyards received 30,969 railcars of livestock but shipped out only 4,852, most of those going to Kansas City, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; and St. Joseph, Missouri, with a very few diverted to Los Angeles and Arizona (see Table V-2 and Table V-3).

Table V-2  Livestock Bought by Fort Worth Packers 1901 to 1905

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Hogs</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>118,020</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>120,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>4,787</td>
<td>81,202</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>86,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>274,216</td>
<td>142,666</td>
<td>51,850</td>
<td>468,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>324,453</td>
<td>439,877</td>
<td>47,481</td>
<td>811,811</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: *Fort Worth Record*, October 16, 1904, p. 15; July 8, 1906, p. 11.
### Table V-3 1906 Livestock Shipments to and from Fort Worth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Shipped In</th>
<th>Shipped Out</th>
<th>Processed Locally</th>
<th>Percentage Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>615,686</td>
<td>81,885</td>
<td>533,801</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>243,599</td>
<td>52,618</td>
<td>190,981</td>
<td>78.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>553,054</td>
<td>29,860</td>
<td>523,194</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>98,761</td>
<td>11,837</td>
<td>86,924</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses and Mules</td>
<td>21,761</td>
<td>16,960</td>
<td>4,801</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,563,830</td>
<td>198,012</td>
<td>1,365,818</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Record*, February 10, 1907, p. 3.

The labor required to process huge quantities of livestock radically changed the local employment environment. In 1904 Fort Worth listed only seven industries employing 100 or more workers. In their first year Swift and Armour employed more than ten times the number of the second largest Fort Worth business, Texas Brewery, and over twice as many as the top seven combined (see Table V-4).

### Table V-4 Fort Worth Industries Employing 100 or More in 1904 (number of businesses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Packinghouses (2)</th>
<th>2,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Next Seven</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brewery (1)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ice Houses (2)</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour Mills (3)</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture Makers (3)</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biscuit Maker (1)</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmakers (43)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundries and Machine Works (4)</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Record*, October 16, 1904, section 3, p. 16.
The packinghouses and their supporting infrastructure experienced almost constant expansion. The stockyards, pushed to its limit by local and outside buyers, expanded to forty-two acres with 200 employees earning a monthly payroll of $7,000. In November 1908 the dynamics or supply and demand stimulated a $100,000 subscription to attract a third major packinghouse. The fund, which was quickly subscribed, brought a stream of interested factory representatives but never finalized a major commitment, although a small operation, the Cass Packing Company, opened at Jones and Twenty-second streets just south of the stockyards and west of Marine Creek. The threat of competition was enough to push Swift and Armour into major expansions but they delayed announcing those plans until assured that Fort Worth’s planned annexation of the city of North Fort Worth would not include the plants, which would have added $7,000 in annual municipal taxes. Assured of exclusion, Armour spent $500,000 to double its beef and pork production and Swift increased its overall capacity forty percent, making Fort Worth’s operation the equal of Omaha and inferior only to Kansas City and Chicago.³

The period was not without major setbacks, both natural and man-made. To a meaningful extent, nineteenth-century increases in devastation resulting from natural disasters, such as floods, was a product of urbanization and industrialization. Ted Steinberg’s study found that extremes of nature first carried disastrous consequences in the late nineteenth century due, in part, to the population shift from farms to cities, especially cities located in desirable but disaster-prone areas. While his point is well taken it is guarded in that population concentration carries an inherent risk independent of location.⁴ Such was the case in May 1908 when torrential rains flooded much of Fort
Worth, paralyzing railroad service and washing out the Exchange Avenue bridge while killing seven and leaving 5,000 homeless.\(^5\)

Fires, which were often man-made, also posed great urban hazards. In 1908 flames destroyed the Shamrock Saloon (also known as the Bucket of Blood), one of the Acre’s most notorious dives, and did $250,000 in damages to the Texas and Pacific Depot. The next year a glass factory was leveled and seven died during a blaze at the Southern Hotel located on Jones Street across from Santa Fe depot.\(^6\) The worst incident, occurring in April 1909, consumed a large portion of the fashionable residential district just south of the Texas and Pacific reservation. The firestorm began in Mrs. Hatcher’s barn at Jennings and Peter Smith streets, the city’s highest point, then spread quickly thanks to high winds and dry conditions left by a month-long drought. After fifteen minutes flames burned out of control, continuing for hours despite the rail arrival of firefighters from Dallas and Weatherford (three large fires destroyed seventy-five buildings in Dallas while its crews fought in Fort Worth). The path of destruction traversed one-half mile wide and a mile and a half in length, covering twenty square blocks, but might have been much worse if the new steel and stone Union Passenger Depot had not protected the wholesale district and the rest of downtown. Some 300 buildings burned, including four churches and two schools as well as the Texas and Pacific repair shops and roundhouse containing twenty locomotives. The total estimated loss reached $3,000,000, a huge sum for the day.\(^7\)

Disasters such as floods and fires tended to be acute but industrial development often created unanticipated and unsavory chronic problems. In July 1902, during the packinghouse construction phase, a visitor remarked that large plant piping had converted
Marine Creek into a big sewer, a fact that residents quickly realized was all too true. During the first year downstream residents sued, claiming that discharged waste had rendered the creek water odorous, especially during dry summer months. A group associated with the livestock trade asked forbearance from further lawsuits, citing fears that adverse reactions would jeopardize Fort Worth’s industrial golden calf. A compromise solution lay in the installation of a bacterial purification system costing $60,000 to $75,000 that became operational on May 22, 1904. Unfortunately, the system failed to keep pace with demand, leading, in 1918, to four more lawsuits against the packinghouses and the city over effluent polluting the Trinity River.  

Industrialization also brought management-labor issues that proved troublesome. Since the violent strike of 1886 local labor relations remained relatively quiet until July 1904 when Michael Donnelly, president of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers’ Workmen of America, ordered a national packinghouse strike to force an increase in the unskilled hourly rate from $.15 to $.181/2. Union employees at Fort Worth’s Swift plant voted to walk out but Armour locked out its workers before they could vote. Both plants continued operations using management and scab labor, doing so well that production suffered more from livestock shortages than from the strike. That success, combined with an absence of local grievances, sapped the energy out of the local effort, dropping the number of pickets from 600 in July to only 250 in September. Recognizing a losing cause, the national union leadership sought a settlement but found management unwilling to make even minor compromises. Particularly galling, the companies refused a blanket reinstatement of strikers, insisting on reviewing each worker individually, a
position the union suspected as a ploy to dismiss older employees. Eventually labor conceded all points, returning to work without a contract covering unskilled workers.\(^9\)

Associated problems notwithstanding, the Armour and Swift plants spurred considerable economic and demographic development. Paddock recognized very early that a crucial aspect of the packinghouse effect lay in the stimulation of other commerce. Others also recognized that dimension. In 1903, before slaughtering began, the *Telegram* lamented Fort Worth’s paltry two score factories but in October 1904 the *Record* reported that steady growth had brought some 200 factories capitalized at $7,208,200 and employing 21,852. Business and commercial expansion had a positive effect on population growth. An informal census conducted in 1904 counted 46,290 residents, an addition of twenty-three percent since January 1902, the largest increase in the state even without the 5,180 residents of the city of North Fort Worth. By 1907 population estimates reached 75,000 and Fort Worth seemed destined to pass the 100,000 mark. Those projections were optimistic but not without precedent. After a packinghouse opened in St. Joseph, Missouri, in 1892 the population almost doubled, increasing from 52,324 in 1890 to 102,979 in 1900.\(^{10}\)

Swift and Armour complemented Fort Worth’s railroad industry, although most of the impact involved facility development around the plants, which did not show up in assessments since they remained outside the city limits. For example, between 1904 and 1905 the taxable assessment of Fort Worth’s railroad property increased only one percent, from $1,248,973 to $1,262,875. In contrast, the effect on freight and passenger traffic was remarkable. Demand for freight railway cars showed steady double-digit increases from 1905 through 1907 (see Table V-5) and the number of railroad cars
interchanged rose thirty-two percent from 1903 to 1907, from 436,556 to 575,147.

Passenger traffic showed even more impressive growth, increasing from eighteen to twenty-six percent every year between 1903 and 1907 (see Table V-5).\(^\text{11}\)

Table V-5  Freight Traffic in Fort Worth from 1903 to 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Freight Cars</th>
<th>Percentage Change in Passenger Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>588,768</td>
<td>+18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>603,226</td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>682,104</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>750,123</td>
<td>+26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>827,412</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The growth helped Fort Worth, now with the South’s largest passenger depot, remain the largest railroad center in the Southwest. In 1907 twelve companies ran ninety-eight passenger trains in and out of Fort Worth each day. The Texas and Pacific, Fort Worth’s first railroad, was the clear leader with twenty-eight daily passenger trains, an impressive figure but less than twenty-nine percent of the total (see Table V-6).
Table V-6  Daily Passenger Trains in Fort Worth in 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Railroad</th>
<th>Number of Daily Trains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas and Pacific</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rock Island</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri, Kansas, and Texas</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Fe</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth and Denver</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth and Rio Grande</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis, San Francisco, and Texas</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International and Great Northern</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston and Texas Central</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Belt</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazos Valley</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Record*, August 1, 1907, p. 4.

Commercial expansion carried varied effects. In the spring of 1905 a building boom drove Fort Worth’s lumber costs to the state’s highest while during one six-month period in 1906 some 1,065 feet of Fort Worth street frontage experienced new construction, a figure unsurpassed in the Southwest, and plans were announced for a fifteen story skyscraper at Eighth and Houston streets. Still, demand for commercial space exceeded supply to the point that a disinfectant company had difficulty finding a suitable building. In 1908 the pace of construction slowed due to a general economic slump, but then rebounded in 1909 (see Table V-7), creating, in the perspective of a cartoon, the threat of “rubberneckitis.” (see Illustration V-1).
Table V-7  Fort Worth Building Permits and Their Value for 1907, 1908, and the First Five Months of 1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Building Permits</th>
<th>Value of Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>$1,430,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>$1,007,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909 (first five months)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>$1,280,626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Fort Worth Record, June 20, 1909, p. 19; New York Times, January 15, 1908, AFR45.

Construction caused a spike in tax values and in post office receipts. In 1905 municipal tax assessments soared to $26,220,725, an increase of $2,117,675 over 1904, while Tarrant County values reached $30,619,440, an increase of $3,597,590, the largest rise of any Texas county. A factory representative inspecting Fort Worth for possible expansion argued that post office statistics provided the most accurate measure of an area’s commercial growth. Comparing the fourth quarter of 1904 to the same period of 1903, he found that sales of second-class postage, used for newspapers and magazines, had almost quintupled and that total mail volume had doubled. The upward trend continued, although at a slower pace, as total postal receipts increased just under twenty percent between 1906 and 1907 (see Table V-8).13

Table V-8  Fort Worth Postal Receipts in 1906 and 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>$190,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>$227,799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Fort Worth Record, January 19, 1908, p. 1.
Bank transactions also grew significantly. In 1904 Fort Worth’s weekly bank clearings—the total of all checks, drafts, and notes presented for settlement—exceeded comparable periods in 1903 by as much as forty-seven percent. The rate of increase, which often led the nation, pushed Fort Worth to twelfth in the nation in 1907, remarkable for the fifth largest city in Texas. In the first nine months of 1908 Fort Worth was one of only eleven cities with an increase but finished the year down considerably, then rebounded in 1909 to almost equal 1907 (see Table V-9).^{14}

Table V-9  Annual Totals of Fort Worth Bank Clearings 1903 to 1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>$168,907,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>$188,484,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>$265,506,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>$317,393,685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>$395,936,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>$254,745,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>$337,782,874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within three years after the start of packinghouse operations all seemed to turning up roses for Fort Worth’s industrial development. In 1906 a total of seven businesses employing 137 opened, increasing manufacturing and industrial capitalization to between $9,000,000 and $10,000,000 and the annual production value to $40,000,000. A major portion of that investment came from twenty-two large firms with twenty-five or more employees. That list included eight heavy industries, such as steel and brass foundries; four furniture or construction material manufacturers; three grain mills; three food and beverage producers; two cotton oil mills; one oil refiner; and one producer of consumer
goods. Fort Worth’s five largest employers (the packinghouses lay outside the municipal limits) were: Texas Brewing (175), Fort Worth Furniture (150), Burrus Mills (125), Fort Worth Machine and Foundry (100), and Fort Worth Iron and Steel (90). In 1907 a $50,000 glass factory scheduled to employ 250 men and 70 boys, the $100,000 Gin Manufacturing Company, a $50,000 building for the Roofing and Manufacturing Company, plus six smaller projects ranging from $10,000 to $30,000 brought the total factory count to 167. In 1908 the Bolt Works, which had opened in 1904 at the terminus of the Hemphill Streetcar line, expanded and added rolling mills to become Texas Rolling Mills, one of only two steel companies in the Southwest.

While packinghouses remained the commercial elephant in the room Fort Worth, by 1908, developed as a significant grain and milling center. Only a few years earlier the grain trade had been inadequate to fund even one elevator but prospects improved after Muggs and Dryden, later Muggs and Pemberton, built storage facilities with a capacity of 175,000 bushels. Their investment provided the economic base and incentive that led to construction of twelve elevators but production still exceeded capacity so greatly that hundreds of grain-filled railcars carried excess grain to the Gulf coast. By 1908 the grain market had become so important that Paddock suggested an exposition highlighting Fort Worth’s status as the Southwest’s grain and milling center.

Between 1907 and 1909 a national banking panic that closed eleven national banks and forty state banks curtailed Fort Worth’s industrialization but seemed to have little effect on non-commercial development. In 1908 local Baptists succeeded in luring the Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary away Waco, Texas, after a two-year courtship. In addition, A. T. Byers of Arlington Heights opened the $200,000 Byers
Opera House at Rusk and Seventh streets (entrance on Seventh), the Tarrant County Benevolent Home for Orphans, capable of holding forty boys and girls, was built at Stop Five of the Interurban, and the Kindergarten Association established a settlement house at Crump and Eighteenth streets run by Mrs. Margaret Grabill, a veteran of seven years in Colorado mining camps.\textsuperscript{18}

Fort Worth’s overall development from 1899 to 1909 can be seen in a comparison of wages, salaries, and value added by manufacturing. Between 1899 and 1909 the number of manufacturers increased 114 percent, wages increased forty-nine percent, salaries (non-hourly, white collar workers) 269 percent, and value added by manufacturing 153 percent while the number employed grew fifty-one percent between 1904 and 1909. The impressive gains registered were all the more impressive gains because they did not include Swift and Armour, which remained outside the Fort Worth city limits (see Table V-10).

Table V-10  
Manufacturing Businesses, Employees, Wages, Salaries and Value Added in Fort Worth in 1899, 1904, and 1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Businesses</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Salaries</th>
<th>Value Added by Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>$565,000</td>
<td>$131,000</td>
<td>$1,341,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>$843,000</td>
<td>$213,000</td>
<td>$2,479,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>$1,285,000</td>
<td>$484,000</td>
<td>$3,395,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Commercial growth offered hope for ending shortfalls in the municipal budget. According to the mayor’s 1904 annual report serious budget issues had developed in
1900 after Fort Worth spent $500,000 to provide what it thought would be long-term fixes for water (the Mead system) and streets, a large outlay that drained the treasury and led to suspension of interest payments. After 1904 many felt that the worst had passed as the gap between revenue and expenditures narrowed, in part due to refinancing the debt. In 1904 the annual interest on debts of $1,822,000 totaled $147,621, the city’s largest budgetary item, but in 1909 refinancing lowered interest to $96,550 (second to the fire department budget) despite no significant debt reduction. In addition, Fort Worth’s governmental finances benefited from property assessments that increased from $16,493,035 in 1901 to $20,953,383 in 1904 and then more than doubled to $46,000,000 in 1909. Tarrant County’s taxable assets rose similarly, to $78,697,999 in 1909, Texas’ third largest total behind only Harris ($89,116,370) and Dallas ($94,784,800) counties.

The near tripling of Fort Worth’s property assessments between 1901 and 1909 was driven by absorption of suburbs. Higher valuations with the city limits accounted for only $5,000,000 of the increase achieved by 1909, with the rest coming from annexations, including $3,000,000 from North Fort Worth and $1,000,000 from the Glenwood Addition. Fort Worth’s expansion was overdue. According to Kenneth T. Jackson’s study, American cities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries utilized boundary adjustments as the dominant form of population growth but, until 1909, Fort Worth remained confined to only seven square miles while San Antonio had spread to thirty-six, Dallas to twenty-three, and Houston to almost twenty. Aggrandizement of territories not only added population but also inspired confidence in community vitality, which spurred citizens into greater development efforts.
Prodded by Paddock, the Board of Trade in 1909 presented an ambitious plan to absorb eighteen square miles, including the suburbs of Arlington Heights, North Fort Worth, Rosen Heights, Sycamore Heights, Polytechnic Heights, Riverside, the Factory Place, the Van Zandt Addition, Mistletoe Heights, and Fairview Heights. The proposal met with considerable opposition in Arlington Heights, Polytechnic Heights, and Riverside while North Fort Worth demanded Fort Worth assume its $193,000 debt and agree to fund $200,000 in improvements. A clearly improved financial condition explained Arlington Heights’ reluctance. In 1906 the owners sold the Arlington Heights Street Car Company for $480,000 and invested $125,000 in new acreage and $50,000 to build the Pavilion on Lake Como. Fort Worth met North Fort Worth’s condition but adopted a less ambitious scheme that excluded Arlington Heights, Rosen Heights, and parts of Riverside and Sycamore Heights but that still would have increased Fort Worth’s population by 70,000 and its area to sixteen square miles.²¹

Even the smaller version proved too controversial. Suburbs threatened with absorption exercised their political muscle on Tarrant County’s state legislative delegation, forcing defeat of revisions to Fort Worth’s charter that would have authorized the takeovers. Fort Worth reacted by immediately cutting off the suburbs’ water, light, and sewerage connections, closing schools to their children, and stopping response to their police calls. The legislative defeat did not affect the mutually agreed annexations of North Fort Worth (not including the packinghouses) on March 11, 1909, and of Glenwood on June 29, 1909, that increased Fort Worth to just over fifteen square miles. A few newly-absorbed manufacturers sought tax exemptions, arguing that they had built with the Board of Trade’s assurances that their plants were and would remain outside the
city taxing limits. The city rejected those petitions as unfair to other, tax-paying concerns.22

After a short period of success the Mead system, begun with such hope, proved incapable of meeting required production levels. In 1905 all seemed fine. The Record called the Mead development the greatest municipal improvement in Texas history and the city water department reported that pure and ample water supplies had brought 936 new connections, increasing receipts from $53,940 in 1904 to $85,217 in 1905 while expenses decreased $5,391 and rates fell by half. Soon thereafter well production dropped to only 2,500,000 gallons daily, below the 3,000,000 gallon contractual level. To bolster output the city drilled fifteen new wells, called the Powell Field, four miles southwest off Benbrook Road, piping the production to the Holley Pumping Station while also spending $21,000 for air compressors to increase water flow at existing wells. The expenditures wiped out the positive cash flow, putting the waterworks once again into deficit operations. Mead argued that the system worked properly but that dynamics had changed because new wells, including those added by the city of North Fort Worth and the packinghouses, drew 2,000,000 gallons daily from the same water table. Fort Worth disagreed and refused to pay the contracted fee but Mead won a $30,000 court judgment.23

While assigning blame consumed considerable effort the more serious issue involved developing solutions to a problem that had been a constant drag on city finances. To make matters worse, Fort Worth’s annexations had aggravated demand problems by adding population and thirty-nine miles of new water mains. The addition of 100 new connections monthly to an already overburdened system raised more
questions about the continued viability of wells as a primary water source. In June 1907 Lee Stephens, commissioner over the water works, argued that little hope existed for a well-supplied waterworks despite considerable money spent on air compressors and efforts to revive the Mead system. Stephens suggested providing sufficient well water would require spending $600,000 for a 2,000,000,000 gallon reservoir that would function not as a direct water source but to provide drainage into the underground water table. Ex-mayor T. J. Powell disagreed vehemently, calling Stephens’ claims and proposals “dense ignorance” and insisting that enough water lay underground for all eternity. Stephens admitted that a $100,000 annual expenditure could carry the current system through another decade, but after that a reservoir would still be required, therefore, the greater economy lay in doing the inevitable rather than spending money on reviving a dying supply. City engineer E. C. Woodward offered a third alternative, proposing a dual system with drinking water supplied by wells with all other uses pumped from a $986,000 reservoir on the Clear Fork of the Trinity River one-half mile west of the Parker County line. In March 1908 work began on converting 550 acres into a reservoir with promises that water would flow by year’s end.24

The projections proved overly optimistic. Lack of funding slowed reservoir construction at the same time that the existing waterworks system deteriorated from poor maintenance. In September 1908 the city abandoned three Mead wells after their flow dwindled below the point necessary to support pumps. As the summer of 1909 approached officials offered little other than prayers that no crisis would force widespread reliance on river water. In April 1909 the mayor, two city commissioners, and the city engineer toured the waterworks, finding an appalling state of disrepair. The
eleven wells of the Powell field southwest of town past the old stove foundry (now Vickery Boulevard) lay almost totally dismantled and what remained of the Mead system suffered from vandalism and poor-to-no maintenance. They admitted what many charged, that one-fourth of the water supplied during the year had been pumped unfiltered from the Trinity River. Powell, who became water commissioner in 1909, still favored wells. He recommended halting work on the Parker County reservoir and expanding the well system but the commission remained committed to the mixed use plan with the reservoir for non-potable supplies and a 5,000,000 gallon well water reservoir for human consumption. Improvements completed in 1909 raising daily output to 8,000,000 gallons seemed to have, yet again, solved the problem. That would not prove to be the case.25

The city’s other perennial issue, open vice in Hell’s Half Acre, earned local law enforcement scathing criticisms. A January 1904 grand jury report broadly attacked both county and city officers, chiding beat patrolmen for “willful negligence” that allowed gambling houses to exist and describing the city detective force as ignorant of its duty. The report singled out an unnamed investigator who conducted a stranger to an “assignation house” and termed the arranged fine system a de facto system of regulation. The jurors recommended that the unofficial agreement become official, suggesting that the city seek state legislative authority for a vice reservation where the worst excesses could be eliminated or reduced.26 In November 1904 Reverend Dr. Alonzo Monk, pastor of the Methodist church, joined in, blasting the police from the pulpit for making a few token arrests of non-whites while ignoring well-known operations catering to white men. In a city hall speech Carrie Nation, a famous prohibitionist crusader noted for wielding an
axe against saloons, praised Monk while urging women to “clean out this hell hole” she
described as one of the most corrupt towns she had ever seen. As usual, nothing
changed. In 1905 a preacher touring the Acre expressed shock at the presence of girls as
young as thirteen cavorting in wine rooms with coarse men, at a woman dancing for the
amusement of a mixed audience of “whites and coloreds [sic],” and at saloons in which
women mingled with men soliciting drinks and “things even worse.”

The pressure eventually brought a police reaction. J. H. Maddox, campaigning
for chief of police, promised, if elected, to resign if he did not close the dives and illegal
joints operating in “lower end of the city.” Following his election Maddox sought a
municipal ban on alcohol sales in variety theaters, a move supported by the Texas
Brewing Association as part of a multi-city campaign designed to blunt the prohibition
movement by correcting the worst abuses. Variety theaters were not just a Fort Worth
issue. Gunther Barth’s study of the rise of modern cities found that most city dwellers
identified variety shows with dissolute men and lewd women and suspected, correctly,
that salacious tastes shaped their performances. Fort Worth’s variety theaters were
notorious for their female “entertainers” who circulated offstage, conning gullible patrons
into buying exorbitantly-priced drinks.

The county sheriff also entered the enforcement picture. On Sunday, November
20, 1904, sheriff’s deputies closed all gambling houses and saloons, which made for great
theater of the moment but little else. Those Sundays in which saloons were closed saw
an actual increase in intoxication arrests while large crowds simply waited for midnight
when the doors reopened. Afterwards the county tended to leave alcohol enforcement to
city officers, concentrating their efforts on gambling. Their raids, including one in
scheduled in January 1905 with sixty-eight specially deputized men, discouraged gamblers to the extent that the average county jail inmate population declined from 100 to 75. Like all previous campaigns the effort waned. In December 1905, a press article headlined “The Lid is Off in Fort Worth” recounted the ease of finding games of roulette, craps, and poker in the northern business district and on lower Main Street. The reporter relayed his findings to County Attorney Jefferson Davis McLean who insisted that strict enforcement was the still the order of the day. The next day deputies raided the casinos cited, claiming that they had been unaware of the locations until the article, a transparent misstatement of facts.29

Political connections, rather than ignorance, explained the prevalence of gambling and prostitution. Even the Telegram admitted that vice survived because many civic leaders believed it necessary for the city’s welfare, quoting unnamed vice purveyors who insisted that most politicians opposed eradication and would deal strongly with any police interference. In 1905 an assistant city attorney obliquely confirmed the existence of a “reservation” exempt from vice enforcement when he refused to prosecute women from “the district of the city known as the ‘reservation.’” When the city magistrate also adopted non-enforcement and Police Chief Maddox ordered an end to prostitution arrests from “a known district not frequented by the general public.”30

Three tragedies gave new but still transitory emphasis to vice enforcement. The first occurred in December 1906 when Police Officer John Nichols was shot and killed inside the Standard Theater. The officer’s death led the Record to ask “how long are we to tolerate the reproach of this noisome section of an otherwise decent city?” Speakers at mass meetings and letters to the editor railed that the Acre constituted the worst den of
iniquity in the state and was responsible for three-fourths of Fort Worth’s crime.\textsuperscript{31} To “quicken the moral pulse” and help bring an end to the “unspeakable evilness of Hell’s Half Acre” a Record columnist joined Detective Al Ray on a tour of dives and brothels where depravity lay “like an open sore,” visible to anyone passing to or from the Union Depot. An account of their adventures appeared under the headline “Christmas Night in Hell’s Half Acre.” The journalist took care to avoid casting blame on the police, arguing that officers could only fight vice as hard as public sentiment allowed, that closure would have to spring from citizen demand.\textsuperscript{32}

They began their sojourn at the Standard Theater on Thirteenth Street, just two blocks off Main Street. Upon entering, their ears were assaulted by the singing of a peroxide blonde wearing a low-cut dress. The “entertainer” rambled through the audience as she sang, wheedling beers at $1.00 each or wine for $5.00 that would gain the purchaser a few minutes in one of the “wine rooms,” small areas partitioned by flimsy curtains allowing a modicum of privacy. The theater bill also included a motion picture and another live act in which a seven-year old girl sang while making suggestive expressions. At the bar a group of women, none handsome but not all homely, waited to separate men from their money. One, a twenty-two year old English woman wearing a dress ending just below her knees, admitted receiving a twenty percent commission on drinks bought for her, including several provided by Nichols’ assailant just nights before the shooting.\textsuperscript{33}

The Standard proved to be the high point of a tour that took a steady decline into seediness. The Crown, another theater, was far dirtier than the Standard, both in setting and clientele, but the Black Elephant on Rusk Street between Thirteenth and Fourteenth
was the worst of the lot. The writer lamented an insufficient vocabulary to describe the filthy, horrible, smoke-filled, and foul-smelling atmosphere in which the patrons, who were mostly African-American, danced lewdly in “disgusting familiarity.” For some reason the adjacent Shamrock, a notorious hell hole of twenty-years legacy considered one of Texas’ worst dives, was not mentioned. The Bucket of Blood, as it was often called in deference to its frequent beatings, knifings, and shootings, occupied three stories with a saloon on the ground floor, a variety theater presenting the most repugnant shows on the second, and a rooming house of the “lowest order” on the top floor. Ray included a tour of several saloons: the Do Drop In, the Redlight, the Anchor, Marion Warren’s place (where blacks and whites mingled), the Arizona (which had a brothel), the Star, the Acme, Don O’Connell’s, and the Cave (a gathering spot for professional beggars). The article suggested that those brought to charity by the patrons of the latter would be disgusted by the sight of the “repulsive creatures” in their nightly revel.

Nichols’ death and the resulting publicity brought quick but temporary responses. On January 3, 1907, a Record political cartoon urged banishing the Acre “monster” (see Illustration V-2). The next day Detective Ray headed a large force that went through the Acre closing “cribs” or “box houses” as a crowd of 1,000 followed behind. Arrests began at the more upscale spots employing white prostitutes, many of whom reacted with surprise, asking if it was a joke and how long the crusade would last. The march then turned south to Fourteenth Street between Rusk and Calhoun streets before reaching the Black Elephant and Shamrock. Soon word spread and the officers found the lights turned off at the Do Drop Inn, another notorious hangout. The officers arrested 115 but that number could have been much larger if they had not released many “variety actresses” on
their promise to leave town immediately and had not given several vagrants orders to
either get a job or leave. For several days raids and arrests continued, resulting in the
closing of the Crown and Black Elephant and the Standard Theater’s suspension of
alcohol sales. By January 12, 1907, some $2,000 in fines had been leveled, and trade so
reduced that 200 Acre denizens left town. The effect was so massive that men reported
walking down some of the worst streets without hearing even one solicitation.37

The second event involved Tarrant County District Attorney Jefferson Davis
McLean. McLean, who had run and been elected on an anti-vice platform, began
fulfilling that pledge by raiding eighteen casinos on his first night in office and kept at it,
earning credit from the 1906 grand jury for suppressing gambling. Their high opinion
was not shared by all. Gamblers and their supporters allegedly backed Jorden Y.
Cummings in the 1906 election, although Cummings bristled at charges that he was the
handpicked choice of gamblers. He maintained that he would simply do a better
enforcement job, that McLean had failed to close many casinos, including one in the
“very shadow of the courthouse.” McLean won office again in 1906 and, following
Officer Nichols’ death, agreed to prosecute variety theater cases in county courts that
carried heavier punishments than their municipal counterparts. On March 22, 1907, Bill
“One-Armed” Thompson, a flamboyant gambler whose casino was being raided, shot and
ekilled McLean, then was killed immediately afterwards in a shootout with Officer Hamil
P. Scott.38

The ramifications of McLean’s death spread across the state but were especially
evident locally. Many state legislators had been attending Fort Worth’s Fat Stock Show
the day of the shooting. The incident caused such shock and dismay that just one week
later the legislature made gambling a state felony offense. Waco officials confiscated five wagonloads of gambling equipment, citing McLean’s death as their motivation and the Dallas police chief ordered all gamblers arrested on sight. The local reaction expressed itself in anger, spawning threats of vigilante violence against gamblers so serious that cooler heads walked the street urging calm. After the ephemeral hysteria died down an incipient questioning of the Acre’s overall benefit arose. Speakers at mass meetings declared gambling abhorrent and citizens formed the Jefferson Davis McLean Law and Order League with J. J. Jarvis as president. Jarvis expressed the change in conviction succinctly, proclaiming that “(t)his is no longer a frontier city. The ‘Wide-open-town fallacy’ of lawlessness and immorality is no longer entertained…the notion that crime and vice are necessary for prosperity is a libel.”

Fort Worth commissioners reined in abuses. They ordered disorderly houses to close by July 12, 1907, or face arrest and restricted saloons to designated areas known as saloon limits. The saloon limits ran west on Belknap to Taylor and back to Houston, then south to Seventh where it jogged over to Throckmorton before continuing south to the Texas and Pacific reservation where it ran south on Main to Elizabeth before turning north on Arizona to east on Front (Lancaster) to the city limits, then north to Twelfth and over to Rusk and north back to Belknap. Many saloons within the geographical boundaries closed as habitués relocated to residential sections to avoid scrutiny. Consideration was given to moving “that undesirable element that have hitherto occupied Rusk, Calhoun and other neighboring streets” into a “vice district” north and east of Front Street (Lancaster Avenue), only a few blocks east of the Acre but off the main
thoroughfare between the respectable north end and the Union Depot. That plan fell through under stiff opposition from residents of the planned site.\textsuperscript{40}

Support yet remained for the Acre as an economic necessity. After a few months a petition, signed by “a large portion of the representative businessmen of the city,” asked that the Acre be left undisturbed, arguing that it would die a natural death as business expansion raised property values to an unsustainable level. In June 1907 another petition called for the resignation or removal of George Mulkey, the city commissioner over the police, on the grounds that he was “detrimental to the growth and prosperity of our city.” Again, many respectable citizens signed “because they believe that a ‘wide open town’ makes for business prosperity and that certain laws ought to be winked at in order that prosperity may not be interrupted.” Judge W. R. Booth, a large property owner involved in both petitions, confirmed that petitioners tied the Acre to economic development. He suggested that hundreds of thousands of dollars of commercial property lay idle because of the crackdown and that the Acre was necessary for Fort Worth to become a great city, although he supported centralizing vice within restricted geographic boundaries to enhance order maintenance.\textsuperscript{41}

Mulkey survived the effort to displace him. Recall supporters held the petition for five weeks in hopes that the commissioner would modify his “extreme position” before submitting over 1,200 signatures on August 30, 1907. The effort proved for naught after the city secretary found only 594 qualified voters, leaving it well short of the 1,044 required. The rejection sparked a celebration at city hall in which Mulkey told the celebrants that when he took office that Fort Worth had been the wickedest city on earth, worse than Paris, and that he knew some financial interests would oppose its cleansing.
McLean’s successor also addressed the crowd, vowing to continue the struggle while others argued vociferously that the time had passed when gambling and other vices were necessary for Fort Worth’s prosperity. In September Mulkey put new vigor into enforcement by ordering the police to clear an area bounded by Rusk, Throckmorton, Thirteen and Railroad streets which Acre evacuees had made so dangerous that lone police officers refused to enter. He also demonstrated a commitment to law and order at all levels by addressing the obvious, that joints like the Bucket of Blood could not have operated without official collusion. To add action to words he sought grand jury indictments accusing five police officers of taking bribes.

Once again the forces supporting the Acre had only to wait for more propitious times. On November 1, 1908, less than two years after McLean’s death, the Record reported that the Acre had rebounded and was almost as bad as ever. In 1909 Fort Worth admitted the obvious by granting the Acre official recognition. On June 7, 1909, city commissioners ordered all disreputable persons to vacate residential areas and move into a designated zone of toleration, commonly called a reservation, located just east of the Acre. The established boundaries ran from the north side of Fourteenth Street, then north on Calhoun Street to east on the north side of Ninth Street before turning south on Grove Street and back to Fourteenth. Within those borders gamblers and prostitutes encountered no interference but outside they faced vigorous prosecution. Many legitimate businessmen supported the arrangement as a way to retain the Acre’s economic benefits, both direct and indirect, while ridding the business district of scantily-clad women who loitered around hotel corridors disturbing guests with solicitations. Mulkey maintained a hard-line stance, announcing that he would never allow a
reservation to exist, but the Fort Worth police chief offered acceptance, stating he would restrict all “unfortunate women” to the area.\textsuperscript{45}

A major selling point for the reservation had been that concentration would allow more effective control, thereby reducing associated excesses, such as robberies and thefts. That theory faced a serious challenge in August 1909 when an assailant upset over stringent enforcement shot and killed Police Officer W. A. Campbell outside the Jockey Club Saloon located at Thirteen and Rusk streets. The killing of three law enforcement persons in under three years reflected a violent tendency out of proportion to Fort Worth’s size. According to the 1900 Census Fort Worth ranked 158 nationally in population but had thirty-eight homicide arrests in 1909, more than Cleveland, Ohio, the nation’s eighth largest city, despite trailing the larger city substantially in assault arrests with only 258 compared to 1,597. The disparity between arrests for assaults and homicides indicated that Fort Worthians were statistically more likely to introduce firearms into disputes, a tendency which the \textit{New York Times} blamed on the city’s Western and Southern heritages.\textsuperscript{46}

Campbell’s death brought familiar and innovative reactions. A crowd of 1,300 attending a city hall meeting demanded removal of saloons from the Acre, while the county attorney argued that the murder would be Acre’s death knell. The \textit{Record} repeated its mantra, calling the Acre the “lowest, basest, rottenest plague spot of municipal life of the United States” but abandoned its traditional closure recommendation to support relocation, suggesting that some place of “carnality” away from the heart of the city might be necessary.\textsuperscript{47} The city and county decided jointly to close the reservation despite concerns that doing so would only spread, not end vice. Tarrant
County set September 6, 1909, as the Acre’s final day, promising that operation after that date by any of the Acre’s twenty “resorts” employing 84 to 150 prostitutes or the estimated 450 self-employed women (approximately one for every 100 residents) would bring prosecution. On September 5, 1909, the *Star Telegram* headlined “Acre Denizens Begin Hegira,” reporting moving vans busily hauling off furnishing as for rent signs went up. Some effort was made to ease the transition by converting one of the best known prostitution houses into the Mildred Clifton House for fallen women. Fort Worth commissioners also tried to prohibit liquor sales in the Acre but the courts ruled against them while a 1909 state law limiting towns to one saloon per 500 residents had little effect since it grandfathered Fort Worth’s 178 existing bars, one for every 350 residents. As feared, the Acre’s closing simply moved prostitution into residential neighborhoods, leading to complaints and reestablishment of the district in 1911, by then a clearly trite outcome.

The situation for blacks remained bleak, but incipient signs of organized racial resistance appeared. African-Americans were all but shut out of local politics. In 1900 Fort Worth’s black population of 4,249 represented almost sixteen percent of its total but in 1904 only 238, or less than six percent, were registered to vote. Blacks also faced discrimination in many sectors, including the federal post office where a white letter carrier refused a direct order to train an African-American (the carrier was suspended). In 1905 a petition led to unanimous passage of a city ordinance that, in the stated interest of making the streetcars “safer,” required separate public transit seating, with exceptions allowed for nurses and officers with prisoners. The local black community condemned the act but a proposed boycott fizzled when Texas passed its own Jim Crow code.
stipulating the same segregation. Even the local Federation of Women’s Clubs displayed bias, urging the establishment of African-American neighborhoods in all nine wards to make it easier for whites to secure servants. In 1906 black leaders met at a skating rink at Third and Throckmorton streets to protest The Clansman, a theatrical drama that became the basis for Birth of A Nation, D. W. Griffith’s 1916 classic film praising the Ku Klux Klan. The mayor refused to ban the production, noting that the play had appeared the previous year with no ill effects. In 1909 the Democrat sponsored an essay contest in which school children described the value of the Klan, the winner receiving Clansman tickets. One essayist called the Klan the protector of the weak from the outrages of “lawless negroes [sic]” while the winner credited the Klan for protecting “womanhood and girlhood from the negro [sic] uprising that followed the civil war [sic]” and blamed carpetbaggers for excesses that “the slow-witted African could not understand.”

There was some good news for African-Americans. In 1907 the first African-American bank in Texas and only the fourth in the South opened in a Masonic Temple on east Ninth Street that housed several other black businesses. Plans were also announced by the Negro Texas Missionary and Educational Convention for a Negro Industrial College in the College Heights section of east Fort Worth, a proposal that area residents protested. Perhaps in response to those complaints the college, which was the first private school in Texas for African-Americans, opened in Arlington Heights where an inaugural class of forty began learning industrial arts and agriculture.

By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century some long term economic facts seemed evident. Following a slump in 1908 business had rebounded in 1909 with several planned projects that suggested 1910 would be even better. By every calculation
the packinghouses had jumpstarted the local economy, pushing it into regional, if not national prominence. Thanks to Swift and Armour, stockyards receipts recorded almost unbroken growth to break the 2,000,000 barrier in 1909 (see Table V-11). The Fort Worth boom drove an increase in of 300.1 percent in Texas’ slaughtering and meatpacking production between 1899 and 1904 and another 172.3 percent between 1904 and 1909, making it the state’s largest industry (in value of production) with fourteen establishments producing $42,530,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Calves</th>
<th>Hogs</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Horses/ Mules</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>375,779</td>
<td>70,999</td>
<td>150,527</td>
<td>125,322</td>
<td>10,094</td>
<td>732,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>549,772</td>
<td>93,022</td>
<td>280,840</td>
<td>103,650</td>
<td>17,895</td>
<td>1,045,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>663,660</td>
<td>148,427</td>
<td>462,766</td>
<td>125,270</td>
<td>18,033</td>
<td>1,418,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>603,616</td>
<td>234,269</td>
<td>550,661</td>
<td>97,514</td>
<td>21,303</td>
<td>1,507,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>706,631</td>
<td>314,442</td>
<td>486,679</td>
<td>112,853</td>
<td>18,507</td>
<td>1,640,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>839,774</td>
<td>229,591</td>
<td>702,844</td>
<td>120,489</td>
<td>12,435</td>
<td>1,905,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>883,353</td>
<td>314,022</td>
<td>868,333</td>
<td>188,006</td>
<td>20,732</td>
<td>2,274,446</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While their effect was impressive the packinghouses served more the ends of increasing existing commerce than creating a diverse economy. Swift and Armour were part of an agricultural-based economy dominating the Southwest, Texas, and Fort Worth to the detriment of other industrial development and commercial diversity. The 1901 United States Census noted that Texas manufacturing largely involved processing raw materials provided by stock-raising, agriculture, and minerals and that “they have been greatly stimulated by the rapid increase in production of these materials.” That was
certainly true of Fort Worth where the manufacturing base, packinghouses and millers, involved the two great food staples, flour and meat (see Table V-12) and in Tarrant County, which in 1909 remained a major agricultural producer (see Table V-13). In 1922 Paddock reassessed his estimation of the packinghouse effect, downgrading it to second behind that created by railroads.54

Table V-12  Annual Value of Production in 1904

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Amount Produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>$24,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouses</td>
<td>$ 8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mills</td>
<td>$ 3,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Brewing and ice</td>
<td>$ 1,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>$ 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windmills</td>
<td>$ 250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>$ 250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harnesses and saddle</td>
<td>$ 200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous</td>
<td>$ 200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Fort Worth Telegram*, May 17, 1903, Part 4, p. 6.

Table V-13  1909 Tarrant County Farm Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Amount Produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>31,402 Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>8,918 Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mules</td>
<td>6,578 Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swine</td>
<td>14,172 Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>3,375 Head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>4,961 Bales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>372,601 Bushels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>28,687 Bushels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>56,093 Bushels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>30,180 Pounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing Fort Worth’s post-1903 industrial development to Dallas reveals only minor changes. In 1899, four years before the packinghouses opened, Dallas had 160 percent more businesses, 201 percent more wage earners, and 363 more salaried employees. In 1904, five years later and one year after the packinghouse opened, the percentages had declined slightly to 142 percent more businesses and wage earners and 267 percent more salaried employees. In 1909, after the packinghouses had been operating for six years, Dallas still led by triple digits in every category with 107 percent more businesses, 137 percent more wage earners, and 232 percent more salaried employees (see Table V-14). The differences are muted in that the Fort Worth statistics did not include the packinghouses, which remained outside the city limits. Adding them would have only increased Fort Worth’s business total by two or three but would have been sufficient to match Dallas in wage earners and, possibly, in salaried employees. Of course, Dallas had businesses just outside its city limits as well, making that discussion speculative. What can be argued strongly is that as late 1909 Swift and Armour, though important, did not raise Fort Worth’s industrial output to match that of its nearest and dearest rival.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dallas</th>
<th>Fort Worth</th>
<th>Percentage Difference Fort Worth to Dallas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businesses</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>2,842</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried Employees</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>Percentage Difference Fort Worth to Dallas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Businesses</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>3,445</td>
<td>1,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaried Employees</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Businesses</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>4,882</td>
<td>2,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaried Employees</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A statistically less obvious but still important packinghouse effect lay in intensifying Fort Worth’s waning infatuation with railroads, the industry that had dominated its commercial affairs since the 1870s. In 1901, just after the Armour announcement, residents refused to support a subscription drive to bring the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway unless the company relocated its headquarters. The money was secured only after a compromise in which the Fort Worth and Rio Grande, which the St. Louis and San Francisco was buying, established local offices and the company agreed to purchase 250 acres southwest of the Union Depot. Such insouciance would have been unthinkable before 1901. In 1902 the International and Great Northern bought six acres in Glenwood for machine shops and roundhouse, becoming the first line to not seek or receive a bonus before building.55
The change in attitudes appeared in rhetoric. Just months after the packinghouses committed Paddock stated that railroad development had reached a level of saturation so that solicitations or bonuses were no longer necessary. The Board of Trade agreed, opting to redirect its energies away from transit companies, which they termed as all that could be desired, into other industries. In June 1904 the new coolness contributed to Tarrant County’s significant upward adjustment of railroad property assessments. The Texas and Pacific Railroad, which topped the list at $25,000,000, objected strongly, arguing that it already paid $26,830, or twelve percent of all county taxes.\textsuperscript{56}

The response may be well understood in view of the sacrifices Fort Worth residents had made to become a rail center. The first to arrive, the Texas and Pacific, received 320 acres directly south of town that in 1901 was valued at least $1,000,000 and later arrivals often received both cash and land. In twenty-five years between 1876 and 1901 Fort Worth invested over $2,000,000 in railroad development (see Table V-15).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
Railroad & Year Locally Established & Monetary Subsidy & Value of Facilities and Land \\
\hline
Texas and Pacific & 1876 & ? & $1,000,000 \\
Santa Fe & 1881 & $120,000 & $340,280 \\
Transcontinental & 1881 & & \\
Missouri, Kansas, Texas & 1881 & $25,000 & $48,650 \\
Fort Worth&Denver & 1881 & & $154,000 \\
Fort Worth&New Orleans & 1885 & $75,000 & $105,210 \\
Fort Worth&Rio Grande & 1887 & $40,000 & $53,600 \\
Cotton Belt & 1885 & $35,000 & $17,200 \\
Rock Island & 1894 & $35,000 & $120,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Subsidies Granted to Fort Worth Railroads}
\end{table}

Source: \textit{Fort Worth Register}, July 14, 1901, pp. 7-10.
The packinghouse effect also reduced Fort Worth’s willingness to make the similar sacrifices to attract other industries. That happened, in part, because Swift and Armour were such a major coup that many thought no more work was needed. In 1903, soon after the plants opened, the Board of Trade complained that many memberships had lapsed because business was so good that some members felt the organization was no longer needed. The loss of enthusiasm was evident in lamentations about the passing of the old guard who had sacrificed for the community good. Long-time residents recalled how John Peter Smith, who had already invested heavily, offered $5,000 more when the Santa Fe Railroad bonus seemed in danger of failing and even Paddock lamented the decline in broad-based business involvement in promoting Fort Worth. In 1907 a $50,000 drive for a Livestock Exhibition Building began so poorly, collecting only $12,000, that work ceased and the project lay in danger of abandonment. Once more a few public-spirited citizens rallied, this time marching in groups on the streets chanting:

“Rah! Rah! Rah!
Who are we?
Fort Worth Boosters!
Don’t you see!”

Their exuberance pushed the fund to success, allowing the Livestock Exchange to hold its grand opening on March 11, 1908, during the Fat Stock Show. That level of energy would become even rarer.

After 1903 commercial promotion focused on attracting smaller businesses. The Home Factory and Industrial Association, or the Factory Club, was an example of the new boosterism. The organization, which grew rapidly to reach 250 members, elected William R. Booth (of the petition to remove Mulkey) as president. Booth called for an emphasis on small factories, arguing that experience had shown it was more profitable to
attract small institutions and let them grow than to spend huge resources for large factories that too often withered from lack of demand. In that spirit the club successfully wooed the Plumhof Saddlery with thirty employees from Waxahachie but the change in focus seemed counter intuitive, given the tremendous success of 1903. In October 1909 the *Record* noted that all great cities, with only a few exceptions, became great by having factories but that Fort Worth was still not a manufacturing center despite having a transit system second to none in the South that provided access to cheap fuel and raw materials as well as easy distribution. In the second decade of the twentieth century Fort Worth would recommit to industrialization but only after facing more obstacles.\textsuperscript{61}
Chapter Five Endnotes

1 *Fort Worth Record*, January 11, 1906, p. 4; July 8, 1906, p. 11; May 3, 1908, p. 16.

2 Pate, *Livestock Legacy*, p. 295; *Fort Worth Record*, October 16, 1904, p. 15; July 8, 1906, p. 11; February 10, 1907, p. 3.

3 *Fort Worth Record*, July 8, 1906, p. 11; August 1, 1907, p. 4; May 2, 1908, p. 12; November 8, 1908, Section 2, p. 6; November 10, 1908, p. 12; November 15, 1908, p. 16; December 10, 1908, p. 8; January 1, 1909, p. 1; December 2, 1908, p. 6; March 10, 1909, p. 1.


5 *Fort Worth Record*, May 24, 1908, p. 1; May 25, 1908, p. 1.

6 *Fort Worth Record*, January 8, 1908, p. 5; January 9, 1908, p. 3; January 27, 1909, p. 3; February 24, 1909, p. 12.


8 *Fort Worth Morning Telegram*, July 9, 1902, p. 8; *Fort Worth Record*, February 14, 1904, p. 10; March 8, 1904, p. 2; May 22, 1904, Section 1, p. 12; October 25, 1918, p. 10.


10 *Fort Worth Telegram*, February 18, 1903, p. 5; May 17, 1903, section 4, p. 1; Duncan, “Paddock and Fort Worth Boosterism,” p. 258; *Fort Worth Record*, May 27, 1904, p. 10; October 16, 1904, Section 3, pp. 3, 16; October 3, 1905, p. 1; June 2, 1907, p. 1; June 23, 1907, pp. 9, 16; September 17, 1907, p. 1.

11 *Fort Worth Record*, October 16, 1904, Section 3, pp. 1-3; October 3, 1905, p. 1; January 4, 1908, p. 1.

12 *Fort Worth Record*, March 17, 1905, p. 12; October 16, 1904, section 3, p. 3; May 9, 1906, p. 12; May 13, 1907, p. 9; July 17, 1907, p. 14.


14 *Fort Worth Record*, October 16, 1904, Section 3, pp. 1-3; May 19, 1907, p. 6; October 8, 1908, p. 7.

15 *Fort Worth Record*, October 14, 1906, Part 5, p. 11.

55 *Fort Worth Register*, June 8, 1901, p. 4; June 28, 1901, p. 8; July 1, 1901, p. 5; July 2, 1901, p. 5; June 2, 1902, p. 5.

56 *Fort Worth Telegram*, February 18, 1903, p. 5; November 11, 1903, p. 6; *Fort Worth Record*, June 24, 1904, p. 3; June 25, 1904, p. 7; *New York Times*, May 20, 1907, p. 10.

57 *Fort Worth Record*, November 8, 1904, p. 10; August 6, 1905, p. 10; *Fort Worth Telegram*, February 18, 1903, p. 5.

58 *Fort Worth Record*, July 2, 1907, p. 4.

59 *Fort Worth Record*, July 14, 1907, p. 12.

60 *Fort Worth Record*, March 11, 1908, p. 1.

61 *Fort Worth Record*, April 4, 1905, p. 5; April 23, 1905, p. 20; May 23, 1905, p. 10; July 15, 1905, p. 5; October 17, 1909, p. 7.
Between 1910 and 1914 the packinghouse effect waned. From 1903 to 1910 Fort Worth solidified and developed the Swift and Armour plants and their supporting infrastructure, a task so monumental that little effort went into anything else. A concentration of focus was understandable and appropriate, given that the enormity of the endeavor, but it was overdone. The opportunity costs associated with one-dimensionalism became apparent after 1912, not because the packinghouses declined, they did not, but because Fort Worth had neglected other industrial development. Most new businesses established after 1910 were either service oriented or retail shops rather than factories. By 1913 it was clear that, while the packinghouses remained major producers, the rest of the Fort Worth commercial scene had suffered from inattention. An economic revival occasioned by war in Europe in 1914 obscured the developmental failings but profound observers realized that opportunities had been lost and began plotting corrections that would pay big dividends.

Fort Worth made significant progress redressing some familiar issues. Perennial water problems forced abandonment of the strongly defended well system, facilitating the process that would finally provide a safe and adequate water supply, an important step on the path to metropolitan status. City government also made advances in sewage treatment and the school system and initiated a major bridge construction project, all desperately needed civic accoutrements. Boosters remained relatively quiet, although they were instrumental in attracting a university to relocate from Waco, Texas. The reservation reappeared, thanks to initiatives originating from an unlikely source, but the
Acre still faced challenges from prohibition legislation and the diversification of Fort
Worth’s entertainment offerings. Despite the advances Fort Worth remained violent and
racist.

Between 1900 and 1910 Fort Worth experienced remarkable population growth. The 1910 Census counted 73,312, up 174.4 percent from 26,688 in 1900, the largest percentage rise of all large American cities. The total increase, 46,644, exceeded that of Houston, San Antonio, and Galveston (which actually declined as a result of the massive 1900 hurricane), but trailed the 49,466 Dallas gained (see Table VI-1). As a result, Fort Worth passed Galveston to become Texas’ fourth largest municipality and the South’s tenth largest (San Antonio, Dallas, and Houston ranked seventh, eighth, and ninth, respectively).¹

Table VI-1  Population Trends in Texas’ Five Largest Cities Between 1900 and 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population 1900</th>
<th>Population 1910</th>
<th>Growth/Decrease</th>
<th>Percentage Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>53,321</td>
<td>96,614</td>
<td>43,393</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>42,638</td>
<td>92,104</td>
<td>49,466</td>
<td>116.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>44,633</td>
<td>78,800</td>
<td>34,167</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>26,668</td>
<td>73,312</td>
<td>46,644</td>
<td>174.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston</td>
<td>37,789</td>
<td>36,981</td>
<td>-808</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Thirteenth Census, Vol III, pp. 795-796.

Tarrant County actually exceeded Dallas County in both total population growth, 55,196 to 53,022, and in percentage increase, 105 percent to 64 percent (see Table VI-2).
Table VI-2  Population Increases in Tarrant and Dallas Counties from 1900 to 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Population in 1910</th>
<th>Increase from 1900</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dallas County</td>
<td>135,748</td>
<td>53,022</td>
<td>64 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarrant County</td>
<td>108,572</td>
<td>55,196</td>
<td>105 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fort Worth’s rapid growth was all the more impressive because it occurred during a period of limited geographical expansion. Between 1900 and 1910 Fort Worth annexed North Fort Worth with six and one-half square miles, Glenwood with two and one-half miles square miles, and one-half square mile that became the Tenth Ward, raising the city’s area to seventeen and one-half square miles, still considerably less than Dallas’ twenty-five or San Antonio’s thirty. That Fort Worth’s population increase led the nation without expansive territorial acquisitions spoke to the intensity of the packinghouse effect.  

Manufacturing also developed significantly. Fort Worth retained its position as the Southwest’s leading railroad center with 104 passenger and 204 freight trains daily while its factories increased from only twenty in 1901 to 282 in 1911. In October 1910 50,00 spectators lined the streets for a massive parade featuring both horse-drawn and automobile-powered floats showcasing the city’s industrial progress. For example, the Bewley Mill contrasted its 1882 beginnings, depicted by a barn, with a replica of its modern seven-story operation followed by a float loaded with flour.  

Fort Worth did well, but so did the entire state with a 174 percent increase in the value of industrial
production between 1900 and 1912. In the same period Texas agriculture increased 153 percent in value, forest production 105 percent, and mining 249 percent (see Table VI-3).

Table VI-3  Production Values for Texas’ Major Enterprises in 1900 and 1912

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>$119,415,000</td>
<td>$327,000,000</td>
<td>174 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farms</td>
<td>$239,823,000</td>
<td>$607,836,000</td>
<td>153 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>$27,160,000</td>
<td>$55,678,000</td>
<td>105 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>$5,296,000</td>
<td>$18,500,000</td>
<td>249 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fort Worth Record, May 13, 1913, p. 12.*

Despite Fort Worth’s advance Dallas in 1910 remained the industrial superior by wide margins. Dallas led by 107 percent in manufacturers, 151 percent in wage earners, 278 percent in salaries, 103 percent in wages, 137 percent in investment capital, and 211 percent in value of production (see Table VI-4). Of course, the differences were exaggerated because Swift and Armour, still outside Fort Worth city limits, were not included.

Table VI-4  Comparison of Manufacturing Statistics for Fort Worth and Dallas in 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dallas City</th>
<th>Fort Worth</th>
<th>Percentage Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>107 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>6,621</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>151 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>$1,831,000</td>
<td>$484,000</td>
<td>278 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>$2,604,000</td>
<td>$1,285,000</td>
<td>103 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$17,688,000</td>
<td>$7,443,000</td>
<td>137 Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Products</td>
<td>$26,959,000</td>
<td>$8,661,000</td>
<td>211 Percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Thirteenth Census, Vol IX, pp. 1214-1215.*
Those Census figures clashed with a 1910 Texas State Labor Commission study showing Fort Worth with forty-two factories, only six fewer than Dallas’ forty-eight, but with larger total wages, $3,967,230 to $1,221,544, over twice as many factory employees, 61,08 to 2,824, and a higher average wage, $650 to $433 (see Table VI-5).

The obvious contradictions between the 1910 Census and the state report the same year suggest different bases of comparison. For example, in the 1910 Census 6,621 wage earners worked in the city of Dallas but the state study listed only 2,824 for all of Dallas County, which could only be explained by faulty data or that the state considered wage earners separately from salaried personnel. The latter would not explain how the Census found 147 manufacturers in just Fort Worth while the state reported only forty-two in Tarrant County. The unexplainable inconsistency renders the state version unreliable. (see Table VI-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counties</th>
<th>Factories Employed</th>
<th>Wage Earnings</th>
<th>Average wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tarrant</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6,108</td>
<td>$3,967,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>$1,221,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2,388</td>
<td>$1,535,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexar</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>$690,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Paso</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>$422,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>$231,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fort Worth Record, October 8, 1910, p. 1; December 15, 1912, Part 5, p. 10.

Fort Worth ranked very high in other measures of commercial growth. From 1909 to 1910 Tarrant County assessed property values increased $3,817,050 to
$88,502,920 while its 1912 banking deposits reached $26,132,278, an increase of $8,000,000 over 1911. Bank clearings reflected even more remarkable surges, rising to $337,782,874 in 1910, a fifteen percent increase over the 1909’s $292,589,111 and 647 percent more than the 1900 total of $45,193,763. The total dipped slightly in 1911 to $319,933,332 but in the first eleven months of 1912 rebounded to $347,850,187, exceeding both prior years with one month remaining. The percentage increases were so remarkable that Fort Worth ranked fifth nationally comparing 1903 (when the packinghouses opened) to 1913 and comparing 1893 to 1913 (see Table VI-6 and Table VI-7). 4

Table VI-6     Top Five Cities in Percentage Increases in Bank Clearings from 1903 to 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
<th>1913 Bank Clearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>$725,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>$1,211,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>$664,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>$2,850,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>$418,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table VI-7     Top Five Cities in Percentage Increases in Bank Clearings from 1893 to 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>2,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>1,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>1,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland (Oregon)</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fort Worth’s rapid financial growth following 1903 was not a coincidence but rather a direct effect of Swift and Armour. The stockyards area increased from only one acre in 1902 to 120 acres in 1912 with a capacity of 25,000 cattle, 10,000 calves, 15,000 hogs, and 7,000 horses and mules capable of supplying packinghouse processing daily demands of up to 4,500 cattle, 4,000 calves, 10,000 hogs, and 3,500 sheep. That volume of trade was exceeded only by Chicago and Kansas City, making Fort Worth one of a half-dozen sites significantly affecting the world’s market basket. Such massive operations radically boosted the local job market, adding a major stimulus to the economy. Packinghouse jobs were neither plush nor especially well-paying but they offered steady employment with pension plans, free medical services, and English lessons for immigrants. What they lacked in pay they made up for in incredible numbers. In 1912 Swift and Armour employed 3,800 with an annual payroll of up to $3,000,000. The total effect was much larger with associated stockyards businesses employing approximately 6,000 workers and producing trade valued at $75,000,000. The indirect impact was also impressive, especially for Fort Worth’s railroads. In the first eleven months of 1912 the stockyards received 3,794 railcars of livestock, enough to fill 190 trains. Fort Worth residents recognized the overall impact. In a 1910 survey they overwhelmingly credited the packinghouses for their economic success.

Throughout the period from 1910 through 1914 the stockyards experienced steady growth with only minor declines stemming from supply shortages rather than inadequate demand. One of the supply-side dips occurred in 1911 but the market rebounded in 1912, although not completely returning to the 1910 level (see Table VI-8).
Table VI-8  Livestock Received at the Fort Worth Stockyards, 1910 to 1912

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
<th>1912</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>783,754</td>
<td>691,584</td>
<td>-92,170</td>
<td>774,978</td>
<td>+ 83,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>285,800</td>
<td>192,156</td>
<td>-93,644</td>
<td>263,958</td>
<td>+ 71,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>540,881</td>
<td>554,748</td>
<td>+13,867</td>
<td>387,565</td>
<td>-167,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>162,522</td>
<td>195,777</td>
<td>+33,255</td>
<td>283,914</td>
<td>+ 88,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse/Mules</td>
<td>34,445</td>
<td>37,361</td>
<td>+2,916</td>
<td>49,025</td>
<td>+11,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,807,402</td>
<td>1,67,722</td>
<td>-135,776</td>
<td>1,759,440</td>
<td>+ 87,814</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fort Worth stockyards receipts were an anomaly in a national market undergoing declines. In 1911 the seven largest livestock markets experienced drops in cattle supplies, especially Chicago which saw its share of the national cattle market decline from thirty-six to thirty-two percent. In 1911 both Chicago and St. Louis reported decreased cattle and Kansas City declined in both cattle and calves. The situation worsened in 1912 when Fort Worth was the only major market not reporting cattle decreases, helping it rise to third nationally in cattle handled, to second in calves, and fourth in sheep. In addition, Fort Worth was soon to benefit from new rail access to the herds of New Mexico. The happy outcome was reversed concerning hogs. Fort Worth’s hog receipts fell thirty percent, the nation’s largest drop, followed by Chicago down nineteen percent, Kansas City seventeen percent, Omaha twelve percent, St. Joseph twenty-eight percent, and St. Louis but four percent. (see Table VI-9).
During the supply crunch the Fort Worth market benefited from aggressive buyers aided by favorable shipping rates. The local Swift and Armour plants, like many other packinghouses, raided livestock from other markets. In August 1912 the two companies split the $50,000 cost for twenty six railcars filled with hogs arriving from St. Joseph, Missouri. Fort Worth packers enjoyed a considerable advantage in Oklahoma because of a favorable railroad rate structure that made it more expensive to ship cattle from Texas to Oklahoma than from Fort Worth to Chicago, making it unlikely that the Morris Brothers and Sulzberger packinghouses in Oklahoma City could poach at the Fort Worth Stockyards. The combination of price increases, shipping advantages, and wide-ranging buyers increased the hog supply at Fort Worth to the extent that it approached demand in September 1913.\(^7\)

In 1913 and 1914 the Fort Worth market enjoyed a happy co-existence of high prices and supplies while most other markets remained sluggish. In 1913 total stockyards receipts increased fifteen percent over 1912, rising from 1,759,440 to 1,973,166, with over fifty-nine, or 1,143,660, slaughtered by Fort Worth packinghouses (see Table VI-10). The surge solidified Fort Worth’s position as the nation’s third largest livestock
market and helped fuel expansions raising packinghouse employment to 5,000. Driven by the euphoria, some even dreamed of replacing second-place Kansas City.\(^8\)

Table VI-10  Livestock Received at the Fort Worth Stockyards, 1913 and 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>Percentage from 1912</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>Percentage from 1913</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>965,525</td>
<td>+25</td>
<td>990,763</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>219,629</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>185,536</td>
<td>-15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>403,761</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>515,003</td>
<td>+27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>337,527</td>
<td>+19</td>
<td>407,796</td>
<td>+20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses/Mules</td>
<td>56,724</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>47,712</td>
<td>-15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,973,166</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>2,146,810</td>
<td>+8.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Increases in livestock passing through the Fort Worth Stockyards benefited farmers and ranchers across North Texas. In 1914 stock providers received an estimated $67,000,000 based on rates of $55 for steers, $40 for cows, $18 for calves, $13 for hogs, $5 for sheep, and $140 for horses and mules (see Table VI-11). Prices for horses and mules soared after 1914 when representatives from England, France, and Russia, all embroiled in the Great European War, flooded the United States with orders for 20,000 animals. The demand drove local prices to $270 per head and made Fort Worth the world’s third largest horse and mule market.\(^9\)
Table VI-11   Estimated Payout by Livestock Type at the Fort Worth Stockyards, 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livestock Type</th>
<th>Estimated Payout</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>$27,775,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>$20,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>$3,470,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>$6,765,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>$2,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses and Mules</td>
<td>$7,420,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fort Worth Star Telegram*, December 13, 1914, Part 4, p. 7

As of 1910 the packinghouse effect had not sparked a corresponding boom in unrelated industries. A comparison to 1900 showed a massive 2,471 percent increase in livestock received, 2,462 percent in livestock slaughtered, 2,400 percent in packinghouse employees, and 14,900 percent in annual packinghouse trade, indubitable evidence of the effect of Swift and Armour, but growth rates for non-packinghouse industries were remarkably lower. Fort Worth increased in factories thirty-five percent, in capitalization seventy-one percent, and 122 percent in employees. None of the non-packinghouse measures reflected anything close to a 1,000 percent increase (see Table VI-12).
Table VI-12  Comparison of Fort Worth Infrastructure and Industrial Development, 1900 and 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property Assessments</td>
<td>$21,000,000</td>
<td>$54,000,000</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles of Street Railways</td>
<td>29 miles</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miles of Permanent Paving</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Received</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>2,288,700</td>
<td>2,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock Slaughtered</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>1,665,000</td>
<td>2,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Packinghouse Trade</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>$75,000,000</td>
<td>14,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouse Employees</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories other than Packinghouses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories other than Packinghouses</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Capitalization other</td>
<td>$2,688,045</td>
<td>$4,600,000</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Employees other than</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Employees other than</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>3,215</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packinghouses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Water Consumption (gallons)</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>16,500,000</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Trains Daily</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight Trains Daily</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During and after 1910 Fort Worth experienced significant development but much of it involved service and retail entities rather than factories. In 1910 the Westbrook Hotel opened on Third and Fourth between Houston and Main streets with 302 rooms that included amenities like toilets (200 with baths), running hot and cold water, telephones, and air conditioners. The same year the Board of Trade worked to acquire a university, first trying unsuccessfully to sway Southwestern University away from Georgetown, Texas, then succeeding in relocating Texas Christian University (TCU) from Waco. TCU, which opened itself to offers after a fire destroyed its main building, considered Dallas, Waco, and Gainesville before accepting Fort Worth’s offer of $200,000 and a choice of two sites. Initially, subscriptions lagged over doubts of
advantages offered by another college but supporters overcame opposition by emphasizing economic benefits, that the school’s faculty and other employees, plus some 600 students, would contribute $500,000 annually to local commerce. After the fund closed successfully Fort Worth University threatened relocating unless Fort Worth contributed to the establishment of a fifty-acre campus and $200,000 in facilities, criteria required for a $100,000 Methodist Educational Board endowment. The request (demand) faced tough sledding because it represented a large investment increase for an institution with an existing valuation of only $50,000 and because many considered the proposal importunate in view of the $30,000 already donated by Fort Worthians, including $15,000 just four years previously. When an adequate response failed to materialize the university moved to Oklahoma, but the loss was hardly felt since the addition of TCU gave Fort Worth seven colleges enrolling 4,500.10

In 1911 commercial construction reached remarkable levels. Montgomery Ward, attracted by the distribution advantages afforded by railroads, erected a five-story building at Seventh and Grove streets and in August Texas’ largest office building opened after fourteen months of construction. The massive four-story structure, located at Tenth and Commerce streets, covered 1,650,000 square feet with the Majestic Theater occupying the ground floor and the Rock Island and Frisco railroads taking much of the upper space. Also in 1911 construction began on the Fort Worth Wagon Factory, which promised to employ thirty to forty to turn out 120 wagons each month, and on seventy-five acres northwest of Fostepco Heights for the Pierce-Fordyce Refinery costing $1,500,000 and employing 100 to 150. The construction of the refinery was deemed the industrial event of 1911 but its real significance lay it what it portended for the future (see
chapter 7). Suburban residential growth continued with the opening of Hubbard Heights, advertised as removed from the “unpleasant features of commerce and industry,” and Ryan Place between College Avenue and Eighth Avenue, directed at the upscale market, offered as Fort Worth’s only restricted access community and featuring an entrance graced by two columns of Missouri marble. In 1911 construction permits totaled $2,919,942, the second highest total in all the Southwest, ahead of Houston with $2,195,235 and San Antonio’s $1,813,174 but trailing Dallas which led the region with $5,184,422 (Local partisans groused that Dallas benefited from the $1,000,000 Adolphus Hotel).  

Through 1911 the zeal for industrial development seemed undiminished. The Board of Trade was active in that campaign, adopting “We’re for Smoke” as their official slogan (the city commissioners did also). The slogan was a reference to the association between smokestacks and industries, reflecting Fort Worth’s desire for more factories. The organization also changed its name to the Chamber of Commerce out of concern that the Board of Trade implied a limited mandate focused on merchandising. At an August 1911 board dinner on the roof of the new Westbrook Hotel speakers emphasized that work was needed if Fort Worth were to keep up with the manufacturing development of other cities. A pro-active city commission also contributed, proposing in 1911 to offer companies ten years free water “as a means of bringing smoke-stacks to the City [sic],” another reference tying smokestacks to factories.  

The city infrastructure reached a new level of mature development that reflected Fort Worth’s loftier status. In 1910 the city commissioners contracted the electric franchise to J. R. Nutt Company of Cleveland which took over all the facilities of Fort
Worth Power and Light and the electric operations of Fort Worth Gas. As part of the agreement Nutt promised to cut rates in half and spend $2,000,000 building the South’s and Southwest’s grandest generating plant, including the tallest smokestack in the South (250 feet high). In May 1911 ground was broken on the north bank of the Trinity River just west of the streetcar bridge with completion scheduled in one year. On September 1, 1912, a Cleburne Interurban Line opened, making it possible to ride from Denison in extreme North Texas to Cleburne, thirty miles south of Fort Worth. The Cleburne trains ran hourly until 8:30 P.M. with a late theater departure at 11:00 P.M. City streetcar service had reached a point of development in 1912 that carried 40,000 riders daily over twenty-three routes covering sixty-six miles. Also in 1912 a major bond issue funded construction of four bridges, including structures spanning the Trinity River at Seventh Street and North Main Street. The contract for the North Main Bridge, the largest at 1,752 feet long and fifty-four feet wide, went to Hannan and Hickey Brothers Construction of St. Louis for $373,953 while Tarrant County Construction built the Seventh Street bridge for $106,772.13

The public school system stood on relatively equal footing with Texas’ other major cities. In 1910 Fort Worth’s enrollment and faculty ranked fourth in Texas, the same as its population, but had the state’s highest average attendance and length of session. (see Table VI-13).
Table VI-13  Comparison of School Statistics for Texas’ Five Largest Cities in 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Enrollment</th>
<th>Average Attendance Percentage</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>Days in Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>13,047</td>
<td>54.62</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>12,707</td>
<td>59.75</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>11,148</td>
<td>50.52</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>10,516</td>
<td>70.45</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston</td>
<td>4,490</td>
<td>52.44</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The waterworks remained a glaring exception to the litany of progress. That the dual system was inadequate became evident in April 1910 when an outbreak of typhoid was traced to river water in the drinking system. City commissioners blamed pump failure for poor well production, a position seconded by J. H. Howland, a water systems inspector for the National Board of Fire Insurance Underwriters who found the two pumping stations in poor states of repair but thought that a $20,000 dam under construction near the Holley Pumping Station would provide relief. In December 1910 a fire destroyed the Powell field, forcing the almost total abandonment of the Mead system and a reliance on river water to the extent that citizens were warned to boil drinking water. The situation deteriorated further in 1911 when unknown vandals put emery dust in the oil of a new $25,000 air compressor, shattered a Holley Plant pipeline, and clogged pumps using rags. Supply became so poor that Southside residents met to air grievances, including that water had failed to flow for six hours despite assurances from water department personnel repeatedly that all was fine.
The city finally began to turn away from wells and to construction of a large reservoir. A city engineering report issued in December 1912 found that well water could not provide a cost-effective and reliable supply, that the only viable option lay in a surface reservoir coupled with a filtration system. The report suggested three possible sites and the estimated cost associated with each, one on the Clear Fork costing $905,000 and two on the West Fork, the first at Eagle Cliff around the Ten-mile Bridge for $995,000 and the second at Mound Dam, one and one-half miles south of Eagle Cliff, for $1,235,000. In April 1911 voters approved a $1,350,000 bonds issue with $1,000,000 set aside for the reservoir and filtering and $350,000 for well improvements.\(^{15}\)

Progress on the filtration system went smoothly and quickly. On June 29, 1911, work began on a $70,000 system at the Holley Plant that could filter 10,000,000 gallons daily. By July 1913 construction had reached a level allowing testing, which indicated that filtered river water had less bacteria and other contaminants than high-alkaline well water.\(^{16}\)

Reservoir plans began well but costs soon overran estimates. Due to the project’s size the contracts were subdivided into general construction, masonry work, basin digging, erection of the dam, and of laying of a conduit to the filtration system. The original specifications called for a lake thirty feet deep covering 3,000 acres but dimensions expanded to a forty-seven foot depth capable of holding over 7,000,000 cubic feet. Along with the size increases came cost increases, leading one critic to refer to the project as Fort Worth’s Panama Canal, to which the mayor replied that he would be glad if it had a similar benefit. The inflated costs stirred such heated public reactions that
commissioners closed their meeting on finances to avoid confrontations. The uproar probably contributed the mayor’s defeat in the 1912 Democratic primary.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite many problems, including costs and alleged frauds, the reservoir was finally completed in 1913. In November 1912 city officials assured critics that the treasury held $187,000 to finish the reservoir, only to follow in January 1913 with an admission that another $300,000 bond issue would be needed, blaming the increase on the escalation in size from 22,000,000,000 to 30,000,000,000 gallons. The matter became more complicated in May 1913 when the dam’s contractor, the Underground Construction Company, went bankrupt. Left with a partially completed site and a host of unpaid workers, the city opted to supervise the completion, estimating it could finish in about two months at a cost of $29,000 by utilizing the abandoned workforce camped at the construction grounds. Cost inflations may not have reflected poor oversight as much as outright fraud. In 1913 Charles McCormick, former president of the Underground Construction Company, was arrested for inflating charges of reservoir work and W. T. George, a company officer, was accused of bribing inspectors to overlook sub-standard cement and other materials (George was acquitted). In any case, estimates increased wildly, prompting speculation that even the additional $300,000 bond issue would be insufficient, that it would take $550,000 to finish reservoir, pay off $102,000 in outstanding waterworks debt, and provide $200,000 in needed street construction and maintenance. A quick audit found that the situation, as far as reservoir work was concerned, was not that desperate. Of $1,000,000 appropriated only $935,514 had been spent but $428,609 had spent on wells with only $350,000 budgeted. In 1913, after four years, the reservoir was completed at a cost of $1,300,000 and named Lake Worth after
the commission rejected Lake Panther, Lake Tonkeway (after an Indian tribe), and Lake Jarvis. The finished basin covered 4,400 acres, was twenty-seven in miles circumference, and held 25,000,000,000 gallons.\(^{18}\)

Safe drinking water was desperately needed in the fight against disease, a perennial struggle without remarkable progress as epidemics or near epidemics seemed to appear annually. In 1912 Palo Pinto County (approximately thirty miles west) barred travelers from Fort Worth based on reports of hundreds lying stricken with smallpox. They rescinded the order following assurances from the city health office that the disease had been confined after only seventy-six cases, largely among “negroes (sic) and Mexicans (sic).” In January 1913 meningitis hit North Texas with 190 cases reported in Dallas, 100 in Fort Worth, and 97 in Waco. The relationship between those outbreaks and poor drinking water was suggested by repeated warnings to boil drinking water. In 1914 the Health Board again urged that residents boil drinking water after finding that forty percent of the city’s supply was contained by bacilli related to typhoid fever.\(^{19}\)

Other health issues existed besides the water supply. Only in 1910 did city administration suspend dumping sweepings in the middle of streets and then only after many complaints, including one report of a mound on Oak Street reaching three feet high and 100 feet in length. That action may have only have shifted the problem a few yards to larger dumping grounds. In 1914 a large dump filled with all varieties of filth lay just 200 feet west of the Paddock Bridge on the south bank of the Trinity River, extending all the way south to Florence Street (see Illustration VI-1). The city’s sewage problem was made worse by property owners who refused to connect with the municipal system. In 1914 commissioners found that 8,000 buildings, including homes, churches, and business
with many employees, were without sewer service. In 1916 the city finally forced some compliance by demolishing all dry closets situated within 100 feet of sewer line. The state also became involved, mandating that Fort Worth build a $1,000,000 sewage disposal plant or cease dumping raw sewage into the Trinity River. The commissioners rushed to comply since Dallas, which lay downstream, could have enjoined further use of the river. The aldermen also announced plans to build a contagious disease hospital near Peter Smith’s five acre tract across from St. Joseph’s Hospital on South Main Street.  

Fort Worth’s general poor state of health was reflected in a 1910 examination that found approximately one in ten students suffered from disease or deficit (see Table VI-14).

Table VI-14  1910 Report of Afflictions Suffered by Fort Worth School Children

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Number of Children Affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diseased Tonsils</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Eyesight</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(some children sent to school with their grandmother’s glasses)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Teeth</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cervical Adenitis</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(inflammation of lymph nodes or glands)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anemia</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fort Worth Record, July 10, 1910, p. 9.

Prostitution continued to flourish in the Acre but gambling seemed in decline. In 1911 the Waco chief of police, in town for a convention, complained that he had never seen so many prostitutes flocking in the streets and hotels, of course he may have been
only expressing “sour grapes” over Waco’s loss of TCU to Fort Worth. The 1910 police report also confirmed the vitality of the sex for hire trade. The “social evil” accounted 1,153 arrests, the second-highest arrest total (exceeded only by intoxication with 1,598) or approximately one-sixth of 6,932 total arrests. In contrast, gambling charges resulted in only sixty arrests, suggesting that it was no longer as prevalent, a supposition supported by a 1913 complaint by the county attorney that fifty nickel slot machines with a payoff of $1.00 operated under the guise of returning a package of gum. For the county to take note of such a penny-ante operation suggested that the day of open casinos had passed.  

A clamor for reestablishment of a vice reservation arose in the halls of justice, of all places. In October 1910 a Forty-seventh District Court Grand Jury’s report on city graft and corruption asserted that closing the reservation had not eliminated or reduced immorality, that Acre habitués had not diminished and that saloon rooming houses continued to cater to an indecent and immoral clientele. The jury recommended returning to a set-aside section, arguing that the police could exert better control in a concentrated area. In January 1911 the same court declared that the state of conditions allowing “houses of ill fame [to] exist on Main Street to an alarming extent” was unlikely to change until public opinion demanded it. In 1912 a Seventeenth District Court Grand Jury noted that police officers ignored streetwalkers and houses of prostitution until they received complaints while in 1913 the Forty-seventh Grand Jury called once again for restricting prostitutes to a defined district to counteract their dispersal into the rooming house district.
In 1911 citizens also petitioned for reinstatement of the reservation, arguing that closure had spread vice into the business district, simply moving it from Commerce and Calhoun streets to Main and Houston streets. They noted that Houston and Dallas had established reservations and that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals had sustained Dallas’ right to designate an area specifically for the regulation of “houses of ill-repute.” Police Commissioner Bob Davis, Chief of Police O. R. Montgomery, and Sheriff William Rea supported the petition, arguing that, since prostitution would endure in any case, the better choice lay in confining it to a well-lighted and well-polic ed section where liquor was prohibited. The commissioners appointed the petitioners as a committee to locate a suitable spot.  

J. Frank Norris, pastor of the First Baptist Church at Third and Taylor streets, became one of the reservation’s most vocal critics. Norris, described by the *New York Times* as a “saloon-fighting Baptist minister,” declared no owner of property used for immoral purposes could remain a church member and threatened injunctions blocking the reservation. From the pulpit and other venues he called on the city commissioners to make a real cleanup, not just a whitewash, of Hell’s Half Acre, arguing that it no longer facilitated but retarded progress, that its removal would bring residents of “the best sorts.”

In 1912 a series of arsons and other crimes plagued Norris. On January 10, 1912, a suspicious fire did $5,000 in damages to his church and four days later two shots narrowly missed him as he sat in the church study. On February 4 both the church and Norris’ home at 810 West Fifth Street suffered fire damage, on February 27 a man attempted to assault Norris around 913 West Second Street but was fought off by a
companion, and in March Norris and the church deacon received letters threatening more violence. The Forty-eighth District Court Grand Jury investigated, calling the pastor and others to testify, then indicted Norris for perjury after forensic evidence linked the threatening letters to the parsonage. The night Norris made bond his home suffered serious damage during an early morning fire that began in an inside closet.\textsuperscript{25}

Many stood by the embattled preacher. Church members published a statement of support and the pastor of Waco’s First Methodist outspokenly defended Norris as the victim of Fort Worth’s lack of morals, which he described as some of the worst of all Texas cities. The Waco supporter blamed the climate contributing to the attacks on Norris’ opposition to prostitution and gambling, stating that the mayor and many Fort Worth businessmen protected the Acre because they were willing to sacrifice moral welfare to achieve urban commercial supremacy.\textsuperscript{26}

Norris survived more indictments and two trials but continued his involvement in shady affairs. At the end of March 1912 he resigned from the pulpit, citing poor health, just as additional indictments charged him with arson in the fires at the church and his home. The perjury trial began April 9, 1912, ending April 24 with a not guilty verdict. The arson charge, which was almost dismissed, went to trial in August 1913 after reports surfaced of $1,500 being offered for anyone willing to take the heat off Norris by confessing. Norris again won acquittal despite testimony that placed him leaving the church just before the fire. The narrow escapes did little to rein in Norris. In 1916 an ardent young supporter shot himself in the hand during Norris’ church service. Subsequent investigations revealed a plot in which the man was to shoot into the ceiling, then escape, leaving Norris to claim he had survived an assassination. The scheme went
awry when the pistol discharged inadvertently, wounding the accomplice so that he could
not complete his escape.27

The Acre probably faced a bigger threat from the prohibition movement than from
Norris and his ilk. Prohibition had gathered strength in the 1880s, especially in a stretch
of states of the Upper South and West, including Texas, but died out only to be reborn in
1908. The renewed effort enjoyed success in rural counties so that by 1910 some 156 of
Texas’ 254 counties had voted dry. After 1913, after winning more impressive victories
and adding converts, the movement segued into cities, the stronghold of anti-
prohibitionists. Fort Worth’s brewery industry fought back through advertising touting
beer’s nutritional value, noting that the British classified it as a food, and its low alcohol
content, which made it “absolutely harmless” in moderation. A prohibition referendum
in July 1911 lost statewide by a bare majority of 226,999 to 223,748 but by larger margin
in Tarrant County, 7,295 to 5,932. Stymied at complete eradication, prohibitionists
chipped away through legislation, including a 1913 a state law mandating that saloons
close at 9:30 P.M., a measure that local saloon owners warned would cost $400 in daily
sales and 200 jobs. Although those predictions may have been an exaggeration, the
number of saloon licenses issued in Fort Worth did decline from 176 in 1914 to 160 in
1915.28

Any decline in the Acre’s trade may have been more a product of a diversifying
entertainment scene for the common man. Nell Irvin Painter’s study of reform between
1870 and 1919 suggested that the latter period differed from the former in the availability
of mass entertainment accessible to working class Americans. Prior to the 1910s saloons
had played an important role in working-class leisure but their influence eroded due, not
only to prohibition and temperance movements, but also, to the spread of movies, baseball, and amusement parks. The most noticeable entertainment development in Fort Worth appeared in a proliferation of cinemas after 1910. One of the earliest, the Healy Theater, opened on June 16, 1910, at 1004 Main Street with 340 seats—including 125 in the balcony for smokers. Fort Worth’s morality guardians reacted quickly to control the new medium, establishing a three-person censorship board in 1911. Some of their trepidation stemmed from increased juvenile delinquency in the East and North that had been associated with the arrival of movie houses. It was not just the content that caused worries. The Law Enforcement League organized around a call for enforcement of City Ordinance 473 forbidding most Sunday recreations, including movies. The Citizens Welfare League, supported by Paddock, successfully struck back in a three-page appeal published in two local newspapers that called for “more liberal enforcement of the Sunday laws to give to the people innocent entertainment.” The first Sunday following repeal saw 20,000 crowd into Fort Worth’s eleven theaters but the issue remained unresolved because Tarrant County, with concurrent jurisdiction, also banned most forms of Sunday entertainment. The county statute posed a much more difficult problem since county officials answered to rural constituents who tended to be more conservative. Given the political costs associated with repeal, the county commissioners opted for a traditional subterfuge, assessing limited but regular fines that allowed uninterrupted operations while maintaining the law’s appearance. County law officers cooperated by scheduling raids between features to avoid interrupting films in progress.29

The growth of other entertainment and the slight decrease in saloons did little to make Fort Worth less violent. In 1910 a police captain shot and killed a Texas Ranger
under nebulous circumstances. The incident began on January 21, 1910, when J. M. “Grude” Britton appeared at police headquarters to complain about Captain Tom Blanton’s conduct during a raid on the Amarillo Hotel, a “well-known disorderly house” (house of prostitution) on Jennings Street between Twelfth and Thirteen streets owned by a female friend. Connections between law officers and the demimonde were not unusual, even Captain Blanton owned the Senate Saloon at Sixth and Main streets. When Britton became irate and threatening, the desk sergeant demanded his weapon but rescinded the order after Britton displayed Texas Ranger identification. As a second captain escorted Britton down the city hall steps, Blanton, returning after hearing of the allegations, walked up and fired three shots into Britton’s chest.  

Between 1913 and 1915 three police officers were killed in the line of duty. In 1913 Tommie Lee, an African-American, shot and killed Officer Tom Ogiltree and another man and wounded two others. The spree began when Lee apparently went berserk, firing at a man on the street, then running into McGar’s Pool Hall where he killed Walter Moore and shot a seventeen-year old boy, both bystanders. Lee left the pool hall fleeing east to Eighth and Grove streets where he shot Ogiltree as the officer responded to the sound of gunshots. Lee then seriously wounded a junk dealer before shooting himself in the jaw as a crowd of 2,000 surrounded him in a culvert on East Fifth Street. Afterwards, a crowd of 500 battered the door to the Tarrant County Jail, leaving only when allowed inside to verify that Lee had been removed. The mob turned its anger on the black business district around East Ninth and Calhoun streets, spending the night beating any hapless African-American found as well as breaking windows and destroying
shops, all without police interference. Lee paid the ultimate price for his actions when he was executed by hanging at the county jail on March 9, 1914.\textsuperscript{31}

Two policemen were killed in 1915. Police Captain G. Frank Coffey was shot to death on June 26, 1915, in front of Buck Cooper and Sons Saloon at North Main and Twenty-fifth streets in the stockyards district. Coffey had gone to the tavern to arrest Ed Cooper but was shot by Tom Cooper, a brother. A jury acquitted Tom Cooper after fellow officer Henry Vaughan testified that Coffey had drawn his weapon first. The next month Officer Pete Howard died after being stabbed eight times in the back and having his throat cut while making an arrest in Battercake Flats, a squalid area located just north of the Tarrant County Courthouse that was known for its “bad negroes.” Howard had been walking an arrestee up a hill to the city jail when the man began fighting and was joined by an accomplice. The two escaped immediate apprehension but in 1916 Martin Flores received a life sentence and in 1918 Joe Estapanear, who did the actual stabbing, was killed by an United States Army sentry near Reynosa, a Mexican town across the border from McAllen, Texas. Estapanear had joined a bandit gang preying on victims on both sides of the border.\textsuperscript{32}

Fort Worth’s broken but relentless commercial and infrastructure advances stood in contrast to its lack of progress in race relations. From 1910 to 1918 African-Americans were more often victims rather than perpetrators of violence. On February 10, 1911, Will Knox, arrested for an attempted assault on white woman and sentenced the next day to four years confinement, was shot and killed by the victim’s husband as deputies walked him down the courthouse steps. Despite the swift retribution the black community suffered abuses. On February 18, 1911, while police officers stood idly by, a
crowd of 1,000 ruffians destroyed the Dixie Theater, a recently-opened black cinema at Main and Eleventh streets. The police chief claimed that officers had not interfered to avoid injuring innocent bystanders but Judge Swayne, who remained unconvinced, ordered his Forty-seventh District Court Grand Jury to investigate the “disgrace” and indict any officers who failed to do their duty.  

The Knox incident was just one of many injustices meted out to blacks. In 1910 Fort Worth Commissioner Mulkey announced the appointment of special policemen to drive out idle African-Americans and the commission voted unanimously to ban film of the Jack Johnson-Jim Jeffries championship boxing match because it involved a black man (Johnson) fighting a white man (Jeffries). In 1911 four blacks from Dallas on a motoring jaunt were arrested twice within twenty minutes by officers who assumed the car was stolen. Also in 1911 police officers had to fight off an angry mob to rescue a white woman and black man discovered to be traveling together at the Texas and Pacific Passenger Depot. In 1913 a storm of protest erupted after the mayor addressed an African-American Odd Fellows convention, forcing him to deny having told the group that he was honored to have them in Fort Worth.  

Other groups also faced injustice and segregation. In 1911 clashes between Anglos and Hispanics became so frequent and bloody that the police raided “Little Mexico,” a largely Hispanic district around Twelfth and Calhoun streets, arresting forty-eight. The next day the presiding municipal judge complained of difficulty in distinguishing prisoners because all but one sported a mustache. Many new arrivals from eastern Europe crowded into squalid housing around Calhoun and Commerce between Twenty-second and Twenty-third streets in the packinghouse district where an immigrant
community held up to 1,000 recent arrivals from Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Rumania, Bohemia, Spain, Mexico, Poland, and Germany. In one case forty Macedonians existed in eight hotel rooms while in another thirty-six Serbians shared just six rooms. Immigrants, welcomed at first for their cheap labor, were quickly rejected when the economy soured. During the 1912 downturn Fort Worth’s United Charities asked the Galveston immigration office to head off foreigners, suggesting that “bohunks” without employment be denied entry.35

At times city government demonstrated sensibilities ahead of its time. In May 1916 residents of 1300 New York Street petitioned for the forceful removal of three black families from neighborhood while in January 1917 another group sought the banishment of a “colony of Mexicans” living in the area of South Main Street around the Gulf, Colorado, and Santa Fe Railroad, alleging that they constituted a nuisance and lowered property values. Both appeals went to the city lawyer who ruled that the city could not restrict habitations based on color or nationality.36

Racism may not have extended to residential codes but it was part of Fort Worth boosterism. In 1910 the Board of Trade boasted that “Fort Worth has the most nearly all-white population of any city in the Southwest.” They based the claim on school statistics indicating that African-Americans constituted only ten percent of the student body in Fort Worth public schools, compared to fifteen to seventeen percent for San Antonio, Dallas, and Houston. In addition, the Board of Trade advertised that San Antonio had a larger “Mexican” population and that Houston had more foreign born. The converse of that boast was that Fort Worth had more Hispanics than Houston or Dallas and more foreign
born than Dallas or San Antonio, the former explained by Hispanics working as railroad labor and the latter by Eastern European immigrants employed by the packinghouses.37

Despite its racist rhetoric the Board of Trade performed laudable work promoting railroad and industrial development. In 1910 Newton H. Lassiter, the board president who was also general attorney for the Rock Island and Trinity and Brazos Valley railroads, supported a northwest line through Springtown and Azle that would run north of the Texas and Pacific and south of Fort Worth and Denver tracks. Lassiter pushed the route as necessary to prevent forfeiture of the region’s trade to Kansas City and St. Louis. The first segment, stretching thirty miles to Springtown, required a $500,000 subscription that would then serve as bond security to finance the remaining mileage. Lassiter’s proposal was supplanted in 1912 by an agreement to extend the Gulf, Texas, and Western Railway eastward from Jacksboro, sixty miles north west of Fort Worth, to a connection with the Texas and Pacific tracks in Palo Pinto providing access all the way to Seymour, a distance of 135 miles, at minimal cost.38

The Fort Worth economy that had showed such promise in 1910 and 1911 struggled in 1912 through 1914 with few initiatives. The big news in 1912 involved the largest real estate transaction in Fort Worth’s history (to that date), the $450,000 sale of the James Building at Seventh and Main streets. In 1913 Fort Worth claimed to be the cold storage center of the Southwest with just six fewer carloads of capacity than the all the rest of Texas. Also in 1913 a Denton interurban line opened, as did the Texas Power and Light plant costing $2,500,00, the Pierce-Fordyce Oil Refinery costing $1,500,000, and several smaller factories. In 1914 a new Chamber of Commerce auditorium, touted as the grandest southwest of Kansas City, opened, plans were announced for a ten-story
building on Main Street between Ninth and Tenth streets, and the Fort Worth National Bank merged with the State National, creating a $10,000,000 super bank. While the list appeared impressive all the listings except the proposed skyscraper involved completing projects begun earlier, a suggestion that the economy was coasting rather than expanding.  

The economy’s distress became evident in 1913 and 1914. The Chamber of Commerce displayed remarkable candor in its 1913 annual report, admitting that the year’s progress had not been spectacular, that railroad traffic had sagged and building permits had dropped from $3,389,333 in 1912 to $2,154,423, a loss of over thirty-six percent. To make matters worse, the construction of 1913 included only six factory projects amounting to $90,000, or less than five percent of total permits, with residential building accounting for over ninety-five percent. In 1914 permits declined another three percent to $2,087,404. In part, the 1914 declines were part of a temporary depression in the American economy following the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1914. Fort Worth’s bank clearings reflected the war’s effect, falling in September 1914, then rebounding in December, but closing the year down almost $22,000,000 from 1913 with $396,153,383.  

The war certainly exercised a limited negative effect but the Fort Worth economy also suffered from a loss of industrial focus. The Chamber of Commerce’s list of objectives for 1912—parks and boulevards beautification, road and bridge improvements, and promotion through advertising—indicated a shift to developing existing facilities rather than attracting factories. The chamber spent much of its energy on sojourns designed to increase patronage at local merchants. In July 1912 approximately 100
boosters traveled to Gainesville and Whitesboro and in October a large contingent took a six-day whirlwind tour of fifty Panhandle and West Texas towns. The chamber’s 1912 annual summary listed the establishment of those trade ties as a major accomplishment. Doubtless they increased wholesale and retail sales but they also represented an opportunity cost in attention diverted away from industrial development.\textsuperscript{41}

Paddock and other supporters remained upbeat and optimistic. Paddock argued that more building occurred in 1913 than in any other single year since the packinghouses arrived, that new residents had stimulated $5,000,000 in construction, over twice the official permit figure. Of course that position tended to verify the dominance of residential over commercial construction but Paddock may well have been correct in that Fort Worth permits did not include development outside the city limits. That possibility lay behind a \textit{Record} editorial maintaining that Fort Worth was on its way to becoming the largest manufacturing center of the South and West despite perceptions of retarded growth brought on because most construction occurred away from the city center, making it less visible to the general public and visitors. Of course, that point did nothing to explain the drop in bank clearings.\textsuperscript{42}

At the end of 1914 signs of revival appeared. A relaxation of financial tensions and increases in the credit supply had a national uplifting effect that touched the local economy. Fort Worth benefited disproportionately after 1914 from significant increases in the demand for food attributable to the European war. Fort Worth’s position as a livestock and grain center with eighty-seven of its 285 factories involved in food production or processing put it in an excellent position to reap economic rewards. War-induced demands dramatically increased prices paid for most livestock, especially horses
and mules, and food stuffs in general. The effects of that surge increased packinghouses production twenty-six percent, the number of rail cars inspected to 1,116,681, or almost fifteen percent above 1913, and helped make Fort Worth in 1914 the largest grain market in the Southwest with eighteen elevators holding 3,375,000 bushels and two mills processing enough grain annually to fill 29,108 railcars. In addition, Fort Worth lack of integration with the cotton trade insulated it from a price fall depressing most of the South. The advantages elevated Fort Worth in 1914 to first among Texas cities in payroll, workforce, and average wage as well as in percentage of population owning homes.  

The war’s stimulation also glossed over the troublesome issue of stalled commercial development plaguing Fort Worth since 1910. In 1913 Paddock blamed the stalled Fort Worth economy on the negativity of civic leadership, an unusual complaint in a town that had benefited so greatly from its citizens’ sacrifices. The depths to which Fort Worth’s industrialization drive had sunk was clear in the 1914 Chamber of Commerce annual report that failed to list even one new factory. The post-1911 recession certainly played a role but the evidence suggests that Fort Worth also suffered from a changed focus that stressed merchants over manufacturers. To a degree, Fort Worth’s turn away from aggressive industrial solicitation was propelled by regional forces. In 1910 W. F. Sterling, general agent of the Fort Worth and Denver Railroad, observed that Texas emphasized trade to the detriment of its industrial development, that the whole state lagged industrially because Texans had not developed an appreciation of manufacturing’s importance and, therefore, remained content to act as wholesalers and retailers. In that context the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce’s focus on
merchandising in 1912 can be viewed as a local manifestation of a state-wide phenomenon. In the next four years a redirection would occur at a most fortunate time.44
Chapter Six Endnotes


2 Fort Worth Star Telegram, September 23, 1910, p. 1; October 30, 1949, Merchandising Section, p. 2; Fort Worth Record, September 28, 1910, p. 1.

3 Fort Worth Star Telegram, May 22, 1912, p. 14; Fort Worth Record, October 26, 1910, pp. 1, 9.

4 Fort Worth Record, October 7, 1910, p. 13; October 27, 1910, p. 1; December 15, 1912, Part 3, p. 3. Note: In 1910 the top ten wealthiest list according to tax evaluations was Winfield Scott, the city’s only millionaire with $1,388,030, followed by R. D. Farmer with $507,550 with the eight others ranging from $400,000 to $169,000.


6 Fort Worth Record, February 11, 1910, p. 10; December 31, 1911, p. 14; January 2, 1913, p. 14; December 15, 1912, Part 3, p. 3.

7 Fort Worth Record, August 11, 1912, p. 16; Fort Worth Star Telegram, September 28, 1913, p. 20; New York Times, May 21, 1911, p. 12.

8 Fort Worth Record, December 15, 1918, Part 4, p. 1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, June 14, 1914, Part 4, p. 1; December 13, 1914, Part 4, p. 7.


10 Fort Worth Record, March 29, 1910, p. 3; April 10, 1910, p. 11; May 4, 1910, p. 5; May 11, 1910, p. 1; June 11, 1910, p. 5; June 22, 1910, p. 4; June 23, 1910, p. 9; July 1, 1910, p. 1; May 10, 1911, p. 5; March 31, 1911, p. 5; May 22, 1912, p. 14; City Council Minutes, Vol. Y, August 9, 1911.

11 Fort Worth Record, December 16, 1910, p. 7; April 1, 1911, p. 3; August 20, 1911, pp. 3, 8; November 5, 1911, p. 1; July 28, 1912, p. 11; March 19, 1911, p. 12; December 17, 1911, p. 28.

12 Council Minutes, Vol U, April 11, 1911; Fort Worth Record, April 9, 1911, p. 13; August 8, 1911, p. 7; December 7, 1911, p. 7. Note: When the board changed to the Chamber of Commerce it also named Paddock honorary president for life.

13 Fort Worth Record, October 2, 1910, p. 1; May 16, 1911, p. 3; September 1, 1912, pp. 7-8; October 13, 1912, p. 11; September 29, 1912, p. 9; October 26, 1912, p. 8.

14 Fort Worth Record, April 10, 1910, p. 10; September 2, 1910, p. 5; December 9, 1910, p. 10; December 11, 1910, p. 18; December 12, 1910, p. 7; June 18, 1911, p. 1; August 9, 1911, p. 9.

15 Fort Worth Record, December 30, 1910, p. 10; June 1, 1913, p. 12.

16 Fort Worth Record, June 20, 1911, p. 14; June 9, 1911, p. 4; July 9, 1913, p. 1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, September 18, 1913, p. 1.
The Dallas lawsuit had been brought by neighborhood residents who sued on the grounds that the vice reservation devalued their property and sanctioned an activity prohibited under the Texas constitution. See Fort Worth Record, January 15, 1911. On October 26, 1913, ex-Chief of Police Renfro was indicted by the Forty-eighth District Court for maintaining a disorderly house at 205 and 205 East Belknap Street, see Fort Worth Star Telegram, October 26, 1913, p. 20.


Painter, Standing at Armageddon, p. 385.
Fort Worth developed distinct neighborhoods. Irish Town, located east of Jones Street was known in 1923 as the bloodiest police beat, began as an Irish section but deteriorated and became largely African American. Little Mexico was located around lower Calhoun and Jones near the Acre, Little Africa was on East Ninth, the Cabbage Patch was near the wholesale vegetable market along Front Street that had immigrants from many nations that after 1918 became known as the League of Nations, Battercake Flats ran a few blocks west of courthouse between Weatherford and Belknap Streets, Hogan’s Alley was a small enclave on Thirteenth, Bum’s Bowery, a nationally known haven for “traveling gentlemen,” or hoboés, was on the north side of the Texas and Pacific west yard, and Quality Grove was an African-American section on the Northside. The more affluent neighborhoods included the Gold Coast, a highbrow area around Summit and Pennsylvania, Silk Stocking Lane on Main and Houston between Fourth and Eighth was named for the upper-class women who flocked to its fine shops. See Fort Worth Star Telegram, February 18, 1923, p. 14.


33 Fort Worth Star Telegram, February 11, 1911, pp. 1, 7; February 28, 1911, pp. 1, 11; March 6, 1911, p. 1.

34 Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 19, 1910, p. 9; July 5, 1910, p. 2; April 14, 1911, p. 11; October 6, 1911, p. 1; August 6, 1913, p. 2; New York Times, July 10, 1910, p. 3.

35 Fort Worth Star Telegram, November 12, 1911, p. 1; November 13, 1911, p. 10; November 24, 1911, p. 20; November 25, 1913, p. 11; Fort Worth Record, January 20, 1912, p. 12.


37 Fort Worth Record, July 10, 1910, Part 2, p. 1; October 7, 1910, p. 9.

38 Fort Worth Record, November 5, 1910, p. 4; February 8, 1911, p. 7; February 14, 1912, p. 1.

39 Fort Worth Record, March 7, 1912, p. 8; August 16, 1913, p. 1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 28, 1913, p. 3; January 24, 1914, p. 8; January 29, 1914, p. 14; February 1, 1914, p. 1.

40 Fort Worth Record, December 7, 1911, p. 7; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 28, 1913, p. 3; November 20, 1913, p. 11; December 14, 1913, p. 11; February 25, 1913, p. 11.

41 Fort Worth Record, October 11, 1911, p. 10; July 10, 1912, p. 7, October 24, 1912, p. 3; October 29, 1912, p. 1.

42 Fort Worth Star Telegram, November 20, 1913, p. 11; Fort Worth Record, August 16, 1913, p. 1.


44 Fort Worth Record, January 12, 1910, p. 7; Fort Worth Star Telegram, November 20, 1913, p. 11.
After 1915 Fort Worth bloomed, achieving most of the goals that had driven boosters since 1880. The key to that development centered around a remarkably successful economy that boomed under multiple stimuli. The packinghouses, straining to meet insatiable demands, were just part of the equation. Fort Worth shook off its post-1903 complacency to reap tremendous benefits from America’s entry into world War I, winning not just a major field base but also three military air fields. At the same time oil became a major factor in the Fort Worth economy after vast supplies were discovered just ninety miles west. Together, the three forces propelled Fort Worth past Dallas in manufacturing, a long-cherished but never achieved dream.

The army’s presence, beside stimulating the economy, provided the salient factor that finally ended official recognition and acceptance of vice. Attacks on the Acre had waxed and waned throughout Fort Worth’s history but in 1917 that opposition benefited from army imperatives linking abstinence from liquor and prostitution to patriotism and military preparedness. That combination proved too strong for even the Acre to overcome. Alcohol and sex for hire did not disappear but they no longer existed with Fort Worth’s official acceptance.

During the commercial sluggishness lasting from 1912 through 1914, Fort Worth, like many cities, had retrenched in the face of changing conditions but entered 1915 confident that the local economy had survived and was on its way up. Banking statistics charted a clear course of economic recovery. Fort Worth banks held $23,807,915 on deposit on December 31, 1915, a forty percent increase over the same date in 1914 and
bank clearings, which had sagged in 1914, rose ten percent in 1915. The improved commercial situation also affected Dallas, where bank clearings grew at an even higher rate but still trailed Fort Worth by almost $78,000,000 (see Table VII-1).\(^1\)

Table VII-1  Increase in Fort Worth and Dallas Bank Clearings, 1915 over 1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>Increase over 1914</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>$435,289,425</td>
<td>$39,136,042</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>$357,822,044</td>
<td>$48,000,000</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fort Worth Record*, January 1, 1916, p. 2; September 29, 1916, p. 3.

Statistics from the United States Census Bureau indicated that Fort Worth’s population growth outperformed Texas’ other large cities. Between 1910 and July 1915 the estimated population reached almost 100,000, an addition of 26,216, or almost thirty-six percent, the largest total and percentage increases of the four largest cities. As a result, Fort Worth briefly passed Houston to become the state’s third largest city (see Table VII-2).

Table VII-2  U. S. Census Estimated Population Increases in Texas’ Four Largest Cities from 1910 to July 1915

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>July 1, 1915</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>96,164</td>
<td>119,447</td>
<td>22,283</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>92,104</td>
<td>116,604</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>73,312</td>
<td>99,528</td>
<td>26,216</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>78,800</td>
<td>96,523</td>
<td>17,723</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fort Worth Record*, August 9, 1915, p. 1.
Population growth and the expansion of Fort Worth’s bank business in 1915 to become the envy of Texas were directly attributable to the packinghouses. In part that effect was historical. In the course of fourteen years since the arrival of Swift and Armour to 1916 the Fort Worth Stockyards paid out $1,000,000,000 for livestock, a substantial sum affecting local banking. After 1914 the historical effect was complemented by war-driven demands for American foodstuffs that increased prices and profits to new levels. In 1916 the Record described the United States’ effort to satisfy both domestic and foreign demands as a great sacrifice requiring the depletion of 50,000,000 animals each year. While the war’s effect benefited large sections of the American economy, Fort Worth, as a grain and livestock center, enjoyed a disproportionate share of that impact. By 1916 the packinghouses’ capital investment rose to at least $10,000,000 and its workforce to 4,700 with a $3,000,000 annual payroll to produce goods valued at more than the total manufacturing and wholesale trade of either San Antonio or Dallas.²

The packinghouse effect touched much more than Swift and Armour. Around the two plants a $5,000,000 cognate infrastructure developed that included subsidiary plants, rail facilities, and commission houses, all employing hundreds. Approximately 250 worked at the stockyards and its beltline rail service, another 400 at the nearby Southwestern Mechanical Company, and 200 at seventeen commission houses. But the effect spread far outside the confines of Fort Worth’s Northside. Most of the $1,000,000,000 the packers spent on livestock between 1903 and 1916 went into the pockets of area ranchers and farmers who supplied many of the 23,261,716 purchased at an average price of $43.42. In addition, the Fort Worth Stockyards supplied other
slaughterhouses and buyers. Over half the cattle and substantial percentages of other animals sold at the stockyards were not processed locally (see Table VII-3).³

Table VII-3  Total Livestock Received at the Fort Worth Stockyards and Processed at Local Packinghouses from the Opening of Swift and Armour in 1903 to 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Locally Processed</th>
<th>Percentage Locally Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>10,171,886</td>
<td>4,811,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>2,694,612</td>
<td>2,095,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>7,008,249</td>
<td>5,889,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>2,937,902</td>
<td>1,578,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses and Mules</td>
<td>449,067</td>
<td>1,578,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,261,716</td>
<td>14,374,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The large percentage of livestock not processed locally, especially in cattle and sheep, reflected a high level of supply. In 1915 a network of eighty buyers representing ten packinghouses and other non-Fort Worth firms bought 382,263 cattle, 144,637 calves, 70,694 hogs, and 94,455 sheep, and 47,242 horses and mules (over eighty-eight percent of the 53,640 horses and mules received). The amount of livestock being shipped out contributed to the establishment of a new Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railroad line to Kansas City, giving Fort Worth eighteen railways running over twelve trunk lines that interchanged seventy-five percent of all Texas rail traffic.⁴

The demand surge occasioned by the European war juxtaposed propitiously with general supply increases to create a vibrant and prosperous commerce. In 1915 stockyard receipts fell in every category, except horses and mules, due to a hoof-and-mouth quarantine against cattle in Mexico, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, but rebounded in 1916,
allowing both Swift and Armour to increase their capacities dramatically. The hog supply, a perennial problem, seemed to have been solved as receipts jumped 139.2 percent between 1915 and 1916 (see Table VII-4). The surfeit of hogs fueled rumors that Cudahy Packing would build on land south of the stockyards served by the beltline rail line. Sales of horses and mules also increased with many becoming part of 425,000 shipped to Europe by September 1915, mostly to England but a few going to France and Italy. Armour’s profit margin did well enough that in April 1917 the company announced a bonus for 1,200 employees equal to five percent of their annual salary. The packinghouse were Fort Worth’s clear economic leader with an annual value of production greater than that of the next ten largest businesses combined (see Table VII-5).^5

Table VII-4  Livestock Received at the Fort Worth Stockyards, 1915 and 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Percentage Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>794,505</td>
<td>905,345</td>
<td>+110,840</td>
<td>+14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calves</td>
<td>149,926</td>
<td>175,177</td>
<td>+25,251</td>
<td>+16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>403,879</td>
<td>968,024</td>
<td>+564,145</td>
<td>+139.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>363,003</td>
<td>430,911</td>
<td>+67,908</td>
<td>+18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses/Mules</td>
<td>53,640</td>
<td>79,209</td>
<td>+25,569</td>
<td>+47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,764,953</td>
<td>2,558,666</td>
<td>+793,713</td>
<td>+45.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table VII-5  Estimated Annual Value of Production of Fort Worth’s Packers and the Next Ten Largest Industries in 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Dollar Amount of Annual Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Packers</td>
<td>$50,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next Ten Largest Industries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain Milling</td>
<td>$12,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Refining</td>
<td>$10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creamery</td>
<td>$ 3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Working</td>
<td>$ 2,750,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture</td>
<td>$ 2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Seed Mills</td>
<td>$ 2,087,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silos</td>
<td>$ 1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing</td>
<td>$ 1,250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>$     850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakeries</td>
<td>$     500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$37,437,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Initially, the European war constricted capital, which limited new construction, but domestic financing eventually expanded to fill the shortfall. At the end of 1915 Ford Motor Company opened an assembly plant on Commerce Street and the Burdett Oxygen Company of Chicago, manufacturers of welding gases, announced construction of a $250,000 plant at Jones and Twenty-third streets, financed in part by local investors who bought $100,000 in stock. In 1916 easier credit brought city building permits to $2,127,884, almost $1,000,000 over 1915, but most of the permits involved small-scale projects, including 300 new homes averaging $2,500 each, a total of $750,000 or over thirty-five percent of all permits. The only big-ticket items involved were two new creameries and two commercial additions amounting to $100,000 or more in construction.
costs. The most important economic news of 1916 occurred outside the city limits and, therefore, outside the purview of permits, at 2600 West Seventh where work began on a Chevrolet assembly plant costing $350,000 and capable of producing 150 cars daily. Production went so well that in September 1916 expansion raised the capital investment to $900,000 and employment to 1,500. The demand for steel, much of which went into oil pipelines, put Fort Worth’s Texas Rolling Mills on a twenty-four hour shift, justifying a $300,000 expansion that increased employment to 300.⁶

Other industries also thrived. In 1917 the printing trades, which had long been a staple of the local economy, boasted that their annual payroll was sufficient to build a ten-story building. Fort Worth also became Texas’ largest and the nation’s fourteenth largest storage center for wheat, corn, and oats with seventeen elevators capable of holding 4,885,000 bushels while its three flour mills produced 3,000 barrels daily. The grain trade facilitated construction of a $250,000 Purina Mills’ plant with half the capital provided by local investors who received preferred stock returning six percent interest. The combined effect was important but the grain trade accounted for only $45,000,000 in 1917, a pittance compared to livestock’s $250,000,000, or more than half of the value of all agricultural products processed in Fort Worth (see Table VII-6). Fort Worth also continued as a leading wholesale center, thanks largely to access provided through its rail transport network. In the fiscal year ending August 31, 1916, jobbers reported a trade of $200,000,000, a 160 percent increase since 1913 (see Table VII-7). While wholesalers put up impressive dollar sales they created few jobs and accounted for very little in value-added transactions because they simply merchandised goods overwhelmingly produced elsewhere.⁷
Table VII-6  Value of Agricultural Products Processed in Fort Worth in 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Agricultural Commodity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>$250,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits and Vegetables</td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>$  80,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>$  45,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peanuts</td>
<td>$    2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cream</td>
<td>$    1,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry and Eggs</td>
<td>$       600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table VII-7  Estimated Annual Value of Fort Worth’s Wholesale and Jobbing Trade, 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Annual Trade Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>$70,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>$50,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>$40,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocery</td>
<td>$  9,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Produce</td>
<td>$  7,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware</td>
<td>$  5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquors</td>
<td>$  3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>$  2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry Goods</td>
<td>$  2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>$     600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fort Worth’s economic success was most clearly evident on Main Street, the city’s commercial thoroughfare. In 1916 a total of 710 businesses covering ninety-two fields crowded the street’s expanse from the Tarrant County Courthouse on the north to the railroad tracks south of Front Street. The list included 101 law offices, 80 doctor’s clinics, 42 bars, 29 cafes, 8 banks, 7 picture shows and pool halls, 5 hamburger stands, 4
department stores, 3 military recruiting offices, and 1 bowling alley. Clear divisions marked the street’s major sections. Law and professional offices tended to congregate around the courthouse, department stores occupied the middle section, and businesses serving a more transient trade grouped close to the railroad terminals.⁹

After 1914 economic growth seemed to occur without much encouragement. Fort Worth investors purchased stock in the Burdett Oxygen Company and the Purina Mills Plant and some new businesses, such as the Chevrolet assembly plant, received donated land, but direct subsidies seemed to be a thing of the past. In 1916 S. B. Ricaby, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, did suggest foregoing taxes on industries building in the undeveloped area between the stockyards and downtown. Ricaby put forth the initiative as a way to bring new businesses to fill a large vacant area between downtown and the packinghouses. By his reasoning the lost commercial tax revenue would be offset by residential property taxes paid by new employees but no notice indicated implementation.¹⁰

The lack of effort may have been a reasoned reaction to solid expectations of a promising future. In part that confidence stemmed from Fort Worth’s position as the nearest major city and principal supplier to much of West Texas, a vast area stretching hundreds of miles served by an army of roving jobbers representing Fort Worth merchants. A north-south commercial dividing line separated Fort Worth’s western trade domain from East Texas, where Dallas merchants reigned. Fort Worth thought they had the better of the split, a belief buttressed by a 1913 federal study calculating that West Texans enjoyed a per capita wealth of $1,146, a figure exceeded by only four states and much larger than the $507 ascribed to East Texas. The differences seemed impressive
but may have been skewed the presence of a few extremely rich ranchers and oilmen among a relatively small West Texas population. 11

Fort Worth’s location played an important role in raising commercial hopes. In 1916 conflicts along the Rio Grande involving Mexican revolutionaries fueled rumors of a second Mexican-American War in which Fort Worth, only 300 miles north of the border, seemed destined to play a major supply role. Local boosters, reacting with alacrity over potential opportunities, bragged that Fort Worth was certain to receive the “lion’s share” of government contracts let in North Texas. Early signs of that effect appeared in a noticeable but measured increase in packinghouse demand and in an Army appropriation request for $15,000,000 for the purchase of 75,000 horses and 25,000 mules. In July 1916 the army ordered 13,950 horses and mules through the Fort Worth Stockyards, stimulating a market already overheated by European demand. In time the speculation assumed grander proportions, that mobilization would bring an army base that would “pour gold” into the city, much of going for food. Optimism surged after the War Department named Fort Worth as the supply point for southern armies, a designation that promised to pump $10,000,000 into the local economy. Those dreams felt victim to peace when the crisis was resolved short of complete war. 12

In the spring of 1917 the Fort Worth’s focus switched to the Europe war where American involvement loomed. The declaration of war on April 6, 1917, had major consequences, most deeply in the ninety-nine Tarrant County lives lost through military service and scores of others who suffered wounds and dislocation, but also for those left behind. Fort Worthians publicly demonstrated their support by mustering for lunch-hour and evening military drills and in a massive patriotic parade on April 17, 1817, featuring
35,000 marchers. City government facilitated the war effort by guaranteeing the jobs of city workers entering the military and by purchasing $80,000 in Liberty Bonds, then reselling $50,000 to 384 employees who paid them out over ten months. In the spring of 1918 Fort Worth joined much of the rest of the nation in adopting daylight savings time and in registering its 360 German residents.\textsuperscript{13}

Beyond the cost and sacrifice lay economic opportunities that Fort Worth was determined to seize. Ben E. Keith, president of the Chamber of Commerce, traveled to Washington after learning that the War Department planned several Texas bases. In the nation’s capital he presented the secretary of war with site proposals that included over 2,000 acres and free water, sewer, electric, and telephone connections. A war department inspection team viewed several sites before choosing, in June 1917, the area between the Arlington Heights Boulevard streetcar line and the Stove Foundry Road (Vickery Boulevard) for the divisional mobilization of the Texas and Oklahoma National Guard. From that point events moved rapidly with construction starting on July 18, 1917, and 5,000 soldiers in place by August 22, followed by commencement of training on September 4, 1917. Just over six months later, in April 1918, a downtown crowd of 400,000 watched 27,000 soldiers of the Panther Division parade just before their departure for France. Camp Bowie, as it was named by the war department, began as a rather moderate facility costing only $250,000 for 27,000 trainees (with a monthly payroll of $750,000) but grew to become a complex costing $2,235,504 that could hold as many as 35,000 soldiers, including a large military hospital with 1,000 beds in seventy buildings spread over sixty acres.\textsuperscript{14}
Keith was also instrumental in obtaining three army airfields. Through General Benjamin Foulois of the United States Army Air Service he obtained access to General Cuthbert G. Hoare of the Canadian Royal Flying Corps, the officer in charge of selecting three air training sites. Keith pressed advantages of weather, open spaces, and readily available lumber and laborers to secure all three fields for Fort Worth. The three sites, covering a combined 1,227 acres, became Carruthers Field near Benbrook, Barron Field near Everman, both used largely for flight training, and Taliaferro Field, also known as Hicks Field and used mostly for gunnery practice, located in the countryside ten miles north of Fort Worth. Work began in August 1917 on facilities costing between $3,000,000 and $4,000,000 to support approximately 200 aircraft. Three hundred Canadian Royal Flying Corps cadets, most of whom were Americans, began relocating from Toronto at the end of October 1917 and all three fields opened between October and November 1917 with 1,500 to 2,000 personnel at each. The American Air Service gradually took over so that by May 1, 1918, all three became exclusively American. Other American training operations were later established at Dallas, Waco, Houston, Wichita Falls, and San Antonio. During the war 1,960 pilots earned wings at Fort Worth using Curtiss JN-4 or Jennies, with a maximum speed 75 mph, graduating with 200 minutes flying time.\textsuperscript{15}

The soldiers’ arrival occurred just as the anti-vice movement developed new levels of support. The initial effort began traditionally in 1916 as a church-based movement opposing the reservation and sponsoring a plebiscite to ban all Sunday entertainments. Despite warnings that desecration of the Sabbath would create a “wide open” town and bring “a San Francisco Sunday with all of its fearful evils,” voters
rejected the proposal on April 1, 1916, by 893 votes, 3,812 to 2,919. In addition, 1916
witnessed yet another county prohibition referendum. The Business Men’s [sic] Anti-
Prohibition Committee ran large advertisements arguing that the question was not if
people would drink (they would), but if drinkers would pay taxes and wages or make
bootleggers rich. While prohibition supporters dominated the county’s rural area, most of
which was already dry, the opposition’s urban strength proved decisive, although the vote
was a rather close 7,997 to 7,113, a difference of 884, just nine votes fewer than the
margin by which the ban on Sunday entertainments lost. The reservation also faced challenges from former supporters. A major
justification behind its establishment had been control advantages offered by
concentration that would reduce criminal activity. Unfortunately, that had not proven to
be the case as the Acre routinely accounted for sixty to eighty percent of all police
arrests. The reservation was also established to provide a level of decorum that hid
prostitution from the public view. That also had not been totally successful. The police
commissioner, Hugh Jamieson, complained that Saturday nights would find women on
the streets, on porches, and in windows acting in ways that “would make a self-respecting
white man ashamed.” Jamieson also questioned the deterrent effect of tolerance, noting
that two girls, ages fifteen and sixteen, had applied for abode permits in the Acre,
especially licenses to engage in prostitution.

The salient issue that pushed Jamieson and others from support to opposition
involved the exploitation of Acre prostitutes by unscrupulous property owners and
rooming house operators. The profitability of prostitution and its limitation to a rather
small area brought usurious rents that reached as high as $200 to $350 monthly for small
rooming houses, an inflated cost that operators, in turn, passed along by charging
prostitutes as much as $14 weekly for one room “cribs.” The women had little choice but
to pay since they would be arrested if found soliciting openly or out of the reservation.
Umbrage over exploitation rested not so much in altruism as practicalities in that
exorbitant rents had driven some prostitutes into other sections of town, bringing
residential complaints and obviating one of the major arguments behind the reservation.
In March 1916 the police demanded a twenty-five percent reduction in rooming house
rents in the area “which is known as the segregated district” on Calhoun and Jones
streets, warning that failure to comply would lead to complete closure. The owners and
operators agreed, at least publicly.¹⁸

The agreement may have been more public than real. By February 1917
Commissioner Jamieson began calling for an end to the reservation after determining that
vice lords had taken over. The two most notorious purveyors, Mack Smith and Charles
Rotsky, owned ninety-seven of the district’s 127 rooming houses and cribs. Rotsky held
two rooming houses and thirty-five cribs with more than forty working women while
Smith counted several houses and sixty cribs with more than seventy-five women.
Rotsky’s lawyer admitted his client owned $200,000 in Acre property but argued he had
never rented a house for immoral purposes without written authorization from the chief
of police.¹⁹

Jamieson’s position included a degree of enlightenment about the conditions
leading women into prostitution. He deplored that women from all over Texas came to
Fort Worth because of its reputation as a wide-open town offering easy money, but he
tempered that emotion with an acknowledgement that most had fallen through the deceit
of men whose reputation remained unspoiled. Affidavits filed by Fort Worth prostitutes in 1917 supported that view, revealing that most had been deserted by husbands or seduced and abandoned. Jamieson felt that exorbitant rents constituted a second victimization committed by more unscrupulous men, this time by those controlling the rooming houses and cribs. He cited an unnamed property owner who realized a $25,000 annual income off rentals and a rooming house operator who paid $50 monthly for a building that he divided into fourteen “cribs” renting for $14 weekly, bringing in approximately $840 monthly. Jamieson proposed some innovative efforts to help prostitutes, such as utilizing the Relief Association to assist in finding other employment and offering railroad tickets to any wishing to return home.20

His distress at the exploitation and his empathy for the plight of the lowly led Jamieson to see the Acre as a disgraceful anachronism that should be closed. He faced stiff opposition from many high-placed supporters, including some fellow commissioners who still believed that vice complemented business interests and the general prosperity and that concentration allowed control of what could not be eliminated. Even the chief of police was rumored to have strong ties to the segregated area. To evade opposition Jamieson attacked the reservation by aggressively enforcing building and health codes, since no new authority was needed to apply existing statutes. He joined the city physician inspecting several properties in “Chinatown” and the reservation district, adding threats of demolition if corrections were not made. In March 1917, the mayor joined Jamieson and the two began working on a closure plan, serving notice that, pending implementation, they would refuse to prosecute prostitutes but would file against property owners and operators. Supporters put up one last attempt to stave off closure,
organizing as the Fort Worth Rationalists to call for a referendum over whether or not to close the reservation. This time they could not stop the inevitable.\textsuperscript{21}

Implementation was not delayed long. Rumors circulated that the official closing would occur on March 19, 1917, but the mayor’s absence delayed it until March 20. The assault began with an injunction issued by Judge R. E. I. Roy that forbade renting, leasing, or operating district property for immoral purposes. Strict adherence to the directive would effectively put over 300 known prostitutes, sixty-seven renting individual “crib” houses and 240 working at sixty parlor houses, out of business. The police ordered all the houses closed but, in what reflected Jamieson’s enlightened influence, did not order prostitutes to leave town, as had been the common practice, but allowed them time to seek other employment. That evening a reporter noted that, for the first time in five years, the Acre was quiet with shades drawn, no “gaudy kimonas”\textsuperscript{sic} in sight, and no ragtime pianos to be heard. Jamieson confirmed the report by walking through the district on a Saturday night without finding a single working prostitute. He promised that the Acre was gone and would not return, arguing that “legalized vice is no more a right than is a safeblower’s union.” The courts added further support in November 1917 by declaring Houston’s segregated district unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{22}

Jamieson’s declaration may have been more wishful thinking than reality as evidence suggested that prostitution had simply moved addresses or become more covert. The chief of police reported that none of the prostitutes had sought relocation assistance, which suggested that they had not gone very far, as did the arrest of seven prostitutes in a residential district soon afterwards. In addition, the city commissioners considered requiring rooming houses to maintain lists of lodgers and female employees, stating it
was needed to control the spread of prostitution into the rooming house district. Other evidence appeared in the proliferation of suits filed against property owners and operators for operating immoral houses, which would not have been necessary in the absence of prostitution. In addition, it was suggestive that the city attorney had to deny complaints of selective enforcement favoring prominent but unnamed property owners.²³

The arrival of the military added gusto to the anti-vice movement. Part of that effect stemmed from local morality campaigners interacting with the bases, such the Fort Worth Equal Suffrage Association that, in July 1917, organized a committee dedicated to combating vice in and around the army camps. More effective action flowed from Washington. In 1917 Congress, seeking to ensure the health of young men destined for army service and to save grains for food production, banned the importation and manufacture of spirits (but not beer or wine). That measure was so limiting that every saloon in the reservation and Irish Town failed to renew their licenses, leading the Record to cite July 11, 1917, as the Acre’s final passing. Many other liquor dealers remained in business, including saloons on Fifteenth Street between Main Street and the Santa Fe Depot and most establishments on the north end of downtown. In August 1917, President Wilson established a one-half mile dry zone around military camps, which closed 376 saloons in Kansas City and 50 in San Antonio, and in September the army prohibited alcohol and prostitution around military camps. Camp Bowie lay too far removed from downtown and the reservation for either directive to have much effect. Despite the limited effect, six National Guard Military Policemen began patrolling Fort Worth in July 1917, joined in August by forty members of the provost guard who walked downtown streets until midnight. In September city commissioners, perhaps motivated by the
military’s presence, reversed their recent tolerance and forced all non-exempted businesses, including saloons, to close on Sundays.\textsuperscript{24}

Prohibition rested publicly on the feel-good issue of patriotism to the war effort but ulterior motives lay underneath. Robert Wiebe’s seminal study argued that the movement’s popularity among the urban-industrial leadership owed a great deal to its effectiveness as means of mass control, to the proposition that prohibition would create peaceful workmen who came to work regularly and minded their own business. In that perspective, the fevers of war constituted an important chapter in a greater campaign designed to discipline society. By tying foreign threats to alcohol consumption, commercial barons appeared to advance patriotism while promoting a controlled, more docile working class. What emerged during the war years was a new middle class that shared common assumptions across a wide spectrum of issues, including strict standards of proper conduct.\textsuperscript{25}

The military influence coincided with and complemented the prohibition movement. On September 10, 1917, Dallas adopted prohibition with implementation scheduled for October 20, 1917. Tarrant County activists attempted to build off that triumph, arguing that Dallas undesirables would flood the Acre if Fort Worth remained wet. Instead, the most noticeable impact of Dallas’ prohibition was a rise in bootleg liquor sold in taverns along Front Street east of the railroad viaduct. The city commission reacted in January 1918 by removing the area from the saloon district, giving the establishments but five days to close. The combined military-reform effect failed to eliminate alcohol but it did compromise its availability to the extent that visitors to the
March 1918 Stock Show were advised that they would find vastly changed moral conditions with questionable joints rarer and farther between.26

State action finally accomplished what reformers could not. In March 1918 Texas enacted a felony law prohibiting liquor sales to soldiers. Fort Worth police began enforcing the new statute with a series of raids that arrested more than 100 men and women, thirty-seven of whom were subsequently indicted. Many of the arrestees were rent-car drivers who procured women and liquor for soldiers. On April 16, 1918, Texas ordered ten-mile dry zones around military bases, backing the measure with harsh penalties of two to five years imprisonment without parole. The affected areas included not only all of Fort Worth, but also most of the state that had not already voted dry and closed some 1,800 saloons. The remaining 750 Texas saloons shuddered their doors on June 26, 1918, when statewide prohibition became effective. The closings greatly reduced the police workload so that in the first week following the establishment of ten-mile-dry zones Fort Worth saw only five arrests for drunkenness, including only one on Saturday night, compared to up to 100 just on a typical Saturday. The downward trend continued with only 470 arrests in the first three weeks after enactment, compared to 1,200 in the three weeks before. Some other problems increased, such as bootlegging, which experienced a sharp growth curve as the going rate for a gallon of liquor reached $40. Liquor became so scarce and valuable that the police reported a rash of home burglaries involving thefts of stored supplies.27

The military also played a major role in combating prostitution. As Camp Bowie opened the railroads reported an influx of “immoral women” arriving from all over Texas and even from out of state, many from cities that had recently closed their vice districts.
The new arrivals plied their trade in hotels and rooming houses and even in public parks. Like prohibition, the military’s involvement in prostitution eradication began early and rested on its threat to the welfare of soldiers, in this case from sexually transmitted diseases (see Illustration VII-1). The medical justification carried some real weight. An army report issued January 18, 1918, showed Camp Bowie with forty-two new venereal disease cases for the week, the seventh largest total of the thirty camps listed. The base’s per capita rate of venereal infections stood at 83.0 per 1,000, almost the twice the national rate of 46.6 for National Guard bases and virtually equal to the 90.3 average rate for regular army bases.28

The military backed a demand for strict enforcement with serious consequences for failure. When local liquor dealers proposed a constitutional challenge to Texas’ ten-mile dry zone law the army warned that repeal would mean the loss of Camp Bowie and the airfields. In October 1917 activists warned that the army would relocate if Fort Worth did not control liquor sales and the army threatened to confine soldiers to base or to relocate if prostitution was not eradicated. Dr. Frank Boyd, president of the Tarrant County Board of Health, agreed that immediate steps were needed to end the “loathsome diseases” that had stricken hundreds of soldiers since their arrival at Camp Bowie. Base officials cooperated by collecting information from infected soldiers, giving the prostitutes’ names and locations to the city police who responded by raiding East Seventeenth Street, arresting nineteen "negroes [sic]," three “mexicans [sic],” and one “American” for vagrancy (a common charge used in prostitution arrests). The success of the military’s involvement was confirmed by an October 1917 New York Times report that military involvement had closed many red-light districts situated adjacent to army
camps, including Fort Worth’s. That conclusion was overly optimistic but, unlike earlier drives, the military-motivated campaign waxed rather than waned. In November 1917 a meeting of city, county, military, and federal authorities discussing enforcement methods was followed by raids arresting scores and closing three cabarets and one dance hall. In December 1917 the Mayor William Davis traveled to Washington seeking to dispel negative reports about Fort Worth’s moral conditions. Davis assured the war department of the city’s commitment to healthy and wholesome moral conditions, including ending the “unhappy conditions” regarding sickness at Camp Bowie, which he blamed on issues beyond the city’s control.  

Medical issues led to expansions of arrest and confinement powers. In March 1918 the city announced a reinvigorated anti-vice campaign to remove prostitutes menacing soldiers. The effort began with a raid on the “Forty-Niner Show” at the Stock Show that arrested twelve women found dancing with soldiers. While dancing was not illegal the arrests were part of an new mandate set forth by the war department’s law enforcement division that authorized prostitution arrests on mere suspicion. The revised military standards also provided for forced medical examinations. Eight of the twelve arrestees from the Stock Show and seventy-five percent of all women subsequently arrested went to a newly established medical detention facility operated by city but staffed by federal officers, the first of its type in the nation.  

Prostitution survived despite the remarkable efforts of the city and the army. In April 1918 two women were convicted for running disorderly houses (houses of prostitution) under military statutes barring such establishments within five miles of army bases. Many prostitutes evaded prosecution by working in automobiles, which led to an
August 1918 state law banning “pandering” in automobiles within ten miles of Camp Bowie and the three airfields. The new law reflected a more enlightened perspective in that its penalties applied equally to men and women. Criminal penalties for men were a timely reminder that prostitution involved the active participation of both sexes, that men were not victims but accomplices and instigators. For example, an African-American servant employed by a state legislator reported she had been accosted by ten soldiers while walking through a local park.\textsuperscript{31}

The concentration of population in military camps adjacent to an urban area posed other health hazards that became all too clear during the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic. A serious national influenza outbreak struck at the end of 1915 but passed quickly only to return the end of 1917, hitting the military so hard that the base hospital strained to care for hundreds of stricken soldiers. Again, the danger peaked and declined quickly so that on January 1, 1918, the brass lifted a quarantine imposed on Camp Bowie and all air bases.\textsuperscript{32} That autumn the Spanish Influenza returned with a vengeance. The base hospital held 1,500 stricken soldiers on October 3, 1918, with as many as seventeen dying in a single day. The military again quarantined all four camps but it was too late to protect civilians. The first civilian cases appeared in September and spread rapidly, leading to closure of some schools by early October. On October 10, 1918, city commissioners established a thirty-five bed emergency hospital at Fourteenth and Calhoun streets in what was known as “Little Mexico” where the situation first reached epidemic proportions, probably because of the endemic overcrowding and poor sanitation associated with poverty. On October 15, 1918, the city physician reported 487 civilian cases with forty-four deaths but the official numbers represented only a fraction of the
sick. In just one week 1,400 packinghouse employees missed work due to flu symptoms. The mayor closed all public places, including schools, cinemas, and theaters and asked churches to forego services or restrict meetings and for citizens to stay home unless absolutely necessary. The epidemic was deadly but passed quickly. By the end of the month conditions had eased sufficiently to reopen schools.\(^{33}\)

The plague aggravated an already serious labor shortage. In November 1918 the gap between demand and supply became so acute that Fort Worth commissioners sent out questionnaires to non-essential businesses to identify male employees who could be reassigned to war work and replaced with women. The city also cracked down with a “Work or Fight” campaign in which the police turned over idlers found in pool halls and other recreation centers to employers with warnings to go to work or face jail.\(^{34}\)

The labor shortage was created in part by demand increases that overwhelmed the packinghouses in 1917. Stockyards receipts increased almost thirty-nine percent, from 2,553,817 in 1916 to 3,542,604 in 1917, due in part to drought-diminished grasslands that forced ranchers to reduce herds. Despite the upswings the demand for pork so overwhelmed supply that commissioners rescinded the ban on hog farming within the city limits. The rise in supply netted suppliers up to $250,000,000 and required 100,000 cattle and refrigerated cars to ship while cementing Fort Worth as the nation’s third largest livestock market. Armour’s executives complained that labor shortages limited operations, that its employment stalled at 2,400 because no more workers were available. Projections for the future were even rosier. A. B. Case, general manager of Armour of Texas, projected that the company in 1918 would spend $30,000,000 for livestock, another $8,000,000 for other materials, and $3,000,000 in wages. Unfortunately, in 1918
supply declined overall and in every category and again in 1919, except for sheep, which increased dramatically (see Table VII-8).\textsuperscript{35}

Table VII-8  Livestock Received at the Fort Worth Stockyards, 1917, 1918, 1919

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<th></th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1,646,110</td>
<td>1,384,594</td>
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<td>Calves</td>
<td>313,427</td>
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<td>Hogs</td>
<td>1,062,021</td>
<td>762,486</td>
<td>588,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>405,810</td>
<td>384,596</td>
<td>453,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses/ Mules</td>
<td>115,233</td>
<td>78,881</td>
<td>60,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,542,601</td>
<td>2,891,072</td>
<td>2,367,930</td>
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The year 1917 may have been the most prosperous in the city’s history, encompassing not only the huge military bases and impressive gains at the slaughterhouses but also the real beginnings of an oil boom. Oil had reached big industry status locally as early as 1915 but the discovery of vast supplies in Ranger in October 1917 accelerated and intensified its importance. Fort Worth, the nearest large city at just ninety miles east, became the field’s base of operations with most activity centered around the Westbrook Hotel. The discovery of large Texas oil fields was complemented by and benefited from a fortuitous confluence of increased demand. The rise in oil demand, like that affecting the packinghouses, stemmed from the war but also from increased industrial use. Between 1914 and 1919 Texas industries more than doubled their fuel expenditures, climbing from $10,738,385 to $22,892,256. The amount of money involved reached huge proportions with $250,000,000 available in November
1918 for Texas oil exploration. Other Texas cities, as well as Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Shreveport, Louisiana, shared in the prosperity but Fort Worth, blessed by an advantageous location, had reasonable expectations of becoming the West’s oil center. In December 1918 the Star Telegram gushed that Fort Worth was the leading oil center of the South with sixty percent of Texas’ oil trunk line mileage and more pipelines than any other North Texas city. Location explained part of that success but Fort Worth’s oil commerce, like its livestock and wholesaling trades, also benefited from its rail transport network. Railroads were critical in providing access and the means to move large equipment. Paddock cited the oil trade as a rationale justifying his proposal for a new rail line from Fort Worth to Jack County.36

Oil shared another similarity with the packinghouses in its stimulation of large infrastructure development that compounded economic impacts. The proliferation of oil-producing fields in North Central Texas brought miles of piping, much of which ran to Fort Worth refineries. One of the first large pipelines, running 200 miles from Moran to Fort Worth, was built by the Texas Pipeline Company based on the company’s belief that Fort Worth would be the oil center of the Southwest. In 1918 that seemed likely with construction beginning on four refineries, including the Evans-Thwing Company $750,000 facility capable of processing 3,500 barrels a day, and the Gulf Well Machinery Manufacturing Company, employing seventy, that relocated from Houston. Existing businesses also became involved, spending $1,000,000 on equipment to serve the oil trade while indirect development included a $1,000,000 argon gas plant to supply the army and navy and a helium plant completed in March 1919 on north edge of town at a cost $3,500,000. The effects lasted into the century’s third decade. By 1920 some 300
oil companies carried Fort Worth addresses, many little more than one-room offices
supporting acres of hopes. That year the *New York Times* reported Fort Worth streets and
businesses were filled at 8:00 A.M on a Sunday with men talking oil as stenographers and
typists toiled.\(^{37}\)

The combined economic impacts stimulated tremendous construction. An
estimated 5,000 new residents arriving each month sparked residential construction that
included, in December 1918, ten apartment houses and 500 residences scheduled for
completion in ninety days. In 1918 Fort Worth issued $2,332,125 in building permits,
ranking twelfth nationally and overshadowing Dallas’ $893,100 and Houston’s $609,193.
In addition, Fort Worth’s downtown area experienced considerable expansion tied to the
oil trade, although a petroleum executive’s claim that it would take ten new skyscrapers
to hold all Fort Worth’s oil businesses was probably an exaggeration. Wartime
restrictions discouraged new skyscraper construction, but additions flourished. The W.
T. Waggoner building added six floors to its existing four and the Texas State Building
added two. In 1918 the dollar value of Fort Worth construction was the nation’s seventh
largest, a remarkable achievement for a city striving for the 100,000 population level.\(^{38}\)

Driven by military bases, an insatiable demand at the packinghouses, and a
growing oil industry, Fort Worth enjoyed a prosperity with far-reaching effects. In 1917
an estimated 50,000 new residents were added, a phenomenal rate of growth that would
have pushed the total population to 130,000. Although estimates were notoriously
unreliable little doubt existed that the population had grown considerably. In 1917 the
public school system staggered under the weight of 1,000 new students, creating crowded
conditions and forcing the employment of thirty-five additional teachers. Banks also did
well in 1918, recording a $21,107,000 increase in deposits, the fourth largest behind only New York City, Houston, and Richmond, Virginia. A comparison of bank statistics in 1908 and 1918 revealed almost 400 percent increases in resources and deposits and almost 200 percent in clearings (see Table VII-9).  

Table VII-9 Comparison of Fort Worth Bank Statistics, 1908 and 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>$12,226,841</td>
<td>$59,361,100</td>
<td>385.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>$8,962,093</td>
<td>$44,224,300</td>
<td>393.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearings</td>
<td>$254,475,760</td>
<td>$694,451,202</td>
<td>172.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Financial increases owed much to a significant industrial expansion that began in late 1917, much of which involved the automobile trade. In December 1917 the Texas Motorcar Association announced plans for a $2,000,000 plant employing up to 500. By June 30, 1918, the plant, built on land donated by the Chamber of Commerce and the Young Men’s Business League, began building trucks using over sixty overall-clad women. In the spring of 1918 the Southern Tire Company, swayed by Fort Worth’s progress in becoming an industrial center (and by donated land), announced a $500,000 plant adjacent to Texas Motorcar. Before the year’s end the two businesses combined under W. H. Vernon, who boasted that they would eventually employ 2,000 and become Fort Worth’s most second important industry, trailing only the packinghouses. In April 1918 the Bridges Motor and Rubber Company planned to build on 280 acres on the Cleburne Cardinal Road, giving Fort Worth three automobile plants and delusions of
becoming the “Detroit of the South.” The Record had a slightly different focus, crediting Camp Bowie for the great industrial successes of 1917 and 1918 making Fort Worth the metropolis of the Southwest.\(^{40}\)

Camp Bowie was important but ephemeral. The war ended November 18, 1918, with demobilization orders mustering out thousands issued the following month. Fort Worth turned the closure into opportunity by soliciting discharged soldiers to become workers, particularly in the growing oil industry. The retention efforts’ effectiveness was clearly reflected in 18,000 new bank accounts opened in January 1919, a forty percent increase. Still, jobs continued to exceed the supply of workers so clearly that Fort Worth employment agencies reported placing all ex-servicemen registering for work. In the spring of 1919 area farmers faced severe problems in getting crops harvested. Needing 5,600 laborers, they found only twenty listed at the local United States Employment Bureau. In desperation, the growers searched jails and the Fort Worth police cooperated by offering vagrants a work option to avoid prison time.\(^{41}\)

Construction also continued and expanded as the war’s close brought an end to restraints. In August 1919 Fort Worth had an incredible $29,000,000 in construction under way, including a new, twenty-story W. T. Waggoner building at Eighth and Main, a twenty-four story bank building at Seventh and Main that would the tallest in Texas, and a $2,000,000 hotel also at Eighth and Main. From November 1, 1919, to November 1, 1920, Fort Worth added 442 businesses, including 6 bakeries, 12 cafes, 147 groceries, and 104 automobile-related shops, such as dealers, supply houses, and garages.\(^{42}\)

The good times put city finances in the black. In February 1918 Fort Worth government had a $160,000 reserve in the bank and every department, including the
water works, reported positive cash flows for the previous twenty-four months, quite a contrast to the century’s first years when the city could not even meet its interest payments while the water department hemorrhaged money. The new prosperity produced water department receipts sufficient to pay cash for $355,745 in improvements, including a new $147,745 filtration system that increased the daily capacity at the Holly Pumping Station from 5,000,00 to 12,000,000 gallons. In 1918 taxable assessments rose $14,352,167, the largest one-year increase ever (to that point), pushing the total to $82,236,310, followed by another $3,423,576 jump in 1919. The growth in valuations increased city revenue without a tax increase.  

The magnitude of Fort Worth’s post-1914 advance was clearly displayed in statistics, especially those from 1919 that reflected the full effect of the war years. In 1919 bank deposits climbed to $85,000,000 and bank clearings to $891,000,000, both records, and building permits reached $18,652,000, approximately $4,300,000 more than the next highest Texas city. The city’s traditional industrial strengths were maintained and solidified. Fort Worth remained the Southwest’s grain center, boasting of elevator space for 4,260,000 bushels and a milling capacity of 2,200 barrels for both flour and corn, as well as its rail center with ten trunk lines and seventeen outlets plus a belt line serving the stockyards and two interurbans. The railroads employed 5,000 Fort Worthians and paid $636,000 wages each month while the $116,000,000 local livestock industry added a monthly payroll of $619,000 paid to another 5,000 workers. In addition, another 200 factories employed 10,964 with a monthly payroll of $1,309,000, giving Fort Worth an annual value of production worth $450,000,000. The new oil industry grew to large proportions as North Texas fields developed a daily production valued at $700,000,
much of which flowed into Fort Worth. In 1919 eight local oil refineries produced 54,500 barrels with another four under construction. They, along with 500 oil companies and fifty-two oil field supply houses, helped cement Fort Worth as an oil center. The development of oil gave Fort Worth a major role in three of Texas’ top four industries, missing out only in lumber. In 1919 oil was Texas’s largest industry in value of production, accounting for 24.2 percent of the state’s total, and in value added by production with 16.4 percent of the total and third in number of wage earners. Automobiles and lumber had the most wage earners while slaughtering was second in value of production with 12.5 percent and fourth in value added with 6.2 percent (see Table VII-10).

Table VII-10  Percentage of Texas Manufacturing Attributable to Texas’ Top Four Industries in 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Lumber</th>
<th>Automobiles</th>
<th>Slaughtering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Products</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The economic advances of the war years accomplished what decades of boosterism had not, pushing Fort Worth’s manufacturing output above that of its eastern neighbor. While Dallas city still outperformed Fort Worth, in 1919 Tarrant County edged ahead of Dallas County with 488 more wage earners, $1,811,220 more paid in wages, $39,139,009 more in goods produced, and $1,034,813 more in value added despite trailing in number of establishments 257 to 492. Superior production and
monetary results with only fifty-six percent as many plants was possible because Tarrant County had larger factories, a direct effect the packinghouses and the large factories opening after 1915, such as the Chevrolet plant, the Texas Motorcar Company, and the Southern Tire Company. The importance of those industries, which were outside Fort Worth city limits, was also evident in differences in comparisons of Dallas County to Dallas city and Tarrant County to Fort Worth. Dallas County outperformed Dallas city 110 percent in wages, 124 in value of products, and 116 in value added but Tarrant County paid 207 percent more in wages, produced 407 more in value of products, and 270 more in value added than Fort Worth. The greater disparity between Fort Worth and Tarrant County established that a much greater percentage of industry lay outside Fort Worth’s city limits than outside the city of Dallas (see Table VII-11).\textsuperscript{45}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishments</th>
<th>Dallas County</th>
<th>Dallas City</th>
<th>Tarrant County</th>
<th>Fort Worth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wages earners</td>
<td>8,708</td>
<td>7,913</td>
<td>9,196</td>
<td>4,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages</td>
<td>$8,752,026</td>
<td></td>
<td>$10,563,246</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>$32,671,541</td>
<td>$28,146,461</td>
<td>$33,706,354</td>
<td>$12,502,858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tarrant not only bested Dallas County in three of four manufacturing measures but also led the state in value added by manufacturers and all counties south of Kansas
City in production value. The rise of Fort Worth manufacturing was a true rise and not a product of a poor economy affecting Dallas or the rest of Texas. Dallas’ production value, $116,160,150, or $39,139,009 less than Tarrant County, placed second in the region southwest of Kansas City while Houston trailed close behind with $105,776,719. The statistics lent credence to claims that Fort Worth was becoming the manufacturing center of the Southwest.46

Expanding the comparison emphasizes that a larger part of manufacturing in Tarrant County lay outside the Fort Worth city limits. Tarrant County led Fort Worth by 12.2 percent in number of factories, 156.3 percent in wage earners, and 228.5 percent in value of products, far in excess in every category compared to Dallas city and county, Houston and Harris County, and San Antonio and Bexar County. For example, Tarrant County had 228.5 percent more value of production than Fort Worth, Dallas County had 24.5 percent more than Dallas city, Harris County had 20.6 percent more than Houston, and Bexar had 4.5 percent more than San Antonio (see Table VII-12). Therefore, county comparisons provide much truer reflections of relative industrialism than city to city studies.

Table VII-12  Comparison of Manufacturing in Texas’ Four Largest Cities and their Counties in 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fort Worth</th>
<th>Tarrant County</th>
<th>Percentage Difference County over City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>+ 12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>4,452</td>
<td>11,411</td>
<td>+156.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Products</td>
<td>$38,160,000</td>
<td>$155,299,159</td>
<td>+228.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dallas County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>+ 7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>7,913</td>
<td>8,708</td>
<td>+10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of</td>
<td>$93,650,000</td>
<td>$116,160,150</td>
<td>+24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Houston County</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>9,860</td>
<td>11,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of</td>
<td>$86,874,000</td>
<td>$104,776,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>San Antonio County</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Earners</td>
<td>6,614</td>
<td>6,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of</td>
<td>$35,456,000</td>
<td>$37,045,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Fort Worth’s population experienced slower growth than its economy. In the 1920 Census Fort Worth broke the symbolically important 100,000 barrier with 106,482, an increase 33,170 or 45.2 percent since 1910, the nation’s sixty-fifth largest rise. However, the rest of urban Texas grew even faster as all three of the Texas’ other large cities and their counties experienced superior population increases to Fort Worth and Tarrant County. The city of Dallas increased 72.6 percent, adding 66,872 to reach 158,976, the state’s second largest population while San Antonio retained its position as Texas’ largest city with an increase of 67.1 percent, and Houston added 75.5 percent to 138,276. Many Fort Worthians blamed the poor showing on the failure to annex any
suburbs since 1910, arguing that aggressive expansion would have pushed the population past Houston and almost equal to Dallas. That argument clearly lacked substance. If Fort Worth had annexed all of Tarrant County the population in 1920 would have reached only 152,800, still smaller than the city of Dallas’ 158,976. A better argument could have been made that labor shortages had slowed Fort Worth’s growth, that if a workforce sufficient to meet demands had been available the population differences may well have diminished or disappeared (see Table VII-13). 47

Table VII-13  Comparison of Population Increases, 1920 to 1910, at the City and County Levels for Texas’ Four Largest Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City/City</th>
<th>1920 Population</th>
<th>Increase Over 1910</th>
<th>Percentage Increase Over 1910</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>161,397</td>
<td>64,783</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bexar County</td>
<td>202,096</td>
<td>82,420</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas City</td>
<td>158,976</td>
<td>66,872</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas County</td>
<td>210,551</td>
<td>74,803</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>138,276</td>
<td>59,476</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris County</td>
<td>186,667</td>
<td>70,974</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>106,482</td>
<td>33,170</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarrant County</td>
<td>152,800</td>
<td>44,228</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite slower than expected population growth it was clear that Fort Worth turned a significant corner during the period from 1915 to 1918. In 1880 a serious effort began to put Fort Worth on the map economically. That effort first manifested itself in
railroads expansion that made Fort Worth the Southwest’s rail center. By the end of the 1880s many realized that more than railroads was required, that factories were needed. That realization suffered through years of depression before reaching expression in 1903. For years after the arrival of Swift and Armour Fort Worth rested on its laurels, neglecting the battle for industry. Fortunately, boosters recovered their zeal by 1917 in time to attract a large military complex that revitalized the local economy. That success, coupled with railroads, packinghouses, and the oil boom that seemed to fall into Fort Worth’s lap by virtue of its location, constituted the realization of the 1880 dream.
Chapter Seven Endnotes


9 Fort Worth Record, March 26, 1916, p. 3.

10 Fort Worth Record, May 11, 1916, p. 4.


13 Fort Worth Record, April 1, 1917, p. 1; April 18, 1917, p. 1; April 16, 1917, p. 4; Council Minutes, Vol Z, May 22, 1917; April 16, 1917, April 23, 1917; Fort Worth Star Telegram, April 29, 1918, p. 10; March 9, 1918, p. 1; October 13, 1918, p. 32; December 15, 1918, p. 6.


15 Fort Worth Record, August 26, 1917, p. 16; August 24, 1917, p. 10; October 21, 1917, p. 15; Maxfield and Jary, Camp Bowie: An Illustrated History, pp. 3-5; New York Times, August 30, 1917, p. 8; February 24, 1918, p. 4; April 28, 1918, p. 82; Fort Worth Star Telegram, May 29, 2005, pp. 1, 8; Tom Burke Bond, History of Fort Worth, 1849-1928. (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), Chapter 26.

17 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 4, 1917, p. 2; March 5, 1917, p. 1; March 16, 1917, p. 3.


19 Fort Worth Record, March 21, 1917, pp. 1-2; March 25, 1917, pp. 1, 5; Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 20, 1917, p. 8.

20 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 16, 1917, p. 3; March 5, 1917, p. 1; March 25, 1917, p. 9, 16, 18.

21 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 16, 1917, p. 3; March 7, 1917, pp. 1, 3; March 6, 1917, p. 1; February 1, 1917, p. 2; Fort Worth Record, March 29, 1917, p. 5.

22 Fort Worth Record, March 17, 1917, p. 4; March 18, 1917, p. 7; March 21, 1917, pp. 1-2; March 25, 1917, p. 1, 5; Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 25, 1917, p. 18; November 7, 1917, p. 5.

23 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 22, 1917, p. 7; Fort Worth Record, March 22, 1917, p. 4; March 22, 1917, p. 4; March 23, 1917, p. 10; March 24, 1917, p. 17.

24 Fort Worth Record, July 8, 1917, p. 4; July 17, 1917, p. 1; July 12, 1917, p. 10; August 14, 1917, p. 1; September 14, 1917, p. 1; July 28, 1917, p. 5; September 28, 1917, p. 3; Fort Worth Star Telegram, August 26, 1917, p. 1; Painter, Standing at Armageddon, p. 333.; Wiebe, Search for Order, pp. 287, 290-291.


26 Fort Worth Record, October 17, 1917, p. 9; September 17, 1917, pp. 1, 5; January 9, 1918, p. 12; March 10, 1918, p. 10.

27 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 11, 1918, p. 4; March 28, 1918, p. 10; May 22, 1918, p. 1; June 25, 1918, p. 1; April 14, 1919, p. 16; July 20, 1918, p. 3; November 21, 1918, p. 7; January 16, 1919, p. 1; Fort Worth Record, March 2, 1918, p. 10; March 3, 1918, p. 1; March 10, 1918, p. 10; June 26, 1918, p. 1; March 22, 1918, p. 1; April 3, 1918, p. 12; April 5, 1918, p. 1; April 13, 1918, p. 6; April 15, 1918, p. 1; May 8, 1918, p. 10.


29 Fort Worth Record, October 10, 1917, p. 1; October 11, 1917, p. 5; October 8, 1917, pp. 1, 2; October 19, 1917, p. 12; November 11, 1917, p. 1; December 21, 1917, p. 10; April 5, 1918, p. 1; New York Times, October 28, 1917, p. SM6.

30 Fort Worth Record, March 18, 1918, pp. 1, 2; March 26, 1918, pp. 1, 3.

31 Fort Worth Record, April 6, 1918, p. 7; August 11, 1918, p. 3; October 10, 1917, p. 1; February 9, 1918, p. 1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, May 13, 1918, p. 5.

32 Fort Worth Record, January 14, 1916, p. 9; September 1, 1916, p. 7; January 1, 1918, p. 12; January 4, 1918, p. 4.

33 Fort Worth Record, October 3, 1918, p. 10; October 5, 1918, pp. 4, 10; October 10, 1918, p. 5; October 15, 1918, p. 10; October 16, 1918, p. 1; Fort Worth Star Telegram, October 23, 1918, p. 1; October 28, 1918, p. 3; Council Minutes, Vol Z, October 21, 1918.

34 Fort Worth Record, November 1, 1918, p. 1; November 6, 1918, p. 12; Fort Worth Star Telegram, June 21, 1918, p. 13.
35 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 9, 1918, p. 1; March 30, 1918, p. 11; Fort Worth Record, November 13, 1918, p. 8; December 11, 1918, p. 8; December 15, 1918, part 4, p. 1; January 1, 1920, Shriner’s Edition, p. 10.


37 Buenger, Path to a Modern South, p. 135; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 15, 1918, p. 1; Fort Worth Record, April 7, 1918, p. 10; December 8, 1918, p. 1; December 10, 1918, p. 1; December 13, 1918, p. 1; December 14, 1918, p. 1; Bond, History of Fort Worth, Chapter 29; New York Times, February 1, 1920, p. XXI.

38 Fort Worth Record, December 8, 1918, p. 1; November 26, 1918, pp. 1, 5; November 3, 1918, p. 7; Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 21, 1918, Section 3, p. 1; October 30, 1949, Oil and Gas Section, p. 17.

39 Fort Worth Star Telegram, December 16, 1917, section 3, p. 2; Fort Worth Record, November 2, 1918, p. 7; New York Times, April 14, 1919, p. 16; January 1, 1920, p. 20.

40 Fort Worth Record, January 13, 1918, p. 1; December 20, 1917, pp. 1, 4; March 4, 1918, p. 4; June 30, 1918, p. 7; March 10, 1918, p. 10; August 11, 1918, Part 2, p. 8; April 14, 1918, p. 8.


42 Fort Worth Star Telegram, March 31, 1919, p. 1; August 17, 1919, p. 16; February 8, 1920, Section 4, p. 1; February 10, 1920, p. 1; November 4, 1920, p. 5.

43 Fort Worth Record, February 13, 1918, p. 5; November 3, 1918, p. 5; June 16, 1918, pp. 1-2; September 1, 1918, p. 14; Fort Worth Star Telegram, August 21, 1919, p. 1. The Texas and Pacific Railroad was the city’s largest taxpayer, paying in excess of $35,000 on a valuation of over $2,000,000.


45 Fourteenth Census, Vol IX, Manufactures, pp. 1449-1450, 1460-1461; Talbert, Cowtown Metropolis, p. 126.


Conclusion

Between 1880 and 1918 Fort Worth transformed from town to city. To some extent that transition was part of national phenomenon, identified by Nell Irvin Painter, in which the United States underwent fundamental changes between 1877 and 1919 from a rural, agricultural nation to an industrial society dominated by great cities.¹ The local experience, while part of that larger trend, was unique in its degree. According to decennial reports Fort Worth’s population rose from 6,663 in 1880 to 106,482 in 1920, an increase of 99,819 or 1,498 percent, a remarkable rate of growth. The largest percentage rise for any decade, 246.3, occurred between 1880 and 1890 but amounted to an increase of only 16,413. The smallest growth rate, 15.7 percent, took place during the 1890s depression that hit Fort Worth harder and longer than Texas’ other large cities. The aberration of the nineties was followed by the nation’s largest percentage increase, 174.7 percent, in the first decade of the twentieth century when Fort Worth added 46,624 persons. Although the rate slowed in the 1910s, Fort Worth still registered a healthy 45.2 percent rise, or an actual increase of 33,170. In fact, eighty percent of Fort Worth’s growth from 1880 to 1920, a total of 79,794 persons, came during the second twenty-year period from 1900 to 1920 (see Table Conclusion-1).
Table Conclusion-1  Fort Worth Population Increases, 1880 to 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Increase Over Previous Count</th>
<th>Percentage Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>6,663</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>23,076</td>
<td>16,413</td>
<td>246.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>26,688</td>
<td>3,612</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>73,312</td>
<td>46,624</td>
<td>174.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>106,482</td>
<td>33,170</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A positive correlation exists between population and economic growth. Fort Worth experienced remarkable growth in the 1880s as it developed its first major industry, becoming the Southwest’s railroad center, then stalled in the depression years of the 1890s. In 1903 the Swift and Armour packinghouses formed the second major industrial development, turning Fort Worth into the nation’s third largest livestock market while spurring a nation-leading growth rate from 1900 to 1910. After temporary sluggishness the Fort Worth economy closed out the 1910s with unprecedented production thanks to multi-faceted stimulation from the European war, a large military presence, and Fort Worth’s development as an oil exploration and refining center. The combined effect added 33,170 residents, more than Fort Worth’s total population in 1900.

Financial statistics illustrate the importance of the post-1914 period. The packinghouse effect appears clearly between 1898 and 1905 when bank resources increased 195.3 percent ($3,200,000 to $9,450,000) and bank deposits 198.9 percent ($2,888,256 to $8,634,042), both representing annual growth rates of over twenty-eight percent. However, from 1905 to 1908 resources only increased 29.4 percent (9.8 percent per annum) and deposits 3.8 percent (1.3 percent per annum), and clearings actually
declined just over 4 percent. The slower rate of economic growth of 1905 to 1908 reflects a coasting effect when Fort Worth stopped promoting new industry after its immense success in 1903. Double-digit annual increases returned between 1908 and 1918 as resources increased 385.5 percent (38.6 per annum), deposits 393.5 percent (39.4 per annum), and clearings 172.9 percent (17.3 per annum). Large increases in the financial growth rate from 1908 to 1918 are retained even after combining statistics from 1898 to 1905 and 1905 to 1908 to reduce the impact of slower growth from 1905 to 1908 on percentage increases post-1908. On that basis of comparison the decade after 1908 still reflects average per annum increases that are forty percent larger than the decade from 1998 to 1908 (see Table Conclusion-2). Clearly, Fort Worth’s largest economic advances occurred after 1908, well after the packinghouse effect had been established.

Table Conclusion-2 Comparison of Fort Worth Bank Statistics, 1898, 1905, 1908, 1918, and 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Deposits</th>
<th>Clearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>$3,200,000</td>
<td>$2,888,256</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>$9,450,000</td>
<td>$8,634,042</td>
<td>$265,506,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>$12,226,841</td>
<td>$8,962,093</td>
<td>$254,475,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>$59,361,100</td>
<td>$44,224,300</td>
<td>$694,451,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>$69,826,920</td>
<td>$73,500,000</td>
<td>$891,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most of the growth between 1908 and 1918 occurred after 1914. Of the $439,705,442 increase in bank clearings between 1908 and 1918 ($694,451,202-$254,745,760=$439,705,442) only $101,707,627, or 23.1 percent (3.9 percent per annum), occurred between 1908 and 1914 ($356,453,387-$254,745,760=$101,707,627).
During those six years Fort Worth reeled under the effects of lost initiative, a national banking crisis, and the European war’s initial depressive effect. The latter can clearly be seen as the drop in clearings from $418,619,829 in 1913 to $356,453,387 in 1914. In contrast, dramatic growth occurred in the four years from 1914 to 1918 as total clearings reached $337,997,815 ($694,451,202 - $356,453,387 = $337,997,815), a 76.9 percent rise that reflected 19.2 percent per annum (see Table C-3).

Table Conclusion-3  Fort Worth Bank Clearings, 1908 to 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Clearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>$254,745,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>$337,782,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>$342,899,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>$349,983,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>$386,933,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>$418,619,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>$356,453,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>$435,289,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>$487,328,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>$668,322,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>$694,451,202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fort Worth Star Telegram, February 25, 1919, p. 1; October 30, 1949, Commerce Section, p. 18; Fort Worth Record, January 3, 1908, p. 1.

The Fort Worth experience paralleled that of Texas’ manufacturing growth. From 1914 to 1919 Texas experienced average per annum increases of 8.7 percent in number of persons engaged in manufacturing, 21.3 percent in capital invested, and 35.3 percent in value added, all higher than average increases from 1904 to 1914, although the earlier period led in average annual per annum increase in establishments, 6.1 percent to 2.6 percent. (see Tables Conclusion-4, Conclusion-5, and Conclusion-6). The uniformity between Fort Worth and state figures suggests the pervasiveness of superior commercial growth during 1914 to 1918 and that more was at work on the economy than simply packinghouses. That was true for Fort Worth where the largest percentage increase in
production occurred not at the packinghouses but in foundry and machine shop products, which grew 932.3 percent.²

Table Conclusion-4  Texas Manufacturing Statistics for 1899, 1904, 1914, and 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1914</th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishments</td>
<td>5,724</td>
<td>5,084</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>3,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Engaged</td>
<td>130,931</td>
<td>91,114</td>
<td>57,892</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>$585,776,451</td>
<td>$283,543,820</td>
<td>$115,664,871</td>
<td>$63,655,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>$298,824,898</td>
<td>$108,135,042</td>
<td>$58,924,759</td>
<td>$38,506,130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table Conclusion-5  Percentage Increases in Texas Manufacturing for Selected Years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1919 to 1914</th>
<th>1914 to 1904</th>
<th>1904 to 1899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishments</td>
<td>+ 12.9</td>
<td>+ 61.0</td>
<td>+ 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Engaged</td>
<td>+ 43.7</td>
<td>+ 57.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>+106.6</td>
<td>+145.1</td>
<td>+81.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>+176.3</td>
<td>+ 83.5</td>
<td>+53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table Conclusion-6  Average Per Annum Increase in Texas Manufacturing, 1904 to 1914 and 1914 to 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Per Annum Percentage Increase, 1904 to 1914</th>
<th>Average Per Annum Percentage Increase, 1914 to 1919</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishments</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Engaged</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Historians have not recognized the importance of the post-1914 period when Fort Worth’s economy reached its highest relative plateau, producing more than Dallas or any other Southwestern city. They have long acknowledged linkages between Fort Worth’s growth and its commerce, specifically the arrival of railroads and packinghouses, but even scholars touching on the period have failed to note the new forces at work. For example, Jill Jackson and Leta Scheon cite railroads as the most important stimulus driving development until World War II but railroads, while continuing to play important roles, no longer held central focus after the nineteenth century. Schoen credited the World War I training facilities as providing a needed lift, Robert Talbert recognized that World War I expanded Fort Worth’s meat packing industry and its flour milling and grain storage facilities, and Paddock paid passing notice to the military’s impact on economic growth, but none devoted more than a few pages to the discussion. 3

Scholars with larger perspectives have developed themes congruent with the Fort Worth experience. Walter Buenger’s argument that Northeast Texas underwent important economic changes after 1914 is particularly applicable, but others have developed closely related points. Richard Dyskatra’s emphasis on boosterism and interurban competition and Lawrence Larsen’s capitalistic imperatives behind urbanization as well as Timothy Mahoney’s expansion of those ideas constitute an obvious but not totally inclusive list. In addition, the connection between Fort Worth’s economic flowering and the military presence carries more than a passing resemblance to Patricia Nelson Limerick’s focus on the role of the federal government in Western development.
Of course more happened than just the building of factories. Fort Worth made important progress in developing its local transportation network of bridges and street paving but its most significant advance concerned waterworks development. Long-term resolution of the extended disaster that constituted the Fort Worth Water Department began to take shape in 1911 when construction began on Lake Worth but completion of the reservoir in 1913 left quality and financial issues that disappeared only after the system achieved financial stability following 1916. Fort Worth also took a giant step to municipal respectability by closing Hell’s Half Acre. From the 1870s onward the vice district survived endured periodic enforcement initiatives thanks to its assumed economic benefits, that the Acre constituted, in effect, Fort Worth’s version of the French Quarter drawing trade to uptown merchants. Other issues contributed to the Acre’s longevity, including that concentrating vice offered enforcement advantages and isolated the blight from other areas. After 1914 the national prohibition movement entered the politics of the Acre but the salient force leading to final closure lay in Camp Bowie and the three air fields. The Acre ended largely because the military exercised its economic leverage, threatening to remove the bases if vice were not controlled, and because dissoluteness came to be viewed as inimical to the war effort. Of course prostitution and gambling survived; a 1920 grand jury report suggested that police payoffs lay behind “appalling conditions” in Irish Town and Little Mexico where prostitutes worked unbothered. But the closing of the Acre was not so much about ending prostitution as it was about ending the community’s official recognition and toleration of illegality in pursuit of commerce, a significant step on the road to modern city status.⁴
None of the changes would have happened without the efforts of Fort Worth’s residents. Citizen involvement played defining roles in making Fort Worth a railroad giant, a major meatpacker, and a World War I training center. Flexibility was critical to that process. The ability of boosters to recognize in the late 1880s that Fort Worth needed more than railroads and after 1914 that the packinghouse effect had limitations led to a multi-dimensional economy. Had that not happened, Fort Worth would have been a much different place. In 1913 William C. Burton, an early settler, recalled that in 1876 Fort Worthians used a large rope to pull the city’s first locomotive across an unfinished, wobbly bridge, an apt metaphor for the boosters who repeatedly pulled Fort Worth to new economic levels.  

Fort Worth’s military connections during World War I not only had palpable economic impacts at the time but also hint at an important legacy for later development. Rational supposition suggests that the foundations laid in 1917 contributed significantly to the development of Fort Worth’s vast defense and aerospace industry. That process accelerated during World War II with construction of the huge Convair Aircraft Plant, leading Fort Worth to receive twenty-two percent of Texas’ World War II defense contracts compared to just twelve percent for Dallas. The effect has carried over into the twentieth-first century. Between 1998 and 2002 military expenditures in the Dallas-Fort Worth area totaled $26,369,417,269, third behind only Washington-Baltimore and Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County. By 2002 Texas boasted 184,000 aerospace jobs (second only to California) of which 62,088, or 33.7 percent, were in Fort Worth. The link between Fort Worth’s World War I experience and that industry is suggestive but needs study.
In a very real sense Fort Worth became a city between 1914 and 1918. The post-1914 period did not solely determine Fort Worth’s standing in the twentieth-first century, Fort Worth would experience many other triumphs and tribulations over the next eighty years. Still, the evidence suggests that between 1914 and 1918 Fort Worth became a very different place. That transformation began forty years earlier when Fort Worthians committed their efforts and much of their wealth to building more than a county seat and more than just an overgrown country town. That they succeeded depended in equal measures on work, luck, and happenstance. Had any element been lacking, the outcome would have been far less impressive and far removed from the metropolitan area that developed where an outpost had once stood.
Conclusion Endnotes


Epilogue

Boardman Buckley Paddock and John Peter Smith were Fort Worth’s two biggest boosters. Both arrived when Fort Worth was still a raw village, Smith in the early 1850s, Paddock in the early 1870s, and both devoted much of their energy, money, and time to civic promotion. Smith’s memory is preserved in dramatic fashion thanks to Tarrant County’s John Peter Smith Hospital and in a statue just outside city hall. In contrast, the only recognition afforded Paddock’s contribution is the North Main Street Bridge and a small park adjacent to the county courthouse, neither widely known. The difference in levels of recognition probably stems from Smith’s untimely demise in 1901 while Paddock survived until old age, dying in 1922. Paddock’s contemporaries recognized his significance, naming him Fort Worth’s most distinguished man in 1918. Paddock was at heart a businessman who struggled all his life to bring Fort Worth the commercial development he saw as the key to municipal greatness. Therefore, the renaming of a major thoroughfare, such as Main Street or Seventh Street in the downtown area, might serve as a fitting memorial. If neither option is possible Fort Worth should take some other step to correct a blatant oversight.
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**Drama**


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Background

Born January 20, 1948, Clifton, Texas
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ABSTRACT

BEYOND OUTPOST TO CITY: FORT WORTH, 1880-1918

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Department of History
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Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Todd Kerstetter, Assistant Professor of History
Dr. Clayton Brown, Professor of History
Dr. Mark Gilderhus, Lyndon Baines Johnson Chair
Dr. Steven Woodworth, Professor of History

“Beyond Outpost: Fort Worth, 1880-1918” argues that historians have neglected the importance of the period between 1915 and 1918 for Fort Worth’s development into a metropolitan area. The focus is on economics but attention is also given to Hell’s Half Acre, Fort Worth’s legendary vice district, and the associated municipal infrastructure, particularly the waterworks, which constituted a reoccurring problem. The study concludes that Fort Worth reached an apogee in 1919 when its manufacturing output surpassed all other Texas cities.

Fort Worth’s history was one of struggle, a struggle that the city came very close to losing. During the Civil War the area suffered a declining population and a stagnate economy before cattle drives in the late 1860s sparked commercial activity. After 1870 the herds declined, sending Fort Worth into another crisis before the arrival of a railroad in 1876 rejuvenated the economy. In the 1880s an impressive railroad expansion fostered the beginnings of a municipal infrastructure with paved streets, streetcars, and the first waterworks. In the second half of the decade many citizens realized that railroads did not
provide sufficient commercial stimulation, that great cities needed factories. The Panic of 1893 devastated Fort Worth so thoroughly that less industrial output was recorded in 1900 than in 1890. The arrival of the Swift and Armour packinghouses in 1903 offered yet another rescue from economic insignificance, doing so to the degree that Fort Worth spent years savoring its good fortune. After 1914 Fort Worth began to recover its zeal for industrial expansion, in part, because of a happy confluence of spiraling demands for meat and grains as supplies increased at the same time that oil was discovered at Ranger, Texas and that civic boosterism revived to play an important role in attracting four major World War I military bases. The synergisms of those forces made Fort Worth Texas’ largest industrial producer in 1919.