

MARCHING THROUGH PENNSYLVANIA:
THE STORY OF SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS
DURING THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

by

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Introduction

Between 1861 and 1865, the United States nearly tore itself apart in the deadliest war in its history. The American Civil War, which pitted the eleven southern states of the Confederacy—South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee—against the combined might of those states that remained loyal to the Union, cost America more than 620,000 lives and devastated the infrastructure of much of the country. Since that time, professional historians and amateur enthusiasts, alike, have scrutinized nearly every aspect of the conflict, though some points of interest have found themselves under the historical microscope more than others. The Battle of Gettysburg, an engagement that ravaged the landscape surrounding a small borough in south-central Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 and which stands as the bloodiest confrontation in the war, is perhaps the best example of this phenomenon as it has proven especially fertile ground for both burgeoning authors and accomplished scholars.

Together, amateur and professional historians have invested a tremendous amount of brainpower and physical energy in the creation of often weighty tomes that analyze the minutest details of this bloodiest and most famous of Civil War battles. Harry Pfanz and Jeffrey Wert have even broken the three-day contest down into twenty-four-hour studies with books entitled *Gettysburg: The First Day*, *Gettysburg: The Second Day*, and *Gettysburg, Day Three*, which taken collectively devote more than one-thousand-five-hundred pages to the subject. Gary Gallagher, the John L. Nau III Professor of History of the American Civil War at the University of Virginia, has issued at least four separate essay collections covering the Battle of Gettysburg, including one entitled *The Third Day*

at *Gettysburg and Beyond*. These examples represent only a tiny fraction of the many titles devoted to the Gettysburg Campaign. In 1982, Richard Allen Sauers published *The Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – August 1, 1863: A Comprehensive, Selectively Annotated Bibliography*, a text that runs 277 pages and includes 2,757 individual entries, and since its release twenty-five years ago, publishers have continued to print articles and books on Gettysburg at a staggering rate.¹

While scholars and students generally agree that historians have virtually exhausted the topic, authors continue to seek opportunities to publish books on Gettysburg in the hopes of adding their names to the already long roster of those writers who have recorded their thoughts regarding what might be the most over-studied three days in American history. After all, the town of Gettysburg and the rolling hills surrounding it that together make up Gettysburg National Military Park stand as the quintessential American mecca as thousands of people from all over the world make pilgrimages to the site of the battle annually. After visiting the grounds, watching a film based on the campaign, or reading about the battle's history, one cannot deny that Gettysburg has become an important part of America's national identity, and as such,

¹ Harry W. Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The First Day* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Harry W. Pfanz, *Gettysburg: The Second Day* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Jeffrey D. Wert, *Gettysburg, Day Three* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Gary W. Gallagher, *The First Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1992); Gary W. Gallagher, *The Second Day at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1993); Gary W. Gallagher, *The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Gary W. Gallagher, *Three Days at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1999); Richard Allen Sauers, *The Gettysburg Campaign, June 3 – August 1, 1863: A Comprehensive, Selectively Annotated Bibliography*, with foreword by Warren W. Hasler, Jr. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982).

books on Gettysburg continue to sell and the topic continues to fascinate serious scholars as well as antiquarians and Civil War buffs.²

Yet despite the still fervent interest in the Gettysburg Campaign, it has become much more difficult for interested parties to carve out a niche significant enough to warrant the publication of a scholarly monograph on the subject. At a recent session of the Society of Civil War Historians, a group of well-known scholars, including Gary Gallagher, Leslie Gordon, and Steven Woodworth, met to discuss this problem and to contemplate the future of Gettysburg erudition. In the end, they agreed that barring the discovery of fresh evidence, there was little room for new scholarship covering minute tactical aspects of the engagement, yet they also offered a ray of hope to those still interested in studying Gettysburg as they called upon their colleagues to examine aspects of the campaign beyond the battlefield. In particular, they pointed out that scholars had traditionally relegated the subject of soldier-civilian interaction during the Army of Northern Virginia's march through Pennsylvania in June and July 1863 to the backwaters of Civil War studies. In a field that has recently developed a strong tradition of producing studies on civilians in the path of war, their point has validity, for ever since the emergence of what historians refer to as the New Military History, scholars have made a more concerted effort to include the perspectives of civilians and common soldiers in their work and to wed the methodologies that both social and military historians employ.

The argument in favor of scholarship on the Confederate invasion of 1863 is all the more relevant because in the evolving tradition of monographs devoted to the study of civilians in the path of the Civil War, nearly all of the works have dealt solely with

² For an excellent overview of the development of Gettysburg's mystique, see Thomas A. Desjardin, *These Honored Dead: How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Da Capo Press, 2003).

southern civilians in the path of Union armies. The past couple of decades have seen a rapid increase in the number of books published that deal with this subject, including studies like Stephen Ash's *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865*, Mark Grimsley's *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians*, Lee Kennett's *Marching Through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman's Campaign*, and Anne Bailey's *War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Savannah Campaign*. These works have explored in gripping detail the nature of the war and its effects upon the southern populace, and there are many other titles devoted to the study of what happened when Union soldiers collided with southern civilians.

Despite this rich literature on Federal movements through the South, academic presses have remained relatively silent with regards to Confederate movements through the North, and one must admit that the opportunities for such studies are rare. While there were instances of Confederate armies entering Maryland and Kentucky, both of those states were represented on the Confederate flag, and both were also slave states. Pennsylvania—to state the obvious—was neither represented on the Confederate flag nor did slavery thrive within its borders. While the Confederates occasionally sent cavalry detachments into the free North, the Gettysburg Campaign stands as the only instance in which a major Confederate field army tread upon free soil, and that is precisely why it provides such an interesting case for further study.³

³ Steven V. Ash, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Lee Kennett, *Marching Through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman's Campaign* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995); Anne J. Bailey, *War and Ruin: William T. Sherman and the Atlanta Campaign* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002).

As a result of the lack of serious scholarship exploring the behavior of Confederate troops toward northern civilians during the Gettysburg Campaign, the legacy of the invasion remains shrouded in myth as the campaign's participants as well as both professional and amateur scholars have long distinguished Confederate General Robert Edward Lee's Army of Northern Virginia during the campaign with an aura of epic restraint and generally contrasted the Confederates' treatment of Pennsylvania's residents with Union armies' conduct toward southern civilians. In an effort to prove the Confederacy's righteousness and salvage pride in the face of defeat, many southerners and some scholars have rallied to the ideals of the Lost Cause, a set of beliefs that among other things stands as a systematic attempt to demonstrate that Confederate armies fought valiantly for the noble cause of states' rights only to be bested by the North's superior industry and manpower. As a result of the power of this (primarily southern) cultural philosophy, which tends to stress the South's moral virtue, the veil of the Lost Cause has come to obscure the true nature of the relationship between the Confederate invaders and the Union civilians in their path. Moreover, the lack of scholarship on the subject relative to work historians have done on Union marches through the Confederacy suggests by way of implication that the Army of Northern Virginia's march through Pennsylvania was comparatively civilized and/or paled in contrast to Union marches through the South such as William Tecumseh Sherman's infamous March to the Sea in 1864.

The origins of the mythology of the Lost Cause in general and as it applied to the Gettysburg Campaign have their roots in the Civil War era. In 1866 Edward Alfred Pollard published *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates* and bestowed to America the terminology of the Lost Cause. Born in

Albemarle County, Virginia, in 1831, Pollard attended the University of Virginia, studied law at the College of William and Mary, and served as a clerk in the U. S. Congress before settling down in Richmond, Virginia, and becoming the principal editor of the *Richmond Examiner* in 1861. A secessionist who cherished the southern cause but had little love for Confederate President Jefferson Davis, Pollard spent much of the war bolstering support for the conflict among his readers while simultaneously lashing out with vitriolic attacks against his president through the pages of his newspaper and a four-volume discourse on the war entitled *Southern History of the War*, which he wrote as the cannons still roared and the blood of soldiers had yet to soak into the ground on many battlefields.

Having maintained a widely read newspaper in the Confederate capital during the war, Pollard felt he was in a good position to comment on the national crisis he was living through, and a year after the great conflict's terminus, he penned *The Lost Cause*, where he continued his tirade against President Davis and discussed many other facets of the war. For example, he castigated Sherman for condoning atrocities that occurred during the March to the Sea and reprimanded Northerners for dignifying the acts by casting Sherman as a hero. Also, in an effort to present the Confederate army in the best possible light, Pollard succumbed to exaggeration and set a historiographical precedent when commenting on the campaign which took the Confederates into Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863. According to him, Lee's invasion of the Keystone State stood in stark contrast to Union marches through the South as "no house was entered without authority; no granary was pillaged; no property was taken without payment on the spot; and vast fields of grain were actually picketed by Confederate guards, mounted on almost starved

horses” during the Gettysburg Campaign. With his book, which is rife with such assertions, Pollard did much to set up and maintain the collection of myths that have become the Lost Cause, and his testimonials regarding Confederate behavior during the Gettysburg Campaign taken together with the writings of Confederate veterans who participated in the invasion certainly left a lasting impression on subsequent authors.⁴

Seventy years after the publication of Pollard’s work, the myth of absolute Confederate restraint during the Gettysburg Campaign continued and became more closely connected to another pillar of Lost Cause mythology—the impeccable character of General Robert E. Lee. This time the support for the Confederates’ legendary discipline appeared in the work of Douglas Southall Freeman, the man many people still hold up as the preeminent Lee biographer. In his four-volume treatise on the general, Freeman asserted that “by daily reminders and by careful example . . . [Lee] succeeded in protecting property from damage and women from insult” while his army moved through Pennsylvania. More than twenty years later, Clifford Dowdey, a historian with a penchant for venerating Lee and the author of *Death of a Nation: The Story of Lee and His Men at Gettysburg*, estimated that soldiers in the Army of Northern Virginia “had never behaved as well” as they did in Pennsylvania, for they “were Lee’s soldiers, and his chivalric code decreed that they should fight only armed men.” As the myth of restraint bonded itself

⁴ Edward A. Pollard, *The Lost Cause: A New Southern History of the War of the Confederates* (New York: E. B. Treat & Co., Publishers, 1866), 404. For a more thorough treatment of the history of the mythology of the Lost Cause, see David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2002); Gaines M Foster, *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause and the Emergence of the New South, 1865-1913* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); David R. Goldfield, *Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002); Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, eds., *The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); William C. Davis, *The Cause Lost: Myths and Realities of the Confederacy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996); Tony Horwitz, *Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the Unfinished Civil War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998); Charles Regan Wilson, *Baptized in Blood: The Religion of the Lost Cause, 1865-1920* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1983).

more strongly to the cult of Lee, it became more engrained in the popular memory of the Civil War and thus more difficult for historians to counter.⁵

As the twentieth century continued, the myths that writers like Pollard, Freeman, and Dowdey perpetuated in their monographs proved difficult to dispel, and a number of more modern scholars joined the chorus of sanctity surrounding the conduct of the Confederates in Pennsylvania. While books and articles that deal specifically with the Gettysburg Campaign have tended away from this trend in recent years, the idea that Lee's army was exceptionally well behaved while in the North still slips into other works on the contest, and the myth's pervasiveness indicates that the traditional interpretation of the campaign still influences scholars who are not focused specifically on the study of the campaign. For example, in a 1991 article that appeared in *The American Historical Review*, one of this country's paramount scholarly journals, Everard H. Smith declared that "throughout the Gettysburg Campaign, the Confederates behaved with commendable restraint, carefully protecting private property and treating civilians with considerable respect." Granted, Smith may have been writing in relative terms as his article focused on the pinnacle of Confederate destructiveness—the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania in 1864—but his general declaration that the Confederate soldiers of 1863 behaved so admirably only served to propagate the affirmations of his misinformed predecessors.⁶

Another modern author who found himself engaged in the process of keeping the myth of restraint alive was Donald C. Pfan. In 1998, the University of North Carolina

⁵ Douglas Southall Freeman, *R. E. Lee: A Biography*, Vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), 57; Clifford Dowdey, *Death of a Nation: The Story of Lee and His Men at Gettysburg* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), 44-45.

⁶ Everard H. Smith, "Chambersburg: Anatomy of a Confederate Reprisal," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 96, No. 2 (April 1991): 434.

Press, a highly regarded academic press and one of the premier publishers of Civil War studies, released his book, *Richard S. Ewell: A Soldier's Life*. Since Lieutenant General Richard Stoddert Ewell was a corps commander during Lee's invasion of the North in 1863, Pfanz had ample opportunity to comment on the campaign. For a brief moment, he appeared to be ready to challenge the myth of Confederate restraint when he admitted that "if there was one thing Southern soldiers did better than fight, it was forage," but he missed his opportunity when he followed up this statement by assuring his readers that "instances of private plundering were few" in Pennsylvania. Somehow the Confederates, who Pfanz admits had a propensity for foraging quite liberally, mysteriously lost their desire to do so when they entered the free North.⁷

Felicity Allen, an independent scholar living in Auburn, Alabama, also praised the conduct of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign in her modern biography of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. According to her, Lee's "men did not molest private property" while marching through the Keystone State. Few scholars living today would dispute that her work, *Jefferson Davis: Unconquerable Heart*, rests solidly on the foundations of the Lost Cause, yet the University of Missouri Press, a reputable academic press of the modern era, elected to publish it in 1999—warts and all—and in doing so, helped keep the myth of Confederate restraint during the Gettysburg Campaign alive.⁸

While visions of a "Marble Man" surrounded by an army of chivalrous southern gentlemen have clearly blinded some historians, the historical record does lend such

⁷ Donald C. Pfanz, *Richard S. Ewell: A Soldier's Life* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 296, 299.

⁸ Felicity Allen, *Jefferson Davis: Unconquerable Heart* (Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 1999), 355.

conclusions some support. Following the war, many veterans, including both common soldiers and commissioned officers, wrote memoirs about their experiences in the conflict, and quite often they seem to have succumbed to selective amnesia in their efforts to uphold the mythology of the Lost Cause as it applies to the Gettysburg Campaign. According to the flawed memory of Major General Jubal Anderson Early, a division commander in General Ewell's Second Corps during the invasion, "there was no marauding, or indiscriminate plundering, but all such acts were expressly forbidden and prohibited effectively. . . . not even a rail had been taken from the fences for firewood." One of Early's brigade commanders, Brigadier General John Brown Gordon, seconded his commander's sentiments, asserting in his memoirs that he "resolved to leave no ruins along the line of my march through Pennsylvania; no marks of a more enduring character than the tracks of my soldiers along its superb pikes. . . . we marched into that delightful region, and then marched out of it, without leaving any scars to mar its beauty or lessen its value." Failure to acknowledge Confederate plundering and depredations was not limited to the rank of general. In a 1915 entry in the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, Lieutenant Randolph H. McKin, Brigadier General George Hume Stuart's aide-de-camp, further supported the notion that Confederate soldiers behaved superbly while in Pennsylvania. In reference to the march through the southern counties of the state, McKin wrote, "I can truly say I did not see a fence rail burned between Hagerstown and Gettysburg." Inaccurate recollections trickled down to lower-ranking officers and soldiers as well.⁹

⁹ The first person to refer to General Lee as a "marble man" was poet Stephen Vincent Benét in a poem he wrote in 1930 entitled "The Army of Northern Virginia." In 1977 Thomas L. Connelly published his classic study of Lee's ascension to god-like status in the postwar period entitled *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), a

On August 2, 1904, Captain George Hillyer, the former commander of Company C of the Ninth Georgia Infantry Regiment, stood before members of the Walton County Georgia Confederate Veterans to give a speech about his service to the Confederacy and the role his fellow Georgians had played during the Gettysburg Campaign. Hillyer was particularly well suited to comment on the performance of the Georgians at Gettysburg, for during the bloody fight in the infamous Wheatfield, where his regiment suffered fifty-six percent casualties on the second day of the battle, he had risen to command of the Ninth Georgia after all three of his superior officers were either killed or wounded. A proud southerner, who admired his fellow Georgians and declared in his official report of the battle that “the whole regiment behaved with its customary steadiness and devotion” at Gettysburg, Hillyer used his opportunity to speak before the Confederate veterans of Walton County to set the record straight, at least as he chose to remember it. Proclaiming that he and his fellow Confederates “were right then and we are right now” and assuring his audience that “we will be true to our honor until we die,” Hillyer once again took charge of the situation before him and led his audience in an assault to seize the moral high ground in one of the earlier battles of the Lost Cause with the following statement:

During our occupancy of Pennsylvania territory, private rights were universally respected. . . . There is no prouder tribute to the manhood and chivalry of Southern character, than the contrast which imperishable history will draw, between the conduct of Southern soldiers in Pennsylvania, and the vandalism which too often disgraced the Federal flag under Sheridan in the valley, and under Sherman in his

book which popularized the term “Marble Man” and which provides a reappraisal of the traditional view of Lee as an infallible icon. Another book on the subject is Alan T. Nolan, *Lee Considered: General Robert E. Lee and Civil War History* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Jubal Anderson Early, *The Memoirs of Jubal A. Early: Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States* (New York: Smithmark Publishers, Inc., 1994), 255, 265; John Brown Gordon, *Reminiscences of the Civil War*, with an introduction by Ralph Lowell Eckert (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1903; reprint, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1993), 144; Randolph H. McKin, “The Gettysburg Campaign,” *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Hereinafter cited as *SHSP*), Vol. 40 (1915): 265.

march to the sea. We did not conquer in the war—because they outnumbered us five or more to one—but we did that greatest and better thing than mere physical success, and that is, we put our enemies in the wrong.¹⁰

In writing of the invasion as they did, Confederates demonstrated diligence in their quest to seize the moral high ground against their Union counterparts during the conflict and in the postwar period. Their attempts at such ascension proved successful, and the lack of adequate scholarship on the matter has only served to reinforce the Confederates' hold on many of the popular perceptions regarding the Civil War. As a result, these claims to superior moral righteousness have become tradition in some sectors of society, and they remain one of the pillars in the Lost Cause's overall effort to explain away Confederate defeat.

Despite the abundant supply of Confederate apologists in the historical record, there have been some historians who have stepped forward to question the tradition of restraint that masks the true nature of the invasion. In 1968 Edwin B. Coddington devoted an entire chapter of his *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command*, arguably the best one-volume treatment of the campaign, to the plundering of Pennsylvania and set out to revise the traditional interpretation of Confederate conduct. In his retelling of the march through Pennsylvania, Coddington asserted that many of the Confederates, who “were justly proud of their conduct as invaders,” had “overstated their case.” In his estimation, the Confederates, who tended to glorify their own behavior during the invasion, could not explain away the “forced sales of goods in stores without any pretense of payment, as well as the appropriation from private dwellings of household

¹⁰ George Hillyer, “Battle of Gettysburg: Address Before the Walton County Georgia Confederate Veterans, August 2nd, 1904,” Georgia: 9th Infantry Regiment File, Box 8, Robert L. Brake Collection, United States Army Military History Institute (Hereinafter cited as USAMHI).

furnishings, clothing for men, women, and children, cooking utensils, tableware, watches and jewelry, cash, and last but not least, sleigh bells.” While Coddington does conclude that “the army as a whole never got out of hand,” he does a fine job of demonstrating that “many a rebel plundered and stole with great efficiency” and of maintaining that “the Confederate invasion left its mark” on Pennsylvania as observers who visited the state after Lee’s army withdrew “were appalled by the scenes of desolation that marked the footsteps of the armies: fences destroyed, ripe grain trodden and ground into the rain-soaked soil, no signs of life except for an occasional dilapidated wagon creeping along cautiously or a little caravan of refugees on its way home.”¹¹

Despite Coddington’s solid research backing up his revisionist interpretation of Confederate behavior during the Gettysburg Campaign, academia did not readily accept his conclusions. According to a review of his book in *The American Historical Review*, the chapter on Confederate depredations represented “a digressive . . . in which the prosecution rather unwittingly makes the case for the defense.” In short, Coddington tried to shed light on the true nature of the relationship between Confederate soldiers and Union civilians in Pennsylvania, but according to the reviewer, he ended up demonstrating that the Confederates were, in fact, an immaculately behaved army of soldier-saints. Clifford Dowdey, who reviewed the book for *The Journal of Southern History*, simply ignored the chapter altogether and noted that Coddington had made no effort at “fresh interpretation” because “there is nothing startlingly new to add.”¹²

¹¹ Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968; reprint, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1979), 154, 178.

¹² Peter F. Walker, Review of *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* by Edwin B. Coddington, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (April 1969): 1375; Clifford Dowdey, Review of *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* by Edwin B. Coddington, *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February 1969): 102.

Such criticisms of attempts to refute the traditional interpretation of Confederate behavior during the Gettysburg Campaign were not limited to the late 1960s. In 2003, Steven E. Woodworth, a prolific Civil War scholar and a professor of history at Texas Christian University, devoted a chapter of his *Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign* to Confederate depredations committed during the invasion, and he, too, found himself ridiculed by a book reviewer. Demonstrating that all Civil War soldiers tended to “use up” the countryside through which they passed and arguing that Confederate soldiers who participated in the invasion of Pennsylvania did indeed engage in the plundering and pillaging of both public and private property, Woodworth concluded, “In most respects, the Confederate army that marched through Pennsylvania was no better or worse than the Union armies that marched through various parts of the South at different times during the war.” Shortly after the book’s publication, *Civil War News*, a popular newspaper that is published monthly “For People With An Active Interest in the Civil War Today,” issued a scathing review in which Clint Johnson, the author of *The Politically Incorrect Guide to The South (and Why It Will Rise Again)*, chastised Woodworth for failing to speculate “that a little Confederate payback . . . might have been in order” and for “setting up the Army of Northern Virginia as an armed rabble of bogeymen terrorizing the citizens of Pennsylvania.” Johnson also criticized Woodworth for spending “an entire page on one account of how a playful Confederate forced a smug Yankee out of his clothes,” never mind that the Pennsylvania civilian was staring down the business end of a Confederate soldier’s rifle during the incident.¹³

¹³ Steven E. Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2003), 27; Clint Johnson, Review of *Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign* by Steven E. Woodworth, *Civil War News*, <http://www.civilwarnews.com/reviews/bookreviews.cfm?ID=449>.

As these few examples demonstrate, steps are being taken to remedy the flawed interpretation of Confederate behavior during the Gettysburg Campaign, but the reviewers' comments and the fact that modern presses continue to publish books that contain such glaring errors leave one to wonder if the situation is, in fact, improving. Recently, Brooks D. Simpson lavished high praise on Edward L. Ayers's *In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863*, a superbly written book in which Ayers devotes part of a chapter to examining the march through Pennsylvania, for recounting "the ways in which war tore at the countryside" and reminding "us that the war became a hard one long before 1864." Yet while the trend in modern academia seems to be turning toward one of dismissal with regards to the mythology of the Lost Cause and the legacy of Confederate restraint during the Gettysburg Campaign, the question of whether or not the audience historians serve is getting the message remains.¹⁴

In the October 2007 edition of *Civil War News*, Giles Distinguished Professor Emeritus of History at Mississippi State University, John F. Marszalek, reviewed Clint Johnson's *The Politically Incorrect Guide to The South (And Why It Will Rise Again*. In evaluating the book, Marszalek remarked, "In an age when professional historians no longer write from a sectionally biased perspective, this book is indeed unfortunate, demonstrating no familiarity with the huge body of historical work that does not fit its preconceived notions." Despite the fact that Johnson's book is part of a widely read, best-selling series and that it currently outranks Marszalek's own highly acclaimed biography of William T. Sherman on both Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com sales lists (by extremely wide margins in each case), Marszalek's comments and the general tone of his

¹⁴ Brooks D. Simpson, Review of *In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863* by Edward L. Ayers, *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 91, No. 2 (September 2004): 601-602.

review imply that the Lost Cause is nonsensical and no longer worth the attention of historians. He is not alone in that belief. During a session on “Civilians in the Path of Civil War” at the 2005 Southern Historical Association meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, Professor Robert T. McKenzie of Washington University claimed that the mythological characterization of Lee’s march through Pennsylvania as a wholly civilized affair “never rested on much evidence in the first place” and questioned whether “we as historians need to spend so much time (dare I say waste so much time) doing battle with those still defending the ‘Lost Cause.’” In 2006 at the annual meeting of the Society for Military Historians, Professor William G. Piston of Missouri State University felt much the same way during a session on myth and memory as it pertains to the Civil War, declaring that after some careful research into the content of high school textbooks, he had concluded that the Lost Cause was but an insignificant blip on the historiographical radar in the modern era.¹⁵

Despite the contention from some halls in academia that the Lost Cause is dead or dying and is best ignored, the facts do not bear out such claims. In presenting Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania as an exercise in grace and humility while traditionally portraying Union marches through the South as acts of barbaric and wanton vandalism, the Lost Cause’s defenders have misrepresented history in order to achieve their own

¹⁵ John F. Marszalek, Review of *The Politically Incorrect Guide to The South (and Why It Will Rise Again)* by Clint Johnson, *Civil War News* (October 2007), 28; According to www.amazon.com on November 1, 2007, Johnson’s book ranks #7,976 in sales, and Marszalek’s *Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order* (1993) ranks only #454,824. On www.barnesandnoble.com, Johnson’s book ranks #19,696, and Marszalek’s book ranks #125,621. In a startling twist, Johnson’s book is actually a close competitor to James M. McPherson’s *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (1988), a book that many historians consider the best one-volume treatment of the Civil War. McPherson’s book is ranked #5,935 on www.amazon.com and #13,051 on www.barnesandnoble.com; Robert Tracey McKenzie, “Comments on Papers Pertaining to ‘Civilians in the Path of the Civil War,’” Southern Historical Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, November 3, 2005, Copy of Comments in Author’s Possession ; William Garrett Piston, Comments on “Myth and Memory” Session, Society for Military Historians Annual Meeting, Manhattan, Kansas, May 18-22, 2006, Copy of Notes on Comments in Author’s Possession.

agenda of explaining away Confederate defeat and maintaining their hold on the moral high ground. While few in academia would cede the moral high ground to the Confederacy in the Civil War, these traditional notions persist and continue to inform many Americans' basic precepts about the conflict. As we move out of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, Americans are still inundated with images and tales of a morally and spiritually righteous Confederacy in films like *Gettysburg* and *Gods and Generals* and in books like *The South Was Right!* and *The Politically Incorrect Guide to The South (and Why It Will Rise Again)*.

Moreover, anyone who thinks that the Lost Cause is dead should take a moment to visit the Confederate States of America: The Official C. S. A. Government Website (csagov.org) or the website for the League of the South (dixienet.org), two organizations that are currently fighting over the true legacy of secession and the Confederacy. If those visits do not suffice, one might attend a meeting of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, an organization that works to preserve “the history and legacy of these heroes [i.e., Confederate veterans], so that future generations can understand the motives that animated the Southern cause” and at whose meetings grown men sometimes still pledge allegiance to or salute the Confederate flag. Some people may scoff and dismiss these organizations as fringe groups, but their message coupled with the still common misinterpretations about the war in many sectors of popular culture demonstrates that historians cannot yet declare victory in the war over history and memory as it pertains to the American Civil War.¹⁶

¹⁶ Quote taken from the Sons of Confederate Veterans website at www.scv.org. For an examination of popular conceptions about the Civil War, see Horwitz, *Confederates in the Attic*.

One of the better examples of how Americans still misread and/or misremember the conflict is in the traditional southern interpretation of Sherman's March to the Sea, an operation which took Sherman and his army from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia, in the winter of 1864 and which southerners have generally characterized as a horrid exercise in cruelty and looting. In 2003 Alan C. Downs, an associate professor of history at Georgia Southern University in Statesboro, Georgia, a small college and farming community located not far from Savannah, curated a museum exhibit devoted to Sherman's march in hopes of "opening some minds about Sherman." Downs competed against the reality that "in the South history is not learned; it is remembered, it is handed down like a family heirloom through generations." Southern recollections of Sherman's March to the Sea are mordant, and since the Civil War era, "Southerners almost delighted in recounting the tales of violence, destruction, and thievery that they claimed the armies of Sherman, Sheridan, and other northern generals directed against civilians." As a result of this tradition, Downs understood that it would not be easy to sway the preconceptions many of his students shared about Sherman: "Many of my students think he's the anti-Christ." His skepticism was not unwarranted, for in a poll conducted by *Savannah Morning News* following the exhibit, seventy-eight percent of the nearly five-hundred participants polled rejected the idea that "the Union commander was doing his duty, trying to save casualties and end the war as soon as possible" and asserted that Sherman "and his troops were out of control, tearing up civilian property out of malicious hatred toward the South." Other historians have even reported receiving nasty emails after having gone public with revisionist comments regarding Union marches through the South, and this experience demonstrates that the Lost Cause is alive and well outside the halls of academia.¹⁷

¹⁷ http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/111003/LOC_sherman.shtml; Goldfield, 16; Foster, 123;

Perhaps Robert Penn Warren explained this phenomenon best when he wrote in his classic *The Legacy of the Civil War: Meditations on the Centennial*, “When one is happy in forgetfulness, facts get forgotten.” But ignoring the bully, as some scholars seem to want to do, is not an acceptable solution to the problem, for it is by seeking the truth and reminding people of the facts that historians remain relevant. In the end, scholars need to spend more time exploring the persistence of these myths and devote more attention to disproving such misleading arguments as it is their principal duty to preserve the human past in as unbiased a fashion as possible so that students of history can learn from their predecessors’ mistakes and more fully appreciate their predecessors’ accomplishments. Finally, in a field that has published tens-of-thousands of monographs and articles, it is surprising that no single book stands out as a comprehensive examination of the relationship between Confederate soldiers and Union civilians during the Gettysburg Campaign. To this point the subject has been relegated to a chapter here or an article there. One can only hope that the following pages represent a step in the right direction toward remedying this defect in Civil War historiography and demonstrating that the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 was exceptional for neither its humility nor its destructiveness—in fact, it was not all that different than Union marches through the South.¹⁸

<http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/111003/shermanpollresults.shtml>; For an example of popular reactions against historians who offer revisionist interpretations of Union marches through the South, see Mark Grimsley, “An Antiwar Military History?: Osama bin Sherman,” Entry 40, May 14, 2004, http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/grimsley1/dialogue/postcolonialism/resistance_40.htm; See also Mark Grimsley, “The Long Shadow of Sherman’s March,” http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/grimsley1/dialogue/long_shadow.htm.

¹⁸ Robert P. Warren, *The Legacy of the Civil War: Meditation on the Centennial* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1961), 60.

Chapter 1

“We Should Assume the Aggressive”

As spring moved toward summer in 1863, the commander of the Confederacy's premier fighting force surveyed his situation along the Rappahannock River in northern Virginia and contemplated his next move. As it had been since he took command, his goal was a climactic battle that would serve as the knock-out punch to bring the tragedy that was the American Civil War to an end. The conflict was now two years old, and General Robert E. Lee had been in command of the Army of Northern Virginia for just under a year. He had recently bested yet another Union commander, General Ambrose Everett Burnside, and he now faced his fourth opponent in the person of Union General Joseph Hooker. When the military contest had begun in the spring of 1861, few Americans guessed that it would last as long as it had, and fewer still foresaw the full magnitude and destruction of the contest that would pit neighbors, families, and fellow Americans against one another.

While scholars have spent much time and written many books exploring the origins of the Civil War, the immediate catalyst for the conflict was the presidential election of 1860. When Republican Abraham Lincoln won that election and vowed to stop the spread of slavery in the United States, the seven Deep South states—South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas—declared themselves out of the Union and organized themselves as the Confederate States of America, choosing Jefferson Davis as their president and Montgomery, Alabama, as their capital. Their militias promptly seized most federal installations within their boundaries. One exception was Fort Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina, where a U. S. Army

garrison of fewer than 100 men waited in uneasy inactivity. When Lincoln declined to withdraw the troops and moved instead to re-supply them, Davis ordered Confederate forces to attack. They did on April 12, 1861, and the fort surrendered two days later. With hostilities underway, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 ninety-day volunteers to put down an insurrection “too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.” This call for troops drove four more Upper South slave states from the Union—Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee—raising the total number of Confederate states to eleven.¹

With Virginia now among its numbers, the Confederacy elected to move its capital from Alabama to Richmond, Virginia, in May 1861, an enticing one-hundred miles from the U. S. capital at Washington, D. C. The relocation of the Confederate capital so close to the Union capital guaranteed that the Eastern Theater would garner the lion’s share of the attention during the Civil War, and politicians, military leaders, and everyday citizens on both sides of the contest tended to focus their interest on the area of the country north of the James River in Virginia and east of the Allegheny and Appalachian Plateaus. Between April 1861 and June 1862, Union forces in that region made two rather uninspiring attempts to capture the Confederate capital. Those two operations—First Bull Run in 1861 and the Peninsula Campaign in 1862—ended as defeats for the Union. The second one also saw the rise of Lee as the commander of the Confederacy’s Army of Northern Virginia. Lee took command on June 1 following the

¹ Abraham Lincoln, *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1952-1955), 4:262-263, 332-333; Charles W. Ramsdell, “Lincoln and Fort Sumter,” *The Journal of Southern History* 3 (August 1937): 259-288; Lincoln, 4:331-332.

severe wounding of Confederate General Joseph Eggleston Johnston during the battle of Seven Pines.²

Lee had graduated second in his class from West Point in 1829, and he had been one of only five cadets in that year to graduate without having earned a single demerit. Known as the “Marble Model” by many of his classmates, Lee was such a well-known soldier in the antebellum U. S. Army that Lincoln had offered him command of Union forces in Virginia at the outbreak of the Civil War. Lee declined, refusing to raise his sword against his native Virginia. Historian Steven E. Woodworth, the author of *Davis and Lee at War*, has gone to great lengths to demonstrate that Lee’s decision haunted him throughout the conflict and that he was a man at war with his own conscience regarding his decision to fight for the cause of the Confederacy. As a result of his personal turmoil, “He sometimes acted as if he felt a need to vindicate his choice by military victory.” Believing that the Confederacy was composed of people who shared his moral ambivalence, Lee felt that the South needed “resounding victories and an early peace, or its morale was bound to crumble.” Operating on this premise along with a firm conviction that the war “could be lost simply by not winning,” “Lee sought crushing victory” in his quest for “a quick resolution to the conflict in order to relieve the tension of moral uncertainty.” Thus, not prone to idleness, Lee represented a grave threat to the Union’s demoralized forces.³

² James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 334, 461-462; Prior to Lee’s appointment, General Gustavus Woodson Smith commanded the Confederate army for a single day.

³ Emory M. Thomas, *Robert E. Lee: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 47-55; Steven E. Woodworth, *Davis and Lee at War* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 115, 157, 227.

During the next month, Lee organized his army and launched an aggressive campaign to push the Union Army of the Potomac under the command of General George Brinton McClellan off of the Virginia Peninsula and into the James River. Over the course of the ensuing Seven Days' Battles, Lee's army suffered massive casualties, but in the end, it was the Union that suffered from a broken spirit. Attributing the failure of the operation against Richmond to McClellan's ineptness, a disheartened Lincoln ordered his general to leave the peninsula and support the newly formed Army of Virginia, which was gathering under Union General John Pope in preparation for a new campaign.⁴

While the Confederate soldiers in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had reason to celebrate, Lee's mentality regarding victory and defeat kept him from resting on his laurels. In a daring move that depended on McClellan's retreat from the peninsula, Lee divided his forces in the face of superior numbers and advanced against Pope near the previous year's Bull Run battlefield. Despite receiving some reinforcements from McClellan, John Pope's Army of Virginia suffered a tremendous loss at the battle of Second Bull Run on August 29-30, 1862. As a result, President Lincoln elected to remove Pope and decided to leave McClellan in overall command of the forces in and around Washington. Lee had the Union on its heels in the Eastern Theater.⁵

In the aftermath of Second Bull Run, Lee once again demonstrated his lack of diffidence and chose to utilize his advantage. In the wake of his recent successes, Lee decided to take the war to the Union. In early September 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac River and invaded Maryland in a campaign designed to

⁴ McPherson, 464-471, 525.

⁵ McPherson, 528-534.

accomplish a number of goals. First, Lee hoped to fuel pro-Confederate sentiments in Maryland and garner European recognition by performing well on Union soil. Lee also believed that a decisive victory north of the Potomac would foster support for Peace Democrats in the coming congressional elections. But perhaps most importantly, Lee hoped to draw the Union forces away from Richmond and to free Virginia from the destructive presence of the armies in time for the fall harvest.⁶

During the first seventeen months of the war in the Eastern Theater, the largest field armies for both the Union and the Confederacy had ravaged Virginia, and food, fodder, and supplies quickly became a concern for both Lee and the greater Confederacy as soldiers from both armies tended to use up the land with startling alacrity. As historian John A. Lynn wrote in his book, *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present*, “Mars must be fed. . . . The soldiers and sailors who practice his craft need food, clothing, and equipment,” and as a Union officer characterized it in a letter written in 1863, “An army is a big thing, and it takes a great many eatables and not a few drinkables to carry it along.” Although the Union had adopted a policy of conciliation and worked hard to soften the impact of the war on the southern populace, depredations inevitably occurred as “the Army of the Potomac possessed its full quotient of thieves, freelance foragers, and officers willing to look the other way.” Moreover, orders that forbade soldiers from pillaging goods from southern civilians “became hard to remember on an empty stomach.” According to Bell Irvin Wiley, the author of a classic two-volume study on the common soldiers of the Civil War, “Regardless of the directives and desires of the generals, Billy Yanks contrived to do a vast amount of food gathering

⁶ McPherson, 534-545; For a challenge to these stated goals, see Joseph L. Harsh, *Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Southern Strategy* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1998), 3-4.

on their own authority. Even the regularly organized foraging parties sometimes were under little control owing to the officers in charge of them—who usually were lieutenants or captains deeply imbued with the attitudes of the men—making no effort to enforce discipline.”⁷

While armies throughout history have tended to use up the land they occupy, the actions of the Union army in Virginia provided Confederates with ample opportunity to rally their countrymen with tales of the ravages of war in the South. According to Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, who on June 5, 1861, sent a message out from Camp Pickens near Manassas Junction to the people of Virginia living north of Richmond,

Abraham Lincoln, regardless of all moral, legal, and constitutional restraints, has thrown his abolition hosts among you, who are murdering and imprisoning your citizens, confiscating and destroying your property, and committing others acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to humanity to be enumerated. All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is “Beauty and booty.”

While he clearly wrote the piece as propaganda to inspire “freemen and patriots . . . to rally to the standard of your State and country, and by every means in your power compatible with honorable warfare to drive back and expel the invaders from your land,”

⁷ John A. Lynn, ed., *Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), vii; ; See also John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), 301-315; Samuel W. Fiske, *Mr. Dunn Browne's Experiences in the Army: The Civil War Letters of Samuel W. Fiske*, ed. Stephen W. Sears (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 177; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 72; William C. Davis, *A Taste of War: The Culinary History of the Blue and the Gray* (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2003), 46-52; Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Billy Yank: The Common Soldier of the Union* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952; reprint, 2001), 233-236.

such hyperbolic announcements certainly served to kindle the fires of retribution among some southerners.⁸

Things only got worse as the war progressed. Following McClellan's defeat in the Peninsula Campaign, the Union abandoned its policy of conciliation, and the Lincoln administration issued new directives encouraging military commanders to use up the countryside whenever necessary. In mid-July 1862, when General Pope took command of the Army of Virginia, he issued a series of orders that reflected the recent change in Union policy toward southern civilians. In General Orders, No. 5 and No. 6, which he issued on July 18, Pope directed his troops to "subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on" and noted that "all villages and neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution." The spirit of these two orders along with General Orders, No. 7, 11, and 12, which declared that Pope would punish southerners if any harm befell his army and that he would no longer post sentries to protect the private property of southern civilians, served to exacerbate the suffering in Virginia even though Pope's tenure in the region was ever-so brief. While Union troops generally applauded the new guidelines, Confederate troops and civilians obviously detested them, and the change in policy motivated many southerners to advocate a strategy of reprisal when Rebel troops finally entered the North.⁹

⁸ United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Hereinafter cited as *OR*), 128 vols. (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 1:2:907.

⁹ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 67-68, 85-92; *OR*, 1:12:2:50-51; General Orders, No. 7, specified that "whenever a railroad, wagon road, or telegraph is injured by parties of guerillas the citizens living within 5 miles of the spot shall be turned out in mass to repair the damage, and shall, beside, pay to the United States in money or in property, to be levied by military force, the full amount of the pay and subsistence of the whole force necessary to coerce the performance of the work during the time occupied in completing it. If a soldier or legitimate follower of the army be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this army."

While Union troops did their fair share of plundering in Virginia, Confederate troops were also to blame for the state's haggard condition in the spring and fall of 1862 as they, too, lived liberally off of the land. In his book on Confederate soldiers, Bell Wiley points out that "Johnny Rebs" tended to use up the countryside just as much as their Union counterparts as "the number of pillagers in the Confederate Army was always large" and as Rebel troops frequently stole and destroyed private property. Firewood was a favorite target for theft, and according to Wiley, "a rail fence in an area occupied for any considerable length of time by a Rebel army was rarely to be seen." He also notes, "A great many soldiers undoubtedly accepted the tenet that the country for which they were fighting owed them sustenance, and when meat was not forthcoming from regular sources they saw little if any wrong in taking it from noncombatants." Meat was not the only commodity Confederates felt compelled to appropriate. While marching through the Shenandoah Valley in northern Virginia in June 1861, Berrien Zettler and two fellow privates from Company B, Eighth Georgia Infantry, succumbed to hunger and decided to "fall out' and hide in the shrubbery in the front yard of a residence until the army . . . had passed; then we would see what could be done at the house for something to eat." Once the ruse proved successful, the soldiers approached a nearby home to see about procuring some honey from the resident's beehive. When they found the citizen unwilling to part with any of his honey, two of them leveled their rifles at his chest and threatened to kill him if he so much as moved. The third then pilfered the beehive, and while all three men later "thoroughly enjoyed" their loot, Zettler's guilt eventually caught up with him: "What inconsistent creatures we are! We were in Virginia for the purposes of protecting the people . . . and here we were entering this man's premises and carrying off his

property!” The tale of these Georgia troops and the citizen they accosted serve as only one example of the depredations Confederate soldiers visited upon their own people, for burdened with an inefficient supply system, “expedience forced many a Southern soldier to take what he could get and worry about orders or ethics later, if at all.” With both Union and Confederate soldiers living off of the land, the people of Virginia needed a reprieve, and Lee hoped to give them one as he embarked on his Maryland Campaign.¹⁰

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Lee’s plan did not meet with much success as McClellan managed to fight him to a tactical draw at the battle of Antietam on September 17, 1862. After participating in the single bloodiest day in American history on the fields outside of Sharpsburg, Maryland, Lee’s tattered army limped back into Virginia and experienced the bitter taste of defeat for the first time in the war. They had only managed to take the contest out of Virginia for a short while, yet during their occupancy of the Old Line State, some of the men had gone against orders and relied upon their own discretion in their quests for something to eat. According to historian Joseph L. Harsh, the author of *Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862*, “the overriding impression . . . is that the Confederates behaved quite well for a Civil War army,” but “it is safe to say the army’s diet did not suffer decline in Maryland, and many of the soldiers ate quite well” as there were “an amazing number of gleeful stories . . . of ferocious pigs that had to be killed in self-defense.” Thomas Gilham of Company K, Eighth Georgia Infantry, a participant in the campaign, later paid tribute to the culinary delights of the Old Line State, writing, “We boys had a good time while in

¹⁰ Bell Irvin Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943; reprint, 2000), 43-48; Berrien M. Zettler, *War Stories and School-day Incidents for the Children* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1912), 48-52; Davis, *A Taste of War*, 52-56.

Maryland feasting on apples, apple butter, light bread and sweet milk.” While some of the food certainly came from supportive (or at least willing) Marylanders, a good portion of it doubtless came as a result of appropriation and theft.¹¹

Despite the regression in the Confederate war effort as a result of the withdrawal after the battle of Antietam, all hope was not lost, and Lee did not wallow in despondence. He did not have time. Following the battle of Antietam, Lincoln grew ever more tired of trying to prod McClellan into action. He openly wondered why McClellan had allowed Lee’s army to escape across the Potomac, and after not receiving any adequate answers from the general, he relieved him for the last time and replaced him with General Ambrose Burnside. On November 14, 1862, the Army of the Potomac stole a march on Lee, and five days later, Burnside was on the Rappahannock River within sight of Fredericksburg. Although the army’s new commander had moved with the speed necessary to maintain the advantage, his campaign came to a screeching halt because the pontoon bridges necessary to see his men across the river had not yet arrived. While the Army of the Potomac waited for the bridges, Lee caught up and concentrated his entire army across the river along the high ground above Fredericksburg to await the Union assault.¹²

On December 11, the Army of the Potomac finally crossed the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg after employing an artillery barrage to drive off Confederate troops who had taken up defensive positions inside the town. When the Union troops entered the city after the bombardment, “inexplicably, discipline evaporated in a frenzy of looting

¹¹ McPherson, 534-545; Joseph L. Harsh, *Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1999), 91; Thomas D. Gilham, “Oglethorpe Rifles: A Full History of This Celebrated Company,” in n.a., *This They Remembered* (Columbus, Georgia: Brentwood University Press, 1986), 44.

¹² McPherson, 562, 569-570.

and pillaging.” According to Private Roland E. Bowen of Company K, Fifteenth Massachusetts Infantry, “we stole or destroyed everything in the City, great was the ransacking thereof,” and according to Colonel Oliver H. Palmer, a brigade commander in the army’s Second Corps, “The whole town was pillaged utterly ripped to pieces.” All the while, the Confederates watched from their position along the high ground west of the city, and it was a scene of destruction they would not soon forget. Two days later, the battle of Fredericksburg ended as the worst Union defeat of the entire war. In the battle’s aftermath, Burnside retreated back across the river and prepared for a maneuver against the Confederate left. Following the retreat, Confederates surveyed the damage in the city, and one soldier reported to his wife back home, “I had no idea before how a bombarded sacked city would look and I do not wish to see it again, unless it would be right to sack Washington, that sink of iniquity, after bombarding it with all ‘old Abe’s’ horrid crew in it.” Meanwhile, as 1862 drew to a close and 1863 dawned, confidence in the Army of the Potomac’s newest commander completely unraveled when he conducted his troops on the infamous “Mud March,” a disastrous movement that ended with the Union army going nowhere. The failed operation resulted in the removal of Burnside from command on January 23 and the appointment of General Joseph Hooker as the army’s new commander on January 25.¹³

¹³ Jeffrey D. Wert, *The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 191; Roland E. Bowen, *From Ball’s Bluff to Gettysburg . . . and Beyond: The Civil War Letters of Private Roland E. Bowen, 15th Massachusetts Infantry, 1861-1864*, ed. Gregory A. Coco (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Thomas Publications, 1994), 142; Oliver H. Palmer, “My dear wife,” December 15, 1862, Oliver H. Palmer Papers, Navarro College, Pearce Civil War Collection, Corsicana, Texas quoted in Wert, 192; Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, January 21, 1863, “Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865,” *The Valley of the Shadow: Two Communities in the American Civil War*, Virginia Center for Digital History, University of Virginia, <http://valley.vcdh.virginia.edu/> (Hereinafter cited as VOTS); George C. Rable, *Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 177, 184; William Marvel, *Burnside* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 179-180; A. Wilson Greene,

It had been nearly two years since Davis gave the order to fire on Fort Sumter thereby officially beginning the American Civil War, and those two years had not been kind to the Army of the Potomac. In the Eastern Theater, the Union had suffered two losses near Bull Run Creek, failure on the Virginia peninsula, a hard-fought stalemate at Antietam that ended with the Confederate army escaping back into Virginia, and a thrashing on the fields around Fredericksburg. Moreover, the Federal troops had endured a revolving door of major commanders, and morale had sunk to an all-time low. In contrast, the war in the Eastern Theater appeared to be going quite well for Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia despite the failure of the Maryland Campaign. His army seemed almost invincible, except at Antietam, and he had succeeded in keeping the Union forces out of Richmond. Unfortunately, from his view point, it was not enough. While his victories had kept Richmond safe and Confederate morale high, Lee understood that he and his fellow Confederates could still easily lose the war. Aside from believing that the national will of the Confederacy was substantially weaker than that of the Union, he also understood that the North enjoyed a significant advantage in resources and industry, and he recognized that the war was not going so well for his countrymen in the Western Theater. As winter gave way to spring and spring moved toward summer in 1863, the Union armies of the Western Theater were cutting deeply into the heart of the Confederacy, and Union General Ulysses Simpson Grant was beginning to zero in on Vicksburg, Mississippi, a Confederate bastion on the Mississippi River that stood as the last significant position protecting access to the vast resources of the Trans-Mississippi South. Thus, while Hooker rebuilt his army, Lee contemplated the next step in his quest

“Morale, Maneuver, and Mud: The Army of the Potomac, December 16, 1862-January 26, 1863,” in *The Fredericksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 171-227; McPherson, 571-574, 584-585

for victory, and on April 16, 1863, he once again demonstrated his assertive nature and summed up his thoughts regarding the best strategy for the Confederacy in a single sentence in a letter to his president: “I think it all important that we should assume the aggressive by the 1st of May.”¹⁴

Lee’s behest to President Davis was not born simply from some rapacious need for battle or the impulse to make war for its own sake. Rather, Lee’s mandate resulted from a combination of forces. As already discussed, Lee felt a sense of urgency in bringing a quick close to the war because he truly believed that the Confederacy could lose the contest through simple inaction. He recognized that while the war might appear to be going well in the Eastern Theater, Confederate defenses were crumbling under the weight of superior Union forces in the nation’s heartland. Moreover, a very practical matter drove him toward an understanding that he must remain resolute in his quest for a decisive battle that would end the war quickly—the Army of the Northern Virginia, which had come to stand as the greatest hope for the future of the Confederacy, was running out of supplies.

It was now spring in Virginia, and the shortage of food and fodder worried Lee. During the time spent in defense of Fredericksburg, Lee’s troops had again witnessed the ravages of war their enemies could commit. In addition, the Confederates had also engaged in their own depredations as they scavenged for firewood, usually in the form of farmers’ and homeowners’ fences and trees, and scoured the surrounding area for foodstuffs. Things were little better south of Richmond as a Union soldier near Suffolk, Virginia, noted on December 14, 1862, “the country is so cleaned out that one can forage

¹⁴ Robert E. Lee, *The Wartime Papers of R. E. Lee*, eds. Clifford Dowdey and Louis H. Manarin (New York: Bramhall House, 1961), 434-435.

to no purpose now.” As early as January 26, 1863, Lee had written to Confederate Secretary of War James Alexander Seddon and stated, “We now have about one week’s supply of the reduced ration. After that is exhausted I know not whence further supplies can be drawn. The question of provisioning is becoming one of greater difficulty every day.” The war in the Eastern Theater had plagued Virginia for much of the conflict, and both the soldiers and their animals suffered as a result. When reflecting on his service with the Army of Northern Virginia during this period, Major General Henry Heth, a native Virginian, West Point graduate, and Mexican War veteran, presented a dismal image of how hard life in the army had gotten by 1863:

It is very difficult for anyone not connected with the Army of Northern Virginia to realize how straitened we were for supplies of all kinds, especially food. The ration of a general officer was double that of a private, and so meager was that double ration that frequently to appease my hunger I robbed my horse of a handful of corn which, parched in the fire, served to allay the cravings of nature. What must have been the condition of the private?¹⁵

The condition of the private was bleak. Not only were the men on reduced rations, but the Confederates lacked a sufficient supply of vegetables to prevent an outbreak of scurvy—a potentially fatal deficiency disease caused by a lack of Vitamin C—in the ranks. As a result, Lee ordered each regiment “to send a daily detail to gather sassafras buds, wild onions, garlic, lamb’s quarters, and poke sprouts” from the countryside. Unfortunately, there was very little to gather relative to the size of the army, and hence, Lee reported his force’s lack of adequate provisions to Secretary Seddon on March 27,

¹⁵ Warren Wilkinson and Steven E. Woodworth, *A Scythe of Fire: A Civil War Story of the Eighth Georgia Infantry Regiment* (New York: William Morrow, 2002), 199; Alvin C. Voris to Wife, December 14, 1862, Alan Johnson Collection, Akron, Ohio, quoted in Davis, *A Taste of War*, 48; *OR*, 1:25:2:686; Henry Heth, “Letter from Major-General Henry Heth, of A. P. Hill’s Corps, A. N. V.,” *SHSP*, Vol. 4 (1877): 153.

1863, writing, “I have endeavored during the past campaign to draw subsistence from the country occupied by the troops, wherever it was possible. . . . At this time but few supplies can be procured from the country we now occupy.”¹⁶

Faced with such a stark situation, Lee felt it imperative to locate a source for supplies lest the Confederacy forfeit the contest on account of an empty stomach. Part of the problem was logistical as the Confederate network of railroads did not measure up to the demands of war, but the fact that the war had ravaged Virginia for the better part of two years as both Union and Confederate soldiers subsisted off of the land was an even greater impediment to keeping the army supplied. Lee had already sent a portion of Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s First Corps into southern Virginia and North Carolina on a supply gathering expedition, and in February 1863, he sent cavalry commanders William Edmonson Jones, John Daniel Imboden, and Albert Gallatin Jenkins into western Virginia to gather cattle and horses for his army. He also pleaded with Brigadier General Samuel Jones to provide him with some cattle from his command in the Department of Western Virginia, but Jones was able to provide Lee only with his troops’ leftovers—1,140 head of cattle that were “in no condition now to be butchered” as they had not had enough time as of yet to mature to the slaughtering stage. With no relief in sight, Lee settled on another invasion of the North. According to General Heth, his commander revealed to him his desire to go even farther into enemy territory than he had in 1862:

If I could do so, I would again cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. I believe this is to be our true policy, notwithstanding our failure of last year [at Antietam]. An

¹⁶ *OR*, 1:25:2:686-687; Davis, *A Taste of War*, 54; Wilber Sturtevant Nye, *Here Come the Rebels!* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965; reprint, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Bookshop, 1988), 4.

invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources. The question of *food for this army* gives me more trouble and uneasiness than everything else combined; the absence of the army from Virginia gives our people an opportunity to collect supplies ahead.¹⁷

Having settled on a course of action, Lee began planning his offensive immediately. On February 23, 1863, Jedediah Hotchkiss, a Confederate cartographer attached to Lieutenant General Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson's Second Corps recorded that he "got secret orders from the General to prepare a map of the Valley of Virginia extended to Harrisburg, Pa., and then on to Philadelphia." He finished the map on March 10. On April 11, 1863, Lee dispatched a letter to Colonel Jeremy Francis Gilmer, the Chief of the Engineer Bureau, and requested that he send a 350-foot pontoon bridge to Orange Court House. It is a reasonable supposition to conclude that Lee wanted such a large pontoon bridge in preparation for his crossing of the Potomac River and perhaps for a later crossing of the Susquehanna River, and the possibility approaches certainty considering Lee also asked that Gilmer "keep the matter as quiet as practicable" and maintain a level of secrecy similar to that requested of Hotchkiss regarding the creation of the Pennsylvania map.¹⁸

While the Army of Northern Virginia prepared to invade the North for a second time, Joseph Hooker launched his own offensive across the Rappahannock in the final days of April and interrupted Lee's plans. The ensuing battle of Chancellorsville on May 1-5, 1863, ended as a Confederate victory as Lee once again bested his Union counterpart

¹⁷ *OR*, 1:25:2:848, 853-854; Heth, 153-154

¹⁸ Jedediah Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer*, with a foreword by T. Harry Williams, ed. Archie P. McDonald (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 116; *OR*, 1:25:2:715.

in spectacular fashion. After dividing his forces in the face of superior numbers, Lee successfully crushed Hooker's right flank and drove the Army of the Potomac back across the river. It was Lee's finest hour as a tactician, but it was also a bittersweet victory. In what has become the most widely discussed friendly-fire incident in American history, a regiment of North Carolina soldiers accidentally shot General Thomas Jackson, the commander of Lee's Second Corps, on the evening of May 2. Jackson's wounds were severe, and a surgeon had to amputate his left arm. On May 10, while recovering from his injuries near Guinea Station, Virginia, Jackson died of complications from pneumonia, and Lee mourned the loss of his beloved corps commander.¹⁹

As usual, Lee did not have time to wallow in depression, for in mid-May, Jefferson Davis summoned his general to Richmond to discuss strategy. During a meeting with President Davis and Secretary of War Seddon on May 15, Lee once again made his case for an invasion of the North. His opponents, including Seddon, had been trying to convince Davis and Lee to reallocate forces from the Army of Northern Virginia in order to reinforce Lieutenant General John Clifford Pemberton's tenuous position at Vicksburg on the Mississippi River. Lee strenuously objected and claimed that he could not afford to give up any of his forces. Arguing that the Army of the Potomac under Hooker still represented a grave threat to the Confederacy and its capital, Lee even went so far as to suggest that "unless we can obtain some re-enforcements, we may be obliged to withdraw into the defenses around Richmond." Lee painted a very grim picture of his position along the Rappahannock and then challenged his superiors to "decide whether the line of Virginia is more in danger than the line of the Mississippi." Davis, who had

¹⁹ McPherson, 639-645.

every confidence in his greatest general, sided with Lee in the debate over whether or not to send troops to Mississippi and approved the planned invasion of Pennsylvania.²⁰

Having dealt with the Union offensive at Chancellorsville and the debate regarding Confederate strategy, Lee once again set about planning his invasion. His first step was an impossible one; he had to find a replacement for Stonewall Jackson. After much thought, Lee opted to forego a simple replacement and elected to reorganize his two-corps system in the hopes of making his army less cumbersome and his command system more responsive. While leaving the very capable Lieutenant General James Longstreet in charge of the First Corps, Lee chose to promote Major General Richard Ewell, who had been Jackson's best division commander, to lieutenant general and place him in charge of the Second Corps. He then took elements from both the First and Second Corps to create a Third Corps. To command the new corps, Lee chose Major General Ambrose Powell Hill, a hard-fighting West Point graduate from Culpepper County, Virginia, and similarly promoted him.²¹

With his reorganization complete, Lee on June 3, 1863, initiated the northward march of the 75,000-man Army of Northern Virginia. What would become known as the Gettysburg Campaign was officially underway, and the soldiers and officers of Lee's army, for whom the campaign's historical name was then as unknown as its outcome, were thrilled at the prospects of following their beloved commander into battle once again. According to Private David E. Holt of Company K, Sixteenth Mississippi Infantry, the soldiers "had the most serene confidence in Marse Bob," and when artillery officer Edward Porter Alexander commented years later on the start of the campaign, he noted,

²⁰ *OR*, 1:25:2:790; Coddington, 5-6; Stephen W. Sears, *Gettysburg* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 9-12 ; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 8-9.

²¹ *OR*, 1:25:2:810-811, 827; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 10-11

“I am sure there can never have been an army with more supreme confidence in its commander than that army had in Gen. Lee. We looked forward to victory under him as confidently as to successive sunrises.”²²

More than a chance for military victory and martial glory inspired some other members of Lee’s army. As the army headed north, Lieutenant Colonel James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, a British observer attached to the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, observed the condition of Virginia during the march north in his diary:

The country is really magnificent, but as it has supported two large armies for two years, it is now completely cleaned out. It is almost uncultivated, and no animals are grazing where there used to be hundreds. All fences have been destroyed, and numberless farms burnt, the chimneys alone left standing. It is difficult to depict and impossible to exaggerate the sufferings which this part of Virginia has undergone.

The soldiers saw the devastation as well. On June 6, Jed Hotchkiss wrote a letter to his wife and informed her, “We are again on the move.” He also took a moment to describe the countryside through which he and the army passed: “We have left many a scar on the face of the once lovely valley of the Rappahannock to tell of our long occupancy. . . . Wide forests have been swept away, many an old mansion has fallen victim to the flames or been torn away piece meal by the destroying hand of war—whose business is, surely, ‘devastation and destruction.’” Yet even though soldiers in Lee’s army had played a role in using up the land themselves as Hotchkiss admits, the images they saw and the stories they heard as they headed north helped to stoke the fires of retribution in the hearts of

²² David E. Holt, *A Mississippi Rebel in the Army of Northern Virginia*, eds. Thomas D. Cockrell and Michael B. Ballard (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 192; Edward Porter Alexander, *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander*, ed. Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 222.

many. On June 10, 1863, Major General Lafayette McLaws, a division commander in Longstreet's First Corps, wrote a letter to his wife and informed her that the Army of Northern Virginia was heading north. Although he could not be certain of the army's destination, he speculated that Pennsylvania might be the target and went on to suggest, "If we are striking for Pennsylvania we are actuated by a desire to visit upon the enemy some of the horrors of war, to give the northern people some idea of the excesses committed by their troops upon our houses and inhabitants." The memories of the impact of Pope's infamous orders, the sacking and pillaging of Fredericksburg, and other Union depredations remained with the Rebels as they headed north. In fact, the day before McLaws sent his letter to his wife, Lee received a dispatch from the Secretary of War informing him that the Union had recently conducted a series of raids east of Richmond:

Parties of their cavalry have passed through . . . burning mills and barns, plundering and destroying, especially provisions and agricultural implements, and stealing slaves, horses, mules, and cattle. They avow, unblushingly, I am credibly informed, the infamous purpose to destroy means of production and subsistence, and either destroy or drive out the whole faithful population, including women, children, and men, helpless, aged, and infirm. Such an atrocious system of warfare has never been practiced by any people professing civilization and Christianity, and must awaken the abhorrence of Christendom, as it has aroused among our people glowing indignation and thirst for vengeance.

The report simply added fuel to an already intensifying fire.²³

²³ James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, *The Fremantle Diary: Being the Journal of Lieutenant Colonel James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, Coldstream Guards, on his Three Months in the Southern States*, ed. Walter Lord (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1954), 176-177; Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 6, 1863, "Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865," VOTS; Lafayette McLaws, *A Soldier's General: The Civil War Letters of Major General Lafayette McLaws*, ed. John C. Oeffinger (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 188-189; *OR*, 1:27:3:875.

Many other Confederates shared McLaws's and Seddon's feelings regarding the desire for revenge. Captain Charles Minor Blackford, a staff officer in Longstreet's First Corps, found it "very hard to control a burning desire for revenge when I hear the piteous tale of wrongs which these people . . . have suffered at the hands of the yankee soldiers," and Major Henry Kyd Douglas, a native of Shepherdstown, Virginia, and a staff officer in Ewell's Second Corps, "felt it would be hard for me, going into Pennsylvania, to put aside all ideas of retaliation." A surgeon attached to Brigadier General Alfred Moore Scales's Fourth Brigade of Hill's Third Corps felt much the same way, reporting a willingness "to endure almost anything, or to be deprived of almost everything, if we can have the pleasure of getting into Pennsylvania and letting the Yankees feel what it is to be invaded."²⁴

Common soldiers also harbored vengeful thoughts. According to William Berkeley of Company D, Eighth Virginia Infantry, he and his fellow soldiers "made many threats of vengeance" as they headed toward the Potomac River, and in a letter home to his wife, William Ross Stillwell of Company F, Fifty-third Georgia Infantry, recalled his behavior during the Maryland Campaign of 1862 and threatened, "if they don't sell it and this time at a reasonable price, I am going to press it into service. I only took rations and apples last year, but they are no friend of ours and I am not going to suffer while I can find anything to eat." The men had seen firsthand the desolation that the armies, both Union and Confederate, had brought to Virginia, and despite having

²⁴ Susan Leigh Blackford, *Letters from Lee's Army: or Memoirs of Life In and Out of the Army in Virginia During the War Between the States*, ed. Charles Minor Blackford, III, with annotations by Charles Minor Blackford (New York: A. S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1962), 179; Henry Kyd Douglas, *I Rode With Stonewall: The War Experiences of the Youngest Member of Jackson's Staff* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1940; reprint, 1963), 243; Spencer Glasgow Welch, *A Confederate Surgeon's Letters to His Wife* (Washington, D. C.: The Neale Publishing Company, 1911), 55-56.

been on relatively good behavior during the Maryland Campaign in 1862, they were now ready and more than willing to visit the full experience of war upon the people of the North.²⁵

²⁵ Letters: William N. Berkeley to His Wife, June 27, 28, 1863, University of Virginia quoted in Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb*, 47; William Ross Stillwell, *The Stillwell Letters: A Georgian in Longstreet's Corps, Army of Northern Virginia*, ed. Ronald H. Moseley, with a foreword by Herman Hattaway (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2002), 173.

Chapter 2

“Wars and Rumors of Wars”

The first Confederate troops to move on June 3, 1863, were the men of Major General Lafayette McLaws’s division in Longstreet’s First Corps. It was a Wednesday, and when they broke camp and struck out on their westward march along the southern banks of the Rappahannock River, these men inaugurated an offensive push that stood as the Confederacy’s second full-scale invasion of the North. There would be a tremendous battle fought in one month that would send the Army of Northern Virginia limping back into the South, but at this early stage of the operation, the men of Lee’s army rode on a great wave of confidence as they anticipated a successful campaign that would culminate in victory for their cause. Many of the men also harbored a spirit of revenge and a desire to visit the horrors of war on northern soil in order to repay the Union for what the conflict had already done to Virginia, and as these troops approached the boundaries separating them from the North—first the Potomac River and then the Mason and Dixon Line—the people of Pennsylvania reacted to the coming invasion; some fled in terror while others braced for war. The Rebels were coming, and few, if any, on either side of the conflict anticipated warm greetings or a kind reception from the enemy.

Lee put his army at great risk when he decided to disengage his forces along the Rappahannock. Maneuvering in the face of a fixed enemy is always a dangerous proposition in war, and though across a river and still battered from the recent defeat at Chancellorsville, Hooker and his Army of the Potomac continued to represent a serious threat to the Confederacy and could readily disrupt Lee’s plans to invade the North. Hence, Lee’s decision to break away from his position was a gamble, but he felt the move

was necessary if the Confederacy hoped to win the war. Moreover, although the move was rife with risk, Lee had demonstrated his capacity as a gambler in the past, and he often met with success because his gambles were generally well calculated. This time was no different as Lee planned first to move Longstreet's and Ewell's corps carefully toward Culpeper Court House to the northwest while leaving Hill's Third Corps in its position along the river to check the Union army in case Hooker decided to try to interrupt Lee's plans. Also, Lee designed the march so that his troops could use the Wilderness west of Fredericksburg to cover their initial movements before turning around Hooker's right flank, stealing a march on the Union army, and slipping into the cover of the great Shenandoah Valley.¹

It was a trick the Confederates had used before. The Blue Ridge Mountains to the east and the Allegheny and Appalachian Plateaus to the west served as geological bulwarks for the Great Valley or Valley of Virginia, as it was known to locals. Perhaps more importantly, since the valley ran from the southwest to the northeast along the line of the Shenandoah River, it pointed like a dagger into the heart of the Union and could easily take the Confederates to within striking distance of several important military targets—the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Cumberland Valley Railroad, and the Northern Central Railroad as well as the cities of Washington, D. C., Baltimore, Maryland, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In the case of the 1863 invasion, the surrounding mountains would conceal the Army of the Northern Virginia and grant it safe passage through the valley to the Potomac River, the boundary between the Union

¹ *OR*, 1:27:2:293; Coddington, 48-52; Sears, 59-60; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 11.

and the Confederacy, and ultimately across the Mason and Dixon Line into the lush agricultural region of south-central Pennsylvania.²

When the Army of Northern Virginia began moving away from its camps on the Rappahannock River, General Hooker's scouts informed him almost immediately. Yet despite knowing that Lee was up to something, Hooker could not be sure of his opponent's intentions. In an effort to find out, Hooker ordered soldiers from Major General John Sedgwick's Sixth Corps to probe across the river above Fredericksburg near the mouth of Deep Run. The investigation sparked a skirmish with Hill's Third Corps. The Confederates succeeded in beating back the incursion while the rest of Lee's army made its way to Culpeper Court House. In the mean time, Hooker telegraphed President Lincoln and suggested a move across the Rappahannock in force to attack the rear of Lee's withdrawing army. Feeling that attacking across the river would put the Army of the Potomac in a very precarious position if Lee's intention was to attack Hooker on the north side of the river, Lincoln disapproved and noted that such a move may very well put the Union army in a situation similar to that of "an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other." Hooker needed to remain on the north bank of the Rappahannock, keep himself between the Confederate army and Washington, and find another way to deal with Lee's maneuver without putting his army or the nation's capital in jeopardy of catastrophic defeat or capture.³

² Richard M. McMurry, *Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 16-17.

³ *OR*, 1:27:1:31-33; Coddington, 52-54; Sears, 60-62; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 11-12.

On Tuesday, June 9, Union forces once again tried to determine the intentions of Lee's movement. Believing that Lee was mounting a major cavalry raid into the North, Hooker ordered 7,000 horsemen under the command of Union Major General Alfred Pleasanton to advance west across the Rappahannock at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords on either side of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. Riding west, they eventually engaged Confederate Lieutenant General James Ewell Brown "Jeb" Stuart's 10,000 troopers in the largest cavalry battle of the war—Brandy Station—a few miles northeast of Culpeper Court House. The Yankee cavalry, which had not performed well relative to Confederate cavalry in the past, demonstrated its evolving military prowess during the battle. In order to beat back the Union assault and maintain a successful screen of the Confederate movements, Stuart had to summon the aid of Confederate infantry. His inability to crush the Union attack decisively nearly exposed Lee's entire operation in the process. Now that Hooker knew that Lee's move included both cavalry and infantry units, he believed that his opponent was leaving the path to Richmond relatively uncovered. He once again telegraphed Lincoln asking permission to cross the Rappahannock in force, this time in hopes of capturing the Confederate capital and ending the war. Again, Lincoln felt his general's suggestion did not represent the best chance for Union victory. Developing a keen sense for strategic thought, Lincoln informed Hooker, "I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your sure objective point." Lincoln wanted Hooker to remain between the Confederate army and Washington, and he wanted his general to fight and not simply trade space with his opponent.⁴

⁴ *OR*, 1:27:1:34-36; Coddington, 56-66; Sears, 64-74; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 12-13.

While Hooker and Lincoln argued over the best course of action for the Army of the Potomac, Lee continued to maneuver his army into the Shenandoah Valley. On June 10, Ewell's Second Corps was the first to move out from Culpeper Court House, and after crossing into the valley through Chester Gap, Ewell and his men headed north through Front Royal and Cedarville on their way to confront the Union forces of Major General Robert Huston Milroy at Winchester. It was Lee's goal to have Ewell's Second Corps clear the valley of Union forces while Longstreet's First Corps marched east of the mountains to screen the advance before finally entering the valley itself between Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. It was a difficult march as the oppressive summer heat bore down upon the troops. Soldiers in Lee's army suffered from the "heat, dust, and fatigue, and worst of all—*lack of drinking water*," and as Randolph Abbott Shotwell of Company H, Eighth Virginia Infantry, noted, whenever the troops came upon a stream or spring, there was "always a wall of men surrounding it—struggling to dip cup or canteen into it." Despite the difficulties inherent in a rapid summer march, some of the men took time to appreciate the change in the landscape as they moved west through the Blue Ridge and then northeast down the valley. In his diary entry for June 11, Jed Hotchkiss noted, "We found the grass, clover and timothy, perfectly luxuriant, a great change from the bare fields of Fredericksburg."⁵

Having moved into the valley on June 12, Ewell sent Major General Robert Emmett Rodes's division east and then north to deal with the Union garrison under Colonel Andrew Thomas McReynolds at Berryville before moving on toward Colonel Benjamin Franklin Smith's force at Martinsburg near the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

⁵ *OR*, 1:27:2:293, 440, 459; Randolph Abbott Shotwell, *The Papers of Randolph Abbott Shotwell*, ed. J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton (Raleigh: North Carolina Historical Commission, 1929), 1:477 quoted in Coddington, 76; Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 150.

Meanwhile, Ewell's other two divisions under Major General Jubal Early and Major General Edward Johnson spent the next two days pressing Milroy's position at Winchester. Milroy had been in control of the town since January 1, 1863, and during his tenure in command of the city, Confederate civilians under his authority had quickly grown tired of his tyrannical methods. Believing it was his duty to enforce the recently issued Emancipation Proclamation and to punish those citizens and soldiers who were unwilling to submit to the authority of the Federal government, Milroy boasted to his wife on January 18, "my *will* is absolute law—none dare contradict or dispute my slightest word or wish. . . . I confess I feel a strong disposition to play the tyrant among these traitors." In order to demonstrate his power over the people of the Shenandoah Valley, Milroy ruled with an iron fist and often sent raiding parties into the countryside and nearby towns where they looted and pillaged liberally. The people of the valley resisted Milroy's rule and often complained about his treatment. Kate Sperry, a resident of the town during his occupancy, carped, "He's a second Butler and \$100,000 is the price the Confederacy (some people in the Confederacy) has placed on his head—I wish I could get it." Confederate politicians, officers, and soldiers were also aware of Milroy's behavior, and the men of Ewell's corps were eager to remove him from his position as the oppressive master of the lower Shenandoah Valley.⁶

⁶ Robert Milroy to Mary Milroy, January 18, 1863, "Letters: Milroy Family—Correspondence," The Robert H. Milroy Collection, Jasper County Public Library, Rensselaer, Indiana, <http://www.jasperco.lib.in.us/Milroy/MilroyCollection.htm>; Jonathan A. Noyalas, "'My Will Is Absolute Law': General Robert H. Milroy and Winchester, Virginia," M.A. Thesis (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2003), 26; Kate Sperry, *Surrender? Never Surrender*, Jan. 21, 1863, Handley Library quoted in Noyalas, 21; Sears, 77; Sperry is referring to Union General Benjamin Franklin Butler, a Federal commander whom Confederates generally reviled for his behavior during his command of New Orleans, Louisiana. During his tenure in the city, Butler had issued the controversial General Orders, No. 28, regarding the treatment of women who insulted or showed contempt for any officer or soldier in the U. S. army. See *OR*, 1:15:426, 743-744.

On the evening of June 14, Early's and Johnson's divisions closed in on Winchester and launched an attack that crushed Milroy's flanks before moving to envelop his position in an effort to prevent his escape. This second battle of Winchester ended as an overwhelming Confederate victory, and although General Milroy and a large baggage train managed to escape on June 15, Ewell succeeded in capturing 4,000 men, 300 horses, 300 wagons, 23 pieces of artillery, and 200,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. Rodes also met with success at Berryville and Martinsburg, and although both McReynolds and Smith got away, the Confederates seized 200 prisoners, 5 cannons, 400 rounds of artillery ammunition, 6,000 bushels of grain, and 2 excellent ambulances. Although some of the men were "greatly disappointed in not getting the General [i.e., Milroy], as he was very obnoxious to the citizens of the Valley on account of his harsh treatment of them in their defenseless condition under him," the clearing of the valley represented a brilliant beginning to the campaign, and many of the soldiers of Lee's army celebrated their haul in style by drinking to Milroy's health with seized whiskey. According to one private in the Thirteenth Virginia Infantry, "such an abundance of plunder they had never seen before, and each man in the regiment was arrayed in style. . . . There were creature comforts and almost forgotten delicacies too numerous to mention which went far to swelling the full tide of that earthly content which rolled in upon each man's soul and reflected itself in each lineament of his face." It was a sign of things to come as the Confederate soldiers enjoyed their plunder.⁷

⁷ *OR*, 1:27:2:45, 440, 546-549; Isaac Gordon Bradwell, "Capture of Winchester, VA., and Milroy's Army in June, 1863," *Confederate Veteran* (Hereinafter cited as *CV*), Vol. 30, No. 9 (September 1922), 332; Alexander Hunter, "Thirteenth Virginia Infantry—Humor," *CV*, Vol. 16, No. 7 (July 1908), 339; The first battle of Winchester occurred on May 25, 1862. It involved Confederate troops commanded by Major General Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson and Union troops commanded by Major General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks, and it, too, ended as a Confederate victory.

With the Shenandoah Valley cleared, the men of the Army of Northern Virginia looked forward to the next step of crossing the Potomac River, which lay just a few miles northeast of Martinsburg, before traversing a small portion of western Maryland and entering Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, Union politicians and military leaders responded to news of the coming invasion. Between June 9 and 11, the War Department created two new military departments in Pennsylvania in an effort to prepare for the state's defense. The first was the Department of the Monongahela. Union Secretary of War Edwin McMasters Stanton selected Major General William Thomas Harbaugh Brooks to command the new department, which was headquartered in Pittsburg and charged with protecting western Pennsylvania. The second new department was the Department of the Susquehanna. Embracing the remaining two-thirds of Pennsylvania east of Johnstown and Laurel Hill, the Department of the Susquehanna was headquartered in the state capital at Harrisburg and commanded by Major General Darius Nash Couch, a former corps commander from the Army of the Potomac who had resigned his old position following a disagreement over who should command the army after its rather dismal performance at Chancellorsville. It was the Department of the Susquehanna that would play host to Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the coming weeks.⁸

While the Federal government set up the new military departments, the new commanders and state politicians worked together to prepare for the invasion. On June 11, General Couch took command of his department in Harrisburg and issued General Orders, No. 1. The orders reflected the militia system of old and called upon Pennsylvania men between the ages of eighteen and sixty to volunteer in forming the

⁸ *OR*, 1:27:3:44-45, 54-55, 68-69; Coddington, 134-135; Sears, 19-34, 90; It should be noted that West Virginia did not attain official statehood until June 20, 1863.

Army Corps of the Susquehanna, which would then serve as an emergency unit “for the protection and defense of the public and private property within this department.” In an effort to inspire his fellow citizens to enlist, Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Gregg Curtin issued a proclamation the following day warning the people of his state that the Rebels were, indeed, coming: “Information has been obtained by the War Department that a large rebel force . . . has been prepared for the purpose of making a raid into Pennsylvania.” As such, he urged “the freemen of this Commonwealth” to rally to the flag in order to protect “our own homes, firesides, and property from devastation.”⁹

Despite the patriotic efforts to rally the people of Pennsylvania, the response to Couch’s and Curtin’s call for troops was underwhelming. On June 14, Thomas Alexander Scott, Union Assistant Secretary of War, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and transportation advisor to Governor Curtin, wrote to Secretary of War Stanton, informing him, “We find difficulty getting our people aroused.” According to Scott, “The difficulty about no pay for the troops until Congress meets is a serious one.” Since the government was calling upon the men of Pennsylvania to defend their own state and hence their own homes and loved ones, it did not feel obligated to grant these volunteers a bounty. Furthermore, General Couch stipulated in his orders that arrangements would be made to pay the men as regular U. S. soldiers “as soon as Congress may make an appropriation for that purpose” and stated that the volunteers would serve “during the pleasure of the President or the continuance of the war.” Although Couch would allow the volunteers to go home “when not required for active service,” he noted that they would remain “subject to the call of the commanding general.” Apparently the lack of pay and questions concerning vague terms of service proved too much for the men of Pennsylvania and did

⁹ *OR*, 1:27:3:68-69, 79-80.

little to inspire them to step forward and sign the roll. In the first few days, the only Pennsylvanians to respond were “several out-of-work, out-of-favor generals and a small company of elderly veterans of the War of 1812.”¹⁰

Although the patriotic spirit of Pennsylvania’s citizens did not appear strong enough to inspire them to come forward and defend their state, the government continued to press the issue. President Lincoln, himself, issued a second call for 100,000 militia—10,000 from Maryland, 10,000 from West Virginia, 30,000 from Ohio, and 50,000 from Pennsylvania—on June 15. The 50,000 Pennsylvania troops were “to repel the threatened and imminent invasion of Pennsylvania by the enemies of the country.” Governor Curtin also issued a proclamation on June 15 and played on his fellow citizens’ emotions in the hopes of influencing them to heed Lincoln’s call:

The President of the United States has issued his proclamation, calling upon the state for 50,000 men. I now appeal to all the citizens of Pennsylvania who love liberty and are mindful of the history and traditions of their revolutionary fathers, and who feel that it is a sacred duty to guard and maintain the free institutions of our country, who hate treason and its abettors, and who are willing to defend their homes and their firesides, and do invoke them to rise in their might, and rush to the rescue in this hour of imminent peril. . . . It is now to be determined by deeds, and not by words alone, who are for us and who are against us.

The following day, Curtin penned a desperate and seemingly angry letter to his state’s big-city mayors:

For nearly a week past it has been publicly known that the rebels, in force, were about to enter Pennsylvania. On the 12th instant, an urgent call was made on the people to raise a Department Army Corps for the defense of the State.

¹⁰ *OR*, 1:27:3: 68-69, 111; Sears, 90-92; Both Union and Confederate governments instituted bounty systems during the American Civil War as a means of inducing men to enlist in the military through cash payments.

Yesterday, under the proclamation of the President, the militia was called out. Today a new and pressing exhortation has been given to furnish men. [Your city] has not responded. Meanwhile the enemy . . . is advancing rapidly. Our capital is threatened, and we may be disgraced by its fall, while the men who should be driving these outlaws from our soil are quarreling about the possible term of service for six months. It was never intended to keep them beyond the continuance of the emergency. . . . If you do not wish to bear the ignominy of shrinking from the defense of your State, come forward at once, close your places of business, and apply your heads to the work.

Again, the pressure from the federal and state governments and the emotional pleas of General Couch and Governor Curtin failed to stimulate a notable response. Despite having a population of 3,000,000 people, Pennsylvania only managed to muster 8,000 troops for its own protection before the battle of Gettysburg. Moreover, in what stands as an embarrassing commentary on Pennsylvania's inability to raise a larger force, New York Governor Horatio Seymour, who was not obligated to send any troops to defend his neighbor state, managed to send 12,000 soldiers to Harrisburg. Those New York soldiers did little to hide their disdain for Pennsylvanians, who seemingly could not defend their own territory.¹¹

While the Union struggled to raise an army for the defense of Pennsylvania, the people along the border reacted to the news of the coming invasion. With Lee's army approaching, the people of south-central Pennsylvania grew increasingly concerned about the horrors of war and the security of their land. It was not the first time they had worried about their fate, for Pennsylvania's proximity to the fighting in the Eastern Theater kept the citizens along the border with Maryland from becoming too apathetic about the

¹¹ Lincoln, 6:277-278; *OR*, 1:27:3:145, 169; Nye, 216, 220; Washington, D. C.: U. S. Census Bureau, Resident Population and Apportionment of the U. S. House of Representatives, Pennsylvania, 1860-1865, <http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/resapport/states/pennsylvania.pdf>.

contest. After the war, Jacob Hoke, a citizen and storeowner who lived in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, recorded his thoughts about life in south-central Pennsylvania during the conflict, writing, “The people who lived along the southern border during the war were kept in an almost continuous state of anxiety. The booming of cannon was frequently heard, and the rumors of approaching foes at times threw the whole community into a state of intense excitement.” A woman who lived in Wayensboro, Pennsylvania, a town only a couple of miles from the Mason and Dixon Line, remembered life along the border during the war, too, and specifically noted of the 1863 assault, “When spring came, the same old rumors brought the refugees from across the border. By this time it had become habit to hide our valuables, and so once more we stowed them away.” Thus, while the reaction that would evidence itself in June of 1863 seems to have developed into a standard one for the people of Pennsylvania during the war, the reality was very different than it had been in the past, for this time, it was not just a cavalry raid or a mere rumor of war. The Rebels really were coming *en masse*.¹²

As the Confederates approached Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863, residents of the state pondered their future. According to Alexander Kelly McClure, a resident of Chambersburg, a strong Republican supporter of Abraham Lincoln, and the editor of the *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* during the war, there was a fear that the approaching Confederates sought an opportunity to plunder and exact retribution upon the people of the Union. As Lee’s army trudged north, McClure fired off a letter on June 9 to Eli Slifer, the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth, writing, “I am perplexed as to what course to adopt. If the Rebels come they will come much stronger

¹² Jacob Hoke, *The Great Invasion of 1863; or, General Lee in Pennsylvania* (Dayton, Ohio: W. J. Shuey, 1887), 94; Lida Welsh Bender, “Troops from Both North and South Trod Streets of Waynesboro during the Hectic Civil War Years,” *The Outlook* (June 24, 1925), VOTS.

than before, and I doubt not with a much more *destructive* purpose. Our raiders south have been wantonly destructive with private property and the *lex talionis* [i.e., law of retaliation] may come back upon us.” Other Pennsylvanians—citizens and visitors, alike—shared McClure’s concerns. Mary Todd Lincoln, the wife of President Lincoln, was in Philadelphia at the time of the invasion, and she sent an anxious letter to her husband expressing alarm for her own safety and asking if she should flee the city and return to Washington, D. C. The president attempted to soothe his wife’s concerns in a letter dated June 16 in which he wrote, “It is a matter of choice with yourself whether you come home. There is no reason why you should not, that did not exist when you went away. As bearing on the question of your coming home, I do not think the raid into Pennsylvania amounts to anything at all.”¹³

Not everyone in the path of Lee’s army shared Lincoln’s serene attitude regarding the enemy offensive, and one may very well dismiss the president’s trivializing of the invasion and attribute his comments to the caring nature of a husband who was trying to alleviate his wife’s apprehension. As Ewell’s Corps waylaid the Union forces in the Shenandoah Valley and Couch and Curtin called upon the people of Pennsylvania to come forward to defend their state, rumors of war continued to spread rapidly through the North. On June 13 the editor of Pennsylvania’s *Harrisburg Patriot and Union* published an article devoted to some of the rumors, including a report that “forty thousand rebs, under the command of Stonewall Jackson, were within ten miles of the city.” General Jackson had been dead for over a month, not a single soldier from the Army of Northern Virginia had crossed the Potomac River, and yet some people in Pennsylvania feared that

¹³ Andrew K. McClure to Eli Slifer, June 9, 1863, “Franklin County, Pennsylvania, Personal Papers: Letters of Alexander K. McClure, 1861-1865,” VOTS; Lincoln, 6:283.

Lee's army was just outside of their capital city. On June 16, New York's *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* claimed that the Confederates were at Carlisle, only eighteen miles from Harrisburg, demonstrating that the rumors of war not only afflicted the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania but also ran rampant throughout the northeast.¹⁴

While newspaper editors and people of note such as President and Mrs. Lincoln debated the extent and target of Lee's invasion, the common citizens of the North also discussed matters and prepared for the waves of Confederate troops that would soon sweep into their states. As early as June 8, a resident of Franklin County, the first county in Pennsylvania to play host to the Confederate army in the summer of 1863, mentioned in his diary, "We might be subject to a raid soon" and noted, "Speculation is rife and everyone uneasy." On June 10, Amos Stouffer, a resident of Guilford Township in Franklin County, penned a diary entry documenting a "good deal of excitement" as the "Rebels [are] reported [to be] coming." Two days later, the rumors continued to pour in, and Stouffer expressed some concern as it was "impossible to tell how true or untrue."¹⁵

As word spread concerning the government's struggle to raise an army adequate for the defense of the state and evidence mounted signifying that the approach of the Confederates was more than just a rumor, the level of excitement escalated. Reports of the Confederates' approach coupled with the news coming out of Harrisburg and Washington served to intensify the feelings of tension and fear among the people in south-central Pennsylvania. While visiting the seat of Franklin County at Chambersburg

¹⁴ "Wars and Rumors of Wars," *Harrisburg Patriot and Union* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), June 13, 1863; "The Rebels at Carlisle," *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* (Brooklyn, New York), June 16, 1863.

¹⁵ William Heyser, "William Heyser's Diary," ed. William S. Bowers, *The Kittochtinny Historical Society Papers* (Hereinafter cited as *KHSP*), Vol. 16 (1970): 72-73; Amos Stouffer, "'The Rebs Are Yet Thick About Us': The Civil War Diary of Amos Stouffer of Chambersburg," ed. William Garrett Piston, *Civil War History: A Journal of the Middle Period*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1992), 210-231.

during the weekend of June 13 and 14, Amos Stouffer reported an increase in the level of anticipation in the city that would play host to the Confederates before long, writing, “The excitement is very great.” He also mentioned that the townspeople were “moving all the government stores out of town and sending them down the rail road” in an effort to save what they could before Lee’s men arrived and exacted the *lex talionis* McClure had mentioned previously. On that same Sunday, June 14, William Heyser of Chambersburg, recorded that the townspeople were in an uproar and that “government property [was] being loaded up and taken away. . . . All the army stores have been packed up and sent to Philadelphia.” Heyser also pointed out that the fear of the approaching army disrupted religious services as there was “little attendance at church and Sabbath School,” and while he admitted that “much of the news is false we hear,” he acknowledged that “it serves to upset the people. We all feel Pennsylvania will be invaded. Many families are hiding their valuables and preparing for the worst.” He even noted that some people were preparing to flee the town and declared, “Tonight we have many sleepless eyes, the houses [are] all shut up tightly.” Rachel Cormany, a fellow citizen of Chambersburg, also noted in her diary on June 14 that the level of excitement in town remained “pretty high” as evening approached.¹⁶

Stouffer, Heyser, Cormany, and the other citizens of Chambersburg were not the only residents of Franklin County who expressed increasing levels of apprehension at being lost in the fog of war. J. C. Atticks, a citizen of Shippensburg a few miles northeast of Chambersburg and located on the border with Cumberland County, wrote that as early as June 10 there was “a rumer that the Rebel Cavelry are making a raid into Penna. quite

¹⁶ Heyser, 72-73; Stouffer, 210-231; Rachel and Samuel Cormany, *The Cormany Diaries: A Northern Family in the Civil War*, eds., James C. Mohr and Richard E. Winslow, III (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1982), 328.

an excitement in Chambersburg.” On June 15, he noted an increase in the level of anticipation caused by the flight of refugees and baggage trains, writing, “Great excitement all day & night. Cars & horses passing through all day & evening.” A local theologian living in nearby Mercersburg to the southwest of Chambersburg also mentioned the spreading rumors and excitement in his journal as the Confederate army approached. While attending the funeral of a local widow on June 14, he noted, “rumors reached us of the advance of the Rebels,” and the following day he wrote, “Rumors accumulated during the day, and fugitive soldiers from Milroy’s command at Winchester and at Martinsburg, most of them drunk, made it certain our force in the valley of Virginia was sadly defeated, and that the Rebels were approaching the Potomac in strong force.” As the retreating Union troops demonstrated that a Confederate force was, in fact, quickly approaching, the level of concern among Pennsylvania’s citizens rose, and in Mercersburg, “all the schools and stores are closed; goods are being hid or removed to the country, valuables buried in cellars or gardens and other places of concealment.” The first Confederates would arrive in Pennsylvania later that day, and soon, the fog of war would dissipate and allow the people of Franklin County to encounter at least part of the enemy force that was causing all of the excitement.¹⁷

As the Army of Northern Virginia continued to surge forward and the people of Pennsylvania tried to cope with the chaos and confusion, at least one Pennsylvanian took a moment to analyze the situation. On June 18, the day before Confederate cavalymen would arrive in his town, Dr. Philip Schaff sat down to record his thoughts on the set of

¹⁷ Dr. Philip Schaff quoted in The Woman’s Club of Mercersburg, Pennsylvania, *Old Mercersburg* (Williamsport, Pennsylvania: Grit Publishing Company, 1949), 167-171; J. C. Atticks, “Excerpts from the Diary of J. C. Atticks, Shippensburg, Penna. During June and July 1863,” June 10, 14, 1863; Citizens File, Box 8, Robert L. Brake Collection, USAMHI.

circumstances confronting his fellow citizens. Born in Chur, Switzerland, and educated in Germany, Schaff was a professor of church history at the German Reformed Theological Seminary located in Mercersburg. Reflecting on the scripture, Schaff tried putting the invasion into a greater context, writing, “It seems to me that I now understand better than ever before some passages in the prophetic discourses of our Savior, especially the difference between *wars* and *rumors of wars*, and especially the force of the command to *‘flee to the mountains.’*” As some of those around him absconded with their families and household wares before the Confederate advance and others hid their livestock in the mountains and hunkered down for the storm to come, Schaff offered some profound insights into the nature of war and its impact on a civilian population:

Rumors of wars, as distinct from *wars* are not, as usually understood, reports of wars in foreign or distant countries, for these may be read or heard of with perfect composure and unconcern, but the conflicting, confused, exaggerated and frightful rumors which precede the approach of war to our own *homes* and *firesides*, especially by the advance of an invading army and the consequent panic and commotion of the people, the suspension of business, the confusion of families, the apprehensions of women and children, the preparations for flight, the fear of plunder, capture and the worst outrages which the unbridled passions of brute soldiers are thought capable of committing upon an unarmed community.¹⁸

Though not a military philosopher, Schaff understood that the fog of war bred fears that were generally far worse than reality. Noting that the people of Pennsylvania were “cut off from all mail communication and dependent on the flying and contradictory rumors of passengers, straggling soldiers, runaway negroes and spies,” he admitted that “*rumors of wars* are actually often worse than war itself,” but he also recognized this invasion would be more severe than the people of Pennsylvania had yet to experience as

¹⁸ Dr. Philip Schaff quoted *Old Mercersburg*, 167-171.

“the military strength and flower of the Southern rebellion is said to be crossing the Potomac and marching into Pennsylvania.” Despite his concerns, Schaff felt the anticipation and anxiety that Lee’s advance was causing served to create “a most intolerable state of things, and it would be a positive relief of the most painful suspense if the rebel army would march into town.” The men of Lee’s army would soon grant Schaff his awaited relief, and as a result of the ravages of war they visited upon Mercersburg and the rest of south-central Pennsylvania, his seminary would close, and Schaff would have to relocate to New York to find work.¹⁹

While the people of Pennsylvania scrambled for shelter as the storm clouds of war rumbled in the distance, the Army of Northern Virginia continued its roll toward the North. On June 17 after having moved his headquarters from Culpeper Court House to Markham in Manassas Gap, Lee sent orders to Ewell instructing him to send Rodes’s division and the attached cavalry under Brigadier General Albert Jenkins across the Potomac toward Hagerstown, Maryland, where they could “operate in the enemy’s country according to the plan proposed.” He also instructed Ewell to “repress marauding” and ordered him to “take what is necessary for the army, and give citizens of Maryland Confederate money or certificates.” Meanwhile, Lee kept Longstreet’s Corps in the Shenandoah Valley’s mountain passes along the Blue Ridge so that those troops could cover the movement of A. P. Hill’s Third Corps, which had finally pulled away from the Rappahannock and was now making its own way toward the valley’s lower end.²⁰

¹⁹ Dr. Philip Schaff quoted in *Old Mercersburg*, 167-171; For more information regarding the life and times of Dr. Philip Schaff, see George H. Shriver, *Philip Schaff: Christian Scholar and Ecumenical Prophet* (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987).

²⁰ *OR*, 1:27:2:296-297,1:27:3:900-901; Coddington, 104-105; Sears, 94-95; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 15-16.

While the bulk of Lee's army continued to move through the valley, General John Imboden's cavalry moved toward the Potomac from its position in West Virginia and gathered cattle and horses while laying waste to a number of key economic targets. In addition to destroying nearly a dozen bridges that served the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Imboden's troupe wrecked "all the depots, water-tanks, and engines between the Little Capacon and Cumberland," razed a number of block-houses, and damaged the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal by cutting the embankments above and below Old Town. When he received the news of Imboden's exploits, Lee responded with delight on June 20, writing, "I am very gratified at the thorough manner in which your work in that line has been done." He then asked that Imboden continue his activities in Maryland and Pennsylvania: "Should you find an opportunity, you can yourself advance north of the Potomac, and keep on the left of this army in its advance into Pennsylvania, but you must repress all marauding, taking only the supplies necessary for your army . . . and give receipts to the owners, stating the kind, quantity, and estimated value of articles received." In his orders to Ewell and Imboden, Lee understood that his officers must do their best to maintain discipline even in their efforts to gather supplies, for if his force turned to rampant vandalism and disintegrated into the countryside to violate the rules of war and wreak havoc on the civilian population, he would no longer have an army to command. Hence, Imboden was to continue his efforts to gather supplies for the army and destroy economic and military targets, but he was to do so with efficiency and discipline.²¹

While Lee's army closed in on the boundary between North and South and Imboden carried out his raid along the Potomac, General Rodes and General Jenkins were

²¹ OR, 1:27:2:296-297, 1:27:3:905-906; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 16.

well ahead of the Army of Northern Virginia. Two days prior to Lee's order to Ewell regarding the move toward Hagerstown, Jenkins's cavalry had already become the first Confederates to enter the North in the summer of 1863. After breaking camp at 2 o'clock in the morning on June 15, Jenkins's troopers headed across the Potomac and passed through Williamsport, Maryland, where the inhabitants greeted them with a fine breakfast in the streets, and Hagerstown, Maryland, where according to First Lieutenant Hermann Schüricht of Company D, Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry, Jenkins's men "were received very kindly by the inhabitants." While the citizens tended to demonstrate strong southern sympathies and welcomed Jenkins and his men with cheers and waving handkerchiefs, the cavalrymen did meet with some resistance from a small group of Union horseman under the command of Captain William Boyd. Boyd was doing his utmost to cover the retreat of General Milroy's baggage train that was making its escape from the valley. While there were no known casualties as a result of these skirmishes, the Union resistance did slow Jenkins and his men. Eventually, the Confederates managed to fight off Boyd's cavalry and crossed the Mason and Dixon Line into Franklin County.²²

After a brisk five-mile ride, Jenkins deployed his men and seized the town of Greencastle in Antrim Township. While occupying the town, the Rebel cavalry destroyed and seized crops and tore down fences before cutting telegraph wires and burning a rail depot, a water tower, and a warehouse. Jenkins subsequently garrisoned a small detachment in the town and charged the men with keeping order before taking the rest of his troupe and continuing toward Chambersburg eleven miles to the north. Following the occupation of Greencastle, Rodes, who would not arrive in the town for some time,

²² *OR*, 1:27:2:547, 550; Hermann Schüricht, "Jenkins's Brigade in the Gettysburg Campaign: Extracts from the Diary of Lieutenant Hermann Schüricht, of the Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry," *SHSP*, Vol. 24 (1896): 340.

reported evidence of fraud and instances of “violence to property . . . traceable to the cavalry” in his official account of the campaign. It was only the first of many inconsistencies that would run counter to the legacy of restraint so often attributed to Lee’s army during the invasion.²³

While the citizens of Greencastle endured the presence of Confederate cavalymen in their town, the bulk of Jenkins’s force continued toward Chambersburg. According to reports from the city’s residents, “the usual work of secreting, or packing and sending away, merchandise and other valuables” was already well underway. Earlier on June 15, Rachel Cormany reported in her diary that what remained of General Milroy’s baggage train from the Shenandoah Valley had hurried through town. As the wagons dashed down the streets of Chambersburg, their haphazard flight gave further proof to the stories about a Rebel invasion. Moreover, Cormany reported that “contrabands,” the name given to the black refugees who fled before the Confederate army, were also moving through the city streets as “fast as they could on all & any kind of horses, their eyes fairly protruding with fear. . . . There really was a real panic. All reported that the rebels were just on their heels.”²⁴

Jacob Hoke wrote a very similar account of June 15. According to him, “On this day we witnessed the greatest excitement which had occurred up to that time during all the history of the war.” Early that morning, farmers from the southern portions of Franklin County fled before the Confederate invaders and headed down the road to Harrisburg, carrying with them “their stock and valuables. The road was crowded with wagons, horses and cattle.” Following this initial group of refugees came “large numbers

²³ Schüricht, 340; Nye, 137-138; *Greencastle Pilot* (Greencastle, Pennsylvania), July 28, 1863.

²⁴ Hoke, 94; Cormany, 329.

of colored persons, men, women, and children, bearing with them huge bundles of clothing, bedding, and articles of house-keeping.” Then, at 10:00 a.m. a large body of some forty or fifty wagons “came dashing down our street, drivers alternately lashing the poor animals and looking back to see if the enemy were in sight.” The arrival of Milroy’s baggage train in such a frightened state turned the nervous march of civilians toward Harrisburg into an all-out panic. According to Hoke, “the scenes of terror and confusion were perfectly terrific.” Things were so stark and the wagon masters were pressing their horses so hard, in fact, that “one of the horses dropped dead from exhaustion,” and a young lieutenant stationed in Chambersburg on provost duty felt urged to calm the scene: “Observing the needless panic, [he] drew his revolver and ordered the teamsters to halt.” The damage, however, was done, for “the arrival of this train and the information it brought of the approach of the foe, naturally gave a fresh impetus to the citizens of Chambersburg, and the rush from the town in the direction of Harrisburg assumed larger proportions.” According to the *Franklin County Repository and Transcript*, “the skedaddle commenced in magnificent earnestness and exquisite confusion” following the retreat of the baggage train.²⁵

Healthy men of military age were especially susceptible to the panic as the rules of war did not protect them as surely as they protected women and children. While the men living in Franklin County were clearly noncombatants, nineteenth-century ideas about manhood blurred the line separating male combatants from male noncombatants whereas the line between men—combatant or not—and women and children remained quite distinct. Thus, as the Confederate troops approached Chambersburg, some of the

²⁵ Hoke, 97-99; *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863.

men of the town grew increasingly concerned about their fate. According to Jemima K. Cree, a resident of Chambersburg who wrote a letter to her husband in Pittsburg on June 15, “The men talk of leaving town, for fear of being taken prisoner. . . . J. Nixon, W. McLellan, the Eysters, McClure, Kimmel, and a few more have gone, but left their families here.” Again, the men would have felt little compunction about leaving their families behind because the rules of war served to protect their wives and children.²⁶

The confusion and panic continued as the day progressed. While Rachel Cormany claimed in her diary that “for awhile before dark the excitement abated a little,” she also noted, “but it was only like the calm before a great storm.” As the sun began to set on June 15, “news came that the rebels were in Greencastle & that said town was on fire.” Shortly thereafter, the few hundred Union cavalymen driven before Jenkins’s men fled through the streets, and the town, again, erupted in panic. According to Cormany, “Such a skedadling as their [sic] was among the women & children to get into the houses. All thought the Rebels had really come. The report now was that they will be here in an hour.” After lamenting the lack of news from her husband, a soldier in the Union Army of the Potomac, Cormany bemoaned, “Many have packed nearly all of their packable goods—I have packed nothing.” She then somehow found the strength to put her “trust in God” and tried to get some sleep at 11:00 p.m., convincing herself “all will be well.” Thirty minutes later, Jenkins’s cavalry would finally arrive and give her cause to awaken.²⁷

As Jenkins’s men closed in on Chambersburg driving civilian refugees, Union cavalry, and Milroy’s baggage train before them, many residents in Pennsylvania moved

²⁶ Letter: Jemima K. Cree to John Cree, June 15, 1863, in “Jenkins Raid,” *KHSP*, Vol. 5 (1908): 93.

²⁷ Cormany, 329.

from a position of cautious anxiety to a state of outright panic. While some of them fled before the advancing Confederates, others hid their livestock in the countryside and even in their homes, and not only did many storeowners box up their goods to ship to Philadelphia for protection but also bankers and railroad men prepared for the emergency and “had all their portable property loaded on cars and ready for shipment” by midday on June 15. Those who planned ahead completed their preparations just in time, for Jenkins’s cavalry force entered the town that night, and upon their arrival at around 11:30 p.m., they discovered that “many inhabitants had fled in haste from the city,” and they found “clothes and household utensils . . . scattered in the streets.”²⁸

Not everyone in Chambersburg buckled under the pressure of the Confederate onslaught. When Jenkins’s raiders finally entered Chambersburg that evening, they met with some civilian resistance. John A. Seiders and T. M. Mahon, both “just returned home from service in the army,” attacked and captured two of Jenkins’s scouts as they rode into town. The men then commandeered the soldiers’ weapons and horses before placing them in the local jail. Realizing the danger of holding two Confederates prisoner as 2,000 Rebel cavalymen descended on the city, the people of Chambersburg released the men while Seiders and Mahon fled the town. The following morning, Jenkins set up his headquarters in the Montgomery House and held a meeting with the burgess and town council. He demanded that they return the horses and equipment taken from his men, “and in case of their not being returned, payment for them, and in default of either, he threatened the destruction of the town.” Unfortunately, the horses and guns were long gone with Seiders and Mahon, so the townspeople eventually paid Jenkins \$900 and gave

²⁸ Schüricht, 340; *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863.

him the same number of pistols as had been taken from his men. Interestingly, Jacob Hoke noted, “the \$900 were paid over to him in Confederate scrip. Doubtless he expected to receive United States currency; but as his soldiers had flooded the town with their worthless currency, pronouncing it better than greenbacks, the city fathers took him at his word and paid him in his own money.” Although it had not been a brilliant conquest, Jenkins now occupied Chambersburg, and according to the *Franklin County Repository and Transcript*, “Having won it by the most determined and brilliant prowess, Jenkins resolved that he would be magnanimous, and would allow nothing to be taken from our people,” noting with sarcasm “excepting such articles as he and his men wanted.” Moreover, according to Jemima Cree, the people of the town had little choice but to obey the requests of Jenkins and his men, for “Everything the rebs asked had to be complied with or ‘they would fire the town.’”²⁹

While some of the townspeople resisted the Rebel occupation and others succeeded in shipping out a fair portion of their holdings before the arrival of the Confederate cavalymen, Jenkins did not miss the opportunity to plunder Chambersburg. In hopes of avoiding needless bloodshed, Jenkins commanded the town’s citizens to surrender all public and private arms on the morning of June 16 or risk having their homes searched and pillaged. Upon receiving the weapons, Jenkins’s chief of staff, a Captain T. B. Fitzhugh, “assorted the guns as they were brought in, retaining those that could be used by their men, and twisting out of shape, or breaking over the stone steps of the court-house, such as were unfit for service.” With the citizens of Chambersburg disarmed, Jenkins “ordered the storekeepers to open their establishments” on June 17 and

²⁹ Hoke, 105-106; *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863; Cree, 96.

permitted his men to purchase items from the stores with worthless Confederate scrip. According to Hoke's recollection, "Not only Confederate notes were paid us, but shimplasters issued by the city of Richmond and other Southern corporations." Such occurrences would become quite common during the course of the invasion as the Confederate invaders carried printing presses with them so that they would never run out of money and as "the fiction of payment permitted the Southerners to imagine themselves gallant and generous."³⁰

The absurdity of the Confederate's use of worthless scrip did not escape Alexander McClure. On July 8, 1863, his newspaper reported, "True, the system of Jenkins would be considered a little informal in business circles; but it's his way, and our people agreed to it perhaps to some extent because of the novelty, but mainly because of the necessity of the thing." Moreover, the editor noted, "Jenkins was liberal—eminently liberal. He didn't stoop to haggle about a few odd pennies in making a bargain," and "to avoid the jealousies growing out of rivalry in business, he patronised all the merchants, and bought pretty much everything he could conveniently use and carry." In a final note of sarcasm, the editor admitted, "Some people, with the antiquated ideas of business, might call it stealing to take goods and pay for them in bogus money; but Jenkins calls it business, and for the time being what Jenkins called business, was business. In this way he robbed all the stores; drug stores, &c., more or less, and supplied himself with many articles of great value to him." Thus, hoping to avoid physical confrontation with an

³⁰ Hoke, 106-107, 109; Edward L. Ayers, *In the Presence of Mine Enemies: War in the Heart of America, 1859-1863* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 402.

armed enemy, the citizens of Chambersburg complied with Jenkins's order, and in the estimation of Lieutenant Schüricht, "their feelings toward us were very adverse."³¹

While subduing the citizenry and pillaging the town's stores of all sorts of items, including "remnants of ladies' dress goods," Jenkins tried to maintain a systematic approach to the plundering of Chambersburg's shops. Meanwhile, he also sent foraging parties into the countryside, where they gathered cattle and horses by the thousands, which they sent south to the army, as well as personal items, including hats and shoes, two of the Confederate invaders' favorite targets for theft. During these expeditions into the country, the discipline and efficiency Jenkins used to appropriate items in the city faltered. Out from under the watchful eye of their commanding general, some of the men took to pillaging farms and entering abandoned homes in search of loot. Civil War soldiers on both sides of the contest had a propensity to view abandoned homes as very different from occupied homes, especially when they contained women and children. While occupied homes often stood a decent chance of being left alone, soldiers almost always considered abandoned homes ripe for plunder. Hence, with "the families being absent," Jenkins's troopers broke into a number of houses and stole all sorts of items—"bureaus and cupboards were all emptied of their contents, and such articles as they wanted were taken." A group of Confederates also visited Caledonia Iron Works at the foot of South Mountain to the east of Chambersburg during one of these foraging adventures. Those ironworks belonged to Pennsylvania Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, and "under the promise that if all the horses and mules belonging to the establishment were delivered to them the iron works would not be burned, about forty valuable animals

³¹ *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863; Schüricht, 340.

with harness, etc., were carried away.” The Rebels would be back, and the Caledonia Iron Works would not remain standing for long.³²

It was also during Jenkins’s initial raid into south-central Pennsylvania and into Chambersburg that the Confederates began to engage in an activity that stands in stark contrast to the legacy of restraint so often applied to the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania. While one can point out many similarities between the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania and Union marches through the South during the war and attribute much, if not most, of what happened to the rules of war and military necessity, the Confederacy’s decision to kidnap former slaves and free blacks and send them back south into slavery lacks justification and stands a reprehensible violation of the laws of warfare. When Jenkins first crossed the Mason and Dixon Line, the appearance of “large numbers of Negro men, women, and children . . . streaming out of Maryland over Antrim’s roads and through Greencastle” to the point that “the Negroes darkened the different roads Northward for hours” alerted the Pennsylvanians to the Confederates’ approach. Now that the Confederates were in the Keystone State, they scoured fields and searched houses in an effort to capture any black Americans they could. According to Jemima Cree, “They took up all they could find, even little children, whom they had to carry on horseback before them.” In a letter to her husband, Cree wrote about her efforts to free one of her employees on June 16:

This morning among the first news I heard was that they had been scouting around, gathering up our Darkies, and that they had Mag down on the court house pavement. I got my ‘fixens’ on, and started down, and there were about 25 women and children, with Mag and Fannie. I interceded for

³² Hoke, 106-107, 109; Schüricht, 340; *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863; For a discussion of soldiers’ views on occupied and unoccupied homes, see Kennett, 84-85, 303-307.

Mag, told them she was free born, etc. The man said he could do nothing, he was acting according to orders. As they were just ready to start, I had to leave; if I could have had time to have seen the General, I might have got her off. Fannie being contraband, we could do nothing for her. I went over to the Gilmore's and we all stood and saw them march up the street, like so many cattle, poor Mag and Fannie in the first line.

Cree's plea had failed, for the Confederates seem to have been under orders to seize escaped slaves and were going beyond those orders to kidnap indiscriminately even free blacks. Two days later, William Heyser, another resident of Chambersburg, reported in his diary entry that "the Rebels have left Chambersburg taking with them about 250 colored people again into bondage."³³

Rachel Cormany wrote about similar incidents. In her diary entry for June 16, she reported that the Confederates "were hunting up the contrabands & driving them off by droves. O! How it grated on our hearts to have to sit quietly & look at such brutal deeds." Moreover, Cormany claimed, "I saw no men among the contrabands—all women & children. Some of the colored who were raised here were taken along," indicating once again that at least some of the African Americans the Confederates seized were born free. Painting a heartrending scene of the Confederates' confiscation of the free blacks and former slaves, Cormany noted, "I sat on the front step as they were driven by just like we would drive cattle. . . . One woman was pleading wonderfully with her driver for her children—but all the sympathy she received from him was a rough 'March along'—at which she would quicken her pace again. It is a query what they want with those little

³³ Hoke, 97-98,108; Cree, 94; Heyser, 74; *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863; See also Ted Alexander, "'A Regular Slave Hunt': The Army of Northern Virginia and Black Civilians in the Gettysburg Campaign," *North and South: The Official Magazine of the Civil War Society*, Vol. 4, No. 7 (September 2001): 82-89; Regarding the orders to capture African Americans, see Chapter 3.

babies—whole families were taken.” In speculating about the absence of the men, she wrote, “I suppose the men left thinking the women & children would not be disturbed.” After all, women and children generally were exempted from the miseries of the contest—at least more so than men—but such exceptions apparently did not apply to black Americans.³⁴

Jacob Hoke, who witnessed some instances of kidnapping in and around Chambersburg, also recorded his thoughts on the tragedy, writing, “these poor creatures—those of them who had not fled upon the approach of the foe—sought concealment in the growing wheat fields about the town. Into these the cavalymen rode in search of their prey, and many were caught—some after a desperate chase and being fired at.” Hoke is also clear in his assertion that such kidnappings were not limited to Chambersburg while the Confederates searched through Franklin County, and he references similar incidents in both Greencastle and Mercersburg, where “entire Negro families were seized.” In his final estimation, Hoke expresses his disdain for the activity and makes it very clear that “this feature of the war indicated the object for which it was waged, to establish a government founded upon human slavery.”³⁵

Having wreaked havoc in the county seat of Franklin County for a few days, Jenkins withdrew from Chambersburg and back through Greencastle to the Mason and Dixon Line on June 18 after his men alerted him to what they believed to be advancing Union cavalry from the direction of Shippensburg. Before leaving Chambersburg, Jenkins ordered his men to destroy the railroad bridge at Scotland Station northeast of town, and his men also “set fire to a large frame warehouse then belonging to Messrs.

³⁴ Cormany, 330.

³⁵ Hoke, 97-98, 108.

Oaks & Linn.” Luckily, the citizens quickly extinguished the flames before they could spread and consume the town. This retreat upset General Rodes, especially after he discovered that the supposed Union cavalry were nothing more than curious Pennsylvania citizens coming down from Shippensburg to get a closer look at Jenkins and his men. In his official report, Rodes wrote, “The result [of Jenkins’s retreat] was that most of the property in that place which would have been of service to the troops, such as boots, hats, leather, &c., was removed or concealed before it was reoccupied.” Rodes had not gotten all he had hoped for in his initial strike.³⁶

Upon reaching the vicinity of Greencastle and Middleburg near the state line, Jenkins sent additional foraging parties as far away as McConnellsburg in Fulton County to the west and Fairfield in Adams County to the east. All across the southern portions of Adams, Franklin, and Fulton counties, Jenkins’s men gathered cattle, horses, personal items, and black Americans, ravaging the countryside like a plague of locusts. It was during this second phase of the raid that about two hundred cavalymen descended on Mercersburg on Friday, June 19. For the previous three days, the people of Mercersburg lived “under continued and growing excitement of conflicting rumors.” According to Philip Schaff, those days were the worst days up to that point in the war as it was a period characterized by “removal of goods by merchants, of the horses by the farmers; hiding and burying of valuables, packing of books; flight of the poor contraband negroes to the mountains from fear of being captured by the Rebels and dragged to the South.” In the end, Schaff opted not to evacuate himself and “concluded to stay with my family at the post of danger, trusting in God till these calamities passed. There is now no way to escape, and no horses and carriages are within reach. All communication cut off.” When

³⁶ Hoke, 110-113; *OR*, 1:27:3:905; Stouffer, 214.

the Confederates finally road into town and began their plunder, Schaff admitted, “The *sight* of the Rebels was an actual relief from painful anxiety.”³⁷

After visiting Mercersburg on the morning of June 19, a detachment of Jenkins’s men pushed across Cove Mountain into Fulton County. While there the men visited McConnellsburg, and although they primarily seized livestock, they also pillaged stores. According to W. S. Fletcher, “a party of Rebels several hundred strong” compelled him to open his store and “took by force goods of different kinds.” In total, Fletcher claimed they took \$610 worth of boots, shoes, hats, caps, dry goods, and cutlery. The men also carried off \$1,950 worth of goods from the Greathead family store. Upon their return to Mercersburg later that evening, they arrived brandishing “pointed pistols and drawn sabers” and had with them their loot, which included “a drove of about two hundred head of cattle captured at McConnellsburg, and valued at \$11,000, and about one hundred and twenty stolen horses of the best kind, and two or three negro boys.” In celebration of their haul, a Confederate colonel gave an impromptu speech of admonition to the people of Mercersburg before heading back to join Jenkins command below Greencastle:

I care nothing about the right of secession, but I believe in the right of revolution. You invaded our rights, and we would not be worthy the name of men if we had not the courage to defend them. A cowardly race is only fit for contempt. You call us Rebels; why do you not treat as such? Because you dare not and cannot. You live under a despotism; in the South the *Habeas Corpus* is as sacredly guarded as ever. You had the army, the navy, superiority of numbers, means, and a government in full operation; we had to create all that with great difficulty; yet you have not been able to subdue us, and can never do it. You will have to continue the war until you either must acknowledge our

³⁷ Hoke, 110-113; Dr. Philip Schaff quoted in *Old Mercersburg*, 167-171.

Confederacy, or until nobody is left to fight. For we will never yield.³⁸

During the final days of Jenkins's raid, "a considerable amount of valuable articles was taken," only some of which was paid for with Confederate money, and in the towns the Confederates visited, "the streets, after their departure, were lined with old shoes, boots, and hats which had been thrown aside for better ones." By June 22, the various detachments of Jenkins's cavalry rejoined the main body of his command between Greencastle, Pennsylvania, and Hagerstown, Maryland, bringing with them their abundant loot. Over the next few days, the main body of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia would swarm across the border and subject Pennsylvania to an occupation exponentially worse than they had experienced during Jenkins's brief raid, and some Pennsylvanians felt betrayed by their government, claiming, "The authorities conclude to fortify Harrisburg and Pittsburgh, and to leave all Southern Pennsylvania exposed to plunder and devastation. . . . The government seems paralyzed for the moment. We fairly, though reluctantly, belong to the Southern Confederacy, and are completely isolated."³⁹

While many Pennsylvanians had successfully hidden their horses, cattle, and sheep in far away places like Dauphin, Lancaster, Lebanon, and Perry counties and sending their goods to relative safety in towns and cities like Harrisburg and Philadelphia, Jenkins's raid had cost the southern counties of Pennsylvania, primarily Franklin County, heavily. Despite what defenders of the Confederate invasion's legacy might say, Jenkins left far more than footprints in his wake during this initial raid into the state. According to Jacob Hoke, "It would be difficult to estimate the value of the property taken by this raid,

³⁸ Hoke, 110-113; Glenn R. Cordell, *Civil War Damage Claims From Fulton County, Pennsylvania* (McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania: Fulton County Historical Society, Inc., 2001), 17, 20; Dr. Philip Schaff quoted in *Old Mercersburg*, 167-171.

³⁹ Hoke, 110-113; Dr. Philip Schaff quoted in *Old Mercersburg*, 167-171.

but it certainly amounted to not less than one hundred thousand dollars.” The greatest loss was in livestock. According to Rodes’s official report, Jenkins successfully captured “some 2,000 or 3,000 head of cattle.” Rodes could not even guess at the number of horses seized, for the many horses Jenkins’s men took “were rarely accounted for.” According to the research of W. P. Conrad and Ted Alexander, the authors of *When War Passed This Way*, Jenkins’s raid cost Franklin County and the fringes of Fulton and Adams counties an estimated \$250,000 in livestock alone. Moreover, the timing of the raid made matters worse, for Hoke reports that it occurred just before harvest season. Without the horses necessary to harvest the crops, yields were low as much of what the farmers had grown was either seized by the Confederates, eaten by their horses, or simply left to rot in the fields. Moreover, many citizens who earned their livings as farmers or invested their money in livestock went bankrupt as a result of the Jenkins raid. Finally, while much of the economic and physical damage fell within the rules of war, none of these estimates figure in the moral cost of the many kidnappings of free blacks and former slaves that occurred during Jenkins’s initial raid. Things would only get worse.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ *OR*, 1:27:2:550; W. P. Conrad and Ted Alexander, *When War Passed This Way* (Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: Beidel Publishing House, Inc., 1982), 136-138; Hoke, 113.

Chapter 3

“The Great Invasion”

Between June 15 and June 22, 1863, 2,000 cavalymen under the command of General Jenkins had crossed the Mason and Dixon Line into Pennsylvania and visited upon the citizens of the Keystone State a sample of what was to come as the rest of Lee’s army advanced into the region. On June 22, General Rodes’s division would move across the line and become the first body of infantry from the Army of Northern Virginia to enter the state. Five days later, the entire Confederate army, totaling around 75,000 men, would be in Pennsylvania, and by the end of June 28, Lee would have much of his force concentrated near Chambersburg, while detachments of varying sizes ranged over an area “roughly one hundred miles east and west by forty miles north and south.” The Pennsylvania counties of Adams, Cumberland, Franklin, Fulton, and York would all play host to Lee’s troops during the Gettysburg Campaign. People in the surrounding areas would spend their time dealing with refugees, preparing for their own defense, and wondering if or when the Rebels would pay them a visit. For the only time during the war, a Confederate field army would find itself on free soil, and the people of the free North would have to endure the presence of an enemy army in their midst.¹

As General Lee approached the southern border of Pennsylvania in the latter-half of June, he had to plan for certain contingencies outside the scope of traditional warfare. Linear tactics and strategic maneuvers were not the only issues Lee would need to deal with on his invasion of the North, for the opposing army was not his only concern. As his large body of troops moved across the Mason and Dixon Line, Lee would need to prepare for the difficulties inherent in operating in a hostile country filled with enemy

¹ Coddington, 154.

noncombatants. He had already addressed the issue to some degree in his June 17 orders to Ewell concerning Rodes's move toward Hagerstown and in his June 20 orders to Imboden regarding the cavalry commander's crossing of the Potomac. Now Lee's entire army would be moving through Maryland into Pennsylvania. Again, he could have ignored the issue and allowed his soldiers to behave as they wished upon crossing into the southern counties of Pennsylvania, but Lee knew better. Rather than allow his army to exact revenge for Union actions in the South, Lee fell back on his training and experience in trying to maintain discipline within his army and in working to mitigate the miseries of the contest for the civilian population. After all, if his army devolved into an armed rabble and simply disintegrated into the countryside on a rampage of vengeful pillaging and looting, any plans he may have had before coming into the state would become pointless, and even if his only plan involved little more than a raid for supplies, Lee understood that efficiency was the key to procuring the provisions he wanted. Moreover, if Lee allowed his troops to behave inappropriately while in the enemy's country, it would not be in keeping with the rules of war and would reflect poorly on both the commander of the army and the greater Confederacy.²

As Lee planned for the invasion of 1863 and the issues of soldier-civilian interaction, a number of factors helped prepare him for the difficulties that lay ahead. During his time at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, first as a cadet and then as the campus superintendent, he certainly received some exposure to the matters of conducting an operation in enemy territory among a civilian population. Admittedly, the coverage was quite limited as the cornerstone for every cadet's education at West Point was military engineering—the art of grand tactics and civil and military architecture. In

² *OR*, 1:27:3:900-901, 905-906.

fact, according to Lee's foremost modern-day biographer, Emory M. Thomas, "mathematics, sciences, and engineering consumed over 70 percent of classroom hours" for West Point cadets in Lee's class. They spent most of the rest of their time learning French and drawing, and it was not until the senior year that Lee would have taken "a catch-all course in geography, history, ethics, and law." In this course, Lee would have read sections from various texts, including Emerich de Vattel's *The Law of Nations* and William Paley's *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, but these two books along with only a few others would provide Lee with a very limited opportunity to learn about the proper relationship between soldiers and enemy noncombatants.³

The chief source for Lee regarding the principles of war was Emerich de Vattel's *The Law of Nations*, first published in 1758, which had long stood as a foundational text on the ethics of warfare for many diplomats, politicians, and generals. A Swiss-born philosopher and diplomat, himself, Vattel discussed the issue of noncombatants at length in his work. In Book Three, Chapter Five, Vattel argued that "since women and children are subjects of the state, and members of the nation, they are to be ranked in the class of enemies," but he also distinguished them as separate from healthy men of military age, noting, "But it does not thence follow that we are justifiable in treating them like men who bear arms, or are capable of bearing them." Having pointed out differences among noncombatants, Vattel went on to contend, "we have not the same rights against all classes of enemies," and in Book Three, Chapter Eight, he asserted that "women,

³ Thomas, 51-52; David Ronald Siry, "Confederates in Pennsylvania: Lee's 1863 Invasion of the North," M. A. Thesis (Pennsylvania State University, 2003), 9-16; James L. Morrison, Jr., *The Best School in the World: West Point, the Pre-Civil War Years, 1833-1866* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1986), 96-97; *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York: 1802-1902* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1904; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 1:366-367.

children, feeble old men, and sick persons . . . are enemies who make no resistance; and consequently we have no right to maltreat their persons, or use any violence against them, much less to take away their lives. This is so plain a maxim of justice and humanity, that at present every nation in the least degree civilized, acquiesces to it.” Two paragraphs later, Vattel extended similar protection to other noncombatants, writing:

At present, war is carried on by regular troops: the people, the peasants, the citizens, take no part in it, and generally have nothing to fear from the sword of the enemy. Provided the inhabitants submit to him who is master of the country, pay the contributions imposed, and refrain from all hostilities, they live in as perfect safety as if they were friends: they even continue in possession of what belongs to them. . . . By protecting the unarmed inhabitants, keeping the soldiery under strict discipline, and preserving the country, a general procures an easy subsistence for his army, and avoids many evils and dangers.⁴

While Vattel declared enemy civilians sacrosanct, he did not always extend the same level of protection to their property. In Book Three, Chapters Eight and Nine, Vattel wrote that belligerents in warfare “have a right to put into practice, against the enemy, every measure that is necessary in order to weaken him” and that an army has a right to deprive its “enemy of his possessions, of everything which may augment his strength and enable him to make war.” However, despite advocating the seizure of enemy property—whether it be the property of combatants or noncombatants was of little significance—Vattel went on to contend, “Those who tear up the vines and cut down the fruit trees, are looked upon as savage barbarians. . . . They desolate a country for many years to come, and beyond what their own safety requires. Such a conduct is not dictated by prudence, but by hatred and fury.” Moreover, Vattel argued, “It is glorious to obey the

⁴ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 13-17; Emerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct of Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns* (revised edition; London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1797; <http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/>), 3:5:72, 3:8:145, 3:8:147.

voice of clemency: that amiable virtue seldom fails of being more useful to the party who exerts it, than inflexible rigor,” and he reminded military commanders and rulers that soldiers were a reflection of them and their nation: “whatever they do is in his name, and for him.” As such “a general who wishes to enjoy an unsullied reputation, must be moderate in his demand of contributions” from the people. In general, then, Vattel advocated as much restraint toward noncombatants as possible, declaring, “What we have advanced is sufficient to give an idea of the moderation which we ought to observe, even in the most just war, in exerting our right to pillage and ravage the enemy’s country. . . . All damage done to the enemy unnecessarily, every act of hostility which does not tend to procure victory and bring the war to a conclusion, is a licentiousness condemned by the law of nature.”⁵

While *The Law of Nations* stood as the principal authority on the ethics of war for Lee, he would also have read portions of *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*, which was published in 1785. In the book, William Paley, a British philosopher and utilitarian, discussed a wide variety of issues, from virtue and charity to seduction and suicide. In Chapter Twelve of his work, he discussed war and military establishments, and he admitted that “if the cause and end of war be justifiable, all the means that appear necessary to the end are also justifiable.” The question of whether or not the Confederate cause was “just” aside, Paley also asserted that “the licence of war authorises no acts of hostility but what are necessary or conducive to the end and object of the war.” Moreover, Paley argued that “gratuitous barbarities borrow no excuse from this plea” and “serves only to exasperate the sufferings, or to incense the hatred of the enemy, without weakening his strength, or in any manner tending to procure his

⁵ Vattel, 3:8:138, 3:9:161-162, 3:9:165-166, 3:9:172.

submission.” In providing examples of such “barbarities,” Paley cited, “the slaughter of captives, the subjecting of them to indignities of torture, the violation of women, the profanation of temples, the demolition of public buildings, libraries, statues, and in general the destruction or defacing of works that conduce nothing to annoyance or defence.” Since such acts defied “the practice of civilised nations” and “the law of nature itself,” it followed that when working to diminish the horrors and destructiveness of warfare, officers and soldiers should do their utmost to exempt noncombatants from the severities of the contest.⁶

While such books were available to Lee and assigned reading during his senior-level “catch-all” course, they represented only a small window into the realm of soldier-civilian relationships. Lee would have to rely on the lessons of history and rigorous on-the-job training to develop any deeper understanding of the subject. According to Mark Grimsley, one of the foremost experts on the history of civilians in the path of the American Civil War, Federal commanders often relied on historical perspectives gained through the study and understanding of the War for American Independence and the Napoleonic Wars when forming their ideas about the appropriate ways to conduct the Civil War. Such ideas included their thoughts regarding the proper relationship between soldiers and civilians. Since Confederate leaders like Lee were often those same Federal commanders’ classmates and fellow officers in the antebellum army, it naturally follows that they, too, would rely on the same historical experiences when forming their opinions about the proper conduct of war among noncombatants. When they looked back on those two contests, Grimsley argues students of history and war “saw [them] as having been

⁶ William Paley, *The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy* (London: R. Faulder, 1785; http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=703&chapter=102957&layout=html&Itemid=27), Chapter 12: Of War, and Military Establishments.

decided by open combat on the battlefield, not by the destruction of economic resources or attacks on the civilian population.” Granted, depredations occurred such as British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s burning of homes and crops during the War for American Independence and the Napoleonic armies’ propensity to pillage and subsist off of the countryside, but on the whole, such “gritty reality remained very much the underside [of war] . . . often overlooked amid the seductive prospect of the Austerlitz-style battle of annihilation.” Thus, history would not have taught Lee to target specifically enemy noncombatants. Rather, history would teach him to direct his efforts against the enemy’s army and to divest his opponent of the means to carry on the war. Unfortunately, it is a difficult task to deprive one’s enemy of the ability and desire to make war without impacting civilians, and hence, the trick for Lee was to find a way to be successful without ultimately visiting the horrors of war on noncombatants.⁷

Aside from reading a variety of books and drawing on the lessons of history, Lee’s most direct experience with the art of war and the subject of soldier-civilian interactions came during his service in the army during the War with Mexico between 1846 and 1848. Like many other Civil War generals, Lee received a substantial amount of hands-on experience in military affairs during that war. Most importantly, Lee served as General Winfield Scott’s protégé and became part of Scott’s “little cabinet”—an informal group of advisers—during the contest, where he learned much about war from the man who conquered Mexico City.⁸

Aside from learning about the military arts under Scott, Lee also ascertained much about the behavior of volunteer soldiers during his time in Mexico. On January 16,

⁷ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 17-22.

⁸ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 17-22; Siry, 17-24; Allan Peskin, *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2003), 155.

1847, just three days prior to Lee's arrival to join his new commander, Scott had written a letter to Secretary of War William Learned Marcy that contained shocking testimony regarding the behavior of the volunteers:

Our militia & volunteers, if a tenth of what is said be true, have committed atrocities—horrors—in Mexico, sufficient to make Heaven weep, & every American, of Christian morals *blush* for his country. Murder, robbery, & rape on mothers & daughters, in the presence of the tied up males of the families, have been common all along the Rio Grande. I was agonized with what I heard—not from Mexicans, and regulars alone, but from respectable individual volunteers—from the masters & hands of our steamers. Truly it would seem unchristian & cruel to let loose upon any people—even savages—such unbridled persons—freebooters, &c., &c.

Scott was not alone in his characterization of the troops' appalling behavior, and Lee certainly would have been privy to his commander's displeasure over the situation as one of Scott's closest advisors during the conflict.⁹

In Scott's mind, the problem existed because the Articles of War, which Congress had approved on April 10, 1806, and which established the rules governing the armies of the United States, failed to include regulations regarding depredations committed in enemy territory. According to Scott, "There was no legal punishment for those offences, for by some strange omission of Congress, American troops take with them beyond the limits of their own country, no law but the Constitution of the United States, and the rules and articles of war." While a few of the articles did contain rules for dealing with citizens and inhabitants of the United States, Scott noted, "These do not provide any court for the trial and punishment of murder, rape, theft, &c., &c.,—no matter by whom, or on whom committed." In an effort to solve this problem and work toward mitigating the horrors of

⁹ Winfield Scott quoted in Mark E. Neely, Jr., *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 9; Thomas, 119.

the contest among the civilian population of Mexico, Scott issued General Orders, No. 20, which he referred to as his “*martial law order*,” on February 19, 1847, at Tampico, Mexico. He later reissued it “at Vera Cruz, Puebla, and the capital [i.e., Mexico City], so it might be familiarly known to every man in the army, and in translation, it was also extensively circulated among the people of the country.” General Order, No. 20, created the first military commission in the histories of both the U. S. legal system and the U. S. military that could serve as a court to try soldiers for a multitude of crimes, including but not limited to “assassination, murder, poisoning, rape, or the attempt to commit either; malicious stabbing or maiming; malicious assault and battery, robbery, theft; the wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices and fixtures; the interruption of religious ceremonies, and the destruction, except by order of a superior officer, of public or private property.” After the war, Scott reflected in his memoirs, perhaps letting his quest for legacy cloud his memory, “the order worked like a charm . . . [and] gave the highest moral deportment and discipline ever known in an invading army.”¹⁰

Scott’s orders and efforts to reduce the severities of war in Mexico certainly would have influenced Lee. According to Lee’s best-known biographer, Douglas Southall Freeman, the future general witnessed many instances in which Federal officers foiled the plans of their troops to loot and pillage while in Mexico, but depredations continued to occur nonetheless. In a letter home to his brother, Sydney Smith Lee, on March 4, 1848, Lee admitted, “It is difficult for a general to maintain discipline in an army, composed as

¹⁰ U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, “An Act for establishing Rules and Articles for the government of Armies of the United States,” April 10, 1806, <http://freepages.military.rootsweb.com/~pa91/cfawar.html>; Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut. General Scott . . . written by Himself* (orig. pub., 1864; reprint, Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 2:393-396, 540-546; Neely, 6-12.

this is, in a foreign country, where temptations to disorders are so great, and the chance of detection so slight.” Now in 1863, armed with his West Point education, the lessons of history, and the knowledge gained during the War with Mexico, Lee would have to put his knowledge to the test in developing his own plans for dealing with enemy noncombatants. While one may point to his invasion of Maryland in 1862 as his first test case, one must remember that he undertook that campaign as a liberator and friend of the Old Line State. This time, however, he was going on the offensive as a conqueror, or at the very least, a large-scale forager, and the civilians of Pennsylvania would warmly welcome neither.¹¹

In preparing for his army’s invasion of Pennsylvania and having moved his headquarters to Berryville, Virginia, Lee penned a general order in the hopes of eliminating the transgressions of his troops while north of the Mason and Dixon Line. It was an order that reflected his education and experience. On Sunday, June 21, 1863, just one day prior to Rodes’s crossing of the Maryland-Pennsylvania border, Lee issued General Orders, No. 72, and gave his Lost Cause defenders the greatest support they would ever receive regarding the restrained behavior of Confederate soldiers toward Union civilians during the Gettysburg Campaign. The order proclaimed that “no private property shall be injured or destroyed by any person belonging to or connected with the army, or taken, excepting by the officers hereinafter designated.” Defining who could make requisitions upon the local population—the commissary, quartermaster’s, ordnance, and medical departments—the order specified that “all persons complying with such requisitions shall be paid the market price for the articles furnished.” Moreover, the order

¹¹ Freeman, 1:284-289; Siry, 20-24.

commanded the prompt and rigorous punishment of any soldier found in violation of the aforementioned regulations for procuring supplies.¹²

Lee's contemporaries and accomplished Civil War scholars have rallied to the spirit of General Orders, No. 72, in asserting the exceptional behavior of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign and thereby bolstered the position of the Lost Cause's advocates, who have long contrasted Lee's march through Pennsylvania with Union marches through the South. According to Early, who after the war reflected on the conduct of the Army of Northern Virginia during the summer of 1863, Lee's order adhered to the "rules of war," and since the army obeyed the directive and requisitioned supplies "in an orderly and regular manner," the Confederates spared the citizens of Pennsylvania retribution for the Union's perceived crimes against the South. Early also contended that the superb behavior of Lee's troops during the Gettysburg Campaign marked the invasion as one "without a parallel in the history of war in any age." Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, a British observer who accompanied the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, noted in his diary that "Lee has issued a remarkably good order on nonretaliation" and commends the forbearance of the Southern troops. Lee's most famed biographer writes, "These orders were written, no doubt, with an eye to the encouragement of the peace movement in the North, for mercy disarms hate; but they were drafted with sincerity and they were enforced with vigor," and according to the recently deceased Shelby Foote, the author of a widely read three-volume history of the American Civil War, "the effect on the men to whom the order was

¹² *OR*, 1:27:3:912-913.

addressed was all that could have been desired. No army had ever marched better or with so little straggling.”¹³

While defenders of the South’s superior morality during the Civil War have rallied to the spirit of Lee’s General Orders, No. 72, as evidence that Confederate soldiers adhered to the rules of war and behaved better than Union soldiers, not everyone in the Army of the Northern Virginia welcomed their commander’s guidance. Major General William Dorsey Pender, a division commander in A. P. Hill’s Third Corps, openly wondered if the troops would even obey the order, writing in a letter home to his wife, “Until we crossed the Md. Line our men behaved as well as troops could, but here it will be hard to restrain them, for they have an idea that they are to indulge in unlicensed plunder.” Aside from questions regarding whether or not soldiers would willingly adhere to the order, there were also uncertainties concerning its practicality. A correspondent for the *Richmond Sentinel* attached to Colonel Edward Porter Alexander’s artillery battalion noted that officers and soldiers “generally and eagerly discussed” the order’s proper interpretation. In his opinion, “to enforce it strictly, is impossible. The doctrine of not using or destroying some of the private property of an enemy while in his country, is a pure abstraction. You cannot possibly introduce an army for one hour into an enemy’s country without damaging private property, and in a way often in which compensation cannot be made.” The correspondent went on to admit that he felt Confederate soldiers should be able to use “the private property of the enemy . . . even without compensation” and criticized the order because it called for strict punishment “if a man takes an onion, or climbs a cherry tree.” In his estimation, the soldiers in Lee’s army had witnessed the

¹³ Early, *Memoirs*, 264-265; Fremantle, 195-196; Freeman, 57; Shelby Foote, *The Civil War, A Narrative*, Vol. 2, *Fredericksburg to Meridian* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1963), 444.

ravages of war and suffered from the pangs hunger long enough. As D. H. Hamilton of Company M, First Texas Infantry, later argued, “A ragged, starving soldier in the ranks owes the world no apology for appropriating from the bounty of some one more fortunately situated, that which he needs to sustain his life and keep him fit to march and fight.”¹⁴

Regardless of such reservations, Lee believed General Orders, No. 72, was “based on rectitude and sound policy.” He sent copies to his subordinate commanders and began moving his army into Pennsylvania. On June 22, Lee sent a letter to Ewell, who had recently moved the rest of his Second Corps across the Potomac River opposite Shepherdstown, West Virginia, telling him, “If you are ready to move, you can do so.” Ewell would be the first of Lee’s corps commanders in Pennsylvania, and assuming that his Second Corps was prepared for the invasion since Rodes’s Division and the attached cavalry under Jenkins had been north of the Potomac since the middle of June, Lee directed Ewell toward the Susquehanna River. He further instructed Ewell to capture Harrisburg if practicable. In addition to urging Ewell to move forward toward the capital of Pennsylvania, Lee attached a copy of General Orders, No. 72, to the letter and asked that Ewell and his men follow the spirit of the order while marching through the Keystone State. Understanding that keeping his army supplied and fed while in the enemy’s country was of paramount importance, Lee urged Ewell to do everything in his power short of violating the new order to obtain what was needed for his troops’

¹⁴ William Dorsey Pender, *The General to His Lady: The Civil War Letters of William Dorsey Pender to Fanny Pender*, ed. William W. Hassler (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 253; “Advance into Pennsylvania,” *Richmond Sentinel* (Richmond, Virginia) in Frank Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, Vol. VII (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1864), 323-325; D. H. Hamilton, *History of Company M: First Texas Volunteer Infantry, Hood’s Brigade, Longstreet’s Corps, Army of the Confederate States of America* (Waco, Texas: W. M. Morrison, 1962), 45.

sustenance, noting, “Beef we can drive with us, but bread we cannot carry, and must secure it in the country.” Finally, he informed Ewell, “It will depend on the quantity of supplies obtained in that country whether the rest of the army can follow. There may be enough for your command, but none of the others.” If it turned out that there were not adequate provisions to support the entire army, Lee would need to send his other two corps into Pennsylvania along parallel routes so that they could subsist off of the land as well.¹⁵

With Lee’s letter on the way, Ewell was already on the move. He must have either anticipated his commander’s wishes or received his copy of Lee’s order before entering Hagerstown, Maryland, on June 22, for while in that city, Ewell issued his own General Orders, No. 49, which served to reinforce Lee’s directive. According to Ewell’s order, “all straggling and marauding from the ranks, and all marauding and plundering by individuals are prohibited, upon pain of the severest penalties known to the service.” The men of Rodes’s Division, who would represent the first Confederate infantry in Pennsylvania and who would arrive in Greencastle the following day, also received the orders, and according their commander, “the conduct of the troops of this division was entirely in accordance with those orders” despite the fact that the citizens of the town “apparently expected to see their houses burned down and all their property carried off or destroyed.” While in Greencastle, Rodes issued a requisition upon the town council calling upon them to provide him with 100 saddles and bridles, 112 pistols, 2,000 pounds of lead, 1,000 pounds of leather, 12 boxes of tin, 200 curry-combs and brushes, and 2 maps of Franklin County. According to Jacob Hoke, “These demands were so heavy that the council felt it impossible to fill them,” and while Rodes did manage to secure “some

¹⁵ *OR*, 1:27:3:914-915.

saddles, bridles, and a considerable amount of leather,” his division started toward Chambersburg on the afternoon of June 23 without incident.¹⁶

While Rodes moved into Pennsylvania and through Greencastle, Jenkins’s cavalymen once again headed toward Chambersburg. Moving in the vanguard of Ewell’s Corps, Jenkins had received orders from Rodes to reoccupy the seat of Franklin County on June 22. After traveling through Greencastle, where they continued to seize “horses, cattle, sheep, hogs, &c.,” Jenkins’s troupe fought a brief skirmish with the thirty-five men of Captain William Boyd’s Company C, First New York Cavalry, about a mile north of town. During the exchange, a Confederate volley ended with Union Sergeant Milton Cafferty being shot through the leg and Union Corporal William F. Rihl, becoming the first soldier killed north of the Mason and Dixon Line after a bullet passed into his upper lip and through his head. Following the exchange, Boyd retreated, and Jenkins continued his march to Chambersburg.¹⁷

Waiting in Chambersburg was a force of about 1,000 New York troops down from Harrisburg under the command of Brigadier General Joseph Farmer Knipe. Couch, the commander of the Department of the Susquehanna, had sent these men to rebuild the bridge at Scotland Station, which Jenkins had ordered destroyed during his initial raid into the Franklin County, and to slow the advance of the Rebel infantry toward the state capital. When they arrived in Chambersburg and set up their defenses just south of town,

¹⁶ According to General Rodes, Ewell had anticipated Lee’s orders. *OR*, 1:27:2:551; Hoke, 131; *The Daily Telegraph* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), June 29, 1863; *Harrisburg Patriot and Union* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), June 29, 1863; *Republican Vindicator* (Staunton, Virginia), July 3, 1863; Hoke, 134-135.

¹⁷ Following the skirmish, the people of Greencastle cared for Sergeant Cafferty, and the Confederates buried Corporal Rihl in a shallow grave on the side of the road. Shortly thereafter, Pennsylvania citizens reburied him in a local Lutheran cemetery. On June 22, 1886, the Rihl Post of the Grand Army of the Republic in Greencastle exhumed his body, reburied him at the spot he was killed, and built a monument in his honor; Stouffer, 215; Hoke, 125-126; Conrad and Alexander, 144-147.

the people in the city breathed a collective sigh of relief. According to Rachel Cormany, when a group of New York troops entered the city on June 21, the excitement that had been raging since the Confederates' first foray into the county seat days earlier "died away," and when the Seventy-first New York Infantry arrived the following morning with some cannons, "we felt safe then." William Heyser noted as well that the arrival of the Union forces caused the citizens of Chambersburg "to breathe a little easier," but he also questioned "how effective could they be?" Many believed that Lee's entire army was approaching, and 1,000 Union soldiers would not be sufficient for the protection of the city.¹⁸

Heyser was right to be concerned. Upon hearing from a local citizen that the Confederates were approaching Chambersburg in force, Knipe's men fled in the direction of Harrisburg on June 22. According to Jacob Hoke, "About five o'clock in the afternoon, a great commotion was observed all over camp. The officers were running around in an excited manner giving commands. The soldiers at the guns hastily abandoned them, and the whole command hurriedly left and marched to town, leaving guns, tents, and other camp equipage standing." Following Knipe's abandonment of the town, the absence of military authority led to a decline in order and civility, and the citizens of Chambersburg started engaging in some looting of their own. According to a number of witnesses, people "went to the abandoned camp and helped themselves to what they pleased of clothing and other articles."¹⁹

While some civilians rummaged through Knipe's abandoned camp, others expressed anxiety regarding the approach of the Confederates and the lack of any federal

¹⁸ Cormany, 332-333; Heyser, 76.

¹⁹ Hoke, 126-130, Cormany, 333; Heyser, 76.

or state protection. In his diary entry for June 22, Amos Stouffer noted, “This after noon affairs look a little blue. They are reported coming in strong force towards this place,” and Rachel Cormany wrote, “Guess there will be nothing to hinder them from coming now. . . . I do indeed feel like getting out of this place on that account but do not like to leave everything behind.” The citizens of Pennsylvania had learned during Jenkins’s initial raid that abandoned homes were prime targets for Confederate looters, and Cormany did not wish to risk having her home burglarized if she fled. Her willingness to stay and protect her valuables rather than flee before the Rebels also demonstrated an understanding on her part that the rules of war protected her as a female noncombatant, for had she felt that she was in any serious physical danger, she likely would have retreated from the path of the invading army.²⁰

The “cowardly flight” of Knipe’s men also triggered a new wave of panic among the town’s citizens. Once again fearing for their own safety, men of military age and African Americans began to abandon the town with their remaining valuables and livestock. According to Amos Stouffer, “Ben & Jim [Warner] started for Shippensburg with a load of oats for the horses,” and since “the excitement was so great,” Stouffer, himself, fled with his horses “to the mountain below Newburg.” William Heyser also noted the intense anxiety the Rebel approach caused, noting, “Excitement is again intense in town. . . . Again there is a general stampede to leave town with valuables. The road to Shippensburg is again packed with fleeing citizens. There is not a Negro to be seen in town. At 11 o’clock the streets are deserted. I did not go to bed till about one. All is quiet, but it is a sleepless town.” While some women undoubtedly left the town as well, African

²⁰ Stouffer, 215; Cormany, 332-333.

Americans and young, healthy men had the most to fear from the approaching Rebels as the rules of war did not protect them as surely as it did other noncombatants.²¹

Jenkins's cavalry entered Chambersburg the following day—Tuesday, June 23. As the Confederate cavalry approached, a couple of men on horseback rushed through town yelling, “those d—d buggers fired on us,” and warned the people in the streets to go to their houses. According to Rachel Cormany, “all at once I got so weak I could scarcely walk, but that was over in a few minutes & I could walk faster than before. The people were wonderfully frightened again, such a running.” When Jenkins finally entered the town later that morning, he and his men once again “made a requisition upon the citizens of Chambersburg for a large amount of provisions . . . , which were to be brought to the court-house pavement within a stipulated time.” The Confederates also declared “that if this demand was not complied with a general search of the houses would be made, and all provisions found taken.” Like Rodes's requisition on the people of Greencastle that same day, Jenkins's demand for supplies stayed within the bounds of Lee's and Ewell's orders, but for the people of Chambersburg, who were told that their property was being impressed rather than stolen, it was just a matter of semantics. Despite their displeasure and clearly not wanting to upset their heavily armed guests, who had threatened to fire the town if Jenkins's demands were not met during his last visit, the people of Chambersburg complied and provided the Confederates with the provisions demanded. According to Hoke, “as fitch after fitch, and jowl after jowl, with a sprinkling of bread, cakes, and pies, were deposited upon the pile, in front of the court-house, the name of the unwilling contributor to the stomach of the Southern Confederacy was taken down, by which his residence would be exempted from search in case enough was not voluntarily

²¹ Stouffer, 215; Cormany, 332-333; Heyser, 76.

brought in.” Not everyone submitted to the Confederate demands, however, and one of the names not recorded would have been that of Rachel Cormany, who wrote with disdain, “Some dumb fools carried them jellies & the like—Not a thing went from this place.”²²

Jenkins men also went beyond passively plundering the town and waiting for the civilians to provide them with forced requisitions as some of the cavalymen took a more active role in seizing provisions and destroying the infrastructure of the surrounding area. According to Cormany, “The Reb’s have been cutting up high.” While some of Jenkins’s men oversaw the civilians’ surrender of the town’s goods, a number of others began “sawing down telegraph poles,” destroying nearby railroad tracks, and a few even “took possession of the warehouses & were dealing out flour by the barrel & molasses by the bucket full.” The Confederate cavalymen also did not always wait for the civilians to surrender their wares, for according to Heyser, Jenkins’s men “opened the warehouse of J. Allison Eyster, and made off with \$4000.00 worth of bacon, salt, beans, coffee, crackers, etc. They also opened the warehouse of Oaks & Linn, and took almost 300 barrels of flour belonging to Jacob Stouffer. They broke in the heads of 20 barrels of whiskey, which they poured out. At Miller’s Drug Store they poured a barrel of brandy into the gutter.”²³

Jenkins’s men were not the only ones robbing Chambersburg. As June 22 wore on, some of the town’s own citizens raided a railroad freight warehouse containing “government stores, such as crackers, beans, bacon, etc.” According to Jacob Hoke, it was “a raid of a most shameful and yet ludicrous character” as “men, women, and

²² Cormany, 333-334; Hoke, 132-133.

²³ Cormany, 334; Heyser, 76.

children came running in crowds, and a general scramble took place, and upon every street and alley leading from the warehouse persons were seen carrying bacon and rolling barrels of crackers and beans.” As order continued to disintegrate, “some [of the thieves] came into contact with others, when scolding, kicking, and fighting ensued.” In one instance, a “woman rolling away a barrel of crackers came in contact with another rolling away a similar prize, and, crowding her too much she turned around and kicked the other, but not being acquainted with the laws of gravitation and momentum, missed her aim and went sprawling backward over her own barrel. By the time she had gathered herself up some one had rolled away her prize, at which a general fight set in.” As the absence of government authority and the presence of an enemy army led to the breakdown of civility, it began to look as if Thomas Hobbes had been correct back in 1651 when he wrote,

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.²⁴

While Jenkins’s men carried out their occupation of Chambersburg and the people there struggled to deal with the presence of enemy cavalry in their midst, the rest of Ewell’s First Corps moved toward the city. Rodes’s division entered the town first on

²⁴ Hoke, 133-134; Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan* (London: Andrew Crooke, 1651; reprint, Whitefish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, n.d.), 52.

June 24, his band playing “The Bonnie Blue Flag” as they moved down the city streets, and Johnson’s division followed shortly thereafter. Early’s division, meanwhile, moved into Franklin County along a parallel route to the east, crossing through Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, before arriving at Greenwood “at the western base of South Mountain, on the pike from Chambersburg to Gettysburg” on June 24. Once General Ewell, himself, arrived in the county seat that same Wednesday, he set up his headquarters in the Franklin Hotel, used a local printing press to issue copies of Lee’s General Orders, No. 72, to the people of the town much like Winfield Scott had done with his General Orders, No. 20, during the War with Mexico, and levied yet another unachievable requisition upon the people of the city:

5,000 suits of good clothing, including hats, boots, and shoes; 100 good saddles; 100 good bridles; 5,000 bushels of grain (corn or oats); 10,000 lbs. sole leather; 10,000 lbs. horse-shoes; 400 lbs. horse-shoe nails . . . 6,000 lbs. lead; 10,000 lbs. harness leather; 50 boxes of tin; 1,000 curry combs and brushes; 2,000 lbs. of picket rope; 400 pistols; all the caps and powder in town; also, all the Neat’s foot oil . . . 50,000 lbs. of bread; 100 sacks salt; 30 barrels molasses; 500 barrels flour; 25 barrels vinegar; 25 barrels beans; 25 barrels dried fruit; 25 barrels sauerkraut; 25 barrels potatoes; 11,000 lbs. coffee; 10,000 lbs. sugar; 100,000 lbs. hard bread.

When the businessmen of Chambersburg failed to meet the demands after a Major Hawkes warned them, “It will not do for you to say that you *can not* furnish the articles we require,” Ewell sent squads around to local businesses, including Jacob Hoke’s store, where they forced their entry and seized those provisions they found. According to Hoke, “It is out of my power to give any estimate of the value of the property taken that day. . . . This much, however, can be said, that many persons who had toiled and economized for

years to gain an honorable support, as well as lay up something for old age, were reduced to poverty.”²⁵

Hoke was not the only resident to provide testimony regarding the impact of Ewell’s troops on the county seat and surrounding areas. According to William Heyser, the Rebel soldiers “sang and cheered lustily as they marched along. About two, the pillage of our stores began. Not a place escaped, never in the history of our boro was there such a scene.” Heyser also noted that the city’s “merchants were compelled to pack up the [Confederate] wagons with their goods, which is being sent to Richmond,” and he reported that “the streets are crowded with Rebels who try to interrogate our lessor citizens as to where things are hidden or sent to. . . . By now, all of our stores have been ransacked.” On June 24, Rachel Cormany attested to the economic impact of the plundering as well, writing, “Some of our merchants will be almost if not entirely ruined.” Apparently, the Confederates continued to pay for things with their worthless money as Heyser reported, “My son’s mill and warehouse has suffered much from confiscation for which they gave him \$800.00 in Confederate scrip.” Heyser also noted that rumors came into town which indicated that things were even less civil in the countryside, where the Union troops could operate out from under the watchful eyes of Ewell and other high-ranking officers: “I hear my tenant farmer, Thos. Miller, was shot at while plowing his corn. I have felt much concern for him, but cannot get thru the line.”²⁶

Circumstances did not improve much in the following days. After witnessing the Confederates’ confiscation of civilian property, Cormany penned the following entry in her diary on June 25: “They must surely expect to set up stores or fill their empty ones

²⁵ Early, *Memoirs*, 254; Hoke, 122, 135-136, 139-144; Ewell’s requisitions printed in Hoke, 139, and Heyser, 77.

²⁶ Heyser, 77-78; Cormany, 334-335.

judging from the loads they have been hauling away & they take every thing a body can think of.” Heyser also noted, “All quiet until about 9 o’clock when the locusts began to swarm again. On each side of the street they stop and make further requisitions. There isn’t much left to take. All businessmen suffer.” The Confederates were demonstrating their proficiency in stripping a country bare just as they and their Union counterparts had done in Virginia. Overwhelmed by what the Rebels were doing to his city, Heyser noted, “I have mixed feelings of indignation and humility. . . . Many feel all is lost, after seeing this show of power in the face of our inadequate defense.”²⁷

Over the next few days, the rest of Lee’s army would cross into Pennsylvania and continue to require the people of the state to provide an unrealistic amount of provisions. Granted, much of the interaction between soldiers and civilians during the first few days of Ewell’s occupancy had fallen within the rules of war, but transgressions of General Orders, No. 72, were already beginning to occur. Conditions were only going to get worse as Lee’s other two corps entered the region. While Ewell’s Second Corps split apart, with Rodes’s and Johnson’s divisions headed northeast toward Harrisburg along the Philadelphia Pike and Early’s division headed east across South Mountain toward Wrightsville, A. P. Hill’s Third Corps would enter Franklin County next and take up residence east of Chambersburg. Finally, James Longstreet’s First Corps would bring up the rear, and his divisions would encamp west of the Franklin County seat. As these soldiers settled in and occupied the region, they behaved much as they and their Union counterparts had and would in the South. When Lee, himself, arrived in city on June 27, he would take note of the situation, and when confronted with the level of disobedience

²⁷ Cormany, 335; Heyser, 78.

in his army, he would feel obligated to issue a second order urging his troops to behave themselves while in the enemy's country.

Chapter Four

“Instances of Forgetfulness”

On June 27, 1863, General Robert E. Lee finally entered Chambersburg. William Heyser, who reported seeing the arrival of Lee and some of his troops, noted in his diary, “About 11 o’clock Gen. Lee passed with his staff. He is a fine looking man, medium size, stoutly built, has the face of a good liver, grey beard, and mustache, poorly dressed for an officer of his grade.” According to Jacob Hoke, who also witnessed the Confederate commander’s entrance, “General Lee, as he sat on his horse that day in the public square of Chambersburg, looked every inch a soldier. . . . His whole appearance indicated dignity, composure, and disregard for the gaudy trappings of war and the honor attached to his high station.” While these men judged the appearance of Lee, other citizens watched the procession of soldiers and officers down their streets, and “All had one thought in mind,” wrote Heyser, ““Were these soldiers to be our conquerors, and if so, what will be our fate?”” The people of Franklin County’s seat of government had hosted portions of Lee’s army for the past thirteen days. They had not enjoyed the visit, and they were ready for their unwelcome guests to leave. Now that Lee had finally arrived, many civilians felt an increasing sense of uncertainty regarding the Confederates’ motives and the methods the Rebels might employ against them.¹

Granted, many of Chambersburg’s citizens would have seen copies of Lee’s General Orders, No. 72, by the time he arrived, but that did not serve to calm them much as many of Lee’s troops refused to abide by their commander’s edict. According to Heyser, the arrival of Hill’s and Longstreet’s corps that afternoon did even less to alleviate the peoples’ concerns: “Later in the day, Gen. Hill and Longstreet passed

¹ Heyser, 79; Hoke, 167.

through with part of their army. They were a far less respectable lot, and constantly shouting, singing, and hooting at females that showed themselves at doors or windows. They were loud in their denunciation of the Union, and insulting to citizens on the sidewalks.” As they moved through town, Heyser heard them yell, ““Boys, this is Pennsylvania. We should destroy her as they did Virginia, dam the Union. Harrisburg will be ours, Hurrah for the Southern Confederacy, and Jeff Davis.”” As more Confederates poured into the city and settled into camp around town, disregard for Lee’s order ran rampant as soldiers engaged in petty theft and regularly stole civilians’ hats, shoes, and other personal items. On the day of Lee’s arrival, Heyser took note of a group of “Louisiana Tigers, a forbidding-looking set of men that would take your hat or remove your boots for their own use,” and he mentioned that “Rev. Schneck was relieved of his gold watch and \$50.00. He complained to get it back, but to no use. Robberies are now common on the street, particularly where they are unguarded.” Despite the arrival of their beloved commander, many of Lee’s men were now totally disregarding his directive, and when civilians complained about the treatment, the officers would “refer to the same treatment our soldiers gave the Confederacy in Virginia.” While Heyser admitted that “many of the Rebels are gentlemen,” he noted that they were the exceptions and pointed out that “those from Florida, Texas, and Louisiana, generally speaking, are a band of cutthroats.”²

This was the situation when Lee arrived, and after setting up his headquarters in Shetter’s Woods to the east of Chambersburg, he set about trying to remedy the

² Heyser, 80; See also Robert T. Coles, *From Huntsville to Appomattox: Robert T. Coles’s History of the 4th Regiment, Alabama Volunteer Infantry, C. S. A. Army of Northern Virginia*, ed. Jeffrey D. Stocker (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1996), 203-204; Cormany, 337; Heyser, 87; Hoke, 176-177.

misbehavior of his men. Less than a week after issuing General Orders, No. 72, Lee released another directive, General Orders, No. 73, on June 27. In his new order, Lee admitted that there had been “instances of forgetfulness” on the part of some of his soldiers with regards to respecting the people of Pennsylvania and their personal property. In reminding his soldiers to uphold the ideals of “civilization and Christianity,” Lee provided his defenders and the Lost Cause’s advocates with yet another quote to rally around:

The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defenseless and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country.

While one does not have to go so far as some scholars to suggest that such orders were simply “a matter of propaganda” that “had a definite purpose, to make the Confederacy appear more virtuous than the Union,” one can easily see how defenders of the Lost Cause could employ such language, which may very well have been sincere on the part of Lee, to bolster their own cause and maintain their hold on the moral high ground. Lee has garnered great respect in the South and even among some northerners, and those who have come to revere him are far less likely to question his purpose or his morality—if Marse Robert said it, it must be true. Thus, while Lee may not have issued his orders as a matter of mere propaganda, that is precisely what they have become.³

Again, Lee issued his second directive to remedy a situation that had been building since the invasion started. According to Hoke, “that the humane intentions of

³ *OR*, 1:27:3:942-943; Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 25, 27; For an example of a northerner who reveres the memory of Robert E. Lee, see Frank Bohn, “Let Us Here Build a Monument to Robert E. Lee,” *KHSP*, Vol. 13 (1954): 367-371.

General Lee[’s General Orders, No. 72,] were not wholly regarded, and acts of plunder were committed, is clearly established by this second order from the commander in chief, in which he refers to some acts of disobedience and expresses his regret at the same.” As his men had neared the boundary between the slave South and free North over the past several days, many of them looked forward to giving the people of Pennsylvania a taste of war and had found cause for celebration. At “precisely” eleven o’clock on the morning of June 26, three Confederate soldiers of the Ninth Alabama Infantry from Hill’s Third Corps straddled the Mason and Dixon Line. Upon learning that they had finally reached the historic border separating Maryland from Pennsylvania, James M. Crow, Edmund D. Patterson, and H. Van Whitehead enlisted a local citizen to show them the exact site of the boundary. After finding the perfect spot, the three men stood “with one foot in Maryland and the other in Pennsylvania,” finished off the contents of their canteens, and drank a toast to their invasion of the Keystone State. Another soldier, C. C. Cummings of Company B, Seventeenth Mississippi Infantry, from Longstreet’s First Corps also employed the help of a local citizen in carrying out his own celebration for the occasion: “I was marching with the lieutenant colonel at the head of the column; and seeing an old man supporting himself with a cane, I called to him to draw a line in the middle of the street, marking off Maryland from Pennsylvania. He did so, and with a running jump I bounded over into Pennsylvania.”⁴

Soldiers from Texas also celebrated their crossing of the Mason and Dixon Line. As he neared the northern border of Maryland, Valerius C. Giles of Company B, Fourth

⁴ Edmund DeWitt Patterson, *Yankee Rebel: The Civil War Journal of Edmund DeWitt Patterson*, ed. John G. Barrett, with a foreword by Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966; reprint, Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2004), 110; C. C. Cummings, “Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863,” *CV*, Vol. 23, No. 9 (September 1915): 406.

Texas Infantry, stepped out of his line of march when he realized his company was closing in on the Pennsylvania state line. He wanted to celebrate the occasion of the crossing with Captain William “Howdy” Martin of the Henderson Guards. As Martin approached, Giles called out, “Captain, I have fallen back for reinforcements. I want you to help me capture the State of Pennsylvania.” Martin replied, “All right, Sonny. Show me the keystone and we’ll smash her into smithereens.” Arm in arm, Giles and Martin, “invaded the United States,” and as the rest of the Texans reached the stone marker denoting the line between Maryland and Pennsylvania, they waved their hats in the air and “gave a Rebel yell that was taken up by the soldiers in front and carried back for miles by those in the rear.” For the past few days, a steady rain had soaked the Confederates to the bone, muddy roads had slowed their advance into the North, and their experiences on the march to Pennsylvania had been, for the most part, rather disagreeable. Yet, despite the hardships they endured, the Confederate soldiers’ spirits remained high. They knew that they were finally taking the war into enemy territory, and some recognized the significance of moving the contest onto “abolition soil” as they entered Franklin County.⁵

As Lee’s troops crossed into Pennsylvania for the first time, many of them took notice of the agricultural wealth of the region. In a letter home to his mother, Private Eli Pinson Landers of Company H, Sixteenth Georgia Infantry, wrote, “This is the greatest wheat country in the world. I never saw the likes. . . . This is a splendid country. Everything is plenty. The people has never felt the war in their country till now.” Second

⁵ Valerius C. Giles, *Rags and Hope: The Recollections of Val C. Giles, Four Years with Hood’s Brigade, Fourth Texas Infantry, 1861-1865*, ed. Mary Lasswell (New York: Coward-McCann, 1961), 176-177; *Rome Courier* (Rome, Georgia), July 21, 1863, quoted in Wilkinson and Woodworth, *A Scythe of Fire*, 221.

Lieutenant Sanford Branch of Company B, Eighth Georgia Infantry, also reported on the condition of Pennsylvania, noting, “This really is the land of plentitude. The whole country appears to be one broad field of grain. Wheat, rye, barley, and oats are the sold products of the soil.” Private John Garibaldi of Company C, Twenty-seventh Virginia Infantry, found the people of Pennsylvania “living in a very flourishing country plenty of good wheat, plenty of the best meadows I ever saw in my life. The generality of the people haven’t got more than eighty acres of land and they have it in the highest state of cultivation and living like princes.” According to Corporal Taliaferro “Tally” Simpson of Company A, Third South Carolina Infantry, “The country is the most beautiful I ever beheld, and the wheat and corn crops are magnificent. All the fields are covered with beautiful green grass and clover, two and three feet high, and burdened with a rich growth of wheat, mostly bearded wheat, and fine fields of young corn are seen every where.” Adjutant Robert T. Coles of the Fourth Alabama Infantry also waxed eloquent in drawing a stark contrast between the plenty of Pennsylvania and the paucity of Virginia: “We had left the war-wasted and battle-driven Old Dominion, and had come to the land of corn and wine, flowing with milk and honey. Everything indicated prosperity and abundance. It was a season of the year when the trees drooped with ripening cherries, and in every direction you could see these trees filled with Confederate soldiers helping themselves to that most luscious fruit.” What these Confederates saw as they crossed the Mason and Dixon Line differed vastly from the wasteland they left behind in Virginia. For many of the soldiers, marching into Pennsylvania was like entering the unspoiled Garden of Eden, and the rich bounty of the region proved as overly tempting to many of them as the forbidden fruit had to Adam and Eve.⁶

⁶ Eli Pinson Landers, *Weep Not for Me Dear Mother*, ed. Elizabeth Whitley Roberson (Gretna,

While Lee had strictly forbidden common soldiers from engaging in any foraging of their own in General Orders, No. 72, the agricultural wealth and pristine condition of the area coupled with robust appetites and a fervent yearning to give Pennsylvanians a taste of war inspired many soldiers to ignore the decree. Sergeant William S. White of the Richmond Howitzers, who celebrated his twenty-fourth birthday on the day he crossed into Pennsylvania, noted in his diary on June 24, “To day, for the first time, I stand upon Northern soil—now the people of Pennsylvania will have an opportunity to sip the sweets of war; let them drink deeply of the bitter cup, for we have well nigh drained it to the bottom.” After crossing into the Keystone State a few days later, Private Landers of the Sixteenth Georgia Infantry wrote another letter home to his mother and reported, “We intend to let the Yankey Nation feel the sting of the War as our borders has ever since the war begun. The citizens . . . are almost scared to death.” Landers also informed his mother about the Confederates’ efforts to subsist off the land and their treatment of civilians, writing, “We intend to press all we can while we are in the Union. Us soldiers treats the people with respects when we want anything and we offer them our money for it and if they refuse it we just take it at our own price.”⁷

In pressing things into service and foraging for food and other items, revenge was one of the principal motivators for Lee’s men as they moved through Franklin County

Louisiana: Pelican Publishing Company, 1998), 108-109; Branch Family, *Charlotte’s Boys: Civil War Letters of the Branch Family of Savannah*, ed. Mauriel Phillips Joslyn (Berryville, Virginia: Rockbridge Publishing Company, 1996), 156-157; Letter: John Garibaldi to Wife, July 19, 1863, Confederate Units, Confederate Officers: Virginia, Box 10, Robert L. Brake Collection, USAMHI; Dick and Tally Simpson, “*Far, Far from Home*”: *The Wartime Letters of Dick and Tally Simpson, 3rd South Carolina Volunteers*, ed. Guy R. Everson and Edward H. Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 250; Coles, 205; See also the comments of Private Joseph T. Payne and Private James Booker in G. Howard Gregory, *38th Virginia Infantry* (Lynchburg, Virginia: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1988), 36-37; Stillwell, 180; Stanley Omwake, “Franklin County Through Confederate Eyes,” *KHSP*, Vol. 14 (1963): 319-328.

⁷ William S. White, *A Diary of the War, or What I Saw of It* (Richmond, Virginia: Carlton McCarthy & Co., 1883), 196-197; Landers, 108-109.

and into the rest of Pennsylvania. According to Tally Simpson, “most of the soldiers harbor a terrific spirit of revenge and steal and pillage in the most sinful manner. They take poultry, hogs, vegetables, fruit, honey, and any and every thing they can lay their hands upon. Last night Wofford’s Brig[ade] of this div[ision] stole so much that they could not carry what rations they drew from the commissary.” He also sent a letter home after the campaign in which he reflected on the Confederates’ behavior and endeavored to explain their motivations:

Everything in the shape of vegetables, from a cow pea up to a cabbage head, was ‘pressed’ without the least ceremony, and all animal flesh from a featherless fowl to full grown sheep and hogs were killed and devoured without the least compunction of conscience. Nearly all seemed to have fresh in their memories the outrages of the ‘Beast Butler’ and the villainy of the inhuman Milroy, and did every thing in their power to gratify their revenge, especially the troops of Ala, Miss, La, & Texas.

Another Confederate soldier, Edmund Patterson of Company D, Ninth Alabama Infantry, also acknowledged that “some of the boys have been ‘capturing’ chickens,” and while asserting that “it is against positive orders,” he also maintained that he “would not punish one of them, for as Joe McMurray says, it’s not half as bad as they did, [to] his mother and sisters in Alabama.” William Berkeley of Company D, Eighth Virginia Infantry, wrote, “We . . . today marched into Pennsylvania. . . . We are sitting by a fine rail fire. It seems to do the men good to burn Yankee rails as they have not left a fence in our part of the country. In spite of orders, they step out at night and help themselves to milk, butter, poultry, and vegetables.”⁸

⁸ Simpson, *Far From Home*, 251; Patterson, 111-112, 261-264; Letters: William N. Berkeley to His Wife, June 27, 28, 1863, University of Virginia cited in Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb*, 47.

Although a desire for revenge motivated quite a few Confederate soldiers during the march through Pennsylvania, hunger and want inspired many others to violate General Orders, No. 72. According to Captain Robert Daniel Funkhouser of Company D, Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry, “Our men are living finely, applejack, fresh butter and milk, chickens and most everything else. The Louisianans particularly pay no regard in foraging and supply themselves on all occasions.” According to Confederate Surgeon J. B. Clifton, “Hogs, sheep, and Poultryes stand a poor chance about here for their lives. We are living off the ‘fat of the land.’” Based on the story of another soldier, Private George B. Atkisson of Carleton’s Battery, even company mascots were not above plundering the Pennsylvanians’ goods. Better still, Atkisson claimed that his “little comrade,” a dog named Charlie, could differentiate between Marylanders and Pennsylvanians:

Charlie was a good forager. . . . During the Maryland campaign he strictly obeyed General Lee’s orders, refusing to leave the ranks. When some of the boys would say, ‘Charlie, go bring us a chicken,’ he would pay no attention, but jog along with the guns. He looked upon people in Maryland as friends, and refused to steal from them. On the Pennsylvania campaign, however, he changed his ideas; being on the enemy’s soil, he plundered. Many a ‘Dutch wife’ lost her chickens and complained: ‘Captain, von little dog vot pelongs to your company steal mine chickens and bring dem to you mens. I vants my chickens, or you pay for them.’ The captain would reply: ‘Well, my friend, point out the men with the dog and I will see that you get your chickens or they will be paid for.’ Among so many men it was impossible to point out the right ones.

While it is absurd for one to think that Charlie could really tell the difference between the people on either side of the Mason and Dixon Line, the message in Atkisson’s story is

clear—he recognized the difference, and it was distinction enough to justify pillaging and theft.⁹

When soldiers finally made it into camp after their long march into Pennsylvania, they often found it easy to escape from the watchful eyes of their commanding officers and sought opportunities to plunder in the countryside. As they moved out on these unsanctioned foraging expeditions, some of Lee's troops operated in the same manner as Sherman's Bummers during the Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns of 1864. According to historian Steven E. Woodworth, the author of *Nothing But Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865*, "during the march through Georgia, the term 'bummer' referred to any soldier who in violation of orders would sneak away from the column to forage on his own." John F. Marszalek, the foremost modern-day biographer of General William T. Sherman, also noted that each of Sherman's Bummers "took his job seriously and was ingenious in ferreting out food, horses, and whatever personal effects he took a fancy to. . . . Rarely did he injure anyone, and he did not, as a rule, burn houses, but he did pick many of them clean, leaving behind a trail of destruction." One could say much the same about what one might call Lee's Bummers. Corporal Samuel Pickens of Company D, Fifth Alabama Infantry, related that after encamping outside of Chambersburg, "the men went off by the scores to the neighboring houses & brought back a great many hens, & milk, butter, &c." Succumbing either to the temptations of sarcasm or the innocence of naivety, Pickens also asserted that "the people gave everything to the soldiers as they said

⁹ Laura Virginia Hale and Stanley S. Phillips, *History of the Forty-Ninth Virginia Infantry, C. S. A., 'Extra Billy Smith's Boys,' Based upon the unpublished Memoirs of Captain Robert Daniel Funkhouser, 'Warren Blues,' Company D, 49th Virginia Infantry, C. S. A.* (Lanham, Maryland: S. S. Phillips and Assoc., 1981), 72; Diary: J. B. Clifton, entry of June 28, 1863, North Carolina Historical Commission, cited in Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb*, 47; George B. Atkisson, "Charlie, 'Recruit' to Troup Artillery," *CV*, Vol. 19, No. 11 (November 1911): 516.

our money would do them no good.” A soldier in the Norfolk Artillery Blues perhaps understood it best when he wrote,

I took advantage to hunt around a little and found abundance of things good to eat and drink such as bread, butter, milk, apple butter, honey, fowls, pigs, mutton, lard, cherries, whiskey, and all of which we got very cheap, as we have no Federal money and the people do not want Confederate. Possibly the people do not care to have us about their houses, and give us what we ask for to get rid of us, a very reasonable proceeding, as who wishes to remain after getting what he wants?¹⁰

Other soldiers reported much the same thing after going into bivouac. During their encampment at Chambersburg, three privates from Company F, Third Arkansas Infantry, conspired to steal a beehive from the farmhouse of a Dutch family. After successfully distracting the woman of the house, the men snagged the hive, and as they ran away with their loot, they decided to plunder the family’s spring house as well. The three men ultimately made their escape with not only the honey but also crocks filled with butter and milk, and they could not even justify their actions with the pretense of paying for their feast with worthless Confederate money. While encamped east of Chambersburg, Adjutant Robert Coles of the Third Alabama Infantry reported another theft, writing that “white, fat Chester pigs were too great a temptation for men tired of poor beef, and they fell on the Chester pigs, and it was not long before the mess had boiled hog’s head and spareribs and newly-baked wheat bread for the haversacks.” Private John O. Casler of Company A, Thirty-third Virginia Infantry, also noted, “As

¹⁰ Steven E. Woodworth, *Nothing But Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 590; John F. Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order* (New York: Free Press, 1993), 301-302; See also Kennett, 267-268; Samuel Pickens in *Voices from Company D: Diaries by the Greensboro Guards, Fifth Alabama Infantry Regiment, Army of Northern Virginia*, ed. G. Ward Hubbs (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2003), 180; John Walters, *Norfolk Blues: The Civil War Diary of the Norfolk Artillery Blues* (Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: Burd Street Press, 1997), 73.

soon as we would go into camp in the evening some of the soldiers would strike out into the country before they had time to put out a guard, and would come back loaded with ‘grub.’” In his opinion, Lee’s order against foraging was irrelevant as he and his comrades lived by the motto “‘everything is fair in war.’”¹¹

Other soldiers who reported on the foraging habits of Confederate soldiers sometimes took time to discuss the issue of payment. Since the arrival of Jenkins’s cavalry on June 15, many Confederates had paid for their purchases with Rebel currency in an effort to make themselves appear benevolent and virtuous—as if Pennsylvania’s citizens had much choice in the matter. They did not, however, always work very hard to maintain the illusion of munificence as they moved into and through the state. After reaching Chambersburg and setting up a campsite a few miles to the east at Fayetteville, Sergeant J. E. Whitehorn of Company F, Twelfth Virginia Infantry, reported in his diary, “some of the boys have gone off ‘foraging,’ in other words gone off to try and see if they can buy or steal something.” Apparently the men were quite successful in their exploits, for Whitehorn also noted, “We are having a regular feast, the boys are constantly coming in with apple butter, milk, light bread, hams, chickens, etc.” Although Whitehorn claimed, “I never forage . . . as I always respect private property,” he did indulge in the banquet his fellow soldiers provided, and he learned not to ask many questions, writing, “In reply to my questions as to how they obtained these articles, their invariable reply is ‘I bought it.’ I dont dispute the point with them but I draw my own conclusions about the matter. We have not been paid off for a long while, and I dont suppose twenty five

¹¹ Calvin L. Collier, *“They’ll Do To Tie To!”: The Story of the Third Regiment, Arkansas Infantry, C. S. A.* (Little Rock, Arkansas: Pioneer Press, 1959), 128; Coles, 205; John O. Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade* (Guthrie, Oklahoma: Stints Capital Printing Company, 1893), 238, 246.

dollars could be raised in the entire company, yet the men have brought in at least \$100.00 worth of provisions.”¹²

Sergeant William White also provided evidence that the soldiers found it difficult to pay for everything they took. After going into camp at Chambersburg, White noted in his diary,

I, as usual, flanked out in a quest of a good supper. My usual success attended me, for the people are so terribly frightened that they will give or sell us anything, and that, too, at our own prices. As to Confederate money they take it with apparent willingness, but whether from fear of us or really because they can make use of it I know not; however, I know this much: my last dollar is sighing for companionship and I must pursue some original plan to procure Pennsylvania dinners in the future.

Lack of choice in the matter coupled with fear over the possibility of upsetting their heavily armed customers must have been the key factors in motivating the people of Pennsylvania to accept Confederate money, for aside from making change for Confederate purchases or holding onto the scrip as a souvenir—neither of which were likely priorities during the invasion—the Rebel currency was really only good for use as kindling to the people of Pennsylvania. Moreover, it does not take a brilliant imagination to figure out what plans White developed for subduing his hunger once he ran out of money.¹³

Aside from stealing provisions from the people of Pennsylvania, some Confederate soldiers also engaged in the destruction of the peoples’ physical property. According to Thomas Lewis Ware of Company G, Fifteenth Georgia Infantry, the Confederates “marched through fields of wheat & corn tearing down fences & not

¹² J. E. Whitehorn, *Diary of J. E. Whitehorn, 1st Sergt. Co. ‘F,’ 12th Va. Infantry, A. P. Hill’s 3rd Corps, A. N. Va.* (Utica, Kentucky: McDowell Publications, 1995), 24-25.

¹³ White, *A Diary of the War*, 197.

respecting scarcely any thing. The soldiers hardly respecting any thing, robing bee gums & poultry yards. We were gathering up all the horses & beeves in the country. People all very much frightened along the road.” As he and his comrades approached Chambersburg, they “burnt all the fences around the corn fields, & [took] wagons & horses in the wheat & corn field,” and while encamped around the town, Ware and his fellow soldiers lived off the fat of the land with “nearly half of the Reg’mt out foraging” and the army “living all-together on what we capture.”¹⁴

Aside from plundering the countryside for their meals and wrecking private property, Ware and his fellow Confederates also participated in destroying the infrastructure of south-central Pennsylvania. According to Ware, the Rebels burned sections of railroad and the railroad depot in Greencastle upon entering Pennsylvania, and after moving on through Chambersburg, they “tore up all the ties & piled the Iron on it & burnt 4 miles of R. R. We burnt the bridge across the river at Scotland Station 5 miles of *Shippensburg*, the bridge was first burnt by our advance Cavalry & rebuilt the next day after we fell back & we returned next day and burnt it again.” William Heyser also reported the destruction of Franklin County’s transportation network in his diary entry for June 30: “The troops are busy destroying the Franklin Railroad at both north and south ends of the County. Along with sills of the road, they pile on all the fence they can find to heat and twist the rails,” thereby creating an early Confederate version of what would later come to be called Sherman’s Neckties. Heyser also wrote, “Another force of about 500 men have been sent to destroy the railroad depot and buildings, starting with the large turntable. . . . The engine house was pulled down after an immense amount of work.

¹⁴ Mark Nesbitt, ed., *35 Days to Gettysburg: The Campaign Diaries of Two American Enemies* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 1992), 122-123, 129.

. . . I tried to reason with a nearby officer about the wanton destruction. Their answers were always the same, ‘This is in retaliation for your troops’ work in the South, particularly Fredericksburg.’” After failing to stop the Confederates from destroying the buildings that supported the railroad, Heyser retreated to the belfry of the German Reformed Church “to see if I could trace any damage to my farm.” Unable to spot his farm through the timberland, he noted more destruction of the Cumberland Valley Railroad, writing, “You could mark the line of the railroad by the smoke of the burning ties.” Discussing the same destruction of the railroad and its buildings in her diary entry for June 30, Rachel Cormany despondently admitted, “The Rebs are still about doing all the mischief they can.”¹⁵

Not all of Lee’s soldiers stopped at stealing livestock, pressing military provisions, and destroying farms and railroads. Other Confederate soldiers regularly made forced purchases of items that hardly qualified as being of military importance. Sometimes it seemed as if Lee’s men were on a great shopping spree, snatching up items that were hard to find in the Confederacy and shipping them back home. In a letter to his wife, Charles M. Blackford of Company B, Second Virginia Cavalry, asked her to “tell Nannie I shall try get her something pretty in Pennsylvania.” George Campbell Brown, General Ewell’s aide-de-camp, did more than try. Upon entering a store in Chambersburg, he used Confederate currency to purchase “several gross of small china

¹⁵ Nesbitt, 122-123, 135; Heyser, 88; Cormany, 338; See also “Destroying Railroads,” *Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization* (New York, New York), October 24, 1863; During his campaign to capture Atlanta, Georgia, in the summer of 1864, General William T. Sherman issued Special Field Orders, No. 37, in which he instructed his officers on the correct way to destroy railroad tracks: “Officers should be instructed that bars simply bent may be used again, but if when red hot they are twisted out of line, they cannot be used again. Pile the ties into shape for a bonfire, put the rails across, and when red hot in the middle, let a man on each end twist the bars so that its surface become spiral.” This practice of twisting the iron tracks during the Atlanta Campaign and subsequent March to the Sea earned the contorted bars the nickname “Sherman’s Neckties.” *OR*, 1:38:5:179.

buttons, a half-dozen calico dress-patterns, some soaps, flavoring essences (peppermint &c) & a few other miscellaneous articles.” Brown clearly had no intentions of using his purchases to craft chic new uniforms or pamper himself while in camp. Rather, he sent the items home to his mother in Staunton, Virginia, and he reported that his compatriot, Colonel J. E. Johnson “got more than I did—and his daughters made good use of it.” In a letter home to his wife on June 24, Jed Hotchkiss informed her, “I bought about \$100 worth of calico, wool delaine, bleached cotton, hoops, gloves, thread, gingham, pins &c &c which I hope to get home in due time if we stop short of N.Y.,” and on June 27, Thomas Boatwright of Company C, Forty-fourth Virginia Infantry, wrote a letter home in which he notified his wife, “I have purchased two dresses for you and a pair of shoes.” Aside from buying women’s clothing, hardly a military necessity, he also noted that he and his men enjoyed such essentials as “whiskey, and candy, sigars, nuts of different kinds.”¹⁶

While some soldiers forcibly purchased items that did not fall within the constraints of military requisites, others contravened Lee’s orders and the rules of war by pillaging private homes. According to Thomas Boatwright, his fellow soldiers “took everything. They even stripped houses though it was against orders.” As was generally the case when Union armies marched through the South, Confederate soldiers rarely entered occupied homes, and not every Rebel soldier was willing to partake in the process of actually breaking into private residences—occupied or not. Some, like Tally

¹⁶ Blackford, 180; George Campbell Brown, *Campbell Brown’s Civil: With Ewell and the Army of Northern Virginia*, ed. Terry L. Jones (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 198; Letter: Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 24, 1863, “Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865,” VOTS; Letters: Thomas Frederick Boatwright to His Wife, June 27, 1863, Thomas Frederick Boatwright Papers, Manuscripts Department, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Hereinafter cited as SHC).

Simpson, simply noted that “after a house had been abandoned by the family and pillaged by our troops, if I saw any thing thrown about liable to be lost, I would be willing to take it if I actually needed it for my own use.” Sometimes, however, Confederates would enter occupied homes as in the case of one of Private Isaac Gordon Bradwell’s fellow soldiers in Company I, Thirty-first Georgia Infantry. According to Bradwell, after his regiment crossed into Pennsylvania, they spotted “a very substantial residence, evidently the home of well-to-do people.” One of his fellow soldiers, a ruffian nicknamed “Webfoot,” “fell out of the ranks of the stragglers when he saw the house and entered it, demanding in his abrupt manner something to eat. The folks treated his request with contempt, refusing to give him anything; whereupon he went through the dining room and pantry, taking the best of what he found.”¹⁷

Private homes and businesses were not the only structures pillaged during Lee’s march through Pennsylvania. In fact, very little remained sacred during the invasion. During their occupation of Chambersburg, Confederate soldiers “broke into the Columbus Lodge of Odd Fellows, in Franklin Hall, cut to pieces and destroyed a greater portion of the regalia, broke open several of the desks and drawers, and mutilated everything they could lay their hands on.” In the mind of the writers at the *Chambersburg Spirit & Times*, “This was an act of disgraceful vandalism, which speaks well for the boasted chivalry of the Southern army.” Worse yet, while collecting livestock in the countryside, Lieutenant John Hampden Chamberlayne of Crenshaw’s Battery, entered a

¹⁷ Letters: Thomas Frederick Boatwright to His Wife, July 9, 1863, Thomas Frederick Boatwright Papers, SHC; Simpson, *Far From Home*, 262-263; Isaac Gordon Bradwell, *Under the Southern Cross: Soldier Life with Gordon Bradwell and the 31st Georgia*, ed. Pharris D. Johnson (Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1999), 121; For comparison of Federal soldiers’ treatment of occupied and unoccupied homes during the most (in)famous Union march through the South, Sherman’s March to the Sea, see Kennett, 84-85, 303-307; See also, Woodworth, *Nothing But Victory*, 590-591.

Dunkard Church during service “and held up the congregation at the point of a pistol, while his men unhitched the horses in the yard.”¹⁸

As Confederate troops moved across their farms, through their yards, and down their city streets, some of them entering homes, businesses, and places of worship along the way, the people of Pennsylvania testified to the hardship and destruction Lee’s army left in its wake. According to Henry B. Hege, a Mennonite farmer in the community of Marion just south of Chambersburg, who wrote a letter to his family in Lancaster County following the invasion, “A great many came to our house for something to eat. . . . The roads got bad and they threw the fences down on both sides of the road and passed through the fields, so they had three roads along side each other. . . . They took all our corn, about twenty barrels, all our oats, about nine bushels, and nearly all our chickens. They also took mowing scythes and axes and all the salt they could find.” Hege also commented on the troops’ behavior, noting, “Some of the rebels appear to be nice and clever men. Some of them would not harm any man or steal anything, but I tell you, the greatest portion of them were nothing but thieves and robbers and some murderers.” Hege also noted that the Rebels wore what he believed were stolen clothes and hauled their loot in what he knew were stolen wagons. Furthermore, he reported their killing of hogs and theft of horses: “We have a good many neighbors that have no horses now. In telling of the damage done to his father’s farm, Hege wrote, “My father says his loss is \$2,000 by this invasion of the rebels.” They pastured all his hay, burned much of his

¹⁸ *Chambersburg Spirit & Times* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 15, 1863; John Hampden Chamberlayne, *Ham Chamberlayne, Virginian: Letters and Papers of an Artillery Officer in the War for Southern Independence, 1861-1865* (Richmond, Virginia: Dietz, 1932; reprint, Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot, 1992), 191-192.

fence, destroyed a great deal of his grain in the fields, and took 100 bushels of wheat out of the barn.”¹⁹

Not everyone in Pennsylvania adopted a passive approach in dealing with Lee’s army. While it was probably not the wisest course of action to risk upsetting an armed enemy and although it generally ended badly for those who tried, some civilians took a more active role in trying to protect themselves from the Confederate invaders. Some Pennsylvanians professed their loyalty to the Democratic Party in the hopes that Lee’s men would spare them, but it rarely worked as few Confederates felt the claims were sincere. When his division moved into Pennsylvania and marched through Middletown, Pennsylvania, on June 26, Robert Shotwell of the Eighth Virginia Infantry, wrote, “Strange to say we met with a more marked exhibition of welcome at this Pennsylvania town than in any portion of Maryland. I saw fully a dozen miniature Confederate flags waving from windows, while all along the streets were ladies waving handkerchiefs and scarfs from the piazzas and upper windows!” Confronted by such an odd display of support for the Confederate cause in a free state, Shotwell wondered, “Can it be that these people are sincere? Or, are these demonstrations merely a part of Dutch cunning to placate the oft-pictured, wild, cantankerous, ravenous Reb of whom so many lies are told that simple people believe him a monster of cruelty?” Granted, while the majority of Franklin County voters had selected Abraham Lincoln in the 1860 election, 34.1% of them had chosen Southern Democrat John Cabell Breckenridge. Though he could not know this, Shotwell speculated, “Possibly tho’, these are Democratic families that have been persecuted and harassed by their abolition neighbors until they really welcome the

¹⁹ Letter: Henry B. Hege to Henry G. Hege, July 12, 1863, quoted in Conrad, *Conococheague*, 40-41.

advent of our army as relief,” but he ultimately concluded, “Of course, we have little knowledge of the real feelings of the people.”²⁰

John Casler of the Thirty-third Virginia Infantry related a story of his treatment of a Pennsylvania citizen who claimed to be a Peace Democrat and captured the misgivings that many of Lee’s soldiers had regarding such declarations:

One day there was an old farmer standing by his gate talking to the boys, saying he was a ‘copper-head’ and a rebel sympathizer, and had quite a crowd around him. He had a fine farm and a fine house, and was well ‘fixed,’ but when any of them attempted to go in the gate he would say they had nothing to eat as the soldiers ahead of us had already eaten him out. I listened to him awhile, but soon ‘tumbled to the racket,’ and saw he was giving us that kind of *taffy* to keep us out of his house. So I told my chum to come on and we would soon see what was in there. When we were about to go in at the gate the old man said there was nothing in there to eat. I told him that was too ‘thin;’ that he might never have the opportunity of feeding the rebels, and that he ought to embrace this chance, as this was our first trip into Pennsylvania and in all probability would be the last. We went on to the house and found plenty to eat by simply asking the ladies for it. When we got back to the road we told the other boys that the old woman said we were to ‘come on’ and get what we wanted, and they went. The old man saw his game was up, but I expect he raised a racket with the old woman afterwards.²¹

Other Pennsylvania citizens adopted even more drastic measures to stand against the rising Confederate tide. According to Blackwood K. Benson of Company H, First South Carolina Infantry, who admitted in a letter home that “rebels don’t respect private property a bit,” Lee’s Bummers sometimes ran into armed civilians when out plying their trade. In a letter home on June 29, Benson noted that upon entering Pennsylvania, there were “bushwackers in abundance.” Surgeon Charles Edward Lippitt of the Fifty-seventh

²⁰ Franklin County: 1860 Statistics, “Franklin County: 1860 Presidential Voting by Precinct,” VOTS; Shotwell, 1:490-491 quoted in Conrad and Alexander, 159.

²¹ Casler, 248-249.

Virginia Infantry also reported hearing some rumors that “some of our men have been bush-whacked” and noted “this should not be allowed.” After Brigadier General George Hume Steuart led his brigade of 2,500 infantry and 300 cavalry across Cove Mountain on June 24 and entered McConnellsburg, where he stayed for two days on a mission to procure even more provisions from Fulton County, several citizens, “who were recently discharged soldiers,” waited for Steuart to leave the area before setting upon two Confederate stragglers. Having captured the Rebel looters, the scene turned bloody as the civilians led the two soldiers out of town and shot them dead. It was yet another violation of the rules of war during the Gettysburg Campaign, and this time it had been perpetrated by civilians.²²

While some Pennsylvanians worked to protect themselves from the Confederates, Lee and his high-ranking officers often tried to minimize confrontations between soldiers and civilians by stationing guards to protect civilian property and regularly placed lower-ranking officers in charge of keeping order among the men. Sometimes this tactic worked, but often times, the guards and officers simply ignored, and thereby condoned, acts of vandalism and plunder despite the invasion’s celebrated restraint. When the Twenty-fifth Virginia Infantry moved into Chambersburg on June 26, the regiment

²² Blackwood K. Benson to Berry G. Benson, July 29, 1863, Confederate Units, Confederate Officers: North Carolina-Texas, Box 9 Robert L. Brake Collection, USAMHI; Charles Edward Lippitt, “Diary and Records of Charles Edward Lippitt, Surgeon, 57th Virginia Volunteers, Armistead’s Brigade, 1862-1863,” Charles Edward Lippitt Papers, SHC; Nye, 254; Hoke, 147-153; Conrad and Alexander, 154-155; John H. Nelson, *Confusion and Courage: The Civil War in Fulton County, Pa., June, 1863* (McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania: Fulton County Civil War Reenactment Advisory Committee, 1996), 15. Note that these two Confederate dead should not be confused with the two Confederate cavalrymen killed in the Battle of McConnellsburg on June 29, 1863. The first two were buried in the local cemetery whereas the latter two were buried beside the road where they fell. The United Daughters of the Confederacy placed a monument on that spot in 1929, and one can see the marker today alongside U. S. Route 16. See John A. Nelson, “On the Monday Before Gettysburg—The Battle of McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania,” *The United Daughters of the Confederacy Magazine*, Vol. 48, No. 7 (June 1985): 17-20; Glenn R. Cordell, *Civil War Invasions in Fulton County* (McConnellsburg, Pennsylvania: Fulton County Historical Society, Inc., 1979), 9-12.

selected Private John R. King of Company B as one of the soldiers that would serve to guard civilian property during their encampment in the city. According to King, “I did a fine job guarding a bed of onions just long enough to pull all I wanted for my own use, and I gave some to others who were not skillful in climbing palings as I was.” As Hill’s Third Corps entered the state and set up their camp, Brigadier General Ambrose Ransom Wright became disgruntled when he learned Lee’s order forbade troops from using fence rails for firewood. Hence, he made an announcement to his men: “I want nobody to burn any rails that two of you can’t break in two.” The following morning, a private reported that no fence rails existed within a mile of the encampment.²³

Other soldiers related similar episodes in their diaries and letters home. Robert Coles of the Fourth Alabama Infantry “saw one evening after we had gone to bivouac a soldier run a chicken under General [John Bell] Hood’s chair and catch it and the General appeared perfectly unconscious of the act, so intent was he on examining a map, while sitting in the yard of a Pennsylvania citizen.” Even Robert E. Lee, the legendary author of the famed General Orders, No. 72 and No. 73, was apparently not above overlooking the actions of his soldiers on occasion. In a letter home to his sister, Tally Simpson wrote, “The brigadiers and colonels made no attempt to enforce Lee’s general orders. And Lee himself seemed to disregard entirely the soldiers’ open acts of disobedience.” Simpson then went on to recount the following story of an encounter with General Lee during the invasion:

While Genl Lee was riding along with a portion of his army, he happened to pass by a very nice looking house at

²³ John R. King quoted in Richard L. Armstrong, *25th Virginia Infantry and 9th Battalion Virginia Infantry*, Second Edition (Lynchburg, Virginia: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1990), 61; Ambrose Wright quoted in Dorothy Holland Herring, *Company C of the Twenty-Second Georgia Infantry Regiment in Confederate Service* (Westminster, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 1997), 154.

a very important moment. A party of some thirty or forty men had invaded the old lady's premises and had completely demoralized the different families of her feathered tribe. The guineas were flying and 'potracking' in the most furious manner, the chickens and ducks were cackling and quacking, the turkeys were gobbling and capering about—all dancing and flying to the mercy and musical voice of hungry rebels. The old lady stood nonplussed. At length, with a terrible hatred against all rebels burning in her heart, with fire flashing from her eyes, and with an abolition venom on the end of her tongue, she cut loose upon her invaders. Seeing that this did no good in checking the progress of the enemy, she concluded to try another plan to get rid of her plague. Genl Lee, as I before said, happened to be passing at the time. As soon as her quick eye caught sight of him, she bawled out in a loud voice, 'Genl Lee, Genl Lee, I wish to speak to you sir.' The Genl., without turning the direction of his head, politely raised his hand to his hat and said, 'Good morning madam,' and then went on his way.

In the ultimate demonstration of the fallacy of the myth of restraint that continues to characterize the Confederates' march through Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg Campaign, the Marble Man himself turned a blind eye to the misbehavior of his own soldiers.²⁴

Aside from recognizing and taking advantage of the plenty of south-central Pennsylvania and committing other depredations on private and public property with or without the blessings of their officers, soldiers also dealt with the actual people of the region in a variety of ways. Generally, Lee's men simply commented on the nature of Pennsylvania's residents, and it is possible that the Confederates' more derogatory characterizations of the Keystone State's inhabitants represented a mechanism for distancing themselves from the noncombatants and making their enemies seem less than human. Historian Reid Mitchell, the author of *Civil War Soldiers*, has argued that such

²⁴ Coles, 102; Simpson, *Far From Home*, 261-264.

actions have been features of America's soldiers in nearly all of the nation's wars. If such were true in the case of the Confederates in Pennsylvania, degrading and dehumanizing the state's civilian population would certainly make it easier for Confederates to rationalize their misbehavior and mistreatment of the locals. Second Lieutenant Sanford Branch of Company B, Eighth Georgia Infantry, noted, "The people are all of Dutch descent, and of course, are mean and cowardly." Colonel Clement Anselm Evans of the Thirty-first Georgia Infantry was not at all impressed by the stock of the state, and when commenting on civilians, he wrote, "The class of Pennsylvanians met with on this route do not impress one favorably. We find them generally living in pretty good style, but coarse, uneducated, and apparently having little knowledge of the outside world." Private Francis P. Fleming of Company H, Second Florida Infantry felt much the same. After encamping east of Chambersburg, Fleming wrote a letter home to his brother and told him, "The portion of Pennsylvania through which we have passed is settled by a class of low Dutch. I have scarcely seen a refined and highly intelligent person since I have been in the State."²⁵

Many other Confederates noted the fear and hatred of the citizens of the Keystone State. Private John H. Lewis of Company A, Ninth Virginia Infantry, claimed, "Many of the people of Pennsylvania seemed to think that we would eat them," and Tally Simpson noted, "This whole country is frightened almost to death. They won't take our money, but for fear that our boys will kill them, they give away what they can spare." After passing

²⁵ Reid Mitchell, *Civil War Soldiers* (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc., 1988), 25-28; Branch, 156-157; Clement Anselm Evans, *Intrepid Warrior: Clement Anselm Evans, Confederate General from Georgia: Life, Letters, and Diaries of the War Years*, ed. Robert Grier Stephens, Jr. (Dayton, Ohio: Morning Side House, 1992), 213-214; Letter: Francis P. Fleming to His Brother, Confederate Units, Confederate Officers: Alabama-Mississippi, Box 8, Robert L. Brake Collection, USAMHI; See also Christian B. Keller, "The Pennsylvania Dutch and 'the Hard Hand of War'" in *Damn Dutch: Pennsylvania Germans at Gettysburg*, ed. David L. Valuska and Christian B. Keller (Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2004), 56-73.

through Greencastle, Private Lewis Leon of Company B, Fifty-third North Carolina Infantry, reported on the despondency and hatred of many Pennsylvanians in his diary entry for June 22, “The people seemed downhearted, and showed their hatred to us by their glum looks and silence, and I am willing to swear that no prayers will be offered in this town for us poor, ragged rebels.” On June 23, Robert Funkhouser of the Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry wrote, “The nearer we get to the border the more grim the countenances of the people; the pall of death had stricken all these people and though bad enough looking by nature, fear had tortured them into the ugliest of creatures.” The following day, he also noted, “People frightened to death, trunks found hid in woods by men and they think that we were going to burn, plunder, rob and rape everything in our way.”²⁶

Pennsylvania women were another popular topic for Confederate soldiers. Private Landers was in the minority with regards to his views of Pennsylvania’s female population, noting, “I have saw a heap of pretty Yankey girls but somehow I cant help but hate them. H.C. give my respects to the Sweetwater girls. Tell them that I say the Yankey girls looks mighty well but I love them the best-yet!” Most of the troops did not find them all that attractive. While praising the beauty of the landscape, Tally Simpson wrote, “I saw a great many ladies, but none very pretty. In fact I have not seen a really pretty girl since I have been in Penn.” Later, he drove his point home, commenting, “They have the fattest horses and the ugliest women I ever saw. . . . The women are what you would call the flat-headed dutch, while the gals are ugly, broad-mouthed specimens of humanity. But they are always neat and clean and very industrious. In my trip through the country I don’t believe I saw a single pretty woman, and it was remarked by several.”

²⁶ John H. Lewis, *Recollections from 1860 to 1865* (Washington, D. C.: Peake & Company, Publishers, 1895), 67; Simpson, *Far From Home*, 251; Lewis Leon, *Diary of a Tar Heel Confederate Soldier* (Charlotte, North Carolina: Stone Publishing Company, 1913), 32; Hale and Phillips, 72-73.

Charles Blackford wrote home and explained to his family, “Never in my life have I seen so many ugly women as I have seen since coming to this place. It may be that the pretty ones do not show themselves but the ugly ones parade around everywhere.” He also commented on the men and children as well, writing, “The men are not remarkable either way. They have an awkward, Dutch look and the analogy between them and their horses and barns is perfect. Men, women, and children are all afflicted with a yankee twang that grates against my nerves and ear-drums most terribly.” Regarding language, Sandford Branch reported that the women of Chambersburg were “right saucy,” and Clement Evans reported that “Southern troops were considerably surprised at the rough and profane language of the Pennsylvania belles. To us who never heard a rough word from the lips of a Southern lady, it sounds very strange to hear these Northern women curse.”²⁷

Despite their less than flattering views of the women of Pennsylvania, Confederate troops did understand that the rules of war protected them as noncombatants. Hence, while there were at least two newspapers that reported a rape during Lee’s invasion, women generally only had to endure verbal abuse or crude Confederate humor if anything at all. While marching through Chambersburg, Private T. J. Watkins of Company C, Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, reported the following story:

Bennet Russell was our color sergeant. A brave, good soldier—but plain, homely (well if you must have it), ‘ugly as home-made sin.’ A woman standing by the roadside, seeing our uniforms worn, dirty and ragged, asked Bennett why we did not wear better clothes? Bennett replied, ‘We always put on our old clothes in which to kill hogs’ (Yankees). He told her she was the finest-looking and puttiest ‘gal’ he ‘had ever saw’ and asked her for a kiss, which she indignantly refused. Bennet and this girl were two of the ugliest mortals the writer ever saw.

²⁷ Landers, 130; Simpson, *Far From Home*, 251-251, 261-264; Blackford, 186-187; Branch, 156-157; Evans, 213-214; See also Omwake, 319-328

On another occasion, a woman who cast insults upon John Casler and the Thirty-third Virginia Infantry found herself the target of Confederate jeers: “One day there was a very red-headed one at a window who was very insulting, when the boys got to making sport of calling her ‘brick top,’ and such names. She got so mad she fairly frothed at the mouth, and threatened to fire into the ranks. We then tried to persuade her to assume male attire and join the army and get satisfaction fighting us.”²⁸

Women who made dramatic demonstrations of patriotism also often found themselves the victims of Confederate taunts. When a “stout Dutch girl” in Chambersburg began waving her U. S. flag “defiantly” and “in an excess of zeal . . . began to wave it almost in the faces of the men” under Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, “a member of Parker’s battery with quite a reputation as a wag . . . stopped square in front of her, stared at her a moment, then gave a sort of jump & shouted ‘Boo.’ A roar of laughter & cheers went up along the line, under which the young lady retreated to the porch.” Sir Arthur Fremantle reported a similar story about a woman in Chambersburg that “had seen fit to adorn her ample bosom with a huge Yankee flag.” As she stood in the door of her house flaunting her patriotic display, “her countenance expressing the greatest contempt for the barefooted Rebs,” a Texan from Major General John Bell Hood’s Division “gravely remarked, ‘Take care, madam, for Hood’s boys are great at storming breastworks when the Yankee colors is on them.’ After this speech the patriotic lady beat a precipitate retreat.” Strangely, this story seemed to circulate though Lee’s

²⁸ For more information on the instances of reported rapes, see *Rome Courier* (Rome, Georgia), September 5, 1863, cited in Woodworth, *Beneath a Northern Sky*, 24, and “Johnson’s Division,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; T. J. Watkins quoted in William A. Smith, *The Anson Guards: Company C, Fourteenth Regiment North Carolina Volunteers, 1861-1865* (Charlotte, North Carolina: Stone Publishing Company, 1914), 200; Casler, 247.

army, for Charles Blackford told the same story with a member of the Seventh Virginia playing the culprit. He also noted that though it was “not a very refined joke,” it amused him, and “where men are thus herded together there is formed a confluent wit which may find its flash, like that from a Leyden jar, from the dullest knob in the regiment.”²⁹

Not all of the Confederates were as amused with simply taunting the women of Pennsylvania. Edmund Patterson of the Ninth Alabama Infantry also noticed that “the females of Chambersburg seem to be very spiteful, make faces, singing ‘Rally round the flag,’ wave their little banners etc.,” but he did not mock them. Rather, he expressed his desire to visit the terror of war on their city, writing, “I think if they had a hole burned out in their town about the size and extent of which the Yankees burned in Florence or Athens, Alabama, these patriotic females would not be quite so saucy.” Tally Simpson’s anger also flared up with regards to women after he witnessed the following incidents: “When we were passing through Chambersburg, all the ladies had pinned to their dresses the Union flag, and as the darkies passed, these same broad-mouthed abolition dutch gals would stop them and entreat them to slip into a back street, desert their masters, and remain with them.” Angered by these conversations, Simpson threatened, “If I could have heard one of them persuading Lewis, I would have felt like jerking the very hide off of her back with a Confederate cow skin, woman or not.” Apparently, some Confederate slaves that came along with their masters for the campaign did find an opportunity to escape, for Private William A. Smith of Company C, Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, reported on June 22 that “Ben, the negro cook of Lieutenant [William A.] Liles, took French leave for the Yankees” after his regiment arrived in Greencastle.³⁰

²⁹ Alexander, 228-229; Fremantle, 191; Blackford, 185.

³⁰ Patterson, 111; Simpson, *Far From Home*, 261-264; Smith, *Anson Guards*, 199.

While Confederate soldiers avoided violating the persons of women and children in Pennsylvania, healthy men of military age did not always receive the same courtesy, especially if those men did not demonstrate a fair amount of deference to the invaders. While women could get away with casting threatening glares at the Confederates and verbally insulting them, men had to be much more careful. As already mentioned, the Rebels enjoyed the sport of robbing Pennsylvania men of their hats, boots, and other personal belongings, but sometimes they went beyond that and violated their persons. While marching through the streets of Chambersburg, Bill Phipps of Company K, Sixteenth Mississippi Infantry, took notice of a finely dressed man, who “had an air of defiant impudence that was offensive to the last degree. He looked like a Durham bull showing off his disdain for weaker things.” Having failed to demonstrate proper respect for Lee’s troops, the man quickly became a victim of the invasion when Phipps “caught his eye and vociferated, ‘Come out of that hat. And don’t say you ain’t in there, for I see your legs sticking out from under it.’” When the man “swelled up visibly” and “threw back his shoulders” in defiance of the Rebel’s command, Phipps loaded his rifle and leveled it at the citizen’s chest. While holding the civilian at gunpoint, Phipps demanded everything the man wore. After taking the man’s hat and coat, Phipps demanded his pants, and the citizen responded with a plea for help: “I demand the protection of an officer . . . to save me from this disgrace of disrobing on the street.” When no officer came to his victim’s rescue, Phipps exclaimed, “I don’t care a pickled damn about your being naked in the street. I want them breeches.” With no help in sight and confronted by an armed aggressor, the citizen invited Phipps into his home and promised him “a

complete outfit of clothes.” Receiving “a nod from his officer,” Phipps entered the home, and when he reemerged, “he had a fine civilian suit.”³¹

Another Pennsylvania citizen also found himself on the business end of a Confederate soldier’s gun, but he had not demonstrated any disrespect of the invaders. Rather, he was a local Mennonite named Michael Hege. On the morning of June 27, three Rebel stragglers arrived at his house and “with a curse” demanded his money. These were not the disciplined, gallant men of Lee’s legendary army; they were thugs. After surrendering what he had, the three men ordered Hege to open his door “and we won’t break it down.” Upon gaining entrance, the men lined Hege’s wife and children against the wall at gunpoint and forced him to open his chest from which they took more money. After ransacking the rest of the house, one of the Confederates “said, not joking, to me: ‘You shall die now!’” He then aimed his gun at Hege and “put his hand on the trigger.” Believing that his life was over, Hege reported, “I turned my head, not wanting to see him fire. I closed my eyes and thought ‘This is it.’” Luckily, one of the other soldiers interposed himself between Hege and the would-be murderer, ordering his companion not to shoot. The men then left the house after what probably amounted to the most harrowing hour in the life of the Hege family.³²

Other Pennsylvanians were not as fortunate as Phipp’s victim or the Hege family. Isaac Strite, “a peaceful and inoffensive citizen was cruelly murdered by some of the Rebel soldiers of [Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell] Hill’s corps on his farm located near the Greencastle road, three miles from town.” Strite was standing in his yard when three Confederate soldiers approached him and demanded his money, which he immediately

³¹ See Cormany, 337; See Coles, 203-204; Story related by Private David Holt of Company K, Sixteenth Mississippi Infantry, in Holt, 191-192.

³² Michael Hege, “God’s Help in Trouble,” quoted in Ayers, 407-409; See also Keller, 65-66.

surrendered. Shortly thereafter, two other Confederates came calling for money, but having given all he had to the previous callers, Strite had nothing left to give. The Confederate hooligans then threatened to burn his barn, and when Strite begged them to spare it, they murdered Strite and “buried his body in a dung heap, and then fled.” There was at least one other reported murder during the march through Pennsylvania, and another Pennsylvania citizen took his own life as a result of the invasion. After “the rebels had carried away all his stock and grain,” a despondent Absalom Shetter committed suicide. “He was found hanging in the orchard, whither he had wandered during the night.”³³

Aside from dishonoring the lives of white Pennsylvanians, the Confederates also continued their practice of kidnapping African Americans even after Lee’s arrival. Between June 25 and June 27, a Confederate troupe occupied Mercersburg, during which time they stole “horses, cattle, sheep, store goods, negroes, and whatever else they can make use of, without ceremony, in evident violation of Lee’s proclamation.” After burning the barn of a farmer in the country, “who was reported to have fired a gun,” they “robbed his house of all valuables” and then “came to town on a regular slave-hunt.” According to Philip Schaff, it “presented the worst spectacle I ever saw of the war.” Upon entering the town, the Rebels threatened “they would burn down every house which harbored a fugitive slave, and did not deliver him up within twenty minutes. And then commenced the search upon all the houses on which suspicion rested.” The search

³³ *Franklin County Repository and Transcript* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 15, 1863; Hoke, 176; Letter: Henry B. Hege to Henry G. Hege, July 12, 1863, quoted in W. P. Conrad, *Conococheague: A History of the Greencastle-Antrim Community, 1736-1971* (Greencastle, Pennsylvania: Greencastle-Antrim School District, 1971), 40-41; Heyser, 87-88; Keller, 66; *Chambersburg Spirit & Times* (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), July 8, 1863; Stouffer, 219-220; *Rome Courier* (Rome, Georgia), September 5, 1863, cited in Woodworth, 24.

met with success as the Confederates captured “several contrabands, among them a woman with two children.” Schaff reported that it was “a most pitiful sight, sufficient to settle the slavery question for every humane mind.”³⁴

The slave hunt continued on the morning of Saturday, June 27. According to Schaff, the Rebels drove “twenty-one negroes” back toward the South and “claimed all those negroes as Virginian slaves” despite the fact that Schaff “was positively assured that two or three were born and raised in this neighborhood.” Bearing witness to this tragedy, Schaff’s emotions took control, and he elected to confront one of the Confederate riders, asking, “Do you not feel bad and mean in such an occupation?” The Rebel “bodily replied that ‘he felt very comfortable. They were only reclaiming their property which we had stolen and harbored.’” Realizing there was little he could do, Schaff lamented, “I expect these guerillas will not rest until they have stripped the country and taken all the contraband negroes who are still in the neighborhood, fleeing about like deer.”³⁵

Following the invasion, the *Franklin County Repository* reported that the Confederate soldiers were committing these kidnappings “evidently with the sanction of officers.” Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s July 1 order to Major General George Edward Pickett commanding that “the captured contrabands had better be brought along with you for further disposition” supports this claim. Such a statement is a far cry from the attitude of Longstreet that director Ronald F. Maxwell presented in the movie *Gettysburg*. During a scene in which the general speaks to Sir Arthur Fremantle, he asserts, “We should have freed the slaves then fired on Fort Sumter.” Such a distortion of

³⁴ Schaff quoted *Old Mercersburg*, 169.

³⁵ Schaff quoted *Old Mercersburg*, 169-170.

the facts is further evidence that the myth of the Lost Cause continues to thrive outside of academia. Unfortunately, historians have been unable to determine the origins of this policy as Longstreet's order to Pickett is the only piece of evidence that exists within the *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. It is hard to imagine that Lee was oblivious to the practice as his senior corps commander was obviously directly involved, but it is also difficult to draw any solid conclusions about the policy of capturing contrabands and kidnapping free blacks during the Gettysburg Campaign. Historians might be tempted to turn to Jefferson Davis's "An Address to the People of the Free States" dated January 5, 1863, which was allegedly a response to Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and which contained the following clause:

All negroes who shall be taken in any of the States in which slavery does not now exist, in the progress of our arms, shall be adjudged, immediately after such capture, to occupy the slave status, and in all States which shall be vanquished by our arms, all free negroes shall, ipso facto, be reduced to the condition of helotism, so that the respective normal conditions of the white and black races may be ultimately placed on a permanent basis, so as to prevent the public peace from being thereafter endangered.

If such a document were genuine, it would clearly demonstrate that the Confederacy had adopted an official policy of seizing black Americans in the paths of their armies, but according to Lynda Lasswell Crist, the editor of *The Papers of Jefferson Davis* at Rice University in Houston, Texas, "We believe it to be spurious and for that reason did not include it in Volume 9." Hence, historians, who cannot deny that African Americans

were seized during Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania, are left to wonder about the policy's origins.³⁶

As evidenced in the preceding pages, it is clear that not all of Lee's soldiers strictly obeyed General Orders, No. 72, as the Army of Northern Virginia entered Pennsylvania, and little improved following the issuing of General Orders, No. 73. Despite what some contributors to the historiographical record might suggest, the Confederate army left far more than footprints on its march to Gettysburg. In fact, the men of Lee's army behaved much as Federal troops did during their marches through the South and left destruction and hardship in their wake as they entered and moved through southern Pennsylvania. The similarities are remarkable. As with Union armies in the South, the majority of Confederate soldiers behaved themselves, but many bent or broke the rules of war and ignored their commander's instructions to mitigate the miseries of the contest. Some men pressed military provisions and destroyed accepted targets of war while others pillaged stores and homes or robbed and abused civilians. In the opinion of one of Lee's own soldiers, Tally Simpson of the Third South Carolina Infantry, "the soldiers paid no more attention" to Lee's orders and the rules of war "than they would to the cries of a screech owl." The *Lancaster Daily Express* attested to this fact in an article published after the invasion on July 11: "If highway robberies, profanity, vulgarity, filthiness and general meanness are the requisite qualifications for constituting a high-toned gentleman then indeed may the southern soldiers claim the appellation." Franklin

³⁶ *Franklin County Repository and Transcript*, July 8, 1863; *Gettysburg*, prod. Robert Katz and Moctesuma Esparza and dir. Ronald F. Maxwell, 254 min., Turner Pictures, 1993, videocassette; Copy of Lynda Lasswell Crist's Letter in Author's Possession; Apparently, Robert W. McElroy, who published a two-volume biography of the Confederate president in 1937, was the first to brand "An Address to the People of the Free States" as a fake. When Frank E. Vandiver founded the project to compile President Davis's papers in 1967, Richard B. Harwell, "the preeminent bibliographer of the Confederacy" also told him it was bogus. Finally, the document does not exist anywhere in manuscript form, and "after three decades of work in Davis material, the editors remain convinced the syntax is not his."

County would bear the brunt of the invasion, but with the First and Third Corps settled down around Chambersburg, Ewell's Second Corps was headed into Adams, Cumberland, and York Counties, where his troops would continue to provide the citizens of Pennsylvania with a taste of the war.³⁷

³⁷ Simpson, *Far from Home*, 261; *Lancaster Daily Express* (Lancaster, Pennsylvania), July 11, 1863, quoted in Sears, 108.

Chapter Five

“Are We Not A Fine Set of Fellows?”

On June 25, 1863, Major General Jubal Early entered Chambersburg for the first time in the war. Lieutenant General Richard Ewell had summoned Early to the Franklin County seat, where the other two divisions of the Second Corps under Major Generals Robert Rodes and Edward Johnson were concentrated, to give him further instructions on his operations while in Pennsylvania. “In accordance with instructions from General Lee,” Ewell ordered Early to move his division from its encampments around Greenwood east across South Mountain. Early was then to head “through Gettysburg to York, for the purpose of cutting the Northern Central Railroad (running from Baltimore to Harrisburg), and destroying the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville and Columbia on the branch railroad from York to Philadelphia.” Following the destruction of the bridge, Early was then to meet Ewell at Carlisle to the northwest by way of Rossville and Dillsburg. Once Ewell’s three divisions reunited at Carlisle, the Second Corps would then, in all likelihood, commence an assault against Harrisburg. Armed with his new orders and reinforced by Lieutenant Colonel Elijah Viers White’s Thirty-fifth Virginia Cavalry, known as “The Comanches,” Early returned to his division’s encampment at Greenwood at the western base of South Mountain to prepare his men for their march to the Susquehanna.¹

Early’s division had crossed the Potomac River at Boteler’s Ford below Shepherdstown, West Virginia, and entered Union territory back on June 22. After moving through Sharpsburg and Boonsboro, Maryland, Early and his men had passed east of Hagerstown along a parallel route with Rodes’s and Johnson’s divisions before

¹ Early, *Memoirs*, 255; *OR*, 1:27:2:464-465.

crossing the Mason and Dixon Line into Pennsylvania on June 23. The next day, Early's division had arrived at Greenwood, where it stayed in camp for two days. Remembering that fourth week of June in his memoirs, which he wrote shortly after the war, Early noted,

We were now in the enemy's country, and were getting our supplies entirely from the country people. These supplies were taken from mills, storehouses, and the farmers, under a regular system ordered by General Lee, and with a due regard to the wants of the inhabitants themselves, certificates being given in all cases. There was no marauding, or indiscriminate plundering, but all such acts were expressly forbidden and prohibited effectively.²

Early's recollection of his division's behavior following its invasion of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, does not hold up under close scrutiny, and the disparity between history and memory demonstrates his deference for the mythology of the Lost Cause. A West Point graduate and native of Virginia's Franklin County, Early would ultimately become America's foremost unreconstructed Rebel in the post-war period. As the war drew to a close in 1865, Early would flee to Mexico and then move to Canada, where he would settle down to compose his memoirs. He would later receive a pardon from President Andrew Johnson for his participation in the War of the Rebellion and move back to Virginia, but he remained unwilling to accept Confederate defeat for the rest of his life. As he lived out his remaining days in the Old Dominion, Early developed into one of the earliest architects of the Lost Cause as the founder and president of the Southern Historical Society. In his position, he worked very hard to extol the virtues of the South and of his beloved commander, Robert E. Lee. According to Robert Augustus

² Gary W. Gallagher, "From Antebellum Unionist to Lost Cause Warrior: The Personal Journey of Jubal A. Early" in *New Perspectives on the Civil War: Myths and Realities of the National Conflict*, eds. John Y. Simon and Michael E. Stevens (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 108; Early, *Memoirs*, 254-255.

Stiles, Major of Artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia, the war's "memories were Early's religion; his mission to vindicate the truth of history with regard to it. So long as the old hero was alive in his hill city of Virginia, no man ever took up his pen to write a line about the great conflict without the fear of Jubal Early before his eyes."³

Edwin Coddington was perhaps the first Gettysburg historian to point out that Early's behavior during the Gettysburg Campaign fell far short of the immaculate reputation presented in the general's memoirs. According to Coddington, "the people of Pennsylvania were fortunate that it was Lee and not someone like General Early who led the invaders" during the 1863 invasion. In his estimation of Old Jube, whom Lee sometimes referred to as "My bad old man," Coddington writes, "there was acid in his makeup and he felt impelled to resort to harsh retaliatory measures to repay the hated Yankees for their alleged acts of vandalism" in the South. Moreover, "while Lee refrained from a deliberate program of terror, [Early] adopted and carried out policies which gained for the occupying forces legitimate military advantages but at the same time caused hardships among the conquered people." Historian Gary Gallagher, the author of "From Antebellum Unionist to Lost Cause Warrior: The Personal Journey of Jubal A. Early," agrees, noting that Old Jube often lashed out against Union depredations in the South and "directed his strongest invectives against those associated with the harshest policies toward civilians and their belongings—among them [Ulysses] Grant, [William] Sherman, [David] Hunter, John Pope, and the prominent Republican Thaddeus Stevens." At one point, Early even went so far as to write of Federal depredations, "I will not insult the memory of the ancient barbarians of the North by calling them 'acts of

³ Robert Stiles, *Four Years Under Marse Robert* (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1903), 190-191.

Vandalism,”” and by 1864, Federal actions in the South would inspire Early to draw the conclusion that “it was time to open the eyes of the North to this enormity, by an example in the way of retaliation.” He would subsequently order Brigadier General John A. McCausland to revisit Chambersburg, where he was to demand a ransom of \$100,000 in gold or \$500,000 in greenbacks, and if the town leaders failed to produce the payment, “the town would be laid in ashes within three hours.” When the townspeople proved unable to meet the requisition, McCausland burned the city to the ground on Saturday, July 30, 1864. Early would later claim, “If I had had an opportunity I would have done much more burning in the enemy’s country.” While the destruction of Chambersburg occurred a year after the Gettysburg Campaign, the invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863 provided Early with a trial run for his policy of Confederate reprisal.⁴

When Early’s men entered Pennsylvania and as they moved toward Greenwood in that fourth week of June, they wrote letters and penned diary entries that seemed to validate the accuracy of Early’s estimation of the Confederates’ epic restraint. Corporal Joseph H. Truett of Company H, Thirty-first Georgia Infantry, reported in a letter home that while in Pennsylvania, “We lived on the best that there was in the state and when we would get to a town we would press all of the sugar, coffee, and whiskey and shoes that was in the towns. We took wagons, horses, beef cattle and every thing that we wanted to supply the army.” Private G. W. Nichols of Company D, Sixty-first Georgia Infantry, also noted that during the invasion, “Our quartermaster and commissary departments took every cow, sheep, horse, mule and wagon that they could lay their hands on, besides

⁴ Coddington, 153-154; Stiles, 189; Gallagher, “Lost Cause Warrior,” 93-118; Early quoted in Edward A. Pollard, *Lee and His Lieutenants* (New York: E. B. Treat & Co., 1867), 468; Early, *Memoirs*, 401; *OR*, 1:37:1:334; Letter: Jubal A. Early to Edmund Jennings Lee II, September 26, 1872, Edmund Jennings Lee II Papers, Duke University, North Carolina, quoted in Smith, “Chambersburg,” 438-439. For a more thorough treatment of the burning of Chambersburg in 1864, see Smith, “Chambersburg,” 432-455.

bacon and flour.” Moreover, Nichols reported that “foraging was strictly prohibited among the men in line. The cavalry and commissary department did this work. We boys, with guns, had more strict orders here than we ever had in our country; we just had to stay in line, and sometimes we almost suffered for water.” Thus, it seemed as if Early’s men really did abide by Lee’s orders and only pressed military necessities (with the possible exception of whiskey) in an orderly manner.⁵

While Early’s troops may have foraged minimally during the actual march into Pennsylvania when their officers could more easily keep a close watch over them as they moved in column formation, the men could not maintain their claims of restraint once they entered camp. In a letter home from his position near Greenwood, William S. Christian wrote, “We are paying back these people for some of the damage they have done to us We are getting up all the horses, etc., and feeding our army with their beef and flour, etc., but there are strict orders about the interruption of any private property by individual soldiers. Though with these orders, fowls and pigs and eatables don’t stand much chance.” He also gave evidence that the seizure of African Americans continued, noting, “We took a lot of negroes yesterday. I was offered my choice, but as I could not get them back home I would not take them.” His conscience apparently also snuck into his decision-making process as he pointed out, “In fact, my humanity revolted at taking the poor devils away from their houses.” In the end, however, Christian justified independent foraging expeditions and violations of Lee’s orders regarding authorized

⁵ Joseph T. Truett quoted in George C. White, *“This Most Bloody & Cruel Drama”: A History of the 31st Georgia Volunteer Infantry, Lawton-Gordon-Evans Brigade, Army of Northern Virginia, Confederate States of America, 1861-1865* (Baltimore: Butternut and Blue, 1997), 84; G. W. Nichols, *A Soldier’s Story of His Regiment, 61st Georgia, And Incidentally of the Lawton-Gordon-Evans Brigade, Army of Northern Virginia* (Kennesaw, Georgia: Continental Book Company, 1961), 115.

requisitions, writing, “It can’t be prevented, and I can’t think it ought to be. We must show them something of war.”⁶

One Pennsylvanian who did not fare well at the hands of Early’s division was Radical Republican Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, a leading spokesman for the antislavery cause before and during the Civil War. When not working on Congressional business, Stevens practiced law in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, to the east of the path of Lee’s invading army, and he owned and operated Caledonia Forge on South Mountain near Greenwood. Cavalrymen had already visited his ironworks during General Jenkins’s initial raid into Pennsylvania at the beginning of the invasion, during which time they seized some of his livestock, but the impact was minimal compared to what was about to happen. For the two days Early’s infantrymen spent at the base of South Mountain, they, too, found opportunity to scavenge foodstuffs and plunder other items from Stevens’s business. On June 24, Captain William Johnson Seymour of the First Louisiana Infantry reported that after stopping at “the extensive iron mills of Thaddeus Stevens, one of the vilest, most unprincipled & most fanatical of the Yankee Abolition Congressmen,” Early’s men “took pleasure in helping themselves most bountifully to the products of his broad and fertile acres.” While Early left to meet with Ewell in Chambersburg the next day, his men continued to spend their time “luxuriating on old Thad’s provider and good things generally.” The men actively sought and exacted revenge against the abolitionist leader, and it was only a small sign of things to come.⁷

⁶ “A Rebel Letter,” William S. Christian to Wife, June 28, 1863, in “Advance into Pennsylvania” in Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record*, Vol. VII, 325.

⁷ Hans L. Trefousse, *Thaddeus Stevens: Nineteenth-Century Egalitarian* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 16, 68; William Johnson Seymour, *The Civil War Memoirs of Captain William J. Seymour*, ed. Terry Jones (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 64-65.

When Early finally returned to camp on June 25, he prepared his division for its move across South Mountain. Sending much of his baggage train to Chambersburg, where it would then accompany the rest of Ewell's Second Corps on the move toward Carlisle, Early and his men began their march east toward the Susquehanna on the morning of June 26. They took with them only their ambulances, one medical wagon for each brigade, the regimental ordnance wagons, a wagon carrying cooking gear for each regiment, and "fifteen empty wagons to gather supplies with." It was starting out as a relatively light trip, but Early clearly had ambitions of confiscating a vast amount of supplies—at least fifteen wagons worth—for the army as he moved through Adams and York counties.⁸

Two miles from camp, Early's division once again visited Stevens's Caledonia Forge, and Early invoked his desire for reprisal against the Union and its congressman. Failing to mention the action against the ironworks in his official report of the campaign, Early later wrote in his memoirs, "As we were leaving [Franklin County], I caused the iron works of Mr. Thaddeus Stevens near Greenwood, consisting of a furnace, a forge, a rolling mill—with a saw mill and storehouse attached,—to be burnt by my pioneer party." Early did this in spite of the pleas of Manager John Sweeney, who tried telling the Confederate general that only the employees and not Stevens would suffer from the forge's destruction. Aside from burning most of the buildings, Early's troops also took what remained of Stevens's horses and mules (including the "crippled" ones), 4,000 pounds of bacon, \$1,000 worth of corn, and \$4,000 worth of iron. Then they destroyed his fences, burned his office, which contained his library, and vandalized the homes of his employees despite Early's postwar claim that "the houses and private property of the

⁸ *OR*, 1:27:2:465.

employees were not molested.” After visiting the devastated furnace following the Confederate retreat from Gettysburg, Stevens estimated his losses to be somewhere between \$75,000 to \$100,000, and although he felt badly for his employees, he managed to keep it all in perspective, writing in a letter to a friend, “If, finally, the government shall be re-established over our whole territory, and not a vestige of slavery left, I shall deem it a cheap purchase.” Hence, while some officers condoned their soldiers’ misbehavior during the Gettysburg Campaign by feigning ignorance or averting their eyes at critical moments, Early took it upon himself to engage openly in an act not in keeping with the tradition of unmitigated restraint that has long characterized the Confederate march through Pennsylvania.⁹

Early later endeavored to explain away his maltreatment of Caledonia Forge despite failing to include the incident in his official report. In defending his decision to raze the ironworks, he argued in his memoirs, “The enemy had destroyed a number of similar works, as well as manufacturing establishments of different kinds in those parts of the Southern States to which he had been able to penetrate, upon the plea that they furnished us the means of carrying on the war.” It was true that during the Civil War both sides tended to destroy establishments that helped their opponents’ wage war, including mills, railroads, and warehouses. Such acts were in keeping with the accepted rules of war, for conventional wisdom dictated that one could and should deprive the enemy of the means to make war. However, it is clear from his own writings that Early did not target Stevens’s ironworks as much for their industrial capacity as in an effort to exact retribution for perceived Union crimes against the South. After all, he wrote, “Finding in

⁹ Early, *Memoirs*, 255-256; *OR*, 1:27:2:459-473; Letters: Thaddeus Stevens to Simon Stevens, July 6, 10, 11, 1863, Thaddeus Stevens Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. (Hereinafter cited as LOC); Trefousse, 134-135.

my way these works of Mr. Stevens, who—as a member of the Federal Congress—had been advocating the most vindictive measures of confiscation and devastation [in the South], I determined to destroy them.” Moreover, realizing that his act of Confederate reprisal was not in keeping with Lee’s orders, Early further noted, “This I did on my own responsibility, as neither General Lee nor General Ewell knew I would encounter these works.” His motivation clearly belies the legacy of restraint that so often characterizes Confederate behavior in Pennsylvania, and as his biographer, Charles C. Osborne, argues, “Though the works was technically a producer of war materiel, it is worth wondering whether it would have been destroyed if it had not belonged to Stevens. As old as war, the justification for its destruction, barely veiled behind a convention of civilized, professional eighteenth-century-style soldier’s rhetoric, was cold-blooded retribution.”¹⁰

Leaving the smoldering ruins of Caledonia Forge and Stevens’s now jobless employees behind them, Early and his men continued across South Mountain, left Franklin County, and entered Adams County. As they moved through the mountain passes, the troops had to deal with bushwhackers as some Pennsylvania citizens took up arms to defend themselves and their homes. In at least one instance, a bushwhacker’s aim proved true when Henry Hahn and three of his comrades decided to ambush the Confederate advance just west of Cashtown, Pennsylvania. Having waited for the Rebels to cross a certain spot on the road, Hahn fired his shotgun at around 10:00am and mortally wounded a Confederate horseman. Hahn and his fellow bushwhackers went into hiding in the nearby mountains, and a Confederate ambulance carried the wounded soldier to the Cashtown Inn, where he later died. Commenting on the problem of

¹⁰ Charles C. Osborne, *Jubal: The Life and Times of General Jubal A. Early, CSA, Defender of the Lost Cause* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Algonquin Books, 1992), 185; Early, *Memoirs*, 255-256; *OR*, 1:27:2:459-473; Letter: Thaddeus Stevens to Simon Stevens, July 6, 1863, Thaddeus Stevens Papers, LOC.

bushwhackers in a letter home to his wife, Colonel Evans wrote, “The bushwhackers occasionally fire on our stragglers, but this helps us to keep them in camp and ranks,” and demonstrated his capacity for finding the positive in a bad situation.¹¹

Upon coming down from the mountain and moving to Cashtown, Early “heard on the road that there was probably a [Federal] force at Gettysburg.” As a result, he divided his division and sent the two parts along different routes toward the borough in an effort to capture the enemy contingent. Early sent White’s Comanches in the vanguard with Brigadier General John Gordon’s Georgians close behind on the road leading directly from Cashtown to Gettysburg. He then took the remainder of his division along the road to Mummasburg, a town located just northwest of Gettysburg. His plan was to have White’s cavalymen and Gordon’s infantrymen hold the Federal force in place while he used the rest of his troops to move in on the enemy’s flank “so as to capture his whole force.” Unable to make it to Gettysburg by nightfall, Early camped at Mummasburg, and Captain Funkhouser of the Forty-ninth Virginia Infantry reported that they were “ordered to burn rails here for the first time, the fences all around were leveled in less than no time and we built rousing fires much to the comfort of our wet backs.” Settling into camp and spreading into the countryside on foraging expeditions, the Confederates upset the people of Adams County, and Funkhouser noted, “The citizens terribly frightened everywhere we go and all they ask is to spare their lives, all else is at our will. Most all say they are for peace and belong to the Copperhead Class of Democrats.”¹²

Gettysburg was the seat of Adams County, and it was clearly a flourishing commercial, educational, and political center as ten major pikes and the Gettysburg and

¹¹ *OR*, 1:27:2:465; Dave Roth and Gary Kross, “Gettysburg: Attack from the West,” *Blue & Gray*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (2000): 51-52; Evans, 218.

¹² *OR*, 1:27:2:465; Hale and Phillips, 74.

Hanover Railroad led into and out of the town. According to the 1860 U. S. Census, Gettysburg was home to 2,391 residents, including 190 African Americans, and it contained a number of successful businesses, a railroad depot, a new courthouse, a college, and a Lutheran Theological Seminary. Despite the special status of Gettysburg in the nation's memory, it was a town not unlike hundreds of others that dotted the American landscape in late-June 1863, yet as the Army of Northern Virginia moved through Pennsylvania, Gettysburg's place in history and memory was about to change drastically.¹³

As Lee's army had carried out their invasion of the Union over the past few weeks, the people of Gettysburg had reacted much like their neighbors in Franklin County. Some citizens grew "tired of all this fuss consequent upon border life," including Salome Myers Stewart, who got so used to watching the recurring exodus before perceived threats from the South that she wrote, "The numerous reports do not alarm me. On the contrary I am sometimes quite amused by seeing the extremes to which people will go" to remove themselves from the path of the alleged invaders. Stewart was not in the majority, for most of the residents of Gettysburg shared the angst of their fellow Pennsylvanians as news of the Confederates' approach spread.¹⁴

The first sign that the stories of this invasion differed from the rumors of the past came to Gettysburg on June 12 when Governor Curtin sent a message to the city. According to Sarah M. Broadhead, a resident of the town during the campaign, "No alarm was felt until Governor Curtin sent a telegram, directing the people to move their

¹³ J. Matthew Gallman and Susan Baker, "Gettysburg's Gettysburg: What the Battle Did to the Borough" in Gabor S. Boritt, *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 144-148.

¹⁴ Salome Myers Stewart, *The Ties of the Past: The Gettysburg Diaries of Salome Myers Stewart, 1854-1922*, ed. Sarah Sites Rodgers (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Thomas Publications, 1996), 160.

stores as quickly as possible. This made us begin to realize the fact that we were in some danger from the enemy, and some persons, thinking the Rebels were near, became very much frightened.” The level of fear in Gettysburg exploded a few nights later. After falling asleep on the evening of June 15, Broadhead awoke suddenly when her child cried for water. It was after midnight when she got up to meet the sharp request, and she “heard so great a noise in the street that I went to the window, and the first thing I saw was a large fire, seemingly not far off, and the people were hallooing, ‘The Rebels are coming, and burning as they go.’” Another Gettysburg resident also reported that

the sky in the direction of Emmitsburg[, Maryland], ten miles away, was suddenly illuminated, as by a tremendous conflagration. People rushed out of their houses and the whole town was panic stricken. Very soon the cry was raised “the Rebels,” “the Rebels have crossed the line and are burning Emmitsburg and are marching towards Gettysburg.”

Panic quickly consumed the town as the people of Gettysburg wondered if their homes and businesses would go up in flames next.¹⁵

The townspeople soon learned that the fire in Emmitsburg had nothing to do with the Confederates. A local arsonist had burned the town, and although the fire had served to provide them with a frightening visual representation of what a real Rebel invasion might look like, many people in Gettysburg settled back into a surprisingly apathetic state. Fannie J. Buehler, another resident of the borough, reported that after the panic, “we had rest for a few days, although we had been looking for a Rebel invasion for a long time, and had as we thought, prepared ourselves for it; when the Rebels really came, they

¹⁵ Sarah M. Broadhead, *The Diary of a Lady of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania from June 15 to July 15, 1863* (Hershey, Pennsylvania: Gary T. Hawbaker, 1990), 5; Fannie J. Buehler, *Recollections of the Rebel Invasion and One Woman’s Experience During the Battle of Gettysburg* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Star and Sentinel Print, 1900; reprint, Gary T. Hawbaker, n.d.), 8; Regarding the date of the Emmitsburg fire, Buehler reported that the conflagration did not occur until June 20.

took us unawares.” She further noted, “We were so used to the cry, ‘the Rebels are coming,’ when they did not come, were not even in sight, that we paid little or no attention to the daily, even hourly reports, that came to our ears and we even laughed and joked among ourselves, little dreaming they were really so near.”¹⁶

Not all of Gettysburg’s citizens were quite so willing to make light of the situation. The lack of news from the outside coupled with the arrival of refugees, including large numbers of African Americans, in the streets rekindled the fear among many residents. In her diary entry for June 20, Sarah Broadhead wrote, “The report of today is that the Rebels are at Chambersburg and are advancing here, and refugees begin to come in by scores.” The following day, she reported, “Great excitement prevails, and there is no reliable intelligence from abroad.” Conflicting rumors only exacerbated the situation: “One report declares that the enemy are at Waynesboro, twenty miles off; another that Harrisburg is the point; and so we are in great suspense.” When a report on Sunday, June 22, claimed that a large Confederate force had made its way across South Mountain, a party of about fifty men went out onto the Chambersburg Pike and cut down trees to obstruct the road leading into Gettysburg. Following a second report that the Rebels had stolen all of the horses and cattle west of town and then driven them back across the mountains, Gettysburg returned to a state of relative normality as Broadhead reported, “I shall now retire, and sleep much better than I had expected an hour since.”¹⁷

As the citizens of Gettysburg tried to settle back into the routine of life along the border, General Couch sent some of his emergency militia units from Harrisburg to

¹⁶ Buehler, 9; Margaret S. Creighton, *The Colors of Courage: Gettysburg’s Forgotten History, Immigrants, Women, and African Americans in the Civil War’s Defining Battle* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 75.

¹⁷ Broadhead, 6; Creighton, 75.

reinforce the town. Major Granville Owen Haller, a native of York, Pennsylvania, was already in Gettysburg with a diversified ensemble of troops under his command, including Captain Samuel Jackson Randall's Philadelphia City Troop, Captain Robert Bell's Adams County Cavalry, and a group of civilian scouts commanded by Captain David Conaughy. Couch added the 743 officers and men of the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia, which included a company of college students from Gettysburg, to this force on June 24 and sent them to the borough via the Gettysburg and Hanover Railroad. It was an interesting trip for the Pennsylvania troops, for six miles from their destination, their train derailed after hitting a cow. For two nights, they encamped in a nearby wood, where they enjoyed "tough steaks" and waited for repairs. When they finally arrived in Gettysburg, Broadhead admitted, "We do not feel much safer, for they are only raw militia," but the soldiers were a welcome sight for other residents. After all, many of the town's men were off serving in the Union army, and a fair number of those remaining had fled the borough upon hearing of the approaching Confederates. Again, the rules of war more readily protected white women and children than they did men of military age. Hence, when the new defenders finally arrived by train at 9:00am on June 26, "all were bountifully fed by the citizens of Gettysburg," and "they also 'received the admiring attention of professors, pretty girls, etc.'" The welcome was short lived, for after hearing rumors that Early's division was fast approaching Gettysburg from the direction of Cashtown, some of the defenders moved three miles west of the borough to set up a picket for the purposes of stalling the Confederate approach.¹⁸

¹⁸ Samuel Gring Hefelbower, *The History of Gettysburg College, 1832-1932* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Gettysburg College, 1932), 189; Michael Jacobs, *Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland*

June 26 represented a date of infamy for the people of Gettysburg, for on that day the Rebels finally arrived. According to Mary Horner, who lived in a brick house on Chambersburg Street during those “Days of Dread,” as she called them, “Although we date the battle from July 1st, this 26th of June was really the end of peace and beginning of the fight.” The first sign that the Confederates were only moments away was the haphazard flight of the Union cavalry and emergency militia through the streets around 4:00pm. Unable to stand against Lee’s veteran troops, the Federal militiamen on picket west of town had retreated, and the Confederates succeeded in capturing a fair number of them. Those who managed to escape ran frantically through the streets of Gettysburg, and following close behind them were Confederate cavalymen, who “tore through our streets yelling for Jeff Davis, firing recklessly, and killing one of the Home Guards. . . . The mad dash of these wild cavalry men through our town, and their ruthless searchings for horses, clothing and eatables made things look pretty serious for us.” A local paper also reported on the arrival of the Confederate cavalymen:

The Rebels entered Gettysburg in force about 4 o'clock on Friday last. The advance consisted of about two hundred of White's mounted guerillas, who charged up Chambersburg Street in the most terrific manner, yelling like demons and firing their revolvers as they passed through the town.¹⁹

Michael Jacobs, a mathematics and chemistry professor at Pennsylvania College in Gettysburg, also witnessed the arrival of the Rebels. A year after the war, he published his notes on the Confederate invasion in which he wrote, “The advance guard of the

and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1st, 2^d and 3^d, 1863 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1864), 14; Broadhead, 7; Creighton, 77; Nye, 271-272.

¹⁹ Dr. Robert and Mary Horner, “Days of Dread: A Woman’s Story of Her Life on the Battlefield” in *Philadelphia Weekly Press*, November 16, 1887, Civilians File, Box 16, Robert L. Brake Collection, USAMHI; The “Home Guard” soldier killed was Gettysburg-native Private George Washington Sandoe of the Adams County Cavalry; Aaron Sheely, “The Battle of Gettysburg” in *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), January 23, 1900; *Gettysburg Star and Banner* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), June 28, 1863.

enemy . . . rode into Gettysburg . . . shouting and yelling like so many savages from the wilds of the Rocky Mountains; firing their pistols, not caring whether they killed or maimed man, woman, or child; and rushing from stable to stable in search of horses.” The Rebels had finally arrived, and they had captured or driven away the only semblance of defense for the town. Moreover, the plundering of Gettysburg had begun. As a result, a new wave of panic surged through the borough. Tillie Pierce Alleman, a fifteen-year-old student at the local Lutheran Theological Seminary, also witnessed the entrance of the Confederates, and she wrote, “What a horrible sight! There they were, human beings! Clad almost in rags, covered with dust, riding wildly, pell-mell down the hill toward our home! Shouting, yelling most unearthly, cursing, brandishing their revolvers, and firing left and right.” The Confederate occupation clearly frightened Alleman as she further noted, “What they would do with us was a fearful question to my young mind.”²⁰

Despite the signs of the previous days that the Rebels were in the vicinity, the arrival of the Confederate cavalrymen and shortly thereafter Gordon’s infantrymen inexplicably caught many of the citizens of Gettysburg off guard. According to Sarah Broadhead, when reports came in that Lee’s army was only a few miles from town,

No one believed this, for they had so often been reported as just coming, and had as often failed to appear, and little attention was now paid to the rumor. When, however, the wagons of the militia came thundering through the streets, and the guard stated that they had been chased back, we began to realize that the report was fact.

Fannie Buehler also noted that she and her husband “both took it as another false alarm, and laughed over it” when their daughter rushed to warn them that “the Rebels are here sure enough!” Once it dawned on her that the Confederates had really entered the town,

²⁰ Jacobs, 15; Tillie Pierce Alleman, *At Gettysburg, or What a Girl Saw and Heard of the Battle*, Chapter II, <http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/alleman/gettysburg/gettysburg.html#II>.

she helped her husband make his escape. He was not only the town's acting Postmaster but also a noted Republican newspaperman, and from her understanding, "Postmasters, especially prominent 'black Republicans,' were marked men by the Confederates, and wherever they could be seized, were hurried to Libby and other prisons where they soon died, or suffered untold miseries worse than death." Hence, fearing for her husband's life, she did everything in her power to make sure that he did not fall into the hands of Lee's men, and he succeeded in escaping from Gettysburg.²¹

Having seen to the safety of her husband, Buehler then took a moment to observe the Confederates who had conquered her town: "I never saw a more unsightly set of men, and as I looked at them in their dirty, torn garments, hatless, shoeless, and foot-sore, I pitied them from the depth of my heart. They excited my sympathy, and not fear, as one would suppose." Despite such fearlessness, she did wonder "what this coming meant; what they were going to do; and how long they were going to stay." Sarah Broadhead agreed that "they were a miserable-looking set. They wore all kinds of hats and caps, even heavy fur ones, and some were barefooted." She also despondently noted that once the Confederates occupied the town, they celebrated by raising their own flag over the town center and playing songs of the South: "The Rebel band were playing Southern tunes in the Diamond. I cannot tell how bad I felt to hear them, and to see the traitor's flag floating overhead. My humiliation was complete when I saw our men marching behind them surrounded by a guard." Buehler and Broadhead were not alone in their estimation of the Confederate invaders. Margaretta Kendlehart McCartney, a sixteen-year-old girl at the time of the occupation, described the Rebels as "the filthiest looking

²¹ Broadhead, 8-9; Buehler, 1, 9.

pack of men we had ever seen, and they had the audacity to call themselves Southern chivalry.”²²

Upon capturing the town, some of the Confederates set about plundering Gettysburg and its surrounding farms. According to Sarah Barrett King, who witnessed the arrival of the Confederate cavalry as they pursued the town’s defenders through the streets, “The Rebs gave up the chase and returned to take part in ransacking the barns, stores, and chicken coops.” The situation did not get easier when the infantry entered the town. Following the arrival of Gordon’s brigade of Georgians, Tillie Alleman noticed, “Soon the town was filled with infantry, and then the searching and ransacking began in earnest. They wanted horses, clothing, anything and almost everything they could conveniently carry away,” and King reported, “Soon a thorough canvass had been made of the town and [Gordon’s men from] Early’s Division of Ewell’s Corps were going into camp in the northeastern portion of the town a short distance away from my home with their plunder.” Moreover, Alleman reported that Gordon’s troops were not “particular about asking. Whatever suited them they took.” In one instance, a group of Confederates ransacked the store of Philip Winter and stole his entire stock of candy, and according to other reports, Gordon’s soldiers also seized as much whiskey as possible and “would cheerfully throw out a barrel of flour to make room for a barrel of whiskey.” Hats, shoes, and cloth also remained popular targets for theft among the invaders as King noted, “Some of the men had a pile of hats on their heads looking comical, strings of muslin and

²² Buehler, 10; Broadhead, 9; Margaretta Kendlehart McCartney, “A Story of Early’s Raid: When the Confederates First Arrived in Gettysburg, The Experiences of a Young Girl on the Night of June 26, 1863” in *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), June 30, 1923.

other goods trailing on the ground, the blankets, quilts and shawls were piled up on their horses, shoes tied to the stirrups, altogether forming a laughable picture.”²³

When Early left his camp at Mummasburg and entered Gettysburg, himself, shortly after the arrival of White’s Comanches and Gordon’s Georgians, he paroled the captured Pennsylvania soldiers, telling them, “You boys ought to be home with your mothers and not out in the fields where it is dangerous and you might get hurt.” The paroled volunteers subsequently fled to Carlisle and then Harrisburg. Early then turned his attention to Gettysburg’s political leaders and made a requisition on the town. After all, he had fifteen empty wagons to fill with supplies. “While seated on his horse in front of one of the principal business houses of the town,” he put together his list of demands, which included “7,000 pounds of pork or bacon, 1,200 pounds of sugar, 600 pounds of coffee, 1,000 pounds of salt, 10 bushels of onions, 1,000 pairs of shoes, 500 hats, or \$10,000 in money.” According to Albertus McCreary, a fifteen-year-old boy who lived in Gettysburg during the campaign, Early also included a “threat that the town would be burned if the demand was not complied with,” which certainly would have been in keeping with the custom of threatening to fire the town that had generally accompanied Confederate requisitions during the invasion. Moreover, considering that the men of Gordon’s brigade hailed from Georgia, and reports circulated that Union troops had burned the town of Darien, Georgia, on June 11, 1863, it was a threat the people of Gettysburg could take seriously. After receiving the request, David Kendlehart, the President of the Town Council, informed Early “that the requisition cannot be given, as it

²³ Sarah Barret King, “Battle Days in 1863” in *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), July 4, 1906; Alleman, Chapter II; Robert L. Bloom, “‘We Never Expected a Battle’: The Civilians at Gettysburg,” *Pennsylvania History*, Vol. 55, No. 4 (October 1988), 167; Creighton, 80-81; *The Adams County Sentinel* quoted in Bloom, 167.

is utterly impossible to comply. The quantities required are far beyond that in our possession.” As a result of the town’s failure to meet his request, Early “caused the stores in town to be searched” but “succeeded in finding only a small quantity of articles suited for commissary supplies, which were taken.” Finding “about 2,000 rations” on the train that had brought the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteer Militia to Gettysburg that morning, he distributed them to Gordon’s brigade before burning about a dozen rail cars and a railroad bridge.²⁴

In his official report of the campaign, Early admitted, “I had no opportunity of compelling a compliance with my demands in this town, or ascertaining its resources” on account of his late arrival and the need to continue his move against York. Professor Aaron Sheely, the county superintendent of schools during the invasion, also speculated that Early’s discovery of the rations, his late arrival, and the pressing need to move onto York “saved the town from a burdensome levy.” According to Fannie Buehler, “After matters had been satisfactorily arranged between our Burgess and the Rebel officers, the men settled down and the citizens soon learned that no demands were to be made upon them by the Rebel soldiery, and that all property would be protected.” As with the rest of the invasion, many of the Confederates obeyed their commander’s wishes, but when the Rebels settled into camp for the night, there was clearly some negligence as “some horses were stolen” and “some cellars were broken open and robbed.” Despite the efforts of the provost guards, unruly Confederates continued to present a problem throughout the night. According to Private Bradwell of the Thirty-first Georgia Infantry, who was on provost

²⁴ Gary Kross, “Action on June 26th,” *Blue & Gray*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (2000), 10; Sheely, “The Battle of Gettysburg” in *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), January 23, 1900; Note that Tillie Pierce Alleman reported that the requisition was for \$5,000 instead of \$10,000; King, “Battle Days in 1863,” *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), July 4, 1906; Albertus McCreary, “Gettysburg: A Boy’s Experience of the Battle,” *McClure’s Magazine*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (July 1909), 244; *OR*, 1:28:2:11;

duty, “Some of our Irish soldiers of General Hays’ ‘Louisiana Tigers’ as soon as they stacked arms found some people of the same nationality in the southern suburbs who sold liquor, and a fight began which resulted in our men beating up the old citizens. The whole thing was over when we arrived on the scene to put a stop to the riot and we made no arrests.”²⁵

Following their capture and ransacking of Gettysburg on June 26, Early’s “raiders remained throughout the night, camping in the court-house and other buildings” and departed the following morning on their way to York. As the sun rose on June 27, Early ordered Colonel White “to proceed with his cavalry to Hanover Junction, on the Northern Central road, destroying the railroad bridges on the way, and to destroy the junction and a bridge or two south of it, and then proceed toward York, burning all the bridges up to that place.” According to Aaron Sheely of Gettysburg, the flames and smoke produced by a the torching of a railroad bridge about half a mile east of town provided an alarming and costly spectacle for the people of the borough:

While it was burning, a dozen or more cars, some filled with merchandise and others empty, were set on fire and started down the track, probably for the purpose of assuring the complete destruction of the bridge, but they all passed over the burning structure and were consumed a short distance beyond. Altogether about twenty cars were burned, belonging to the Pennsylvania, Northern Central, and Hanover Branch railroad companies, besides three or four belonging to individuals.

The Rebels were leaving Gettysburg after what many residents must have considered “the most uncomfortable night” of their lives up that point and after having been surrounded by what Sarah Broadhead described as “thousands of ugly, rude, hostile soldiers, from

²⁵ *OR*, 1:27:2:465; Sheely, “The Battle of Gettysburg” in *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), January 23, 1900; Early, *Memoirs*, 258; Buehler, 11; Isaac Gordon Bradwell, “The Burning of Wrightsville, Pa.,” *CV*, Vol. 27, No. 8 (August 1919), 300.

whom violence might be expected.” For the moment, the citizens of Gettysburg could breathe a collective sigh of relief as they awoke to find their town still standing, their persons undisturbed, and the Confederate soldiers preparing to leave. Unbeknownst to the borough’s residents, they would only get to enjoy a respite of a few days before the world would seemingly come crashing down around them in the deadliest battle of the Civil War.²⁶

Leaving Gettysburg behind them on June 27, Early’s division approached York, a city of 8,605 residents, on three different, roughly parallel routes. Early traveled along the northern route from his encampment at Mummasburg with most of his division and moved toward York “through Hunterstown, New Chester, Hampton, and East Berlin” before settling down into bivouac. White and his Comanches traveled along the southern route through Hanover, Jefferson, and Hanover Junction, stealing horses and plundering businesses and farms while also destroying railroad track, railroad bridges, and telegraph wires. Finally, Gordon’s brigade, which was reinforced by Captain William A. Tanner’s Battery and a company of Colonel William H. French’s Seventeenth Virginia Cavalry, took the central route and approached the seat of York County along the pike leading directly from Gettysburg to York.²⁷

As the Rebels marched out of Adams County and into and through York County, they continued to marvel at the abundance of Pennsylvania. According to Captain Seymour of the First Louisiana Infantry, “The surrounding country was in a high state of

²⁶ McCreary, 244; Buehler, 11-12; *OR*, 1:27:2:466; Early, *Memoirs*, 258; Sheely, “The Battle of Gettysburg” in *Gettysburg Compiler* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania), January 23, 1900; Broadhead, 9.

²⁷ *OR*, 1:27:2:466; Nye, 277-279; Mark A. Snell, “‘If They Would Know What I Know It Would Be Pretty Hard to Raise One Company in York’: Recruiting, the Draft, and Society’s Response in York County, Pennsylvania, 1861-1865” in Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller, eds., *Union Soldiers and the Northern Home Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 71.

cultivation.” Moreover, the land “presented a beautiful appearance, with its immense fields of golden grain that flashed in the sunlight—dotted here and there with neat little cottages, and large substantially built barns which were literally bursting with wheat, oats & corn.” Drawing a sharp comparison between the agricultural wealth of Pennsylvania and the inhabitants, Seymour also noted, “most of the barns in this section of Pennsylvania are larger and more finely built than the dwellings of the farmers; the Dutch lords of the soil invariably bestow more care and attention on their crops and stock than they do on their families.” Even General Gordon later noted that the vista

awakened the most conflicting emotions. It was delightful to look upon such a scene of universal thrift and plenty. Its broad grain-fields, clad in golden garb were waving their welcome to the reapers and binders. Some fields were already dotted over with harvested stocks. The huge barns on the highest grounds meant to my sore-footed marchers a mount, a ride, and a rest on broad-backed horses. On every side, as far as our alert vision could reach, all aspects and conditions conspired to make this fertile and carefully tilled region a panorama both interesting and enchanting. It was a type of the fair and fertile Valley of Virginia at its best, before it became the highway of armies and the ravages of war had left it wasted and bare.²⁸

Unable to reach York in a single day, the three prongs of Early’s advance went into separate camps about ten miles from their destination in the late afternoon of June 27. Early took up residence in the house of “a German widow a few miles (three or four) east of East Berlin,” and while he later reported that “there was nothing of any historical interest that occurred at the house of the widow,” “there were some very amusing incidents which would not be very proper for publication.” Apparently he later changed his mind, for in a second letter, he reported that after ordering his cavalymen to turn their horses loose in a farmer’s cornfield, he determined to stay with a German widow who

²⁸ Seymour, 65-66; Gordon, 140-141.

claimed, “I’m a rale copperhead, I wish somebody would take old Abe Lincoln by de head and cut his troat off.” While she may have tried to show deference to the cause of the Confederacy, she certainly did not care for Rebel currency, for she complained about Early’s payment for his food and lodging, remarking, “I wonder if dey are gwine to have good money once more agin—de money dey’ve got now aint fit to wipe da b—k s—de on.” Shocked at the woman’s language, Early later assured his correspondent, “These were all the incidents that occurred at the house where I stayed that were noticeable, and there was nothing of consequence on the march from there to York.”²⁹

While Early dealt with the dubious hospitality of his hostess, other Confederates snuck away and took on the roll of Lee’s Bummers to partake of the cornucopia before them. Even low-ranking officers participated in some of the independent foraging expeditions as Confederates stole horses, foodstuffs, and anything else they deemed necessary. After going into camp outside of East Berlin, Captain Funkhouser wrote in his diary, “I borrow a horse and try the system of foraging. Meet with good success in bread, applebutter, butter, etc. The people are scared into fits and break their necks nearly to wait on me.” Even Captain Seymour had to admit that stragglers made “predatory excursions into barnyards and dairies,” yet he endeavored to justify the actions by arguing that “this was unavoidable” and by pointing out that the pillaged buildings belonged “to persons who were disposed to be inimical and unaccommodating.”³⁰

Leaving his men to enjoy the riches of York County, Early rode to Gordon’s camp on the York turnpike to arrange with his brigade commander “the manner of the approach upon York, should it be defended.” During the meeting, the two men agreed

²⁹ *OR*, 1:27:2:466; Nye, 277-279; Letter: Jubal A. Early to George R. Prowell, June 4, 1885, Jubal A. Early File (11647), Copy, York County Heritage Trust (YCHT).

³⁰ *OR*, 1:27:2:466; Nye, 277-279; Hale and Phillips, 74; Seymour, 66-67.

that they did not believe York was defended. Later that evening, a citizen of York verified their conclusion when he gained passage through the picket line and visited the Confederates. Arthur Briggs Farquhar sought permission to warn the residents of York of the Rebel approach, and Gordon and Early provided him with “a written article of agreement in which it was stated that upon their entering into York and its vicinity they would refrain from destroying private property and not molest women and children in their occupation, but would expect a contribution of money and maintenance while there.” Sending Farquhar back to York, Early and Gordon continued their meeting, and Early made a unilateral decision to disobey his orders from General Ewell and General Lee. Rather than have Gordon move through York to Wrightsville in order “to destroy the bridge over the Susquehanna,” he ordered him to move quickly through undefended York “and proceed to Columbia Bridge, and secure it at both ends, if possible.” Early no longer intended to cut the Wrightsville-Columbia Bridge. Rather, he hoped to secure it so that he could throw his division across the river to gather supplies from Lancaster County, cut the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, and “attack Harrisburg in the rear while it should be attacked in front by the rest of the corps.”³¹

While Early and Gordon discussed their plans for conquering York and Wrightsville, the people of York prepared to meet the Confederates. Much like other Pennsylvania citizens, York’s residents had mixed reactions to the news of the Rebel approach. As early as June 15, James William Latimer, a Republican lawyer living in York, wrote an admittedly rambling letter to his brother, Bartow Latimer, and informed

³¹ *OR*, 1:27:2:465-467; Early, *Memoirs*, 259; “The Occupation of York, Pa.,” *York Gazette* (York, Pennsylvania) in Frank Moore, ed., *Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events*, Vol. VII (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1864), 321; Nye, 279-280; Martin L. Van Baman, “Description of the Confederate Invasion of York, Pa., June 28th, 1863,” in *York Gazette* (York, Pennsylvania), June 28, 1913.

him, “We had a boro meeting tonight to devise measures for the defense of the town and responding to the very earnest call for volunteers which Gov. Curtin telegraphed over today.” Worried for his mother and sister, he also let his brother know that he would “when the danger becomes imminent try to persuade Ma & Sister to go to Philada. But fear will not succeed.” A correspondent for the *Baltimore Daily Gazette* living in York concurred with Latimer’s assessment of the situation, writing, “For some days the town had been much excited, expecting a raid from the Rebels. Stores were closed, goods shipped off, and public meetings held to raise volunteers. . . . The roads were thronged with fugitives, driving their stock towards the river. Many of our families fled in great trepidation.” Martin L. Van Baman, a resident of York at the time of the invasion, also noted the seemingly endless torrent of refugees:

For fully ten days previous to the entry of the Confederates there was a steady stream of farmers and merchants, with wagons laden with merchandise, cattle and personal property of various kinds working their way down the Gettysburg pike from our adjoining counties of Adams, Franklin, and Cumberland, and portions of Maryland on their way through the borough down the Wrightsville pike, over the Columbia bridge into Lancaster and Chester counties in great haste to escape capture from the advancing Confederates.³²

While some residents fled before the Confederate advance, others prepared to meet the invaders. According to James Latimer, who visited Harrisburg on June 17 in an effort “to ascertain the facts in regard to the rebel invasion,” soldiers and civilian volunteers were “digging rifle-pits and throwing up intrenchments at *Wrightsville* to protect the *Columbia bridge*. . . . They have a force of men on the bridge night and day to

³² Letter: James W. Latimer to Bartow Latimer, June 15, 1863, James Latimer Papers File (12801), YCHT; n.a., “The Confederates in York,” in *Baltimore Daily Gazette* (Baltimore, Maryland), July 3, 1863; Van Baman, “Confederate Invasion of York” in *York Gazette* (York, Pennsylvania), June 28, 1913.

destroy it if necessary.” Meanwhile in York, a Committee of Safety worked with Federal troops “to *obstruct roads* and delay the Rebs as much as possible if they should attempt any advance in this direction.” Van Baman also reported that “the merchants of York had sent the greater portion of their merchandise by rail to Philadelphia. Many private families buried their valuables in excavations made in gardens and cellars. Everyone was intensely excited, not knowing what was in store for them and greatly fearing the consequence of coming events.” As Lee’s army moved through the counties to their west, some of York’s citizens began to “wonder what would happen to us here in defenseless York.”³³

Despite some signs of obvious concern, not everyone in York County feared for their safety. In a letter written on June 18, Latimer noted, “There is not the least excitement here. No one is alarmed.” Expressing disbelief at the apathy of many of his fellow citizens, he also reported,

Everyone seems as indifferent as if there are no rebels within a thousand miles. Either the people at Harrisb’g are scared very badly about nothing and are making fools of themselves or there is some considerable danger to be apprehended. Still many people here say it is nothing but a causeless fright among *rail-road men*. . . . Every particle even of interest seems to have died out here. And no one seems to think it worth while to inquire where the rebels really are.

Little had improved by June 24, for Latimer continued to report in letters to his brother, “There is the most extra-ordinary apathy with regard to this invasion. If the information we have here is reliable we have an attack on Harrisburg in a day or two, and yet nothing is being done here.” Noting the lackluster response to his town’s efforts to raise troops for

³³ Van Baman, “Confederate Invasion of York” in *York Gazette* (York, Pennsylvania), June 28, 1913; Mollie Cox Busser, “Girl of Civil War Days Tells of York Invasion,” Mary Ruggles File (32893), YCHT.

its own defense, Latimer grumbled, “If men wont go to the defense of their own State they dont deserve to be called patriots. I am ashamed of myself and my town.”³⁴

As the people of York reacted to the news of the Confederate approach, the twenty-four-year-old Arthur Farquhar made it back to the city and informed the Committee of Safety of the deal he had struck with the Rebels. Initially pleased by the news for fear of what the Confederates might do when they entered the town, the Committee of Safety put together a delegation—David Small, George Hay, Thomas White, and Arthur Farquhar—“authoritatively to go out to meet the Confederates and enter into a definite understanding.” On Sunday, June 28, the delegation, fearing an act of Confederate reprisal, met with Gordon and surrendered the town. Although it was a committee decision to honor Farquhar’s deal, this act would later earn the ire of the young man’s fellow citizens, who would call him a “rebel,” a “traitor,” and “the man who had sold York.” While a number of local York historians have stepped forward in more recent years to rehabilitate Farquhar’s memory, noting, “Discretion is sometimes the better part of valor and Jubal Early wasn’t a warm, fuzzy guy,” historian Mark A. Snell, the Director of the George Tyler Moore Center for the Study of the Civil War at Shepherd University in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, and a native of York, claims, “Jubal Early was bluffing and they fell for it. He would not have set fire to this town.” While it is true that the Confederates had threatened to burn a number of towns since coming into Pennsylvania and had failed to follow through on a single occasion, Early was the Rebel most likely to make good on his threats—Thaddeus Stevens and the residents of Chambersburg in 1864 would certainly concur. Old Jube’s own words in the

³⁴ Letter: James W. Latimer to Bartow Latimer, June 18, 24, 1863, James Latimer Papers File (12801), YCHT.

post-war period demonstrate his chagrin at not engaging in “more burning in the enemy’s country.” Moreover, while Early may have been “bluffing,” it is unwise to test the earnestness of an armed and angry aggressor, and one should not fault York’s citizens for electing to avoid an unnecessary risk.³⁵

On Sunday, June 28, the three wings of Early’s advance once again moved against York. As they continued to maneuver through the countryside, gathering livestock, foodstuffs, and other items, the men of Early’s division met with a number of self-proclaimed Copperheads. Considering that in the 1860 Presidential Election, 52% of York County’s votes went to Democratic candidates, it is not unlikely that some of the people they met actually were Peace Democrats, but despite this fact, some Confederates found it strange that “as we moved through the country, a number of people made mysterious signs to us.” Noticing these symbols and ciphers, some Confederates approached the residents, and “on inquiring we ascertained that some enterprising Yankees had passed along a short time before, initiating the people into certain signs, for a consideration, which they were told would prevent the ‘rebels’ from molesting them or their property, when they appeared. These things were all new to us, and the purchasers of the mysteries had been badly *sold*.” Cassandra Morris Small (Franklin), a resident of York at the time of the invasion, gave even more credibility to this phenomenon when she noted in a letter to her cousin, Lissie Latimer,

It is the Copperheads that have suffered all through the county. In many cases Union men living beside them were untouched, and now, these poor ignorant people come into

³⁵ Van Baman, “Confederate Invasion of York” in *York Gazette* (York, Pennsylvania), June 28, 1913; For more information on the evaluation of Arthur Farquhar’s actions during the Gettysburg Campaign, see R. Scott Rappold, “The Occupation of York: Farquhar’s Act Sparked Debate in Papers, Yorker Recalls Reading to the ‘Man Who Sold York,’” *The York Dispatch* (York, Pennsylvania), July 2, 2002; Smith, “Chambersburg,” 438-439.

town in crowds to some smart people here, bringing their tickets of the Knights of the Golden Circle and saying: “Here, we want our dollar back, we showed the ticket, and made the signs, but it did no good. They struck it out of our hands, and said we don’t care for that now, and made us give whatever they wanted.” In many cases, when they were told that the horses had been sent away, they made them pay as much as the horses were valued at.³⁶

Like the Confederates who had met with alleged Copperheads in Franklin County, Early’s men tended not to believe the self-proclaimed Peace Democrats. According to Captain Seymour of the First Louisiana Infantry, “The inhabitants professed to be ‘Copper-heads’ and opposed to the Federal Conscription Act and the further prosecution of the war. Not much faith to be placed in their professions: they are a mean, selfish, sordid people, who would profess or do anything to save their money & property.” According to James Latimer, Copperheads suffered substantially at the hands of the Confederates despite their efforts to show their sympathy to the South. Writing a letter to his brother on July 8, 1863, Latimer noted, “I think the Rebel visit to this county will have a wholesome effect on the Copperheads. The Rebs made no distinction. . . . Men who had joined the ‘K.G.C.’ & paid their dollars to learn the signs which were to save their property, found them of no avail.” Hence, the Rebels continued to gather supplies for the army and plunder at will when the opportunity presented itself. A soldier from the Thirty-first Georgia Infantry reported, “Passing in front of a lovely home . . . I rushed in at the front gate, through which others were passing, and went into the spacious hall through the open front door, thinking to find hospitable people who would give me

³⁶ Of the 68,200 residents of York County, 11,761 voted in the 1860 Presidential Election. 5,497 voted for the “Reading Ticket” that listed both Democratic candidates—Stephen A. Douglas and John C. Breckenridge, 562 voted for just Stephen A. Douglas, 5,128 voted for Republican Abraham Lincoln, and 562 vote for John Bell of the Constitutional Union Party. See Snell, 72; Early, *Memoirs*, 265; Letter: Cassandra Morris Small (Franklin) to Lissie Latimer, July 8, 1863, in James McClure, *East of Gettysburg: A Gray Shadow Crosses York County, Pa.* (York: York County Heritage Trust, 2003), 174-175.

something to eat; all doors were left wide open.” Finding the house deserted, “I hastily snatched up from the dining room such as I found convenient.” Captain Seymour also noted the extent to which the Confederates would forage along with the lengths to which the Pennsylvanians would go in hiding their livestock:

Major [John G.] Campbell, Acting Quartermaster of our Brigade, called at a large, finely furnished house, the owner of which he had learned was possessed of a splendid horse. The proprietor stoutly denied that he had such an animal but, unfortunately for him, a neigh from an adjoining room gave the *nay* to his assertion and revealed the hiding place of the much desired quadruped. The Major quietly opened the door and there in an elegant parlour, comfortably stalled in close proximity to a costly rosewood piano, stood a noble looking horse. . . . With some difficulty the Major led his prize forth from the novel stable and paid for him in the current funds of the Confederate realm.³⁷

Gordon’s brigade was the first to reach York at around 10:00am on June 28, and his men entered the city to the sounds of church bells ringing. It was Sunday, and many of the townspeople were dressed and ready for church when the Confederates arrived. Upon entering the city, Gordon’s men removed the American flag from the town center, and the city’s residents reacted to the Confederates’ arrival. Standing on her front porch and watching the Rebels riding down the streets of York, Cassandra Small got a good look at the invaders. She later wrote to her cousin, “Oh Lissy, what did we feel like? Humiliated! Disgraced! Men who don’t often weep, wept then. They came with loud music, flags flying.” Noticing the panicked expressions of the citizens, Gordon took a moment to address the people and attempted to allay their fears. Pulling ahead of his troops, Gordon addressed the people of the town and assured them

³⁷ Seymour, 67-69; Letter: James W. Latimer to Bartow Latimer, July 8, 1863, James Latimer Papers File (12801), YCHT; Bradwell, *Under the Southern Cross*, 122.

that under the orders of the Confederate commander-in-chief both private property and non-combatants were safe; that the spirit of vengeance and of rapine had no place in the bosoms of these dust-covered but knightly men; and I closed by pledging to York the head of any soldier under my command who destroyed private property, disturbed the repose of a single home, or insulted a woman.³⁸

According to Cassandra Small, the general specifically stopped to address her and her friends. Stopping his horse in front of her house, Gordon addressed the women: “Ladies . . . I suppose you think me a pretty rough looking man, but when I am shaved and dressed, my wife considers me a very good-looking fellow.” Dispensing with the small talk, Gordon pledged, “I want to say to you we have not come among you to pursue the same warfare your men did in our country. You need not have any fear of us, whilst we are in your midst. You are just as safe as though we were a thousand miles away.” James Latimer was also a witness to Gordon’s speeches, but he did not think it wise nor patriotic for the people to put themselves in such compromising positions:

Ladies, most of them, had the sense to stay at home. The men went about freely. I did not speak to any of the Rebs except once. Others talked to them & questioned them, but I did not feel like it. . . . I am glad to say that at our house no one was visible when they came into town. The parlor shutters were bowed and none of us showed ourselves. I thought the conduct of the people crowding out to see them was disgraceful. Even Philip Small who should have known better allowed his family to stand on his porch to gaze at them.³⁹

While Gordon’s men moved through York, Early took the rest of the division to Weigelstown, from which he “dispatched Colonel French with the greater part of his

³⁸ Letter: Cassandra Morris Small (Franklin) to Lissie Latimer, June 30, 1863 in McClure, *East of Gettysburg*, 174-175; Gordon, 141-142.

³⁹ Letter: Cassandra Morris Small (Franklin) to Lissie Latimer, June 30, 1863 in McClure, *East of Gettysburg*, 174-175; Letter: James W. Latimer to Bartow Latimer, July 8, 1863, James Latimer Papers File (12801), YCHT.

cavalry to the mouth of the Conewago, to burn two railroad bridges at that point and all other between there and York.” Having sent French’s cavalry on its mission to destroy more of Pennsylvania’s infrastructure, Early continued his move toward York. When he finally arrived, he “met with General Gordon, and repeated to him my instructions to proceed to the Susquehanna and secure the Columbia Bridge.” According to Gordon’s memoirs, he had already received a significant piece of intelligence regarding the uninspiring defenses at Wrightsville. As he rode his horse down the streets of York before Early’s arrival, a young girl had approached Gordon and “handed me a large bouquet of flowers, in the centre of which was a note, in delicate handwriting, purporting to give the numbers and describe the position of the Union forces of Wrightsville, toward which I was advancing.” Unsure of the note’s validity, Gordon “carefully read and reread this strange note. It bore no signature, and contained no assurance of sympathy for the Southern cause, but it was so terse and explicit in its terms as to compel my confidence.” Armed with the note and Early’s orders, Gordon moved his brigade east on the Lancaster Pike intent upon securing the bridge and crossing the Susquehanna into Lancaster County.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, Early moved his remaining brigades into the city. Brigadier General William “Extra Billy” Smith, a two-time governor of Virginia, led the column of troops into York. As he led his brigade of Virginians down the city streets, he ordered the brigade band “to come up here to the front and march into town tooting ‘Yankee Doodle’ in their very best style.” Always the politician, Smith rode ahead of his staff and to the sounds of the music bowed and saluted the people of York, “especially every pretty girl he saw, with that manly, hearty smile which no man or woman ever doubted or resisted.”

⁴⁰ *OR*, 1:27:2:466; Gordon, 143.

Soon Smith had a crowd gathered, and according to Major Robert Stiles, “It was a rare scene—the vanguard of an invading army and the invaded and hostile population hobnobbing on the public green in an enthusiastic public gathering.” Finding himself completely within his element, Smith broke into an impromptu speech for the people of York:

My friends, how do you like this way of coming back into the Union? I hope you like it; I have been in favor of it for a good while. But don’t misunderstand us. We are not here with any hostile intent—unless the conduct of your side shall render hostilities unavoidable. You can see for yourselves we are not conducting ourselves like enemies today. We are not burning your houses or butchering your children. On the contrary, we are behaving ourselves like Christian gentlemen, as we are.

You see, it was getting a little warm down our way. We needed a summer outing and thought we would take it at the North, instead of patronizing the Virginia springs, as we generally do. We are sorry, and apologize that we are not in better guise for a visit of courtesy, but we regret to say our trunks haven’t gotten up yet; we were in such a hurry to see you that we could not wait for them. You must really excuse us.

What we all need, on both sides, is to mingle more with each other, so that we shall learn to know and appreciate each other. Now here’s my brigade—I wish you knew them as I do. They are such a hospitable, whole-hearted, fascinating lot of gentlemen. Why, just think of it—of course this part of Pennsylvania is ours to-day; we’ve got it, we hold it, we can destroy it, or do what we please with it. Yet we sincerely and heartily invite you stay. You are quite welcome to remain here and to make yourselves entirely at home—so long as you behave yourselves pleasantly and agreeably as you are doing now. Are we not a fine set of fellows? You must admit that we are.⁴¹

Smith’s speech was both a humorous greeting and a sarcastic warning, and in the eyes of Jubal Early, it was a complete waste of time. In stopping to give his speech,

⁴¹ Stiles, 202-204.

Smith had brought the Confederate advance to a standstill. Making his way to the front of the column, Early snatched Smith by the back of his collar, jerked him around, and shouted, “General Smith, what the devil are you about! Stopping the head of this column in this cursed town?” Having sufficiently chided his subordinate, he ordered him to move his brigade into camp a Lauck’s Mill, two miles north of town. He also ordered Brigadier General Harry Thompson Hays and his Louisiana Tigers to follow Smith, keeping only Colonel Isaac Irwin Avery’s brigade of North Carolinians in York and quartering them in the local hospital.⁴²

Having organized his division around York, Early “levied a contribution on the town for 100,000 dollars in money, 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 hats, 1,000 pairs of socks, and three days’ rations of all kinds for my troops.” As *The York Gazette* reported on June 30, 1863, “every effort was made to fill the requisition,” for the citizens of the borough feared retribution from the Confederates if they failed to comply. In response to Early’s demand, “a meeting was called of the Committee of Safety & it was determined to endeavor to comply with their demand as far as possible.” Having decided to try to meet Early’s demands, “Ward Committees were appointed to collect money, P. A. & S. Small furnished the groceries and flour, and the hatters & shoemakers were called on for the shoes & hats; with the understanding that the Boro’ would assume the debt & repay the money & pay for the supplies.” Despite their efforts, the citizens of York succeeded in collecting only a portion of the goods demanded and only \$28,600, but many of them believed that their attempts at compliance “saved the burning of all the shops and buildings of the Railway Company and machine shops . . . the burning of which would have involved the destruction of an immense amount of private property.” Not everyone

⁴² Stiles, 204-205; *OR*, 1:27:2:466.

agreed, for James Latimer, who regretted paying \$100 of his own money toward the ransom, wrote his brother and claimed, “Had the demand been refused, I dont believe they would have done any damage. In Gettysburg they made similar demands which were *not* complied with & no evil consequence followed. I do not believe such large requisitions would have been made had not the Boro’ Authorities behaved so sheepishly in regard to the surrender.”⁴³

While one cannot conclude with certainty what might have happened had the citizens of York balked at Early’s demands, Early wrote after the war, “I believed that [York] had made an honest effort to raise the money, and I did not, therefore, take any stringent measures to enforce the demand, but left the town indebted to me for the remainder.” According to at least one source, Early did threaten to burn the town, a threat he later reduced to just the burning of the courthouse records, if he did not receive the other \$71,400 owed him, but his forced departure on June 30 under orders from General Ewell to rejoin Lee’s army led him to leave the town before he could make good on his threat. Years after the war, the unreconstructed general who had held York for ransom reportedly continued to assert, “The city of York still owes me one hundred thousand dollars.”⁴⁴

Having gotten a fair portion of what he demanded, Early dispersed the food, shoes, and hats to his men and used a portion of the money to buy “beef cattle, which

⁴³ Early, *Memoirs*, 259; *OR* 1:27:2:466; Letter: James W. Latimer to Bartow Latimer, June 30, July 3, July 8, 1863, James William Latimer Papers (12801), YCHT; *The York Gazette*, June 30, 1863; “York County in the Civil War,” Civil War in York County Miscellaneous File (737), YCHT; Snell, 96-97; For more specific information on York’s efforts to meet Early’s requisition, see Raymond E. Hoffman, “Confederate Occupation of York,” Civil War in York County Miscellaneous File (737), YCHT.

⁴⁴ Early, *Memoirs*, 261-262; *The York Gazette*, June 30, 1863; “York County in the Civil War,” Civil War in York County Miscellaneous File (737), YCHT; Quoted in George R. Prowell, “Prof. Prowell Tells Some Interesting Things About the Man Who Captured York in 1863,” June 28, 1904, Jubal A. Early Papers (11647), YCHT.

could be found much more readily when they were to be paid for than when certificates were to be given” or simply pressed without any suggestion of payment. Meanwhile, his men destroyed portions of the rail yard and wrecked some of the rolling stock. According to James Latimer, they also “destroyed all the R.R. bridges within miles of the town” and “committed all sorts of depredations in the Country” as the citizens of York County “were plundered indiscriminately. . . . Horses and mules taken, houses broken open, and everything the thieves fancied stolen.” Some of Early’s more unruly soldiers even broke into houses on the outskirts of the town.⁴⁵

While the bulk of Early’s division remained in York, Early headed toward Wrightsville shortly before nightfall to check on Gordon’s progress. He had not gotten very far from York when he “saw an immense smoke rising in the direction of the Susquehanna.” By the time he finally reached Wrightsville, the bridge was “entirely destroyed.” After finding Gordon, Early learned that his brigade commander had met with a defensive force of about 1,200 entrenched militia. Gordon had tried to move around the enemy’s flank and cut him off from the crossing, but the militia had already prepared to destroy the bridge rather than let it fall into enemy hands. According to Early’s official report of the action, Gordon succeeded in making it halfway across the bridge before finding it on fire. Gordon tried to send back for water to douse the flames, but he found that the citizens of Wrightsville “were not in sympathy with my expedition, nor anxious to facilitate the movement of such unwelcome visitors.” Hence, he had to withdraw his force and allow the flames to consume the bridge.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Early, *Memoirs*, 261-262; Letter: James W. Latimer to Bartow Latimer, June 30, July 3, July 8, 1863, James William Latimer Papers (12801), YCHT.

⁴⁶ *OR*, 1:27:2:466-467; Early, *Memoirs*, 259-261; Gordon, 147-148.

As the bridge went up in flames, and with it Early's desire to visit the horrors of war on the people of Lancaster County, the fire spread to nearby buildings. Not wanting to see the town razed, Gordon's men worked to put out the quickly spreading fire. Having asked for buckets of water to save the bridge earlier, Gordon was surprised to see that "when the burning bridge fired the lumber-yards on the river's banks, and the burning lumber fired the town, buckets and tubs and pails and pans innumerable came from their hiding-places, until it seemed that, had the whole of Lee's army been present, I could have armed them with these implements to fight the rapidly spreading flames." When water alone proved insufficient, Gordon's men destroyed a number of homes to create a firebreak, and in so doing, saved the rest of Wrightsville. Colonel Evans later wrote,

While the town was burning I chanced to kick up a stray piece of newspaper that the wind blew to my feet and then by the light of a fire which we were putting out, I read a northern account of the invasion and fire at Darien in Ga. McIntosh and Darien boys, like gallant Southerners, were putting out fires kindled in a Northern town while invaders of Ga. were burning our towns. Such incidents show the noble spirit of Confederate men.⁴⁷

Evans's story is probably too convenient to be true, but he was correct in asserting that Confederate actions at Wrightsville demonstrated Lee's soldiers did sometimes behave like the Christian gentlemen their defenders have claimed. Yet while it is an undeniable testament to the Georgians' humanity and character that they did not allow the town to burn to the ground, Lost Cause advocates can take this act of Confederate benevolence too far. After all, when the town of Columbia, South Carolina, was infamously destroyed by fire in February 1865, many of Sherman's soldiers, whom Lost

⁴⁷ *OR*, 1:27:2:467; Early, *Memoirs*, 259-261; Gordon, 147-148; Bradwell, 301; Evans, 200-201, 22; Also see the editor's reference to the James Hilton Papers at the Georgia Historical Society in Savannah, Georgia.

Cause advocates tend to blame for the conflagration, worked diligently throughout the night to stop the flames from consuming the town and to keep looters from damaging civilian property. Although they were unsuccessful in their endeavor to keep the city from burning, their efforts show, again, that there were startling similarities between the men who participated in Lee's march through Pennsylvania and those who took part in Union marches through the South. It is important to remember that the Confederacy did not hold a monopoly on the virtues of compassion and chivalry.⁴⁸

With the bridge gone and any hopes of crossing the Susquehanna at Wrightsville dashed, Early and Gordon returned to York. On the evening of June 29, Early received a messenger from Ewell. The message he carried was a copy of a letter from General Lee ordering Ewell's Second Corps back to the vicinity of South Mountain. Early would not be going to Carlisle, and Harrisburg would be spared a battle. On the morning of June 30, Early gathered his brigades and his baggage train and headed back the way he had come over the past few days. During the march from the Susquehanna, his men continued to gather supplies and plunder when they could. In one instance, some Confederate cavalymen broke into an abandoned house and "did all kinds of mean tricks." According to a neighboring resident, the Rebels, "Carried window blinds, pictures, etc. up to the woods. They used the doughtray to feed horses and a drawer of the sideboard to mix dough. They opened a jar of black cherries, poured it down the stair steps, then cut a chaff bed open and spread it over them. Wrote on the wall, 'Done in retaliation for what was done in the South.'" Meanwhile, Early received another message from Ewell directing him to head for Cashtown. He would not make it that far as he would receive

⁴⁸ For an examination of Union behavior during the burning of Columbia, South Carolina, see Woodworth, *Nothing But Victory*, 620-623.

yet another message directing him to Gettysburg, where he would find Rodes's division already engaged with the enemy in what would become the deadliest battle in the history of the United States.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ *OR*, 1:27:2:466-468; Letter: Aunt Sue to Belle, n.d., Civil War in York County Miscellaneous File (737), YCHT.

Chapter Six

“It Was a Disagreeable Surprise”

While Early’s troops undertook their march to the Susquehanna during the final days of June 1863, pressing provisions, destroying Pennsylvania’s infrastructure, and plundering farms and businesses as they went, Ewell took the rest of his Second Corps toward Carlisle with plans to assault Harrisburg. Although the Confederate army would never reach Pennsylvania’s capital, Rebel soldiers would give the residents of Cumberland County a taste of war. Ewell’s troops would not be the only Confederates to visit Carlisle and Cumberland County in those midsummer days. Lieutenant General “Jeb” Stuart’s cavalymen would also move into the area after passing through Maryland and York County on one of the general’s legendary rides around the Army of the Potomac. On July 1, some of his troupe would pay an especially frightening visit to Carlisle while the deadliest battle of the Civil War broke out to the south in Adams County. As Ewell and Stuart moved closer to their dates with destiny on the ridges outside of Gettysburg, they continued to visit the miseries of the contest on Pennsylvania’s citizens.

The Second Corps of Lee’s army had moved into Pennsylvania back on June 22 and had been gathering supplies in the vicinity of Chambersburg for four days when the arrival of Lieutenant General A. P. Hill’s Third Corps freed Ewell to begin his march toward Carlisle. Lee had ordered Ewell to move toward Harrisburg and capture the city if possible, and Ewell had given Early orders to march to the Susquehanna by way of Adams and York counties to gather supplies, cut rail and communication lines, and destroy the bridge at Wrightsville. Early was then to move to the northwest and reunite

with Ewell at Carlisle, where the Second Corps would launch an assault against Harrisburg. For the plan to work, Ewell needed to get the remainder of his force to the seat of Cumberland County and gather intelligence on the defenses at Harrisburg while he waited for Early to arrive. Clear on his mission and with a steady rain saturating the countryside, Ewell started moving his troops toward the Susquehanna by way of Shippensburg and Carlisle on Friday, June 26, with General Jenkins's cavalry in the vanguard.¹

Muddy roads slowed the advance, and major generals Robert Rodes and Edward Johnson managed to move only eleven miles on the first day of their march out of Franklin County. It was a tedious march in the summer rain, and as they passed farms, gathering livestock and provisions as they went, Confederates were in no mood to listen to the professions of fidelity offered by a fair number of self-styled "Southern sympathizers." As they had in other cases throughout the invasion, the invaders put little stock in such pronouncements, understanding that human nature can lead people to lie in order to protect themselves when confronted with difficult situations. For example, when Sergeant William White of the Richmond Howitzers reported "meeting a genuine 'Copperhead Democrat'" during the march toward Carlisle, he kindly listened to the farmer's claims but admitted, "when a fellow's hand is in a vise I always receive his opinions *cum grano salis* [i.e., with a grain of salt]." In the end, the assertions of compassion for the Confederacy's cause did little to save the locals from depredation. If

¹ OR, 1:27:2:464-465, 914-915; Early, *Memoirs*, 255; Nye, 301; Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 155.

the Rebels wanted something, they generally took it without regard to one's political affiliation.²

Having moved to the area around Shippensburg on their first day's march, Ewell's soldiers went into camp and relied on authorized requisition squads and formed freelance foraging parties to make quick work of the surrounding area. After watering themselves and their horses in a nearby pond, soldiers from both divisions scoured the countryside and pressed horses, cattle, and other provisions into service. According to residents as far away as Newville, a town located a few miles northeast of Shippensburg, Rebel cavalrymen took hundreds of cows and seized dozens of corn cribs from local farms during the encampment. Sometimes Ewell's men did not even have to ask residents for the things they wanted. According to Private William Smith of the Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry, "The people were all very kind and give us plenty to eat, voluntarily offering bread and applebutter. It is fine and for once our appetites are appeased." Shippensburg's women also rallied to provide the invaders with a variety of baked goods without much provocation in hopes of appeasing their unwelcome guests. When they did have to ask for goods or if they elected to shop around for something particular, the troops generally paid for what they took, but they did so with Rebel currency that even some of them knew was of no real value, one soldier admitting, "Some of the merchants, to our surprise, take our worthless Confederate money for their wares."³

During the march, the Confederates grew especially fond of one commodity. According to Ewell's aide-de-camp, "It was the Cherry season—there were numbers of fine trees along the road—and they were the only private property that suffered

² Nye, 301; Smith, *Anson Guards*, 201; White, *A Diary of the War*, 198-199.

³ Nye, 301; Smith, *Anson Guards*, 201; Brown, 199-200.

materially from our invasion, except the immediate battlefield. The men couldn't be persuaded not to eat them." Even Ewell, himself, was apparently not above consuming the foraged fruit. Fifteen-year-old John Cabell Early, the nephew of Jubal Early, had recently arrived to serve as his uncle's messenger, but Ewell decided not to send him on a dangerous trip through enemy country toward York. Instead, he kept the youth with him, and the boy later reported, "The old General [Ewell] was very kind to me. As we rode along, we saw many fine wax cherries on the road which I had never seen before. I enjoyed these hugely, and so did the General. I brought him so many boughs of them for his consumption that I began to wonder, boy-like, how so small a man could hold so many cherries." Later in the evening, Corporal Samuel Pickens of the Fifth Alabama Infantry also noted in his diary, "There were a great many cherries & one large tree of black hearts which were the finest I ever tasted." He also reported, "A good many hens were about the barn but they soon disappeared. Some few were paid for by men who happened to have a little U. S. currency."⁴

Jed Hotchkiss, cartographer for the Second Corps, was among those who participated in the foraging around Shippensburg. As he prepared for bed, he settled in to write in his diary and made some general observations about the local citizens: "The people [in and around Shippensburg] looked sullen. Our cavalry is scouring the country for horses &c. The people are fearful of retribution from us." Eager for a dry place to rest, Hotchkiss and some of his fellow Confederates "occupied the houses of some Union people for the night," and while he claimed in his diary that "no damage was done to

⁴ Brown, 199-200; John Cabell Early, "A Southern Boy's Experience at Gettysburg," *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, Vol. 48 (May 1911): 415-423, Copy, Confederate Units, Confederate Officers: Virginia, Box 10, Robert L. Brake Collection, USAMHI; Nye, 309; Pickens in Hubb, 180.

anything,” he told a different story in a letter home. Writing to his wife on June 28, he informed her, “We occupied a house night before last [i.e., June 26] which the family had run away and left—we fared very well there and found many good things there.” Once again, abandoned homes tended to be fair game for occupation and plunder. He also informed her, “Our army likes this country very well—and O what a relief it will be to our country to be rid of our army for some time, I hope we may keep away for some time and so relieve the calls for supplies that have been so long made so long upon our people.” Before finally retiring for the night, Hotchkiss made a few closing notes in his diary entry for the day and marveled at the plenty of the region, noting, “The land is full of everything and we have an abundance. The cherries are very fine.” He also made one last entry that proved quite prophetic: “Gen. Lee wrote to Gen. Ewell that he thought the battle would come off near Fredericks City or Gettysburg.” Lee’s hunch would prove true, and when it did, the men of the Second Corps would have to turn back and abandon their plans for attacking Harrisburg.⁵

Although Ewell’s troops would not remain camped at Shippensburg for more than a night, they would pick over the surrounding area more than once as they marched first to Carlisle and then back to Gettysburg a few days later. According to local resident and apothecary J. C. Atticks, the arrival of Ewell’s troops was not his first experience with the Rebels. Two days before the Second Corps’s arrival, Jenkins’s cavalymen visited his shop and used Confederate money to purchase \$250 worth of drugs. When Ewell’s troops passed through town, they were not as benevolent toward Atticks, for they simply “took some Drugs” with no pretense of payment in the worthless Rebel currency. Atticks also

⁵ Nye, 301; Hotchkiss, *Make Me A Map of the Valley*, 155; Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 28, 1863, “Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865,” VOTS.

reported that Ewell's men were "stealing Horses cattle & Commissary Stores wherever found" and "searched all the cellars for Liquers." On June 29, a few Confederate stragglers "caused considerable alarm" in town when they got drunk and out of hand with "no Provost & no guard" in sight. As a result, Atticks reported, "No citizen on the street after dark." The following morning, Atticks was hit again when Rebels stole his horse, "Vick," from his stable. While J. C. Atticks and his neighbors endured the presence of Lee's army, Ewell continued his move toward Carlisle at 6:00am on the morning of June 27.⁶

Like the citizens of the other border cities and towns in south-central Pennsylvania, the people living in Carlisle had lived in a conflicted state of anxiety and indifference over the past weeks upon hearing about the approaching Confederates. According to James W. Sullivan, a fifteen-year-old boy living in Carlisle at the time of the invasion, "'The rebels are coming!' was a cry heard in our border community so often in the early half of the war that its effects came to resemble the skepticism of those sheep farmers in the fable on hearing the alarm, 'Wolf! Wolf!'" Despite a palpable level of indifference among some of Carlisle's residents toward the rumors of the Rebel approach, Reverend Leonard Marsden Gardner, a native of Adams County who was visiting Dickinson College in Carlisle to participate in the commencement ceremonies when Lee's army crossed the Mason and Dixon Line, noticed,

The roads along the valley were crowded with horses, cattle, sheep and hogs. They were mixed up with long lines of wagons loaded with grain and many articles deemed of special value. During the last week of June one steady procession passed through Carlisle from early morning till late at night. It was amusing sometimes to see how in the general panic, the affrightened refugees sought to save their

⁶ Atticks, "Excerpts from the Diary of J. C. Atticks," June 24-30, 1863.

goods. The most useless and cumbersome things were taken. Amid the crowd I saw passing a one horse wagon filled with household goods and an old baby cradle perched on the top.⁷

Sullivan, who also witnessed the flight of Pennsylvania's citizens, further reported that the Confederates' "deliberateness in coming gave opportunity to the farmers southwest of Carlisle in the Cumberland valley to begin a hegira that lasted several weeks, their objective [being] the region in Pennsylvania east of the Susquehanna." Since their path of escape brought them through his town, Sullivan had plenty of opportunity to study the refugees. Writing after the war about what he witnessed, Sullivan remembered, "These refugees traveled in families, each little caravan much the type of the others. Leading came a buggy or other light conveyance, usually far from new, carrying the mother as driver and the babies; next, a covered wagon with a boy driver, laden with kitchen utensils and bedding, some furniture perhaps and even a chicken coop. Following were the farm animals in [the] charge of the head of the family." As time passed and Lee's army drove deeper into Pennsylvania, the tide of refugees only increased, and "in the final days of their escape, when the advancing Southern troops were almost upon them, these fleeing farmers formed nearly a continuous procession on the main valley roads." Noticing the extreme despondency of those fleeing before the Army of Northern Virginia, Sullivan further noted, "The men and boys pegged along like tramps. The women and children, peering from their poor vehicles, seemed frightened dumb. They rarely took up talk with the townspeople, who gazed at them. I remember them as never

⁷ James W. Sullivan, *Boyhood Memories of the Civil War, 1861-'65, Invasion of Carlisle* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Hamilton Library Association, 1933), 13, Copy, Miscellaneous Civil War Papers, Cumberland County Historical Society (Hereinafter cited as CCHS); Leonard Marsden Gardner, *Sunset Memories, 1861-1865* (Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: Times and News Publishing Company, 1941), 1-2, Copy, Civilian Accounts and Human Interest File, Gettysburg National Military Park Library.

singing, or calling, cheerily or otherwise, to one another, or shouting at the animals. The small children neither laughed nor cried.” In short, “All, plainly, were bewildered.”⁸

Many African Americans were also among the refugees taking flight before the Rebel invaders. Nettie Jane Blair, a young girl from New York whose abolitionist mother took her to visit her grandfather in Cumberland County every summer, was in Carlisle at the time of the invasion. Upon hearing that Lee’s men were approaching the city, she reported, “All the Negroes who had ever worked for grandfather had come down from the mountains with their belongings tied in bed quilts, were gathering in the back yard. They were literally fed and then piled into big Conestoga wagons drawn by mules. Another wagon was stacked with food and then the whole outfit including the stock started for Harrisburg.” Perhaps realizing that the rules of war did not provide them with the same level of protection as they did the women of the family and invalid men,

Grandfather and his two sons James and Scott, headed this party and they were joined along the way by sympathetic friends and neighbors with their possessions. They crossed the Susquehanna and went up into the Chester Valley where they rented barns and waited developments. There were left behind my grandmother, two aunts, and Uncle Lank who had been wounded and was home on furlough.⁹

Some of the African Americans living in Cumberland County were not as fortunate as those that had worked for Blair’s grandfather, for the kidnapping of the local black population did not cease when the Confederates left Franklin County. According to Josiah R. Carothers, a resident of Cumberland County, the Confederates visited his farm and took not only five of his horses, one of his sheep, and two of his bee hives, but “they also took with them the negro” he had hired to help him haul away his hay. The

⁸ Sullivan, 13-14.

⁹ Nettie Jane Blair, “Reminiscences of Nettie Jane Blair, August 1934,” 6-7, Miscellaneous Civil War Papers, CCHS.

hijackings were not limited to the countryside. Nettie Blair further recounted that when the Confederates finally entered the town of Carlisle, “part of the program was to search the house and take off the Negroes.” While it is unclear exactly how many former slaves and free blacks the Confederates seized during the course of the invasion, witnesses continued to report kidnappings for the duration.¹⁰

While the people of Carlisle witnessed the flight of their neighbors—both young and old, women and men, black and white—relatively few residents of the city reacted to the invasion by abandoning their homes and businesses until their defenders left them to the mercy of the Confederate invaders. On June 15, “nearly all the storekeepers packed their goods and sent them away,” but they were not yet ready to leave the city, themselves, as Federal troops were present to protect them. Brigadier General Joseph Knipe, who had previously abandoned Chambersburg as an overwhelming Confederate force advanced toward that city, was in charge of two regiments of New York volunteers and a few companies of local militia at Carlisle. Drafting the remaining African American population into service, Knipe and his command worked to erect barricades across the roads leading into Carlisle and dug rifle pits for the defense of the city. It was all for naught. Upon learning that the Confederates were moving toward the city in “overwhelming force” on June 25, Knipe ordered a retreat to the defenses at Harrisburg at around 9:00pm, and “all idea of defending the town was soon abandoned.”¹¹

¹⁰ Josiah S. Carothers, Claim No. 3890, Damage Claims Applications, Submitted Under Acts Passed, 1863-1871, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, RG-2, Roll 1; Blair, 7; For more information on the Confederate slave hunt, see Alexander, “A Regular Slave Hunt,” 82-89.

¹¹ “Carlisle Pocket Diary,” July 15, 24, 1863, Unknown Author, Transcribed by Sylvia B. Havens, Miscellaneous Civil War Papers, CCHS; Sullivan, 14-15; “The Militia Turn Out” and “The Retreat,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Harry W. Snyder, “Civil War History of Carlisle,” *Lamberton and Hamilton Library Association Prize Essays*, Vol. 4 (1961): 11.

The skedaddling of their defenders initially led to a general panic among the city's residents. According to Reverend Gardner, "the public excitement was intense; the college exercises were abandoned. No forces were there to offer resistance and before the slow steady march of the great invading army everyone fled or submitted." Feeling "it no longer safe to remain," Gardner gathered his belongings and walked from Carlisle to his father's house in York Springs, fourteen miles to the southeast in Adams County. Finding "the same panic prevailing here," Gardner gave his sister instructions "to bake a large oven full of bread and when the Confederates came to give them all they wanted to eat." He also told her and her female companions "to treat the men courteously and they would not be disturbed," and then he took the family horse and fled to the relative safety of Harrisburg. Gardner's willingness to leave the women in the path of Lee's invading army once again demonstrates the general feeling among civilians that the rules of war more readily protected white women than it did men of military age.¹²

Gardner was not alone in his decision to abandon the town following the exit of Knipe and his troops. According to the *Carlisle Herald*, the news that the Rebels were closing in on Carlisle "seriously affected the nerves of some of our citizens. Many of our prominent ones, and many not so prominent, concluded to leave town, and conveyances of all kinds were in great demand." Desperate for an avenue of escape despite the shortage of wagons and horses, some residents "started on foot for Harrisburg and other points." Soon citizens from all over Cumberland County were "hurrying on their way, thronging the roads, greatly increasing the confusion and alarm." The people who fled

¹² Gardner, 1-3.

proved unwilling to risk playing host to the Confederate army and cast their wide, panicked eyes longingly to the eastern shores of the Susquehanna.¹³

Many of those who elected not to run in the face of the enemy settled into a state of either apathy or denial when they awoke on Friday, June 26, to find their town still free of the Rebel invaders. As residents ventured into the streets, they “met each other with a smile and talked about the ‘big scare.’” Despite receiving reliable information from scouts that the Confederates were only a few miles away, “it was very difficult to find any one willing to believe the report. There had been too many ‘scares,’ and the people were absolutely exhausted with rumors and reports. A degree of unconcern had settled down on them and they were unwilling to listen and give credence to the ‘cry of wolf,’ when it was reality.” The arrival of the Rebels seemed destined to catch the people who had remained in Carlisle off guard.¹⁴

While many residents lapsed into apathy or denial, a few leading citizens managed to keep their wits about them and developed a plan to meet with the invaders in an effort to save the town. With Jenkins in the vanguard, Ewell’s force continued to press in on Carlisle, and as the cavalry neared the city, a committee led by Burgess William M. Penrose and Assistant Burgess Robert Allison rode out to meet them. They quickly surrendered the town and assured the Confederates that there were no Federal forces defending it. Taking the committee members at their word, Jenkins’s troupe entered the city at 11:00am on June 27. Rather than charging through the streets with their guns blazing, they entered at a more leisurely pace, yet “every man carried his gun in a position to use it on the instant, with his hand on the hammer” in the event that the

¹³ “The Skedaddle of Citizens,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863.

¹⁴ “A Day of Quiet,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863.

committee was luring them into a trap. Finding the inhabitants peaceable, Jenkins issued a requisition for 1,500 rations “to be furnished within one hour and deposited in the market house.” While the townspeople gathered the rations, Jenkins cut the local telegraph wire and moved his troupe east of the city, where he established an outpost from which to gather information on the defenses at Harrisburg. The men would soon have plenty to fill their stomachs, for within “less than an hour the stalls of the market house were piled with all kinds of eatables.” Shortly thereafter, residents reported seeing “hungry secessers . . . lining themselves with good food. Their horses were picketed along the pavements faring equally well with their masters, the corn having been procured at the crib of Mr. John Noble.”¹⁵

Following Jenkins’s occupation of Carlisle, the rest of Ewell’s Second Corps approached the city along two different routes. Johnson’s Division camped three miles west of town, and Rodes’s Division moved into the city with a band playing “Dixie” at the head of the column. According to a local newspaper, “The emotions awakened by the incident, were of the most humiliating character.” Despite admitting that the Rebels “exhibited a cheerfulness which was indicative of great spirit and endurance,” the paper also reported, “The men of the command presented a sorry appearance. Many were barefooted, others hatless, numbers of them ragged, and all dirty.” James Sullivan disagreed. In a special position as a child, whom the rules of war clearly protected from danger, he got as close as possible to watch the Confederates march down his city’s streets and claimed, “My eyes saw differently. I used them to advantage, going about

¹⁵ “The Entrance of the Rebels” and “Requisitions,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Nye, 303; “Carlisle Pocket Diary,” July 27, 1863.

freely, as a grown man might not have done.” Disparaging the local papers, he questioned,

Where were those ‘ragged uniforms?’ those ‘half-starved stragglers?’ that ‘army in a plight?’ Our newspaper prophets of a speedy Confederate collapse through its army’s miseries must have been talking about some other army! The passing uniforms undergoing our inspection were if not new, newish; there was no showing of torn coats and badly frayed trousers. . . . Further opportunity for inspection of cavalry, infantry, artillery and the transportation service confirmed my first impressions of a fit, well-fed, well-conditioned army.

Confederate bellies were full and spirits were high as these men had been living off of the plenty of Pennsylvania for the past several days. In Sullivan’s final estimation of the newspaper reports regarding the state of General Lee’s army, he proclaimed, “We had been fed on lies.”¹⁶

While the town’s residents disputed the physical appearance of the Confederates, Ewell’s men took note of their hosts. According to Jed Hotchkiss, Carlisle was “a lovely place” and its people “not half as sullen as they are farther down the Valley, the German element not being as strong & the humanizing influences of schools &c have made a better population.” He also noted, “We found them in quite a state of alarm, expecting us to burn pillage & destroy as they have done, but when they saw the conduct of our army they seemed surprised.” Private Lewis Leon of Company C, First North Carolina Infantry, reported similar feelings in his diary, writing, “The city is certainly a beautiful place. It has 8,000 inhabitants, and we were treated very good by the ladies. They thought we would do as their soldiers do, burn every place we passed through, but when we told

¹⁶ Hotchkiss, *Make Me A Map of the Valley*, 155; Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 28, 1863, “Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865,” VOTS; Sullivan, 17-19.

them the strict orders of General Lee they were rejoiced.” Private Smith of the Fourteenth North Carolina Infantry further noted, “These people are amazed at Lee’s audacity in invading Pennsylvania.”¹⁷

Having finally entered Carlisle, Rodes sent his brigades to various positions throughout the city. Colonel Edward Ashbury O’Neal and his Alabamians went to guard the eastern entrance to the town, while Brigadier General George Pierce Doles’s Georgians camped on the grounds of Dickinson College at the western end of town. The remainder of Rodes’s division along with Ewell, himself, took up residence in Carlisle Barracks, a U. S. military installation located north of the town square. It was a homecoming of sorts for Ewell, for following his graduation from West Point, he had been stationed at the barracks for a time. Settling into the buildings, Rodes seized supplies and provisions from the nearby warehouse, including “a large quantity of grain,” “musketoons, holsters, tents, and a small quantity of subsistence stores.”¹⁸

Having established his headquarters at Carlisle Barracks and having cleaned out its warehouse, Ewell made a requisition on the town beyond Jenkins’s initial request for rations. He asked for 25,000 pounds of bacon, 5000 pounds of coffee, 3000 pounds of sugar, 100 sacks of salt, 1500 barrels of flour, 25 barrels of dried fruit, 25 barrels of molasses, 25 barrels of potatoes, and “immense quantities of quinine, chloroform, and other drugs.” Finding the requisition “rediculous in its character,” a group of prominent citizens tried to reason with Ewell and informed him of “the utter impossibility to comply,” but the Confederates would not accept their protestations and warned the borough’s authorities that “unless the articles were forthcoming at a certain hour the

¹⁷ Nye, 304; Hotchkiss, *Make Me A Map of the Valley*, 155; “Entrance of Ewel’s Army,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Leon, 33; Smith, *Anson Guards*, 201.

¹⁸ *OR*, 1:27:2:551; Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 155; Nye, 305.

stores and dwellings of the town would be searched, as the military was confident the demand could be met.” Meanwhile, Ewell’s troops settled into bivouac for the night, and camp fires dotted the streets and the grounds of Dickinson College. According to James Sullivan, “Water was brought from our common street pump; fuel came from the telegraph poles just cut down to destroy communication with the Union forces.” The Confederates gave the people of Carlisle the night to comply with their demands, and Ewell placed provost guards throughout the town to insure that his soldiers did not molest civilian property.¹⁹

When June 28 dawned and Ewell realized that Carlisle’s authorities had failed to gather the supplies he required, the Confederates organized into squads for the purposes of searching the town. As the requisition squads made their way through the streets, “All the stores and warehouses were visited, and such articles as were needed by them were taken.” Apparently the collectors had help from local residents who willingly “pointed out where goods and produce were secreted,” for according to the local newspaper, “it would have been utterly impossible for them to have known where the articles were, with such accuracy, unless they received information from some of our own citizens. The squad would move directly to a house where the goods were stored, halt, name the articles, and demand that they should be produced.” Hoping that the other townspeople would hold these “Piloters” accountable, the reporters at the *Carlisle Herald* proclaimed them “worse than the rebels.” Using these methods, Jed Hotchkiss estimated that the Confederates successfully gathered “some \$50000 of medicines & large supplies of provisions &c.” Ewell also later reported that his commissary and subsistence officers

¹⁹ “The Original Requisition Upon the Authorities of the Borough of Carlisle, Pa., during the Confederate Raid—June 27, 1863,” *The Evening Sentinel* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), June 21, 1863; “The Requisitions,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Sullivan, 19.

managed to gather 3,000 head of cattle and 5,000 barrels of flour while on their march to and from Carlisle.²⁰

One particular item that the Rebels seized that raised the hackles of some of Carlisle's residents was surgical equipment. Under the heading of "A Most Inhuman Act," a local newspaper reported, "In the requisition was a demand for four cases of amputating instruments. There was not a case in town, except those in the possession of our physicians." General Ewell wanted them anyway, and he demanded that the doctors surrender their kits to the medical department of the army. In the newspaper's estimation, "This demand was the most inhuman committed, and has had no comparison during this terrible struggle." The town's doctors complied, but "it was evident from the demeanor of several of the Surgeons that they felt that it was a most unheard of demand, in violation of the rules of war, and at war with all the rules of humanity. Our physicians protested in strong language against the outrage, but it was in vain." As they turned in their cases, the Confederates examined them, and they "were robbed of the best of the instruments, and then the sacked case was handed back to its owner." After the battle of Gettysburg, the halls of Dickinson College would house a large number of wounded soldiers, and those medical tools would certainly have been useful.²¹

While Ewell and his officers carried out the authorized collection of requisitions, other soldiers got to work tearing down a local railroad bridge. A group of Confederates arrived bearing "axes, crowbars, and fire-brands" and "track rails were ripped up and thrown down to the surface road; next came ties, which were set afire, and then all the

²⁰ "Sunday Morning—The Searches" and "The Piloters," *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 28, 1863, "Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865," VOTS; *OR*, 1:27:2:443.

²¹ "A Most Inhuman Act," *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863.

fifteen to twenty piers were stripped of their half-dozen upper courses of heavy stone.” Other soldiers took to plundering local businesses, houses, and farms, and according to at least one resident, “the Rebels are robbing [and] stealing from the stores and dwelling[s]” and “are going in every house and stealing all they can.” James Sullivan, who always seemed to exhibit a more positive view of the invaders than his fellow citizens, claimed, “There was no indiscriminate authorized plundering nor any unrestrained pillaging by soldiers so far as I heard,” but he had to admit, “Perhaps the category including chickens did not count.” He also pointed out that some residents had suggested “printers from the army of occupation had turned out from a convenient local press a supply of Confederate paper money” in an effort to demonstrate their benevolence by having currency on hand to pay for their requisitions. Sullivan was of the opinion that it was not true, but if it were, he implied that the Confederates could not have been too precise in their creation of the bills, for “not one of the print shops in Carlisle could have in stock paper of banknote texture, design or durability or ink of the fixed colours of the Confederate currency.” If the money existed, Jed Hotchkiss may very well have gotten a hold of some of it or simply relied upon that which he carried with him, for in a letter home to his wife on June 28 from Carlisle, he documented his shopping spree, writing,

I have not been able to find any shoes but will probably find some before long. I sent to Winchester a large bundle for you of Calico &c—I do not know how many yards, but a good many—I hope you will find the goods such as please you—I had to select them in a hurry & had but little time to make choice—if there are any other little things you may want let me know of it & I will try and get them for you in the course of our marches.²²

²² “The Destruction of the Railroad Bridge,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Sullivan, 19-20, 23-24; “Carlisle Pocket Diary”; Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 28, 1863, “Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865,” VOTS.

Even though Ewell's army occupied their city and pressed many things from them, the residents of Carlisle were afforded at least a small modicum of normalcy on Sunday, June 28. On the morning of the Sabbath, "the Gen. sent word to the clergy to have their services as usual, as no one would disturb them—so some of the churches were open today, and the preachers, though nervous, prayed for their country in peril and their friends in danger—they also prayed for the strangers that were among them, some of them prayed for peace." At Carlisle Barracks, a "Mr. Lacy" held two services, and most of Ewell's staff attended. Some of the local preachers wondered about the proper content of the day's sermons, and according to one of Ewell's staff officers, a committee from the local Episcopal and Lutheran churches approached Ewell and asked if he objected to them saying a prayer for President Lincoln. "Certainly not," Old Jube replied, "Pray for him. I'm sure he needs it." Apparently it was a day filled with ceremony, for later that afternoon, the Rebels raised the Confederate flag over the barracks and listened to speeches "by Generals Rodes, Trimble, Daniels, Ewell, &c."²³

While Rodes's and Johnson's divisions remained encamped in and around Carlisle, Ewell sent his engineer with Jenkins's cavalry to scout and test the defenses at Harrisburg. It proved a short-lived expedition, and although Jenkins did manage to lob a few shells into the defenses on the west bank of the Susquehanna, orders from General Lee cut the move toward Harrisburg short. On June 28, Lee had learned from a spy that the Army of the Potomac was advancing across the Potomac River and heading toward Pennsylvania. He estimated that the Union army would likely move into the Keystone State through Adams County, and he sent Ewell orders on June 29 "to rejoin the main

²³ Jedediah Hotchkiss to Sara A. Hotchkiss, June 28, 1863, "Augusta County, Virginia, Personal Papers: Letters of the Hotchkiss Family, 1861-1865," VOTS; Hotchkiss, *Make Me A Map of the Valley*, 155; Douglas, 237-238; Nye, 308.

body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg.” Ewell then sent a messenger to Early at York informing him of the move and also ordered Johnson’s division to begin the retrograde movement. The Second Corps’s commander subsequently evacuated the rest of his force from Carlisle. Interestingly, he later found it important to note in his official report that “agreeably to the views of the general commanding, I did not burn Carlisle Barracks.” It would not stay standing for long.²⁴

The men of Johnson’s division had not gotten to enjoy the fruits of the city as had Rodes’s troops, and as they moved back toward Shippensburg, they “committed a great many outrages.” According to the *Carlisle Herald*, “what had been left by Rhodes’ Division, not through mercy, but from want of information, was swept away by this horde. Every barnyard was visited, and poultry, and in fact everything which would furnish a mouthful of food was taken.” Moreover, “Cavalry rode through fields of grain ripe for the scythe, and the growing corn was trodden down by acres.” In the estimation of the paper’s editor, “The foraging parties were in reality marauders, and destroyed what they could not make use of,” and worst of all, the paper reported a possible rape: “We hear of one case where the person of a Miss Lephart, of Frankford township [to the northwest of Carlisle], was outraged by one of the scoundrels.”²⁵

When the rest of Ewell’s Second Corps finally exited the city and joined Johnson’s Division on the move toward Cashtown and Gettysburg, they left behind them a power vacuum. Into this void stepped “many lewd and depraved women and men,” and

²⁴ Nye, 343; Hotchkiss, *Make Me a Map of the Valley*, 156; *OR*, 1:27:2:443; For more information on the Federal defenses at Harrisburg, see Robert Grant Crist, *Confederate Invasion of the West Shore—1863* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Cumberland County Historical Society, 1963; reprint, 2003), 5-44.

²⁵ “Johnson’s Division,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Considering there were no Georgian’s in Johnson’s division, it is possible that this was not the same rape the correspondent for the *Rome Courier* reported in Chapter Four.

when they hurried to Carlisle Barracks to see what damage the Confederates had done during their stay, “the prostitutes and their friends did not consider anything sacred, and despoiled and ravaged the premises.” Not only did they destroy many of the garrison’s records but they also stole “clothing, blankets, and apparel of every kind” and destroyed much of the furniture. Hence, without any semblance of military or political authority, some of the people in Carlisle degenerated into a state of barbarism.²⁶

Tuesday, June 30, was little better for the citizens of Carlisle. As Jenkins’s cavalry brigade made its withdrawal through the city, Colonel James Cochran’s troupe caused quite a panic among the citizenry. According to a local newspaper, “They had not been in town half an hour until they were riding wildly through the streets.” Things only got worse when they found whiskey as “this exciting drink appeared to madden them. They tore through the streets, cursing and yelling, and playing the demon, as demons only can play it.” It was not until Jenkins, himself, arrived that the cavalymen calmed down. With quiet restored, “the people retired not to sleep, yet in much more peacefulness than they would have done had they remained at the mercy of Cochran’s men.” The following morning, the townspeople were relieved to find their city once again devoid of an enemy presence.²⁷

On July 1, 1863, as the first day of battle drew to a close at Gettysburg, Union Brigadier General William Farrar Smith arrived in Carlisle at 6:30pm to provide the town with some semblance of security. The townspeople welcomed Smith’s arrival with great enthusiasm. According to James Sullivan, “the entire population, it would seem from the crowds in waiting, had been making ready to receive their rescuers. . . . The women of

²⁶ “Citizens Plunder the Post,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863.

²⁷ “Tuesday” and “Second Arrival of Jenkins,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863.

Carlisle had brought out from their scantily stocked larders the essentials of a welcoming reception. Soon the scene was that of a merry picnic on a large scale.” The Rebels were gone, their defenders had returned, and the “citizens were rejoicing almost as though the war were over.” The celebration lasted only a short while, for about thirty minutes later, “Jeb” Stuart’s Confederate cavalry arrived on the outskirts of town and initiated a new wave of panic.²⁸

For the past week, Stuart’s cavalymen had carried out an epic and highly controversial ride around the Army of the Potomac. The day after a hard-fought battle with Federal cavalry at Upperville, Virginia, on June 21, Stuart had received orders from General Lee instructing him to “take position on General Ewell’s right flank, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.” On June 23, Lee sent Stuart a second set of orders giving the cavalry commander more discretion in his mission. Unsure how quickly the Union army would move against him as he headed north, Lee wrote, “You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell’s troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.” Armed with his new orders, Stuart moved out from his camps near Salem, Virginia, on June 25 and soon decided to ride around the Union force. It turned out to be an unfortunate decision as Stuart found himself cut off from Lee’s army for the next week. On June 28, President Lincoln replaced Major General Joseph Hooker, who seemed reluctant to pursue Lee’s force into

²⁸ “Arrival of Gen. Smith,” *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 31, 1863; Sullivan, 24-25.

the North, as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General George Gordon Meade took his place, and under his command, the Union army proved more vigorous in its move northward to combat Lee's force. Consequently, Federal troops remained between Stuart and his army, severing communication between Lee and his most trusted cavalry commander.²⁹

Having decided to move around Hooker's (and later Meade's) army, Stuart traveled to Pennsylvania by way of Fairfax Court House, Dranesville, Rockville, and Westminster, gathering horses and provisions and capturing wagons full of supplies along the way. He ultimately crossed the Mason and Dixon Line on June 29. After fighting a Federal force to a stalemate at Hanover in York County on June 30, Stuart's troopers moved east and then north toward the city of York in search of Early's Division after learning from local citizens and newspapers that he was in the area. When they reached Jefferson, a small town located less than ten miles east of Hanover, they not only confiscated a number of horses to replace their run-down mounts following the recent battle but also cleaned out a fair portion of stock from William T. Crist's store on the town square. They took 6 caps, 12 hats, 22 pairs of boots and shoes, 40 yards of muslin, 300 yards of calico, 6 silk handkerchiefs, 6 pairs of traces, 5 table oil cloths, 5 pounds of tobacco, and 200 cigars. Unfortunately for Lee's army, by the time Stuart finally arrived at York, "General Early had gone." According to Stuart, "It is to be regretted that this officer failed to take any measures by leaving an intelligent scout to watch for my coming or a patrol to meet me, to acquaint me with his destination." After all, "He had reason to expect me, and had been directed to look for me. . . . But [he] left me no clue to his

²⁹ *OR*, 1:27:3:913, 923; For more information regarding the controversy of Stuart's ride around the Union army, see Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzini, *Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart's Controversial Ride to Gettysburg* (New York: Savas Beatie, 2006).

destination on leaving York, which would have saved me a long and tedious march to Carlisle and thence back to Gettysburg.”³⁰

Having missed Early at York, Stuart still believed that Confederate forces were “before Harrisburg,” and so he decided to try his luck at Carlisle. Moving toward the seat of Cumberland County by way of Dillsburg and Rossville on June 30, Stuart’s cavalymen continued their march of desolation and plunder. Upon reaching Dillsburg, they seized whatever they desired from local shops and stole stamps and money from the local post office. As they continued to Carlisle, a few men from Company B, Third Virginia Cavalry, stopped at a local farmhouse, and according to Eric J. Wittenberg and J. David Petruzzi, the authors of *Plenty of Blame to Go Around: Jeb Stuart’s Controversial Ride to Gettysburg*, they had “a bit of fun.” After knocking on the door, the Rebels were greeted by a rather hostile young woman who was carrying a baby. The men asked her for something to eat, but as a Unionist, she was not interested in feeding traitors and told them as much, saying, “I have nothing and if I did, I’d not give it to you.” Displeased with her answer, one of the men moved closer, and she yelled, “You dirty Rebels will get nothing from me. I’d like to see the whole lot of you die.” Once again frustrated by the woman’s response, one of the cavalymen snatched the baby from her arms and suggested to her that he would eat the child if nothing else was forthcoming. While the Rebels may have considered this “a bit of fun,” the unarmed female noncombatant was terrified. When the men “offered to trade her the baby for bacon,” she “set out ham, fowl, bacon, bread, and butter,” and the men claimed, “We had a glorious feast and took the remainder back to camp after paying her (in Confederate money) for all we had taken.”

³⁰ Wittenberg and Petruzzi, 119, 122-126; McClure, *East of Gettysburg*, 97; *OR*, 1:27:2:708-709.

The terrorizing incident stood in stark contrast to the generally accepted belief that women and children were sacrosanct during the invasion.³¹

While the Army of Northern Virginia found itself engaged in the battle at Gettysburg, Jeb Stuart's cavalry finally reach Carlisle on the evening of July 1. Commenting on Stuart's arrival and subsequent attack upon the town after only a day of peace free from the Confederates, resident Margaret Fleming Murray wrote in a letter, "It was a disagreeable *surprise*." Finding only Smith's Union force to greet him, Stuart sent Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee to try to get his opponent to surrender the town so that his cavalrymen could "procure rations," but the Union general would not have it. Fitzhugh Lee warned Smith that if he did not surrender Carlisle, the Confederates would be within their rights to launch an artillery barrage against it, and Smith responded with a recalcitrant "Shell away and be damned!" Without giving any further warning, Confederate Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee inaugurated a thirty-minute bombardment before calling for another official surrender and giving the citizens an opportunity to find safety.³²

Fortunately, the initial cannonade harmed no one as the shells rained down along High Street near the town square, but it was still a shocking spectacle for the townspeople. According to Margaret Murray, "We never dreamed that very evening the Rebel demons would shell the town . . . without giving the usual warning. . . . I think the attack was the most inhuman and barbarous I ever heard of, attempting to destroy a town with the women and children in it." On July 10, 1863, the *Carlisle Herald* issued an

³¹ *OR*, 1:27:2:709; Wittenberg and Petruzzi, 131-132; Letter: Fitzhugh Lee to J. T. Zug, August 5, 1882, Miscellaneous Civil War Papers, CCHS.

³² Wittenberg and Petruzzi, 139-141; Josephine C. Donovan, "The Confederate Invasion of Carlisle," *Lamberton and Hamilton Library Association Prize Essays*, Vol. 4 (1958): 4; *OR*, 1:27:2:220-221.

article stating, “The people, not anticipating such a thing—not even knowing that the rebels had cannon, were walking the streets. The first announcement was the whizzing of shells and the terrific report of their explosions. . . . The women and children ran into the dwellings and secreted themselves in the cellars, where they, in terror, listened to the hellish carnival that was going on.”³³

The shelling continued for the remainder of the evening as General Smith refused to surrender the town, the last attack coming at 3:00am on the morning of July 2. During the night, while they continued to rain artillery shells into the city, the Confederates fired Carlisle Barracks as well as a local gas works and lumberyard causing thousands of dollars in damage. Early on the morning of July 2, Stuart’s cavalry finally made contact with scouts from Lee’s army, who were led to Stuart’s positions by the flames of the burning city, and Stuart learned that the Rebel army was engaged in a major battle at Gettysburg. Calling off the assault on Carlisle, he withdrew to join Lee. Fortunately, the flames did not spread into the rest of the city as the Confederates made their exit.³⁴

During the frightening attack on Carlisle, the Confederates had incited chaos and confusion, killed one horse, and wounded twelve Union soldiers. Fortunately, no civilians died as a result of the cannonade. Echoing Confederate criticisms of Union generals like John Pope, Robert Milroy, and William Sherman, a local paper had this to say about Fitzhugh Lee following the attack: “By this inhuman and most brutal act this man Lee has written his name in history a niche higher than Haynan, the Austrian woman whipper. . . . If he should ever fall into the hands of the Union soldiers, as we most devoutly hope

³³ Letter: Margaret Flemming Murray to Harmar Denny Murray, July 3, 1863, Murray Letters, CCHS; *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 10, 1863.

³⁴ *OR*, 1:27:2:221; *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 10, 31, 1863; Wittenberg and Petruzzi, 139-159.

he may, let mercy such as he showed be meted out to him.” Following the invasion of Cumberland County and after the Army of Northern Virginia’s final retreat from Pennsylvania after the battle of Gettysburg, the *Carlisle Herald* issued a report that summed up the citizens’ views of the Rebel invasion: “An immense rebel army has marched through our midst, wasting our substance, devastating our fields, robbing our granaries and warehouses, searching our dwellings, and visiting on us many other calamities of war.”³⁵

³⁵ *OR*, 1:27:2:221; *Carlisle Herald* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), July 10, 31, 1863.

Conclusion

While many Pennsylvania towns suffered heavily during the Confederate invasion of 1863, no place endured more than the small borough of Gettysburg. For three days, the principal field armies of the Union and Confederacy blew each other apart in the bloodiest battle in American history. Because of the battle's importance in the Eastern Theater, historians have told the story of those July days in 1863 many times. When sitting down to write his memoir in 1925, D. H. Hamilton of the First Texas Infantry was already claiming, "So much as been said and written about the battle of Gettysburg that there is little to be added to its well known history." That statement is even truer today, and aside from just covering events on the battlefield, historians have done a thorough job of exploring the impact of the battle on the local civilian population. It is unnecessary here to delve too much into the minute details of the three-day engagement.¹

Although historians have essentially exhausted the story of the battle and its impact on the borough of Gettysburg, it is still worth noting that Lee's men continued to adhere to the pattern of behavior they had established during their march through Pennsylvania prior to the engagement. While much of the damage suffered in and around Gettysburg was the shared responsibility of both Union and Confederate troops, the Confederates occupied the actual town of Gettysburg for much of the contest. During the first day of fighting, Confederate soldiers had successfully driven Union forces from the town onto the hills south of Gettysburg. Upon entering the borough, the Rebels continued their practice of seizing livestock, plundering gardens, and ransacking stores. For

¹ Hamilton, 28; For a thorough treatment of the civilians at Gettysburg, see Bloom, 161-200; Gerald R. Bennet, *Days of "Uncertainty and Dread": The Ordeal Endured by the Citizens of Gettysburg* (Littlestown, Pennsylvania: Gerald R. Bennett, 1994); Gallman, 144-174; Creighton, *The Colors of Courage: Gettysburg's Forgotten History*.

example, after Liberty Augustus Hollinger's father refused to give Confederate soldiers the keys to his warehouse, "the Rebels forced the locks at the warehouse and took what they wanted and then ruined everything else. They opened the spigots of the molasses barrels and allowed the molasses to run over the floor. They scattered the salt and sugar on the floor also, and anything else that was accessible." Confederate soldiers also continued to pillage abandoned homes. Mary Horner, another resident of Gettysburg, reported that "those who left their homes found them out of order on their return," and according to Liberty Hollinger, her neighbors who fled before the Confederate approach not to return until after the battle, "found their once orderly houses in confusion; beds had been occupied, bureaus ransacked and contents scattered over the house. The larders had been searched for eatables and nothing remained that the soldiers could find use for."²

As the battle raged, the town and surrounding country turned into a scene straight out of Dante Alighieri's *Inferno*. Having moved through the streets during the Confederate occupation, Mary Horner witnessed the effects of war firsthand: "A dead horse just before the door, a soldier breaking open a cellar door with an axe, and in the streets the direst collection of coffee and groceries of all kinds, boxes and barrels, wagons and guns, dead men and blood everywhere." When the battle was over, she also reported, "Our houses were filled for the most part with the wounded; provisions were well nigh exhausted; bridges in all the country round about were burned; all the fences for twenty miles around were gone; our railroad was destroyed; the country people, having suffered in many ways, were unable to bring in any supplies." Moreover, "as a result of the immense quantity of dead and decaying matter, filth of all kinds and the excessive heat,

² Horner, "Days of Dread"; Liberty August Hollinger, "Some Personal Recollections of the Battle of Gettysburg," Hollinger File, Civilian Accounts of the Battle of Gettysburg, Adams County Historical Society.

the atmosphere of the large area covered by the two armies was in a terribly polluted condition; sickness abounded, fevers were prevalent and deaths occurred.” The level of death and destruction left in the wake of the battle overwhelmed the people of south-central Pennsylvania, yet Horner found a reason to be thankful in the oddest of places. She was thankful for the flies, which assumed “the proportions of a plague,” for they were “much-needed scavengers and the only ones who had leisure to attend to the cleansing of our surroundings for many days after the battle.”³

Following the extremely bloody battle at Gettysburg, which cost Union and Confederacy more than 50,000 casualties, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia made its way back into the South, having failed yet again to achieve victory on northern soil. During the two weeks his army spent in Pennsylvania prior to the battle, Lee’s men had torn up and burned railroads, railcars, and railroad depots, had plundered and pillaged stores, farms, and private homes (sometimes paying for that which they took with worthless Confederate scrip), had kidnapped hundreds of free blacks and contrabands to send back into slavery, and had generally acted as soldiers are apt to do when hungry and spoiling for a fight. According to the research of historian Kent Masterson Brown, the author of *Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign*, Lee’s army managed to bring “more than forty-five miles of quartermaster and subsistence trains filled with impressed stores,” including “thousands of tons of hay and grains of all kinds, as well as thousands of barrels of flour” and “large quantities of leather harnesses, saddles, bits, bridles, iron bars, sheets of steel, bellows, forges, coal, hammers, screwdrivers, wagon parts, tar, coal oil, pencils, pens, paper, blank books, and a wide variety of cloth materials, hats, and medicinal items,” out of Pennsylvania during its

³ Horner, “Days of Dread.”

withdrawal from the Keystone State. This impressive convoy of plundered and pressed goods “included nearly 6,000 vehicles and anywhere from 30,000 to 40,000 horses and mules that pulled them,” and the Confederates had taken “more than 20,000” of those animals from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Lee’s army also took thousands of chickens, cows, hogs, and sheep from the people of the Union but “had to leave about 12,000 head of cattle and 8,000 head of sheep along the muddy roads between Gettysburg and the Potomac River” during the retreat. Despite having to abandon some of his haul in the effort to get safely back into Virginia, “Lee was able to save nearly 30,000 head of cattle, almost 25,000 head of sheep, and thousands of hogs.” In Brown’s assessment of the invasion,

That Lee’s campaign into Pennsylvania was a foraging expedition carried out on an immense scale, and that it succeeded in bringing back to Virginia the enormous stores and herds of livestock that it did, was never understood by Southern civilians or newspaper reporters. In fact, few soldiers ever observed all of what had been seized. Yet the campaign may well have furnished enough meat, fodder, and stores to extend the life of the Army of Northern Virginia until the harvests in the Southern seaboard states could be used. For certain, it guaranteed that Lee’s men had flour and fresh meat for several months, and the horses and mules had fodder through the rest of the summer. All of that was totally unavailable in Virginia at the time. Only two months before, Lee’s army had been on the brink of collapse.⁴

Following the war, the state of Pennsylvania made provisions for the reimbursement of its citizens who had suffered at the hands of the Confederate invaders. Residents of Adams, Bedford, Cumberland, Franklin, Fulton, and York counties submitted 4,680 claims, not including the 656 claims associated with the burning of

⁴ Kent Masterson Brown, *Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 387-389.

Chambersburg in 1864, requesting a total of \$1,831,161.74 in financial aid. Claims commissioners approved only \$1,693,351.52, and they awaited funds from the federal government to cover the expense, a moment that never came to pass as the U. S. Congress initially determined that

the Government is under no obligation or duty to compensate its citizens for property seized, damaged, or destroyed by the public enemy, nor in battle by the Government forces, or wantonly or unauthorized by its own troops, nor by actual and necessary Government military operations to repel a threatened attack of, or in advancing to meet, an enemy in flagrant war.

While the government later agreed to reimburse some of the claims where the damage had been perpetrated by Union soldiers, Confederate troops were responsible for more than two-thirds of the estimated damages, having cost south-central Pennsylvania \$1,159,718.48 over the course of the war, excluding the burning of Chambersburg in 1864. One must remember that this number includes General Stuart's brief raid in 1862 and General John McCausland's raid in 1864, excepting the damage done to the town of Chambersburg that year, which was handled by another set of claims. Still, the vast majority of the claims and an overwhelming majority of the property damage occurred during Lee's 1863 invasion. Moreover, these final figures do not include impacts on human life such as those associated with the kidnappings of free blacks and former slaves. As of 2007, the relative value of the financial burden of the Confederate invasion into Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 would total nearly \$20,000,000 when adjusted using the Consumer Price Index.⁵

⁵ Report of the Auditor General's Department, Harrisburg, Pa., May 15, 1894, RG-2, Roll 1, Pennsylvania State Archives; John R Miller, Scrap Book: Border Damage Matter, "Losses from Lee's Invasion of Pennsylvania," Miscellaneous Civil War Papers, CCHS; To figure the relative value of money in American history, see <http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/>.

Aside from the quartermaster and damage-claims statistics, the soldiers and officers own words demonstrate the erroneous nature of the legacy of restraint long associated with the campaign. As historian Bell Irvin Wiley noted in his classic book on Confederate soldiers, “observations made during the campaign by some of the soldiers themselves indicate considerable discrepancy between Lee’s pronouncement and the troops’ obedience.” Moreover, while Wiley notes, “Descendents of Confederate soldiers have derived great satisfaction from the conduct of the men in gray during their invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863,” he also asserts that it is “erroneous to assume that Confederates who plundered comrades and fellow citizens were transformed into gentlemen by crossing the Mason and Dixon Line.” All of these facts—the statistics and the testimony of the very soldiers and officers that conducted the invasion—make it clear that despite the contentions of Lost Cause defenders, unmitigated restraint did not characterize Lee’s march through Pennsylvania, and the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia clearly left far more than their footprints in the Keystone State.⁶

If the assertion of epic levels of Confederate restraint during the Gettysburg Campaign is untrue, then the question of its persistence remains. Part of its perseverance has to do with academia’s failure to deal effectively with the mythology of the Lost Cause. According to Gaines M. Foster, the author of *Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865 to 1913*, as “the professionalization of history in the South occurred gradually during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century” and “professional historians [worked] to assume responsibility for the study of [Southern] history,” “they sometimes came under attack by their fellow southerners.” Rather than standing by their principles and maintaining their

⁶ Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb*, 47-48.

methods of critical analysis, these new historians, many of whom were from the South, “learned the advantages of avoiding open confrontation with the tradition” of the Confederacy. Worse yet, Foster claims, “Most professionals not only avoided controversy but paid homage to Confederate pieties.” Such willingness to provide an “uncritical, indeed glowing, portrait of southern culture” and to “participate in the Confederate celebration” created a “divergence between the principle of criticism and the practice of praise,” and it did much to establish a durable foundation for the Lost Cause beneath the rising halls of professional academia.⁷

As time went on, things only got worse, for “the potential for conflict persisted” between Lost Cause advocates and professionally trained historians. According to Foster, “The academics’ belief in free inquiry made them more tolerant of differing views of the southern past than were the more ardent members of the Confederate societies.” Moreover, “the ideology of professionalism led the academics to consider themselves the only ones with the expertise to delineate the past properly, an attitude the nonprofessionals naturally resented.” As the twentieth century continued, “growing tensions suggested that a time would come when southern scholars might not be considered trustworthy keepers of the tradition,” and eventually,

the professionals became irrelevant. Twentieth-century academics generally did not seek and assuredly did not play so prominent a role in society as the early professionals had. More and more, they talked to and wrote for one another, and less and less did the general public listen to or read them. The twentieth-century of debate among professionals about the causes, nature, and meaning of the war, a contentious and continual one, had limited influence on the larger southern society.

⁷ Foster, 180-184.

Professional history continues to function on a somewhat incestuous basis, and the ability of academic historians to reach a general audience is still one of the major issues confronting the profession in the modern era.⁸

Another reason for the durability of the myth has to do with the power of language. In his most recent book, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*, Pulitzer-Prize-winning historian Mark E. Neely, Jr., of Pennsylvania State University, investigates “the question of whether the American Civil War can accurately be characterized as brutal—‘grossly ruthless’ or ‘unfeeling’ in its conduct, ‘cruel’ and ‘cold-blooded.’” While he does not specifically address the relationship between soldiers and civilians during the Gettysburg Campaign, Neely does conclude that many of the views regarding the level of destructiveness and death during the Civil War are the results of the language of its participants. In his estimation, “Extreme expressions embodying extravagant threats of violence ruled political debate, much military correspondence, and the journalism of the Civil War era,” but the “visions of mayhem” officers and politicians depicted in their speeches and writings “*exceeded* ‘anything the Federal government later enacted.’” Neely further argues, “In recent times historians have too often taken the [Union’s] generals and politicians at their word. Their words were often fiercely expressed. But those words were shaped to ends short of universal truth. They were aimed at military victory.”⁹

Historians Charles Royster of Louisiana State University and Mark Grimsley of The Ohio State University argue much the same in their Lincoln-Prize winning books. In *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the*

⁸ Foster, 186-191.

⁹ Neely, 3, 198-199; Neely won the Pulitzer Prize in 2007 for his book *The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Americans, Royster examines the language of the Civil War's most oft-quoted general and claims,

Some of Sherman's most widely quoted statements were simply aphoristic summaries of this qualitative distinction between the workings of peace and those of war: 'war is war, and not popularity-seeking'; 'war is cruelty and you cannot refine it'; 'war is simply power unrestrained by constitution and compact.' In these and other kindred remarks, Sherman did not contend that war necessarily would or should grow as violent as the participants could make it. Rather, he meant that in war one side could not rely on peacetime methods and rules—appeals to public opinion, to humanitarianism, to the fundamental law of civil government—as a binding restraint on the other side's use of force. The belligerents might not do all the harm within their power, usually did not, but they had no guarantee against the possible use of the maximum extremity of violence.

In *Hard Hand of War*, Grimsley agrees and contends that “the influence of William T. Sherman on the future of American warfare was apparent less in his operations than in his rhetoric.” He also argues that Southern myth-makers who have employed Sherman's language and the words of other Union commanders to depict the North as a land of vicious barbarians and dreadful vandals have done so to serve a variety of agendas, including that of supporting the argument that southerners “had inaugurated a chivalrous struggle based on honor; the Yankees were responsible for the brutal, destructive war it eventually became.”¹⁰

While these historians have successfully demonstrated that some pro-South advocates have used Federal language to serve their Lost Cause agendas, one could say much the same of statements made regarding Confederate behavior during the Gettysburg Campaign. Hence, when Lee issued General Orders, No. 72 and 73, setting up a system

¹⁰ Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 353; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 218-220.

of authorized requisition and calling upon his soldiers to adhere to the ideals of “civilization and Christianity” when conducting themselves in Pennsylvania, those guidelines took on the same level of mythos as and were often compared to Sherman’s statements regarding the brutality of the contest; when Confederate officers and soldiers claimed in their memoirs and post-war speeches that all acts of “marauding, or indiscriminate plundering . . . were expressly forbidden and prohibited effectively” or stated that they “left no marks of a more enduring character than [their] tracks” while marching through the Keystone State, they struck blows in the war over history and memory and asserted the Confederacy’s superior righteousness; and when historians argued that Lee protected “property from damage and women from insult” and that his men “behaved with commendable restraint” and “did not molest private property,” they (sometimes unintentionally) supported the Lost Cause agenda of maintaining the South’s hold on the moral high ground. In short, language has been just as important in creating and supporting the myth of Confederate restraint during the Gettysburg Campaign as it has been in establishing and sustaining the legend of Sherman and other Union leaders as merchants of terror. As historians have demonstrated with regard to Union proclamations, readers have too often taken Confederate officers, soldiers, and veterans at their word, but “those words were shaped to ends short of universal truth. They were aimed at military victory” and cultural superiority. They were, in short, Lost Cause propaganda.¹¹

Having explored the origins and persistence of the legacy of unmitigated restraint that has long characterized the Army of Northern Virginia during the Gettysburg Campaign, it is also prudent to investigate the South’s need for such myths, for such an

¹¹ *OR*, 1:27:2:912-913, 942-943; Early, *Memoirs*, 255, 265; Gordon, 144; Freeman, 57; Smith, “Chambersburg,” 434; Allen 355; Neely, 198-199.

examination can help explain, once more, why they are so resilient despite professional historians efforts to exorcise them. As Robert Lee Bailey Professor of History David R. Goldfield of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte pointed out in the introduction to his *Still Fighting the Civil War: The American South and Southern History*, the South can still be “a barren place, a tundra of conformity, a murderer of imagination, inquiry, and innovation” even in the twenty-first century. Based on that assessment, little has changed regarding Foster’s claims about the traditions of the South, for many southerners still do not want to see the sacred cows of the Confederacy sacrificed. According to Goldfield, “The Civil War [in the South] is like a ghost that has not yet made its peace and roams the land seeking solace, retribution, or vindication. It continues to exist, an event without temporal boundaries, an interminable struggle that has generated perhaps as many casualties since its alleged end in 1865 as during the four preceding years when armies clashed on the battlefield.” The question is why are southerners still fighting this war, and what do the myths of Confederate restraint, chivalry, and superior moral righteousness do for neo-Confederates and Lost Cause defenders?¹²

According to Robert Penn Warren, a Pulitzer-Prize winning southern author and poet who wrote about the legacy of the American Civil War, “The Civil War is our only ‘felt’ history—history lived in the national imagination,” and it played the central role in separating the South from the rest of the nation. In his assessment of the contest and its impact on the South,

the War claimed the Confederate states for the Union, but at the same time, paradoxically, it made them more Southern. Even during the War itself, there had been great and disintegrating tensions within the Confederacy. . . . But once the War was over, the Confederacy became a City of

¹² Goldfield, 1.

the Soul, beyond the haggling of constitutional lawyers, the ambition of politicians, and the jealousy of localisms. . . . In defeat the Solid South was born—not only the witless automatism of fidelity to the Democratic Party but the mystique of prideful ‘difference,’ identity, and defensiveness.

Taking it a step further, Warren also claimed, “We may say that only at the moment when Lee handed Grant his sword was the Confederacy born; or to state matters another way, in the moment of death the Confederacy entered upon its immortality.”¹³

Seen as “one South,” where one can easily “trace throughout the region . . . a fairly definite mental pattern, associated with a fairly definite social pattern—a complex of established relationships and habits of thought, sentiments, prejudices, standards and values, and associations of ideas,” this distinctive cultural region of the United States sought its own story and mythology in an effort to define itself and to cope with defeat. According to Warren, war “is, of course, different for the winner and the loser. To give things labels we may say that the War gave the South the Great Alibi . . . [, and] by the Great Alibi the South explains, condones, and transmutes everything. . . . By the Great Alibi the Southerner . . . turns defeat into victory, defects into virtues.” This system has created a vicious cycle for the South, for “even if the Southerner prays to feel different, he may still feel that to change his attitude would be a treachery.” In Warren’s estimation, the South “is trapped in history. . . . The whole process of the Great Alibi resembles the neurotic automatism. The old trauma was so great that reality even now cannot be faced. The automatic repetition short-circuits clear perception and honest thinking.” While this

¹³ Warren, 4, 14.

fantasy may be disappearing in parts of the South, it still lingers and remains unrelenting, for as Warren also said, “When one is happy in forgetfulness, facts get forgotten.”¹⁴

In distorting reality and replacing objective fact with “*perceived* fact,” the advocates of the Lost Cause tradition clearly don the mantle of moral supremacy and cultural superiority. According to Warren, one can explain this reaction by understanding that

righteousness is our first refuge and our strength—even when we have acted on the grounds of calculated self-interest, and have got caught red-handed, and have to admit, a couple of days later, to a great bumbling horse-apple of a lie. In such a case, the effect of the conviction of virtue is to make us lie automatically and awkwardly, with no élan of artistry and no forethought; and then in trying to justify the lie, lie to ourselves and transmute the lie into a kind of superior truth.

The “kind of superior truth” that evolved in the South led to a significant misrepresentation of history and the development and acceptance of the traditions of the Lost Cause.¹⁵

Wolfgang Schivelbusch, a world-renowned cultural historian and the author of *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*, provides some compelling insight into the natural tendency of defeated nations to seek solace in myths of cultural and moral supremacy and demonstrates that the South’s reaction to defeat in the Civil War was not atypical. According to Schivelbusch, while “every society experiences defeat in its own way,” the responses of “vanquished nations . . . conform to a recognizable set of patterns or archetypes that recur across time and national boundaries.” One of these reactions involves the belief that “the one great consolation for

¹⁴ W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), viii; Warren, 53-55.

¹⁵ Warren, 75.

the defeated is their faith in their cultural and moral superiority over the newly empowered who have ousted them.” In keeping with this paradigm, the Confederate march through Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 provided the Lost Cause’s proponents with an opportunity to compare the behavior of Confederate soldiers to that of Union troops and presented them with an opening to try to demonstrate Johnny Reb’s superior character and the South’s exemplary righteousness during the war.¹⁶

In any event, the evidence makes it abundantly clear that the Army of Northern Virginia’s invasion of Pennsylvania in the summer of 1863 was anything but restrained. However, an attack on the myth is not the same as an attack on the historical actors, and one must be careful not to overstate the transgressions of Lee’s troops. After all, the Confederate invasion was not nearly as brutal as the destructive *chevauchée* of the Middle Ages nor did it approach the magnitude of horror that characterized the Eastern Front in World War II or other conflicts of the twentieth century. In fact, there is ample evidence in the historical record to suggest that many of Lee’s men behaved themselves during the Gettysburg Campaign much like many Federal soldiers conducted themselves honorably during Union marches through the South. The evidence presented in these pages is not meant as an assassination attempt on the character of the Confederates by portraying them as vicious aggressors without morals but rather as a demonstration that the Army of Northern Virginia was not an immaculate force of soldier-saints as defenders of the Lost Cause would have people believe. Again, they behaved much like the very same Union soldiers that Lost Cause advocates tend to disparage for their conduct throughout the war. The truth is that Civil War soldiers were neither unrelenting in their

¹⁶ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 10, 19.

use of violence nor fanatical in their demonstration of benevolence; rather, both Union and Confederate armies exhibited a “preference for a directed severity—directed toward military resources and away from noncombatants.”¹⁷

Unfortunately, while the commanders of Civil War armies tried to reduce the effects of war on civilians, the residents who found themselves living amidst the conflict felt its impact. As the great Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wrote in his classic treatise on the nature of warfare, “War is an act of force,” and since “emotions cannot fail to be involved,” “there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” Moreover, since war does not occur in a vacuum, it tends to affect people other than combatants. Claims of military necessity with regards to the suffering of noncombatants rarely comfort those who find themselves in the path of war. Again, as Clausewitz stated:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine that is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. . . . It would be futile—even wrong—to try and shut one’s eyes to what war really is from sheer distress at its brutality.

While that statement seems to address events on the battlefield, one can easily apply it to the relationship between soldiers and civilians. Put more simply by a well-known participant in America’s Civil War, General William Tecumseh Sherman, “War is cruelty,” and while military theorists, including Clausewitz, admit that combatants can endeavor to civilize war through control and discipline, and while some scholars correctly assert “that the effective conduct of war need not extinguish the light of moral

¹⁷ Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 218.

reason,” such an absolute version of civilized warfare as the proponents of the Lost Cause claim existed during the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania is a Platonic ideal that mankind cannot hope to achieve.¹⁸

While officers on both sides of the Civil War endeavored to reduce the number of indiscretions and the level of depredation against civilians via orders and discipline and turned to the social mores of “civilization and Christianity” in the hopes that they would motivate soldiers to behave, transgressions continued to occur quite regularly. Thus, in presenting Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania as an exercise in grace and humility while portraying Union marches through the South as acts of barbaric and wanton vandalism, the Lost Cause’s defenders have been relentless in their efforts to misrepresent history in order to achieve their own agenda of explaining away Confederate defeat and demonstrating the South’s moral superiority. While professional scholars may not accept the arguments and conclusions of the Lost Cause, they need to remain equally persistent in their efforts to keep the unbiased truth before the eyes of the general public if they wish to remain relevant to society and escape the pointless cycle of talking only to themselves.

¹⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, with introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie, with commentary by Bernard Brodie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75-77; William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of W. T. Sherman*, ed. Michael Fellman (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 601; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 225; *OR*, 1:27:3:942-943.

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ABSTRACT

MARCHING THROUGH PENNSYLVANIA: THE STORY OF SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS DURING THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN

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In the summer of 1863, Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia invaded Pennsylvania and inaugurated the Gettysburg Campaign. It was the only time during the war when an entire Confederate field army found itself on free soil, and as such, it provides a remarkable opportunity to explore the relationship between Confederate soldiers and Union civilians during the Civil War. Traditionally, advocates of the Lost Cause have contrasted the Army of Northern Virginia's treatment of Pennsylvania's residents to Union armies' conduct toward southern civilians. In an effort to prove the Confederacy's righteousness and salvage pride in the face of defeat, many southerners have rallied to the ideals of the Lost Cause, and it comes across in their discussions of the Confederates' march through Pennsylvania. Authors like Clifford Dowdey, Douglas Freeman, and Edward Pollard distinguish Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and its second invasion of Union territory with an aura of epic restraint. As a result, the veil of the Lost Cause has obscured the true nature of the relationship between the Confederate invaders and the Union civilians in their path, and the myth has proven difficult for historians to dispel.

Interestingly, while popular perceptions of a Marble Man surrounded by an army of chivalrous soldier-saints persist, the historical record does not support these views. By examining a variety of sources and investigating various aspects of soldier-civilian relationships during the march, one can demonstrate that Confederate soldiers actually behaved no better or worse than their Union counterparts during Federal marches through the South. This dissertation endeavors to do just that by comprehensively exploring the actual nature of the relationship between Lee's soldiers and Union civilians and the legacy of that relationship in history and memory. In doing so, it stands to fill a glaring gap in the historiography of the Civil War by continuing the tradition of scholarship on civilians in the path of Civil War presented in books like Stephen Ash's *When the Yankees Came* (1995), Anne Bailey's *War and Ruin* (2002), Mark Grimsley's *Hard Hand of War* (1995), and Lee Kennett's *Marching Through Georgia* (1995).