A FEMINIST RHETORICAL TRANSLATING
OF THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

by

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

[N]o Oxford student has an adequate excuse for having failed to learn under the auspices of Aristotle. . . . A speech of two hours is often heard with less wandering of mind, than a sermon of thirty minutes; and that by men whose hearts are interested in the subject of the sermon, to a degree infinitely exceeding their care for that of the speech. But the sermon is a dissertation, and does violence to nature in the effort to be more like what Nature prompts. An essay may, indeed, be of such surpassing excellence, as to be heard with unbroken interest throughout; but the mass of the essays of a body of fifteen thousand men never can. We long for more than mere amendments in detail. Our need is for the introduction, or the general prevalence, of a new idea as the proper basis of preaching.

--William Ewart Gladstone, Gleanings of Past Years, 1843-78

The binary mode of structuring the world is agonistic, to use the term employed by Walter J. Ong, who associates it with the adversarial nature of [Greek] male ceremonial combat and contrasts it with the irenic, or conciliatory, discourse characteristic of “women’s liberation movements, student demonstrations, pacifism, and the substitution of the existential noncontesting fugitive hero . . . in place of the agonistic hero . . . .” The discrepancy between these two modes of being in the world has manifold, often violent, consequences, of which one has affected me most deeply: agon (contest or conflict) in the academy. “Ludus,” notes Ong, “the Latin word for school, . . . means also war games.” One cannot go to school, it seems, without going to war, where women, Virginia Woolf and Julia Kristeva and Carol Gilligan and myriad other feminist writers tell us, do not wish to be. . .

In order to earn a Ph.D., I was still required to submit a dissertation (which by definition takes apart that which has been joined together, though it is fortunately also defined as a discourse, a running back and forth: my dissertation . . . ran back and forth a lot). I still had to defend it (to ward off its attackers) even though I think that its indefensibility may have been its one great strength. I went along. Having been in the academy for more than thirty years, I am not innocent (neither unharmed nor harmless).

--Nancy Mairs, Voice Lessons: On Becoming a (Woman) Writer

I. INVENTION

My dissertation sounds a call for and offers the beginnings of a new translation of Aristotle’s dissertation on the logical nature of rhetoric. What is needed is a feminist rhetorical translating of the Rhetoric.

II. ARRANGEMENT

The project is complex, but the Introduction gives a brief overview to the reader. This kind of dissertation with its logical structure also gives a due nod, I think, to Aristotle himself and to his
own articulation of oratory and writing that forms the basis of much contemporary Western scholarship in composition and communication.

In contrast, however, the work of feminisms, of many rhetorics, and of some translation is to transform Aristotle’s original formation of rhetoric. The work recognizes at least “two modes of being in the world,” as Nancy Mairs phrases it (43), and insists that Aristotle’s singular mode is not the only one. His *Rhetoric* remains mired in an agonistic academic system, the masculinist system of snobbery that silences women and others whom it pushes into its margins. The English translations of the *Rhetoric*, eleven extant translations since 1686, have only perpetuated the system because the translators have invariably and wholly participated in it. In the system, moreover, even a dissertation on the rhetoric of Aristotle has no “adequate excuse” for failing to be under “the auspices of Aristotle,” as the epigraph of William Ewart Gladstone implies (77). Mairs suggests that, “in the academy,” the word *dissertation* has been defined to mean a text that “takes apart that which has been joined together” (43). Mairs makes the point that this definition, and perhaps the separational way of defining itself, is part and parcel of the problematic masculinist system. No one sees the problem better than rhetoric historian Cheryl Glenn, who concludes: “Gendered experiences continue to be difficult, if not impossible, to separate from human ones. And for that reason alone, the masculine gender, just like every male experience or display, has come to represent the universal” (my emphasis *Rhetoric Retold* 173). Thus, Glenn has had to go beyond the male-only system and its inherent masculinist method to regender the tradition of rhetoric. Her various methods have taken a risk, then, [of] getting the story crooked . . . [of] look[ing] crookedly, a bit out of focus, into the various strands of meanings in a text in such a way as to make the categories, trends, and reliable identities of history a little less inevitable, less familiar. . . [of] see[ing] what is familiar in a different way, in many different ways,
as well as to see beyond the familiar to the unfamiliar, to the unseen. (*Rhetoric Retold* 7)

Therefore, to write a dissertation that goes beyond Aristotle’s system of masculinist logic may require the redefinition of *dissertation* as also “a running back and forth” (Mairs 43). Such redefinition, likewise, goes beyond logic and actually enacts a redefining of “definition” as more than one way to know, more than the single traditional method. There is a need for alternatives to Aristotle’s system of phallogocentrism that seeks to dominate the feminine, the rhetorical, and the marginal.

Consequently, this project borrows liberally from, runs back and forth between, and seeks to bring together, three different areas of scholarship: 1) feminisms, 2) rhetorics, and 3) translation studies. The complexity of the project derives from the dynamic nature of each of these academic focuses. That is, the three scholarly areas are respectively dynamic in that a) each is born out of social contexts beyond the academy; b) each is richly theoretical and has real world aims and applications; c) each powerfully overlaps and intersects with the others; d) each transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries. In subsequent chapters, the three intellectual focuses may appear conflated. When I overtly discuss terms and definitions, below, it should become clear how I want to conjoin the three areas for my work. (I am referring to the purpose of this dissertation as a “feminist rhetorical translating” of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.)

The reader should note how I am using the five traditional canons of rhetoric commonly attributed to Aristotle as an organizing feature of this introductory chapter. The very brief section entitled “I. Invention” is a paragraph describing what I want to do. Then comes this section, “II. Arrangement and Style,” in order to get at both the “what” and the “how” of the dissertation, the organization and the appeal. Next is “IV. Memory,” or a “treasury of things invented” as the writer of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* puts it (Boone 10); in this section, the reader will find glossaries
respective to each of the three different areas of scholarship along with brief reviews of previous related research followed by more discussions of individual scholars and of their methods. Then, in a section called “V. Delivery,” there are the important statements of Purpose, Significance, and Methods for the dissertation.

Following this Introduction (Chapter 1), there are three body chapters and a summary conclusion chapter (Chapter 5). For simplicity’s sake, the division into body chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) follows what feminists call the phallogocentrism of Aristotle. Each body chapter will focus respectively on (A) the phallic, (B) the logic, and the (C) centric issues of Aristotle’s Greek treatises generally and of his Rhetoric particularly, both in Greek and in English translation. In addition, within each chapter, I discuss how both the non-translators and the traditional translators of the Rhetoric alike perpetuate Aristotle’s phallogocentrism. Moreover, the individual chapters will include a demonstration of the ways a feminist rhetorical translating is, and must be, different.

Chapter 2 offers a commentary on what is explicitly sexist in Aristotle’s writings, a blatant sexism lost in previous traditional translations. My translating recovers the shock of Aristotle’s misogyny and gynophobia.

Chapter 3 examines the logic of the Rhetoric, which traditional translators bind themselves to and, therefore, over-define Aristotle’s words by. The retranslating, in contrast, shows the ostensibly rigid “logic” yielding to the sloppiness of the author’s language as unintended readers read the text.

Chapter 4 exposes the elitism in Aristotle’s Rhetoric; traditional translators either have appropriated this elitism in one way or another or have glossed over it. The feminist rhetorical translating, in contrast, begins to bring out the centricism of Aristotle’s project in his treatise.
Chapter 5 will summarize the dissertation and will suggest what work is left to do. A feminist rhetorical translating of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in its entirety is one idea I will propose. In addition, then, I will call for a comparison of such an ostensibly final project with the previously completed traditional translations, all of which I think are as phallogocentric as Aristotle’s original treatise.

I want to be clear that the respective focuses of the body chapters is simply for organizational convenience. To first emphasize the phallic in Aristotle’s phallogocentrism (in Chapter 3) does not mean to imply that his logic is not phallic (even though logic will be a separate focus of the subsequent Chapter 4) or that his centrism does not also have a masculinist bias (although centrism will be the main topic of Chapter 5). Similarly, there is no need to assume that what is phallic is devoid of logic or lacks centrality in Aristotle’s thinking; or that his central concerns are not logical. My contentions are these: that the three notions overlap (i.e., the phallic, logic, and centric concerns and characteristics of Aristotle’s texts); that their separation is artificial in this dissertation; and that there must be no necessary order by which to discuss one, then the other, and then the next. The order of the morphology of the phrase *phal-logo-centrism* is simply a convenient if arbitrary organizational heuristic for these dissertation chapters.

**III. STYLE**

Normally, a glossary of important terms appears at the end of a book in an appendix. But I am putting the glossary at the beginning of the dissertation (at the start of the next section) for two reasons, one logical, the other rhetorical.

First, on the one hand, I do want to be clear about technical neologisms from the three different areas of scholarship (i.e., feminisms, rhetorics, and translation). The logic is that if (A) definitions appear early, and if (B) the reader then gets the meanings of unfamiliar but key phrases from the start, then (C) there will be meaningful understanding. Following this logic helps me to
prevent the need for “a running back and forth,” which is the second of Nancy Mairs’s two definitions of “dissertation” that in the epigraph above. Ironically, I am appealing now to the reader to run back to the beginning of this discourse. My purpose is not to be coy but rather to begin to demonstrate some of the effects of logic. Logic imposes order, a particular order, and no other. I want to show the limits of Aristotle’s logic, the logic that he would have overshadowing rhetoric, just as he would have males overshadowing females, and his original text overshadowing translation into a Barbarian mother tongue.

Second, on the other hand, I want the reader to notice how my “logic”—a play with Aristotle’s logic—can be rhetorical. By overtly using logic, I am demonstrating its limitations in order to argue, rhetorically, for alternatives to the logic. For example, by the logical law of non-contradiction, I cannot both have (A) a glossary of terms that traditionally, like a dictionary of definitions, does not name the persons defining the terms and have (B) the slightly more personal identification of just who it is that defines my terms. The objective and the subjective, by logic, are mutually exclusive. Below, the reader will notice that my definitions of terms in the glossary are mostly quotations; and yet the traditional glossary format would make me forgo naming those persons. In a sense, I am doing what Aristotle does by his logic; I am separating the idea, the notion, the abstracted definition, from the person. The end game is objectivity, not a hint of subjectivity. I am after observational abstraction, not personal bias. The ironic goal is de-contextualized knowledge of reality, not meanings supplied by context or by a person who might get the abstraction wrong. To maintain the logic, to simulate its effects, I am forgoing the traditional citation format; I am placing the names of the quoted persons in end notes. This is to imitate what logical definitions do, as in a glossary or a dictionary. They seek to foreground the meanings as “objective” and “abstract” and to place in the background not only the persons who
make the meanings of the terms but also the contexts that would help individuals interpret the terms for themselves.

I want the logical absence of a person from a glossary of defined terms to appear limiting and limited; the presentation is a rhetorical demonstration. In an earlier draft of this chapter, a committee member protested one of the definitions by writing in the margin: “This one confuses me.” I have retained the definition in this final draft to illustrate the confusion of a logic that will not easily listen to voices that it marginalizes. Just as a dictionary will not allow a reader to protest no matter how confusing or minimal or decontextualized it is, so Aristotle’s logic generally forbids the voices of those who don’t accept its order and authority.

In the context of the remaining chapters, nevertheless, the terms in the mere glossaries should become even clearer to the reader. And in the body chapters, I will return to the standard, and slightly more personal, method of citation when giving the definition of a term. In Chapter 3 particularly, where I discuss Aristotle’s use of logic to name and to define terms, the dissertation will challenge the very notion of definition and will seek to defy the abstract impersonal authority a writer like Aristotle attempts to gain by his method of logic applied to language.

The style throughout the dissertation will be rhetorical in this way. In other words, I will attempt to display and to enact contrasts between Aristotle’s phallogocentrism and other methods. For instance, I try to give particular contrasts between feminist rhetorical translating and what Aristotle writes in the *Rhetoric*. Likewise, my appeal will be to the reader to see the absolute differences between the *Rhetoric* (in Greek and in traditional translation) and what feminist rhetorical translating opens up.
IV. MEMORY

IV. A. MEMORY: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS IN FEMINISMS

**Feminism** – “Simply put, feminism is a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression.”¹

Three Waves of Feminism in U.S. History – “The first wave . . . was focused on securing the right to vote for women”; “Second-wave feminism . . . focused on achieving equality for women with men and the development of opportunities for women without the constraints of gender expectations”; “Third-wave feminism . . . challenges a universal definition of womanhood as predominantly middle class, white, able bodied, and heterosexual—a definition third-wave feminists see as their legacy from second-wave feminists.”²

**Sexism** – “Sexism is judging people by their sex when sex doesn’t matter. . . . Sexism is intended to rhyme with racism. Both have been used to keep the powers that be in power.”³

**Misogyny** – “Hatred or dislike of, or prejudice against women.”⁴

**Gynophobia** – “Fear of women.”⁵

**Feminist Rhetorical Criticism** – “Feminist criticism is the analysis of rhetoric to discover how the rhetorical construction of gender is used as a means for domination and how that process can be challenged so that all people understand that they have the capacity to claim agency and act in the world they choose.”⁶

**Feminist Historiography** – “[F]eminist historiography’ is . . . literature that consciously reflects upon the writing of history from a feminist standpoint.”⁷

**Feminist Research Methods (in the History of Rhetoric)** – “methods which violate some of the most cherished conventions of academic research, most particularly in bringing the person of the researcher, her body, her emotions, and dare one say, her soul, into the work.”⁸
**Feminist Philosophers** – “[F]eminist philosophers . . . investigate how canonical philosophers dealt with the question of women, both to determine if their views might provide resources for addressing contemporary issues or whether the sexism of their theories continued to pervade contemporary philosophical and, perhaps, even social and political practices.”

**Feminist Hermeneutics (of the tradition of the mostly-male Bible)** – “[I]t is my conviction that the illusive entity that we call ‘tradition’ is the all-encompassing movement that contains within itself the biblical text and the factors leading to its production. It contains as well the reflective interpretation of that articulation in subsequent generations, including our own, as persons in concretized life situations bring the text to bear on their own experience and, no less important, their experience to bear on the text. In other words, tradition is not a boundary but an open road that connects us with the past and points us in the direction of the future.”

**French Feminism** – “‘French feminism’ in the Anglophone academic world has signified the particular kind of thought and writing produced by certain French intellectuals, especially Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray.”

**Fundamental Structure of Patriarchy / Masculinist Binary** – “The fundamental structure of patriarchy is . . . both spatial and temporal, predicated upon separation, not relation. . . speak[ing] the language of opposites[:] me/not me, active/passive, culture/nature, normal/deviant, good/bad, masculine/feminine, public/private, political/personal, form/content, subjective/objective, friend/enemy, true/false.”

**Woman’s Language, or Feminine Discourse** – “Feminine discourse is not the language of opposites but a babel of eroticism, attachment, and empathy.”

**Gynocentric Writing** – an “uncovering [of] gender potentialities in words by studying their dictionary definitions, reworking them, and excavating their etymologies.”
Écriture Féminine – “a particular approach to the question of women's writing, exemplified by Hélène Cixous and her ‘études féminines’ seminar. Central to this approach is the belief that sexual difference is inscribed in language in ways that can be detected.”\textsuperscript{15}

Phallogocentrism – “system of inflexible last judgment, which does not permit even a second of incredulity.”\textsuperscript{16}

Feminist Translator – “The feminist translator, affirming her critical difference, her delight in interminable rereading and rewriting, flaunts the signs of her manipulation of the text.”\textsuperscript{17}

**IV. B. MEMORY: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND METHODS IN RHETORICS**

**IV. B. 1. ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC**

Aristotelian Rhetoric – In this dissertation, Aristotelian rhetoric refers to Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric as put forth both in the *Rhetoric* and in his other treatises.\textsuperscript{18}

Rhetoric – “Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion.”\textsuperscript{19}

Logic – Aristotle’s scientific method of using binary, contrastive statements to define and classify. The focus of Chapter Three of this dissertation will be on Aristotle’s *logic*, his coined term for this method he invented.

Antistrophe – “Antistrophos is commonly translated ‘counterpart’ . . . [and] can mean ‘converse.’” Aristotle opens the *Rhetoric* with his first definition of rhetoric, which uses logic\textsuperscript{20} to establish a contrast, and the contrastive word is “antistrophos”: “Rhetoric is an *antistrophos* to dialectic.”\textsuperscript{21}

Dialectic – “[T]he art of logical argument . . . practiced as an exercise by students of philosophy in the form of question-and-answer dialogue.”\textsuperscript{22}

Syllogism – “a deductive argument consisting of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion.”\textsuperscript{23}

Enthymeme – “a rhetorical syllogism.”\textsuperscript{24}
**Pistis** – “proof, means of persuasion, non-artistic or artistic, by character [ethos], emotion [pathos], or logical demonstration [logos].”²⁵


*Deliberative, Judicial, Epideictic* – “The second tripartite division [of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, after his first tripartite division of the species of *pisteis* into ethos, pathos, logos] concerns the three species of public speech. [1] The speech that takes place in the assembly is defined as the deliberative species. . . [2] The speech that takes place before a court is defined as the judicial species. . . [3 T]he third species . . . the epideictic speech praises or blames somebody, . . . to describe things or deeds of the respective person as honorable or shameful.”²⁷

**IV. B. 2. MEMORY: THREE INVENTIVE FEMINIST RHETORICS**

This dissertation draws on three other (feminist) rhetorics that are particularly inventive and lend themselves to the further development of “feminist rhetorical translating.” These are Afrafeminism, Rhetorical Listening, and Tagmemics; the coiners of these names and the figureheads of the respective inventive rhetorics are Jacqueline Jones Royster, Krista Ratcliffe, and Kenneth L. Pike. All three are well grounded in both rhetoric and composition and have made tremendous contributions to the respective fields.

Royster’s Afrafeminism and Ratcliffe’s Rhetorical Listening are theories in composition and rhetoric that are explicitly feminist. Patricia Bizzell goes so far as to say that Royster’s Afrafeminism is an exemplary method for feminist historiography. And the organizers of the 2007
Feminism(s) and Rhetoric(s) Conference invited Ratcliffe to be the keynote speaker to present her Rhetorical Listening. Pike’s Tagmemics is not overtly feminist; but I’m calling Tagmemics feminist just as Keith D. Miller calls Jim Corder’s work “Radical Feminist Rhetoric” when explaining that

Corder doesn’t call himself a radical, a pioneer, a subversive, or a feminist, [but] his rhetoric is radical, pioneering, subversive, and feminist [. . . for h]e interrogates, overturns, and supplants the agonistic rhetoric of display that dominates scholarly writing (and much of Western culture), replacing it with a feminist rhetoric. (59-60)

Pike, in feminist work like Corder’s, does not ignore the fundamental ideas of Aristotle and Cicero (that were repopularized by Edward Corbett, Frank D’Angelo, and Winifred Horner) but stretches them far beyond what Aristotle, Cicero, and other ancients conceived. . . [and] stretching also defamiliarizes rhetorical concepts. . . reanimating-through-defamiliarizing (Miller 69)

Royster and Ratcliffe, of course, do the same.

Moreover, Afrafeminism, Rhetorical Listening, and Tagmemics are inventive because they view language as carrying what Toni Morrison calls “nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties” (“Nobel Prize”) and what Nancy Mairs characterizes as “a babel of eroticism, attachment, and empathy” and as “an absolute and radical alterity that enfolds the other, as in pregnancy a woman’s immune system shuts down in such a way that she shelters and nourishes, rather than rejects and expels, the foreign body within her” (42). Mairs actually calls this language “woman’s discourse” (42) in contrast to discourse in Western culture that is more straightforward, more conventional, standard, and academic. Mairs is clear to note that “woman’s discourse” is marked and that all other discourse is apparently natural and is, therefore, unmarked. I hope the reader can see from
these quotations of Morrison and Mairs that “mid-wifery” and “pregnancy” are metaphors that do mark a womanly role, a generative process that may include the male but does not thereafter always follow the conventions of men and their culturally sexed, albeit unmarked, roles.

The three inventive rhetorics allow for an acute awareness of how the fundamental ideas of traditional translation rest on and reinforce Aristotle’s phallogocentrism. Without ignoring Aristotle, the three inventive rhetorics reconceive the very Aristotelian definition of translation by stretching, defamiliarizing, reanimating, nuancing, complicating, mid-wifing, eroticising, attaching, empathizing, sheltering, and nourishing it.

Immediately below, I provide a very brief overview of Afrafeminism, Rhetorical Listening, and Tagmemics with a few helpful terms from each theory. In the Delivery (Methodology) Section of this chapter and in subsequent chapters of the dissertation, I will both flesh out the terms noted and mention others; I will also draw attention to other individuals who have contributed to these inventive rhetorics.

Afrafeminism is a rhetoric enabling African American women to examine their literacy practices through “historical ethnography” (Royster, *Traces of a Stream* 272). Royster comments that this method reflexively allows her and other African American women to “define ourselves in counterdistinction to the externally defined perceptions that have been assigned to us over the generations” (273). The inventive rhetoric is much concerned with how “knowledge, experience, and language merge” (259) and with the “merging of specialized knowledge and community knowledge” (276). The subjectivity in objective study is foregrounded. The feminist rhetorical translator finds the afrafeminist insistence on subjectivities and mergings useful when turning to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, which assigns perceptions of gender, race, and class to its readers.
“Rhetorical Listening” (which is the title of one of Ratcliffe’s essays) recovers “a trope for interpretive invention and a ‘code of cross-cultural conduct’” (the essay’s subtitle). The other turns or tropes in Western rhetorics are speaking, writing, and reading. Ratcliffe notes that “Aristotle’s theory never delves into how to listen” (199). What makes listening rhetorical and inventive is its “listening to discourse not for intent but with intent” (205). And one particular technique is inventive “eavesdropping,” a kind of intentional overhearing that makes meaning of conversation that’s listened in on. The feminist rhetorical translator of Aristotle’s Rhetoric should never be able to accept the author’s misogynist intent, for example, but she (or he) may indeed listen with intent; that is, she may just have to listen rhetorically (because reading the text by its author’s intention is abominable).

Tagmemics is a linguistics theory that has been applied to rhetoric and composition with a particular emphasis on the roles of discovery and change of meanings in communication. The perspectives of the insider (emic) and of the outsider (etic) in any discourse are key to the theory. The name tagmemics is a neologism from tagma (or τάγμα) which is Greek for “to arrange, or to order” and --emics (from εμική) which Pike has argued means “subjective insider.” One of the aims of tagmemics is to discover the “psychological reality” of the other as insider. Hence, when Pike gives his famous, interactive “monolingual demonstration,” he makes “etic” observations of an “emic” speaker of a language Pike has never before heard or read. He, the observer, begins to talk by gestures and by interactive observations with the emic speaker in her language. The greatest discoveries and changes come to the etic observer as he learns from the emic observed. The etic observer grants all agency to the emic observed; moreover, the observer outsider may, and does, choose from inventive perspectives herself. The perspectives, Pike notes, can be varied: as “particle,” as “wave,” or as “field.” Pike is borrowing these metaphors from physicists, such as Albert Einstein, who note that the would-be objective observer is not constrained by “nature” to
view “light” only as a particle; no, light may be viewed as having wave-like properties and certainly light is relative to the contexts in which it is observed whether with respect to mass, energy, space, or time. Pike’s mantra is “person above logic,” and tagmemics insists that “reality is always talked-about reality” and that “language is infinitely dimensioned” by its users. Pike means that “person (and relation between persons) is given theoretical priority above formalism, above pure mathematics, above idealized abstractions” as forced by Aristotle’s logic (*Linguistic Concepts* xi). Persons can bend language to make meanings in various ways, in creative and generative ways. Logic is not an essential mirror of reality. And language is not bound by the single dimension of a universal grammar, as linguists such as Noam Chomsky would posit by his system of abstract binary features. Pike views language as basically personal and interpersonal but not bound by impersonal logic:

‘We’ cannot start with logic, unless we first have ‘ourselves’. A child is before it is grown. A child trusts its mother—a person must trust in unproven convictions about life before using them to argue about other things. Here we come full circle—from person, to language-in-society, to knowledge, to arguments for validity, and back to the person so arguing. So here I begin with person—but person [etically and then emically] as interacting through language with other persons, along with interaction with things and events in that environment. (*Talk* vii-ix)

The feminist rhetorical translator of the *Rhetoric* approaches Aristotle’s text etically, hoping for discovery but also counting on change, claiming her emic perspectives, in any chosen context.

Because feminist rhetorical translating in this dissertation will be inventive and will draw from these three inventive rhetorics, I have previewed them here. Afrafeminism’s recognition of and insistence on the subjective agency of the observer is much different from Aristotle’s pretense
of the objective observer using logic. Rhetorical Listening gets at the “how to listen” (even the “how to listen in on” Aristotle); Aristotelian rhetoric, of course, never teaches how to listen. And Tagmemics gives tools to the outsider (rhetorical tools of difference), to any and all of us now reading the *Rhetoric* as outsiders, as women and / or as any non-ancient-Hellene using barbarian mother tongues. It is difference that feminist rhetorical translating seeks to make and to celebrate; such difference Aristotle and his rhetoric disparages.

IV. C. MEMORY: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND METHODS IN TRANSLATION

Earlier in this section (in IV. A.), I introduced the notion of the “feminist translator” who “affirming her critical difference, her delight in interminable rereading and rewriting, flaunts the signs of her manipulation of the text.” Here, I want to make obvious that feminist translation is quite a departure from traditional translation and is more akin to what some scholars are calling “translingualism.” This section continues, then, with helpful terms and definitions in translation, ending with a chart that shows some concrete differences between traditional translation and feminist translation.

IV. C. 1. TRADITIONAL (PHALLOGENTRIC) TRANSLATION

*Source Language* or *Original Language* / *Receptor Language* or *Target Language* – These are typical phrases to suggest the priority and direction of traditional translation work in which the original language is to be received by the target language in forms and ideas equal to the former.

*Dynamic Equivalence* (also known as *Functional Equivalence*) – “Dynamic equivalence in translation is far more than mere correct communication of information”; it “is
therefore to be defined in terms of the degree to which the receptors of the message in the
receptor language respond to it in substantially the same manner as the receptors in the
source language.”

**Formal Equivalence** (also known as **Literal Equivalence** or **Accurate Translation**) – “is basically
source-oriented; that is, it is designed to reveal as much as possible of the form and content
of the original language,” and “a literal translation ‘acts, as it were, as Aristotle’s unmoved
mover, and the psychological effect is to bring the reader to the original [i.e., the original
language as it expresses only the original intent of the original author].”

**Relevance Theory Pragmatics** – “is essentially a theory of communication rather than a translation
theory . . . to offer an account for how meaning is communicated from one mind to another,
in cognitive terms, given a specific situational context; [w]hen it comes to translation, we
are suggesting that translation can essentially be viewed as an act of communication
between two languages and cultures.”

** Literary Translation** – “I wish to distinguish literary translation, including the ancient art of
imitation, from routine information transfer, such as the interlingual rewording of scientific
or business documents. . . the ultimate challenge at the complex heart of literary
translation. . . is [that language, especially poetry is] polysemous, with many layers of
meaning—aesthetic, phonic, and expressive—to transpose between tongues.”

**IV. C. 2. TRANSLINGUALISM**

**Translingual** – “A proportion of the individual speakers of any language are translingual, in the
sense that they are able to move between two closely related outer-languages, inner-
languages or dialects, or even to create an intermediate state between them. This
translingualism among closely related forms of speech is often part of a native speaker's
skill, acquired as a child, and should be distinguished from bilingualism in the more
conventional sense, where an individual speaker is able to navigate between two distinct languages.”

**Host and guest languages** — “one creates *tropes of equivalence* in the middle zone of translation between the *host* and *guest* languages.”

**Interlation** — “is a multilingual variation on the same theme, where the roles of ‘source’ and ‘target’ languages are not established or are interchangeable. One language allows the reader to perceive what another language misses or conceals.”

**Stereotextuality** — “Can an idea be adequately presented in a single language? Or do we need a minimum of two languages (as with two eyes or two ears) to convey the volume of a thought or image?”

**IV. C. 3. MEMORY: TRADITIONAL (PHALLOGOCENTRIC) TRANSLATION VS. FEMINIST RHETORICAL TRANSLATING**

One of my claims in this dissertation is that traditional translators of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* have, wittingly or unwittingly, participated in and perpetuated the original author’s phallogocentrism, or his “system of inflexible last judgment,” as Clarice Lispector puts it (qtd. in Cixous; 123). By insisting on translating in a feminist, rhetorical way, I am not hoping somehow to mirror absolutely or to oppose diametrically the phallogocentrism of Aristotle. In addition, there may really be no difference at all between “feminist rhetorical translating” and what has been defined earlier as “feminist translation”; the former phrase tends to mark the fact that “feminist translation” is rhetorical and is a dynamic process. There are, nonetheless, absolute differences between phallogocentrism and feminist rhetorical translating. Some of these are explained below, and then the differences are noted in two tables further below.

If I were, rather than articulating differences, forced to imagine a precise inverted counterpart to phallogocentrism, then it might be something like “womanly discourse that’s
inclusive” or “feminist-rhetorical-translating.” But such seems to work more appositionally than oppositionally.

When I say “appositionally,” I mean the word ambiguously. Thus, “appositionally” means both a lack of position (or “a-position”) and also a positioning of things side by side (as with an appositive in grammar, in which one noun is positioned beside another so that the first is understood adjectivally perhaps but the second is always to be understood as a restatement of the first.) The two senses convey the following: both 1) the feminist’s position NOT with respect to the phallic position and 2) the ways meaning is made when two words (such as “feminist” and “rhetorical”) are placed alongside one another. This second sense also performs the way Greek parables do, which requires the astute listener to read and to interpret the story told (or thrown alongside) in light of the listener’s own subjective story. (Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, disparages the use of Greek parables and black-man parables as bad style. Likewise, he is very clear to his students that they are to avoid ambiguity, which parables encourage.36)

If there is any single and clear “opposition” at all (in the contrast between phallogocentrism and feminist rhetorical translating), it is the opposition made by the male who is exclusive of females, their rhetorics, and all efforts by women to engage through translation the central, unmarked language of the most educated men. Aristotle, for example, is intentional about his opposition. Aristotelian opposition uses what I am playfully theorizing as a triple strategy of 1) imposition, 2) proposition, and 3) transposition.37 First, Aristotle’s male imposition on females is the phallic in nature, the imposition of what he determines is the nature of “nature.” Women are naturally lesser than men. (See Chapter 2.) Second, Aristotle’s oppositional strategy of proposition is logic. That is, he uses words and statements in “syllogisms” of logic to propose such oppositional correspondences: phallic / feminine; logic / rhetoric; “pure Greek” (“τὸ ἀνθρώπινον”) / translation. In Chapter 3, I discuss proposition as an
oppositional strategy of Aristotle. Third, Aristotle employs the oppositional strategy of transposition. That is, he co-opts the discourse of others, distilling “his baby” from what he sees as “their bathwater.” He exchanges their modes of language for his own reduced mode. Toni Morrison calls this process of opposing by transposing a kind of dominating thievery; Morrison explains, “The systematic looting of language can be recognized by the tendency of its users to forgo its nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties for menace and subjugation. Oppressive language does more than represent violence; it is violence; does more than represent the limits of knowledge; it limits knowledge” (“Nobel Prize”). This dissertation stresses the fact that previous translations of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* have followed the author in his intentions to be oppositional, to be phallogocentric, to be systematically impositional, propositional, and transpositional. The next several chapters will begin to demonstrate how “actual” translation can be different. When I say “actual,” I am making the claim that traditional masculinist translation is merely an apparent rendering of one language as another.

Feminist rhetorical translating will stress difference, the absolute differences, between itself and Aristotle’s phallogocentrism; Nancy Mairs gives reason to call “feminine discourse” an “absolute alterity” (42). But the difference of feminist rhetorical translating is never a total one-to-one oppositional contrast by an either-or binary, which the phallogocentrism insists on. In other words, feminisms that are translational and rhetorical seek productive discovery and change through appositions, not through opposition by imposition, proposition, and transposition.

What follows, then, is my two-part thesis for this dissertation: first, that Aristotle, for all his phallogocentrism, cannot get away from being profoundly influenced by and from employing regularly the marginal discourses of women; and, second, that a feminist rhetorical translating
might yield the most accurate, most thorough, and most representative translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* possible.

That said, I should quickly add a few more qualifications that complicate this argument. First, when I claim that Aristotle is influenced by feminine discourse, I want to be very clear that Aristotle himself intends to do just the opposite. He absolutely wants to marginalize and to silence the voices of women. Aristotle is not only complicit in the misogyny of his male culture and its time; he pushes his society of men and their language even further. He wants to co-opt rhetoric (the language that sophists and women poets like Sappho also use) and then to constrain it by his logic. Aristotle intends always and only to use the agonistic binary, the language of opposites. In Toni Morrison’s words, he intends to “loot” their language for purposes of subjugating females, foreigners, poets, actors, and sophists. Morrison suggests it is not so difficult to recognize the tendency of such looting. In a parable, she has a blind old woman rhetor “seeing” the problem with the listeners of the parable. But I demonstrate also that Aristotle ultimately fails in his intentions not only to “forgo” womanly discourse but also to “menace and subjugate” women. And if he were to admit his failure (which he will not), then he would admit that he uses language with “nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties” without intending to do so. He is in denial. He does, in fact, have meanings he never intends. And he makes these meanings with and by the methods of those whom he most despises, that is, with women and with the poets of old and with us all today, the present barbarians who translate his words. Instead of successfully using the language of opposites, as he intends, Aristotle actually participates unwittingly in feminine discourse. “Feminine discourse,” Nancy Mairs reminds us, “is not the language of opposites but a babel of eroticism, attachment, and empathy.” I would like to suggest that rhetorical discourse and translation too may also be such a babel. To sum up the first part of my thesis, then, Aristotle may intend to rein in and to reign over (women’s)
language, but he fails to do so. Feminist rhetorical translating actually translates Aristotle’s failure to use the phallogocentrism he intends. In this way, feminist rhetorical translating achieves what Richard Leo Enos might call the most “accurate, thorough, and representative” translation of the Rhetoric of Aristotle possible (‘Women’ 300).

The goals of the feminist rhetorical translator are much more richly complex; the goal is not necessarily accuracy, thoroughness, or representation, which often is the goal of traditional scholarship. Traditional history writing, for example, praises the ostensibly-singular correspondence between past reality and present accounts of it. Such a traditional standard even gets applied to feminist historiography in classical rhetoric. Enos, for instance, applies the traditional standard to Cheryl Glenn’s regendering when he says: “The real credit of Rhetoric Retold is in how Glenn reassesses such [sexist] presumptions—both on the part of contemporaries and later historians—so that a space is made to consider discourse practices of this woman in a way that is accurate, thorough, and representative” (‘Women’ 300). And yet historian Patricia Bizzell cautions: “Enos, however, misses an important implication of this new work in feminist research. . . [that] historical research now, though relying on some traditional methods, must also raise new methodological questions” (‘Feminist Methods’ 7). Bizzell makes clear that “traditional methods” are not enough for the feminist historian of rhetoric because the aim of accuracy, thoroughness, and representation demands a phallogocentric tool of objectivity. Invoked are the false binaries of accuracy / inaccuracy, thorough / partial, representative / unrepresentative, objectivity / subjectivity. Feminist methods, in contrast, allow for subjectivities with objectivity simultaneously, and the methods always ask, “whose accuracy, thoroughness, and representations and when and where and why and how?”

When it comes to translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Enos has argued that “The entire point of translations . . . is to put wisdom in the hands of readers who have an expertise other
than philology, so that their insights can enrich our understanding in another dimension” (“Classical Tradition[s]” 288). While it may be true that to impart wisdom and understanding is an admirable goal for translation, the changes that wisdom and understanding might effect by the process of translating may be as valuable or even more important to the rhetorical feminist.

I want to suggest, likewise, that in feminist rhetorical translating the aim of completeness, accuracy, and representation are simply the means to address further additional and varied concerns. Likewise, putting wisdom in the hands of readers is for other purposes. The non-negotiable concerns of the feminist tend to be the voicing of the unvoiced, the speaking of the speakeresque, and the translating of the untranslated in order to minimize and if possible eliminate sexism, racism, elitism and other bigotries.

It should be clear that this dissertation is recognizing a profound difference between phallogocentrism and feminine discourse. The claim is that Aristotle intends phallogocentrism and so does traditional translation. Feminist rhetorical translating, in contrast, seeks to employ feminine discourse. It is helpful to enumerate some of these differences provided we see that the differences are neither mere opposites nor are, for the feminist, primarily oppositional. The table below can begin to illustrate. And then actual translating will best demonstrate the differences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional (Phallogocentric) Translation</th>
<th>Feminist Rhetorical Translating</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The author’s intentions</strong> in the source language of the original text must be retained in the target language of the translated text.</td>
<td><strong>The author always says more than he intends</strong> in the source language of the original text and the target language of the translated text may “mark” the unwittingly unmarked intentions of the author especially as he silences the voices of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The more complete, accurate, and representative a translation</strong> is with respect to the original text the better it is.</td>
<td><strong>The more once-silenced voices translated</strong> and brought out from the original text the better. More completeness, accuracy, and representation of the author’s voice may also result.</td>
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(continued. . .)
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<th>Completeness, accuracy, and representation in the translation are judged by faithfulness to the original text and the intentions of its author.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The translator is more responsive to marginalized listeners and their exclusion by the author. Such responsiveness “overhears” more acutely what the author says than direct faithfulness to his vocalized intentions (Ratcliffe 105).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalence of meanings is to be constructed between the source language of the original text and the target language of the translated text. As possible, there must be complete equivalence, accurate equivalence, and representative equivalence. The original meanings are static and stable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“[O]ne does not translate between equivalents; rather, one creates tropes of equivalence in the middle zone of translation between the host and guest languages. This middle zone of hypothetical equivalence, which is occupied by neologistic imagination, becomes the very ground for change” (Liu, Tokens 137). Translating is translingualism; it changes both the original text and the hypothetically equivalent translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equivalences may be literal, stylistic, or otherwise dynamic (but not necessarily word for word) so that the author’s effect on his original audience may best mirror his effect on the readers of the translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“[T]ranslation will come to serve not as a substitution but as a dialogical counterpart to the original text. Together they will comprise a multidimensional, multilingual, ‘culturally curved’ discourse. … an interlation, a contrastive juxtaposition of two … apparently identical texts running simultaneously in two different languages… Interlation is a multilingual variation on the same theme, where the roles of ‘source’ and ‘target’ languages are not established or are interchangeable. One language allows the reader to perceive what another language misses or conceals” (Epstein).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The translator should be silent and invisible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The translator may speak with her own voice and have “increasing visibility” (Flotow-Evans 69).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The translator’s work must be transparent, “seen through, and not heard about” (Flotow-Evans 69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The translator may work to produce an “obvious over-translation . . . for ‘shock effect’ and for ‘the repossess of the word by women, and the naming of the life of the body as experienced by women’ transparent”” (Godard qtd. in Flotow-Evans 70).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The translator must understand the author’s intention and language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The translator must act as both a scientist and an artist (Lightman), both understanding the author’s intention and language and also allowing readers to participate in believable meaning making.</td>
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The translator’s understanding of the author’s intention and language must be **objective** and should take into account etymological **origins** and should not take liberties with original-culture **categories**.

The best objectivity is “in bringing the person of the researcher, her body, her emotions, and dare one say, her soul, into the work” (Bizzell 17). The translator brings her own subjectivities to the texts and **personalizes her own positions**: including the fact that she is an outsider to Aristotle’s writings and cultures. Her positions are “etic” and “emic.” “The observer changes and is changed” (Pike Linguistic Concepts 3).

In addition, there are some very subtle differences between traditional phallogocentric translation and feminist rhetorical translating. The following table notes these differences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional (Phallogocentric) Translation</th>
<th>Feminist Rhetorical Translating</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>The translator</strong> may grapple with the <strong>ambiguity</strong> in the original Greek language but imagines that it must be, and works so that it will be, <strong>disambiguated for reader clarity</strong>.</td>
<td><strong>The translator</strong> takes advantage of the <strong>ambiguity</strong> in the original Greek language <strong>by flaunting it and maximizing the polymorphic word play</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The translator</strong> may leave undefined words in the original text but will tend to <strong>transliterate the undefined words</strong>. The purpose is to leave as much of the language in the original as possible, so as to retain static meanings and to bring across the sounds of the original language. To thoroughly explain, then, the translator will use <strong>text-external apparatuses</strong>: footnotes, glossaries, lexicons, dictionaries, commentaries, theses or dissertations, lectures, debates, and articles.</td>
<td><strong>The translator</strong> will leave undefined any assumed meanings of words in the original text so that <strong>the reader may participate in new meaning making</strong>. The goal is to make the original words and meanings “grounded in their sites of usage in ways that <strong>remake</strong>, not simply lift” them from their contexts (Berlin in Ratcliffe 104); but, understandably, the remaking extends also in the direction of the words and meanings in the language used for translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintended and subtle <strong>biases and prejudices</strong> in the author’s language and culture (i.e., sexism, classism, racism) may be <strong>downplayed or altogether avoided</strong> in the target language, especially when they detract from the author’s intended theses and the sensibilities of the readers of the target language. George A. Kennedy, for instance, is right in the traditional view when he makes as one of the two features of his translation of Aristotle’s <em>Rhetoric</em> “the avoidance of sexist language.”</td>
<td><strong>Bigotry in the original text, however subtle or unwitting, is not reversed but highlighted</strong> “not as a gendered busybodiness but as a rhetorical tactic of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one’s own knowing so as to overhear and learn from others and, I would add, from oneself” (Ratcliffe 105). Mary Daly’s “gynocentric writing” (or a “Daly-esque . . . uncovering [of] gender potentialities in words by studying their dictionary definitions, reworking them, and excavating their etymologies”) (Ratcliffe 104).</td>
</tr>
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There is absolutely no relativism desired by the translator. Not “anything goes.” Postmodern deconstruction of the original text or author by translation is not the goal.

The translating is grounded in the ‘shock effect’ and ‘the repossession of the word by women, and the naming of the life of the body as experienced by women’ transparent (Godard qtd. in Flotow 70). There is “radical relativism” but only and always within “rigid restraints” (Goodman qtd. by Pike). There is much word play in the original (i.e., wiggle room and playfulness), and the translator only exploits that. Not “anything goes.”

The translator’s gender is unmarked. And yet because unmarked, the male gender is the default especially because no woman has to date published a translation of Aristotle’s treatise on Rhetoric. More than that the translators’ methods have been exclusively and exclusionarily masculinist and Aristotelian, employing opposition, dichotomy, and cerebration.

The translator may be female or male but employs (intentionally or otherwise) feminist, rhetorical critical methodologies for the translating. “Preference [is] for relation over opposition, plurality over dichotomy, embodiment over cerebration: Montaigne’s begins to sound like a feminist project. Which is not to say that Montaigne was a feminist” (Mairs 75).

The above list of differences is intended not to be exhaustive but expansive. One of the purposes of this dissertation is to explore and to open up the various ways a feminist rhetorical translator works and might work.

The body chapters of this dissertation will give many more examples, but here I offer a bit of a preview, a brief narrative as an imagined background. I am imagining across history, visualizing what Aristotle’s contemporaries, namely his daughter and his slave, might do with his text. And I am comparing how they might translate with how our contemporaries, such as George A. Kennedy and John H. Freese, might render Aristotle’s Greek into another language. This imagination is, admittedly, a postmodern exercise, an attempt to span the gap of time. But the comparative exercise is more than just to erase time; it is to begin going back to lost discourses and methods of engaging with text that predate Aristotle. As a father, Aristotle excluded his daughter from learning; conversely, as a father I want to imagine how one of my
daughters, like Aristotle’s daughter, might approach, overhear, interpret, and translate a text not meant for her and her friends. In feminist postmodernism, it is more than the mind and more than the imagination that can bring together feminine discourse across time. Cixous suggests, for example, that women without regard to time may write the feminine body (or write the body feminine); Aristotle’s daughter or one of my daughters can write with regard to the body. Such writing, however, is something Aristotle would be loath to imagine.

Imagine that one day Aristotle is off at the Academy, teaching young men there. His daughter Pythias, who is well documented in history, is at home where she has taught herself to read. She’s also learned to converse in the language of the slaves and with the Libyan Eunuch named Horace (a fictional person). She leads him that day into her father’s study where, on the table, lies unrolled a copy of the *Rhetoric*. Although he also understands Greek, she reads it aloud, simultaneously translating it in his mother tongue.

Pythias is looking at what Aristotle has written, but she reads aloud as noted in the bottom-right box (as if she could interpret aloud in English). George A. Kennedy’s traditional (phallogocentric) translation is to the left of hers. She will not be as familiar with the text as Kennedy, a rhetoric scholar and a male, will be.

For convenience to scholars and others who know the traditional references, I supply here the Bekker page: 1354a. I am also retaining the line numbers, the footnote numbers, and the brackets that Kennedy supplies.

---Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1354a
1 Rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic; for both are concerned with such things as are, to a certain extent, within the knowledge of all people and belong to no separately defined science. A result is that all people, in some way, share in both; for all, up to a point, try both to test and to uphold an argument [as in dialectic] and to defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric].

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy

Speaker-ism is a turning different from the “-ism” of “talking for truth.” Around these two, at least, are the very common turnings that every woman, man, and child takes. These are the turns taken for knowing things, and yet they’re not for boundless understanding. Thus, all women, men, and children share in taking at least these two turns. All women, men, and children, in fact, go as far as this: not only do they examine and hold on to a statement but they can also handle a defensive statement and an accusation.

--a feminist rhetorical translating as if by Pythias

A traditional translator such as George A. Kennedy, of course, renders the passage as English much differently from Aristotle’s daughter. He does not begin his translation until after thirty pages of well-defined commentary and an explanatory preface. He cannot easily begin the translation without such framing notes. Kennedy also must use transliterations, or Greek words written in the English alphabet, in order to keep the Greek sounds; he considers Aristotle’s words technical and wants to follow the original author as closely as possible, in both sound and in intention. Hence, he also uses footnotes and brackets to reinforce the meanings as much as possible so that personal interpretation and context are not required.

If Pythias would translate in English, as suggested above, then her interpretation of the text is not simply attention to her father’s singular meaning. She is not, as Kennedy is, solely trying to represent Aristotle’s mind. Pythias and a barbarian eunuch slave may not be entirely ignoring what Aristotle intends, but they do listen with their own intent, and they also therefore are free to examine all other meanings, the various ambiguities in the Greek words Aristotle uses but wants to constraint. Pythias and Horace are intentional eavesdroppers, overhearing, listening in on the text. They care as much about how the words sound to themselves as how they
“should” come across to the elite Greek boys at the academy. In the subsequent chapters, I will theorize the contrast between Kennedy’s phallogocentric, Aristotelian translation and Pythias’s feminist rhetorical translating.

IV. D. MEMORY: PREVIOUS RELATED RESEARCH

Because it is so lengthy, the traditional literature review of previous research appears in Appendix A at the end of the dissertation. Nonetheless, the various chapters discuss feminist, rhetoric, and translation scholars who have done much helpful work already that makes this dissertation possible. Here, I mention some briefly who have started combining feminisms and rhetorics with translation. They include Eve (the historical-mythic mother of all, whom Willis Barnstone, a translation theorist-practitioner, calls “the mother of translation . . . [who] transformed forbidden fruit into knowledge, secret sperm into children, and the text of her story into us” (82) and Aspasia (who translated her own “status as a woman and a hetaera” into a “reputation as rhetorician, as philosopher, and as influential colleague,” in the male-dominated “movement devoted to the analysis and creation of rhetoric” (Glenn, Rhetoric Retold 41). Some of the earliest feminist rhetorical translators also include the following: Christine de Pizan (who writes women into history and influences how that history is translated); Laura Cereta (who translates a phrase from Plato’s Republic to write a history of rhetors that includes women); Olympe de Gouges (who rewrites Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen); Julia Evelina Smith (who translates the Bible); Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton (who reappropriate The Declaration of Independence); Hélène Cixous (who gives us the English word phallogocentrism by re-translation of Clarice Lispector with Eric Prenowitz); Cheryl Glenn (who reexamines Greek texts to regender the history of classical rhetoric); Nancy Mairs (who uses feminist discourse within the masculinist academy); Krista Ratcliffe (who recovers the canon of rhetoric of “listening,” which she argues Aristotle abandoned); and Jacqueline Jones Royster (who uses subjectivity in her research of the
I borrow the methods for the feminist rhetorical translating from these and other feminist translators and rhetoricians.

The rhetorical translating of these foremothers is worth looking at more closely. I will just examine the works of Pizan, Cereta, Smith, and Cady Stanton, however, because their scholarship is early, extant, and spans in time to sufficiently influence contemporary translating of phallogocentric texts.

Pizan produced her most successful works at the turn of the fifteenth century. Her well-known volumes, *The Book of the City of Ladies* and *The Treasure of the City of Ladies*, are histories that she substantially reinterpreted to include women; and the women Pizan embraces in these once-male-only histories were not only excluded but also were denigrated by men. The role of translation in Pizan’s scholarship is not unimportant. For instance, Maureen Quilligan, in *The Allegory of Female Authority: Christine de Pizan's Cité Des Dames*, says:

> By 1405 the story of the suffering of Griselda had become famous through a number of important retellings. Its initial appearance as the final story in Boccaccio’s *Decameron* inspired Petrarch, who deemed it the one piece of Boccaccio’s text worthy of circulation beyond the Italian-speaking public, to retell it in Latin. His version was twice translated into French; Christine [de Pizan] knew it in the translation of her friend Phillip de Mézières. She would also have known the Italian version in the *Decameron*. Her choice to follow Petrarch instead may not be mere ease of access, but rather a choice, once again, to move against Boccaccio’s [female-denigrating] authority. Radically condensing the Petrarchian prose, Christine proves more sympathetic to Griselda’s suffering and by the same token more attentive to her strength [than either male author or translator]. . . . In Mézières’s translation of Petrarch’s Latin, Griselda directly
compares her own strength to the young brides’s. . . . In her revision, Christine drops the direct self-reference and has Griselda cast her chastisement of her husband into the third person; the suffering of wives becomes a more general phenomenon, with the first wife actively achieving something of value, while Mézières’s Griselda simply suffered. (165-66)

Pizan clearly attends to the importance of translation in feminist historiography.

Moreover, Pizan quite plausibly influenced another feminist of the fifteenth century, Laura Cereta. Cereta, with her letter “To Bibolo Semproni,” also writes a history that is inclusive of women. And again, translation is important in this work of historical feminist rhetorical criticism. Cereta, in the letter, uses the phrase “Muliebris republica,” which glosses to English roughly as “womanly republic” or “republic of women.” Prudence Allen, in The Concept of Woman: The Early Humanist Reformation, 1250-1500, Part 2, notes the translational possibilities significant to our understanding of Cereta’s rhetorical feminism. Allen finds Cereta’s phrase, “Muliebris republica,” in another “letter replete with references to Boccaccio’s Concerning Famous Women.” And she speculates that “it is possible that Cereta gave a general term to gather together the women Boccaccio described.” Likewise, Allen hypothesizes another possibility “that Cereta was aware of Christine de Pizan’s Book of the City of Ladies” and that “[w]ith this interpretation, the expression ‘republic of women’ refers to the republic or gathering of women” (984). Nonetheless, Allen makes a more startling proposal:

I would like, however, to raise another possibility, namely that the phrase “republic of women” also harkens to Plato’s theory of educated women philosopher-guardians in his utopian Republic. My reasons . . . are as follows. First increasingly more accurate versions of Plato’s Republic were made available to Italian readers of Latin by various translators . . . . Second, Plato’s community
of women in the Republic had received considerable notoriety. Third, when Laura Cereta wrote her letter addressed to Bibolo Semproni, Cardinal Bessarion and Marsilio Ficino had attempted to redefine Plato as morally compatible with Christian life. Fourth, Laura Cereta had already proven herself willing to use controversial classical phrases and concepts when it suited her own purposes. Fifth, Laura Cereta may have been well aware of Plato’s suggestion that women were capable of the highest intellectual development in an ideal republic. Therefore it is possible that she was raising an echo of women’s place in Plato’s Republic in her phrase “muliebris respublica” even as she was describing ill treatment of a general republic of women of letters. (984-85)

What is most amazing about Allen’s suggestion is that Cereta is possibly engaging in feminist rhetorical translating; that is, while writing herself into her history of women, Cereta does so by retranslating a key Greek phrase of Plato. Plato, of course, is the teacher of Aristotle who, according to historians of rhetoric, invented the word “rhetoric,” one of the words that Aristotle, his student, goes to lengths to define in contrast to Plato’s neologic uses. Cereta, by feminist translation, may be invoking the tradition of the first rhetorical scholarship.

Some of the more recent feminist rhetorical work with respect to translating has been done and recognized, not within rhetorical scholarship per se, but in Bible translation and commentary. In 1895, for example, Cady Stanton, Lucinda B. Chandler, and more than thirty other women from around the world, decided to publish a commentary on the Bible, which they entitled The Woman’s Bible: A Classic Feminist Perspective. Francis Ellen Burr wrote an Appendix in which she gives a biography of Julia Evelina Smith and praises her work. Smith singlehandedly translated the complete Hebrew-and-Greek Bible into English when, in the 1870s, three teams of one-hundred and one men, and no women, began work in England and
America on the “Revised Version” of the English Bible. Although she was a “distinguished scholar” learned in the languages of the Bible (including Latin and English), Smith was excluded from the project because she was a woman. Burr wrote a review that contrasted what Smith did to what the men were able to produce: “Julia Smith’s translation of the Bible stands out unique among all translations.” And Burr went on to give the following detail:

Frequently her wording is an improvement, or brings one closer to the original than the common translation. Thus in I. Corinthians viii, I, of the King James translation, we have: “Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth.” Julia Smith version: “Knowledge puffs up and love builds the house.” She uses “love” in place of “charity” every time. And her translation was made nearly forty years before the revised version of our day, which also does the same. . . . This word “charity” was one of the words that Sir Thomas More, Lord Chancellor of English, charged Tyndale with mistranslating. The other two words were “priest” and “church,” Tyndale calling priests “seniors,” and church “congregation.” Both Julia Smith and the revised version call them priest and church. And she gives the word “Life” for “Eve.” “And Adam will call his wife’s name Life, for she was the mother of all living.” . . . Her work has had the endorsement of various learned men. A Hebrew professor of Harvard College (Prof. Young) . . . examined it. He was much astonished that she had translated so correctly without consulting some learned man. . . . She received many letters from scholars, all speaking of the exact, or literal translation. Some people have criticised this feature, which is the great merit of the book. (149-50)

Acknowledging the rigors of translation and of the work of commentary, Cady Stanton specifies the additional effort of contributors to The Woman’s Bible, a complement to Smith’s acclaimed
translation. In the Preface, Cady Stanton describes to readers the enduring work of feminist rhetorical translation and remarks that it calls for not only language expertise but also knowledge of history and capability in interpretation.

Within contemporary rhetorical scholarship, the most important feminist critical work done to date is not in translation but in historiography and particularly in the recovery of women rhetors and writers in the history of rhetoric. In addition, beyond rhetorical scholarship, there is a more recent and ongoing self-history of women that involves translation. The focus, nonetheless, has been neither on woman’s history related to Aristotle and Aristotelianism particularly nor on the *Rhetoric* and its translation. This dissertation, therefore, seeks to move forward with the scholarship by feminist rhetoricians doing historiography and translation to Aristotle and his *Rhetoric*. My project even considers feminist translation work beyond rhetoric.

For instance, I think Carolyn Osiek’s hermeneutical alternatives for the Bible and its tradition are important when considering Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the traditions of rhetorics. In “The Feminist and the Bible: Hermeneutical Alternatives,” Osiek has identified five different interpretational stances of feminists interpreting the Bible: “rejectionist, loyalist, revisionist, sublimationist, and liberationist” (97). That is: 1) “rejecting the Bible as not authoritative or useful. . . [and/or rejecting] the whole religious tradition it represents” (97-98); 2) “the opposite of rejectionist” (99); 3) “the tradition is worth saving” (101); 4) “the search for and glorification of the eternal feminine in biblical symbolism” (102); and 5) “the central message of the Bible is human liberation” (103). Quite obviously, there are analogies from Bible interpretation by feminist scholars to the interpretation of Aristotle’s corpus by feminist academicians. For example, there are feminist rhetoricians, such as Carol Poster, who approach Aristotle and his *Rhetoric* with a rejectionist hermeneutic. Poster says, “There are. . . several reasons why Aristotle has not, and in my opinion, should not, be appropriated for feminist rhetoric” (43). In
contrast to Poster, the eleven philosophers who write essays with her for the volume *Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle* hold various positions that can be seen as “revisionist, sublimationist, and liberationist,” all interpretational positions with respect to Aristotle’s Organon in general.

The different hermeneutical possibilities with respect to biblical scholarship do not need to be precisely correlated to Aristotelian scholarship. The respective positions of theologians, rhetoricians, and philosophers are not easily categorized. Osiek gets to the difficulties of definition and separation into categories when she says that Elizabeth Cady Stanton is at first a rejectionist but is, later at least, a more reluctant rejectionist when “her great project of The Woman’s Bible . . . shows that . . . she was not prepared to reject the whole of her religious tradition” (98). In addition, Osiek says that Mary Daly is a rejectionist, but one could argue that Daly’s *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism* actually opens up positions closer to the revisionists’ stance or the liberationists’ place. Feminist rhetorician Krista Ratcliffe actually uses what she calls “Dalyesque” methods to reappropriate the meanings of the word *eavesdropping* as a technique of Ratcliffe’s Rhetorical Listening (104).

What I am interested in is how Osiek herself seeks to leave open the various possibilities and how she runs back and forth between them to keep the options and the hermeneutical agencies open. Osiek gives this summary as a less-than-bound conclusion:

> We have surveyed five alternative responses to the question of feminist biblical hermeneutics. They arise from five different sets of women’s experiences and assumptions about the Bible. I believe that they are truly alternatives, that is, within the limits imposed upon us by our experience and human conditioning, we really are free to choose our own hermeneutical direction. The category of conversion directed by liberationist feminists to perpetrators of androcentric
patriarchy applies to feminists as well, especially to those who by race and class are caught in the double web of being both oppressed and oppressor. (104)

This kind of open determination is, I think, extremely useful to my goals and methods for feminist rhetorical translating of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

**V. A. DELIVERY: STATEMENT OF PURPOSE**

One purpose of this dissertation is to call for and to offer the beginnings of a feminist rhetorical translating of the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle from his Greek into English. The purpose is not only to start recovering what traditional phallogocentric translations have lost from the original language. The hope is also to demonstrate the possibility of recovery both of the voices and personal ways of speaking silenced by the masculinist, logical, elitist author of the text.

I understand that Aristotle intends to give voice exclusively to the elite Greek males under his training. Nonetheless, this project listens to how silenced women and muted men might hear what Aristotle writes, not because he has positioned females as outsiders or even as the most-marginalized of his outsiders but because the discourse of women does allow anyone to hear what Aristotle intends and, more importantly, more than he intends. Aristotle would circumscribe what “females” are in nature, and he would singularly “define” what is known as “rhetoric,” and he intends for limits on “translation.” The threefold claim of this project is: a) that feminism is rhetorical and translational (but not by the narrow intensions of Aristotle for “rhetoric” and “translation” but by the ways feminists define them); b) that rhetors (despite any intention to the contrary) cannot avoid feminine discourse which includes others’ languages; and c) that translation is interpretation (with respect to gender, race, and class). Another purpose of this dissertation is to begin to enact feminist rhetorical methods that expose Aristotle as a rhetor attempting but failing to constrain the discourse (1) of women, (2) of word-playing wordsmiths, and (3) of weavers of the speech and texts of one mother tongue into another. In contemporary terms, these discourses are
feminisms, (2) rhetorics, and (3) translations. The discourses of women, wordsmiths, and word-weavers pre-date Aristotle and his constraining method of phallogocentrism. Hence, when contemporary scholars argue that women (or rhetorical sophists or loose translators) have had to co-opt men’s language, the scholars may wrongly presume that Aristotle and manly discourse is prior to feminisms, rhetorics, and translations. My argument is that Greek women, Greek rhetoricians, and Greek translators into foreign languages existed long before Aristotle. My project is to recover the voices of women and other minorities who would not limit themselves to Aristotle’s “logic” but would be more open to the discourses he suppressed, namely “logos,” “myth,” “poetry,” “paradox,” “parable,” “hyperbole,” “sophistry,” “platonic idealism,” “Socratic dialectic,” “listening,” “silence,” and “rhetoric.” I want to enact the feminist rhetorical methods, various methods and not just “logic” in a translating of the Rhetoric of Aristotle. In so translating, one begins to show that Aristotle himself cannot live up to his singular goal of using ostensibly-objective and intentionally-inflectable “logic.” Likewise, in translating by feminist rhetorical methods, one shows the problems and the limits of traditional translation, that has as its intention faithfulness to Aristotle’s goal.

V. B. DELIVERY: STATEMENT OF SIGNIFICANCE

The significance of the dissertation is that it applies the recovery aims and methods of other feminist translators and rhetoricians to translating the Rhetoric of Aristotle. The project dares to use translation—and not just historiography, etymology, or archaeology—to recognize and to expose Aristotle’s canonical treatise as dominant and dominating, as phallogocentric. Using translation also calls attention to the traditional translators who—by faithfully attending to their understanding of Aristotle’s authorial intentions—ironically often obscure the sexism, logic, and elitism in his Rhetoric. In addition, a feminist rhetorical translating works in contrast to the moves of some well-meaning “feminist” scholars in rhetoric who would simply silence
Aristotle. *That is, a feminist rhetorical translating offers an alternative to the perpetuation of silencing, even the ironic feminist-phallogenocentric silencing of the male.*

I am choosing Aristotle for translating also because most readers already have some knowledge of and relationship to him. Most will recognize this author as one of the most powerful, original writers and thinkers in the formation of the academy particularly and of the dominant Western worldview generally. In addition, all readers can appreciate this writer as one who expresses clear intentions. Moreover, I am not the only reader who sees that Aristotle expresses many clear intentions (based on his systematized categories of gender, class, and race) not only in order to exclude but also to authorize the exclusion of particular persons, even certain readers. The excluded by Aristotle are women, slaves, poets, sophists, and speakers of Barbarian mother tongues.

My selection of the *Rhetoric* is important for several reasons. First, scholars through the centuries have accorded it status as an original, canonical text for rhetoric and composition studies. Second, Aristotle’s work is extant and is a fairly complete statement on rhetoric, a statement that purports to define “rhetoric” precisely and to classify it in contrast to other discourse and communication methods. Third, this treatise of Aristotle has been translated into English from the original language by at least eleven different scholars since 1686. Fourth, both the Greek *Rhetoric* its traditional translations are unnecessarily limited; the author Aristotle and the translators who would be faithful to his authorial intent fail to appreciate ancient discourses of women, of wordsmiths, and of weavers of words across mother tongues. Hence, a feminist rhetorical translating shows differences these ancient discourses can make when applied to phallogenocentric texts such as Aristotle’s and his translators’.

Feminist rhetorical methods significantly work to re-voice the unvoiced, to re-speak the speakeresque, and to re-translate the untranslated. I hope my project encourages others to
participate in feminisms and rhetorics and translation, as productive ways to speak about the differences between females and males with respect to composition and communication. But it would also be personally meaningful to me if the dissertation actually makes a difference in some small way in the equality of men and women in the academy and beyond.

V. C. DELIVERY: STATEMENT OF METHODOLOGIES

The translational methods for this dissertation are explicitly feminist and overtly rhetorical. For the feminist translator particularly, the techniques include what Sherry Simon calls “interventionist moves” (14) to “extend and develop the intention of the original text” (16). Likewise, “rhetoric,” as defined operationally by Jacqueline Jones Royster, is “language functioning as an instrument of engagement within social, political, and cultural context[s]” and is, as such, “a vital dimension of human experience, consequential in social engagement, and [action] complicit in successfully facing the challenges of life and living within local communities and beyond them” (12). Royster would agree with Kenneth L. Pike, who insists with co-authors Richard Young and Alton Becker that “Greek rhetoric was not a single, homogeneous theory.” Pike further observes that “Aristotle’s formulation of the art, however, became the nucleus of the theory that [has] dominated the tradition of rhetoric. . . . It was Aristotle’s conception of rhetoric, modified and developed by the [male] Roman rhetoricians . . . that shaped the . . . tradition of Western rhetoric” (3-4). Thus, the translator who is a feminist may employ what Krista Ratcliffe theorizes as “rhetorical listening,” a recovered method of the art, which is a “trope for interpretive invention” (Rhetorical 1); she says, “Aristotle’s theory [of rhetoric] never delves into how to listen” (“Rhetorical” 199). The various methods of feminist rhetorical translating, then, are those of vital engagement, of social engagement, of heterogeneous traditions before and after Aristotle that recover lost voices and that defy the system of the sexist author and his elitist text.
For a man to use feminist methods may seem to some peculiar or inherently wrong. I do want to identify myself as a male who is feminist. I don’t make this identification in some effort to authorize myself to do this project. Nor am I interested in reifying “the dualist lens of male-female biology” that Cheryl Glenn says is “gone” (*Rhetoric Retold* 12). Rather, with Glenn, I want to highlight the fact that “our resistant readings of the paternal narrative . . . [demand] our awareness of situatedness, our angle (in my case reading as a feminist, as a woman)” (5). I understand that if I am to “broaden my definition of rhetoric and its practice” (which is what I want my translating to do), then I will do well to situate myself as one having his “gender as a social product” (11-12). I appreciate that Glenn is “able to give to [the female gendered] Aspasia the kind of acceptance [she] had always given to [the male gendered] Socrates.” For only then through “[s]uch small methodological steps” could Glenn “write a fuller, relational account of Aspasia’s place and participation in rhetorical history, as a woman, as a foreigner, and as an intellectual and political force” (11). To broaden my (male) definitions, I understand that my method demands an awareness of my (male) situatedness, reading as a feminist, as a man.

Furthermore, I want to acknowledge that a woman like Nancy Mairs is willing to learn from a man, perhaps not even a feminist male, what she so clearly writes as “feminine discourse.” This kind of learning from, or “listening to,” as a feminist method, demonstrates in a small way what I’m calling the methods of feminist rhetorical translating.

Mairs says a woman may listen to a man, or may prefer to *read* a male author, without ignoring his perhaps-sexist or his maybe-feminist intentions but also without letting his authorial aims singularly dictate the reading either. Mairs listens, for example, to Michel de Montaigne, and she translates what she hears:

> Preference [is] for relation over opposition, plurality over dichotomy, embodiment over cerebration: Montaigne’s begins to sound like a feminist
project. Which is not to say that Montaigne was a feminist. (“You are too noble-spirited,” he was able to write to the Comtesse de Gurson when she was expecting her first child, “to begin otherwise than with a male.”) But whether intentionally or not, Montaigne invented, or perhaps renewed, a mode open and flexible enough to enable the feminine inscription of human experience as no other does. The importance of this contribution has been largely overlooked, perhaps because many of Montaigne’s statements, as well as his constant reliance on prior patriarchal authority, strike one as thoroughly masculine, and also because the meaning of essay has traveled so far from Montaigne’s that the word may be used to describe any short piece of nonfiction, no matter how rigid and combative.

“Thus, reader, I am myself the matter of my book,” Montaigne writes in his preface to the essays. “You would be unreasonable to spend your leisure on so frivolous and vain a subject.” (75-76)

Mairs is translating Montaigne for us, noting how he’s doing things both intentionally and perhaps unintentionally. He may not be a feminist, though he begins to sound like one. He strikes readers as thoroughly masculine, and yet he invents or renews so as to enable discourse that is feminine. One point I am making is that, even if he were as phallogocentric as Aristotle is, Montaigne can be read these ways: in a feminist way, in a rhetorical way, and in a translational way—ways that are not entirely, if at all, separate. Thus, a male writer can participate in a feminist rhetorical translational project. But the situatedness of the writer (as male, as female, as socially constructed) is fore-grounded just as the nature of the writer’s discourse must be.

The situatedness of socially constructed gender always must come into play. To attempt to ignore my gender is akin to trying to downplay sexism. And when one attends to gender and
to sexism, then the translational method of feminism, the opening up of defined words, begins to work. A good example is the definition of feminism by bell hooks:

Simply put, feminism is a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression. This was a definition of feminism I offered in *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* more than 10 years ago [in 1985]. It was my hope that at that time that it would become a common definition everyone would use. I liked this definition because it did not imply that men were the enemy. By naming sexism as the problem it went directly to the heart of the matter. Practically, it is a definition which implies that all sexist thinking and action is the problem, whether those who perpetuate it are female or male, child or adult. It is also broad enough to include an understanding of systemic institutionalized sexism. As a definition it is open-ended. To understand feminism it implies one has to necessarily understand sexism. (1)

There are three important things that hooks stresses that reveal her feminist methodology.

First, her “definition . . . is open-ended.” In other words, there is more to be said about “feminism” than the fact that it “is a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression.” To be “open-ended” implies a resistance to an imposed proposition; it further implies inclusion (i.e., both women and men) and generation (i.e., “child” from “adult”). Feminism so defined can indeed be, for instance, ways to communicate—such as “rhetoric” — and methods for bringing ideas across from one language to another—such as “translation.” Feminist rhetorical translating bridges gender and age, space and time.

Second, hooks’s definition is highly personal. Not only may people who are “female or male, child or adult” perpetuate the problem of sexism, but human beings also can be potentially part of the feminist solution.
Third, then, hooks hangs her definition necessarily on the definition of “sexism.” For hooks, sexism is “the heart of the matter” and “the problem” that feminism and feminists, both female and male, must solve. It is important to note that the word sexism was not even heard until 1968 when it was coined by three different feminists. The situatedness of socially constructed gender and acts of sexism do not depend on the definition of words. But the method of defining requires attention to gender.

SUMMARY THOUGHTS

This chapter has introduced the need for a feminist rhetorical translating of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. When beginning to define this method, I have intentionally used the ambiguous gerund/participle form, “translating,” rather than the full noun form, “translation.” I want to describe the method as active and as dynamic. And I want to demonstrate that language can be kept open with respect to meanings so that the authority in definition is not logically just the original author’s authority. A reader, a translator, however marginalized by an original text may nonetheless retain her or his own agency with respect to the words, the definitions, and the claims to originality.

Previous English translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric have all rather faithfully followed the author’s singular intention of constructing an inflexible system of defining and classifying which he claims to have discovered in nature and which he names “logic.” Feminist scholars call this intended system “phallogocentrism” since it puts the phallic symbol of the male above the female, prioritizes logic over “mere rhetoric,” and perpetuates an unnecessary notion that language which is central to the author must be more important than the language of the translator.

As a man translating in a feminist rhetorical way, I cannot write for women. As Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote, “man cannot speak for her” (Elizabeth 28). Nonetheless, I can’t
be silent either. I agree with Glenn who says, “We can all deploy silence as a linguistic strategy to demonstrate power or domination, regardless of our gender” (*Rhetoric Retold* 177); but she also says that the silencing of any of us by “the paternal narrative. . . demands our awareness of situatedness, our angle (in my [her] case, reading as a feminist, as a woman)” (5). Thus, as a feminist, as a male, I am suggesting that any of us can go beyond the paternal narrative, that in some ways we must go beyond it. I am employing a canon of rhetoric that, according to Ratcliffe, Aristotle refused to use or to teach his male students: I am listening rhetorically, eavesdropping in on Aristotle’s text. I am calling for more of us to do this kind of listening by translating, a feminist rhetorical listening with intent rather than a listening solely to the male author’s original intention. Translating this way may recover a new kind of original text: “A ‘feminine text,’. . . ,” which the (woman) writer Mairs reminds, “can be produced (by a woman or a man) . . .” (48). Our academic tradition of writing should not be mired in just the one and just the male mode of “two modes of being in the world” (Mairs 43). My hope is that feminist rhetorical translating of the *Rhetoric* will allow more freedom from the phallogocentric tradition of Aristotle that would silence and marginalize many of us. When the tendency for Aristotelian rhetoric, as with the propensity of Aristotelian logic, has been to take things apart, to dominate the other, there needs to be instead freedom to join together, to speak order into the world differently. There needs to be freedom to run back and forth within different rhetorics (women’s rhetorics and non Western rhetorics of all sorts) and within and between various traditions (beyond rhetoric). With the Aristotelian translation of the *Rhetoric* in the past, the ten or so translators have limited the possibilities for such generative interactions by scholars and by those outside of the academy. Feminist rhetorical translating continues the opening up of possibilities in fresh new ways that gives back agency to the silenced and the marginalized.
Chapter 2 – A Rhetorical Feminism: Translating the Phallic in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*

[T]o alter [by my translation] Aristotle’s many uses of *he*, *his*, or *him* in reference to speakers or members of a Greek assembly or jury would be unhistorical and would involve an actual change to the text. Aristotle usually envisions only males as speaking in public, but he clearly did not think that rhetoric was a phenomenon limited to males, for he draws examples of rhetoric from Sappho . . . and from female characters in epic and drama. . .

[H]e remarks that “happiness” is only half present in states where the condition of woman is poor. (Greek nouns have grammatical gender, and . . . most rhetorical terms in Greek are feminine. . . . It is not clear, however, whether the ancient Greeks [i.e., men such as Aristotle] were conscious of rhetoric as operating in feminine space.)

--George A. Kennedy, “Prooemion” to Kennedy’s translation of *On Rhetoric*

In Aristotle’s time, . . . the facts of women’s nature were certainly not sufficiently comprehended . . . [But to] any true appreciation of a woman’s qualities . . . Aristotle, by the whole trend of his prejudices, was opposed. His mistake was that he failed to realise the moral aspects of feminism.

A nation that degrades its women will inevitably suffer degradation itself. Aristotle lent the weight of his name to a profound error, and helped to perpetuate the malady which had already been the chief cause of the destruction of Greece.

--F. A. Wright, *Feminism in Greek Literature*

Feminist scholars rightly recognize in Aristotle’s writings what Hélène Cixous calls phallogocentrism. Cixous, translating Clarice Lispector, calls it a “system of inflexible last judgment, which does not permit even a second of incredulity” (123). Anna Livia explains how apt the word is: “Unlike the English phrase *pronoun envy*, which suggests the protester is misguided, the term *phallogocentrism* recognizes both that gender is a central, indeed the central, component of language . . . and that it is organized around the mark of masculinity” (5). What is so difficult about the male centrality of Aristotle’s sexist language is that it often dominates a reader’s or listener’s agency. Thus, in the presence of Aristotle’s “mark of masculinity,” there can be resentment, spite, or jealousy on the one hand; and, on the other hand, there may be excuses for it, a downplaying or even a flat-out denial of the existence of phallogocentrism.

What is so clever about Livia’s description is that it affords agency to the protester who recognizes Aristotle’s central sexist dominance in something as small as a Greek pronoun in his treatise, the *Rhetoric*. In this chapter, I want to show how a feminist rhetorical translating can
offer the reader agency to protest without envy and to fully recognize, without fear of misguidance, Aristotle’s gender-based bigotry.

The twofold thesis of this chapter is as follows. First, Aristotle imposes the male’s part in his Rhetoric in a way that steals language from women for use by elite Greek men only. Second, an English translating of the Greek Rhetoric that is both feminist and rhetorical can expose Aristotle’s masculinist stealth and can reclaim ancient feminisms, rhetorics, and translations.

This chapter proceeds with an explication of the thesis in four sections: I. The Phallic Intention; II. Recognizing the Phallic of Aristotle; III. Aristotle’s Phallic Language in the Rhetoric and Its Translation; and IV. The Difference Feminist Rhetorical Translating Makes in the Rhetoric. In the first section, I begin to show what Aristotle’s phallic language purposes to do (i.e., to steal from his rich mother tongue—from the language of women—and to claim it exclusively for elite males of Greece), and I discuss briefly the phallic effect on contemporary rhetoricians who either downplay Aristotle’s sexism in the Rhetoric or who entirely oppose it. In the second section, I examine writings of Aristotle beyond the Rhetoric that are overtly phallic and expose, by a contrasting feminist rhetorical translating, the ways traditional (masculinist) translators work. In the third section, I examine the question of whether Aristotle is phallic in the Rhetoric and the range of answers given by four rhetoricians. In the fourth section, my feminist rhetorical translating starts to recognize in new ways the phallic nature of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

The sections are by no means intended to be an exhaustive analysis of Aristotle’s phallogocentrism in his writings and in translation. They are meant to focus on the phallic part of Aristotle’s system and how a feminist rhetorical translating handles language much differently.
I. THE PHALLIC INTENTION

Aristotle imposes his masculinism by appropriating the language of women. Aristotle intends to claim the Hellene mother tongue as his own, as language for elite men of Greece only; worse, then, using the language in his teachings and in his writings, Aristotle entirely opposes “a woman’s qualities. . . by the whole trend of his prejudices” (Wright 222). When it comes to rhetoric, Aristotle places it lower than logic just as he places women lower than men. He divides women from their language, by their language, and leaves them in silence. “Sexist language” results, says Toni Morrison; when it is the language of the world of men exclusively, then it has become phallic. It bears the masculinist mark. Morrison calls the sexist process of discourse appropriation “the systematic looting of language [which] can be recognized by the tendency of its users to forgo its nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties for menace and subjugation” (“Nobel Prize”). What gets “conceived by Aristotle” as if by his impregnating, phallic pen are the “defects in the female character” that he inscribes in his treatises (Wright 204). This sort of “fathering” maintains the shape or structure that Nancy Mairs calls the “fundamental structure of patriarchy.” Mairs says, “It is a structure, both spatial and temporal, predicated upon separation, not relation. . . , [which] demands rupture, the split into halves engendered [as if] by the abrupt erection of the phallus: those who have and those who have not . . . [because i]t speaks the language of opposites” (41). In summary, first there is looting of the Hellene mother tongue; next, there is the use of language for abrupt separating and silencing; and finally there is a fathering that guarantees the perpetual use of discourse for dominant and sexist purposes.

Aristotle’s patrilineal structure is certain and pervasive today. “In every department of civilized [Western] existence,” observes F. A. Wright, “the influence of Aristotle must be taken into account, and his judgment of women’s position in society—a view sincerely held and on the whole most temperately expressed—has had far more effect on the world than have the idealist
theories of Plato” (202). Wright explains that “in [Aristotle’s] time the position of women could hardly have been altered for the worse, but by his blind followers in later ages” there has been much misunderstanding and mistreatment of women since “his slightest word [is by them] regarded almost as inspired truth” (218). And Wright laments: “If he had been a little more of a poet and idealist—in other words, if he had not been Aristotle—he might have taken another view” about females, rhetoric, and the full ranging expressiveness of the Greek mother tongue; but, Wright recognizes, “Aristotle’s influence in this matter has been an enormous hindrance to human progress” (218). And Aristotle’s influence can still hinder progress. Often it does.

Anyone can easily follow Aristotle by being a user of circumscribed and circumscribing masculinist language. The users of less “nuanced” language can be males or females in the world of men. They can pretend to belong to an unmarked (albeit masculinist) tradition of discourse, or they can wear the masks of “rhetorician” and “translator,” and even of “feminist.” They will mirror Aristotle’s phallic structure willingly or by an unwitting mirror-opposite.

On the one hand, for example, users of Aristotle’s language may insist on retaining the masculine pronoun in English translation, as does rhetorician George A. Kennedy, who does not want to be “unhistorical” or to do anything that might “involve an actual change to the text” (xii). Or, on the other hand, opposers of Aristotle’s centrality may say, along with a feminist rhetorician such as Carol Poster, that “Aristotle has not, and in my opinion, should not be appropriated for feminist rhetoric” (343); to appropriate Aristotle’s rhetoric, Poster says, “would be to use his prestige to authorize the marginalized discipline of pedagogy” vis-à-vis “the higher prestige, traditionally masculine discipline of philosophy,” which really should have only a “(perhaps separate but) equal validity [with] the traditionally feminine discipline of pedagogy” (343). Kennedy insists on the male pronouns only because, he says, Aristotle intends them. And Poster seems envious of the higher prestige of Aristotle’s “traditionally masculine discipline,” a
prestige that she says the man himself intentionally gives the discipline. Kennedy claims that Aristotle includes women in his *Rhetoric*. And yet Poster says, “Especially in light of the absence of women students from the Lyceum, it is quite difficult to read Aristotle as an advocate of women’s rights. Instead, the evidence of the *Rhetorica* is that he was equally dismissive of both women and rhetoric” (4341). Kennedy translates Aristotle’s treatise. And Poster wants no part of his theory of rhetoric whether in Greek or in translation.

I will say more about Kennedy and Poster in the section below on “How Contemporary Rhetoricians Mirror Aristotle’s Phallic Structure.” What I hope to show in this chapter, and to preview in this section, is that Aristotle’s phallic structure dominates not only the traditional rhetorician-translator but also the feminist, anti-Aristotle rhetorician as well; if both want to be sympathetic to women, then they each separately come to mirror-opposite conclusions about whether to translate the *Rhetoric*. In the two cases, I think, what the opposing rhetoricians forgo is the “nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties” of language, and what they tend towards is more like “menace and subjugation” of Aristotle’s sexism (Morrison, “Nobel Prize”).

Obviously, on the one hand, if Aristotle’s Greek language is phallic, then a masculinist translation of his language by a rhetorician will tend toward the masculinism of the original text. The original text forgoes the feminine; and so goes the translation when the translator purposes to follow faithfully the authorial intentions of Aristotle.

Likewise, on the other hand, a purely oppositional response to Aristotle, even one labeled “feminist,” also may decline feminine discourse and feminist methods for a couple of reasons. First, such an oppositional response, by attempting to marginalize the male author and his masculine mark, may at some points fail to recognize the full scope of the phallic. To silence Aristotle, or even to put his *Rhetoric* in the margins of the scholarship labeled “feminist rhetorics,” is to risk downplaying the shock of his misogyny and its source, gynophobia.
Second, an oppositional response that seeks to silence the other is itself a rigid, inflexible, phallic response, even if it is “feminist”; separating is what phallic language does. If Poster does not overtly claim such a methodological structure as masculinist, then at the very least she may appear envious of what Aristotle achieves as a male with the canonized text of rhetoric. Poster’s method can seem to mirror the “fundamental structure of patriarchy” that “demands rupture, the split into halves engendered [as if] by the abrupt erection of the phallus” (Mairs 41). Such a binary splitting downplays discourse, whether the discourse of women or the discourse of Aristotle. In both cases, there is the playing of Aristotle’s game and also the loss of any full recognition of the consequences of playing Aristotle’s game.

Going beyond Poster’s separating “feminism,” her ironic phallic feminism, there is an alternative language that engenders alternative methods. Mairs has an apt description of the alternative language worth hearing again: womanly discourse is “an absolute and radical alterity that enfolds the other, as in pregnancy a woman’s immune system shuts down in such a way that she shelters and nourishes, rather than rejects and expels, the foreign body within her” (41). This kind of radical alterity is not what either Kennedy or Poster intends or does. The language of Kennedy is separational, oppositional language because he participates in the questionable faithfulness to Aristotle’s endorsement of male-only practices in rhetoric. Neither Kennedy nor Aristotle “enfolds the other” when the “other” is woman. Similarly and ironically, Poster separates; she separates Aristotle from rhetoric and especially from feminist rhetorics. She opposes the enfolding of his “Rhetorica” into the canon. Her move only “rejects and expels” and cannot easily shelter or nourish an appropriation of “the foreign body” of Aristotle’s corpus.

I am not trying to take Toni Morrison’s or Nancy Mairs’s metaphors about phallic and feminine language too far. But I do want to demonstrate that a feminist rhetorical translating retains not only “nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties” but also “an absolute and radical
alterity that enfolds the other.” A translation, therefore, can employ feminine discourse. My contention is that Aristotle opposed translation unless it was to translate Barbarian texts into Greek (as his student Alexander the Great seemed to call for). But Aristotle’s notion of “translation”—as uni-directional, from lesser-tongues into Greek only—is rather limited indeed. Actual translation, which Aristotle would deny, can be feminist and rhetorical and multi-directional, from and to many different languages by the speakers of those languages. As mentioned already in Chapter 1, Nancy Mairs says that “[f]eminine discourse is not the language of opposites but a babel of eroticism, attachment, and empathy” (42). What we can begin to imagine is that a feminist rhetorical translating is not separational and is very different from the sexist, phallic system of Aristotle’s language. Clear examples of such translating are given in the last section of this chapter. The feminist rhetorical translator does not mirror—and does not seek, with envy, the mirror opposite of—Aristotle’s phallic nature. Rather, the feminist rhetorical translator is free to recognize more completely and to protest more substantially the phallic intention of Aristotle’s project of (male) “rhetoric.”

II. THE PHALLIC LANGUAGE OF ARISTOTLE

Aristotle does explicitly use the word φαλλικά, which traditional translators have transliterated into English as phallic. He uses the term to define and classify, to systematize.

In Chapter 3, I look more closely at his logic used to define; and in Chapter 4, my focus is on the centric nature of Aristotle’s classifications to establish his elitism. It should become apparent here in this chapter, nonetheless, that Aristotle uses the word phallic or φαλλικά to define something he sees as good and natural for the elite Greek male. He is using the word to define the various Greek musical dramas and to classify them in their natural proper places within his conceptual system. Aristotle is especially concerned with the enduring origins of certain species of musical dramas with respect to the world of Greek men.
Thus, Aristotle writes the phrase that I have placed in the right hand box of the table below. Beside it, in the boxes on the left, are traditional (masculinist) English translations offered by other men, respectively William Hamilton Fyfe and Stephen Halliwell. I have emphasized with bold font the apparently equivalent, corresponding English and Greek words:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Greek</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comedy... came from the prelude... to the phallic songs which still survive as institutions in many cities.</td>
<td>ἡ κωμῳδία... ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων... τῶν τὰ φαλλικὰ ὅ ἐτε καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-- William Hamilton Fyfe

-- Aristotle, Poetics 1449a

Before I do any feminist rhetorical translating of this sentence, I enumerate a few assumptions to show how Aristotle and traditional translators Fyfe and Halliwell mirror one another in intentions and assumptions. My inferences about the author Aristotle are these:

1. The Greek, male scientist named Aristotle is observing objectively and writing originally, authoritatively.
2. He is describing and naming what he sees in history, in the fixed nature of Greek society.
3. He is not inserting himself subjectively, interpretively, into what he writes.
4. He is not translating what some other person has written.
5. He is not interpreting what some other person has written.
6. He does not consider, beyond what he knows to be Greek male culture, the possibility of original feminine qualities or foreign qualities in the particular species of musical drama he is observing in the system of knowable nature.

This list of axioms is not comprehensive; but I do want to begin identifying a few assumptions of Aristotle. These assumptions tend to be either (a) rejected by certain feminist rhetoricians who
despise Aristotle and his agency or (b) embraced and employed faithfully by masculinist rhetoricians, all of whom regard Aristotle and the rigid principles of his phallic nature. As an alternative, feminist rhetorical translators (a) insist on listening to and highlighting as fully as possible the shock of Aristotle’s game and nonetheless (b) fully opening up, allowing, and employing all alternatives to phallogocentrism.

In correspondence to Aristotle’s phallic assumptions, there are mirror assumptions we could find about Fyfe and Halliwell and other traditional masculinist translators. These include the following:

1. Traditional translators hope to be as objective as they think Aristotle intends to be. The translator is following the various tendencies and the ostensible intentions of Aristotle. The resulting traditional translation seeks to be an objective observation of what the original Greek is.

2. The translation is to be somehow a fixed restatement of the Greek text albeit in an English that describes and names equally all that Aristotle observes.

3. The translator is not inserting himself subjectively, interpretively, into what he translates. He does not need to say, for example, that he is William Hamilton Fyfe or that he is a man or that he is a scholar of Aristotle. He must not say these things because he has a true appreciation for the original observation of Aristotle, and he lets Aristotle have the true appreciation for what is originally observed in Greek society. The translator hides behind and speaks only what Aristotle says.

4. The translation now must always go from Aristotle’s Greek to the lesser Barbarian language. Thus, the translator must allow the original author and the original text to speak with all authority and agency. English is subservient to the Greek.
5. Aristotle as author has done all of the interpreting needed. The translator must follow the interpretation of the writer.

6. The translation limits itself to the scope of the original text and context. I am not trying to establish exact correspondences, but I do want the reader to notice the aim of the translator who tends to follow the intention of the author. The author Aristotle simply intends to follow the nature of the subjects he is observing, defining, and classifying. He cannot help if something in nature is phallic; he must simply observe and faithfully define and classify the facts of nature, or so it seems. Likewise, the traditional translator simply follows Aristotle’s intentions and the seeming nature and facts of his text.

For the particular Greek translated sentence above, one might rephrase in the following way what the traditional masculinist translators say that Aristotle says. The translators are conveying that Aristotle writes this: “the phallic songs which still survive as customary institutions in many cities” have a “prelude or start” which is the very source of or “lead” into “comedy.” The shape of Aristotle’s words is to be fixed, rigid, and imposing. Each translator is to have as little variation as possible with respect to the original language where, in this case, “phallic” is mentioned; thus, between translators Fyfe and Halliwell there are only slight alternations of the English words but no variation at all of the objective meaning. Neither traditional translator is unfaithful to Aristotle’s original Greek phrase “τὰ φαλλικά” when he makes it “phallic songs”; other traditional translators do make slight variations but none significantly different from what they see Aristotle writing: “phallic verses,” “phallic performances,” and “phallic procession and dance.” The translators respectively are George L. Hendrickson, Leonard James Potts, and Lane Cooper. These all reflect faithfulness to Aristotle’s phallic system.
Readers tend to assume the accuracy and veracity of the translations that seem so independently similar ostensibly because of their respective fidelity to the original. We have come to expect the traditional translator to say nothing more and nothing less than what the original author says; the source Greek text is to impose and to insert itself on the target English wording. Aristotle’s objectivity is toward “nature,” and the translator’s objectivity is toward the nature of Aristotle’s text, even if that “nature” is phallic.

Aristotle is objectively systematizing what is original and natural and perpetual. Never mind that—in this example of Aristotle’s writing—the original, natural, perpetual thing that he is defining and classifying just so happens to be “τὰ φαλλικά” or “phallic [songs].” Never mind that the universe which Aristotle observes is the exclusive world of Greek males. This thing observed needs not be marked with some subjective interpretation. The reader needs not to be affected. I am using passive voice again to emphasize the devaluing of and the silencing of the subject position of the observer. The thing in itself, not a subjective person, will interpret the nature of what Aristotle means. His intention is never to interpret because Aristotle is only describing the hard, fixed nature of that thing observed. If that thing (i.e., the phallic) disrupts the “other” (i.e., women), then it is not the fault of Aristotle as the objective observer, scientist, and historian. And the disruption is not the fault of the objective traditional translators either. Similarly, in the phallic system of knowing, the reader’s job is not to change the thing but to be enlightened by and to understand it. For Aristotle’s male readers who are his contemporaries, there is to be a shared appreciation for the original natural perpetual thing.

For Aristotle’s later readers, through phallogocentric translation, there is to be a similar appreciation. Thus, “phallic songs,” in a masculinist translation, is not to change the original Greek phrase, “τὰ φαλλικά.” The traditional translator transliterates, or writes the Greek word using the English alphabet. The transliteration keeps the natural shape of the original Greek
word as much as possible, by sight and by sound. It also intends to keep the meanings of the original author, with little need ostensibly for interpretation. The inherent properties of the word, by transliteration, are rigidly retained by abstraction; a personal subjective hermeneutic is unhelpful, and context is unnecessary. For the current day reader who does not understand the transliteration, there can be experts who teach courses or write articles, and at the very least footnotes, endnotes, or glossaries, as if, in my pretense, to help the reader better understand Aristotle’s pure intentions.

Halliwell, for example, in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Poetics* clarifies “phallic songs” with the following definition: “ribald and scurrilous entertainments, associated with fertility cults [whose . . . ] festive character . . . contributed to the origins of comic drama” (Halliwell *Poetics* 194). Halliwell seems to want to close the information gap between his readers and the original readers of Aristotle.

Nevertheless, a troubling thing both for Halliwell’s readers and for the contemporary readers of Aristotle alike is that the original author does not say very much at all. For Aristotle, the original, natural, and enduring “τά φαλλικά” is self-evident and is useful to cause and to explain the causes of other things. Perhaps Aristotle feels like he does not need to say much; isn’t the dominant phallus in nature rather obvious? Is it not a given in the logic of nature? Thus, “phallic songs,” Aristotle says, “contributed to the origins of comic drama” (Halliwell, *Poetics* 194); Aristotle intends this much, it seems, and intends to say no more.

But what if the modern translator wants to say even more of “comic” drama and poetry than Aristotle says? He cannot if he is to be faithful to Aristotle and to the original Greek. Aristotle intends to say no more than he does. He says “τά φαλλικά” are the source of the prelude to the comedy. The most faithful translators will rigidly maintain this meaning. The masculinist translators will transliterate. Halliwell and the other traditional translators keep the
word “phallic.” In addition, they render Aristotle’s κωμῳδία (e.g. *kom-Odia*) by English transliterations: “comedy,” “comic drama,” and “comic poetry” are the English variants so faithful to the shape of Aristotle’s words. And then again, Halliwell must observe that Aristotle gives “only the barest outline of a theory of comic poetry” (*Halliwell Aristotle’s* 237).

In other words, Aristotle has not sought in his writings to close the information gap of this second term (κωμῳδία) for his readers in the way that Halliwell closes the information gap of the first term (“phallic songs”). For Aristotle, the information given to his readers is apparently so obvious that he needs not give them any further elucidation. Nonetheless, Halliwell must go on, as the translator himself, to offer a more thorough understanding to Aristotle’s contemporary readers. On the one hand, Halliwell might justify this move of adding more information than Aristotle because all objective readers really do need an objective understanding of the nature of Aristotle and his text. If Halliwell is simply wanting himself to fill in the gaps of knowledge about distant cultures, then as a translator he is still going beyond Aristotle. On the other hand, such a move is dicey because it is prone, then, to speculation and to interpretation. The translator will say more than the original author does. Of course, Halliwell can always resort to objective observations (of what he finds archaeologically, or in other Greek writings by Aristotle’s contemporaries, or in scholarship by Halliwell’s own contemporaries), or so it seems. But if the translator can and does find more information on “comic drama” than Aristotle’s “barest outline” gives, then is he, the translator, not being less faithful to Aristotle’s “barest” traces? Must Halliwell not decide why Aristotle provides “only the barest outline of a theory of comic poetry”? Must he, the translator, then justify his providing more information if that more information would be a departure from the wishes of the original author? These are the hard questions of the masculinist translator.
Sometimes the hard questions of whether to depart from the author’s intentions run in opposing directions for the phallogocentric translator. If the translator who wants to be faithful must sometimes consider going beyond the informational intentions of the original author, then the same translator at other times may be faced with wanting to give less information than the author. A case is point is the “translation” of two other words in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of “τά φαλλικά” [phallic]. These are “τραγῳδία” [tragodia] and “ποιητική” [poiētikē] which phallogocentric translators respectively transliterate as “tragedy” and “poetics.” Aristotle writes very much about both, and literary experts consider him an original authority on Greek tragedy and poetics. Both transliterated words are loans from the Greek to English, and there is considerable contemporary scholarship on each. The irony is that traditional translators have not said and cannot say by mere abstract transliteration all that the words mean.

First, “τραγῳδία” may mean to Aristotle something like our English meanings of “tragedy.” Nevertheless, a more faithful English translation of the word would be something like “billy-goat song” or “song of the he-goat” or “song for the goat stag.” But cultural references to a male goat by Aristotle and his contemporaries may not have the same literal or metaphorical connotations to billy goat as for English speakers today. And experts today, trying to be faithful to Aristotle’s scholarship, seem much more comfortable assigning technical abstract and decontextualized meanings to tragedy than to “he-goat songs.” It should be no surprise that the unnamed and ostensibly-objective author of The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature must observe the following about Aristotle’s word τραγῳδία: “There is no satisfactory explanation of this name. It may have arisen because, it has been suggested, the chorus in tragedy originally wore goat-skins, or in connection with a goat-sacrifice, or even because there was a competition with a goat as prize.” Nonetheless, Aristotle does write more, including more about goats, goat stags, goat meat, mutated goats, and male and female goats in
unequal positions as they copulate. In *Generation of Animals*, for example, Aristotle blames human mutations on the mother who fails to function properly during conception, and he goes as far to say that people generally call the heads of deformed children by animal names and that “jesters will frequently compare someone who is not beautiful to a ‘she-goat breathing fire’,” or “οι σκώπτοντες εἰκάζοντι τὸν μὴ καλῶν ἐνίους τούς μὲν αἰχμῆς φυσῶντι πῦρ” (769b). Speaking of “mutations” or “τέρατα” in people, he adds:

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| humans [men] | Again, they may have the body parts doubled, both male and female; this is known in humans and especially in she-goats. For babies called ‘billy goats’ are such because they have both male and female procreative birth parts; there is even a case of a she-goat being born with a horn upon its leg. |
| ‘billy goats’ ['tragaeae'] | ––traditional phallogocentric translation | ––a feminist rhetorical translating |
| procreative birth [generative] | |

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Thus, not to translate but merely to transliterate is to abstract and to lose the animal-sex-female-fear that Aristotle expresses, even in his definition and classification of Greek plays. “Tragedy” as a technical term in the study of drama and poetry, and “tragaeae” as the scientific term for a species, no longer connotes Aristotle’s contrasts between he-goats and she-goats, contrasts by which he logically separates males and females to classify the former as superior to the latter.

In other words, any sexist connections between τραγῳδία and φαλλικά are lost in transliteration, which is the most abstract and rigid sort of “translation” possible. When the words are simply “tragedy” and “phallic,” then all interpretation of these words is left to
ostensible experts who gloss over any misogyny and gynophobia intended by and inherent in Aristotle’s texts.

A second term to note in this context is “ποιητική” [poïêtikē]. Aristotle entitles the text in which he discusses “τά φαλλικά” [phallic] the following: τοῖς περὶ ποιητικής [transliterally tois peri poetikes]. Simply to transliterate this title is a phallic move on the part of the English translator. The transliterator refuses to translate and wants the original language of the original author to remain rigid and fixed. Thus the traditional (masculinist) translator renders it “tois peri poetikes.” By traditional phallogocentric translation, then, the treatise is known only as the Poetics, or at best On Poetics. The word poetics connotes things related to Greek lyric verse. It is an abstract technical word, undefined in any extant text of the original language; for the word’s meaning, scholars and readers must depend in large part on Aristotle. In writing his famous treatise τοῖς περὶ ποιητικής, Aristotle is one of our earliest and main experts. In translating that famous title of his as On Poetics, Aristotle’s translator fails to convey the fullest meanings of the word.

The coined word ποιητικής [poietikes] is not a technical term that a treatise can adequately explain even if written by Aristotle, the male expert for other males who are learning from him. To be sure, Aristotle never defines the word. To the non-snobbish reader, whether male or female, the word rather “sounds” in English something like “Make-Believe-Esque.” The first part of the word is from ποιεω / poieo / (the verb “to make” or “to create” or to “make believe”). To this root, Aristotle’s own teacher Plato adds the suffix -ική / -ike /. (I will say more about this adjectival suffix later in the chapter; suffice it to say here that the suffix is sexist and is a favorite of both Aristotle and Plato).

In translation, the meaning making relies on the ear of the hearer and on the context. In snobbish technical transliteration, the Greek word abstracted out of context has always been
known in English as the transliteration *Poetics*. To *translate* the title of Aristotle’s text in a 
feminist rhetorical way is to make it something like “Around What’s Make-Believe-Esque.”
There is nothing technical or academically snobbish about such a translation. “On Poetics,” in 
contrast, loses the personal contingencies of “believe” or “make-believe” and the sexism of the 
adjectival suffix, “-esque”; the title of Aristotle’s treatise as a transliteration abstracts its meaning 
as something technical, specialized, and taught by an expert.

Nonetheless, Aristotle’s translated (now English) word *poetics* is like *stasis* and a whole 
set of technical, over-determined words that Aristotle uses. These are commonly understood 
only because they have become technically and expertly understood. In some cases, the experts 
presume to say less and in other cases more than Aristotle does. For example, Otto Dieter has 
become an expert on “stasis” in “rhetoric.” He writes, “Truly, *stasis* doesn’t need to be 
translated into English by rhetoricians,” and he adds, “it has already become a perfectly good 
modern English word, defined by Webster as meaning ‘a standing still’” (215). But Dieter 
recognizes that the English dictionary definition does not translate the Greek:

To begin with, *stasis* is not an untranslatable term. The complaint that there is no 
equivalent for it in a modern language is never voiced except by English scholars.

Every student of Indo-Germanic philology knows that *stasis*, as well as *status*, 
comes from the root STA, *to stand*. (214)

Here, then, an expert appeals both to technical English senses of a Greek word (which go beyond 
what is in the original) and senses that have crept into Latin (as determined by Roman experts of 
rhetoric) and senses that the English-speaking experts say really ought to be translated (i.e., “is 
not an untranslatable term”). Likewise, *ποιητική* [transliterally *poetikes*] is not an 
untranslatable term. And yet, it remains untranslated by the experts who want to have it faithful 
to Aristotle’s Greek.
The significance of all of this technical discussion is that the transliteration keeps the word technical, and the technical abstraction robs the language of all readers who are not experts. Transliteration, abstract technicalizing of the word, is a masculinist move. Aristotle denied females admission to his Academy; similarly, by a technical discussion of τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς [tois peri poetikes] his school leaves women out. However, feminist rhetorical translation brings all readers, women and men alike, back into the meaning making process.

A feminist rhetorical translator, therefore, chooses to approach Aristotle’s phallic system very differently than does the traditional phallogocentric translator. The feminist rhetorical translator will not use transliteration to ossify and to abstract, without interpretation, the original Greek language. The feminist rhetorical translator does not participate in the perpetual search to find what must be natural and to claim what surely is original in the author’s intention, without acknowledging the subjectivities of the observer. The feminist rhetorical translator will insist on interpretation, on various interpretations and subjectivities, of the original writer, of his listeners, of the translator herself, and of her readers. The inclusive and subjective and interpretational effects of what is written and is translated, of what is heard and what is read, will always be much more important than faithfulness to what the original author intends. The feminist rhetorical translator also recognizes that the author’s intention is never singular and is never the only intention that is “natural” and enduring. And when the original author appears to silence further discussion beyond his final words, then the feminist rhetorical translator may decide to transgress by writing more to expose the information gap and to call into question the author’s intention.

The goal of the feminist rhetorical translator isn’t fidelity to the author’s intent, but hers (or his) is a listening with intent so as to decide how to re-present the ostensibly fixed nature of the text. The feminist rhetorical translator will not hide her (or his) own agency. In fact, she
herself (or he himself) may show up in the text, as if authoring in addition to or even instead of Aristotle. The authoring may come in overtranslation of unmarked words, in parenthetical notes that disrupt the text’s flow, and in footnotes that protest and challenge rather than seek merely to explain. Such is the babel of feminine discourse that Nancy Mairs describes. The intention of the protest is not to oppose and to divide. The intention is to offer Morrison’s “nuanced, complex, mid-wifery properties.” To demonstrate the contrast between a traditional phallogocentric translation and a feminist rhetorical translating, I now provide Aristotle’s Greek again and the two traditional translations again, with the more nuanced, more complex, more fully birthed translation. The feminist rhetorical translating appears below the original and the traditional translations in the boxes to the left:

| [C]omedy . . . came from the prelude . . . to the phallic songs which still survive as institutions in many cities. | Ἡ κωμῳδία . . . ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξαρχόντων . . . τῶν τὰ φαλλικὰ ὅ ἐπὶ καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομίζόμενα. |
| -- traditional phallogocentric translation by William Hamilton Fyfe | --Aristotle, Poetics 1449a |
| [C]omedy [is originally] starting from . . . the leaders of the phallic songs which are still customary in many cities. | The boisterous musical dramas of the village . . . have their beginnings . . . in what’s blatantly penis-esque, which is still the sexist rule that currently remains as the penetrating force in many of the city-states. |
| -- traditional phallogocentric translation by Stephen Halliwell | --a feminist rhetorical translating |

Aristotle may intend a single point, a linear, enduring, end point. The metaphorical shape of his intention is phallic. The traditional translators intend rather rigidly to make his point too.

But a feminist rhetorical translating does something very different. The feminist rhetorical translating above renders the Greek words into English words in a more nuanced and suggestive way for the reader. In addition, the translator listens with intent to what Aristotle is saying; and she (or he) suggests the shock of Aristotle’s misogyny and gynophobia. This is the
rhetorical listening that Krista Ratcliffe calls for when she recognizes that “Aristotle’s theory [of rhetoric] never delves into how to listen” (199).

Presented alongside Aristotle’s words, the alternate English words of the feminist rhetorical translation make no pretense of faithful correspondence with the male author’s Greek. For example, Aristotle’s Greek phrase ἡ κομῳδία (transliterated “comedy” by traditional translators) is newly welcomed into English with my phrase, “the boisterous musical dramas of the village.” Aristotle’s sparse comments on the phrase inform my phrase in the context of his entire treatise on poetry and plays, and this allows for much more speculation than does a fixed and “equivalent” transliteration such as “comedy.” There is no need for the masculinist-translation footnote to offer understanding of Aristotle; there is no need, that is, to explain that the original author has “only the barest outline of a theory of comic poetry” (as Halliwell must). If the feminist rhetorical translator adds a footnote, it is to assert her authority and agency as an equal to the original author.

Sometimes, the feminist rhetorical translator wants to disrupt the language of the original author. Thus, my phrase (i.e., “the boisterous musical dramas of the village”) intends first to break apart Aristotle’s phrase into (A) ἡ ['he, the Greek article], (B) κομ [kom, a Greek morpheme meaning ambiguously “reveling” and/or “village”], and (C) ὁδία [odes, which is the transliteral, technical name for Greek lyric poetry]. Second, my phrase keeps as much wordplay as possible by suggesting correspondences with suggestive equivalents: (A) the, (B) boisterous, (C) musical dramas, (B) of the village. Third, I authoritatively invent word play not in the Greek to highlight the masculine nature suggested in just one meaning of the Greek κομ [kom], that is the meaning of “reveling.” The English “boisterous” is intended to pun on the word “boy”; of course, the Greek author does not have the pun, and the authority for it must go to the translator.
What the feminist rhetorical translator recognizes, and exposes, is that Aristotle has written more than he intends to write by borrowing others’ words. The feminist rhetorical translator rightly sees that Aristotle never intends to return what he borrows, and she (or he) understands with Toni Morrison that this is “sexism” and “looting” (“Nobel Prize”). The feminist rhetorical translator knows that Greek readers and listeners who are Aristotle’s contemporaries would be familiar with speakers and writers other than Aristotle. These readers and listeners all would hear in his text the voices of the others and would recognize their co-opted styles. The feminist rhetorical translating highlights what Kenneth L. Pike calls the “N-Dimensionality” of language (Stir, Change, Create 108) and how Ratcliffe says that “words ‘play’” (9). It’s the polymorphic, multivocal writing that Aristotle would try to avoid, but additional ambiguities and word plays are always created when the male’s voice would be singular and authoritative. In protest, a writer such as Jacqueline Jones Royster says, “I claim all my voices as very much authentic voices” (37), which is to say that there is a plurality when one communicates.

The feminist rhetorical translator is not trying—faithfully—to replicate the fixed, unified nature of some historical context. That is, she (or he) is not worried, as George A. Kennedy is, about being “unhistorical” or about translating that must not “involve an actual change to the text” (first ed, vii). The feminist rhetorical translator knows that much history has been written of males only from an exclusively male perspective; thus, she (or he) is willing to trouble that history in order to explore a regendered history. And the male-authored original text, likewise, must be troubled.

By the feminist rhetorical translation, the once-marginalized listeners and the formerly excluded readers of Aristotle are better able to overhear and eavesdrop. That is, women, slaves, non-Greeks, uneducated Greeks—quite simply all of us not in Aristotle’s Academy using other
languages as well—may overhear and eavesdrop. Phyllis A. Bird says our translating is “to overhear an ancient conversation, rather than to hear [one]self addressed directly”; and she adds, “I am not certain that the translator is even obliged to make the modern reader understand what is overheard” (qtd in Simon 91). Likewise, Ratcliffe would clarify the obligation of the rhetorical listener (a listener who, I think, is in a better position as feminist than the masculinist translator is). The obligation is the remaking of what might have been more narrowly understood once upon a time. Ratcliffe advises that we do not have to understand the ancient male “rhetorical theories [as grand,] timeless . . . a/historical structures that may [be] lifted from fourth and fifth century B.C.E. Greece and dropped into” our contexts unaltered but never “grounded in their sites of usage in ways that remake, not simply lift, the theories ([James Berlin “Revisionary”] 116)” (102). Ratcliffe would have us do more. She herself uses Mary Daly’s “gynocentric writing” (or a “Daly-esque . . . uncovering [of] gender potentialities in words by studying their dictionary definitions, reworking them, and excavating their etymologies”) (104); and Ratcliffe allows us, any of us, and not just some male-privileged, elite-educated few, to excavate words. She uncovers the English word eavesdropping as follows. It becomes

not only . . . a rhetorical tactic but also . . . an ethical choice, or tactical ethic . . . [a] choosing to stand outside . . . in an uncomfortable spot . . . on the border of knowing and not knowing . . . granting others the inside position . . . listening to learn [and yet . . . ] not as a gendered busybodiness but as a rhetorical tactic of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one’s own knowing so as to overhear and learn from others and, I would add, from oneself. (104-05).

Thus, rhetorical listening with the tactics of Daly-esque uncoverings of words and Ratcliffean eavesdropping gives the feminist rhetorician translating more agency. Feminist rhetorical translating does not require Aristotle to be the sole teacher about what he writes as something
overtly penis-esque (or φαλλικά); and this original male author does not dictate that what he says must always be said to others in a phallic way. Feminist rhetorical translator will listen with intent and may restore the polymorphic voices of others to the text in ways that expose the original author’s looting of their language.

What may be clear by now is that, by translating in a feminist rhetorical way, I am not seeking an equivalence between what Aristotle has written and what I write in translation. In fact, I am not seeking to understand translation in the way of the Western tradition at all. Lydia H. Liu’s reconception of translation, for instance, comes from Chinese translingual practice. Liu would say that the original Greek language of Aristotle is not the “source” that must find my English language as the “target” of his. Rather, my English language is the “host,” and his Greek language must be my “guest.” Aristotle’s rigid, fixed language is not penetrating mine. Instead, my language chooses to consider his. Liu says:

If it is true that the translator . . . in the host language always initiates the linguistic transaction by inviting, selecting, combining, and reinventing words and texts from the guest language and, moreover, if the needs of the translator and his/her audience together determine and negotiate the meaning (i.e., usefulness) of the text taken from the guest language, then the terms traditional theorists [in the West] use to designate the languages involved in translation, such as “source” and “target/receptor,” are not only inappropriate but misleading. (*Translingual Practice* 27)

Liu’s metaphor for translation defies the traditional, elite, Western male conception of translation as doing the penis-esque work of sticking the original male-authored source text to the recipient-language target. Liu is working in the context of Chinese who have appropriated Western modernism on their own terms. That is, having never been dominated by Western colonists, the
Chinese translators do not seek to reverse some power position. Likewise, they view translation in terms of sharing and as welcoming, as a host would a guest.

Jacqueline Jones Royster similarly defies the traditional, elite, Western male conception of translation. In the African American context, she notes, mothers instruct their families in “home training” and in “politeness” (“When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own” 613), which Royster advocates as good metaphors for cross-disciplinary listening and conversation. Feminist rhetorical translating seeks to reconceive of the translation project in terms of Liu’s and Royster’s metaphors.

When “guest” and “host” are the metaphors for the two languages in a translation project, then “home training” and “politeness” certainly come into play. An interactive intercourse between the languages is invited. The whole understanding of “equivalence” that traditional, phallogocentric translation insists on is challenged. Liu explains:

[O]ne does not translate between equivalents; rather, one creates tropes of equivalence in the middle zone of translation between the host and guest languages. This middle zone of hypothetical equivalence, which is occupied by neologistic imagination, becomes the very ground for change. (Tokens of Exchange 137)

However, masculinist translation insists on equivalence only because the translator assumes the targeted recipient language is always naturally subservient and faithful to the original male-source male-authored text.

Equivalence for the feminist rhetorical translator means that both the guest and the host languages have equal agency. As Mikhail Epstein theorizes, there is an “interlation” so that “[o]ne language allows the reader to perceive what another language misses or conceals.”
Thus, as a rhetorical feminist translator, I am giving myself certain visibility by adding word play that is not in Aristotle’s original language—or that he would deny is in his language. More than just the pun on “boisterous,” I am making obvious my “over-translation” for “shock effect” as if somehow to effect a “naming of the life of the body as experienced by women” (Barbara Godard qtd. in Von Flotow 70). Hear again the translating:

Aristotle, Poetics 1449a

The boisterous musical dramas of the village . . . have their beginnings . . . in what’s blatantly penis-ese, which is still the sexist rule that currently remains as the penetrating force in many of the city-states.

This is not polite translating. I have added the adverb “blatantly” for insistence, have insisted on the root noun “penis” for shock, and have tagged on the suffix “-ese” as a kind of tease. “What’s blatantly penis-ese” is a rendering of Aristotle’s τά φαλλικά (which is quite different from the transliteration “phallic” that has found its way into technical and male-central fields such as Sigmund Freud’s clinical psychoanalysis). In addition, in the whole clause, I’ve contributed the phrase “sexist” to modify rule and “the penetrating force” as another phallic pun to re-emphasize the male part in the customs of the Greek entertainment and politics.

The shock effect of such language is also to draw the reader in. Surprise is intended specifically for the English reader who may be familiar, overly familiar that is, with the usual masculinist translation, which uses “phallic” as a kind of unmarked technical term. The phrase “penis-ese” draws attention to the biological term for the male organ while marking it with a suffix that ambiguously means “suggestive of” and “a performance or playfulness.” The shock is not only intended to get the reader looking over at language that is unmarked (i.e., language
that says, “this is the nature of things and there’s no need to point it out.”) But the shock is also valuable to the reader in another way. The surprise is intended to include the reader as an insider participant. Aristotle’s Greek, the ancient Greek, does not invite any of us in. The shocking English, on the other hand, is suggestive of an inside joke. If the reader smiles silently, or laughs aloud involuntarily, then there is a shared effect. The translator-author and the reader-insider make meaning in performed collaboration. Either one may wince, or blush, because the words may evoke images within the reader’s mind immediately and involuntarily. There might be the kind of reflexive and participatory meaning-making as in a simple joke such as the following: “Don’t think of a pink elephant.” Those who understand the meanings of these words laugh because they evoke in the mind of the reader images of pinkness and of an elephant. The fun is compounded by the fact that elephants are not naturally pink. Furthermore, there is silliness because readers are usually not instructed to avoid thinking of something when a writer mentions it. Thus, these phrases may be playful as masculinist phallic symbols that are overtranslated: “boisterous musical dramas,” “what’s blatantly penis-esque,” and “sexist rule that currently remains as the penetrating force.” And yet, the feminist rhetorical translating is accurate, representative, and complete because there is a referencing of, a recognition of, the undeniable phallus in the Greek language of Aristotle.

Before turning to Aristotle’s infamously sexist passages in his various treatises including the *Rhetoric*, I make one more set of observations from this phallic example in Aristotle’s writing. I am not saying that feminist rhetorical translating, for all the liberties it takes, is absolutely relativistic.

To be sure, I am assuming with Kenneth L. Pike that persons using language may ultimately choose their own perspectives on that language and have agency in deciding which dimensions of the language to highlight in speech and in writing. This is the agency of the
author. And the feminist rhetorical translator claims the agency of the author. Therefore, at first glance, it would seem that this is radical relativism.

Then again, Pike notes that always there are rigid restraints, and he paraphrases Nelson Goodman as saying, “What we need is radical relativism within rigid restraints.” For the writer of this dissertation, there are acknowledged restraints on my relativism. For example, if I, the translator, am trying to do what Mary Daly does with her “gynocentric writing” (i.e., “uncovering gender potentialities in words by studying [and...] reworking them, and excavating their etymologies”) (Ratcliffe Rhetorical 104), then I, as a man, have no right to assume that I understand experientially what “geocentricism” may be. This is one restraint, a restraint on my feminism.

Moreover, where I see bigotry, misogyny, elitism, and sexism in Aristotle’s text, I am not free to reverse that. Rather, I am bound to recognize it, and to leave it there, actually to flaunt it. I am bound to flaunt what’s phallic in Aristotle by listening rhetorically. Ratcliffe describes the limits on invention. She says:

Defining rhetorical listening as a trope of interpretive invention not only emphasizes the discursive nature of rhetorical listening but also plays with the etymology of the term trope as “a turning.” For rhetorical listening turns hearing (a reception process) into invention (a production process), thus complicating the reception/production opposition and inviting rhetorical listening into the time-honored tradition of rhetorical invention. Second, rhetorical listening turns the realm of hearing into a larger space, one encompassing all discursive forms, not just oral ones. Third, rhetorical listening turns intent back on the listener, focusing on listening with intent to hear troubled identifications, instead of listening for intent of an author. Fourth, rhetorical listening turns the meaning of
the text into something larger than itself, certainly larger than the intent of the speaker/writer, in that rhetorical listening locates a text as part of larger cultural logics. And fifth, rhetorical listening turns rhetoric's traditional focus on the desires of the speaker/writer into a harmonics and/or dissonance of the desires of both the speaker/writer and the listener. (Rhetorical 46)

Ratcliffe is permitting those of us who want to translate to view language polymorphically.

This chapter so far has examined a sentence using the overt phrase τά φάλλικά (transliterated “phallic”) as part of the masculinist language of Aristotle. But he has, indeed, written much more that separates men and women and that puts women down, much more that keeps males opposed to and over females. The blame of physical mutations on the human mother and the comparison of mutated children to a billy goat is just one instance of Aristotle’s misogynist science already noted.

The following is a sample of a few more of Aristotle’s biological and political writings. Aristotle is writing to coldly observe what he sees in nature. He is, in most cases, using logic to define and academic elitist language to classify. The entire process of his describing is a male prescribing. Excerpts of Aristotle’s Greek with my feminist rhetorical translating appear below. But I have bracketed the technical transliterations or sexist terms usually included by masculinist translators. This translating and bracketing serves as my only commentary on these passages. The aim of including them here is to recognize that Aristotle was thoroughly phallic in his various writing. By no means am I trying to be comprehensive with the selections. I begin with his physical science first and then move to his social science writings. The bracketed phrases below indicated the “traditional phallogocentric translation,” and what precedes the bracketed phrases is the contrastive feminist rhetorical translating. For example, in the first set of tables below, the Greek word ὑπόπτηρα is presented followed by its traditional phallogocentric
translation, “a hysteria,” which I bracket; then, both before the brackets and in a fuller context in another box, I show “a uterus” as a feminist rhetorical translating. I give several tables in succession without commentary below. My purpose is to illustrate Aristotle’s most blatantly phallic writings and how a feminist rhetorical translating recognizes and highlights the phallicism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Τοῦ δὲ θήλεως ἱδιον μέρος ὑστέρα, καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος αλὸδοῦν,</th>
<th>The respective part of a female is an emptiness, a uterus, and of a male is a spear, a penis.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Aristotle History of Animals 493a</td>
<td>--traditional phallogocentric translation --a feminist rhetorical translating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a uterus, [a hysteria]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humans [men]</td>
<td>Males have more teeth than females in the case of humans [men], sheep, goats, and swine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Aristotle History of Animals 501b</td>
<td>--traditional phallogocentric translation --a feminist rhetorical translating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a sexual way [physically aphrodisiacal, peculiarly lecherous], and comes on to [wheedles] the male cat with sexual advances, and cries out [caterwauls]</td>
<td>Cats do not come together in intercourse from the rear with respect to the female, but the male stands erect and the female puts herself underneath him; and, by the way, the female cat is naturally attracting in a sexual way, and comes on to the male cat with sexual advances, and cries out as they come together.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Aristotle History of Animals 540a</td>
<td>--traditional phallogocentric translation --a feminist rhetorical translating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The female is more dispirited and more despondent than the male, more shameless and more lying, reader to deceive and possessing a better memory for grudges . . . . But as we have stated, the male is more able to help and is manlier than the female.

--Aristotle History of Animals 608b

The female is more dispirited and more despondent than the male, more shameless and more lying, reader to deceive and possessing a better memory for grudges . . . . But as we have stated, the male is more able to help and is manlier than the female.

--traditional phallogocentric translation

--a feminist rhetorical translating

Now a boy is like a woman or wife in form, and the woman or wife is, as it were, a childless impotent male; for it is through a certain lack of ability that the female is female, being unable to concoct the nourishment in its last stage into seed or semen.

--Aristotle Generation of Animals 728a

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--Aristotle Generation of Animals 732a

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--Aristotle Generation of Animals 732a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Humans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **[Generation]** birthings  
the [definition] statement and the  
[form] visual,  
**[Cause]** birth  
mixes sexually [mingles]  
work of birth [generation]  
--traditional phallogocentric  
translation | **This is why there is always a class of humans and animals and plants. But since the male and female essences are the first principles of these, they will exist in the existing individuals for the sake of birthings. Again, as the first efficient or moving cause, to which belong the statement and the visual, is better and more divine in its nature than the material on which it works, it is better that the superior principle should be separated from the inferior. Therefore, wherever it is possible and so far as it is possible, the male is separated from the female. For the first principle of the movement, or efficient birth, whereby that which comes into being is male, is better and more divine than the material whereby it is female. The male, however, comes together and mixes sexually with the female for the work of birth, because this is common to both.**  
--a feminist rhetorical translating |
| **Ωσπερ γάρ καὶ ἐκ πεπηρωμένων ὅτε μὲν γίνεται πεπηρωμένα ὅτε δ’ οὐ, οὕτω καὶ ἐκθήλεος ὅτε μὲν θῆλυ ὅτε δ’ οὖ ᾗλλ’ ἄρρεν. τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὦσπερ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ πεπηρωμένον.**  
--Aristotle Generation of Animals 737a |  |
| Mutilated [peperomia]  
born [generated]  
--traditional phallogocentric  
translation | **Just as the young of mutilated parents are sometimes born mutilated and sometimes not, so also the young born of a female are sometimes female and sometimes male instead. The female is, in fact, a mutilated male.**  
--a feminist rhetorical translating |

In addition to these observations in his physical-science writings, Aristotle says similar things in his ethical, political, and metaphysical works. In these, Aristotle is also sexist:
Én oí̲̅ς̼ φανερόν ἐστίν ὅτι κατά φύσιν καὶ συμφέρον τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τῷ σώματι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος, τὸ δ᾽ ἔξ ἵσου ἢ ἀνάπαλιν βλαβερὸν πᾶσιν. ἐν ἄνθρωπω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις ὑπόκειτος; τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρα τῶν ἄγριων βελτίω τῆς φύσιν, τοῦτοις δὲ πάσι βέλτιον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων· τυγχάνει γὰρ σωτηρίας οὖτως. ἐτί δὲ τὸ ἄρρεν πρὸς τὸ ἡθικόν φύσει τὸ μὲν κρέπτον τὸ δὲ χείρον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχον τὸ δ᾽ ἄρχομενον. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ἑπὶ πάντων ἄνθρωπων.

--Aristotle Politics 1254b

the chief nature [physical properties]  
the person [soul, psyche]  
over the body [soma],  
the statement [the rational element] over the passionate [pathetic, pathos]  
broken apart [analyzed].  
humans [men];  
[physical] nature  
rulled [by man];  

this principle [trope],  
people or humankind [all men].

--traditional phallogocentric translation  
And it is apparent that the chief nature born together is that of the person over the body, and the mind and the parts of the statement over the passionate is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the chief part of the inferior is always hurtful or broken apart. The same holds good of animals in relation to humans; for tame animals have a better nature than wild ones, and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled; for then they are preserved or rescued. Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; the one rules, and the other is ruled; and this principle, by force, extends to all people or humankind.

--Aristotle Politics 1259b

ἐπεὶ δὲ τριά μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἐν μὲν δεσποτικῇ, περὶ ἤς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐν δὲ πατρικῇ, τρίτον δὲ γαμικῇ (καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχει καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἁμοιν, οὐ δὲν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἄρχης, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικώς· τὸ τε γὰρ ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θηλείου ἀγαμομοιώτερον, εἶ μὴ τοιαύτης παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀπελών) ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικᾶς ἄρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἄρχομενον (ἐξ ἵσου γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μιθὲν), ὅπως δὲ, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄρχη τὸ δ᾽ ἄρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχήματι καὶ λόγοι καὶ τιμαῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀμασίς εἶπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποδαντηρῆς λόγον· τὸ δ᾽ ἄρχεν δὲ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον. ἡ δὲ τῶν τέκνων ἄρχη βασιλική· τὸ γὰρ γεννήθησαν καὶ κατὰ φύλιαν ἄρχον καὶ κατὰ πρεσβείαν ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ βασιλικῆς ἕδος ἄρχης. (ὅδι καλῶς Ὁμήρος τὸν Δία προσηγόρευσεν εἰπὼν πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τοῖς τεθεῖν τετὸν βασιλέα τούτων ἀπάντων.) φύσει γὰρ τὸν βασιλέα διαφέρειν μὲν δεῖ,
And since, as we saw, what's home-order-esque has three divisions, one the relation of the ruler-esque to slave, of which we have spoken before, one the father-esque relation, and the third the marriage-esque—for it's a rule over woman or wife and over children, these two at least as under freemen, yet not with the same sort of rule, but over the woman or wife as in the exercise of City-state-esque control and over the children as in a kingdom; for the male is by nature better fitted to command than the female except in some cases where their union has been formed contrary to nature and the older and fully developed person than the younger and immature. It is true that in most cases of City-state-esque control the ruler and the ruled interchange in turn (for they tend to be on in equal level in their nature and to have no difference at all), although nevertheless during the period when one is ruler and the other ruled they seek to have a distinction by means of patterns and statements and honors, just as Amasis made his statement about the foot-bath; but the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously. The rule over the children on the other hand is that of a king; for the male parent is the ruler in virtue both of affection and of seniority, which is characteristic of a kingdom or royal government (and therefore Homer by good form designated Zeus by the words of the father of men or husbands and of gods, as the king of them all women and men). The rule that a husband has over his wife, a free person, is the same sort of rule that exists over free persons in a polity. For by nature [by physics], the kingdom ought to be this way.

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Aristotle’s voice in these passages is that of the misogynist. He assumes, reasons, and concludes that the male sex is superior to the female sex.

Nonetheless, a defender of Aristotle may claim that among scholars generally “[t]here is a great deal of confusion over what Aristotle says in his biological writings about females and whether what he says about them there is ideological”; this is what Robert Mayhew says in The Female in Aristotle's Biology (2). And Mayhew argues that he himself can “determine” that Aristotle’s biological treatises “are products of honest science” and “not of bias and ideology” (2). Moreover, a feminist may allow that “Aristotle is never dogmatic . . . and does not profess to give anything but the somewhat casual expression of his own personal knowledge and opinions”; this is what Wright says in Feminism in Greek Literature (218-19). Wright adds that “[i]t is unfortunate that [Aristotle’s] experience of women was misleading, and that the problems of feminism do not always fall within the confines of science” (221).

I think, to be fair, there should be a look at both Aristotle’s ostensibly-honest science but also at passages in which he seems friendlier to females than normally he seems. Of course, there are only a few more-obviously benign passages by Aristotle on females. These include the following:
καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν, διόσῳ πρότερον καὶ ἁναγκαίωτερον οἷκα πόλεως, . . .

οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι οὕτω μόνον τῇς τεκνοποιίαις χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· εὐθύς γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἐτέρα ἄνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς· ἑπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἄλληλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἱδια. διὰ τάυτα δὲ καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ Ἥδυ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ.

--Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 1162a

| an affectionate friendship [philea] | But a man or husband and a woman or wife seem to have an affectionate friendship by nature; for a human being, there is naturally a coupling together —even more than being naturally City-state-esque, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more forceful than the City-state . . . |
| by nature [physicality]; a human being [a man] naturally [physically] City-state-esque [politicking] | human beings live together not only to create children in households favored together but also for the various purposes of life; for from the start the work is divided, and that of men or husbands and women and wives are different; so they help each other by sharing their individuality. It is for these two reasons at least, for utility and sweet pleasure, that there seems to be something special found in this kind of affectionate friendship. |
| human beings [men] | --traditional phallogocentric translation |
| life [bios] | --a feminist rhetorical translating |
| these two . . . at least [both] | |

Διότερ οἱ μὲν ἄνδρῶδες τῇ τοῦτο φύσιν εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτῶν. . .

γυναικὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες τοῖς συστένουσι χαίροντας, καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγοῦντας. μιμεῖται δὲ ἐν ἄπασι δὲ ὁδηγεῖ ὅτι τὸν βελτίω.

--Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 1171b

| manly by nature [courageous physically] affectionate friends [philea]. . . | Therefore, those who’re manly by nature take on this blessed resistance to sharing their own pain with their affectionate friends. . . |
| to copy [to mimic] | In contrast, women or wives and these different men or husbands favor mourning together, and are affectionate and friendly with affectionate friends and with sufferers together. However, it is clear that in everything one ought to copy the better sort. |
| | --traditional phallogocentric translation |
| | --a feminist rhetorical translating |
But even these passages sounding somewhat kinder to females do not make the pro-Aristotle Mayhew retreat from his observation that “Aristotle’s conception of the female is, in general and in many details, false” 47 (2). This exceptional concession for Mayhew actually supports the view of most people recognizing Aristotle’s misogyny. Most agree with Wright: When Aristotle said “‘Women and slaves are inferior [to all men and especially to free men . . . ] by the conditions of existence as I see them: therefore they are inferior by the laws of nature’ . . . he was wrong in this matter” (219, 221). An examination of Aristotle’s own phallic statements makes clear that his methods and his conclusions by them are suspect.

It is worth reviewing what a number of other scholars say in critique of Aristotle and his misogyny. Charlotte Hogg, for example, credits a few others for seeing how the Greek man in his culture discriminates against women: “Aristotle is just one of many public male voices to advocate denying women access to the realm of politics or oral or textual spaces in public ([Cheryl] Glenn, [Jean Bethke] Elshtain, and [Mary] Dietz)” (63). Similarly, Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch identify Aristotle’s misogynist method particularly:

Aristotle, the biologist and philosopher, in his several treatises on ethics wrote that male/female differences also involved further polarities: active/passive, sexual generator/receptacle, spirited/dispirited, civic/domestic, orator/hearer, self-restraint/lack of restraint, endurance/softness (malakos), whole/defective, normal/deviant, soul/body, intellect/feeling, ruler/ruled, simple living/luxurious . . . (112). The structure of the “household code” in [Colossians] 3:18-4:1 with its (1) three pairs, (2) related reciprocally, (3) emphasizing three domestic groups (wives, children, slaves) subordination to the paterfamilias in his three roles (husband, father, master—the same male) is ultimately dependent on Aristotle’s sociological description and philosophical/political justification of Greek
domestic life. “The primary and smallest parts of the household are master and slave, husband and wife and children. . . . Aristotle is primarily concerned to order the relationship between ruler and subordinate, . . . . This structured domestic code has its origin in Aristotle. . . .” (Families in the New Testament World. 118-19)

The most thorough and helpful secondary scholarship on Aristotle’s bigotry comes from F. A. Wright and from Prudence Allen. An excerpt from Wright serves as the epigraph at the start of this chapter.

Wright gives direct quotations of all the salient texts of Aristotle on “women.” At certain points, Wright gives summaries. Here is one:

Women, in Aristotle’s view, are rather plants than animals; for the animal differs from the plant, chiefly in having sense-perception. If the sensitive soul is not present, the body is no better than a corpse, and this sensitive soul is supplied only by the male. The female provides the material, the male fashions it; the body is from the female, the soul from the male, who can stand outside the body just as the artist stands outside his creation. It certainly seems that female children progress more quickly than male, but that is merely a proof of their inferiority; for all inferior things come sooner to their perfection or end, and as this is true of works of art so it is true of what is formed by nature.

These quotations . . . illustrate that curious depreciation of the female element in nature . . . which is one of the weaker points in the treatise [i.e., Generation of Animals 728a, 784a, 787a]. (216)

Wright does evaluate the treatises of Aristotle for their weaknesses, but goes on to explain their power over Aristotle’s readers. As noted earlier, Wright calls many “his blind followers.” (218).
Likewise, Allen notes that Aristotle’s influence spreads beyond just the Greeks to the entire Western world: “Ordinarily, the word revolution implies the overthrow of one power structure by another. However, the Aristotelian Revolution is not an overthrow in this sense; it is more properly understood as the first takeover of the western mind by a single theory of the concept of woman” (The Concept of Woman 1). Allen thoroughly reviews all extant Aristotelian texts about women. She carefully identifies how Aristotle's statements on woman relate to four categories important to his predecessors: Opposites, Generation, Wisdom, and Virtue. Then Allen summarizes for readers, and comments on, what Aristotle has said:

1. The male is separated from the female, since it is something better and more divine in that it is the principle of movement for generated things, while the female serves as their matter.
2. A woman is as it were an infertile male.
3. The female is as it were a deformed male.
4. The male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled.

In these statements the superior valuation of man over woman is explicitly stated. However, it is also present in the theory of contraries and in other aspects of Aristotle’s thought about sex identity. Aristotle stands out from his predecessors in that he gave a complete rationale for his theory of sex polarity. He developed reasons and arguments for the philosophically significant differentiation of the sexes and for the superiority of man over woman. Therefore, he is correctly identified as the founder of the sex polarity position. . . . [H]e also laid the groundwork for another theory of sex identity in his philosophy of definition.

(Aristotelian 121)
The primary and the secondary literature, before one even picks up Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, demonstrates Aristotle’s very powerful phallic influence.

Thus, although pro-Aristotle scholar Mayhew says, “[t]here is a great deal of confusion over what Aristotle says . . . about females” (2), a feminist rhetorical translator has absolutely no confusion at all about what Aristotle writes about women. Moreover, feminist rhetorical translators who use Bird’s overhearing and Ratcliffe’s eavesdropping do not have to insist on getting absolutely right *either* the author’s sexism *or* the basis of his bias in order to debunk him or reverse his method. (In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I look squarely at the logic of Aristotle that Allen rightly claims is the cause of his sexism; but the goal in feminist rhetorical translating is to open up an alternative epistemology, not necessarily to shut Aristotle up or to shut down his “logic”). Through the various texts of Aristotle that are blatantly misogynistic, the goals of the feminist rhetorical translator are to recognize the phallic and to reclaim feminine discourse by feminine discourse.

**III. ARISTOTLE’S PHALLIC IN THE RHETORIC AND ITS TRANSLATION**

It should be obvious that the phallic symbol shows Aristotle’s general intention to force from women their rhetorical agency. And yet there very different responses to Aristotle’s notion of the male part specifically in the *Rhetoric*. The views range from Carol Poster’s belief that the *Rhetoric* is blatantly sexist to George A. Kennedy’s excusing the sexism; the perspectives span from Cheryl Glenn’s observation that Aristotle gives women nothing but a nod to Jasper Neel’s suggestion that Aristotle is not being sexist in the *Rhetoric*. A review of Poster’s, Glenn’s, Kennedy’s, and Neel’s outlooks shows the implications of translation of the *Rhetoric*. Is Aristotle given absolute and exclusive agency by the translator and by the rhetorician? What might feminism and rhetoric and translation scholarship do to recognize fully the phallic in
Aristotle’s phallogocentric Rhetoric? How might Aristotle’s male-marked Greek sound if read in a woman’s English?

Before reviewing the perspectives of these four named rhetoricians to begin answering such questions, it is helpful to confirm that Aristotle is misogynist in his treatise on rhetoric. At first glance, it seems that Aristotle is not particularly hard on women in the Rhetoric as he is in his other treatises (especially in the passages noted in the previous section). Feminist literary historian F. A. Wright, for example, seems to struggle with this initially. When surveying Aristotle’s copious claims “of the deficiencies in women” (204), Wright suggests that “[w]e have to go to the Rhetoric to get Aristotle’s idea of their [i.e., women’s] merits” (204). The scholar pinpoints this paragraph below, saying “This passage is significant” (204):

| θηλειων δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἀνευ ἀνελευθερίας. |
|---|---|
|--Aristotle Rhetoric 1361a |
| The excellence of females is (a) physical, a large and beautiful body; (b) mental, virtuous moderation and love—but not a sordid love—of work. |
|--traditional phallogocentric translation|48|

But Wright quickly follows up the passage with a sarcastic commentary on Aristotle’s phallic intentions in his treatise about rhetoric. Wright correctly claims here that women were viewed by Aristotle, even in his Rhetoric, as passive prostitutes, as slaves working for the pleasures of men. Wright notes:

First, it will be seen, comes physical attractiveness. The excellent woman must be good-looking, and by ‘good-looking’ we mean tall and stout, for ethereal grace does not suit the harem-master’s taste. Secondly, she will be temperate in her desires; the word ‘Sophrosyne,’ ‘virtuous moderation,’ is the chief virtue in a woman: it is the faculty of ‘doing without’—love, food, pleasure, consideration,
etc.—and the Greeks, unlike the Romans, really did admire this passive merit even in men. Thirdly comes industry, with the restriction that a woman must not be a slave to work: she has other even more important duties—her master’s pleasure, for example—and work must not be allowed to interfere unduly. In his conception of female virtue Aristotle has advanced somewhat from Pericles’ negative ideal, but he has not got very far. (204-05)

Wright’s sarcasm rightly recognizes Aristotle’s prejudices against women. On Wright’s second point, classics scholar Anne Carson concurs:

> The celebrated Greek virtue of self-control (*sophrosyne*) has to be defined differently for men and for women, Aristotle maintains. Masculine *sophrosyne* is rational self-control and resistance to excess, but for the woman *sophrosyne* means obedience and consists in submitting herself to the control of others. (*Men* 142).

When Aristotle uses the word Σωφροσύνη (or *sophrosyne*) in the *Rhetoric*, as in the excerpt above, the traditional phallogocentric translator renders the phrase “virtuous moderation.” Aristotle has not bothered to comment in the passage about how the term applies differently to females. Thus, traditional, phallogocentric translator either does not feel obligated to note that Aristotle intends the word to be disparaging of females, or he does not recognize that Aristotle is biased against women. Since neither the original Greek context nor the traditional English translation convey the sexism of Aristotle overtly, commentators such as Wright and Carson must make explicit the masculinism that is otherwise left implicit.

In the next section, I will offer a feminist rhetorical translating of this Greek sentence, a translating that explicitly demonstrates the phallic in the *Rhetoric*. Here, the remarks of Wright and Carson suffice to show Aristotle’s low view of females around his term Σωφροσύνη and his
other descriptive qualities of women. Against this bit of evidence, one can begin to review the perspectives of rhetoricians Poster, Glenn, Kennedy, and Neel.

Like Wright, Poster writes as if a bit reluctant to claim wholly that Aristotle uses phallic arguments in the *Rhetoric*:

Aristotle has generally proven uncongenial to feminist rhetoricians. This might, at first sight, appear an error in feminist rhetorical historiography in need of rectification, for Aristotle does discuss pathetic appeals, probablistic reasoning, and private as well as public persuasion—all areas that might seem quite fruitful for feminist theory (342-43).

But as Wright does, Poster points to much evidence of the phallic symbol plaguing women in the *Rhetoric*:

Not only does Aristotle marginalize the forms of discourse most accessible to women, but his statements about women are far from congruent with feminist ideals. He speaks of the Mytileneans honouring Sappho “although she was a woman” (*Rhet. II.xxiii.11*), and suggests that the best way to praise a woman is by listing her distinguished male relatives (*Rhet. I.ix.31*). As an example of the *topos* of greater and lesser, Aristotle says:

οὖν εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἄνηρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ὅνηρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπεροχαὶ τῶν γενόν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς.

If the biggest man is greater than the biggest woman, men in general will be bigger than women; and if men in general are
bigger than women, the biggest man will be bigger than the biggest 
woman; for the superiority of classes and of the greatest things 
contained in them are proportionate. (*Rhet.* I.vii.5)

It would be possible to read this comparison of the size of men and women 
as purely physical, but when read against, for example, G.A. II.i, it is hard not to 
read this as yet another example of woman’s inferiority. Especially in light of the 
absence of women students from the Lyceum, it is quite difficult to read Aristotle 
as an advocate of women’s rights. Instead, the evidence of the *Rhetorica* is that 
he was equally dismissive of both women and rhetoric. (341)

One must appreciate Poster for reading the *Rhetoric* within the larger context of Aristotle’s 
phallic statements. Indeed, as context for the sexist passage in the treatise on rhetoric, Poster 
rightly points to the *Generation of Animals*. And yet, when Poster returns to the *Rhetoric* in the 
original Greek and its traditional translation⁴⁹, she must give additional commentary on the 
sexism. As noted with the passage (on page 84) above, the passage Poster quotes lack any 
explicit sexism; Poster, the commentator, must go beyond Aristotle’s and the translator’s words 
in the *Rhetoric* to find the phallic meanings.

Thus, in the next section, I will offer a feminist rhetorical translating of this Greek 
paragraph, a translating that more fully recognizes the phallic noted in the larger context of 
Aristotle’s corpus of works. The retranslation does not necessarily eliminate the need for context 
and commentary; and yet it does make more overt the sexism in Aristotle’s words.

Poster also points to a passage in the *Rhetoric* which, in traditional phallogocentric 
translation, seems to have Aristotle himself definitively disparaging a woman. It is a quotation 
that rhetorician Cheryl Glenn also attributes directly to Aristotle, again because of traditional 
phallogocentric translation.⁵⁰ Glenn concludes,
Aristotle makes no provision for the intellectual woman, except for his nod to Sappho: “Everyone honours the wise . . . [T]he Mytilenaeans [honour] Sappho, though she was a woman” (Rhetoric 2.23.1398.b). Otherwise, Aristotle denied any philosophical or rhetorical contributions by women. (49)

What a feminist rhetorical translating shows is that Aristotle is not necessarily giving the nod to Sappho; but even if he is, Sappho has much more agency in the Greek Rhetoric of Aristotle than the traditional phallogocentric translations suggest (respectively to Poster and to Glenn). This should become clear in the next section.

The remainder of this section critiques two rhetoricians, Kennedy and Neel, who minimize the phallic Greek language of Aristotle in the Rhetoric and who offer their own masculinist translations. Kennedy features his “avoidance of sexist language” as a bonus of his translation of the Rhetoric. As shown in the next section, a feminist rhetorical translating suggests he needs to go further. Kennedy spells out his intentions as follows:

A second feature [intended in the English translation] is the avoidance of some of the sexist language seen in older translations, which often speak of “men” when Aristotle uses a more general plural. I have used man or men only in those few instances in which the word anthrōpos or anēr appears in the Greek; otherwise I use someone, people, or they. On the other hand, to alter Aristotle’s many uses of he, his, or him in reference to speakers or members of a Greek assembly or jury would be unhistorical and would involve an actual change to the text. Aristotle usually envisions only males as speaking in public, but he clearly did not think that rhetoric was a phenomenon limited to males, for he draws examples of rhetoric from Sappho (a woman poet of the early sixth century B.C.E.) and from
female characters in epic and drama. In 1.5.6 he remarks that “happiness” is only half present in states where the condition of woman is poor.

(Greek nouns have grammatical gender, and as a result of the conventions of Greek word formation most rhetorical terms in Greek are feminine, as the glossary at the end of this volume reveals. The Greek words for city, political assembly, and law court are also feminine. It is not clear, however, whether the ancient Greeks were conscious of rhetoric as operating in feminine space.) (page xii of the translation’s Prooemion)

The feminist rhetorical translator has to ask whether Kennedy’s translation actually does what is intended. And the question here is asked ambiguously in the passive voice because it really is not clear whose intentions are being followed, Aristotle’s or Kennedy’s.

What I want to show initially is that Kennedy’s translation is inconsistent with regard to the translator’s intended “features.” Kennedy wants to follow Aristotle, and he ends up offering a traditional phallogocentric translation, despite his intentions to “avoid sexist language.” Kennedy intends to downplay Aristotle’s appropriation of the Hellene mother tongue for males only, and yet the translator contradicts his own explicit intentions by use of singular masculine words in English. I have emphasized the pronouns with bold font in the following passage of Kennedy’s translation, and in my attempt at a feminist rhetorical translating. The reader should note how Kennedy is intent on providing clarity and complete understanding by adding bracketed words. The reader should also see how Kennedy adds the genderless “someone” and “person” and “others” and “self” and “oneself” all of which contradict Kennedy’s intention not “to alter Aristotle’s many uses of he, his, or him” (xii). When Kennedy does retain his and Aristotle’s “his,” it is not clear why Kennedy does so except that he seems to want to avoid more awkward possessive forms in English such as “someone’s,” “person’s,” “another’s,” “self’s,”
and “oneself’s.” Kennedy’s choice of the singular masculine pronoun does not make his translation more historical, or even less “unhistorical,” and his “his” does not, as he suggests, avoid “an actual change to the text.” Kennedy’s translation cannot support his assumptions (a) that Aristotle’s very clear intention is to give “reference to speakers or members of a Greek assembly or jury” who are “only males” (xii), or (b) that Aristotle’s contemporaries reading his text must consider his masculine pronouns as having a “more general,” more gender-inclusive senses. Aristotle’s text and Kennedy’s translation below illustrate the inconsistencies:

In the Greek, Aristotle writes ambiguously either about men only or more inclusively about people, men and women. But Kennedy’s English translation makes it seem that Aristotle is writing generically about any gendered person, woman or man (i.e., “someone”); and then, further along, it seems clear in the translation that Kennedy concedes that Aristotle is specifically referring to men only (i.e., to “him” as “a person”). And then, once more, Kennedy’s male-only
references in translation are not clear again because the translator comes about the pronominal plural objects (“others”) and begins using generic, not gendered singular pronouns (i.e. “self” and “oneself”). The only consistent thing that Kennedy does is to avoid the use of feminine pronouns.

A feminist rhetorical translating does make a difference. As is shown in the next section, such a translating gets at other intentions including the various intentions of a marginalized reader, even a woman, with respect to this passage.

In addition to the discussion of Kennedy, I offer a critique of Jasper Neel, who observes that “[i]n Aristotle’s system, soul is privileged over body, intelligence over emotion, humans over animals, men over women, and freemen over slaves” (26). However, Neel claims “Aristotle did not need to spend much time on slavery in the Rhetoric because he had justified it in detail in the Politics, the master art in which his rhetoric is a subsidiary” (16). For Aristotle, “rhetoric” does not have the status of other “arts.” Neel adds, “And by now, of course, it is clear why we read the Rhetoric alone, pretending that it can be extracted from the political and social theories in which Aristotle embedded it. . . . Through his eyes, things ‘make sense’ in a terrifying way” (18). Our readerly pretense is that “rhetoric” does not need to fit in the context of Aristotle’s terrible, terrifying map of knowledge. Neel specifies that Aristotle’s terrifying map of knowledge includes “[s]lavery, sexism, and racism [which together as a system] made perfect sense to Aristotle, even though he clearly knew persuasive and cogent arguments against them all” (25). Neel suggests that although Aristotle writes with explicit phallic language in every treatise except the Rhetoric, then ostensibly readers can assume that the Rhetoric is not sexist. I would like to suggest that Neel has read the Rhetoric well in the context of the body of Aristotle’s phallic works. Any yet, his readings of the Rhetoric, even in the larger context, have
been tainted by traditional phallogocentric translations that mask the phallic nature of Aristotle’s theorizing of rhetoric.

In his commentary on Aristotle’s voice, Neel feels the need to attempt his own translation of certain passages that “might more nearly capture the Greek by violating elegant English.” He notes that in some places his “translation is slightly out of keeping with standard translations” while in other places it must be “dramatically out of keeping with standard translations” (44).

Neel’s assertion is that he has “offered more of a ‘transterpretation’ than a translation” (my emphases, 44), and he confesses to his own readers that he feels he has used translation to interpose his own interpretations of the Greek, and he attempts not to hide the sexism, racism, and pro-slavery intentions of Aristotle. Neel departs from the traditional phallogocentric translations as if departing explicitly from the “standard.” His is a “violating” by interpreting, as if the “standard” traditional translations never do these things. But if Neel’s transterpretation might “more nearly capture the Greek,” then his own ideal of “standard translations” as somehow free of interpretation is a notion that Aristotle’s phallic methods have already captured.

In other words, Neel fails to recognize that translating, “standard” or otherwise, is interpreting. Neel unwittingly participates in Aristotle’s phallic system by separating “translation” from “interpretation” and by putting the former above the latter. In Aristotle’s and Neel’s system, the Greek reader remains over the standard translator, and the standard translator is over the “transterpreter,” who might remain over the mere interpreter.

There are, admittedly, degrees of “standard.” In other words, what Neel considers a “standard” translation must be relative to others’ standards for a translation. But one has to be careful to trace exactly what an ideal “standard” presumes: that the Greek original is above interpretation and that the translator must leave any interpreting to the author, Aristotle. Hence, for Aristotle, politics could be “the master art in which his rhetoric is a subsidiary” (Neel 16).
Neel allows Aristotle’s classification without protest and seems to offer this subordination of rhetoric as the explanation for why presumably Aristotle has no explicit misogyny in the *Rhetoric*.

The feminist rhetorical translator will have difficulty with Neel’s failure to note that his so-called “standard translations” are by and large interpretations of Aristotle. Neel needs to ask, and so do other rhetoricians, whether the “standard” traditional translations have interpreted the phallic right out of Aristotle’s writings on rhetoric. And what interpretation is Aristotle himself making, in the Greek?

In summary, this section finds in the text of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* his masculinist mark. Traditional phallogocentric translators would mask over the phallic in ways that require the reader to turn to the larger context of his other works in order to recognize the misogyny. Carol Poster and Cheryl Glenn, therefore, in their correct recognition of the ways Aristotle disparages women in the *Rhetoric* rely on traditional phallogocentric translations that do not go far enough. In addition, George A. Kennedy incorrectly claims that Aristotle does valorize the rhetoric of women, and Kennedy by translation attempts “avoidance of sexist language” but inasmuch as he succeeds fails to follow Aristotle in his original sexist language. Finally, Jasper Neel recognizes the need for a translating that interprets but separates “standard” translation from interpretation and the Greek text from the English so that he participates in Aristotle’s phallic logic and unwittingly praises masculinist translation.

**IV. THE DIFFERENCE FEMINIST RHETORICAL TRANSLATING MAKES**

In this last section, my purpose is to begin the feminist rhetorical translating of particular passages in the *Rhetoric*. I am returning to those quotations from the previous section that are phallic both in Aristotle’s Greek and in the traditional translators’ English. With each passage, I give Aristotle’s Greek, the traditional phallogocentric translation again, and my rhetorical
feminist translating. My goal is to imagine the very authentic voices around Aristotle and around his *Rhetoric*.

To be sure Aristotle writes sexist, racist, and pro-slavery things in his various writings; and traditional phallogocentric translations tend to overlook or to downplay such issues. I’ve shown much of this in the first section above.

But Aristotle seems to have personally practiced what he taught. And what is personal does concern or ought to concern others, even the reader and the translator of Aristotle’s works. His lived theorizing is important to feminist rhetorical translating not because it provides important clues to Aristotle’s authority but because it helps us position him personally with respect to ourselves and to others as readers, as feminists against sexism, as rhetorical listeners, and as translators.

In my translating, I want to bring in persons and personalities who in Aristotle’s immediate and contemporary context were marginalized by his phallic *Rhetoric*. Again, I am using passive voice to remind myself and my reader that Aristotle silences others as he spoke for them and wrote disparagingly of them.

When he was around 37 years old, Aristotle married a girl named Pythias who likely was around 18 years of age; at that time, he wrote his treatise on *Politics* in which “he specified as the optimal nuptial ages thirty-seven for the man and eighteen for the woman” (Edel 14). The implications are not missed by Wright, who declares, “The whole arrangement is obviously wrong” (213); and Wright explains:

> The gap between husband and wife is far too great for any real physical or moral companionship. The husband, moreover, remaining unmarried until the age of thirty-seven, can hardly be supposed to have escaped from the illicit connections
which were allowed and encouraged. . . [and] to say that such an one is in his prime is surely to mis-state the case (213).

In the *Rhetoric* (1390b), Aristotle did in fact say that the prime age for a man’s body is thirty-five but for his mind forty-nine. At the time he wrote this, Aristotle was forty-nine and had already outlived Pythias, who would have been thirty. They had a daughter named Pythias who would have been, at age twelve, approaching the baby-bearing age if still a few years from the optimal marrying age.

Wright continues to note the personal issues:

> The art of being a grandfather also under this system tends to disappear, for a man could hardly hope to see grandchildren of his own, if neither he nor his sons married till they were thirty-seven: his daughters, of course, . . . on marriage passed altogether out of their father’s life (213).

By this arrangement of Aristotle’s, then, his daughter Pythias and any grandchild she might bear would be under another man. And it does not take much imagination to picture, through the years, the various problematic issues for a wife, a mother, a concubine, and a grandmother, who experience different translations and distanced relationships with respect to men. It is important to consider the other women, children, and slaves in Aristotle’s life and their problems. History does record that Aristotle fathered another child, a son named Nichomachus by a wife or concubine or slave named Herpyllis although the details are sketchy (Edel 14). And we do know that “[un]questionably, Aristotle owned numerous slaves. . . [by] a kind of structural racism” (Neel 19). These are not unimportant facts when one is translating Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* rhetorically and feministically.

It is fair for the translator to imagine that Aristotle’s daughter Pythias, his second wife (or woman) Herpyllis, and a eunuch slave perhaps named Horace might be together one day while
Aristotle and Nichomachus were away at the Academy. Quite possibly all of them were multilingual, and very plausibly each of them could read. In addition, there is no reason to think that they might not have had access to Aristotle’s original *Rhetoric* as it sat in his office at home. This is not to say that Aristotle intended for them to have the text. Clearly, he writes the treatise for teaching in his male-only school. His audience is not his daughter or wife; it is not women. Aristotle’s intended readers, likewise, are not slaves and not Barbarians, even if they are men.

My feminist rhetorical translating imagines the daughter, the concubine, and a mutilated and race-denigrated slave together and simultaneously translating—quite apart from Aristotle’s intentions. The translators are claiming their own agency. In his text, they as outsiders are finding their voices although he would silence them. They translate into a spoken Barbarian mother tongue what they read in Aristotle’s hand-written Greek. I’m imagining their using my English to sound out their perspectives on several passages already reviewed in the previous section.

The first passage is the one that Wright sarcastically suggests illustrates “Aristotle’s idea of [women’s] merits” (204). It is the same passage that Kennedy uses, ironically, to say that Aristotle values women because “[i]n 1.5.6 [of the *Rhetoric*] he remarks that ‘happiness’ is only half present in states where the condition of woman is poor” (xii). In the table below is the paragraph from Aristotle. On the next page follows the phallogocentric translation by Kennedy and the feminist rhetorical translating as the daughter, the concubine, and the slave of Aristotle might translate it into English, as below:
Good children and numerous children is not unclear. As applies to community if there are many good young men—and good in excellence of body, for example in stature, beauty, strength, athletic prowess; in the case of the mind, temperance and courage are a young man’s virtues. In an individual, being blessed with good and numerous children means having many of one’s own and of the quality described, both female and male. In the case of female children, excellence of body means beauty and stature, [excellence] of mind [means] temperance and industry, without servility.

Equally in private life and in the community, both among men and among women, there is need to seek the existence of these qualities.

Among those like the Lacedaimonians where the condition of women is poor happiness is only half present.

There’s nothing unclear about wanting and having blessed children and many children. There are, however, blessed children of and for the commonwealth, both many youths and good ones to be had. The good ones have good character in their bodies: they have a large size, good form, strength, and capabilities in athleticism to develop battle skills. Their personalities have the following: wise sense and manly, youthful character. Some individuals have these: blessed children and many children and many of their very own children to possess. Theirs are female sometimes but also male. The females’ good character really comes from a body with a good large figure, but also from a personality with wise submissiveness and affection for work without preoccupation from freedoms.

The individuals and the commonwealth alike (the men who are husbands and the women who are their wives) all ought to seek each of these things from the beginning.

When, in fact, women and wives are cheapened (as the Deity-Striker women and wives in Sparta are) nearly half of the society has no blessing of the deities.

What I want to emphasize is that the daughter, the son-bearing concubine, and the impotent eunuch slave of Aristotle would take the passage personally. They would read it as marginalized

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Aristotle Rhetoric 1360b-1361a

---traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy

---a feminist rhetorical translating
persons, as persons owned by an intellectual and wealthy man and his City State that is in competition with other City States, notably with Sparta of the Deity Strikers (i.e., Lacedaimonians).

The second passage I translate is the one that Wright sarcastically claimed was the text of the *Rhetoric* which shows Aristotle’s greatest kindness to women. The translator Wright quotes glosses over the sexism; hence Wright’s added commentary is needed to highlight the misogyny. Carson, likewise, comments on the meaning of σωφροσύνη as meaning different things for men and for women. For the latter, it may be “virtuous moderation” as with Wright’s translator, but it is also submission and obedience to others (in contrast to avoidance of excess for men). The traditional phallogocentric translation downplays or downright ignores how Aristotle theorizes the superiority of males in male-female difference. A feminist rhetorical translating, as below, brings these notions directly into the text.

| θηλειῶν δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἀνευ ἀνελευθερίας. | A female’s good character really comes from a body with a good large figure, but also from a personality with wise submissiveness and affection for work without preoccupation from freedoms. |
| Aristotel Rhetoric 1361a | traditional phallogocentric translation|

The excellence of females is (a) physical, a large and beautiful body; (b) mental, virtuous moderation and love—but not a sordid love—of work.

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In another passage in the *Rhetoric*, Glenn identifies Aristotle’s direct disparagement of the woman, Sappho; if he gives her a “nod,” then he still makes “no provision for the intellectual woman” (Glenn *Rhetoric Retold* 49). Kennedy reads the same passage (1397b) very differently, saying that Aristotle “clearly did not think that rhetoric was a phenomenon limited to males, for he draws examples of rhetoric from Sappho . . . and from female characters in epic and drama”
(xxi). The context is Aristotle’s enumeration of various “topics” or “places” for rhetoric. Again, the table below offers Aristotle’s Greek, Kennedy’s translation, and a feminist rhetorical translating that imagines Pythias, Herpyllis, and Horace reading someone else’s notes written for someone else.

--Aristotle Rhetoric 1398a-1398b

**Topic 10: From induction. 11. Another is from induction [ex epagögës]; for example, in the case of the woman of Peparethus [it was argued] that women everywhere discern the truth about [the father of] children; for when the orator Mantias at Athens was disputing [the parentage of] his son, the boy’s mother declared the truth.**

Similarly, when Ismenias and Stibon were in a dispute at Thebes, the woman of Dodona identified the son of Ismenias; and for this reason another place is birthed out of the bundle of particulars. For instance, it is birthed from some female of Peparethus; and it is argued that in matters of parentage wife-women always seem to discern the unveiling; this happened, indeed and in fact, at Athens, where Mr. Mantias the speaker-orator was litigating with his son, and there the mother declared the unveiling of the facts of the case; And yet again it happened, at Thebes; there Mr. Ismenias and Mr. Stibon were disputing about a child, and some female of Dodonis declared that Mr. Ismenias was its father.

(continued....)
Thettaliscus was recognized as Ismenias’ son. And again, [another example is] from the Law speech of Theodectes [to the effect that] if people do not entrust their horses to those who take poor care of others’ horses nor ships to those who have overturned others’ ships—if then this is similarly true in all cases—one should not employ for one’s own safety those who have poorly guarded the safety of another.

And [another example is] as Alcidamas [argued], that all honor the wise; at least, Parians honored Archilochus despite the nasty things he said [about them]; and Chians Homer, though he was not a citizen; and Mytilenaes Sappho, although a woman; and Lacedaimonians, though least fond of literature, made Chileon a member of their council of elders, and the Italiotes honored Pythagoras and the Lampsacenes buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and even now still honor him. And Athenians were prosperous while using the laws of Solon, and Lacedaimonians when [using] those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, at the time the leaders became philosophers, the city prospered.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy

Mr. Thettaliscus was accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias. There is another instance in the “law” of Mr. God-Acceptable:

“If we do not entrust our own horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust our own safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others.”

Similarly, in order to prove that men and women of talent are honored everywhere, Mr. Alcidamas said:

“The Parians honored Mr. Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians honor Mr. Homer, although he had rendered no public services; the Mytilenaes honor Mr. Sappho, although she was a woman who could be a man’s wife; the Deity Strikers, by no means a people fond of learning, elected Mr. Chilon one of their senators; the inhabitants of Italy honored Mr. Pythagoras, and the Lampsacenes buried Mr. Anaxagoras, although he was a foreigner, and they still hold him in honor . . . . The Athenians were happy as long as they lived under the laws of Mr. Solon, and the Deity Strikers were happy as long as they were under those of Mr. Lycurgus; and at Thebes, where the woman was the arbitrator, as soon as those who had the conduct of affairs became affectionate for wisdom the City State flourished.”

--a feminist rhetorical translating
Kennedy’s phallogocentric traditional translation renders Aristotle’s passage with transliterations, bracket English phrases and clauses to supply Aristotle’s presumed intentions, and superscripted numbers for footnotes, all of which are designed to show the reader where Kennedy hopes to be faithful but apologetically departs from the Greek writer’s original text. Kennedy departs to make guesses about Aristotle’s authorial meanings, but the faithful goal of the translator is to have his English be both as technical and as true to Aristotle’s language as possible.

Aristotle uses language that excludes the underprivileged, the uneducated, and the woman who could read what he writes. Kennedy fails to bring across the possibility of an unintended readership. The audience of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, I imagine could be his daughter, the woman whom he marries or at least impregnates to bear him his son, and one of his slaves. They would overhear Aristotle much differently than do his elite students in his male-only Academy. They eavesdrop very unlike Kennedy does, who seeks only to understand Aristotle’s intention. Notice how their language is more commonplace, more physical in metaphor, more acceptable to outsiders as indicative of his sexism, and less technical. These translators remember the woman at Thebes when reading Aristotle’s quotation of Mr. Alcidamas.

What I also want to note here is that feminist rhetorical translators recognize Aristotle’s sexism as subtle but not too difficult to miss. (Kennedy does miss it if he is not downplaying it intentionally because he knows that Aristotle is part of his culture, as if that would make Aristotle or Kennedy less culpable for the misogyny). What is subtle is the fact that Aristotle does not directly disparage Sappho. Rather, he seems to quote Alcidamas, who characterizes the views of several groups about particular individuals who are poets and not fully citizens of the Greek City States in most cases.
Aristotle’s daughter, his concubine, and his slave would relate to these other outsiders to Aristotle’s text, and they would notice how Aristotle presents as rather remarkable that women would have any voice at all in the legal affairs of men and their sons. Later passages in the _Rhetoric_ have Sappho seeming to shame a man and Alcidamas presented as one who cannot use Greek very well anyway. Pythias, Herpyllis, and Horace would read this passages as etic outsiders whose own voices must trouble the sure oratory of men in the City States. They would be pleased if Aristotle objected that this is hardly what he intends. Pythias, Herpyllis, and Horace would see that Aristotle is not intending at all to give a nod to Sappho but rather to disparage her by the sayings of Alcidamas whom Aristotle claims is unable to say much at all well in Greek.

The third passage I translate in a feminist and rhetorical way is the one in which Kennedy wants to avoid sexism, but cannot, by a faithful translation of Aristotle’s male-only pronouns. I give a bit longer version with more context than was given above. In this instance, I am imagining again the translators to be Pythias, Herpyllis, and Horace (the daughter, the concubine, and the slave to whom Aristotle writes nothing). I use bold font to emphasize certain words in each text; I retain paragraph numbers to show correspondences. In addition, the indentions of long quotations are my formatting. The table below begins with Aristotle’s Greek and continues in English translation beyond the next page:
[16] And on what’s as great as the prize of honor: a good form of beauty.
• And on what’s as great as an honor more than money.
• And whatever is not something for herself (or himself).
• And [17] things which are absolute goodness,
• Whatever is made excessively on behalf of the fatherland: her or his own and the goodness of nature and not the goodness of herself (or himself).
• [1367a] (1) her or his own, in fact, on account of these.
• [18] And whatever is taken in at the beginning of death more than living.
• her or his, in fact, because it very much holds on to living.
• [19] And whatever work is done because of others.
• Less, in fact, for herself (or himself).
• And whatever blessed gains around other things for other women, men, or slaves, not around herself (or himself).
• and around blessed creations: the Goddess whose name is Mr. Justice, in fact, and the blessed work; not, in fact, for herself (or himself).
and things that are the opposites of those of which people are ashamed (for they feel shame when speaking and doing and intending shameful things), as also Sappho has written in a poem:

(Alcaeus speaking) I wish to say something, but shame hinders me.

[Sappho] If you had a longing for noble or honorable things And your tongue had not stirred up some evil to speak, Shame would not have filled your eyes, But you would have been speaking about what is just.

[21] [Those things are honorable] also for which people contend without fear; for they put up with suffering in regard to good that contributes to their reputation.  [22] And those are the virtues and actions of those who are superior by nature are more honorable, for example, those of a man more than those of a woman.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy

• [20] And what’s different from and especially opposed to those things more than these shameful things: The shameful, in fact, are shamed and statements and creations and intentions; just as Ms. Sappho also shamefully created it in this supposed saying by Mr. Alcaeus:

“I wish to say something, otherwise humiliation holds me back,”

Ms. Sappho most conveniently responds:

“Had you not desired what was fine more than beautiful form, and had not your tongue said some bad to utter it, then humiliation would not have filled your eyes, and you would have stated things otherwise around the Goddess named Mr. Justice.”

• [21] And around what’s strived for, not terror.

• Around, in fact, what moves toward an opinion carrying goodness that passes this way.

[22] And the things naturally worthy of both good character and beautiful form and the things worked out: such as a man - husband more than his woman - wife.

--feminist rhetorical translating

For feminist rhetorical translators, it appears that Aristotle has rather mundanely made a list. The three translators do not necessarily try to make sense of it. But they don’t attempt to treat the masculine pronouns as only applicable to males. In addition, when they do translate the comparisons between males and females, then the translating recognizes the phallic male separating himself from the female. Aristotle in his own authorial authority creates unwitting hypocritical shame. That is, as the feminist rhetorical translating illustrates, he calls it shameful when Ms. Sappho exercises textual authority, when she creates a statement by Mr. Alcaeus, putting words in his mouth so as to dialogue with him, as if to get the upper hand. Aristotle will
not confess that he’s getting the upper hand with Ms. Sappho by quoting and characterizing her. But he has the audacity, according to the translation, to call shameful the fact that she creates a dialogue with Mr. Alcaeus. And in the dialogue, the translators make sure to invoke Lady Justice when Aristotle only intends to speak through Mr. Alcaeus of the abstract notion of justice. Again, Aristotle does not intend to give even a nod to Ms. Sappho, but the feminist rhetorical translators give her more, a rather divine authority.

The reader may object to the feminist rhetorical translating on the grounds that it interprets and seems to take liberties. But the purpose of such translating is freely to give voice and agency to the silenced and marginalized who stand outside of the scope of Aristotle’s audience or who speak as captives to his text. With the feminist rhetorical translating, subjective interpretation is celebrated, not shunned. The sexist intentions of the author are recognized and protested, not followed faithfully or opposed with silencing.

A final excerpt from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* speaks volumes from silence, or at least Aristotle’s intended silence. It is his ostensibly purposeful silencing of a particular rhetor-rhetorician. For all of Aristotle’s theorizing of rhetoric and rhetoricians, it appears that he intends completely to ignore a well-known contemporary, a woman named Aspasia.

As quoted above, Aristotle does theorize women rhetors and names the poet Sappho twice, and she is a woman who he is willing to mention if in a phallic and separational way. Moreover, Aristotle does mention and valorize several men who are acquaintances of and maybe even learners of Aspasia:

- **Socrates**, whom he recognizes or quotes six separate times in the *Rhetoric* and twice quotes from Plato’s treatise the *Menexenus*, a Socratic dialogue in which Aspasia and her rhetoric theorizing is a central subject.
• **Plato**, whom Aristotle mentions overtly or quotes six separate times as well, including those two mentions with his dialogue *Menexenus*, where Aspasia is a key rhetorical figure.

• **Pericles**, whom he identifies or quotes six times as well, including one mention from the *Menexenus*.

• **Xenophon**, whom Aristotle quotes once.

The significance of these four men is that they interacted with and wrote praises of Aspasia. In fact, Aspasia was so well known that it is not unlikely Aristotle’s daughter, concubine, and slave may have heard of her.

Cheryl Glenn’s research concludes that “[i]t is difficult to overemphasize how extraordinary the foreign-born Aspasia—a public woman, philosopher, political influence, and rhetorician—would have been in fifth-century BCE Athenian society” (*Rhetoric Retold* 38). Glenn adds:

> In the *Menexenus*, Plato’s Socrates reveals Aspasia to be the author of Pericles’s funeral oration. . . . The rhetorician most closely associated with Pericles would no doubt have served as his logographer, as logography (the written composition of speech) was commonly the province of rhetoricians. Hence, Aspasia surely must have influenced Pericles in the composition of those speeches that both established him as a persuasive speaker and informed him as the most respected citizen-orator of the age. (*Rhetoric Retold* 39)

Glenn goes on to say that “Socrates deeply respected Aspasia’s thinking and admired her rhetorical prowess, disregarding, it seems, her status as a woman and a *hetaera*” (*Rhetoric Retold* 40). Hetaerae, of course, are “upper-class courtesans,” and perhaps Aristotle’s second woman—“wife” Herpyllis is of the hetaerae.
For whatever reason, Aristotle does not mention this foreign-born prostitute Aspasia, even though Socrates, Plato, Pericles, and Xenophon all praise her. They valorize her not only for her abilities and rhetorical theories but also for her “art of inductive argument” (Glenn, *Rhetoric Retold* 43). Glenn says that these men recognize her facility even in “issues of translation and adaptation” (*Rhetoric Retold* 41).

To close this chapter, I want to suggest that Aristotle made a slip of the pen, and I want to flaunt that possibility. Clearly, he refuses to praise or even to mention the well-known woman rhetor-rhetorician Aspasia in the *Rhetoric* (or in any of his other treatises). He does, indeed, use the word, ἀσπασία, which is transliterated as “aspasia.” However, he does not use the word as Aspasia’s name. Aspasia means an “embracing.” And here’s how Aristotle uses that word in the *Rhetoric* (1400a). Aristotle is listing what has become know in the study of his rhetoric as the common topics or the places of commonalities for rhetoric. He is writing about the commonplace where, in rhetoric, one human being attacks another with slander. In the table below, Aristotle’s text is first, and below it is Kennedy’s phallogocentric traditional translation. Beside that is the feminist rhetorical translating of several to whom Aristotle never writes although he would claim them as his daughter, his concubine, and his slave. In the feminist rhetorical translating, I am bringing in one additional person: Aspasia, whose name means the One Who Embraces; she embraces Pythias, Herpyllis, and Horace to translate; Aspasia is no longer silent. The texts are as follows. I have bolded the word ἀσπάζεσθαι and its translation in English for the sake of reader correspondence. The additional words in the feminist rhetorical translating are to emphasize the various nuances inherent in the Greek.

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άσπαζεσθαι εδίκαι συνέιναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λέχθεντος δὲ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλύθη ἢ διαβολή.

--Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1400a
for example, when a certain woman claimed that her son was the child of a different mother, because she embraced him she was thought to be involved with him as her lover, but when the reason was explained [i.e., that he really was her son] she was freed from slander.

Another example: there was the claim that a certain son was her own, and she embraced him (she, like the one named Embracer, or Aspasia, who is translating this very text, who men tend to see only as a prostitute); then there was, as there is too often, the prejudice of men, the opinion that they were together in an illicit relationship. The real reason was explained, however, and she was free of the impetuous false charge thrown at her.

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Kennedy again is intent on understanding and explaining to readers Aristotle’s ostensible technical intentions. Both men do not notice that Aristotle has used the word “aspasia” which can be interpreted as his unwitting use of the name Aspasia, or Embracer. Kennedy has not noticed that Aristotle completely ignores and therefore silences the woman who so influenced Socrates and impressed Plato.

Aspasia finds herself in Aristotle’s text where he would not mention her by name at all. And though he intends his male-only students to abstract some example from rhetoric from this particular case, Aristotle is made to say, by Aspasia and the others, that men like Aristotle are prejudiced against women even in the most innocent of situations. And though Kennedy downplays the issue by highlighting the explanation for the males’ mistake in judgment, the feminist rhetorical translators highlight the freedom of the woman from men’s false charges.

Of interest is that Aristotle, in this example, uses but a feminine possessive pronoun (i.e., αὐτής) to identify the falsely accused mother, but the pronoun depends on the masculine head noun ὅνον or “son.” And it is the embrace (τὸ ὁπ ἅρκεσθαι or the “aspasia”) that incorrectly suggests that this adult woman (unnamed and identified only in relation to her male son) has done something illicit with the young man—not her lover in a secret affair but her very own child.
Aristotle perhaps is not taking a shot at the woman Aspasia, who appears illicit by her dependence on younger men. But my feminist rhetorical translating wants to flaunt the fact that Aristotle does intend to silence the rhetorician-rhetor Aspasia. As I overhear the silence and listen with my own intent, I then intend for the translation to be an overtranslation, an inclusion of the person of Aspasia in Aristotle’s example. The purpose is to startle the reader, just as Aristotle must have been startled that his teachers and other male rhetoricians whom he quotes would learn rhetoric from a woman, and an apparently illicit woman at that. Maybe readers need to be taught to see the shock in such a translation; and yet, the feminist rhetorical translator blatantly announces herself in the text as both an intruder and an original author. The feminist rhetorical translating, then, works as a kind of parable against Aristotle’s silencing of the woman, the rhetor, the translator.

In summary, Aristotle’s writings are phallic; even the *Rhetoric* is phallic. If traditional translators in some cases have sought to downplay the sexism, they have nonetheless participated in and have perpetuated Aristotle’s phallogocentrism. A feminist rhetorical translating highlights the misogyny and the gynophobia while maintaining that Aristotle is unwittingly affected by women and must use their rhetorical discourses, discourses which translate more than he intends as the ostensibly-sole author.
Chapter 3 – A Feminist Rhetoric: Translating the Logic in Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Everything Aristotle ever wrote on the difficult art of logic, on the important realm of moral experience, and on the exact comprehension of natural objects, I shall translate in the correct order.

-- Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione

Real translation can only come about if the “jagged relationship between rhetoric and logic, condition and effect of knowing” are reconstructed in the other language. . . “so that the agent can be alive, in a human way, in the world” ([Gayatri Spivak “Politics of Translation”] 181).

--Sherry Simon, Gender in Translation: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Transmission

Aristotle’s writings make clear that he intended to be absolutely logical. He left for himself few alternatives: for if he was not logical, then he would be, by logic, illogical. Ironically, Aristotle was not as logical as he claimed to be. It is true that he invented logic, that he actually even coined the term \( \lambda \omega \gamma \kappa \varepsilon \) /logikē/, and that he began using it to separate his teachings from those of his own teachers, Plato and Socrates. It is also true that Aristotle uses logic to denigrate females, to describe rhetoric, and to deny the value of translation. His logic, upon close examination, is motivated by his fear of females. And he resorts to rhetorics, including womanly rhetorics, when making his claims. Therefore, Aristotle fails to be as logical as he intends to be, if logic is to separate personal bias from objectivity and, hence, females from males and rhetoric from logic itself.

Aristotle creates additional ironies for translators who would downplay his sexism and who would follow his logic. When traditional translators have adhered to Aristotle’s intentions, they have conspired with him in what feminist scholars call “phallogocentrism” (Cixous 123).

To be sure, traditional translators may not associate logic in translation with what is phallic and centric in Aristotle’s “system of inflexible last judgment” (Clarice Lispector translated and qtd. in Cixous 123). However, traditional translators want to be faithful to Aristotle. As the epigraphs above suggest, there may be an assumed correctness to such faithfulness, as pledged by translator Boethius (154), and as noted by translation theorist Gayatri Spivak, who stands as an outsider to the central Western male tradition of logic (Spivak qtd. in
Simon 143). Consequently, traditional translators of Aristotle seek to sound Greek, which includes sounding as logical as Aristotle intended to sound. Thus, the traditional translators transliterate Aristotle’s words, and they intend to define precisely each of his key terms.

As I began to show in Chapter 2, traditional translators end up participating in and perpetuating the phallic part of Aristotle’s system, or τά φαλλικά to use his untranslated phrase. My aim was to start illustrating how a feminist rhetorical translating of certain sexist passages in the Rhetoric renders them in ways that traditional masculinist translations do not: as overtly penisesque; as shockingly and offensively misogynistic; and as Aristotle’s looting of women’s discourse, his robbing women of rhetoric.

The thesis of this dissertation as supported in this chapter has two aspects. First, my claim is that Aristotle invents logic possibly to disfigure the languages of many, especially of women, and he uses logic further ostensibly to define “rhetoric” in the Rhetoric, which is his attempt to distort and to control Greek-male-only rhetorics. Second, a feminist rhetorical translating not only exposes Aristotle’s game, but it also gives agency to the person who would translate his treatise in a feminist way, in a rhetorical rather than a logical way.

There are three sections to this chapter, as follows: I. Aristotle’s Neologism Logic; II. Aristotle’s “Logical” Definitions in His Rhetoric and in Traditional Phallogocentric Translation; III. How a Feminist Rhetorical Translating Makes a Difference. The first section examines Aristotle’s sources of and motives for logic. The second section focuses on Aristotle’s logic in the Rhetoric and the problems of logical definition both by Aristotle and by his traditional English translators. The third section refuses to make use of Aristotle’s logic for translating the ostensible definitions in his treatise on rhetoric and instead translates two key words in a feminist and a rhetorical way.
The phallic in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, and in well-intentioned anti-Aristotelianism, is not always obvious. But no scholar denies to Aristotle his logical intentions; all translators of the *Rhetoric* recognize how important logic is to Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric; and no academic seems blind to his or her own use of logic. Even so, it is important for me to emphasize the conspicuous nature of logic surrounding Aristotelian rhetorical scholarship because, I believe, most scholars fail to recognize that logic is part and parcel of the phallic system.

In the next chapter, focused on Aristotle’s centricism in his *Rhetoric*, I will make a similar observation: that what is phallic and what is logical, for Aristotle, is also what is central to his project. Logic, as the separationist-binary method, retains and perpetuates what Mairs calls the “fundamental structure of patriarchy” (41).

Perhaps only those most-personally and most-powerfully affected by the phallic symbol and by the logic in Aristotle’s system may clearly see the similarities between the two especially in terms of their influence, but there is little dispute by anyone in history or in most any contemporary society that Aristotle’s logic has been exceptionally powerful and enduring. In the dominant traditions of the academy, which often ignore or minimize Aristotelian phallicism, logic may be celebrated not as offensive or offending but as the means to human progress. In fact, in general, scientists, philosophers, and scholars of the various language arts including rhetoric have long praised Aristotle for his profound contributions to their respective fields. And, for the academics who appropriate Aristotle in any way, logic may be the single most important cause of his widespread and continuing impact.52

I. ARISTOTLE’S NEOLOGISM LOGIC

Aristotle invented the word λογική for his system of reasoning and rationality, which we have come to know as “logic.” Aristotle implies some rather unique meanings by in his particular coining of that word. The peculiar etymology of the neologism receives more attention later in
this section. For now, I want to suggest that Aristotle’s own misogyny and gynophobia may have motivated him to pursue logic. Furthermore, there are fairly clear connections of his phallic language to what has become Aristotle’s logic. What is not clear is whether logic is the cause of phallicism or whether what is phallic caused logic.

It is not difficult, however, to imagine that Aristotle wants his logic to drive all his, and any male’s, conclusions. The end of a syllogism is always to be rational and conclusive, if only seemingly-rational and apparently-conclusive. Logic guides Aristotle’s phallic, sexist, and misogynist evidentiary end: that females are naturally lesser than males. To put this another way, the effect of Aristotle’s logic is that women are lesser than men because of the observed facts of nature. The consequence is that a woman cannot speak or write or learn on an equal par with a man. The result of Aristotle’s logic on woman’s literature through the centuries, for example, is something that writing and rhetoric scholar Michelle Baliff has brought to our attention. Writing in a rather defiant style that seems to flaunt logic with her “paralogical” discourse, Baliff notes:

According to Aristotle’s aesthetics, a narrative must be arranged according to some organizing principle. . . . Aristotle also offers us the classificatory system of binaries to help us order our stories, to order our experiences, to order ourselves. . . . But perhaps Woman can (un)speak in the unthought, not-yet-thought, non-spaces produced by alternative paradigms, by new idioms, by paralogical and paratactical and, thus, illegitimate discourses. What . . . if our narrative had no syllogistic, metonymic, linear or triangular structure? . . . What if Truth were a Woman . . . what then? Cixous replies,

Then all stories would have to be told differently. . . . (93, 96-97).
Baliff is clearly accounting for the sexist effects of Aristotle’s binary, classificatory logic. Her own language is an attempt to demonstrate “alternative paradigms” to “Aristotle’s aesthetics” caused by Aristotle’s logic.

Two other feminist scholars, Nancy Mairs and Anne Carson, show the causes of Greek male logic: misogyny and gynophobia. Mairs and Carson seek to demonstrate Aristotle’s insecurities with respect to women as the very reason his male-method of knowing is important to him.

Mairs, a feminist academic writer, gets at the abstract and oppositional male shape of Aristotle’s masculinist logic. The procedure of logic depends on the binary, the separation of what a defined thing is from what it is not. Mairs explains that:

The fundamental structure of patriarchy is thus binary: me/not me, active/passive, culture/nature, normal/deviant, good/bad, masculine/feminine, public/private, political/personal, form/content, subjective/objective, friend/enemy, true/false. . . . It is a structure, both spatial and temporal, predicated upon separation, not relation. It demands rupture, the split into halves engendered by the abrupt erection of the phallus: those who have and those who have not. It speaks the language of opposites. (41)

Mairs has started into this description of the logical binary by saying that it is motivated by the male attempt to control the other. Mairs explains, “In order to get what he wants, then, the father must have power to coerce those around him to meet his demands. To have power is to alienate oneself, however, because power is always power over and the preposition demands an object” (41). Logic here is not presented simply as abstract rationality but rather also as a very personal means for the male logician to secure his position hierarchically over the female and any other who threatens his desires.
Mairs illustrates the effect of Aristotelian logic on composition studies. She points to one way that logic has dominated rhetoric, especially the rhetoric of a minority woman. Logic, Mairs shows, has led to the development of one straightforward convention for writing called, “the five-paragraph essay”; and yet there are other more-rhetorical more-complex forms that an African American woman writer, such as Alice Walker, may use in contrast to the standard convention of logic: “In this day of nearly universal education, with handbooks for writers proliferating . . . the five-paragraph essay has achieved the status of a cultural paradigm, which Walker blows to smithereens” (93). Mairs examines Walker’s essay entitled, “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens”:

In this essay, as in many of her other writings, Walker remakes the definitions of Art and the Artist . . . which have [except for such remakings] have resided from time immemorial in the patriarchal domain, so that they describe the African-American woman. To do so, she must so subvert the conventional meanings that they no longer have the power to exclude her [i.e., by the binary, definitional logic that separates females from males and even rhetoric from logic itself]. In the process, she employs and thereby validates many of the cognitive modes—indirection, associative reasoning, anecdotal development, reliance on folk wisdom and intuition—which patriarchal [i.e., binarying] critics have traditionally devalued by ascribing them to women and other primitive thinkers [and not to men, who would be especially logical thinkers].

The essay [by the African-American woman] is a structural anomaly. I would hate to teach it in a traditional [i.e., logic structured] freshman composition course. After reading their textbooks, my students would go nuts trying to find the thesis statement and the major points of support for a formal outline, much
less figure out its method of development and analyze its *logical* devices. (Interestingly, in the rhetorical index to *The Contemporary Essay*, [a traditional textbook] where [Walker’s] “In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens” is reprinted, it is listed only under “narration”—not even “description” or “example”—despite, or perhaps because of *the complexity of its rhetorical strategies*.) (bold font added; 93)

In tracing the structure of Aristotle’s patriarchal logic, Mairs has identified the effect of male binarying on writing: the college composition course separates the logical form of the essay from other more-rhetorical and less-male ways of communicating.

Similarly, Carson observes the importance of physical boundaries for ancient Greek males. Carson is a classics scholar, poet, historian, and comparative literature scholar, who translates Greek writings into English. She is aware of the insecurities of men in the ancient Hellene world. Carson sees Aristotle as comfortably developing his bifurcating logic to deal with his hate of females and his fear of women. Logic perpetuates Aristotle’s profound, unarticulated cultural prejudices. Carson observes:

> As the anthropologists say, “Every touch is a modified blow.” The difficulty presented by any instance of contact is that of violating a fixed boundary, transgressing a closed category where one does not belong. The ancient Greeks seem to have been even more sensitive than we [in the present day Western world] are to such transgressions and to the crucial importance of boundaries, both personal and extra personal, as guarantors of human order. Their society developed a complex cultural apparatus, including such rituals as supplication, hospitality, and gift-exchange, which historians and anthropologists are only recently coming to understand as mechanisms for defining and securing the
boundaries of everything in the habitable world. Civilization is a function of boundaries. \( (Men\ 130) \)

As I will note in a later section here, feminist rhetorical translating recognizes the inherent boundaries in Aristotle’s words in the *Rhetoric*. Traditional phallogocentric translators ignore the personal aspects of these boundaries as part of Aristotle’s language and logic.

Carson explains further how men form personal boundaries and use their logic to construct gender and to control women:

In such a society, individuals who are regarded as especially lacking in control of their own boundaries, or as possessing special talents and opportunities for confounding the boundaries of others, evoke fear and controlling action from the rest of society. Women are so regarded by men in ancient Greek society, along with suppliants, strangers, guests, and other intruders. But the threat which women pose is not only greater in degree than that presented by other transgressors of boundaries; it is different in kind. “Let a man not clean his skin in water that a woman has washed in. For a hard penalty follows on that for a long time,” Hesiod advises \( (Op.\ 753-55) \). When we focus on Greek attitudes to and treatment of the female, we see anxiety about boundaries from a particular perspective—that of hygiene, physical and moral. \( (Men,\ 130) \)

Lest anyone doubts that Aristotle and his masculinist logic plays a role in his gynophobia, Carson makes some of the connections overtly.

Considerations of pollution, which do not noticeably predominate in other ruses of contact like gift-exchange or supplication, assert themselves when the crises of contact involve erotic relations between male and female. . . . First, let us consider the logic of female pollution. . . . We might note also that the so-called
Pythagorean Table of Oppositions, cited by Aristotle, aligns “boundary” or “limit” on the same side as “masculine”: over against “the unbounded” and “feminine” on the other side. (*Men*, 130-33)

Carson goes on to quote Aristotle directly as he denigrates female, using a “logic of female pollution” (133). As I discussed in the previous chapter, Aristotle believes that females are botched males. In fact, any human mutation, he “observes,” is caused by the mother during conception. He carefully studies every species of animal he can find to make analogies to the human condition: females, inherently weak, dirty, and therefore dangerous females need to be bounded. There is virtually no aspect of a woman—whether physical, moral, or linguistic—that does not threaten the world of men. Thus, men should take care not to bathe in a woman’s bath (as Hesiod warns); men should beware of women who do not have “‘Sophrosyne,’ ‘virtuous moderation’” (Wright 204), which is her “obedience and consists in submitting herself to the control of others” (*Carson, Men* 142).

Thus, to summarize Mairs and Carson (on what we might call Aristotle’s method of epistemology), logic is binary with a focus on defining fixed boundaries for separations and establishing closed categories on a hierarchical map of knowledge. Aristotle’s logic appears both naturally motivated by the phallus and consistently threatened by the female.

Quite simply, Aristotle’s logic is the cold, objective observation of any particular subject. The logician uses the ostensibly fixed starting points of apparent nature (i.e., the givens called premises) to draw firm conclusions (i.e., through a well-ordered form of specific-to-general deductive statements called syllogism). The observer needs to be neither touched by nor to touch the subjects of his observation. In fact, subjectivity is completely denied if not forbidden by the logician. The implication is that the male is objective in his logic, and by the logic of opposition, the female is not objective because she is without logic. The female is subjective because she is
illogical (as if logic and not logic are the only alternatives). Likewise, the subjective poet, female or male, is a “master contriver—or what Aristotle would call an ‘imiter’ of reality. Imitation (memesis in Greek) is Aristotle’s collective term for the true mistakes in poetry” (Carson, *Men* 55). Poetry tends to be mistaken when trying to join two things that should, by logic, be separated. Thus, the poetic, for Aristotle, threatens logic as much as the female does.

Logic, therefore, is what Aristotle elevates above the poets and above women. By logic, he reduces, if not absolutely steals away, the agency of the poets (both men and women) and of women rhetors. He makes logic the key objective for his schools.

In contrast, Kenneth Pike says a person is always to be above logic; in other words, the woman, the poet, the Barbarian, and anyone outside of Aristotle’s elite Greek male-only academy of logic is not subject to using the binary system to order her or his own world. Pike has studied various languages that Aristotle would consider Barbarian, and among these Pike has found native speakers of mother tongues that work fine without a numbering system, and without anything resembling Western logic. In his own academic language, Pike says: “Reductionism is inadequate” because of the limiting binary that separates a “thing” from what it is “not.” Logic attempts to reduce and to simplify. Pike asks rhetorically, “Is only logical simplicity to be acceptable to the academic community?” (*Linguistic* xiii-xiv). Persons who are above logic may simultaneously choose “alternative ways to view every situation as static, dynamic, or relational according to the current needs and interests of the observer” (*Linguistic* xii). Logic as “the hopeless attempt to eliminate the observer in favor of scientific detachment or of objectivity is dismal” (*Linguistic* xii).

By the process of logic, Aristotle makes reductionistic, simplified, academic observations not only of nature (or φυσική, transliterated /physikē/) but also of everything beyond (or μετά, /meta/) nature (which is metaphysics). He develops the new observational process in his six
treatises collectively called the *Organon* (i.e., *Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations*); and he uses the method, discussing it explicitly along the way, in *Physics, Metaphysics, On the Animals,* and the *Generation of Animals.* Aristotle names the observational procedure λογική (or “logic”) in order to separate it from λόγος (or “logos”). “Logos,” in Aristotle’s view, had become too complex, too over determined, too poetic, and too mixed with the modes of knowing and of communicating that women and Barbarians might use.

Rather systematically, Aristotle separates λογική (or “logic”) from Plato’s and Socrates’s διάλεκτική (or “dialectic”). He separates διάλεκτική (or “dialectic”) from σοφιστική (or “sophistic”). He divides these two also from ρήτορική (or “rhetoric”). Aristotle views “logos,” “dialectic,” “sophistic,” and “rhetoric” as inadequate means for observing reality. He uses his binarying, separating λογική (or “logic”) in his *φιλοσοφία* (or “philosophy”), in order to argue for the facts of the deficiencies of all other methods.

I have used scare quotes to mark these terms, which are, for Aristotle, technical. The same words—transliterated into the English alphabet—have become technical terms for Aristotelian scholars as well. For the benefit of the reader who may not be familiar with their traditional definitions, below I provide descriptions of the words as from George A. Kennedy, who has completed the most recent translation of the *Rhetoric.* Kennedy notes the following:

- “logic . . . consists of particular observations from which a general conclusion is drawn [. . . by the] syllogistic form of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion” (fn46,40);
- “Greek logos means ‘what is said,’ speech, a speech, a word, but often also the reason or argument inherent in speech” (fn38, 38)
- “Dialectic as taught by Aristotle was the art of philosophical disputation. . . . The procedure . . . was for one student to state a thesis . . . and for a second student to try to
refute the thesis by asking a series of questions that could be answered by ‘yes’ or ‘no’

. . . much as Socrates is shown doing in the earlier Platonic dialogues” (28).

• “sophist, a person who engages in specious argument” (318).

In this list of terms, Aristotle’s “logic” is the new one.

Aristotle invents this word in contrast to a much older one: “Greek logos” (Kennedy fn38, 38). “Logos,” explains rhetoric historian Edward Schiappa, “was a much overworked word during the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries” (91), and before “the fourth century the key conceptual term for the Sophists was usually logos and sometimes legein [which means ‘to speak’] — terms broader in meaning than any ancient conception” (91); these two terms are broader also in meaning than what rhetoricians today understand as “rhetoric” or what Aristotle intended by “logic.”

By logic, Aristotle intends to make simple and singular “a complex cultural apparatus, including . . . [the old plural words and the various] mechanisms for defining and securing the [binaried, separational] boundaries of everything in the habitable world” (91) so that once and for all, for Greek males, “[c]ivilization is a function of boundaries,” boundaries of and by logic (Carson Men, 131). Schiappa explains that “Aristotle consistently sought to contrast his philosophical system [of logic] with that of his predecessors even if the contrast required distortion of his predecessors’ doctrines” (52). Aristotle thought that the men who taught him had not done enough to separate the language arts of poets and sophists and women from good, pure Greek. Logic is Aristotle’s answer. It is an answer to his teachers that is based on boundaries, based on the binaries that separate, based on a classification system that orders hierarchically so that men, certain educated Greek men, and their language, are on top. If logic is separate and above other ways of knowing, then other discourse methods which are “not logic” must take lower priority in Aristotle’s science of nature.
Nevertheless, it appears by Aristotle’s logic alone he was not able to convince his contemporaries of the supremacy of logic. And yet Aristotle was ostensibly so persuaded by the power of logic that he was willing to ignore facts and to re-write history so that certain men, including himself, could be at the pinnacle. For example, Schiappa notices how, by logic, “Aristotle reduced the origin of rhetoric to the study of probability, thereby accommodating the history of rhetoric to his own system of logic and giving his own treatment precedence,” but in defiance of the facts, he “fictionalized some of his own history of presocratic philosophy in order to offer his own as the final solution” (52). Aristotle’s “designation of Corax and Tisias as originators of a probabilistic rhetoric could be similarly motivated by a desire to offer his Rhetoric” as the logical definition of what his teacher Plato has so disparaged. What I want to point out is that logic becomes so important to Aristotle that he is willing to “fictionalize” history and to “define” rhetoric so that history and rhetoric favor logic and would be subservient to logic. Like Socrates and Plato, Aristotle was against the sophists: “Aristotle [would] argue from an either/or logic” to contrast the method of the sophist “Protagoras [who] used a both/and logic. . . [that was to Aristotle dangerously] rich and variable enough to be capable of multiple—and even inconsistent—and nature-distorting] accounts” (Schiappa 52). Moreover, Aristotle argued that his logic was a truer way to the facts than even the dialectic method of his teachers Plato and Socrates: “Aristotle’s comments in the Metaphysics [were made even though they] contain a similar distortion [as the one he makes with history]. Aristotle argued that if two parties disagree about what-is and what-is-not, one of the parties must be mistaken (1063a)” (52). Neither sophistry nor dialectic can separate the mistaken party from the true party as does logic. In summary, Aristotle develops logic in contrast to women, to sophistry, to rhetoric, and to the dialectic method of his own teachers.
Aristotle struggles with rhetoric and with defining it and classifying it in his logical, cold-objective, observational way. Kennedy suggests that Aristotle “avoids” the use of certain aspects of his logic when he seeks to put rhetoric below logic:

In calling rhetoric an antistrophos of dialectic in 1.1.1. and an offshoot of dialectic and ethical studies here [in 1.2.7], and “partly dialectic” and like it in the next sentence, Aristotle avoids use of the formal categories of genus and species. He cannot very well call rhetoric a species of dialectic, since it contains elements—the persuasive effect of character and emotion in particular—that are not proper to dialectic; but at the same time he stresses the logical side of rhetoric and thus its relationship to dialectic. He does not entertain the possibility that dialectic should be regarded as a species of rhetoric, perhaps because dialectic deals with universals, rhetoric with specifics; dialectic is logically prior. Also, to make rhetoric the more general term would lead to the celebration of it as the most characteristic and worthwhile human activity, as [a “sophist” such as] Isocrates regarded it. For Aristotle, that honor belongs to philosophy—hence his attempt to find metaphors to describe rhetoric as a mixture of logical, political, and ethical elements. In *Nichomachean Ethics* 1.2.4-6 he says that politics is an “architectonic” subject, of which generalship, economics, and rhetoric are parts.

(fn46,39)

Whether distorting history and language or struggling with the fit of logic to language, Aristotle is after control. In order to control women, Aristotle invents logic based on his misogyny and gynophobia. But as he investigates the subject of rhetoric, he cannot easily women. Perhaps he can ignore Aspasia whom Socrates and Plato appear to credit for dialectic; and, in fact, as I noted at the end of last chapter, Aristotle completely silences this woman, excluding her from his
writings. It would be much more conspicuous to silence the legendary heroine rhetors Helen and Sappho; thus, Aristotle more subtly denies them as much rhetorical agency as possible by acknowledging how other men, less logical men perhaps, do acknowledge the famous women. He names his famous *Ethics* after his own son and his father but never once mentions his daughter or either of his wives (except in his will, where he gives the nod to his first wife). That he teaches men only and that he teaches them logic above all other means of language is a “reasonable” principle that follows from Aristotle’s phallic logic.

II. ARISTOTLE’S “LOGICAL” DEFINITIONS AROUND AND IN HIS *RHETORIC* AND IN TRADITIONAL MASCULINIST TRANSLATION

To consider Aristotle’s logic in his *Rhetoric*, there are six important issues to review in a more general context. First, Aristotle overtly speaks of λογική (or “logic”) when, in the context of “logos” but not necessarily “rhetoric,” he’s trying to observe the biology of sex. Second, he seems quite concerned about how his coined words sound, and as I show below gender seems crucial to him when words are spoken aloud. Third, the definitions of words need to sound logical to Aristotle, even if they are not logical. What one finds in Aristotle’s writings is that his key terms are not defined although he makes them sound logical; even the central term “rhetoric” in the *Rhetoric* is not logically defined. Fourth, traditional masculinist translators follow what they think is Aristotle’s intention of sounding logical, for they intend their translations to sound as logical. Fifth, Aristotle writes five “definitions” of “rhetoric” in the *Rhetoric*, which can illustrate some of these other issues. Lastly, a feminist rhetorical translating of these definitions makes a difference.

As discussed above, Aristotle names his observational procedure λογική (or “logic”) to separate it from λόγος (or “logos”). Nowhere is this separation clearer, perhaps, than in
Aristotle’s discussion of the sexual reproduction of animals, a discussion which sets the two terms in binary opposition:

| "Ἰσως δὲ μάλλων ὁν δόξειν ἀπόδειξες εἰναι πιθανὴ τῶν εἰρημένων λογικὴ [“logic”]—λέγω δὲ λογικήν [“logic”] διὰ τούτο ὅτι διώ καθόλου μᾶλλον πορρητέρω τῶν οἰκείων ἑκάτων ἄρχων. Ἐστὶ δὲ τοιαύτη τις: ἀγαθὸν ἐξ ὁμοιωτάτων ἄρρενως καὶ θῆλεως ὁμοιωτάτως γίγνεσθαι πέροις γεννήσασιν ἄρρεν ἢ θῆλη, οἷον ἐκ κυνὸς ἄρρενος καὶ θῆλεως κύων ἄρρην ἢ θῆλεα, καὶ ἐξ ἐτέρων τῷ ἑδεῖ ἐτερον τῷ ἑδεῖ, οἷον ἐκ κυνὸς ἄρρενος καὶ λέοντος ἂθηλεος ἐτερον καὶ ἐκ λέοντος ἄρρενος καὶ κυνὸς θῆλεος ἐτερον: ἦστ’ ἐπιειδῆ γίγνεται ἡμίονος ἄρρην καὶ θῆλις ἀδιαφόρων ὄντων τῷ ἑδεί ἀνήληλος, γίγνεται δ’ ἐξ ἰπποῦ καὶ ὄνου ἡμίονος, ἐτερα δ’ ἐστὶ τῷ ἑδεί ταῦτα καὶ οἱ ἡμίονοι, ἀδυνάτων γενέσθαι ἐξ ἡμίονον: ἐτερον γὰρ γέους οὐκ ἐδέ τὸ ἄρρενος καὶ θῆλεως τῶν ὁμοιωτάτων ταύτω γίγνεσθαι τῷ ἑδεί, ἡμίονος δ’ ὃτι ἐξ ἰπποῦ καὶ ὄνου γίγνεται ἐτερον ὄντων τῷ ἑδεί, ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἐτερῶν τῷ ἑδεί ἐτερον ἐτερόν ἐτερεθῇ γίγνεσθαι ζῷον. οὕτως μὲν οὐκ ὁ λόγος [“logos”] καθόλου λιαν καὶ κενὸς: οἱ γὰρ μὴ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἄρχων λόγοι [“logoi”] κενοί, ἀλλὰ δοκοῦσιν εἰναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ὄντες. |

-- Aristotle *Generation of Animals* (emphases added 747b)

Perhaps an abstract proof [λογική “logic”] might appear to be more plausible than those already given; I call it abstract [λογική “logic”] because the more general it is the further is it removed from the special principles involved. It runs somewhat as follows. From male and female of the same species there are born in course of nature male and female of the same species as the parents, e.g. male and female puppies from male and female dog. From parents of different species is born a young one different in species; thus if a dog is different from a lion, the offspring of male dog and lioness or of lion and bitch will be different from both parents. If this is so, then since (1) mules are produced of both sexes and are not different in species from one another, and (2) a mule is born of horse and ass and these are different in species from mules, it is impossible that anything should be produced from mules. For (1) another kind cannot be, because the product of male and female of the same species is also of the same species, and (2) a mule cannot be, because that is the product of horse and ass which are different in form, and it was laid down that from parents different in form is born a different animal. Now this theory [λόγος “logos”] is too general and empty. For all theories [λόγοι “logoi”, plural for “logos”] not based on the special principles involved are empty; they only appear to be connected with the facts without being so really.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Arthur Platt (emphases added)

The reader should note how Aristotle is arguing that λογική (or “logic”) is plausible for the reason that it is not subject to a particular context and because it is generally abstract and applicable to any context. In contrast, he claims that λόγος (or “logos”) may be too general. He is continuing in this context to make general statements about males and females, to prove
principles that apply to any particular species of animals. The implications and the final conclusion in the general context of this text are that much can be understood about human sex and sex differences by extrapolating observations of animals. In the *Generation of Animals*, Aristotle constantly establishes the “general” or universal “connexion” between species including “human beings” around procreation (Platt 24). By logic, Aristotle is claiming to be faithful to nature.

Traditional translator Arthur Platt attempts to be faithful to the nature of Aristotle’s original Greek words. Platt makes “logic” equal to “an abstract proof” and “logos” equal to a “theory.” Platt’s is not an entirely bad translation except that it loses the relationship and the artificial contrast between the old “logos” and Aristotle’s new “logic.”

A. L. Peck gives a similar rendering to Platt’s that is equally faithful to Aristotle. However, instead of “proof” Peck offers “argument” and rather than “theory / theories” Peck offers again “argument / arguments.” Peck does want to show a relationship between Aristotle’s “logic” and the older “logos” by having the former be “abstract argument” and the later be merely “argument” (255).

In the next section of the chapter, I will give a different feminist rhetorical translating. But let me comment a bit more now on the traditional phallogocentric translations.

Neither Platt nor Peck recognize the sexual / sexist issues for Aristotle; they downplay Aristotle’s misogyny as developed by his logic. The two translators do not bring across into English the fact that Aristotle is both arguing for logic and arguing by logic so that he can denigrate the female. The translators do not show that women, for Aristotle, are users of “logos,” a theory of observation much too broad and that “logic,” in opposition, can ostensibly remove the observational bias of a female. Of course, the feminist rhetorical translator can never be absolutely sure of Aristotle’s intentions. The feminist rhetorical translator wants fully to
recognize Aristotle’s intention but not to let his intention ever supersede or suppress her own intentions. The point I am making is that the two traditional translators who want to be absolutely faithful to Aristotle’s authorial intentions in the text will not even consider the possibility that Aristotle is being sexist. What the two translators ignore are the following: (A) the misogyny of his Greek male culture in which boundaries mean control and separational binaries keep females in their place below men; (B) Aristotle’s own gynophobia in his other texts; (C) the denigration of females throughout this text, his *Generation of Animals*; (D) his male only audience for his texts including this one; and (E) the technical sexist suffix in “logic” that puts the word in binary, oppositional contrast with “logos.” Another thing both translators ignore is the context that immediately follows the excerpt (as above). After writing the passage quoted here, Aristotle immediately turns to geometry as a sure analogy for logic, and then he begins to talk with certainty about the problems of female infertility and of mothers producing mutations if not properly bred by male counterpart animals and if not assisted by human male breeders who, for instance, “after an interval put the horse to the mare again [because the mare cannot bear it continuously]” (brackets in original; Peck 255). Aristotle concludes the passage by explaining logically that human females are to blame for dwarfs because they fail to engage in the sex act properly.

In the passage, one should notice the importance of λογική (“logic”) to Aristotle, as opposed to λόγος (“logos”), because it is marked by a sexist suffix (explained below) in the context of Aristotle’s overt, gendered bigotry. But notice how Platt’s “abstract proof” manages to downplay the opposition by contrasting it with “theory”; and Peck’s “abstract argument” is not much of a contrast with “argument” at all. For both translators there is not the slightest hint that Aristotle may be associating “theory” and “argument” (i.e., “logos”) with women and separating that from “abstract proof” and “abstract argument” (i.e., “logic”) which is what men should use.
To Aristotle’s ear, and perhaps to his male Greek readers’ ears too, I imagine, the word λογική [“logic”] itself was to sound masculinist; that is, the very word pronounced should control the unbounded femininity in a rich and variable and polysemous word such as λόγος [“logos”]. The suffix “-ική” is key for three reasons: 1) an avoidance of translation; 2) a male’s control over the female; and 3) a manly sound for soundness.

In the first place, since the suffix “-ική” was uncommon in Greek discourse, Aristotle the logician could use it to avoid translation as a womanly practice; he could invent his own novel words rather than having to bring meanings across from the mother tongue. The meanings could be abstract, with no connection to a deeper, more fluid, more feminine nature. “Woman is that creature” in Greek male culture, says Carson, “who puts the inside on the outside” (Glass 129). Aristotle, in opposition to the womanly attention to what’s inside, wants to keep the meanings on the surface. And the suffix “-ική,” which has an abstract surface meaning like a variable in algebra functioning like a mask covering the face of any represented number, works perfectly for logic. Females, according to Aristotle, would always prefer to unmask the algebraic variable, to go deeper to the meaning behind what’s on the abstract surface. Carson explains how, in contrast to Aristotle’s abstracted words, a woman’s words may be manifested as direct translation, as profound language surfaced by a feminine act:

> By projections and leakages of all kinds—somatic, vocal, emotional, sexual—females expose or expend what should be kept in. Females blurt out a direct translation of what should be [in the male’s mind] formulated indirectly [i.e., as through the abstracted steps of Aristotle’s syllogistic logic]. There is a story told about the wife of Pythagoras, that she once uncovered her arm while out of doors and someone commented, “Nice arm,” to which she responded, “Not public property!” Plutarch’s comment on this story is: “The arm of a virtuous woman
should not be public property, nor her speech either, and she should as modestly
guard against exposing her voice to outsiders as she would guard against stripping
off her clothes. For in her voice as she is blabbering away can be read her
emotions, her character and her physical condition.” In spite of herself, Plutarch’s
woman has a voice that acts like a sign language, exposing her inside facts.

(Glass 129)

Aristotle is not at all interested a woman’s directness, especially not her directly-surfaced
emotions. Aristotle does not want a voice to speak up or to speak out when he does science.
Aristotle wants abstraction, a series of steps as with a syllogism, a set of boundaries that guard
against subjectivities which would pollute the objectivity of a male observing nature. Aristotle
does not want anything like what Plutarch’s woman does with her voice: “exposing her inside
facts.” The outside facts are all and only what the logician needs.

Therefore, such a translating, such a female directness so unlike logic is problematic for
the man. If logic and its suffix “-ική” can help Aristotle avoid translation, then logic and its
ending can more generally enable Aristotle to control in principle the speech of a woman.

Carson explains:

Ancient physiologists from Aristotle through the early Roman empire tell us
that a man can know from the sound of a woman’s voice private data like whether
or not she is menstruating, whether or not she has had sexual experience.
Although these are useful things to know, they may be bad to hear or make men
uncomfortable. What is pernicious about sign language is that it permits a direct
continuity between inside and outside. Such continuity is abhorrent to the male
nature. The masculine virtue of sophrosyne or self-control aims to obstruct this
continuity, to dissociate the outside surface of a man from what is going on inside
him. Man breaks continuity by interposing logos—whose most important censor is the rational articulation of sound. (emphasis added; Glass 129-30)

For Aristotle, the interposing of λόγος [“logos”] gives man control over a woman’s speech. And I am suggesting that his use of the suffix “-ική” to form the word λογική [“logic”] gives Aristotle an even more rational censorship of the woman’s directness. But why? Why is this particular abstract and abstracting suffix “logical” to Aristotle?

Aristotle had heard Plato using this same suffix in coinage words. For instance, he had listened to Plato’s Socrates use the word ῥητόρος [“rhetoros”] or “speaker” to characterize and to defend himself in his famous trial.

---

αὐτὸ δὲ τούτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἄρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τάληθή λέγειν.

--Plato Apology (emphasis added 18a)

Look and give your mind to this, Is what I state or not representative of Lady Justice? This, in fact, really is her good character: **a speaker** is to state the truth.

--a feminist rhetorical translating

What Aristotle heard was Socrates’s appeal to justice (which I have translated by personification as Lady Justice because the words δίκαια and δικαστοῦ (/dikaia/ and /dikastou/ phonologically and culturally connote the goddess Dike [Δικη], or Lady Justice. How Socrates identifies with Justice (the female deity) is by speaking and by identifying himself as a speaker. Notice also how indirect Socrates is; he is using the dialectic method on his audience by asking questions, and this method is the one that Aristotle perhaps remembers Aspasia teaching to the men such as Socrates, Pericles, and Plato.

But Aristotle had also heard Plato’s Gorgias, the sophist, using a different word when interacting dialectically with Plato’s Socrates. In this context, Socrates asks Gorgias to answer
how he would identify himself; and the latter answers with Plato’s coinage, ῥητορική
[“rhētorikē”]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὁ Σώκρατες.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Plato Gorgias (emphasis added 449a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A speakerista is what I am, Socrates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--a feminist rhetorical translating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The term ῥητορική is traditionally “translated” by transliterating the Greek word into English as
“rhetoric.” In this case, the term refers to the one who practices “rhetoric” or who is a
“rhetorician” or even quite literally “one who is of rhetoric.” In Plato’s dialogue meant to
disparage the sophist, ῥητορική is Gorgias’s technical word for himself in reply to Socrates. My
attempt at a feminist rhetorical translating of the phrase is “speakerista.” I am trying to show
how Plato has taken the word ῥήτορος [“rhētoros”] or “speaker” and has added the suffix “-ική”
to coin “ῥητορική.”

Schiappa examines the evidence from the extant ancient Greek texts to corroborate the
conjecturing of a few other historians that Plato coined the word ῥητορ-ική [“rhētor-ikē”] either
here in the Gorgias or in the Phaedrus. In fact, Schiappa observes, “Plato’s creative use of
language is well established, as is his need to invent a proper philosophical vocabulary. In
particular, it is significant that Plato was a prolific coiner of words ending with -ική, denoting
‘art of’” (464). Aristotle followed his teacher, Plato, in coining such words with this suffix.

Aristotle, the inventor of logic as a more advanced philosophy, could use the suffix to
avoid translation as a womanly practice. Instead of needing to allow over determined meanings
of words in the mother tongue, for words such as λόγος [“logos”], Aristotle could get more at
rationality and at censoring of the woman’s nouny directness by adding the adjectival suffix “-ική” to form the word λογική [“logic”].

Therefore, I want to suggest that the suffix “-ική” had a unique etymology of control, the kind of control a man has over the sort of woman who would be initially and therefore exclusively possessed by the man. Despite the solid evidence of Schiappa and the other rhetorician-historians that Plato coined ῥητορ-ική, no contemporary scholar has seen anything phallic or sexist at all in the Greek philosopher’s invention. But when looking at how Aristotle borrows the neologistic practice of his teacher, I want to argue that there is something misogynist going on for Aristotle.

The first instance of the -ική suffix I can find belongs to Hesiod and to Homer from around the 690s BCE. In the extant texts attributed to Hesiod and Homer, the uses of the suffix are in the poem, Work and Days (by the former writer), and in the epic, Odyssey (by the latter story teller). Each “author” uses only one word with the -ική suffix, and it is the same single word for both writers, suggesting to me that one of these two poets coined the term and the other borrowed it. Hesiod includes the word thrice in his poem; Homer but once in his epic. The neologism is παρθενική [parthenikē] (an ostensibly newly-coined variant of the much more common παρθένος, transliterated parthenos in the nominative case or parthenon in the accusative case for “virgin” or “maiden”). I think that Aristotle “is following his practice of using the poets in support of his conclusions. . . [b]ut he [. . . as] often quotes [them] selectively” (Simpson 19). Aristotle’s conclusions may be that Homer and Hesiod’s neologism helps to control, to abstract, the meaning of the virgin. The adjectival form παρθενική [parthenikē] with the suffix “-ική” is a reductive abstraction that loses all the many meanings of παρθένος [parthenos]. Homer and Hesiod are not interested in any particular maiden or virgin who might,
for example, have a name and a real life. Rather, these men are talking about what any virgin
can be to any man in general.

Below are the contexts in which I have found the first uses of the “-ική” suffix. They are
in Hesiod’s and Homer’s παρθενική [parthenikē] in the following passages:

```
Then he commanded Hephaistus the world-famed craftsman as soon as
Possible to mix water and earth, and infuse in it human
Speech, also strength, and to make it look like a goddess, and give it
Likewise a **girl-like** form that was pretty and lovesome.

-- Daryl Hine translation
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I can imagine that Aristotle formulated some of his own general, abstracted views of the
desirable woman from Hesiod’s suffix, as Aristotle uses the same ending ostensibly to make
language less direct and more abstract. The scientist hears the poet abstracting with the suffix
“-ική.” Hine translates the suffix as “-like”; whereas in the passage below he renders the Greek
suffix in English as “-al.”

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--Hesiod *Work and Days* (emphases added 516-21)
Also it [the North Wind] blows through the goat’s fine hairs, but the fleece of a sheep
Cannot because it is so close-packed that the powerful North Wind
Can’t penetrate it, which nonetheless easily bowls over old men.
Nor is it able to penetrate smooth-skinned **virginal maidens**
As they abide in the house beside their affectionate mothers,
Blissfully ignorant stir of the doings of gold Aphrodite.

-- Daryl Hine translation

Aristotle quoted Hesiod in the *Rhetoric* and was surely familiar with the above passage. The
reader may recall in the last chapter Aristotle’s discussion of goats; in this discussion from the
*Generation of Animals,* he explains that if the she-goat does not at first conceive, then point her
to the North wind and have the billy goat mount her. One wonders if Aristotle reads Hesiod as
informing his own science about male and female differences. I am conjecturing that Aristotle
did not miss the abstract suffix that Hesiod uses to describe virgins who cannot by the wind be
easily penetrated.

The excerpt below shows Hesiod adding the suffix as if to abstract generally on advising
about the age for marriage. Hine does not translate the suffix in any meaningful way. I think
Aristotle would have taken note of Hesiod’s move, even though Hine does not seem to.

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Ωραίος δὲ γυναικὰ τεὸν ποτὶ οἶχον ἄγεοθαι
μήτε τριμύροντων ἐτέον μᾶλα πόλλ.: ἀπολείπον
μὴ τ' ἐπιθεῖς μᾶλα πολλὰ: γάμος δὲ τοι ὁρίος οὔτος:
η δὲ γυνὴ τέτορ' ἤμων, πέμπτῳ δὲ γαμότο.

**παρθενικὴ** δὲ γαμεῖν, ὡς κ' ἡθεὶ κεδνὰ διδάξεις,
τὴν δὲ μαλίστα γαμεῖν, ἵτις θέθει εὔγεθε ναιεί
πάντα μὰλ' ἀμφὶς ιδῶν, μὴ γείτοσι χάριτα γῆμης.
οὐ μὲν γὰρ τι γυναικὸς ἀνήρ λήξετ' ἄμεινον
τῆς ἁγαθῆς, τῆς δ' αὕτε κακῆς οὐ ρήγην ἄλλο,
δειπνολόγχης, ἵ τ' ἄνδρα καὶ ἱρθημὸν περ ἐόντα
εὖ εἶτε ἄτερ δαλοῖο καὶ ὡμῷ γῆραὶ δῶκεν.

--Hesiod *Work and Days* (emphases added 695-705)
Take to your dwelling a woman when you are ready to marry,
Not long after your thirtieth birthday is something behind you,
Nor when you're very much older, for that is the age to get married.
See that she's four years older than puberty; wed in her fifth year.
Marry a \textbf{virgin} to teach her all her respectable duties.
Most of all marry a woman who lives in your neighbourhood, nearby.
Looking about you, be sure no neighbour makes fun of your marriage.
Surely a man can obtain nothing better at last than a woman
When she is good; if she's bad, there is nothing more thoroughly tiresome;
Keeping her eye on her dinner she kippers her husband however
Strong without smoke. She'll bring him unwilling to early old age.

-- Daryl Hine translation

The reader should recall how Aristotle, at age thirty-seven, married Pythias his first wife, and
then declared that age thirty-seven is the optimum age to marry for a man. And in the passage
above, he is taking advice generally about getting an obedient virginal girl young so that she can
be taught everything the husband desires. Aristotle’s virgin was eighteen years of age, which
may have meant that he was counting, by Hesiod’s advice, on her having reached puberty five
years earlier.

Aristotle quoted Homer more frequently than he did Hesiod in the \textit{Rhetoric}. It is obvious
that he knew the \textit{Odyssey}. Passages like the one below may have reinforced his suspicions of
women as those who cannot be easily known because of their tricky guises.

\begin{verbatim}
\textit{\textit{Odyssey}} (emphases added 7.18-20)
\end{verbatim}

But when he was about to enter the fair city,
bright-eyed goddess Athena met him
in the guise of a \textbf{young maiden woman} holding a pitcher.

--James Huddleston translation
Aristotle surely would have noticed how Homer employs the same abstracted, adjectival suffix on the same noun that Hesiod thrice used the suffix with. Both poets, in their oral tradition, were likely trying to sound indirect and abstract when they were talking about the virgin in general. They were attempting, it seems, to describe any particular virginal maiden as the property of men in general. Curiously, neither poet used the suffix for any other word other than the young maiden in the abstract. Curiously, Aristotle’s teacher Plato used the suffix to disparage the sophists and this general, abstractable, despicable practice of theirs that we understand today as “rhetoric.”

There are a few matters to make clear about the suffix -ική in the context of Hesiod’s and Homer’s poetry. The Greek suffix -ική seems to connote an adjectival meaning of quality. In English, adjectival suffixes of quality include “-esque,” “-ish,” “-al,” “-y,” “-ist” and “-istic” as in coinable words such as “virginesque,” “virginish,” “virginal,” “virginy,” “virginist,” and “virginistic.” Moreover, in Work and Days and in the Odyssey, the suffix -ική also allows the sense of “art of,” the meaning that Schiappa says Plato has for the word-ending. While Hesiod and Homer are not necessarily describing, for the females, the techniques or art of being a virgin, they are certainly allowing the Greek listeners of their works to imagine the general and abstract qualities of a virgin. In addition, with respect to translation in the four contexts (in the poetry lines) above, Daryl Hine’s “girl-like” and “virginal” certainly get to the adjectival nature of the suffix, which is less direct and more abstract than the common and polysemous feminine noun form. Therefore, Aristotle the logician could use the suffix “-ική” to take advantage of the unique etymology of control; he used it to abstract and to generalize and to disparage. Indeed, to use the suffix was to gain control by logic as a man might gain control over anything virginesque.
Moreover, phonologically, the suffix "-ική" sounded right for the male logician. Carson explains the gender of sound, especially for ancient Greek men, including Aristotle:

> It is in large part according to the sounds people make that we judge them sane or insane, male or female, good, evil, trustworthy, depressive, marriageable, moribund, likely or unlikely to make war on us, little better than animals, inspired by God. These judgments happen fast and can be brutal. Aristotle tells us that the highpitched voice of the female is one evidence of her evil disposition, for creatures who are brave or just (like lions, bulls, roosters and the human male) have large deep voices. If you hear a man talking in a gentle or high-pitched voice you know he is a *kinaidos* ("catamite"). (*Glass* 119)

What I am beginning to suggest is that the abstracting suffix "-ική" was not just a morphological marker in writing but that served Aristotle also to lower the pitch or to function phonologically in a manly, controlled way. Carson explicates further:

> High vocal pitch goes together with talkativeness to characterize a person who is deviant from or deficient in the masculine ideal of self-control. Women, catamites, eunuchs and androgynes fall into this category. Their sounds are bad to hear and make men uncomfortable. Just how uncomfortable may be measured by the lengths to which Aristotle is willing to go in accounting for the gender of sound physiognomically; he ends up ascribing the lower pitch of the male voice to the tension placed on a man’s vocal chords by his testicles functioning as loom weights. (*Glass* 119)

I suspect that high pitch as well as sibilant consonants were feminine sounds that grated on the ears of Aristotle.
In other words, the *grammatically masculine* suffix “-ός” [“-os”], as in λόγος [“logos”], ends with the airy “-s” sound of a closed syllable with a constant hissing consonant made at the front of the mouth. But, in contrast, the *grammatically feminine* suffix “-ική” [“-ikē”] that Aristotle preferred to use has a consonant at the back of the mouth, a consonant that must end abruptly and then allow for the vocalization of the vowel sound as in the Greek letter eta, or η. The lower-pitch vocalization sounds deviant, deficient, uncontrolled, and indeed womanly: as if a woman, unnaturally, is trying to sound male, and yet only able to make a higher pitched sibilance of the more common pronunciation of the word.

That the sound of words was particularly important to Aristotle is clear from what he wrote. Here he disparages the work of a poet by quoting Dionysius:

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Ἐστίν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἁμαρτία, ἐὰν μὴ ἡδεῖας ἄ σημεία φωνῆς, ὅλον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἔλεγχοις κρανγήν Καλλιόπης τὴν ποιήσιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναῖ σφαῦλη δὲ ἡ μεταφορά ταῖς ἁσήμοις φωναῖς

Aristotle *Rhetoric* (1405a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There is fault in the syllables if the indications of sound are unpleasant; for example, Dionysius the Brazen in his Elegies calls poetry “Calliope’s screech” because both are sounds; but the metaphor is bad because it implies meaningless sounds.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--traditional phallogocentric translation by George A. Kennedy</td>
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</table>

In this passage, Aristotle is explicit about what bothers him with respect to sounds in language. His creation of logic seems, in part, to be motivated by finding sounds that are not to him unpleasantly feminine.

In summary, I am speculating that the suffix “-ική” is key to Aristotle for three “logical” reasons. First, it can allow him to avoid womanly directness as in translation from the mother tongue; he would use it to abstract his terms. Second, the suffix might remind him of the poets’ use of it on the word for a virgin; then one who is virginesque may be abstracted, generalized, and controlled. Thirdly, the suffix “-ική”—although grammatically feminine in contrast to the
masculine “-ος”—produces a sounder, more manly or at least a less-feminine-sounding word; the wordplay suggests a woman trying to sound like a man. For Aristotle, the suffix kept the utterance, unconsciously or not, at the back of the throat and not right up front on the lips where a female might more readily make the sound.

In traditional masculinist translation, translators follow Aristotle’s logic. To be sure, they do not usually associate logic with what is phallic and sexist. Nonetheless, traditional translators want to be faithful to Aristotle. Consequently, they seek to sound Greek, and they are determined to define precisely each of the key terms.

To sound Greek, traditional masculinist translators will simply transliterate the Greek consonants and vowels into the letters of the English alphabet. Not only does transliteration “keep in the original” Aristotle’s words, but it also allows the translator to abstract the meaning. Sometimes, even the Greek suffix obscures English meanings. More often, words such as *rhetoric, logic, topos, pathos, pistis, and enthymeme* can have new English meanings that no longer are or never were a part of Greek uses of their counterparts in the original language.

When the transliterated and untranslated Greek suffix is used on English words, the meanings are obscured. For example, in his article “Folkloristics,” Bruce Jackson, a folklorist, muses about the meanings of the English word *folklorist* as opposed to *folkloristic* (and various such academic, technical terms, with the meaningless transliterated Greek suffixes). Jackson theorizes the following:

The usual process is for an abstract noun or adjective (absolute, real, fatal) to be attributed to a person (absolutist, realist, fatalist) and thereby made into a noun of another order, and then for that noun to be turned into an adjective (absolutistic, realistic, fatalistic) . . . And it is the same for us [in our field of folklore]: the person who studies the class of things called “folklore” is a “folklorist,” and the
adjective meaning “folklorist-like” is “folkloristic.” “Folkloristic” as an adjective is correct when it refers to work done by folklorists; the adjective for material examined by folklorists is “folkloric.” “Folkloristic research” means “the kind of research folklorists do,” but not “research into folklore.” (96)

Jackson expresses disappointment with the colleagues in his field for not being more accessible to a general readership. He blames the distancing terms, the abstracting adjectival suffixes on them, for the relative obscurity of his discipline.

An analogy that might be easy to see, or rather to hear, is the term “feminist.” To use the noun adjectivally, one needs not to modify it at all but rather can use it as an appositive, as in the phrase “a feminist method.” But when the suffix, “-ic” is added, the phrase becomes “a feministic method,” which is less personal. At least the phrase is less personal in the sense that “a feminist” (which could mean a person who is a “feminist”) is no longer part of the description when the adjective is “feministic.” And then as the word morphs adverbially, it becomes “feministically” so that the double layer of suffixes really abstracts from the more direct “feminist.”

For the traditional phallogocentric translator, there is a similar abstraction by the logic of transliteration for whole key words. In the Rhetoric, not surprisingly, Aristotle does define the word we have come to know as “rhetoric.” The definitions given, however, retreat to a kind of faux logic. The translator cooperates with Aristotle. Aristotle’s definitions retain the shape of his logic, and the transliteration by the English translator retains the shape of this original word. But any meaningful content that logic and the logic of transliteration might develop is vacuous.

In the next section below, I translate in a feminist rhetorical way Aristotle’s ostensibly logical definitions of rhetoric in the Rhetoric. The translating follows what Sara J. Newman has uncovered when she shows simply how “those definitions are presumably explanatory”
(emphasis mine; 3). Newman is an English studies scholar who specializes in classical rhetorics and in Aristotle. Newman is not the first scholar to notice in the *Rhetoric* “where Aristotle shifts from his initial austere focus on the logical aspects of rhetoric to a less solemn tenor that countenances both ethos and pathos within the domain of that discipline” (4). But Newman is the first to be “able to show that Aristotle’s [definitional] practice in this situation does not match his [logical] criteria, a circumstance that has certain consequences for reading the *Rhetoric* and for applying his theory” (4). In the next section, I will present the definitional passages about which Newman comments, showing them in Aristotle’s Greek, in traditional phallogocentric translations that would reinforce the author’s definitional logic, and in a feminist rhetorical translating that defies Aristotle’s logic.

Newman explains that:

Aristotle . . . makes four definitional statements in Book I of the *Rhetoric*, three of which depend on metaphors . . . However, the metaphors defining *rhetoric* do not function according to Aristotle’s own criteria for heuristic metaphors . . . [Moreover,] the four metaphors do not fill in the outline to form a precise enough Aristotelian definition. They never clarify how *rhetoric* and *dialectic* relate, for example, as *antistrophos* to *strophe*, as part to whole, or as species to species. Similarly unclear is rhetoric’s link to ethics and politics. As a result, none of the metaphors can be removed from the definition and leave the term *rhetoric* clear. Aristotle himself does not supply the appropriate and necessary textual materials to resolve the lack of clarity in his own definition of rhetoric according to his own criteria. The three, equivocal metaphorical definitions are not characteristic of a systematic treatise. (1-2)

Aristotle’s logic as applied to definitions of *rhetoric* is consistently sloppy.
Before I translate the faux-logical definitions of the key word *rhetoric*, I would like to review a few other undefined central terms of Aristotle. Aristotle’s attempts at a logical definition of *rhetoric* requires thorough analysis, but I want to show first (A) that he is has a pattern of sloppiness with his definitions of many terms and (B) that scholars see the sloppiness if they expect rhetoricians and logicians today to be more precise than Aristotle himself was.

Some of Aristotle’s undefined but notable words are *topos*, *pathos*, *pistis*, and *enthymeme*. Scholar Kennedy observes, for example, that “*Topos* . . . accords with Aristotle’s fondness for visual imagery” but that “neither in *Topics* nor in *Rhetoric* does Aristotle give a definition of *topos*, a sign that he assumed the word would be easily understood; he does, however, give his own special twist to its meaning” (*On Rhetoric*, first ed., 45). Similarly, Jeffery Walker notes that “in the *Rhetoric* . . . Aristotle’s account of *pathos* implies a rhetoric that is not quite ‘Aristotelian’ in the usual sense [that is, in the usual logical sense] and that sits uneasily with Aristotle’s preferences” (“Pathos” 74). Likewise, William Grimaldi says:

> In actual fact the word πίστις [or *pistis*] in Aristotle’s text will not sustain the univocal interpretation (i.e., proof, way of proving) which has been imposed upon it. The assumption of such a univocal meaning has generated some of the difficulties about the coherence and unity of the text. In reality the word *pistis* has a number of meanings in the text, and it is necessary to discriminate among them for an understanding of the text and the meaning of enthymeme. (57)

But assuming Grimaldi can find the right definitions of “pistis” for the individual contexts in Aristotle’s text, there may still be difficulties in coming to “an understanding of the text and the meaning of enthymeme” (16). In fact, Lloyd Bitzer, and Elizabeth Jane DeGroot both notice how Aristotle fails to define *enthymeme*. Bitzer notes:
In view of the importance he has given the enthymeme, we might reasonably expect to find it carefully defined. However, although there are many hints as to its nature, the reader of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* will find no unambiguous statement defining the enthymeme. (179)

Furthermore, DeGroot begins to help us see the phallic-logic problem in enthymeme:

Readers of the *Rhetoric* soon discover that, despite the forthrightness of Aristotle’s opening statement and the centrality of the concept for his theory of rhetoric, the enthymeme is an elusive term. . . . In all of these [varied] perspectives [on the term], the dimension of gender remains unexplored. (6)

What the various rhetoric scholars show is that Aristotle, who would put tight logical boundaries around language, does not define his terms, even his key terms.

As I stated at the beginning of the chapter, Aristotle was ironically not as logical as he claimed to be. Traditional phallogocentric translators gloss over this fact. Ironically, they cannot be faithful to Aristotle because the translators don’t know whether (A) to follow Aristotle’s logic that would tidy up language and lock down the singular, masculinist intended meaning or (B) to follow Aristotle in his failure to write differently from those he would disparage—that is, to leave key words undefined, to allow readers, sometimes unintended readers, to interpret variously what his terms might mean.

A feminist rhetorical translating keeps open the meanings of the words. The demonstration of the multiple meanings in *topos, pathos, pistis*, and *enthymeme* becomes clear by feminist rhetorical methods. Such translating does not require following the method of Aristotle’s logic in part because Aristotle himself cannot follow it. Aristotle, despite his desire to be logical, must resort to the personal, the womanly, the rhetorical, the translational. And the traditional translator who would follow Aristotle’s logical intentions also always has to resort to
more explanation. The “more” for the traditional translator includes footnotes and imaginations and speculations about what Aristotle surely must have meant, even though Aristotle himself does not offer footnotes or definitions of key words. Traditional phallogocentric translators simply resort to the logic of transliteration, abstractions in footnotes, technical explanations in articles, and in other methods of pure definition. They intend to get at Aristotle’s intention. In contrast, a feminist rhetorical translating invites unintended readers, whom Aristotle and phallogocentric translators would marginalize, into the text, to participate in meaning making and to speak many things into the text.

III. HOW A FEMINIST RHETORICAL TRANSLATING MAKES A DIFFERENCE

I have mentioned that feminist rhetorical translating refuses to abstract and to participate in Aristotle’s logic. Thus, a feminist rhetorical translating project will refuse to transliterate.

A similar project is that of Ralph Lever, a philosopher who commented on the Rhetoric in 1573 and proposed a translation that did not transliterate. Although he was not a feminist, Lever believed that the traditional translations (i.e., by transliteration primarily) were suspiciously distant and snobbish. These translations sought to lift the Greek right out of the context of Aristotle’s texts, to abstract the words in translation, to carefully define them by meanings that experts only could know, and to teach them to the students in schools as “rhetoric.” Thus, in reaction, Lever began his own translation of the key words of Aristotle in a work which he entitled “The Arte of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft.” “Witcraft” is Lever’s retranslation of the mere transliteration “dialectic”; his substitution for “rhetoric” is “speechcraft”; his “astronomy” is “starcraft”; and even his “preface” is “forespeech.” What is most important to note about Lever is that he was trying to bring across in English some of the direct meanings in the Greek. He was trying to make the Greek words as immediate as the English. Or he was at least trying to free the text and its readers from the logical straightjacket of transliteration, which
had the added effect of perpetuating the snobbishness of the ostensibly educated upper class in the United Kingdom. Walter Ong confirms, for example, that “[s]ince the [Ramist-Aristotelian] student had been trained in one rhetorical (and logical) pattern after another, we should expect his speech [i.e., the male pupil’s orations]” to follow “conceptually from the Aristotelian categories”; ironically, Ong notes that, because of the transliterations, the “categories” were so thoroughly entrenched in English that they were “occasionally confused—as by Ralph Lever in [his retranslation] The Arte of Reason (1573)” (63). In other words, teachers in the British schools were so accustomed to the transliterations of the Greek words as the categories of Aristotle that they were confused by an actual translation. If Aristotle calls it “dialectic,” then why confuse things with “witcraft”? If the original has it as “rhetoric,” then how can it be “speechcraft”? The confusion that Lever causes, however, is confusion only for the teacher or student locked into Aristotle’s logic of fixed definitions, categories that the transliterating translator creates or reinforces. And all elite students would already understand the Aristotelian terms in transliteration. Lever appeared to be dumbing down the language of rhetoric because he was replacing the familiar (albeit abstract) terms with ones familiar in different contexts, in personal contexts, in contexts that gave more agency to the non-experts and the non-academics.

A feminist rhetorical translating takes what Lever attempted several steps further. First, such translating actually recognizes the phallic symbols, the absolutist logic, and the marginalizing centricism in Aristotle that traditional phallogocentric translators seem to gloss over. Lever does not achieve this recognition; that is, even though Lever wants to get beyond the rigid abstractions of transliterated terms, his choice of actual translated terms in place of the abstractions does not lead readers, instructors, and learners to hear or see the silencing in and by Aristotle’s text. Second, a feminist rhetorical translating not only hears, sees, and translates Aristotle’s phallogocentrism but such a translating also gives voice to the silenced woman,
dissolves the “logical” boundaries between her and the world of men, and opens up possibilities for any marginalized rhetor to be publicly speakeresque.

That brings me to the third, and perhaps most important, difference a feminist rhetorical translating makes. A feminist rhetorical translating insists on allowing women’s voices to speak and permitting them to occupy not only the margins of the male text but also the center. In the introduction, I called this a(p)positioning, something very different from Aristotle’s “logic” as the core position of his phallogocentrism.

Logic seeks only (A) to impose and (B) to propose. There is the phallic imposition by the logical proposition. But the logician, especially the original logician Aristotle, may also have to concede his position occasionally. That is, he cannot always impose his way and is not consistently able to propose his own definitions. Thus, he may often, however resistantly and reluctantly, (C) have to transpose what he first intends. From the position of the logician, transposition is mere accommodation to the other. Let me illustrate. The gynophobic Aristotle turns to “nature” which ostensibly (A) imposes the forceful “fact” of male superiority. He (Aristotle) next turns to the “statement” which ostensibly follows the “given” of nature; that is, he turns to the “syllogism” (or the set of “givens” followed by “statements”) which systematically (B) proposes the validation of the “facts.” When (A) nature and (B) the statement seem to fail, he (Aristotle the master of “nature” and of “logic”) turns to other methods. In other words, he (C) transposes his facts and his validation of the facts into what is more palatable, perhaps, to other men who don’t as easily accept his givens and his statements. After “physics” (or “nature”), he turns to “metaphysics.” After “logic,” he turns to “metaphor.” Newman already has shown, for example, how Aristotle’s would-be logical definitions are merely metaphorical definitions in most cases. It is when other men he respects do not believe his conclusions that he must turn to the other methods. Other men he respects, such as Euripides,
Plato, and Socrates, praise women such as Helen, Sappho, and Aspasia. And these men listen to those women; they dialogue with them; they do not find them naturally to be mutants or the mothers of mutants. The men actually seem to learn from the women and from foreigners, too, from Barbarians. Aristotle does not want to completely ignore his literary mentors and teachers; hence, he negotiates argument with them in transposition. In summary, Aristotle seeks to oppose the female. That is, he desires to impose the phallic, to propose by his logic, but must transpose at times by metaphysics and by metaphor.

In contrast, a feminist rhetorical translating seeks to a(p)pose. Generally, I mean at least two things by a(p)position. First, there is a non-position, an a-position, with respect to the dominant male who insists that his position is always above the female’s. The a-posing woman will reject the placement of submission by the man. And, to be clear, a female’s a(p)osing is very different from the male’s opposing. The difference is that the former is an erasing of the boundary, and the latter is an insisting on the boundary of separation. Second, there is an appositive, as in grammar. That is, the feminist rhetorical translating tends to work by comparison, by placing two unlike things side by side. For instance, in English one might use the phrase, “a man woman.” Clearly, the logical dictionary definitions of the two nouns keep them bounded and separate from one another. Logic says that “man is man” and “woman is not man.” But an appositive allows one noun to modify the other, adjectivally, and vice versa. Apposition says that, in the context of the phrase where “man” and “woman” are placed side by side, new meanings are made. For example, the meaning of the word “woman” is modified so that one possibility is “the woman of a man, or the woman for a man”; another possibility is “the woman is like a man, or the woman has mannish qualities.” Likewise, the meaning of the word “man” is modified so that there is, on the one hand, the sense of “the one that qualifies the woman” and, on the other hand, the connotation of a “different sort of qualities possessed by the
woman.” With the appositive, the ambiguities abound. The senses sometime seem to favor the first noun and other times the second noun. The importances of grammatical apposition are (A) that neither noun invariably dominates the central meaning; (B) that both nouns change the meanings or senses of the other; and (C) the nouns side by side open up meaningful possibilities to keep opening up possibilities of meanings.

When it comes to translating, perhaps there is a better word than “translation” for the processes of a(p)posing. Indeed, translation theorist Mikhail Epstein coins the terms “interlation” and “stereotexting” to describe the processes (1). And Aristotle himself uses the term παραβολή (transliterated “parabole” or “parable”) to define the a(p)positional process and to differentiate it from “metaphor” (Thomas and Winspur, 119); I will say more in the next chapter about “parable” and Aristotle’s disparagement of the method. Aristotle’s παραβολή, my “a(p)positioning,” and Epstein’s “interlation” (vs. translation) and his “stereotexting” are different names for very similar processes. Epstein encourages me to place texts side by side. He notes the value, for instance, in my placing Aristotle’s original words alongside the translated text(s). Epstein suggests that, when side by side, a “translation will come to serve not as a substitution but as a dialogical counterpart to the original text” (1). And he adds, “Together they [the original and the translation] will comprise a multidimensional, multilingual, ‘culturally curved’ discourse” (1). Aristotle’s culture will not be dominant in interlation; rather it must listen to the other and curve away from its original form. This is the same kind of effect as with a grammatical appositive but on a much larger and more comprehensive scale. When I present Aristotle’s text and translation(s) side by side, below, I am asking for the reader to acknowledge the multiple meanings possible. Epstein gets at reader agency:

Interlation is a multilingual variation on the same theme, where the roles of “source” and “target” languages are not established or are interchangeable. One
language allows the reader to perceive what another language misses or conceals.

. . . Robert Frost said that poetry is what gets lost in translation. By contrast, interlation increases, indeed doubles the benefits of poetry. In addition to those metaphors that connect words within one language, a new layer of imagery emerges through a metaphorical relationship between languages and provides a surplus (rather than loss) of poetic value. (emphasis added; 1)

A feminist rhetorical translating insists on interlation, on stereotexting, on parable, on a(p)positioning. This insistence does not mean that Aristotle’s text is denied its “nature” or its “logic” or its occasional, concessionary “metaphor.” Rather, feminist rhetorical translating wants to deny Aristotle’s “logic” of its sole and central position. Likewise, such translating wants to let the woman’s voice, the translator’s voice, speak alongside the one who would silence her, namely Aristotle.

A feminist rhetorical translating relishes the fact that “the roles of ‘source’ and ‘target’ languages are not established [and] are interchangeable” (Epstein 1). In fact, such translating prefers Lydia H. Liu’s renaming of the roles so that there is no “source” and no “target” language but rather there is a “host” language and a “guest” language (Translingual 103). The irenic, more feminine connotations of “politeness” and what Jacqueline Jones Royster calls “home training” are important in this kind of side by side translating in which one language is not dominant over the other and neither one targets the other (“When the First Voice” 32).

I return here to several passages in the Rhetoric already noted above. As mentioned, I want to show the differences that a feminist rhetorical translating makes. Immediately below, Aristotle is bothered by the sounds of language. It is a section of the Rhetoric in which Aristotle is trying to rationalize and to justify Greek language not so easy to define by his logic. Of course, Aristotle is more interested in justifying his logic, in defining terms, and in locking down
his categories than he is in hearing from others’ language that would modify his fixed boundaries. In the passage, Aristotle is drawn to a riddle, one that seems to have troubled him also in his Poetics (1458a) when he was observing what foreigners (i.e., speakers of Barbarian mother tongues) do with the logical boundaries of his Greek language.

Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not express an agreeable sound; for instance, Dionysius the Brazen in his elegiacs speaks of poetry as the scream of a Calliope; both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because the sounds have no meaning. Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but we must give names to things that have none by deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is clearly seen to be akin, as in the famous enigma, (continued. . .)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek Text</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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| ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἰμαρτία, ἕαν μὴ ἡδεῖας ἢ σημεία φωνῆς, ὀλον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγήν Καλλίστης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωνὴ· φαύλη δὲ ἢ μεταφορὰ ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖς. ἔτι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἄλλ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὀμοιότον μεταφέρειν <ἐπί> τὰ ἄνωνύμα ὑνομασμένας ὁ λέγειν δῆλον ἔστιν ὅτι συγγενές οἷς ἐν τῷ αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι

<table>
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<th>ἄνδρ’ εἴδον πωλὶ χαλκόν ἐπ’ ἄνερι καλλήσαντα:</th>
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<tr>
<td>ἄνωνύμων γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ’ ἄμφω πρόσθεσις τις· κόλλησιν τοῖνυν ἐπε τὴν τῆς σκῦας προσβολῆν), καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὗ ἤνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορᾶς λαβέν ἐπεικείς· μεταφορὰ γὰρ αἰνίτονται, ὡς ῥήμαν ὅτι εὔ μετενήκειται. καὶ ἀπὸ καλόν· κάλλος δὲ ἄνωμα τὸ μὲν ὕστερ Λυκύμιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, καὶ ἄσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον δ λῦε τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον.</td>
</tr>
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--- Aristotle Rhetoric (1405a) ---

There is fault in the syllables if the indications of sound are unpleasant; for example, Dionysius the Brazen in his Elegies calls poetry “Calliope’s screech” because both are sounds; but the metaphor is bad because it implies meaningless sounds. Further, metaphor should be used in naming something that does not have a proper name of its own and [it should] not be far-fetched but taken from things that are related and of similar species, so that it is clear the term is related; for example, in the popular riddle [ainigma].

There is in what’s taken together, a missed target if there should be no sweet pleasure the significance of a voice. For example, the Bronze Dionysius, in The Grievings, calls the cries of Calliope sounds of creativity because these two at least are voices. But the bearing of these to full term is flawed as they are unsignifying voices. And yet, it should not be distant. In other words, whether from meanings birthed together or from meanings seen as alike, the bearing of them to full term should name the unnamed. To state what’s obvious is to see the meanings birthed together. Here they are in a riddle of blessed opinion:

(continued. . .)
I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another.

There was no name for what took place, but as in both cases there is a kind of application, he called the application of the cupping-glass gluing. And, generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that it is clear that the transference is clever.

[13] Metaphors should also be derived from things that are beautiful, the beauty of a word consisting, as Licyminius says, in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same. There is a third condition, which refutes the sophistical argument.

---traditional phallogocentric translation by Freese

"I saw a man gluing bronze on another with fire,"

the process has no name, but both are a kind of application; the application of the cupping instrument is thus called "gluing." From good riddling it is generally possible to derive appropriate metaphors; for metaphors are made like riddles; thus, clearly, [a metaphor from a good riddle] is an apt transference of words. And the source of the metaphor should be something beautiful; verbal beauty, as Licyminius says, is in the sound or in the sense, and ugliness the same; and thirdly there is what refutes the sophistic argument;

---traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy

A man seen with fire, bronze on a man, an attachment

Unnamed here is the passion, although there’s a plurality [of meanings] as a situating towards something. “An attachment” of this sort speaks of the bleeding-cup pulling towards [the man]. And so, on the whole, from a fine riddle is the bearing [of meanings] to full term to receive what’s fitting. A bearing [of the meanings] to full term, indeed, actually riddles (which is what’s so obviously fine about bearing [them] to full term [and not delivering them prematurely]). “A goodness, yet, is named,” as Licyminius states it, “in either the noise or the sign[ificance]; and yet a disgrace in the very same way.” And yet, third, there is the destruction of the wise-ish statement.

---a feminist rhetorical translating

The side-by-side comparison is to give the layered effects of interlation. The reader is encouraged to move back and forth between Aristotle’s original and the three translations. I only have space to note some of the differences.

What a feminist rhetorical translator absolutely refuses to do is to transliterate; she (or he) insists always on translation without the abstraction of transliteration. Where Freese has *elegiacs* and Kennedy has *Elegies*, a feminist rhetorical translating offers *Grieving Statements* because the Greek word Ελευθερίας is the term for “logoi” or “statements” by which grief is expressed. Where Kennedy has “syllables,” my alternative is “what’s taken together”; where the two traditional
Some translators say “poetry,” I say “creativity”; where “metaphor,” a “bearing to full term”; where “enigma” and “[ainigma],” “riddle”; where “sophistical” and “sophistic,” I have “wise-ish.”

Traditional, abstracted and technical terms must give way to personal and embodied words. For example, instead of “the indications of sound are unpleasant,” there is “sweet pleasure the significance of a voice”; instead of “argument,” there is “statement.” The goal is embodiment, a writing of the body, not a disembodiment in logical abstraction.

There are other important contrasts between a feminist rhetorical translating and the traditional phallogocentric translations of this passage of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. A feminist rhetorical translating insists on the inclusion of “passion.” That is, not only is πάθος translated as “passion” (as if consistent with a fitting translation of the early passages of the *Rhetoric*) but πάθος and “passion” signify the personal, the problematic, and the possible. Freese makes it “what took place” and Kennedy, “the process.”

The personal is emphasized in the translating from a feminist rhetorical perspective by including word play that gets to the feminine and the womanly and the not-logically not-singularly defined. (As noted earlier, by “word play” I mean, ambiguously, the plural idea of “play” as “playfulness” and as allowing much “wiggle room.”) The emphasis, then, is on the play in Aristotle’s words that have a feminine sense (both in the lexical grammar of Greek that so much more clearly marks gender than does English and in the lexical grammar of English where the masculine is more typically left unmarked). As mentioned, the word λόγος [“logos”] is the one that Aristotle wants to lock down and make into “logic”; but here he’s trying to disparage what we’ve come to know as “sophistic”; the feminist rhetorical translator takes the root σοφίσ- [“sophia”] and translates it as “wise.” Aristotle cannot take away language from the translator and lock its meanings down.
A feminist rhetorical translator approaches the text perhaps as Hélène Cixous also might advise: *avec l'écriture féminine.* For example, there is the emphasis on the body, on pregnancy, on the events of birthing and offspring and naming. Metaphorically (to use an *English* adverb), the Greek word μεταφορὰς [“meta-phorás”] is translated “a bearing to full term.” Now, I’m following Sappho. In one of the fragments of her extant texts (a passage with which Aristotle likely would have had more familiarity than we), Sappho writes:

| κατ’ ἔμοι στάλαγμον, τὸν δ’ ἑπιπλάζοντες ὅμοι φέροιεν καὶ μελεδῶναις |
|------------------|------------------|
| --Sappho fragment 17 |

> From my distress: let buffeting winds bear it and all care away.  

--translator Edwin Marion Cox

Of course, φέροιεν [“pheroien”] as *bear* (the way translator Cox rightly puts it) is the physical, metaphorical, feminine sense in which I am translating μεταφορὰς [“meta-phorás”] (i.e., as “a bearing to full term”).

Other feminist senses in the passage are in the word ἄμφω [“ampho’]. Rather than the word’s merely speaking of “both” (i.e., an ambiguity but simply a binary), the feminist perspective offers that the term might be speaking to many ambiguities all at once.

Aristotle’s use of ἄμφω [“ampho’] with the riddle suggests plural ambiguities, hence the translation, “a plurality” and not “both.” For example, the riddle has two men also in two positions and with two different elements then doing different things with respect to attachings; but the riddle itself has multiple meanings some (but not all) of which Aristotle begins to tease out for the reader. Aristotle is making points about unnamed meanings, unnamed passions, which cannot be premature if they are to allow for rich readings of the riddle not confined to a single (i.e., correct / incorrect) interpretation. If the very act of reading the riddle is multiply
interpretative; and if the riddle is plural and ambiguous; then the riddle and the readings of the riddle are polysemous. The logic of Aristotle cannot limit the text to one single correct meaning.

Aristotle’s rhetorical language, although he wishes it to be logical based on hard nature, rather allows multiple persons to engage in such rhetoric that exposes human presumptions about nature. Aristotle himself collaborates with Licyminius (and perhaps, in this passage, silently with Sappho) to build his personal, passionate case—which is their case built together. They say (through a feministic translation) that “a goodness is named in noise or a sign and so is a disgrace.” This signifying noise sounds less like controlled patriarchy, as Mairs describes it, and more like the polymorphic world of women.

The (feminist) translator employs Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening with its eavesdropping as listening with intent; she (or he) may ask and often does ask what Aristotle’s intention might be if one could know it, but her (or his) most important question is what intent does she (or he) the translator have with respect to the text. With Jacqueline Jones Royster, the voices that the feminist rhetorical translator listens for are her own (or his own). She (or he) stands as Pike’s emic outsider, aware of multiple possible perspectives in the text and into the passage. She (or he) exercises Bird’s overhearing; she (or he) brings into play Daly’s gynocentric excavations; she (or he) attempts Godard’s "shock effect . . . the repossession of the word by women, and the naming of the life of the body as experienced by women" (14). When it comes to coining and defining “rhetoric” something like “speaker-esque” seems to work just fine.

When Pythias, Aristotle’s daughter, overhears the opening of the *Rhetoric,* perhaps reading and translating simultaneously in the barbarian tongue of another, such as a eunuch black slave named Horace (someone Aristotle would have despised as a mutilated being of a marked race fit for servitude), then the very first “logical definition” of “rhetoric” sounds like this:
This is hardly much of a definitional statement. And the logic is just, perhaps, a slight sound of singular either-or binary logic. The feminist rhetorical translator tries to open up the possibilities and to suggest, not serious technical definition, but creative undefinition by both the word play in the suffixes and by the allusion to movement away from poetry. The opening clause in the *Rhetoric* actually turns itself on a word from poetry, as something not necessarily “in opposition” as a “not” but rather as something with fluidity as a “difference.” Aristotle continues the paragraph following this opening “definition” by using the word for boundaries: ἀφορισμένης. This Greek word is the metaphor for definition, and the reader should notice the negating prefix “-ά” to make the word quite literally mean something like “un-bounded.” The feminist rhetorical translator wants to make that, rather than a binary, something like “at least these two.” But traditional masculinist translator Kennedy renders the phrase “no separately defined,” which follows the binary structure of logic fairly directly.

Newman notes the standard translation of this ostensibly-definitional opener to the *Rhetoric*. She explains:

According to the standard interpretation (e.g., Cope, 1867, 1877; Kennedy in Aristotle, trans 1991), this first statement defines a rhetoric that excludes emotion and that distinguishes rhetoric and dialectic from each other, although the specific sense in which these pursuits are distinct is not delineated. (96).

Without knowing the Greek well or the context of the sentence at all, one finds that it is not too difficult to discern a kind of definitional algebra in the “definition”; logical definition might be
reduced, for example, by algebraic variables to something like \( R = \neg D \). Thus, we might as well review Kennedy’s difference, and the standard translation that Kennedy was updating, Freese’s:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|}
\hline
\text{η ῥήτωρ-ική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτ-ική:} \\
\text{--Aristotle Rhetoric (1354a)} \\
\end{array}
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rhetoric (^{2}) is an \textit{antistrophos} to dialectic.</th>
<th>What’s speaker-esque is a turning different from what’s truth-talk-esque.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy</td>
<td>--a feminist rhetorical translating as if by Pythias and Horace</td>
</tr>
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</table>

What may seem clear to a non-rhetorician, a non-classicist, and a non-philosopher is that two or three of the English words in Kennedy’s and Freese’s translation here are not readily recognizable English for the non-specialist. But, from the Greek, the words really do need to be recognizable and not just made clear from the singular perspective of the expert. The point I am making is that the translated “definitions” by the phallogocentric translators are abstract and are neither embodied in context nor in most readers’ experience. Therefore, both Kennedy’s and Freese’s first sentence in their translations of the \textit{Rhetoric} require technical explanation, which each has to provide; that is, each translator must offer explanatory commentary. This sentence, in fact, is one of the most discussed and perhaps most disputed sentence in the whole of the \textit{Rhetoric}. I think the abstract translations confuse the ostensibly singular, apparently well-defined meaning. Logic does not solve the experts’ disagreements and profuse theorizing.

Aristotle’s second definition of rhetoric in the \textit{Rhetoric} is as lacking in Aristotelian logic and is as much theorized by rhetoricians as is his first definition. I give the feminist rhetorical translating first and then commentary following that:
Let’s say the speaker-esque ability really is what’s around each man’s, woman’s, child’s, and slave’s view of what’s taken to be persuasive

--a feminist rhetorical translating as if by Pythias and Horace

Again, there is little here in the translation (or in the Greek) that is pure binary. Aristotle’s words and the translators’ do not insist on a well-bounded definition of rhetoric. Even more than that, the statement starts with an invitation to participation and continues with a rather open-ended inclusion of persons (not by separating logic) as the primary agents collaborating in this playful ability of speakers.

In contrast, the traditional translators make Aristotle sound logical. We might say they, in this way, participate in his phal-logic. Here is how they render this second “definition” of Aristotle:

Kennedy again provides a footnote. This time, instead of simply giving an encyclopedic meta-definition, the translator Kennedy seems to want to explain away why Aristotle uses ἔστω δή, and why the translator renders that with the imperative personal-sounding invitation,
“Let R be . . . ” The footnote reads as follows:

32. Aristotle uses the phrase estô dê, “Let X be . . . ,” commonly of a working hypothesis rather than a final definition and occasionally to resume a definition made earlier. The definition here was anticipated in 1.1.14 on the ergon of rhetoric. In Topics 6.12.149b26-28 Aristotle quotes a definition of an orator as one having the ability to see the persuasive in each case and omit nothing. (37). Kennedy wants it to be very clear that Aristotle is defining, even if the definition is somewhat in process.

Rhetorician Jeffery Walker examines this definitional phrase at 1355b of the Rhetoric to open up various possibilities in translation. He says:

Most obviously, the phrase “rhetoric is”—the usual way the definition gets invoked—elides the fact that Aristotle’s estô de rhêtorikê employs a third-person imperative, estô, meaning something like “let rhetoric be,” which some translations render as “rhetoric may be defined as.” What commonly gets lost is the fact that Aristotle is invoking a stipulative definition, as in a speculative argument or mathematical hypothesis, where one says “let the value of X be Y.” Aristotle, one might say, is stipulating a contentious definition, an opening position, in order to give a particular philosophical account of rhetoric. (“On Rhetorical Traditions”)

That there is stipulation or contention should imply that there are persons who are insiders and others who are outsiders. Even if Aristotle intends “to give a particular philosophical account of rhetoric,” the feminist rhetoric translator does not care, especially if women are intended to be outsiders to philosophy and Aristotle’s philosophical, logical rhetoric.
Walker offers various translations but always in response to traditions of contemporary rhetorics that have grown out of different, if faithful, interpretations of what Aristotle surely intends. The translation that tries to define rhetoric with acknowledgement of “third-person imperative, *estô,*” is as follows:

“Let’s say that rhetoric is a faculty of observing the available means of persuasion — where will that get us?” (scare quotes in the original; 2)

Walker’s tag question is just for illustrative fun; he offers this translation in a conference paper in which he is disputing that there may be just one tradition of contemporary rhetoric based on Aristotle’s famous definition. Walker explains that translating (but not traditional logical translation) allows for at least three interpretations:

I now seem to have two rhetorical traditions from just one quote: rhetoric as a faculty of invention (observing the available means of persuasion in order to make arguments), and rhetoric as a faculty of judgment (observing what should be admissible as persuasive in a given discourse). I will leave it to others to argue that these may be related, even inseparable, rather than antagonistic or just irrelevant to each other; many can do that ably. And there is a third tradition here: if we read *théorésai* simply as “to theorize,” which I think is admissible, we get rhetoric as a kind of critical theory, a hermeneutic of the rhetorical, an effort to account for what makes the persuasive thing persuasive. (3)

Although Walker makes important and fascinating claims about how different composition and rhetoric traditions can read Aristotle differently, I include his play with the definition here for another reason. I want to show that, legitimately, Aristotle’s Greek language is ambiguous.

Although Aristotle’s language is ambiguous (i.e., polymorphous and polysemous), rhetoricians seem most concerned that it lacks definition. Kennedy says it is a “working
hypothesis,” and Walker calls it a “stipulative definition, as in a speculative argument or mathematical hypothesis, . . . a contentious definition, an opening position, in order to give a particular philosophical account of rhetoric.” Similarly, Newman, who gives the best deconstruction possible of Aristotle’s statement, seems most interested in the problems by the standards of logical explanation. She says:

Aristotle’s second definitional statement, which begins chapter 2, is nonmetaphorical and offers some explanation of what rhetoric means to Aristotle:

. . . According to this second definition, rhetoric belongs to the genus dunameis, or potentialities. It is, as such, related to dialectic, also a dunamis, but is different in that rhetoric involves persuasion with particulars, whereas dialectic involves reasoning with universal . . . Aristotle continues, indicating that as a potentiality, rhetoric also differs from dialectic and other arts that instruct and persuade because it functions not merely to persuade but “to observe the persuasive about ‘the given,’ so to speak. That too is why we say it does not include technical knowledge of any particular, defined genus [of subjects]” (Rhetoric 1.2.1355b32). This definitional statement about rhetoric includes no metaphors but again does not explain fully what rhetoric is or how it relates to dialectic. (5)

Note that Newman wants the reader to see how inadequate the “definition” is but how it does approach definition and allows for “rhetoric” to be strictly classified as if by Aristotelian logic.

However, I emphasize again that a feminist rhetorical translating does not look to, or need to use, Aristotle’s intended logic. The feminist overhears Aristotle’s attempts at logic, at definition, and overhears the phallic intended also by the male author.

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Ἂστω δὴ ἡ ὑποτικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ εὑρέχομενον πιθανόν.

--Aristotle Rhetoric (1355b)
Let’s say the speaker-esque ability really is what’s around each man’s, woman’s, child’s, and slave’s view of what’s taken to be persuasive

--a feminist rhetorical translating as if by Pythias and Horace

A feminist rhetorical translating uncovers and discovers the ambiguity, or multidimensionality, in the original and in the English. In addition, the position of the typically excluded referent in the Greek (i.e., the women and her child) is included. Moreover, the reader of both the Greek and the English, whoever she or he may be, is actually invited into the making of meaning (regardless of the fact that Aristotle intends a male-only, Greek-only, educated-only readership or audience and regardless of the fact that his Greek culture regards males only in public speaking and his Greek language specifies the male gender in the grammar of the word ἐκαστόν, meaning literally “each male’s”).

The other definitions of rhetoric in the Rhetoric are all given within the space of a few paragraphs. These correspond to Bekker pages 1356a and 1356b and are presented below side-by-side so I can use formatting to emphasize the structure of Aristotle’s language compared to the feminist rhetorical translating and Freese’s and Kennedy’s respective traditional phallogocentric translations. To keep the comparisons on a single page when possible, moreover, I have reduced the font size in some cases. In all cases of the traditional translations, I have retained the translator’s footnote marks and brackets.

The context of the definitions from Aristotle, with the various translations, spans four full pages below. I do supply some commentary. And yet, I challenge the reader first to see differences for herself or himself. The feminist rhetorical translating follows my reformatting of Aristotle’s Greek to emphasize clausal subordinations. The traditional translations tend to require a technical jargon, which may only be understood with a specialist’s familiarity.
[7] Since there are believable things coming across these ways, what follows is apparent:
To take hold of these is an ability.
   an ability not only to arrange statements together
   but also to view what’s around individual quirks and cultural customs,
   and around good character,
   and around emotions, thirdly;
   that includes what each individual emotion is
and what the make up of each is,
and what each is born from (25)
and how

--a feminist rhetorical translating

[7] Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions— the nature and character of each, its origin, (25) and the manner in which it is produced.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Freese

[7] Since pisteis come about through these [three means], it is clear that to grasp an understanding of them is the function of one who can reason logically and be observant about characters and virtues and, third, about emotions (what each of the emotions is and what are its qualities and from what it comes to be (25) and how).

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy
Thus, these can be brought together as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What’s speaker-esque is like a naturally flowering stem of what’s truth-talk-esque</td>
<td>as even what’s around the business of individual quirks and cultural customs, which is in a just way coming to be agreed on as what’s citizen-esque.</td>
<td>So then, what’s even worn as the underwear of the citizen-esque figure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>That is why Rhetoric assumes the character of Politics, and those who claim to possess it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness, and partly from other human weaknesses, do the same.</td>
<td>--traditional phallogocentric translation by Freese</td>
<td>The result is that rhetoric is like some offshoot [paraphues] of dialectic and ethical studies (which is rightly called politics). Thus, too, rhetoric dresses itself up in the form of politics, as do those who pretend to knowledge of it, sometimes through lack of education, sometimes through boastfulness and other human causes.²³</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

¹ traditional phallogocentric translation by Freese

²³ traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy
What it is, in fact, is a part of what’s truth-talk-esque, and what is like it, just as was said above.

Around no one, in fact, is there a boundary self imposed on these two on how to possess understanding, said But there are abilities of some sort to carry on statements. Around what the abilities really are – just how they do possess (35) differences – enough has been, or nearly enough.

[8] There is, however, a need to say what comes across as a show, or an apparent show, just as also is seen in what’s truth-talk-esque [1356b] (1):
what really is what’s agreed on, but what a statement arrangement is when together, and what an apparent statement arrangement is, is yet just otherwise in such and such a way.

--a feminist rhetorical translating

For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, since neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are merely faculties of furnishing arguments.

We have now said nearly enough about the faculties of these arts and their mutual relations.

[8] But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Freese

Rhetoric is partly [morion ti] dialectic, and resembles it, as we said at the outset; for neither of them is identifiable with knowledge of the contents of any specific subject, but they are distinct abilities of supplying arguments. Concerning their potentiality and how they relate to each other, almost enough has been said.

[8] In the case of persuasion through proving or seeming to prove something, just as in dialectic there is one the one hand induction [epagōgē] and on the other the syllogism and the apparent syllogism, so the situation is similar in rhetoric; for the paradeigma ["example"] is an induction, the enthymēma a syllogism.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy
And yet what I call an inner passion really is a speaker-esque arrangement of statements together, and more: a side-by-side show is what’s agreed-on as what’s speaker-esque.

What all men, women, and children find believable, however, is made by what comes across as a show or a side-by-side show or inner passions, and there’s nothing else besides these.

--a feminist rhetorical translating

Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction.

Now all orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or enthymemes and nothing else.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Freese

I call a rhetorical syllogism an enthymeme, a rhetorical induction a paradigm.

And all [speakers] produce logical persuasion by means of paradigms or enthymemes and by nothing other than these.

--traditional phallogocentric translation by Kennedy

What these examples should continue to illustrate is Newman’s assertion that Aristotle, when giving definitions of “rhetoric” in the *Rhetoric*, does not use “logic.” Instead he resorts to “metaphor.” A feminist rhetorical translating more gladly and willingly goes beyond mere logic and even beyond metaphor to “parable” or side-by-side comparisons. This interlation is the way Aristotle’s failed logic is exposed, and the stereotexting also draws attention to the attempts at abstract, pure terminology by the phallogocentric translators.
The commentary here focuses on the feminist rhetorical translating because enough has been said about the traditional translations elsewhere. However, the contrasts are important.

With respect to individual phrases, the general practice of the feminist rhetorical translator is actually to translate by means of an English phrase. No abstraction due to transliteration is necessary. Even the suffixes are translated: “-esque” and “-ish” for “-ική.”

Furthermore, when possible, a feminist rhetorical translator offers bodily connotations. Thus, whereas the English of the two masculinist logical translators has a technical term or phrase for συλλογιςμός (i.e., “syllogism” and “logical reasoning”), the feminist rhetorical translator makes it an “arrangement of statements together” as if something artists and florists do. Likewise, “enthymeme” becomes for the feminist rhetorical translator “inner passions”; “ethos” is “individual quirks and cultural customs”; “virtues” becomes “good character”; “offshoot” is “naturally flowering stem”; and “υποδύεται υπὸ τὸ σχῆμα . . .” becomes “what’s even worn as the underwear of the citizen-esque figure.” This translating is play with language, both a playfulness and an opening up of room for new and multiple meanings. But the translating is after embodiment and experiences in the reader’s lives that are invoked by the imagery.

In addition to differences with respect to words and phrases, there are alterations by the feminist rhetorical translator over the larger passage. For instance, “what’s believable [i.e., to persons]” (for πίστεις) is the term or phrase at the beginning and end of this passage to bookend it. Both traditional translations, however, miss the redundancy of the term in the passage. Freese, for example, starts with “proof” but ends with “belief,” and Kennedy begins with the technical transliteration “pisteis” and ends with “logical persuasion.” Likewise, at the beginning and end of the passage, there is “what’s apparent” (what’s φανερών). At the opening and towards the closing of this passage, the word is repeated. But the two traditional translators open
by translating the word φαινερον as what’s initially “evident” and what is unmistakably “clear”; and yet they close the passage by translating much more doubtfully.

Newman makes much of Aristotle’s definitional writing. She acknowledges that Aristotle is trying to define, and to logically define, “rhetoric.” She calls his statements in this passage, “more definitional statements about rhetoric” (5) But Newman explains that “[e]ach refers by means of metaphors to relationships that rhetoric shares with other disciplines,” namely “dialectic but also . . . politics and ethics” but also “biological works” (5). In each case, the feminist rhetorical translator might note that the “other disciplines” are all logically and technically and abstractly transliterated. Newman could have just as easily made the point that the so-named disciplines are metaphorical names. Dialectic has to do with talking through a matter towards Truth; politics refers to matters of the City-state; ethics has to do with cultural customs of morality; biology, of course, is a statement or a study of life (or bias + logos).

The feminist rhetorical translating makes a difference because it turns to feminine discourse (not the phallic imposition of assumptions about male superiority); to what’s speakersque (not to “logic”), and to interlational translating (not to transliteration or to the use of low-pitched male voices). The notion of logic and of definition becomes suspect, and yet a feminist rhetorical translating recognizes the mere attempt at logic and overhears the unachieved intention to define. Through a(p)positioning, or side-by-side translating, a feminist rhetorical translator opens up the possibilities for meaning making and for recovery of voices once silenced in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. A feminist rhetorical translating exposes Aristotle’s logic but does not necessarily participate in it or perpetuate it.
Chapter 4 – A Feminist Rhetoric Translating: Re-Positioning the Centric Rhetoric

Thus, Greek rhetoric was not a single, homogenous theory. Aristotle’s formulation of the art, however, became the nucleus of the theory that dominated the tradition of rhetoric.

-- Richard Young, Alton Becker, and Kenneth Pike, Rhetoric: Discovery and Change

That said, I believe our discipline can only be enriched by the prevalence of ongoing rhetorical work in critical-race, gender, ethnic, queer, disability, feminist, spiritual, and cultural studies. Some of this scholarship and pedagogy is comparative, contrastive, or alternative, useful work that tends to use the rhetorical tradition as its universal backdrop (or tether). These works confront the rhetorical tradition at the same time that they also reinscribe that tradition as the tradition, albeit a broader one. Other scholarship, however, particularly that rooted in theories of Afrocentricity and Chinese cultures, tends to ignore that so-called universal backdrop. While this scholarship, too, offers explanations, rereadings, and timely expansions of the rhetorical tradition, it carries a rich difference: when these scholars refer to the rhetorical tradition, they’re not talking about the same one that most of us know so well.

-- Cheryl Glenn, “Alliance of Rhetoric Societies Position Statement”

And I finally realized the irony of my reasoning: by enthymemically arguing my case from existing commonsense assumptions . . . , I was retreating into an Aristotelian rhetoric of common sense (i.e., the sense we hold in common), which was the very rhetoric that my manuscript challenged. Now I grant you, Aristotelian rhetoric is a very powerful, very useful way to reason. But as I argued . . . , it can be gender blind, that is, naïvely blind to concerns of gender. What I was realizing in my own life was that it can also be race blind. . . . When asking myself whether my defense of Woolf, Daly, and Rich was as race blind as Aristotle’s treatise of rhetoric was gender blind, I answered myself with a well-intentioned, “Of course it is.”

--Krista Ratcliffe, Rhetorical Listening: Identification, Gender, Whiteness

Western rhetorics, at least the legacies of them that we have inherited through scholarship, are demonstrably dominated by elite male viewpoints and experiences. Twenty-five hundred years of rhetorical scholarship (as inscribed by the names of highly respected rhetorical figures from Socrates to Kenneth Burke and beyond) are, in fact, testament of Western dominance in interpretive authority and of the situating of that authority in male-dominated and elite ways. In fact, the dominance has been so fixed that contemporary scholars who seek to shift these viewpoints and paradigms, to extend the boundaries of interest and inquiry, or to re-endow these spaces with the materiality of other lives face an abiding challenge. . . . In my own work . . ., I have concentrated on what in contemporary scholarship would be labeled counter discourses in that I focus on non-normative arenas in the sense that my focus is on African American women, that is, on a group that defies the three basic features that I noted above: Westernness, in that they are historically linked to Africa; maleness, in that they are women; and eliteness, in that they are a historically oppressed group in terms of race, class, gender, and culture.

--Jacqueline Jones Royster, “Disciplinary Landscaping, or Contemporary Challenges in the History of Rhetoric”

In the earlier chapters, I have started respectively with two epigraphs. The initial quotation represents the phallogocentric tradition of Aristotle; and the subsequent quotation
provides a feminist response. My purpose has been to allow alternative voices to speak “in translation” of the dominance of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. The voices show not a diametric opposition to but rather a free recognition of Aristotelian rhetoric as a system of sexism, absolutism, and elitism.

To start this chapter, I am taking the opening page, nearly a full page, for more alternative voices. I offer the long epigraphs to quote the rhetoricians whose work has most influenced my dissertation. By their statements, these individuals begin to get at a particular problem of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. It is a problem that they face squarely. The problem is twofold. First, *Aristotle never intended his elite style of language to be ours in any way*. Aristotle prescribed an elite style of rhetoric, which he called “τὸ ἑλληνίζειν” [transliterated “tō Hellēnizein”], for his exclusively Greek, male-only students. It was to be the means for the educated and the privileged to conform all citizens, and foreigners, to that sort of Hellenism that is centrist; it was a tool to dominate the unconformable. Second, the problem of Aristotle’s rigidly masculinist, dominantly logical, snobbishly elitist *Rhetoric* is exacerbated by traditional translators. The problem is a quandary for contemporary scholars of feminisms, rhetorics, translation, comparative literature, literacy, linguistics, communication, and composition, who want to consider, perhaps to appropriate or to reject, Aristotle’s treatise and theorizing. I discuss the problem and demonstrate solutions more fully in this chapter. Specifically, the difficulty is that Aristotle loots the mother tongue of the Greeks. He pilfers the works of female and male poets, playwrights, sophists, rhetors, rhetoricians, philosophers, scientists, politicians, historians, educators (even his own teachers), and Barbarians whose texts have been translated into Greek so that he can read and disparage them. Aristotle reduces their language to his logic. Then he silences some, distorts others, and defines and classifies all with reference to his misogynistic, “logical,” and so-called “non-extreme” hierarchy. Nature, by Aristotle’s objective observations,
finds him and his elite kind at the top, sexually, racially, linguistically, and by class. In this way, Aristotle steals others’ words and uses the stolen language to marginalize women in particular, a practice that traditional translators of his *Rhetoric* have followed faithfully.

I want to review a bit, to make clear that the centrism of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is part and parcel of his phallogocentrism, that is, what Clarice Lispector calls the “system of inflexible last judgment, which does not permit even a second of incredulity” (Cixous 123).55 Readers going through this dissertation in a linear way have seen that I am treating, in order, three separate aspects of Aristotle’s “system.” This third topical chapter focuses on the central elitism of Aristotle’s rhetorical project in Greek and in traditional translation. I am following, and treating (as) separate(ly), the morphemes in *phal-logocentrism*: first that which is phallic (Chapter 2), second Aristotle’s logic (Chapter 3), and now finally what’s centric in his project. If this project weren’t an academic dissertation so heavily influenced by Aristotle, then I might have structured it differently and readers might feel freer to skip around the manuscript as they choose. Nonetheless, inasmuch as I, an academic English writer of a dissertation, have abstracted and then appropriated or applied Aristotle’s central style (as he may have intended it), I have also appropriated or applied one aspect or another of “the whole trend of his prejudices” (i.e., his sexism) (Wright 222). I have to reiterate that what is centric for Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (and for its traditional translations) is also logical and phallic.

And yet, in this chapter, I am doing something a bit different from what I did in the previous two chapters: rather than showing just snippets of the *Rhetoric* in the Greek and in translation, here I examine a full “chapter” of Aristotle’s central treatise on his theory of rhetoric. The focus is on a larger piece of writing of Aristotle around which he “centers” his teaching overtly on writing. The initial section of my chapter here explicates the ways various scholars have engaged with Aristotle’s centricism, first the traditional phallogocentric translators
I offer a second section on the translation of this “chapter” in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. Specifically it is what we have come to know as the *Rhetoric*’s Book Three, Chapter Five. In addition to the original Greek, I present the two most popular traditional, masculinist translations (Freese’s and Kennedy’s) alongside my feminist rhetorical translating with some commentary. The third section of the chapter is to consider implications.

### I. ENGAGING (WITH) THE “ΚΕΝΤΡΙΚΗ ‘ΠΗΤΟΠΙΚΗ’ [CENTRIC RHETORIC]

My dissertation shows that the traditional phallogocentric translators of the *Rhetoric* have caused problems by attempting, if failing, to follow Aristotle’s original authorial intentions. The biggest problem, however, is not that the translators have too quickly skirted the sexism, absolutism, and centricism—although they have glossed over these issues. Traditional masculinist translators have (A) avoided the larger and plural context of the *Rhetoric* in what Pike sees as “not a single, homogenous theory” (3); have (B) seen no need to “confront the rhetorical tradition” as Glenn would confront it (“Position”); have (C) downplayed what Ratcliffe calls “commonsense assumptions . . . naively blind to concerns of gender” (5); and have (D) downright ignored what Royster calls “Western dominance in interpretive authority and of the situating of that authority in male-dominated and elite ways” (149-50).

However, the greatest problem caused by traditional masculinist translators is that they themselves engage in Aristotle’s centricism. The traditional translators of the *Rhetoric* permit, participate in, promote, and perpetuate Aristotle’s “system of inflexible last judgment.” A quick review of the stated goals of some of the translations from 1685 to 2007 may reveal some of the motives.
The first extant English translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is addressed in its “Preface” to the Monarch of England by the translator “H. C.” who, in 1685, suggests that Aristotle’s intentions with the treatise are global domination and that the intentions of the British King James II and VII might be as well:

> The Emulation of the *English Version* to approach as near as might be to the *Greek Original*, and to follow the Authors Example, embolden’d this Address to your Honour. For they were not the Pedantic Rudiments of *Rhetoric*, which *Aristotle* offer’d to one that had been his *Royal Pupil, . . . Alexander*. ("Epistle Dedicatory")

Alexander, of course, is Alexander the Great, whom Aristotle tutored. Likely, the world dominator had studied Aristotle’s accounts of the global conquerors Darius and Xerxes in the *Rhetoric* (Book II, Chapter 20, 1393a – 1393b); translator H. C. certainly seems to have taken note of this possibility. The strong implication is of an elitism in the text (both in Aristotle’s original Greek and in H. C.’s English) that instructs the powerful on means to acquire nations so that there can be educational and colonial conquest. One common denominator between the Greek empire achieved by Alexander and the British empire of James II and VII is the learning of lessons from Aristotle and his *Rhetoric*. Even if H. C. has exaggerated the history of Aristotle’s influence on Alexander, the translator is inviting his own ruler to read the *Rhetoric* as if it teaches one to dominate the globe.

In 1811, Thomas Taylor began translating the treatise on rhetoric and asked a friend to review it. That Taylor was faithful to Aristotle’s intentions for the *Rhetoric* is clear from the friend’s letter:

> You will not expect from me any of that microscopic criticism, in which the gentry we have been speaking of delight to indulge. *I perceive in your
translation, wherever I examine it, that prime virtue of a translator, a complete subordination and subserviency to his original;—no tampering with the exact meaning in order to evade a difficulty, or to round a period. There is also a manly plainness and integrity which commands respect; and I have seen enough to convince me that a student will derive satisfaction often, from the literal rendering you have adopted. (original emphasis; vi)

The perceived value in the translation was the translator’s ability to subordinate his own view to Aristotle’s, to be subservient to the elite Greek author. Taylor’s friend praised him for doing what the first English translator H. C. did by following “The Emulation of the English Version to approach as near as might be to the Greek Original, and to follow the Authors Example” (“Epistle Dedicatory”). The reader should note the masculinist emphasis in the qualification that Taylor’s “plainness and integrity which commands respect” is decidedly “manly.”

In 1823, one John Gillies decided to translate the Greek text. Again, the supreme goal was loyalty to the author Aristotle and to his ideas. Gillies’s title makes explicit the intent of the translator to be guided solely by the intent of the original:

A NEW TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE’S RHETORIC; WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND APPENDIX, EXPLAINING ITS RELATION TO HIS EXACT PHILOSOPHY, AND VINDICATING THAT PHILOSOPHY, BY PROOFS THAT ALL DEPARTURES FROM IT HAVE BEEN DEVIATIONS INTO ERROR.

Two things should be clear from the titular statement of Gillies. First, anyone must be in “error” if he (or she) causes any “departure” or “deviation” from what Aristotle intended in such an “exact” way. Second, Aristotle’s philosophy ruled the day, and Gillies presumably subsumed rhetoric within the “exact philosophy” (i.e., the logic) of the supreme Greek teacher.
There are seven other translators who have completed and published full translations of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*; all of these making translator comments have pledged similar loyalty to Aristotle and his original intentions with his text. All males, they are Thomas Hobbes, who completed a translation is 1890; Richard C. Jebb, who published his translation in 1909; John H. Freese, whose work of 1926 remains popular today as part of the Harvard Loeb bilingual series; W. Rhys Roberts, who finished his translation in 1954; Lane Cooper, who published a translation in 1960; and Hugh Lawson-Tancred, who completed his translation in 1991. These translators are classicists or philosophers but not rhetoricians. They remained faithful to Aristotle inasmuch as they understood his philosophy, his logic.

The most current translation of Aristotle’s complete *Rhetoric* is by rhetorician George A. Kennedy. Kennedy first published his translation in 1991; he republished it with a few updated notes in 2007. What is unique about Kennedy, with respect to the ten previous translators, is that he alone intends to translate the *Rhetoric* “rhetorically.” What is not at all exceptional about Kennedy, what makes him like every other translator of Aristotle’s work, is that he intends to follow the Greek author’s intentions and to follow them faithfully.

My careful review of Kennedy that follows is important because the rhetoric-scholar community generally identifies Kennedy’s translation as the best one for the teaching and study of rhetoric. The Rhetoric Society of America dedicated several sessions of its Fifth Biennial Conference to the praise of Kennedy’s work; the publication of the proceedings in 1992 has given much more and enduring exposure to the new translation. In 2007, the leading journal *Rhetoric Review* published a review of the second edition in which reviewer Brad McAdon concluded that Kennedy’s translation “will continue to be an important component for rhetoric programs, especially those in English and Communication departments” (344). The result is that
no other translation in the history of rhetorical scholarship has received as much attention among rhetoricians, attention that has been enduring and significantly favorable as well.

Kennedy’s loyalty to Aristotle as a rhetorician and to his *Rhetoric* as the ultimate text for the canon of rhetoric has led the translator right into the Greek author’s phallogocentrism. Rhetorician Thomas Farrell examines Kennedy’s aim to faithfully follow Aristotle’s intentions as author. In Farrell’s review of Kennedy’s first-edition translation, he describes how all of the previous translators have followed what they view as most important in the mind of the author, noting that “[w]here the defiant text of the *Rhetoric* is concerned, it has usually been the Classicists who are best equipped to wrestle with the nuances of etymology and shades of meaning” in Aristotle’s mind as expressed in his words. Farrell also observes that the “[p]hilosophers [are] more attuned to [Aristotle’s] larger concerns about practical reason, action, conviction, and value” (237). Finally, the commentator comes to the way that Kennedy—like none of the classicists, philosophers, or other rhetoricians before him have done—has attended to *all of* Aristotle’s intentions. Farrell says the following:

This leaves rhetoricians, often ill-equipped in [Aristotle’s philological] matters of Greek grammar and etymology, not terribly interested in [Aristotle’s philosophical] issues such as the above, while bound by [Aristotle’s] derived wisdom on both. Add to this the observations by Richard McKeon that most previous translators of the Aristotelian corpus have been Platonists [who philosophically anyway are neither Aristotelians nor observers of Aristotle’s rhetorical intentions] and we get an inkling of the difficulties confronting those whose theory has been based on the *Rhetoric*. Kennedy brings to this text a familiarity with the larger issues confronting any serious student of this work. And yet his ultimate responsibility, as translator, is not to the sweep of issues, but
to the range and fidelity and freedom afforded by [Aristotle’s] *Rhetoric’s* original Greek language. (237)

Farrell finds Kennedy’s translation closely following Aristotle’s authorial intentions.

So does rhetorician Janet M. Atwill. In Atwill’s review of Kennedy’s translation, she quotes the translator, who confesses he is solely after the aims of Aristotle, even if these aims are plural. She says: “Kennedy frames the ambiguity of rhetoric’s epistemology and ethics as ‘a kind of dialogue in Aristotle's mind between two views of rhetoric, one making strong moral and logical demands on a speaker, one looking more toward success in debate’ (xi)” (94). As Atwill reviews the translation, she observes Kennedy’s singular faithfulness to all that is in Aristotle’s thinking.

Therefore, when Kennedy claims he best departs from the decisions of previous non-rhetorical translators, he invariably warrants his translational differences by an appeal to Aristotle. For example, Kennedy offers the following in the “Prooemion” of his translation:

Two features of my translation may be worth pointing out in advance. A major doctrine of [Aristotle’s] *On Rhetoric* is the use of the enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism. In Aristotle’s own writing enthymemes often take the form of a . . . Greek [phrasing . . . .] These [doctrinaire enthymemes as Aristotle intends them] occur on every page but are often obscured by other translators. I have kept them . . . . A second feature is avoidance of some of the sexist language seen in older translations, which often speak of “men” when Aristotle [intentionally] uses a more general plural. I have used [certain English pronouns to mirror what]. . . . Aristotle usually envisions [by his Greek word choices]. . . . (first ed. xii)
Kennedy’s features, he seems to believe, are what Aristotle would intend, rhetorically; whether or not Kennedy’s belief is suspect—and one might understand that it is—my point is that Kennedy bases his translation on what he sees to be in Aristotle’s mind.

Presumably, Aristotle makes other apparently rhetorical moves that Kennedy says his translation follows. Kennedy writes:

Although Aristotle largely limited the province of rhetoric to public address, he took a broader view of what that entails than do most modern writers on communication. . . . He addresses issues of philosophy, government, history, ethics, and literature; and in Book 2 he includes a comprehensive account of human psychology. In Aristotle’s view, speakers need to understand how the minds of their listeners work, and in the process we come to understand something of who we are and why we do what we do. (first ed. xi)

What Kennedy does with such commentary is to bring together Aristotle’s view with his own. He goes on, tracking Aristotle’s intentions as “views,” “attitudes,” and “wants” that a translator should faithfully convey so that modern students might consider them:

Aristotle seems to have written different portions of the work at different times, he sometimes changed his views, and he never made a complete revision of the whole, nor did he add as many illustrations and examples as we would like. Finally, his attitude toward rhetoric was ambivalent. He wanted his students to understand the dangers of sophistic rhetoric as dramatically portrayed by Plato, and at the same time to be able to defend themselves and be effective if they engaged in public life. The differing views [of Aristotle] found in the text, especially when taken in conjunction with Plato’s criticism or Isocrates’
celebration of rhetoric, can provide a good starting point for discussions by modern students about the nature and functions of rhetoric in society. (first ed. xi)

We should note, before enumerating Kennedy’s various aims for his translation of Aristotle’s aims, the way that Kennedy sees himself as personally like Aristotle, who carved out rhetoric separately from Plato. Kennedy says: “All too many [present day] students of Aristotle are, in their hearts, Platonists. I am not only content, but delighted, when Professor Farrell proclaims that I am [like Aristotle] not a Platonist” (“Response” 244).

Kennedy’s additional translational aims to render Aristotle’s authorial intentions into English are as follows:

1. “to convey something of Aristotle’s distinctively compressed style and his thinking”;
2. “to render the work [once accessible to Aristotle’s ancient audience as] more accessible to modern readers by introductory comments, supplemental phrases in the text, and notes”;
3. “one reason for studying Aristotle is to understand his technical language. I have kept this and offered explanations of it” (second ed. xi);
4. “to enable the average reader to understand the text” (first ed. xii).

Again, Kennedy as translator seems to have one main goal, the aim of traditional translators: to translate the intentions of Aristotle as author.

In reviewing Kennedy’s translational intentions at length, I want to be clear that Kennedy is doing what every single English translator of Aristotle’s Rhetoric has done before him. Kennedy, and each of the other men, has intended to let Aristotle and Aristotle alone speak through his treatise. When the translators are aware of the problems of Aristotle’s intentions, including the difficulties of his centricism, they tend to slough them off, as Kennedy does when
he argues that his hands are tied; he says, when following Aristotle’s exclusion of women, that he the translator must be as exclusive because anything otherwise would “be unhistorical or would involve an actual change to the text” (On Rhetoric xii).

It is not just in translating that Kennedy has suggested a central elitism in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. In 1995, four years after Kennedy published the first edition of his translation, he began to teach Comparative Rhetoric. At first glance, Kennedy’s decision to investigate rhetorics outside of the Aristotelian and Roman male traditions seems a refreshing departure from Aristotle’s Western male logocentrism. It is always encouraging to look outside one’s own dominant tradition by encouraging one’s students to do the same. Moreover, if any one could provide a fair basis for comparing other traditions to the Western tradition of rhetoric as formalized by Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it is Kennedy. Kennedy had contributed to the writing, editing, and translation of several notable classics such as The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.-A.D. 300 (1972); Volume I of the Cambridge History of Literary Criticism (1989); and On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse (1991). He had already begun to bridge ancient secular rhetoric into contemporary times and into non-Greek religion with the writing or editing of works such as Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (1980); Greek Rhetoric Under the Christian Emperors (1983), New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (1984); and A New History of Classical Rhetoric (1994).

Nevertheless, as Kennedy began comparing the dominant Western tradition to others, he seems to have ignored the work of other scholars on these other traditions. For instance, in the 1980s, there were a few rhetoricians, and many in various disciplines outside of rhetoric, who had published findings on all sorts of rhetorics and their applications. As noted, the linguist Pike had joined two rhetoricians to publish an applied-theory textbook in composition that
acknowledged various traditions including African American, Aztec, Chinese, Hebrew, and Japanese (10-23, 68-70, 131-37, 184, 534, Young, Becker, and Pike). In addition, Pike’s comparative theory terms (emic and etic) had appeared in the publications of twenty different fields of inquiry (Headland). Furthermore, from English-as-a-Second-Language scholarship, there had been cultivated substantial research in Contrastive Rhetoric, a field of inquiry that focuses on culture-bound rhetorics and their manifestations in the academic writing of ESL learners (Kaplan, Connor).

However, in 1998, Kennedy published his “cross-cultural study of rhetorical traditions” (1) as if it were the first statement of comparative rhetorics. He entitled the book Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction. Kennedy had begun teaching comparative rhetoric a few years earlier, and when the book went to print, he addressed it to a wide audience: not only to “the general reader, curious about the world, and teachers of classics, English (both literature and composition), philosophy, and speech communication” but also to “linguists, anthropologists, social biologists, and experts in non-Western societies, [are academics] most of whom never use the word ‘rhetoric’” (2). A few reviewers praised the book as a first. For example, Mary Garrett, an Asian rhetorics scholar, called Kennedy’s book “a step forward in our study of world rhetorics . . . [the] first and hardest step” (433); Kermit E. Campbell, rhetorics scholar and African American rhetoric specialist, likewise concluded, “Our field has long needed such a book, and now that we have it, we should read it, discuss it, and develop it” (174). Others’ acknowledged “Kennedy’s scholarly dedication and, even more, his courage, in venturing into such a demanding subject” (Garrett 431); his “pioneering work in rhetoric historiography” (Campbell 174); his “good starting points” (Mao 410); his valor as a “senior scholar to embark on an experimental volume” (Zulick 521); how “Kennedy models the difficulty of writing a brief, broad, and satisfying survey of public discourse” (Erard 634); the
way he “offers much to the field of technical communication” (Tebeaux 174); and how he has “opened many new frontiers for fruitful study of rhetorical expression in areas well beyond any current research” (Major 33).

Despite the early praise, it was Kennedy’s elitism that caused concern. Kennedy’s “step forward,” if it is not a misstep, may actually be a step backwards for the study of rhetorics in a comparative way. “Caveat lector,” Garrett warned after commending Kennedy for ostensibly starting the conversation about non-Western rhetorics (432). Other critical voices rightly noted the following in Kennedy’s study: rhetorical Darwinism (Garrett; Krajewski; Mao); racism (Stewart; Zulick); androcentricism (Stewart); linguistic absolutism (Erard; Garrett; Krajewski; Mao; Major; Tebeaux; Zulick); and various ethnocentrisms, including Orientalism (Garrett; Mao), the neglect of some African rhetorics (Campbell), the disparagement of Islamic discourses (Erard), and the denigration of Native American literacies (Lyons). I believe these accusations are so strong that another review is in order. I want to know just how influenced Kennedy might be by Aristotle.

Kennedy’s *Comparative Rhetoric* uses the Western tradition of rhetoric, in which he places himself, as the pinnacle standard for all other rhetorics. And he seems to suggest, by the organization of his book, that earlier or purely oral rhetorical traditions, are inferior to the Western tradition of rhetoric. Kennedy’s book presents—in an ethnocentric order from least to most central—the rhetoric or “rhetorical factors” of the following groups: social (non-human) animals; human infants acquiring language; Aborigines in Australia; various other societies without writing systems; Indians in North America; and the literate ancients of the Near East, of China, and of India, and ultimately the Western rhetoricians of Greece and Rome.

When Kennedy opens the book to define rhetoric, it appears at first glance that he has transcended the pinnacle tradition of Aristotle and Cicero. He defines “rhetoric, in essence, [as]
a form of mental and emotional energy” (3 – 4). This broad definition, not the typical one of Athens or Rome, may be widely applicable both to the Western rhetorical tradition and to those far beyond it. Kennedy’s description of “rhetoric” is, for instance, not different from the “rhetoric” of an Afrafeminist such as Jacqueline Jones Royster. “What becomes critical . . . is the acknowledgement of the multiple functions of emotions and experiences in defining one’s relationship to one’s research, a departure from traditional methods that Royster calls ‘practices of disregard’ [as opposed to] ‘developing a habit of caring as a rhetorician’” (emphases added by Bizzell 13-14). Royster is as committed to the emotional senses (not essence) of rhetoric if from a vastly different non-traditional, subjectivism. Nonetheless, Kennedy’s prejudices show.

Kennedy identifies his biases explicitly. “My understanding of rhetoric,” he claims, “has a partial precedent in the concept of ‘vivacity’ as taught by eighteenth-century British rhetoricians and resembles some ideas in Chinese philosophy” (4). While his confessed foundation is clearly not identified as Aristotle, Kennedy does seem to ground his logic of rhetoric they way Aristotle does: by observing animals. Kennedy acknowledges a “sentimental approach to animal life [in opposition to] the radical humanism that draws a sharp line between nonhuman and human animals, sometimes on the basis of religious doctrine of the soul, [and] sometimes on the assumption that animals lack reason because they lack human speech” (12). Kennedy’s work mirrors Aristotle’s extrapolation of the study of animals to logical lessons about humankind. Perhaps Kennedy is already after the intent of Aristotle. Kennedy professes a commitment to “the belief in the material basis of life, in human evolution from primate ancestors, and in the importance of rhetoric in human society [as opposed, in a simple binary, to p]ostclassical theories” (30). And implicitly, in his book’s organization, Kennedy claims commitment to “the new possibilities for research provided by Darwinian theory” (31): from the rhetoric of social animals to the most developed and complex literate rhetorics of ancient Greece.
and ultimately Rome. Similarly, evolutionary biases color his terminology. As mentioned, Kennedy uses only Western rhetorical terms to compare the non-Western traditions. Such limited methodology, without question, inherently stalls not only Kennedy’s general definition of and objectives for rhetoric but also any learning he or we might well do from non-Western, more-than-male-only rhetorics.

When considering Kennedy’s take on other rhetorics, one wonders why his comparative work has not found a scholar willing to translate the book for an international audience. But an anonymous translator of sorts has begun commenting on Kennedy’s *Comparative Rhetoric*, at least of the TCU library’s copy. In the margins of page 143 are penciled 公 and 信, two “Simplified Chinese” characters to compare with Kennedy’s original English (with transcribed “pinyin”) for the terms. But by page 162, the comparative scrawling has stalled. How, in translated Chinese writing, is one to show Kennedy’s Anglo-centric and Western perspectives here (on the topic of Chinese rhetoric)? Kennedy has written: “The . . . author of a Chinese work that most approximates a rhetorical handbook was Han Fei-tzu, probably born about 280 BCE, ‘the Machiavelli of ancient China’.” Kennedy does not seem to imagine for a moment that the Chinese rhetoricians and their rhetorics that he is viewing so ethnocentrically may be, in turn, viewing Aristotle, and Kennedy, and the whole of the West in a much different way. A Chinese comparative rhetorician, a translator even, might venture, for example, that Niccolo Machiavelli is the Han Fei-tzu of Italy. Kennedy’s lens for comparing rhetoric is the lens of the West. Kennedy’s Western male biases cry out for translation from other perspectives.

I am trying to suggest that Kennedy has ethnocentric, Western biases and that his lens seem to be founded on Aristotle’s centricism. The way Kennedy and the other previous translators of the *Rhetoric* have followed Aristotle’s intentions so faithfully may, in part, account for the perpetuation of the dominance of Aristotle’s phallogocentricism.
Royster explains that “the dominance has been so fixed” (150) that some scholars who would desire to let marginalized voices speak do not know how to let them speak. In fact, Pike, Glenn, Ratcliffe, and Royster perhaps do not—and maybe cannot at times—go far enough. The phallicism, the absolutism, and the ethnocentrism of classical rhetoric have become increasingly apparent thanks to the work of feminist historians; and yet how feminist scholars negotiate the study of Aristotle remains dicey.

For instance, Pike and his co-authors of *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* were dogged by critic Kathleen E. Welch, who mistook their acknowledgement of Aristotle’s tradition for their blind perpetration of his “Heritage School” (22). Welch claimed incorrectly that the authors are so entrenched in “classical rhetoric [that their perspective] appears to be valorized according to the interpretive bases of Comte’s positivism and Descartes’s rationalism: a definite world ‘out there’ exists and is readily available for retrieval” (10) She argues wrongly, I think, that their book:

- disregards the inevitable translation problems from Homeric and Attic Greek . . . ,
- depends on the use of formulas, usually numerical ones, as a structure for presenting classical rhetoric . . . , [and defends] the consistent removal of contexts of classical rhetoricians and their ideas that have come down to us either in their writing (for example, Plato’s writing) or in versions of their ideas presented by other writers (for example, versions of many Sophists’ ideas in the writing of Plato and Aristotle [sic] or Plato’s version of Socrates). (10-11).

However, the book *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change*, not to mention the respective life works of Young, Becker, and Pike, fly in the face of Welch’s over generalized denigration of them. James Berlin rightly called Young, Becker, and Pike’s rhetoric, “new rhetoric” for composition ( 767). And such a new rhetoric was born from the kind of cross-cultural not-exclusively-western work
that Pike and Becker did as anthropological linguists. Welch’s own critique, however, does not
go beyond a western-centric view. In other words, even Welch’s negative review works within
that “Heritage school” that she would try to disparage. I do not, however, want to fault Welch
entirely. Perhaps Young, Becker, and Pike should have made very clear how the rhetorical
centrism of someone like Aristotle does not entirely inform their own views. But I think, in
1970, they were trying to introduce Pike’s methods as a new rhetoric and likely viewed
Aristotle’s old phallogocentric perspectives, though controversial, as tangential to their goals.

Like Pike, Glenn has been challenged by a critic as being subject to Aristotle’s dominant
elitism. For example, one of the audience members at an Alliance of Rhetoric Societies
conference emailed Glenn anonymously, suggesting that she is beholden to the Western
tradition: “It is important to remember that you are teaching the dominant History of Rhetoric.
There are contestations and other histories of rhetoric as well as Thee [sic] History of Rhetoric
that you teach. . . . Do you get it now?” (brackets are Glenn’s; “Position Statement”).

The criticism is rather ironic and hollow because of the key role Glenn has played in the
inclusion of feminism in her male-dominated discipline. She has worked to reconsider and to
rewrite the history of rhetoric from the perspective of women (i.e., *Rhetoric Retold*) and has
written of both women and native Americans as exemplifying the rhetoric of silence (i.e.,
*Unspoken*). However, when challenged, Glenn awkwardly suggests that two different
racial/cultural groups (the “Afrocentric” and the “Chinese”) are somehow wrong to keep
themselves separate from the pure “rhetorical tradition.” In her “Position Statement” for the
conference, for example, she begins by posting anonymously the email of the challenger:

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There are contestations and other histories of rhetoric as well as Thee [sic]
History of Rhetoric that you teach. . . . Do you get it now? I hope you don’t feel
offended by this communication, but if no other white person in the room got this,
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I want you to get it because you are one of my favorite people. Thanks for listening.

Glenn uses the space of her own academic position statement—a public web page posted following the conference—to respond and to clarify. She refuses to edit the misspelling of the emailer, leaving the reader to infer that perhaps the writer is not careful and/or is one of her students and/or is of a racial minority.

Glenn does respond, however, with some humility and gratitude and begins by conceding that “[t]he sender of the email is right.” Glenn preserves “our discipline” of various rhetorics as categorically inclusive, and she concludes with suggestions as to how persons of “Afrocentric” and “Chinese” identity might, as scholars, contribute to rhetorics. Nonetheless, her own intellectual “rhetorical tradition” is exclusive of the demands of that one emailer and of what Glenn identifies as that “[o]ther scholarship.” Moreover, Glenn suggests that certain theories from the two specific non-Western (racially-and-culturally identified) groups of people are untethered to the Western rhetoric by which Glenn personally positions herself. These two groups Glenn calls “contrastive and separatist (for lack of better terms)”: they are persons who refuse to use Glenn’s tradition—but what she calls “the rhetorical tradition as [their] universal backdrop (or tether).” Glenn suggests that African or Chinese students, teachers, or researchers (or anyone theorizing Afrocentricity or Chinese cultures) have not had much interest in or interaction with Aristotle and other Greeks or Romans or any Westerners in the history or the current scholarship of rhetoric.

Perhaps Glenn was using hyperbole to suggest the distance between “the rhetorical tradition” and “theories of Afrocentricity and Chinese cultures [which] ignore that so-called universal backdrop.” I do know that she has taken down the public web page on which she made the comments. And, elsewhere, Glenn makes abundantly clear that in “the tradition” of rhetoric,
“we [have] followed an aristocratic blue line, a master narrative that started with Corax and
Tisias and led directly to Plato and Aristotle, then Cicero, Quintilian, and St. Augustine, and
eventually to Richard Weaver, I. A. Richards, Chaim Perelman, and Kenneth Burke—each
rhetorician preparing us for the next” (3). And with Rosalyn Collings Eves, Glenn emphasizes
that:

When Aristotle offers [something . . . ] in his Rhetoric, it is for an audience of
men (trans. 1991, Book. II) (232) so that in “the tradition” as Aristotle would
prescribe [it, the thing Aristotle offers] is exclusionary. It allows no “rhetors
[who are] women (such as Sappho, Aspasia, Diotima, and Hipparchia) . . . [to]
compensate by moving beyond ‘the available means of persuasion’ (Aristotle,
trans. 1991, Book I, ii) to transform or otherwise [to] adapt the spaces and
circumstances in which they find themselves” (236).

The point I want to make in reviewing Glenn’s important feminist work is that the Rhetoric of
Aristotle has been central and dominant. Even though Glenn has been one of the most important
challengers of Aristotle’s exclusionary tradition, she continues to insist that she and other
scholars must be “tethered” to it.

Ratcliffe, like Pike and Glenn, finds herself in the vortex of the “Aristotelian rhetoric”
that is “very powerful” (5). And like Glenn, Ratcliffe sees her connections to the dominant
masculinist tradition. Refreshingly, Ratcliffe is not afraid to admit what she calls “the irony
of my reasoning” when she slips into Aristotle-style discourse (5). In her book Rhetorical
Listening, she calls Aristotle “gender blind” and herself when following Aristotle at times,
likewise, “race blind” (5).

Royster, too, struggles with the fixed dominance of Aristotle. While expressing
eagerness to work with and on her rhetorical “group of choice” (i.e., African American women
gaining agency through literacy), Royster finds herself constantly distracted by the “abiding challenge” of defiance to the western tradition of gender-and-race-based power (“Disciplinary Landscaping” 150). In her forward to *African American Rhetoric(s): Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Royster specifies that “the challenge” is “generating more powerful interpretive frames” (x) than the frame of Aristotle and of western rhetoric; she says her continued “call is for analytical and interpretive models capable of helping us to incorporate well into theories and practices what we are coming to know about these rhetorical legacies . . . in terms of sites for engagement” (x). It seems that Royster must regularly justify not only her own feminist, African American, rhetorical traditions but also her understanding of the values in examining the dominant tradition as well albeit through different, and overtly subjective, lenses.

Feminist rhetorical scholars such as Royster, Ratcliffe, Glenn, and Pike all stress the need to continue to engage with Aristotle and his *Rhetoric*, from various perspectives. They are not advocating a repositioning or a silencing of Aristotle as Welch or Carol Poster do. Welch wants all study of Aristotelian rhetoric to be removed from the “Heritage School” (22). And Poster has suggested that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* needs to be wholly set aside unless Aristotle’s prestige can be tapped in order to prop up writing programs in American universities. Without explanation, she transliterates the title of Aristotle’s work “the *Rhetorica*” (not the typical “the Rhetoric”) perhaps to draw attention to the feminine grammar in the Greek title. Writing a decade ago, Poster argues:

> Over [just] the past thirty years, the *Rhetorica* has become a central authoritative text in compositions studies [in the United States], and both Aristotle’s treatise and composition textbooks closely modeled on it have proliferated throughout both first-year and advanced composition courses.
The valorization of Aristotle’s *Rhetorica* in composition studies as the central authoritative text in the tradition of rhetoric has little merit on strictly historical or philological grounds; it does, however, have an important polemical and rhetorical purpose. Composition as a field has traditionally been at the bottom of the prestige hierarchy in English departments, and, as Thomas Miller suggests, “[c]omposition specialists have used the prestige of a classical heritage to make the teaching of writing respectable in English departments.” Kathleen Welch also accounts for the current prestige of Aristotle’s *Rhetorica* as resulting from a nostalgic criticism that (1) depends on faith to suppress thought and (2) creates an unchangeable hierarchy of privileged texts depending on argument from questionable authority. She suggests: “One modern reception of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* acts as a useful example of both these problems: when the *Rhetoric* is treated as an Arnoldian touchstone. . . . In [sic] . . . the creation of a hierarchy of texts, the *Rhetoric* is placed at the top of the hierarchy. The placement goes so far as to make the *Rhetoric* the beginning of classical rhetoric, rather than a product of and response to at least a century and a half of intense rhetorical inquiry, pedagogy, and writing.” (336-37)

Despite Poster’s acknowledgment that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is a dominant force, her assessment is misguided by asserting that the Western tradition under Aristotle is a recent force in composition and that it now can authorize the teaching of composition studies. Ironically, Poster follows Aristotle’s intentions of refusing to listen to the other, anyone who is judged not worthy of the center. Is her call to invoke the prestige of Aristotle to bolster composition studies an effort to participate in the kind of separating and purifying elitism that Aristotle would promote?
Pike, Glenn, Ratcliffe, and Royster work to recognize the dominance of Aristotle, even over their own work. But they neither call for the *Rhetoric*’s marginalization nor depend on Aristotle’s treatise for prestige. Rather, they are scholars who not only find their voices individually in a system that would otherwise silence them but they also provide feminisms, rhetorics, and methods of translation to help the marginalized speak and listen. I’ve outlined and already begun using Pike’s Tagmemics, Glenn’s historiography, Ratcliffe’s Rhetorical Listening, and Royster’s Afrafeminism, in my feminist rhetorical translating in the previous chapters. In the next section of this chapter, I’ll continue borrowing from and applying their methodologies.

But I want to conclude this section by quoting poet-writer-teacher Maya Angelou because she brings together the inventive feminisms and rhetorics and translatings of these four scholars. In an interview, Russell Harris asks Angelou “Do you feel that today it is best to combine education plus experience?” Angelou answers by noting her need to listen to and to translate Aristotle:

One needs both. I was very fortunate. I was curious and handicapped as a young person. And so I read everything I could get my hands on and I have a good memory. And I have a lot of energy. It's a blessing. So I continued to learn. I'm hungry for knowledge still. Not every young person is blessed or visited with that combination. So he or she desperately needs to go to a university and be introduced to some of the great ideas of humankind. One needs to worry over the question of "Why am I here, what am I doing here of all things in this place, this life?" One needs to know Aristotle and Plato. One needs it desperately. One must have Leopold and Pascal. Must! I mean desperately, if one is to be at ease anywhere. One should have read the African folk tale to see what the West African calls deep thinking. One must worry over ideas that if I come forward
how far do we have to go before we meet? And when we meet will I go through you and you go through me and continue until we meet somewhere else? This is an African concept. Do we stay once we meet or do I actually go right through you and pass through you and continue on that road. Is that what life is? All this knowledge is available at universities. . . . What I really teach is one thing; that is I am a human being. Nothing human can be alien to me. That's all I teach.

(Angelou qtd. in Elliot 171)

Angelou is suggesting listening with intent to Aristotle in the West and listening with equal intent to the folk tale teller in West Africa. This is the kind of feminist rhetorical translating methodology of a(p)position that I described in the previous chapter. Angelou is encouraging what Mikhail Epstein calls “interlation” and “stereotexting” so that there may be “more metaphorical layers” on both sides, that is on Aristotle’s side and on the African folk teller’s side. In Angelou’s proposal, there is the personal perspective, the acknowledgement of outsiders and insiders, the overhearing of one another, and the employment of the agency of personal subjectivity. But Angelou is not listening so as faithfully to follow singularly the sole intention of Aristotle alone. She knows from her listening that he intends not to listen to the marginalized. Aristotle by his version of rhetoric promotes elitist centricism. And yet, as Angelou advises, there may be a translating of Aristotle from very different perspectives.

II. TRANSLATING THE “ΚΕΝΤΠΙΚΗ ‘ΠΗΤΟΠΙΚΗ” [ELITIST SPEAKERISM]

Aristotle marginalized many and various groups of people who were his contemporaries. He did not tolerate the kind of side-by-side listening that Angelou calls for. In fact, to define and to belittle such “side-by-side” listening, he coined the word παραβολή (transliterated /parabole/ and translated “parable” or “comparison”). He also belittles the telling of fiction (or λόγοι /logoi/ which Kennedy translates “fables”) (1392a). In the previous chapter, I showed how
Aristotle went to great lengths to differentiate λόγοι and λόγος ("logoi" and "logos") from his "logic." Likewise, "Aristotle takes great care to differentiate . . . between parabolé and metaphor," according to linguist Jean-Jacques Thomas (Thomas and Winspur 119). For Aristotle, "logic" is the central tool for pure knowledge; and "metaphor" is a central mechanism for pure-Greek poetry.

But it is the black person from Lybia who use "fables," according to Aristotle, and it is simple Aesop who uses "parables" or that "side-by-side" listening to another’s story thrown alongside one’s own. Even Kennedy’s translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* does not cover over Aristotle’s ethnocentrism and linguacentricism. Below is the passage that begins Book II, Chapter 20. The reader should notice Aristotle’s use of a binary logic that divides and conquers as it defines and classifies. I have retained all of Kennedy’s brackets by which he supplies what Aristotle intends but only implies, his footnote numbers by which the translator seeks to provide essential understanding of the author’s intentions, and his transliterations of the Greek words, as if to rigidly retain the terms as technical and abstract:

1. It remains to speak about pisteis that are common to all [species of rhetoric], since the account of specifics has been completed.94 These common pisteis are of two kinds: paradigm and enthymeme (maxim [gōmmē] is a part of an enthymeme). 2. First, then let us speak of paradigm; for paradigm is similar to an induction, and induction is a beginning.

There are two species of paradigms; for to speak of things that have happened before is one species of paradigm and to make up [an illustration] is another.95 Of the latter, comparison [parabolé] is one kind, fables [logoi] another, for example Aesopic and Lybian.96 (1393a-1393b)
After some discussion of “comparison,” including the observation that Socrates uses this kind of side-by-side listening, Aristotle just briefly discusses “fables” such as the Lybians use. His conclusion is that, in stark contrast, “examples from history are more useful in deliberation” (1394a).

It should be clear that Aristotle is not prohibiting the use of side-by-side comparisons, as Angelou advises, or of fables, as some Africans use them. Nonetheless, he belittles their practicality and marks their source as foreign, outside the center of pure, logical, male-only Greek rhetoric. For Aristotle, the very foreign nature of fables or λόγοι may be punctuated by the fact that he and his philosopher contemporaries were familiar with a collection of Δίσσι Λόγοι (Dissoi Logoi or Differing Arguments), a compilation of various fables from many different cultures. In this work, likely authored by a sophist now unknown to history, contrasting moralities were placed side-by-side, and the total effect was an introduction of extremely dissimilar views which, in total, worked to relativize the central absolutism Aristotle argued for. For example, there are the contrasting statements, “In Sparta it is seemly for girls to exercise naked, in Sparta it is shameful for girls to exercise naked” (Dissoi Logoi trans. Robinson. qtd in Bizzell and Herzberg 51). A statement like this one may have inspired Aristotle to write in the Rhetoric, “When, in fact, women and wives are cheapened (as the Deity-Striker women and wives in Sparta are) nearly half of the society has no blessing of the deities” (my translating 1361a). My point here is that Aristotle is very reluctant to see the other as an equal. Spartans are different from him, and they must therefore be lesser. Aristotle is very averse to listening to the other, as if to learn from him or her.

I am comparing Angelou’s side-by-side listening to Aristotle and to the African with the terms παραβολή and λόγοι as side-by-side listening (in contrast to Aristotle’s “logic”). Both terms suggest that there is someone else to listen to. With a “parable,” another’s story informs
my own. With “logoi,” or many statements, there is not just the one statement I may want to make but also the various words, ideas, and communications of others compared to mine. As I will actually show below, this kind of side-by-side comparing is a method of feminist rhetorical translating. The other’s story or statements dare to make me see mine as not necessarily central, as not necessarily the only one.

In contrast, Aristotle comes to visualize the abstract notion of the “central.” As I have tried to show, Aristotle used invented words, such as παραβολή (or parable, comparison) to denigrate certain ways of knowing as extreme. Likewise, by his writing, Aristotle also attempted to marginalize as different the various kinds of Greek, Barbarian, and female persons who lived before him and around him.

For example, in his *Athenian Politics* (also known as *Athenian Constitution*), Aristotle writes of Solon, the Athenian statesman, as at the center of Greek male civilization. Quite literally, Aristotle writes, in section 12, that Solon took the κέντρον [“kentron”] or literally “the pricking centered point” on behalf of all the men of Athens, to liberate them; metaphorically, perhaps Aristotle is saying that Solon took a spear in the side. Solon, in Aristotle’s history, has sacrificed himself to make an elite-male city-state; and the sacrifice was masculinist or, to use another term of Aristotle’s, it was phallic, at least in a figurative sense. I am paying attention to this particular word, κέντρον [“kentron”], for two reasons.

First, the word κέντρον [“kentron”] is related to the technical word κέντρική [“kentrikē”], which comprises the last part of “phal-logo-centrism.” The technical form, with its suffix “-ική,” abstracts the concept of keeping to the point, or to the center. I want to recognize Aristotle’s use of the word as a sort of sexist language for elitist purposes. Second, Aristotle seems to choose his words carefully. That he coins words and uses them in logical fashion is evidence that his terms matter to him. The *Athenian Politics* appear to be most important to
Aristotle for political reasons and important also for rhetorical reasons: for his lessons on the
central style of Athenian-male Greek composition. P. J. Rhodes, in his commentary on this
particular work, says that, by writing the treatise, Aristotle “aimed not merely at setting down the
facts in the simplest possible way but [also] at writing readable Greek. . . . There are signs of a
taste [by the author] for balanced elements within [readable, stylistic Greek]” (40). Likewise, in
the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle is concerned with good Greek writing and speech that is not extreme; he
sees this as proper style.

Below, I demonstrate feminist rhetorical translating of one of the central “style” passages
in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. My only regret here is that there may be voices in the more mundane and
marginal texts of his treatise that cannot be recovered in this dissertation. Charlotte Hogg
reminds her readers that there are “nontraditional literacy practices that are deserving of
scholarly attention but have been ignored largely because of their social nature: ‘Because it does
not fit the dominant model, it is harder to see’ (*Intimate Practices* 37)” (Anne Ruggles Gere qtd.;
19). In the less-studied passages of the *Rhetoric*, there may be silences unheard. There may be
sections, too, that appeal more to nontraditional or non-Western mindsets. Aristotle, intending to
write for elite Greek males, would not have worried, for example, with how Lybians or Spartans
or women poets might read his *Rhetoric*. I do want to be aware that an outsider may read where
she or he chooses. My selection of Aristotle’s chapter below, nonetheless, is to begin
somewhere, perhaps the most obvious somewhere for rhetoric and composition scholars: where
the treatise addresses “good language for written and spoken communication.”

In Chapter Five of Book III of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle’s central aim is: “τὸ Ἡλληνιζεῖν”
[transliterated “tō Hellēnizein”]58 (1407a-1407b). This appears to be the objective of the lesson,
which is given below paragraph by paragraph. I offer side-by-side Aristotle’s Greek, John H.
Freese’s translation, George A. Kennedy’s translation, and my feminist rhetorical translating.
Between the paragraphs of translation, I also offer commentary.

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ο μὲν οὐν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τοῦτων, ἦστι δ’ ἀρχή τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἐλληνίζειν: τοῦτο δ’ ἐστίν εὖ πέντε,

---Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a

V. Such then are the elements of speech. But purity, (20) which is the foundation of style, depends upon five rules.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech, then, is composed from these things. Chapter 5: To Hellênizein, or Grammatical Correctness</th>
<th>The stated idea, then, really is stitched together out of these things. There is the beginning of speaking: the Hellene mother tongue. These are there in fives:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The first principle [arkhē] of lexis is to speak [good] Greek [to hellênizein]. 2. This is done in five ways:§8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- traditional, Freese</td>
<td>--feminist rhetorical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--traditional, Kennedy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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For a feminist rhetorical translating, I am imagining that Pythias, Herpyllis, and Horace—Aristotle’s daughter, a concubine, and a eunuch slave—are “eavesdropping” on this written lesson. The educated male author of the text never intended for their eyes to see or their voices to translate the pages into a barbarian tongue. They would know that the text is a prescription for the elite male students. Notice how these intruders to the lesson could care less about Aristotle’s capture of the “Hellene mother tongue” as Freese’s “purity” or as Kennedy’s “[good] Greek.” For these listening in, or listening rhetorically, there’s nothing abstract or technical in the words as Kennedy makes them with his transliterations. They might be amused that Aristotle takes such a common thing, the Greek mother tongue, and tries to stitch it together in an abstracted, ordered series as some overarching statement, some controlling idea. They might view, and rightly so, what Aristotle is doing as taking something quite familiar and making it unfamiliar. They might see that he is using something simple, and overly complicating it. They might think that he is trying to sound erudite. They probably know better. The words Aristotle uses have ambiguous meanings, meanings that also apply to daily, bodily experience,
such as “stitching together” and “speaking” and making a “statement” of an idea and using mother’s language.

I am suggesting that, by trying to be technical insiders, Freese and Kennedy are more outsiders to the text. Freese follows the typical arrangement for all other previous masculinist translators. Kennedy separates out the first part of this chapter and puts it as the conclusion of the last. Nonetheless, such divisions of the text don’t really matter to my feminist rhetorical translators because they do not need to see “the foundation” for “style” or the “first principle” of something technical called “lexis”; instead, a beginning of speaking seems fine and part and parcel of the mother tongue. The big “λόγος” [“logos”] (not “logic”) that starts the passage is “speech” for Freese and “to speak” for Kennedy. But for those lurking in the study of Aristotle while he’s off at the Academy, it’s just a common “stated idea” of some sort, something patched together like a quilt (not important “elements” or something “composed”).

Aristotle signals there are “fives.” Below is the first something of the “fives.” Aristotle does provide clear enumeration, and the translators follow this pattern as well. Before showing the translations side-by-side, the only thing I want to add is that my imagined translators might take issue with Aristotle’s order of the list or the arrangement of the list. Freese and Kennedy do not.

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--Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1407a
First, connecting particles should be introduced in their natural order, before or after, as they require; thus, μὲν and ἐγὼ μὲν require to be followed by δὲ and ο’ δὲ. Further, they should be made to correspond whilst the hearer still recollects; they should not be put too far apart, nor should a clause be introduced before the necessary connection

1 for this is rarely appropriate. For instance, “As for me, I, after he had told me--for Cleon came begging and praying--set out, taking them with me.” For in this phrase several connecting words have been foisted in before the one which is to furnish the apodosis; and if the interval between “I” and “set out” is too great, the result is obscurity.

-- traditional, Freese

first is in the [correct] use of connective particles, when a speaker preserves the natural response between those that are prior and those that are posterior to each other, as some require. Thus, ho men [“He on the one hand . . .”] and ho ego [“I on the one hand . . .”] require in a subsequent clause de [“on the other hand . . .”] and ho de [“he on the other hand . . .”] respectively. The correlatives should occur while the first expression is still in the mind and not be widely separated, nor should another connective be substituted for the one needed; for it is rarely appropriate: “But I, when he spoke to me (for there came Cleon both begging and demanding), went, taking them along.” In these words many connectives are thrown in, in place of what is expected; and if the interval is long, the result is unclear.

--traditional, Kennedy

First, really, there is what’s shackled together, naturally given as to a slave, in front and in the rear where there’s hysterical lack, like one born for a master, just as he demands. This way: the “really now” and the “I really mean it” demands. There’s the “but” and the “it’s a ‘but,’ sir.” There ought to be remembering while these are given out. There’s no need for them to be spread far apart nor shackled together before the shackles are forced together. It’s hardly, in fact, fitting this way: “I, really, when he said to me—Cleon, in fact, came both chained and worthy—carried on, dragging them alongside.” In these phrases, in fact, there are many shackled together and many given out before there are ones shackled together and tossed in. Should there be many befores-and-afters, then, what’s born out of that carries on without bounds.

-- feminist rhetorical

Here, as Aristotle intends to teach his freeman students about Greek connective particles in phrases, the eunuch slave overhears that much differently. Aristotle uses the same words for meta-language in his classroom as he uses for guarding Horace. The words used are exactly the same, but the personal contexts determine the metaphors. The free students may hear “connectives” but the slave hears “shackles.” The free boys may hear “posterior” or “after” but the daughter and the concubine hear “hysterea” or “lack” which is what Aristotle calls the “womb” or the “uterus.” Which most gets at the shock of Aristotle’s centricism? A translation
that recognizes the separation of boys from women and slaves or one that fosters sexism and racism and classism? Or translations that cover over these horrors and keep the mother tongue taught as an elite craft of the privileged sex. My feminist rhetorical translating is trying to flaunt the fact that Freese and Kennedy see themselves as insiders to the text, when they are not. The traditional phallogocentric translators are so blind to Aristotle’s subtle sexism, logical absolutism, and elitist centricism that they cannot see themselves as outsiders. Perhaps they do not want to be marginalized. Maybe they do not like the pathos of being foreign—that is the pain of being outsiders—and of having words used as if against them. Feminist rhetorical translating tries to make the text personal, to make its effects felt effects on a body, on one’s own body.

In the feminist rhetorical translating, there is real translation of each Greek word. And yet, both Freese and Kennedy, as noted in the passage above, either retain the Greek within the English or retain a transliteration of the Greek words. The traditional phallogocentric translators are afraid to misstep by altering Aristotle’s Greek examples of grammar. Faithfulness to the original author’s intent is the central aim.

| εἶν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὕ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν. | --Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a |
|———|———|
| [3] The first rule therefore is to make a proper use of connecting particles; the second, to employ special, not generic terms. | 3. On the one hand, then, one merit is found in the use of connective, a second, on the other hand, in calling things by their specific names and not by circumlocutions.⁶⁰ | One really is the blessing of the shackles together. Two however is the individual names spoken and not those possessed around them. |
| -- traditional, Freese | --traditional, Kennedy | -- feminist rhetorical |

Again, Aristotle’s words connote an experience that a slave would understand, and understand differently, of course, from a student who is free in the elite Greek classroom for boys. For
example, for περιέχουσιν, Freese has “generic terms” and Kennedy “circumlocutions” (which he, the translator, tries to explain with a footnote). But Horace, the translating slave, has something else altogether: “those possessed around them.” Horace hears quite literally, περιέχουσιν, which is the compound of περι and χουσιν, meaning literally, “around” and “to possess.” When something is possessed by an owner, it is property. The slave understands what it means to be possessed by a master like Aristotle; Horace is the master’s property. He also knows how Aristotle possesses his woman, his wife Herpyllis, and his daughter, Pythias. They, too, are property. They each have a different understanding of the words of this text than the phallogocentric translators do. For the latter, there are “connecting particles” or “connectives”; for the slave and the women who are property, there are also “shackles.” I do want to emphasize that outsiders (who are not the elite boys of the academy) really can, and perhaps would, understand Aristotle’s intentions. That is, they should have no problem at all seeing that Aristotle is using relatively common Greek words that apply to his prescriptive rules for writing Greek. But the women and the slave understand more. They listen to Aristotle’s intent, and they listen with intent, too. They open up the possibilities of the text to be viewed from multiple vantages. They see acutely what the text can mean to them. They feel the impact of those possibilities in their bodies; if ever they had been shackled and shackled together by Aristotle, then the phrase ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις (“in the joinings by shackles” would have meanings that Aristotle never intends for his elite pupils.

The elite male students of Greek would have more limited experience with the words. And they would rely not so much on a bodily experience but would depend on Aristotle’s abstract, separational logic to teach them. The translators Freese and Kennedy, likewise, are only after what Aristotle tells them (i.e., the experts in Aristotle’s rhetoric). Both the boys in Aristotle’s academy and the men who translate in the academy today assume that Aristotle’s
lessons are for them and are directed at them and their purpose. Neither Aristotle’s first pupils nor these contemporary rhetoricians much regard the etic positions of those who live in bodies that are sexed female, that may be mutilated (i.e., eunuchs) so as to safeguard the master’s property, or that have learned a Barbarian mother tongue. Ironically, these in emic “insider” positions may be “gender blind.”

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Aristotle Rhetoric 1407a-1407b

[4] The third consists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you deliberately intend the opposite, like those who, having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something; such people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the manner of Empedocles. For the long circumlocution takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected like the majority of those who listen to the soothsayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities, they also assent; for example, Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty dominion.  

(continued. . . . )

4. Third is not to use amphiboli—unless the opposite effect [obcurity] is being sought. People do this when they have nothing to say but are pretending to say something. Such are those [philosophers] who speak in poetry, Empedocles, for example. When there is much going around in a circle, it cheats the listeners and they feel the way many do about oracles: whenever the latter speak amphibolies most people nod assent:

“Croesus, by crossing the Halys [river], will destroy a great kingdom.”  

(continued. . . . )

Three is no wrap-abouts. These shouldn’t be used unless one chooses an opposite: whenever no one really possesses a statement of any kind, but is just for making up some statements. These are the sort, in fact, in making up statements, who are like Empedokles. It cheats, in fact, the many in a circle, who are passed over as hearers, as most of them are cheated when beside the fortune tellers. Whenever, in fact, they make wrap-around statements, everyone beside them nods together:

“Croesus, the Halys-crosser, is going to destroy great beginnings”  

(continued. . . . )
[1407b] (1) And as there is less chance of making a mistake when speaking generally, diviners express themselves in general terms on the question of fact; for, in playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right if he says “even” or “odd” than if he gives a definite number, and similarly one who says “it will be” than if he states “when.” This is why soothsayers do not further define the exact time. All such ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be avoided, except for some such reason.4

--- traditional, Freese

Since there is generally less chance of a mistake, oracles speak of any matter in generalities. In the game of knucklebones one can win more often by calling “odd” or “even” than by specifying a particular number of counters, and the same is true about what will happen in contrast to when it will happen, which is why soothsayers do not specify the time. All these things are alike, so they should be avoided except for the reason mentioned.

--- traditional, Kennedy

And across the whole, there is a smaller marksman’s error; that is, across the family business stated by the fortunetellers. There’s a lucky hit, in fact, should someone do this very often in those perfection games: say “perfection” less than “just around that” which should be said very often for however much is possessed. And say the phrase “that will be” more than the phrase “whenever.” Thus, those staters of fortunes do not put boundaries on the “whenever.” All of these are exactly the same, and should one not do them because of these things, then flee from them.

--- feminist rhetorical

Here again one finds Aristotle’s technical use of common things, things like αἵματα or shawls to wrap around one’s shoulders. The women and slave would understand this Greek word much differently than the boys at the academy and the phallogocentric translators can. Likewise, εὐ ποιήσει λέγοντα is “what’s involved in making up statements” as is overheard when a good storyteller such as Homer weaves a tale or a lyricist such as Sappho sings a song. Yes, there may be technical understanding of “those [philosophers] who speak in poetry” as Kennedy translates; there may be the more abstracted phrase of Freese: “people accomplish this by the use of verse.” And yet Herpyllis, Pythias, and Horace hear much more.

It does seem that Aristotle is perhaps alluding to a boy’s game. The game might even be what Kennedy calls “knucklebones,” for the more common allusions to fortune telling are not likely to be something familiar to students in a male-only academy. Indeed, visits to the
fortuneteller, and preparations for such visits, would be more recognizable to certain outsiders to Aristotle’s text—for example, Aristotle’s daughter, his concubine, and his slaves whom he would order to prepare his sacrifices for the fortunetellers.

As Aristotle prohibits what we today consider ambiguities, I want to show the irony of his use of ambiguities in his own prohibition. In the third rule above, the reference to a river crossing, for example, is an allusion to the famous Heraclitus dilemma, which Aristotle despises. In his *Metaphysics* (1005b), Aristotle by his non-contradictory, “either / or” logic directly challenges Heraclitus, who had argued for a “both / and” way of knowing when suggested that when one steps into a river, it is in flux, being the river but becoming a different river.

Aristotle’s fourth and fifth rules are his prescriptions against the “both / and” philosophers Protagoras and Heraclitus respectively. But Aristotle cloaks his personal attacks in their examples of particular Greek-language uses:

![Table]

---Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1407b

[5] The fourth rule consists in keeping the genders distinct—masculine, feminine, and neuter, as laid down by Protagoras; these also must be properly introduced:

[6] “She, having come (*fem.*) and having conversed (*fem.*) with me, went away.”

-- traditional, Freese

5. The fourth [rule is to observe] Protagoras’ classification of the gender of nouns: masculine, feminine, and neuter. There should be correct grammatical agreement:

“Having come and having spoken, she departed.”

--traditional, Kennedy

Four, as Protagoras does: the birth-family of the naming-words by sex: male and female and thing. One ought, in fact, to give this out straight:

*having femininely arrived having womanishly talked so loquaciously she left . . .

-- feminist rhetorical
With Aristotle’s rule four, there is much personal and much in the wider context of “rhetoric” that gets lost in translation, lost in phallogocentric translation that is. A feminist rhetorical translating recognizes Aristotle’s blatant sexism, his logical absolutism, and his elitist centrism in this paragraph. If readers simply follow Aristotle’s words in order, then some of the meanings that one can make through translating, some of the voices that can be recovered, do become clearer.

Aristotle’s choice of a quotation from Protagoras to teach the male students elite Greek is no arbitrary choice. And Aristotle’s decision to choose the particular excerpt from the other is no accident either. “Protagoras used a both/and logic,” Schiappa reminds his readers. “To him experience was rich and variable enough to be capable of multiple—and even inconsistent—accounts” (193). In direct opposition to Protagoras, Aristotle taught that cold, objective observation of nature was vastly superior to the use of experience, especially personal experience that would pollute the study of an object with dangerous, contradictory subjectivities. Aristotle taught that one must “argue from an either/or logic” of dominant singularity so that “if two parties disagree about what-is and what-is-not, one of the parties must be mistaken ([Metaphysics] 1063a)” and the other of the parties would invariably be correct and would win the argument (191). Aristotle’s argument against “Protagorean relativism” was quite “direct” as Schiappa illustrates:

If this [the Protagoras sort of “logic”] is so, it follows that the same thing both is and is not, and that the contents of all other opposite statements are true, because often a particular thing appears beautiful to some and ugly to others, and that which appears to each man is the measure. (192).

In the Rhetoric, in the passage above, Aristotle does not contradict himself with respect to his observation about Protagoras. Aristotle wants his male students to get the Protagorean problem
straight. What is not immediately clear is whether Aristotle is attempting irony when he says that Protagoras sets the good-Greek rules about grammatical agreement with respect to gender. Or perhaps his quotation is from Protagoras but the rule is Aristotle’s applied to the sentence. And maybe Protagoras creates the rule, which his sophism renders meaningless in its contradiction of Aristotle’s logic.

What is clear is that Aristotle insists that his students do something with the example, as he says that one “imperatively must” (i.e., δεῖ) get this argument straight, “absolutely rigidly inflexibly, and I add, phallically straight” (i.e., ταῦτα ὁρθοῦς). Aristotle’s guise for his anti-Protagorean argument is a grammatical agreement problem, a lesson that just so happens to deal with the question of getting the grammatical gender absolutely straight in a non-contradictory way. The gender in question, moreover, just happens to be feminine, although Aristotle gives his male students the false choices of either masculine or neuter in contrast to the feminine words in the Protagorean sentence.

To be clear, all speakers and readers of Greek would not view Aristotle’s grammar problem to be any real problem at all. Very obviously the feminine parts (i.e., the suffixes) on each of the verbals imply a feminine subject so that the three verbals agree in gender. By Aristotle’s anti-Protagorean implication, the feminine gender cannot be both feminine and not feminine (i.e., either masculine or neuter). This sentence by Protagoras is hardly an argument in grammar as much as it is an argument for Aristotle’s non-contradictory logic.

In addition, if Aristotle is naming Protagoras to argue against his messy relativism, then Aristotle seems to be arguing against Plato, Socrates, and the woman Aspasia as well. Without too much of a stretch, the reader can see how the feminine verbal διαλέξθεισα (transliterated “dialechtheisa”) falls within the same semantic range as the feminine nominal διαλεκτική (transliterated “dialektike”).
They are really the “same” word although the former is in verb form and the latter in noun form. The verb used of Protagoras’s female subject in the sentence is a word of action (i.e., a participle). The noun is a word to name, or to define, this “thing” of selecting or electing what is true by a talk-through, by a διά-λεκτική; the “-ική” suffix used to form the noun. This is a coinage of Plato, it seems, in which he uses the feminine adjectival suffix “-ική” to abstract, to give the word a sense of objectivity, to make the noun less personal. As noted in the previous chapter, “-ική” is the suffix Homer and Hesiod apply first to the Greek word for “virgin” or “maiden” as men describe young females in a rather remote way. In addition, it operates to distance the observer in the way the English suffixes on the word “feminine” may operate: “female” implies a person, but with the adjectival suffix “-ine” becomes “feminine,” which by the addition of “-ist” becomes “feminist,” which implies a person with a cause; but to add further the suffix “-ic” is to make a word that is both adjectival and less personal (i.e., “feministic”), and to add the adverbial suffix “-ly” coins “feministically,” an adjectival adverb that is far more abstract than the noun “female.”

My point is that Protagoras’s feminine verbal διάλεξθεῖσα should remind Aristotle’s readers of Aristotle’s continued disparagement of the non-logical method defined as διά-λεκτική, or “dialectic.” Dialectic is that method famously attributed to Socrates by Plato. Of course, in Glenn’s works on Aspasia, the rhetoric historian gets us to consider the plausibility that Socrates and Plato and Pericles learned “dialectic” from Aspasia. Plato claims that Socrates identifies Aspasia as the writer of the speeches of Pericles; Aspasia, a woman, teaches Pericles, her man, both rhetoric and dialectic. Socrates praises Aspasia generously. So does Plato. And in the context of praise of Aspasia, the men not only theorize dialectic but they also practice it. In contrast to dialectic, Plato and Socrates view rhetoric as much less valuable, as much more vulnerable to sophistic abuses.
Aristotle considers “dialectic”—or the kind of dialogue suggested by Protagoras’s διαλεκτικήσα—to be suspect. In his discussion against the relativism of Protagoras in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle also argues against the “dialectic” of both Plato and Socrates.

It may be that, in Aristotle’s mind, “dialectic” is the kind of womanly, direct, overly loquacious, back-and-forth that Aspasia taught Plato, Socrates, and Pericles. I imagine that Pythias, Aristotle’s daughter, might have known that Aristotle was quite familiar with Aspasia and her method of “dialectic.” It is likely Pythias overheard her father talking with others about the prostitute Aspasia, whom Plato, Aristotle’s teacher, had written and talked about so much. Socrates and Plato seemed to favor Aspasia and to value “dialectic” very much. Aristotle did not. He may have considered “dialectic” effeminate and akin to the logic of female pollution, discussed in the previous chapter. If so, Pythias probably overheard Aristotle speak his mind about Aspasia and her dialectic.

I will get to the evidence further below. But much of my evidence is a fable. I am imagining what is plausible.

Pythias, likely, would have translated Protagoras’s “example” sentence as

*having femininely arrived
having womanishly talked
so loquaciously
she left . . .*

She wants to show that her father intends for the unnamed female in the example of Protagoras to appear “sly” in her “dialectic.” Pythias’s overtranslation into English brings out what is implicit in the Greek.

She might, then, have turned back to the beginning of her father’s *Rhetoric* and retranslated the opening line as “What’s speakeresque is a different turn from what’s womanish talk.”
Kennedy and Freese, of course, translate that opening line much more technically and with much less awareness of the fact that Aristotle does not seem at all fond of either “art”; although it is less clear which “art” Aristotle prefers, he does make logic above both “arts” as he uses logic to define them as distinct: “Rhetoric is a counterpart of [an antistrophos to] dialectic.” What I want the reader to notice in this later passage of the Rhetoric is how the phallogocentric translators lose much of Aristotle’s subtle and sustained argument against “dialectic.” Freese and Kennedy render the Greek “dialectic” of Protagoras’s female respectively: as “having conversed (fem.)” and as “having spoken.” For Freese and Kennedy, the sentence is purely a grammar lesson, not Aristotle’s attack on Protagoras’s relativism or on a woman’s dialectic. Hence, Freese has to add the English-grammar interpolation “(fem.)” and Kennedy must add his 63rd footnote which reads: “63. In Greek the participles modifying ‘she’ have distinct feminine forms; in the next example the participle is in the masculine plural to agree with ‘they’” (208).

Freese and Kennedy do not connect Aristotle’s quotation of Protagoras with the “dialectic” of Aspasia or Socrates or Plato. Their translations do not see the female’s διαλεξθασια as being even remotely related to formal technical thing they call “dialectic” in their versions of the opener of the Rhetoric. In the Greek, I am arguing, it really is the same word in two different forms (verbal and nominal) in two different contexts (at the beginning of the Rhetoric and again in the central lesson of the Rhetoric). Aristotle’s daughter, however, would notice that her father is again putting “dialectic” and “rhetoric” together in his faux logical way so that both are the kinds of things that women (like Aspasia) and sophists (like Protagoras and Heraclitus) do; but neither “dialectic” nor “rhetoric” can be, for Aristotle, as pure as the central Greek methodology of “logic.”
In truth, my imaginative fable aside, Plato did write three extant “dialectics,” or three dialogues in which he coins the word “rhetoric.” Schiappa and other historians of rhetoric are not able to find a single earlier text by Plato or any other writer in which the word “rhetoric” is used. Socrates is the main character in all three “rhetorical” dialogues (i.e., the *Menexenus*, the *Gorgias*, and the *Phaedrus*). In the first, Aspasia is the central figure who writes and who coaches Pericles on a speech to be delivered by this man who keeps her as his kept woman. In the second dialectic, “rhetoric” is the “art” that the sophist Gorgias claims but that Socrates disparages as “cookery.” And in the third of Plato’s rhetorical dialectics, Protagoras is another of the “rhetorical” sophists whom Socrates ridicules for using “rhetoric.”

To be sure, Aristotle has differences with Socrates and Plato. As noted, he makes clear (in his *Metaphysics*) how his “logic” is better than their “dialectic.” In his entire corpus, however, what is striking is that Aristotle refuses to name Aspasia, the dialectical woman. More than being a female who is nonlogical, Aspasia is a nonAthenian from Miletus, where the men praised Sappho although she was a woman. Aristotle’s centricism for logical Greek males only will not tolerate Aspasia.

His exclusion of Aspasia is a glaring omission because even in his *Rhetoric* Aristotle does mention the *Menexenus*, the dialogue (or rhetorical dialectic) in which she has so much voice and so much agency. Moreover, in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle mentions all of the *men* of Plato’s three “rhetorical” dialogues (including Plato, the author, Socrates the protagonist, and the sophists Gorgias, Protagoras, and Pericles). Aristotle’s omission of the woman Aspasia is clearly intentional. This omission is not surprising given Aristotle’s phallicism, misogyny, and gynophobia. Thus, when Aristotle decides to give his male students a grammar example, he finds a sentence from Protagoras in which a woman is the implied subject of its three verbals. Since Aristotle does not spell out his own problem with females and with Protagoras in the
passage, might the real lesson be more of a test for his male students to see if they can logically deduce fallacies with respect to the feminine gender and to sophist reasoning?

With this his fourth rule, Aristotle makes his grand lesson on the central teachings of elitist Greek (i.e., τὸ ἐλληνίζειν) to be less about grammar and more about silencing women and those who would use any method of learning other than his “logic.” A feminist rhetorical translating begins to recognize Aristotle’s phallicism, absolutism, and centricism in the Rhetoric.

The fifth rule of Aristotle is similarly problematic. Traditional phallogocentric translators tend to overlook his biases, but a feminist rhetorical translating overhears Aristotle’s bigotry.

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πέμπτον ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίγα καὶ ἐν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν:

οἱ δὲ ἐλθόντες ἔτυπτόν με.

ὅλως δὲ δεὶ εὐάναγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὐφραστὸν: ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό: ὀπέρ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ μή τὸ διαστήσασθαι, ὁπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστήσας ἐφον διὰ τὸ ἀδήλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τοὶ ύστερον ἢ τὸ πρότερον, οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος: φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου τοῦθεν ἐόντος αἰὲ ἀζύνεται ἀνθρώποι γίγνονται”: ἀδήλον γὰρ τὸ αἰέ, πρὸς ποτέρῳ διαστῆσαι.

--Aristotle Rhetoric 1407b

| The fifth rule consists in observing number, according as many, few, or one are referred to: | 6. Fifth is the correct naming of the plural and singular: |
| “They, having come (pl.), began to beat (pl.) me.” | “Having come, they beat me.” |
| Generally speaking, that which is written should be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a number of connecting particles, or when the punctuation is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus. | What is written should generally be easy to read and easy to speak—which is the same thing. Use of many connectives does not have this quality, nor do phrases not easily punctuated, for example, the writings of Heraclitus. |
| (continued . . .) | (continued . . .) |

Five: there’s “one” and the “many” and the “few” to get straight who’s named:

having arrived in that way, they hit me.

On the whole, then, blessed knowledge-from-above ought to be as blessed to utter as is writing. Yet these are self-sufficient. Those many who are shackled together are not so self possessed nor are the marks across easy. So it is with Heraclitus.

(continued . . . .)
For it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word another belongs, whether to that which follows or that which precedes; for instance, at the beginning of his composition he says: “Of this reason which exists always men are ignorant,” where it is uncertain whether “always” should go with “which exists” or with “are ignorant.”

-- traditional, Freese

To punctuate the writings of Heraclitus is a difficult task because it is unclear what goes with what, whether with what follows or with what precedes. For example, in the very beginning of his treatise he says, “Of this Logos that exists always ignorant are men.” It is unclear whether “always” goes with what precedes [or what follows].

--traditional, Kennedy

In fact, the markings across by Heraclitus are work because they are unclear whether they’re in front or in the rear with that hysterical lack. Here is what’s at the beginning of his written composition: He declares, in fact, that “of the Statement that exists through the ages, there are mortal human beings born without consciousness of them.” It is not clear, in fact, whether “through the ages” goes to the front by his marks across.

-- feminist rhetorical

A grammar example again continues the lesson. Aristotle is now twisting what Protagoras said (in the previous “grammar example”). Instead of beginning η ἔλθονσα or “having femininely arrived,” the new example sentence starts οἱ ἔλθοντες or “having lynchingly arrived” (or “having arrived as a lynching mob would”).

The literal, grammatical contrast in the Greek, of course, is between the two definite articles (ἡ and οἱ) and the two verbal endings (-ονσα and -όντες). The articles and the endings are grammatically gendered, female and male respectively; but the articles are also numbered feminine singular and masculine plural respectively. It should be clear, then, that my feminist rhetorical translating has chosen to mark the gender and number on the Greek articles as adverbs in English. “Femininely” is just a blatant marking of a somehow womanly way (i.e., a way of having arrived); and the adverb points to the overt English pronoun “she,” a kind of equivalent to the Greek article ἡ. The adverb “femininely” also rhymes with the adverbs “womanishly” and “loquaciously” as well as with the open vowel sound of “she.” The “-sly” suffix on “loquaciously” is visually a play on the connotation that a dialectical “she” may be “sly.”
In the second example sentence, I am also playing with the English. The adverb “lynchingly” is to imply a mob with definite intentions. There is no smooth feminine rhyme with “they” (as there is with “womanishly” and “she” for example). The adverb “lynchingly” itself is awkward, to connote something uncommon and extremely uncomfortable, and very likely male and male only, as most lynchings in history have been.

If Aristotle’s daughter Pythias, his second wife or concubine Herpyllis, and his slave Horace were to read Aristotle’s example sentence, then they would understand its meaning in a way that they felt in their bodies. Quite possibly, at least one of them had been hit, if not by their master, husband, father, then by others. The ones hitting, perhaps a mob or a lynching gang, were likely males. Such is the legacy of the violent ancient Greeks.

Aristotle taught such violence even in the *Rhetoric*. He began with innocent games like “knucklebones.” Earlier in Book I (1370b), he wrote of the “sweet pleasures” of competition and of winning boys games. And he goes on to describe similar pleasures for those preparing in brutal ways for the sweetness of the battlefields of men.

But Aristotle himself is using this second example to attack another man. Just as he had assaulted Protagoras and his views with the first example sentence, he now takes aim at Heraclitus. Ostensibly, Aristotle is only giving a lesson on bad punctuation in written Greek; the writing of Heraclitus is to serve as the bad example of how not to punctuate writing. He starts in by giving another imperative: \( \delta\epsilon\iota\ \varepsilon\nu\'\alpha\acute{\gamma}n\omega\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \). This means, quite literally, that “It absolutely must be the case that knowledge from above ought to be good, or blessed.” In other words, \( \delta\epsilon\iota\ ) means “ought,” and \( \varepsilon\nu\ ) connotes a good blessing from the goddesses and gods, and \( \alpha\nu\acute{\gamma}n\omega\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \) is the idiomatic word for “reading,” which is \( \alpha\nu\ ) meaning “upwards” and \( \gamma\nu\omega\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \) meaning “knowledge.” What is important here is that there is a theological implication in the mandate for what Freese (and Kennedy) translate as “should [generally] be easy to read.” As a feminist
rhetorical translator, I am trying to listen in with intent to what Aristotle is writing to the boys in his academy. Without too much of a stretch, I think it is fair to suggest that Aristotle is intending to say that Heraclitus is not playing by the rules of the universe.

Heraclitus is the early philosopher who so influenced the sophists of Aristotle’s day by claiming that the “logos” (not Aristotle’s “logic”)—that is, “the Statement,” is the unifying principle for all things, in the heavens and on earth. I noted previously that Aristotle takes jabs at Heraclitus. Aristotle discusses the philosopher in his *Physics* and calls him extreme, not a centrist. The male students in Aristotle’s elite academy would have heard about Heraclitus’s teachings; they would have understood Aristotle’s position against Heraclitean philosophy.

Likely, those in Aristotle’s household would also have overheard him complain about Heraclitus, so strong was his influence. My feminist rhetorical translating tries to bring out Aristotle’s issues with the great philosopher. And yet I also want to acknowledge the perspectives and the voices of those around Aristotle who must read someone else’s mail and who must eavesdrop and overhear and listen rhetorically with intent but not necessarily to the author’s ostensibly singular intent. What is the one thing that Aristotle must intend with the phrase, τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου? It is the phrase that traditional phallogocentric translators of the Rhetoric have rendered as “that which follows” and “what follows.” However, the very same phrase, nearly literally, can mean “a lack,” and it is the very same Greek phrase that Aristotle uses in his biological writings of females for “uterus.” If Aristotle had talked of such biology around his home, in front of his “women” and his daughter and slaves, female and males, then reading his lesson here to the boys, they would have understood the many meanings of the phrase. A feminist rhetorical translating seeks to open up in the text the many meanings, especially the meanings that have to be made in sometimes-painful bodily experiences, when the body is a possession of a man.
After disparaging the punctuation style of Heraclitus and his general worldview too,

Aristotle goes on to complete the lesson. Aristotle is instructing his elite male pupils on the right grammatical “fittings” between two or more correspondences. This is solely pure Greek grammar, or so it seems. Rather purely, Freese and Kennedy keep the issue in focus as if in Greek, by inflexibly refusing to translate, and transliterating a key technical word as “solecism.”

| ἕτι τόδε ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν, τὸ μὴ ἀποδίδοναι, εἰάν μὴ ἐπύξεινγινῆς ὁ ἁμφοῖν ἀρμόττει, οἷον |
| [ἡ] ψόφῳ καὶ χρώματι τὸ μὲν ἰδὼν οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δ’ αὐσθόμενος κοινόν: ἀσαφῆ δὲ ἂν μὴ προθεῖς εἰπής, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ εμβάλλειν, οἷον |
| “ἐμελλὼν γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς ἐκεῖνῳ τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὁδε πορεύεσθαι”, ἄλλα μὴ “ἐμελλὼν γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς πορεύεσθαι, εἰτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὁδε ἐγένετο” |

--Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1407b

| [7] Further, a solecism results from not appropriately connecting or joining two words with a word which is equally suitable to both. For instance, in speaking of “sound” and “color”, the word “seeing” should not be used, for it is not suitable to both, whereas “perceiving” is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a number of details in the middle; for instance, if you say: | 7. Further, the lack of correspondence creates a solecism if you do not join words with what fits both; for example, if you are speaking of sound and color, seeing is not common to them, but perceiving is. And it is unclear if you do not first set forth what you are talking about when you are going to throw in much in the middle; for example, | Still, however, one creates talk like those people at Soli should one fail to give out and fail to put on all these things that should fit. There is this to consider: “Sound” and “color” do not, really, commonly both go with “see” but “perceive” commonly goes with both. This is imprecise should one not say upfront one intends when there are many “befores-and-afters” thrown in. There is this to consider: |
| (continued. . . . ) | (continued. . . . ) | (continued. . . . ) |
“I intended after having spoken to him thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead of “I intended to set out after having spoken to him,” and then this or that happened, in this or that manner.

-- traditional, Freese

“I intended, after talking with that man about this and that and in this way, to go,” instead of “I intended, after talking with that man, to go” and then “This and that transpired and in this way.”

-- traditional, Kennedy

“I intended, in fact, after manly talking back and forth this way and that way and so forth, to carry on my way” otherwise it could be “I intended, in fact, after manly talking back and forth, to carry on my way” then give birth to “this way and that way and so forth.”

-- feminist rhetorical

When Freese and Kennedy transliterate “solecism,” they need a technical definition or a footnote to give the understanding of this uncommon word. The aim is to teach the apparently singular abstract and technical intention of Aristotle for his word. Freese puts the definition of “solecism” in his glossary: “one who offends against good taste or manners; also one who speaks incorrectly” (481). Kennedy explains in his footnote that a “solecism” is a “mistake in usage or syntax; in later grammatical and rhetorical theory [the solecism is] contrasted to a ‘barbarism’ or mistake in the form of a word” (208).

What Kennedy does not say is that “barbarism” and “solecism” are Aristotle’s terms to denigrate whole groups of people. Barbarians were non-Greeks mocked by the Athenians for sounding foreign and funny, as if in their mother tongues they were saying “bar bar bar bar bar.” And the “Soloi” [Σολοί] were the people living in Soli, a Greek colonial city, on Cyprus. To the Athenians their speech sounded strange, not because of the bar-bar-ous sounds they made but because of their peculiar, non-standard Greek grammar.

Aristotle, of course, was not interested in relativism of any kind, including linguistic relativism. He advocated a centric position, an absolute prescription for Greek male students and their City States. For Aristotle, the Greek mother tongue purely consisted of his dialect alone, the one he taught logically to his elite male students. More than that, Aristotle was threatened by
women and their speech. He took their “logos” and reduced it to his “logic.” Thus, women
rhetors such as Aspasia were completely silenced because they were females. Barbarisms in
speech and solecisms in writing were frowned upon because they were contaminations from the
foreigners. Aristotle’s masculinistic, linguistic, and ethnocentric purity depended on and was
reinforced by his phallogocentrism.

Aristotle’s central project in composition and rhetoric defines itself by placing his
undesirables in margins as wide as possible. Aristotle excludes those persons who represented extremes for him from his teachings except when illustrating what he views as extremes of writing and speech. Aristotle defines the center of language for elite Greek males in contrast to at least these: women, slaves, poets, sophists, coiners of many words, users of parables and hyperbole, speakers of foreign dialects and tongues, Barbarians, the colonists of Soli, the uneducated, and anyone who would dare to translate pure Greek into anything lesser.

Aristotle’s rhetoric is elitist. Traditional phallogocentric translators mask the exclusionary rhetoric of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. In contrast, a feminist rhetorical translating recognizes this centricism and begins to mark it. Not only can there be freedom from elitism by such translating, but it may also be the means to include the marginalized.

III. IMPLICATIONS

The implications of my work in this dissertation may be illustrated and enumerated. Let me do both.

The illustrations are of the agency that feminist rhetorical translating gives anyone reading, or I should say “re-reading,” Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, or any phallologocentric test. Below, I illustrate how the translator gains agency, whether the translator’s focus is (1) on making meaning of the original Greek text; or is (2) on learning the history and traditional applications of rhetorics; or is (3) on personal appropriations of the text.
A feminist rhetorical translator may choose her own agency to overhear and to make meaning of the original text. She may, for example, “overtranslate” the sexism in the most blatantly misogynistic of Aristotle’s texts, such as the bit quoted below from *Generation of Animals* 737a. By “overtranslate,” I mean to “add shock value” in the translating, especially in comparison to the traditional phallogocentric translation. Aristotle’s text is reproduced here with traditional translations that suppress the sexism in the Greek words and a feminist rhetorical translating that highlights the denigration of females.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Greek</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ὃσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐκ πεπηρομένων ὅτε μὲν γίγνεται πεπηρομένα ὅτε δ’ οὖ, οὕτω καὶ ἐκθήλεος ὅτε μὲν θῆλυ ὅτε δ’ οὖ ἄλλ’ ἄρρεν. τὸ γὰρ θῆλυ ὃσπερ ἄρρεν εστὶ πεπηρομένον.</td>
<td>If mutilated young are born of mutilated parents, it is for the same reason as that for which they are like them. And the young of mutilated parents are not always mutilated, just as they are not always like their parents; the cause of this must be inquired into later, for this problem is the same as that.</td>
<td>Just as the young of mutilated parents are sometimes born mutilated and sometimes not, so also the young born of a known female are sometimes female and sometimes male instead. The female is, in fact, a mutilated male, like the poisonous flower, the pereromia, if beautiful, then deadly still.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Aristotle <em>Generation of Animals</em> 737a</td>
<td>--traditional by Arthur Platt</td>
<td>--a feminist rhetorical translating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>born [generated] mutilated [peperomia]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--traditional, key-word focus</td>
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</tbody>
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The reader should notice how in Platt’s English translation, there is no gender reference at all. The translator’s focus is on Aristotle’s discussion of “mutilated young” in these sentences, as if gender is not relevant. Although not shown here, Platt only discusses females in the immediately subsequent statement where Aristotle begins to differentiate male and female young in relation to the presence or absence of sperm.

In contrast, the feminist rhetorical translator brings out the fact that, in these very sentences, there are explicit references to θῆλυ or “females,” as opposed to ἄρρεν or “males.”
Furthermore, the translator herself makes explicit a couple of things only implicit in Aristotle’s Greek. First, she explicitly associates being “born” with “a female.” She knows that γίνεται (“are born”) may pun with γυναῖκας (“women”) and with γνώσω (“known”), even if Aristotle does not intend or hear the puns. The pun with “known” has the double meaning of “cognition” (which a woman, according to Aristotle, will not have) and of “having been sexually known.” Second, the feminist rhetorical translator brings out the overt fact that the root word, πηρόω, or “mutilate,” sounds in transliterated English like the name of the poisonous plant, “peperomia”; she knows that, etymologically, the English word comes from a different Greek root: πεπέρα, from which comes the word pepper. The puns for the feminist rhetorical translator may be intentionally explicit word plays.

The puns stretch and strain the meanings, both ignoring etymologies and also generating new explicit meanings to trouble the implicit sexism. The translator flaunts the etymological issues of origins as with the separate roots noted above for “born,” “woman,” and “know” and for “mutilate” and “peperomia.” She recognizes with Cixous that:

The origin is a masculine myth. . . . The question, ‘Where do I come from?’ is basically a masculine, much more than a feminine question. The quest for origins, illustrated by Oedipus, doesn’t haunt a feminine unconscious. Rather it’s the beginning, or beginnings, the manner of beginning, not promptly with the phallus, but starting on all sides at once, that makes a feminine writing. A feminine text starts on all sides at once, starts twenty times, thirty times, over. (qtd. in Mairs, 85)

The feminist rhetorical translator also generates the kinds of meanings that Daly does. Daly, in Gyn/Ecology, invents (and “re-cognizes”) wordplay in American culture; she reappropriates the male-superior contexts of words such as “therapy,” “bureaucracy,” and even of the Total
Woman of Marabel Morgan in phrases such as “the-rapist,” “bore-o-cracy,” and the “Totaled woman” (Simon 21). The “overtranslation” of sexism in the Greek text illustrates one implication of feminist rhetorical translating: agency for the translator with respect to meaning making itself.

Another implication of feminist rhetorical translating can be illustrated in the rhetoric classroom. Professors of rhetoric, while bringing out traditional terms of rhetoric, should be able to take advantage of explicit word play as illuminating “rhetoric qua rhetoric.” For example, the instructor may want to remind students how historians such as Schiappa have found evidence that Plato coined the words *rhetoric* and *rhetorician* from *rhetor*, in order to disparage the sophists including Protagoras and Gorgias. A side-by-side comparison of translations, the kind of stereotexting interrelation Epstein theories, really can add value to the meanings of the Greek texts and terms. A teacher of the history of rhetoric may just want to start with examples from Plato in order to introduce Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. First, the class might examine how Plato’s Socrates describes himself as a *rhetor* speaker:

![Plato Apology 18a](image)

Next, the rhetoric class may recognize how Plato’s Gorgias, in the dialogue named for the sophist, will call himself a *rhetorician* speakerista. The “-ista” suffix should connote in the English-speaking students’ ears something much more suggestive of a woman performing than the more-abstract, more-technical suffix “-ician” does:
A speaker-ist is what I am, Socrates.

The professor would not need to remind the students how funny Plato’s coined words sound when she introduces them to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. The point the instructor would want to bring out about Aristotle is how he tries, but does not necessarily succeed in sounding logical. That is, Aristotle begins his treatise on rhetoric with a definition of “rhetoric” in contrast to “dialectic.” And yet, to someone like Aristotle’s daughter, the logical definition Aristotle is after sounds more like the feminist rhetorical translating than like the traditional phallogocentric translations, that also try to sound logical:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>η ῥητορ-ική ἀστιν ἀντίστροφος τῆς διάλεκτ-ικῆς:</th>
<th>What’s speaker-esque is a turning different from what’s truth-talk-esque.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>--Aristotle <em>Rhetoric</em> 1354a</td>
<td>--a feminist rhetorical translating as if by Pythias (Aristotle’s daughter) and Horace (his Lybian eunuch slave)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore, feminist rhetorical translating with side-by-side texts implies that the teaching of traditional terms can be more nuanced in classes on the history of rhetoric. Students need not simply learn a new set of technical terms and their definitions, but they can begin to appreciate the very rhetorical nature of word play in the beginnings of Greek rhetorics.

A final implication of feminist rhetorical translating to illustrate is the appropriation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for one’s own purposes. Personal agency is what Bonnie Kathryn Smith reclaims from Aristotle. Her own purposes and those she identifies are for composing writing, for editing an anthology, for reviewing a textbook, and even for experimenting in cooking.
whether for personal enjoyment or for teaching a class.

Smith reviews Katharine Haake’s *What Our Speech Disrupts: Feminism and Creative Writing Studies*. She starts by considering Haake’s text side-by-side with the textbook of two others, Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald. In addition, Smith shows how Ritchie and Ronald do not ignore Aristotle but translate his definition of rhetoric as theirs, and as any woman’s, even though Aristotle intended it for his elite Greek male students only. Smith herself, then, goes on to translate what Aristotle says into something particularly meaningful for herself. She understands Aristotle’s limited intent, but Smith listens not just to his elitist intent that would silence her as a woman, but she moves forward to listen with intent, to recognize how she can make meaning by opening up the possibilities of his text. Smith begins:

In their introduction to *Available Means: An Anthology of Women's Rhetoric(s)*, Joy Ritchie and Kate Ronald note that their decision to title their collection with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as the “discovery of the available means of persuasion” reflects their aim of “locating women squarely within rhetoric but also acknowledging that their presence demands that rhetoric be reconceived” (xvii). Ritchie and Ronald fittingly assert that by reclaiming Aristotle's definition, their ground-breaking anthology can and will illuminate ways women have discovered both to “connect with” and “depart from” traditional methods of persuasion, and they ask their audience to consider the notion of availability within future readings of women's writing. For me, Aristotle's concept of availability has always invoked images of cooking: as a long-time experimenter in the kitchen, I rarely set out to prepare a dish equipped with all the so-called “necessary” or “traditional” ingredients I need right in front of me. So, I have learned to depend upon questions like, “What's fresh?” or “What's in the pantry?”
or “What might fit in my favorite iron skillet?” for answers to the culinary brainteasers I design for myself. As such, my “available means” often result in assemblages that sometimes delight and usually instruct.

Some might see Smith’s move as an unnecessary, unacademic use of the rather mundane (i.e., cooking) to make a point about something more important (i.e., the central significance of Aristotle’s rhetoric and of the pedagogy of writing). Indeed, it might be rather humorous to read an academic who is actually describing her rhetoric as mere cookery because “mere cookery” is exactly the notion that Plato’s Socrates used to disparage the rhetoric of the sophist Gorgias. In fact, however, it is the most serious kind of academic who can refresh and be refreshed by speaking up and speaking out from the margins of a silencing dominant tradition.

A feminist rhetorical translator recognizes the misogyny, gynophobia, and ethnophobia that motivate the dominance. She may claim that the intentions of Aristotle in his text on rhetoric are not more important than any concern of those it marginalizes. The translator, shunned by Aristotle’s centric Rhetoric, reclaims the available means to translate even what Charlotte Hogg calls “the mundane” (personal conversation). Bonnie Kathryn Smith, a woman and to Aristotle a Barbarian, can translate rhetorically what he would claim solely to be his “rhetoric.”

And even within his Rhetoric, there are those whom a scholar such as Cheryl Glenn recovers—“those exceptional figures, such as Sappho, who refuse to be forgotten” (178). Glenn says more about others, too, not really looking for these in Aristotle’s pages or in his words and his written theories. Are they there, speaking? Glenn continues, “or Aspasia, who refuses to be ignored, or Queen Elizabeth I, who refused to be silent—[they] have been studied for only a moment (in comparison to the centuries of attention paid to Plato and Aristotle)” (178). Perhaps
Glenn’s statement here leads me to the biggest implication of my dissertation, the most dangerous one:

Will feminist rhetorical translating of the entire *Rhetoric* simply bring more attention to Aristotle and less to the famous forgotten women of history and others silenced by him and his phallogocentrism?

My hope is that further translation work will simply continue what I have begun, recovering from the *Rhetoric* more of the voices silenced by the author and further gagged by the faithful intentions of the phallogocentric translators. The implication is that translators will work together in an ongoing way, collaboratively. This dissertation adds to the philological work in rhetoric that others have done. For example, Jan Swearingen exclaims that “Aristotle’s” *pistis* has to do with the womanly qualities of belief and expression(ism). Elizabeth Jane DeGroot recognizes a feminist perspective in the central term of “Aristotle’s Rhetoric”: *enthymeme*. Jeffery Walker has suggested that “Aristotle’s” critical *antistrophos* can be understood as a “differing sister.” Janice Lauer sees “Aristotle’s” *techne* as “skill,” as generative, “productive knowledge,” like the conception and birth of a child, and not necessarily something in the middle between “theory” and “practice.” And Sara J. Newman challenges Aristotle’s own definitions of, and his owning method of defining, the word “rhetoric” in the *Rhetoric*. These scholars have already begun the work of feminist rhetorical translating of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

One implication is that simple and complex notions about Aristotle’s rhetoric must be challenged. For example, how useful is it in composition studies to perpetuate “logos, ethos, and pathos” as a simple and perfectly symmetrical set of alternatives for argument? How can scholars reconcile new readings of Aristotle’s terms in the *Rhetoric* with his intended readings and with our now-rigid contemporary uses of these terms? If writing instructors could know
how Sappho, Aspasia, and Pythias would understand Aristotle’s uses of the ostensibly “key”
terms, what then? Do his notions really help argument, or do they ultimately silence the
marginal, or both? The scholars already doing work in feminist rhetorical translating give
rhetoricians cause to question the overly complex glossaries of terms in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.
Both Freese and Kennedy have such glossaries, for example, that seem to be contests for
completeness and accuracy with respect to some rigid system. But how can Freese omit
“syllogism” from his glossary if it is part and parcel of “logic” and is a counterpart to the
“enthymeme”? And why does Kennedy forget “parable” in his glossary? Just because Aristotle
seems to denigrate the word, might there be use in such “side-by-side” listening? Is “Aristotle”
and his intention to decide what is key?

These scholars help us to see that Aristotle does not decide for anyone what terms must
be key and what definition is essential and what methodology has to be employed. Pike, for
instance, readily recognizes that Aristotle does not speak for all Greeks and all rhetoricians in the
West. Ratcliffe reminds us that Aristotle was race blind and gender blind and that he neglected
the rhetorical canon of listening. Royster says that Aristotle cannot speak for her; and as an
African American woman academic she has many voices. And yet they all bring Aristotle and
his *Rhetoric* alongside the other voices. These scholars remind us of the need to dialogue, to
listen, to speak in parables, and to listen to fables. These are things that Aristotle would not do,
and yet these scholars extend to Aristotle the courtesy of doing them with him and his theory of
rhetoric.

At the close of *Rhetoric Retold*, Glenn wrote, “A regendered rhetorical history can never
be completed or concluded. We scholars, male and female alike, still have much to do—that is
the feminist premise and promise” (174). Glenn proceeded to enumerate implications. I follow
her lead:
“First, we might start by recognizing common ground” (174), says Glenn. By illustrating the scholars noted above, my feminist rhetorical translating calls for more bridges to more disciplines. By working with my dissertation committee members respectively, for example, I am already benefitting from this common ground. I’ve discovered feminist heuristics for the phallogocentric biblical texts, heuristics that seem important to an approach to the texts of classical rhetoric. I have begun to consider the value of instruction by peers, as with a peer tutoring program in a Writing Center, much different from the centric approach of Aristotle. I’ve been surprised most recently to learn that a contemporary rhetorician such as Kenneth Burke can so bend the interdisciplinary rules of rhetoric, that rhetoric becomes, metaphorically, translation. And I’ve continued to be amazed by the value of lessons from marginalized writers, woman writers in the culture of the West, rural women writers outside the academy, and graduate instructors sifting through various approaches, theories, and applications to teach undergraduates.

“Second,” Glenn advises, “we may want to explore various means of collaboration” (175). The implication for feminist rhetorical translating is furthering the cross-fertilization of disciplines and methods, especially feminisms, rhetorics, and scholarship in translation.

“Third,” Glenn adds, “given the veneration of women’s silence, an important transformation for us to consider is the notion of silence itself” (175). Important works to consider now are Glenn’s work on silence; Ratcliffe’s on rhetorical listening; Phyllis Bird’s on translational “overhearing”; these are all important for the continuation of feminist rhetorical translating of misogynistic and hateful writings.

Finally, Glenn encourages readers by saying that “enormous amounts of material survive [from the silent past] that can still be used to re-create or re-member a rhetorical situation--which brings me to my fourth and last suggestion. We do not have to compete for bits of female
rhetoric” (178). And she identifies particularly and generally where the work is and where and how it must continue:

. . . [in] work together across the disciplines of religion, education, anthropology, art, sociology, feminist theory, gender studies, postmodern theory, law, home economics, philosophy, and medicine (including midwifery), for example. These fields offer “other” (but) equally valuable kinds of rhetorical performances that include women’s voices in diaries, journals, poetry, drama, mystical experiences, religious feelings, household accounts, church records, letters, autobiographical sketches, educational treatises, music, translations, and of course, orations. (my emphasis; 175)

I have started my work and have continued the work of others by focusing on that enormous piece of material we call Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Much work remains. My call for additional feminist rhetorical translating continues as long as voices remain silenced in its wide margins.
Chapter 5 – Afterward

Females blurt out a direct translation of what should be formulated indirectly . . . since woman does not bind herself, she must be bounded. The celebrated Greek virtue of self-control (sophrosyne) has to be defined differently for men and for women, Aristotle maintains. Masculine sophrosyne is rational self-control and resistance to excess, but for the woman sophrosyne means obedience and consists in submitting herself to the control of others.

--Anne Carson

πῶς οὖν χρῆ δίκαιον ἤγησασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον, ἤτις ἔτη ἐρασθείσα ἐτε λόγῳ πεισθείσα ἐτε μῖσο ἀρπασθείσα ἐτε υπὸ θείας ἀνάγκη ἀναγκασθείσα ἔπραξεν ὅ ἔπραξε, πάντως διαφεύγει τὴν αἰτίαν

--Gorgias of Leontini

We must risk, then, getting the story crooked. We must look crookedly, a bit out of focus, into the various strands of meaning in a text in such a way as to make the categories, trends, and reliable identities of history a little less inevitable, less familiar.

In short, we need to see beyond the familiar to the unfamiliar, to the unseen.

--Cheryl Glenn

My dissertation began with quotations of William Ewart Gladstone and of Nancy Mairs, the former suggesting, by Aristotle’s influence, that “a dissertation . . . does violence” and the latter saying that it “by definition takes apart that which has been joined together.” Mairs adds ambiguity to the meaning of a dissertation, as I was happy to note: “it is fortunately also defined as a discourse, a running back and forth.” Mairs’s ambiguity opens up alternatives, which is one of the purposes of my discourse. I am calling for alternatives to the tradition of masculinist logical translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, an Aristotelian tradition that takes apart “rhetoric” and that makes the center of rhetoric for elite Greek males only. To make the call clear, in each chapter, I’ve offered the beginnings of a feminist rhetorical translating.

The chapters have also run back and forth between how Aristotle in his Rhetoric says one must bind women and define for women (as Anne Carson suggests in the first epigraph above); and how women such as Cheryl Glenn implore scholars to risk a different way of getting at the
text (as in the last epigraph). The dissertation has moved to and from discussions of how Aristotle has sought to impose control over women with his phallicism; how he has looted and limited the Hellene mother tongue with his logic; and how he, by his centrism, has marginalized anyone and any subject that he defined as excessive. My methods, in addition, have moved back and forth from feminisms, to rhetorics, to translation theories—not taking these areas of scholarship apart—but highlighting ways in which feminists and rhetoricians and translators may join together. There’s a joining together in redefining ways—with feminisms as rhetorics and rhetorics as translating and translating as feminisms—so that there can be a listening “into the various strands of meaning” of the canonized text of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

In this dissertation, I have indeed run back and forth. For example, I have practiced eavesdropping on the misogyny of Aristotle, as feminist Krista Ratcliffe recommends: listening rhetorically with intent not so much for his intent but for the voices of women and men whom Aristotle silences. I have viewed person above logic, as rhetorician Kenneth Pike would advocate, acknowledging myself as an outsider to Aristotle’s definitions. And I have listened in to and in on the *Rhetoric* for all my own subjective voices, to Aristotle’s mocking of my barbarisms and solecisms, and have asked the question that afrafeminist-rhetorician Jacqueline Jones Royster asks: “How do we translate listening into language and action, into the creation of an appropriate response?” She offers an answer:

[I]n terms of my own need to understand human difference as a complex reality, . . . I have concluded that the most salient point to acknowledge is that ‘subject’ position is really everything.

Using subject position as a terministic screen in cross-boundary discourse permits analysis to operate kaleidoscopically, thereby permitting interpretation to be richly informed by the converging of dialectical perspectives. Subjectivity as a
defining value pays attention dynamically to context, ways of knowing, language abilities, and experience, and by doing so it has a consequent potential to deepen, broaden, and enrich our interpretive views in dynamic ways as well. . . . In a fundamental way, this enterprise supports the sense of rhetoric, composition, and literacy studies as a field of study that embraces the imperative to understand truths and consequences of language use more fully. (“When the First Voice” 38)

Ratcliffe, Pike, and Royster are hardly traditional, not at all phallogocentric. They suggest feminisms, rhetorics, and translation methods that foster the “irenic, or conciliatory, discourse characteristic of ‘women’s liberation movements, student demonstrations, pacifism, and the substitution of the existential noncontesting fugitive hero . . . in place of the agonistic hero’” such as noted by Nancy Mairs who listens to and quotes Walter Ong (42). Mairs has advised that such discourse, “feminine discourse,” is “an absolute and radical alterity that enfolds the other” (45). Such discourse does not forbid the translating of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* because he is a man, a man who limits women and their discourse. Such discourse enfolds the other, even in a translating, even when the other is Aristotle with his text that does violence, that “takes apart.”

And yet I want to return to the more-limited definition of a dissertation as a text that enacts violence and effects a taking apart. As I call for the completed feminist rhetorical translating of the whole of the *Rhetoric*, I want to recall some of the violence that has led me to pursue a doctorate in English and this dissertation in the first place. I want to recall why the Ph.D. effort has been and has had to be uniquely feminist, and peculiarly rhetorical, and decidedly translational. There are personal motivations to question, just as rhetorician Gorgias of Leontini questioned the motives of Helen. For Aristotle, and for men following him, the woman is an object, with no agency and no central role in western civilization, our civilization.
So I turn to my civilization. In the West, Gloria Steinem has said of the ones committing violence at Columbine, Colorado: “It was not our children, it was our sons” (Grote). I’ve thought a lot about this statement. I think about it when I read today’s headlines about the battles and slaughter in Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Zimbabwe. I think about it when the foreign-born student, a young man, at Virginia Tech massacred others before committing suicide just last year. I think about it when recalling September 11, 2001, the day when nineteen men committed suicide in order to take the lives of thousands of people in acts of war on a nation and acts of terror on the world. I think about it as I remember growing up in South Vietnam during the last decade of the war there. I think about it because I am a son, and because I have a son and daughters, and our heritage is particularly patriarchal with strong fathers dominating families of wives and children.

I wonder about Steinem’s statement as I work with outsiders going into the academy of the West. As my requisite CV at the end of this dissertation shows, my work in the Academy has been with English-as-a-Second-Language students and their teachers. Our educational purpose is to provide a language-and-culture gateway. We teach western rhetoric, composition, and speech communication. We educate in argument, in definition, in analysis that takes apart that which has been joined together. It’s the “agon” and the “ludus” of Greek and Latin that are seen as part and parcel of western rhetorics. They are western motivations. And Steinem astutely says they are motives of men—sexist, absolutist, racist men, perhaps like Aristotle.

I want to recognize the legacy and do not want to gloss over its violence. I would like to go back to Gorgias’s alternatives for Helen, for the Greek male society judging her. We hear from Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* (1401b) that Helen had no agency, that the choice belonged either to Paris (Alexander) or to her father so the logical fallacy occurs only when the wrong man (and never the woman) chooses. But then I wish we readers could hear from her, translating what
Gorgias writes. Her choices must be placed alongside the others’. Gorgias says:

ἡ γὰρ Τῦχης βουλήμασι καὶ θεῶν βουλεύμασι καὶ Ἀνάγκης ψηφίσμασιν ἔκραξεν ἢ ἔπραξεν, ἥ βία ἄρπασθεῖσα, ἥ λόγως πεισθεῖσα, <ἡ ὅψει ἔρασθεῖσα>. . . . πῶς οὖν χρῆ δίκαιον ἡγήσασθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης μῶμον, ἦτις ἐπὶ ἔρασθεῖσα ἐπὶ λόγῳ πεισθεῖσα ἐπὶ βίᾳ ἄρπασθεῖσα ἐπὶ ὑπὸ θείας ἄναγκη ἄναγκασθεῖσα

And the traditional phallogocentric translation\(^{60}\) goes something like this:

For either by will of Fate and decision of the gods and vote of Necessity did she do what she did, or by force reduced or by words seduced or by love possessed. . . . How then can one blame of Helen as unjust, since she is utterly acquitted of all charge, whether she did what she did through falling in love or persuaded by speech or ravished by force or constrained by divine constraint?

Thus, we might imagine Helen eavesdropping, and in “dialectic” saying:

Was it in fact by the counsel of an arrow hitting the bull’s-eye by luck? And now was it the counsel of the goddesses and the gods? And really was it a forced ballot? Why did I do what I did? The force of the looter, the raper of virgins? Or the statement of the persuader, the logic of the man? Or was it perhaps the look, the looks, and the tender speech of my lover, mine!? . . . . How do you blame yourselves, men, if you must blame me for ignoring Lady Justice. She blames you for Aristotle’s phallogocentrism (ἐπὶ βίᾳ ἄρπασθεῖσα / ἐπὶ λόγῳ πεισθεῖσα / ἐπὶ ὑπὸ θείας ἄναγκη ἄναγκασθεῖσα) and not me for my whispered, enacted love (ἐπὶ ἔρασθεῖσα ἐπὶ).

Of course, I am playing with Gorgias’s language\(^{61}\) and by “play” I mean that I am listening for the alternative voices in his words. I am placing his words beside Aristotle’s, and Isocrates, and
Sappho’s and all would speak for her or with her. I am working with Helen’s agency, as she comes alongside, overhearing the men judge her.

Love gives her the choice in acting, in speaking. And she and her beloved “having been loved” in Greek (ἔρωσθεν) plays phonologically on “rhetoric” (ῥητορική). Her supposed “Bias” (βία) [force], “Logos” (λόγος) [persuasion], and “theos” (θεός) [god-centered motive] as “phallogocentrism,” makes Helen a feminist, a playful rhetorician, and a translator. She would understand the violence in force; the violence in an indirectly formulated statement (as in logic, in a syllogism, where the presuppositions and the premises about women go unquestioned); and the violence in the bifurcation of “sophrosyne” (that demands a woman’s virtue be her submission).

Helen recognizes phallogocentrism, as a single theme in three variations, that denies alternatives and perpetuates violence. Nonetheless, a feminist rhetorical translational agency comes through Helen’s choice, her choice for another through “love.” Such agency is what my dissertation is after, “an absolute and radical alterity that enfolds the other” (Mairs 45).
Endnotes

1 In her book, *Feminism Is For Everybody: Passionate Politics*, bell hooks defines *feminism*.

2 Sonja K. Foss, in *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*, gives these definitions of feminisms (151-53).

3 The word *sexism* is only four decades old, and its meaning has seemed fairly stable if ever open. It was coined in 1968 by three different persons, noted below. Immediately, then, we must say that “feminism” does not depend on “sexism,” especially not philologically. Sondra K. Foss, for instance, notes that in America dating from the mid nineteenth century, there have been “three waves or stages” of “feminism” (151). And in France from the late eighteenth century, feminism was enacted with the Women's Petition to the National Assembly and with the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen. The point, then, is that feminism began long before anyone began to name sexism in opposition.

In the November 15, 1968 issue of *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Caroline Bird defined the neologism in her article, “On Being Born Female”: “Sexism is judging people by their sex when sex doesn’t matter. . . . Sexism is intended to rhyme with racism. Both have used to keep the powers that be in power” (90). And just three days later, on November 18, Pauline M. Leet used the new word. Here’s what Leet said according to “Women and the Undergraduate,” the published transcript of the “Student-Faculty Forum” at Franklin and Marshall College:

When you argue . . . that since fewer women write good poetry this justifies their total exclusion, you are taking a position analogous to that of the racist — I might call you in this case a “sexist” . . . . Both the racist and the sexist are acting as if all that has happened had never happened, and both of them are making decisions
and coming to conclusions about someone’s value by referring to factors which are in both cases irrelevant. (qtd in Shapiro 3)

The very next month, in his “Freedom for Movement Girls – Now!,” Sheldon Vanauken uses the word “sexism” also in relation to “racism.” Vanauken also notes problems with definition, and with origins, problems that Aristotle by his logic attempts but fails to solve.

4 From the *Oxford English Dictionary* entry:

**1656** T. BLOUNT *Glossographia, Misogynie (misoginia)*, the hate or contempt of women.

5 As quoted in the *Oxford English Dictionary*:

**1886** O. W. HOLMES *Mortal Antipathy* xix. 231 If we give it a name, we shall have to apply the term *Gynophobia*, or Fear of Woman.

6 This definition is from Sonja K. Foss, in *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice* (151-53).

7 This definition is from Georgia NeSmith, Feminist Historiography: 1968-1993 (online, no date).

8 This definition is from Patricia Bizzell, in “Feminist Methods of Research in the History of Rhetoric: What Difference Do. They Make?” *RSQ* 30 (2000), (16).

9 This definition is from the “Approaches to Feminism” entry at the online *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

10 This discussion is from Carolyn Osiek, in “The Feminist and the Bible: Hermeneutical Alternatives,” Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship, (105).

11 This definition is from Martin, Alison. 19 December 2003. "French Feminism". *The Literary Encyclopedia*.

12 This definition is from Nancy Mairs (41).
This definition is from Nancy Mairs (41).

This is Krista Ratcliffe’s description and definition of Mary Daly’s “Dalyesquise” writing (Rhetorical Listening, 104).

This definition is from the “Écriture féminine” entry in The New Oxford Companion to Literature in French.

Hélène Cixous, in her book Stigmata: escaping texts, translates and quotes “Clarice Lispector, who did not think in terms of phallogocentrism.” Cixous points out that Lispector provides a definition of the term: “We have seen this before; it is the ‘phallocratic system’ . . . this is how she [Lispector] conceives of it: a ‘system of inflexible last judgment, which does not permit even a second of incredulity’” (123). Now the English translation of Cixous’s French translation of Lispector’s Brazilian Portuguese has yielded the term. The three together have made “phal-” from Aristotle’s φαλλικά (“ph-a-l-l-ika”); “logo,” from Aristotle’s λόγος (or “l-o-g-os”) which he himself makes (by) his λογική (or “l-o-g-ikē” aka LOGIC); and “centric” from Aristotle’s κεντρική (or “k-e-n-tr-ikē”).

This definition is from Barbara Godard in Sherry Simon’s Gender in Translation (13).

Aristotelianism has other meanings as well:

- In the subdiscipline of rhetorical criticism (the “process of thinking about symbols, discovering how they work, and trying to figure out why they affect us”), there is “Neo-Aristotelianism” (the “first formal method of rhetorical criticism” ultimately concerned with “the effect of discourse on the immediate audience”). (Sonja K. Foss, Rhetorical Criticism, pages 3, 25, 26)
- In the disciplines of literature, philosophy, and history, “Aristotelianism” respectively emphasizes Aristotle’s Poetics; his philosophical method of logic in contrast to
methods of his predecessors; and the various schools and scholars who have appropriated Aristotle’s name for their thinking.

19 The reader of this dissertation should refer to the extensive glossaries from two different traditional translations (John H. Freese’s and George A. Kennedy’s) for the most common terms and phrases in the tradition of scholarship on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. In addition, it should be noted that definitions of “rhetoric” as rhetoric are varied and plentiful among rhetoric scholars. The definition given here is Aristotle’s first line of Book II of the *Rhetoric* as translated by George A. Kennedy. The brackets in the definition above are Kennedy’s.

20 Again, logic will be discussed much more in Chapter 3. I do want to reflect in this footnote on the unlikely possibility that Aristotle intends this definition as something other than, perhaps less than, logical. George A. Kennedy, for example, in his footnote on this opening line claims that Aristotle is using a technical structure that is not logic; Kennedy says: “The first sentence of the treatise, with its proposition and supporting reason, is an example of what Aristotle will call an enthymeme [not a logical syllogism]” (30). My contention is that Aristotle’s “enthymeme” is not well defined at all and that Aristotle intends much more precisely to define *rhetoric*, that is by his logical binary (“it-is-this and it-is-NOT-that”). Rhetoric, ostensibly, is NOT dialectic, for Aristotle. Or “rhetoric is the anti-strophes of dialectic.”

21 This is George A. Kennedy’s translation. Kennedy goes on to say the following in a footnote on page 14 of the second edition of his translation:

This famous statement has been much discussed; important publications since the first edition of this translation include Brunschwig 1996 and McAdon 2001, both with earlier bibliography. *Antistrophos* is commonly translated “counterpart.” Other possibilities include “correlative” and “coordinate.” The word can mean “converse.” In Greek choral lyric, the metrical pattern of a
strophe (stanza) is repeated with different words in the antistrophe. Aristotle is more likely thinking of an rejecting the analogy of the true and false arts elaborated by Socrates in Gorgias, where justice is said to be an *antistrophos* to medicine (464b8) and rhetoric, the false form of justice, is compared to cookery, the false form of medicine (465c1-2). Isocrates (*Antidosis* 182) speaks of the arts of the soul (called philosophy, but essentially political rhetoric) and the arts of the body (gymnastic) as *antistrophoi*. This view is equally unacceptable to Aristotle, for whom rhetoric is a tool, like dialectic, though its subject matter is derived from some other discipline, such as ethics or politics; see 1.2.7. Aristotle thus avoids the fallacy of Plato’s Gorgias, where Socrates is obsessed with finding some kind of knowledge specific to rhetoric. On later interpretations of *antistrophos*, see Green 1990.

22 This is George A. Kennedy’s definition from the Glossary at the end of his translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (314).

23 This is George A. Kennedy’s definition from the Glossary at the end of his translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (318).

24 This is George A. Kennedy’s definition from the Glossary at the end of his translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (315).

25 This is George A. Kennedy’s definition from the Glossary at the end of his translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (317).

26 This definition is from an essay with no author noted: “Ethos, Pathos, and Logos: A General Summary of Aristotle's Appeals” <http://courses.durhamtech.edu/perkins/aris.html>

27 This discussion is from “Aristotle's Rhetoric” entry at the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* by Christof Rapp.
And with respect to “Accurate Translation,” I offer the following: "In our century," says Willis Barnstone, "the Bible has suffered ignominiously 'accurate' translations. Accurate has replaced literal as the word to justify bad translation" (*The Poetics of Translation: History, Theory, Practice*, page 63).

This quotation is from Ralph Hill (personal communication); Hill is a leading expert on and a recent applicant of Relevance Theory to Bible translation.


This is a definition offered on a linguistics web site, www.linguasphere.org. But I also rather like how Martha Cutter addresses “the meaning of ‘trans’ itself.” She says something that suggests the effect of what I see as a feminist rhetorical trans-lingual trans-lating: “Translingual, transport, transplant, translate: these terms may have something to do with a crossing over, a movement into a new state, a transformation.” (from page 201 of her review of Steven Kellman's *Switching Languages: Translingual Writers Reflect on Their Craft*, in *College Literature* 32.2, 2005, 199-201).

Lydia He Liu, *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulation* says,

As I have argued elsewhere, one does not translate between equivalents; rather, one creates tropes of equivalence in the middle zone of translation between the
host and guest languages. This middle zone of hypothetical equivalence, which is occupied by neologistic imagination, becomes the very ground for change. (137)


36 In Chapter 4 of the dissertation, I discuss Aristotle’s opposition to parable. In this note, let me suggest that Aristotle’s logic works in opposition, which manifests sometimes as a proposition and other times as an imposition. Traditional Translators work mostly to oppose incorrect, inaccurate, and misrepresentations of the author’s original intention; this manifests at best as a transposition. Feminist rhetorical translating works ambiguously, not in opposition, but in apposition, the unposition against the dominant male position or in a position alongside as parables do.

37 This set of four positions is my play with strategies outlined by Robert E. Quinn in his book Change the World. Quinn says that the literature of change management in business shows there are four strategies for change agents: 1) forcing, 2) telling, 3) negotiating, and 4) transforming. I believe the transforming strategy is the one of feminisms. It corresponds to my playful, intentionally ambiguous word “apo(p)osition.” Quinn’s first three strategies, to me, are “oppositional,” always focused on changing the other and not necessarily the subjective self. Hence, there are the correspondences: 1) the phallic imposition is forcing; 2) the logical proposition is telling; 3) the centrist’s transposition is negotiating.

38 C. S. Lewis writes of unintended “second meanings” by writers. Sometimes, says
Lewis, the author might admit that he or she has written something that readers later understand as a new, an unintending, or a second meaning that was not originally intended in the original context. Lewis gives several examples of this in his chapter entitled “Second Meanings” in his *Reflections on the Psalms*. As I hope to show in this dissertation, feminist rhetorical translating begins to exploit such second meanings in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle, who most clearly intends rather rigidly and singularly to marginalize if not absolutely to silence women.

39 Alan Lightman, who spoke to TCU’s fortieth Honor’s Convocation, suggested that there are two ways of approaching writing: as a scientist or as an artist. I met him and wanted to try out his binary on the ways of approaching translation.

Lightman himself is both a scientist and an artist, who writes both ways and whose writings have been translated. Lightman is an acclaimed physicist whose physics textbooks are used in TCU’s Physics Departments; he has also become famous as writing instructor at MIT and as a novelist, whose novels have been translated into thirty different languages. Lightman said to the Honors students at TCU:

> Scientists write to name things. They want you to know things. They use their heads. Artists, in contrast, write to get your belief. That is, they really unname things so that you’ll go along with the narrative or the new categories in the poetry. They use their hearts and their stomachs.

Intrigued at this statement and its implications for the Aristotelian binary and for translation, I was able to ask a follow up question at a later afternoon session. I asked: “Professor Lightman, if you have read any of the translations of any of your novels [and he confessed he hadn’t before I finished my question], or even if you have not, then would you rather the translators be scientists, using their heads, or artists, using their hearts and stomachs?”
Lightman didn’t hesitate at my question. His immediate answer was brilliant; he said:

“Both.”

Lightman who authors as a scientist and who authors as an artist, and who can talk and write about doing both, wants the translators of anything he writes also to do both. His answer to my question was brilliant, I think, because it gets at feminist rhetorical translating. Let me explain.

First, the idea of hard science forcing concepts is rather phallic. That is, there are facts, a factual reality that, as Aristotle would assume it, can be coldly observed. Facts are coldly observed either correctly or incorrectly. Lightman says as much in his book *The Future of Spacetime*, edited with his very famous friends including Stephen William Hawking. In his own concluding essay for the book, an essay entitled “The Physicist as Novelist,” Lightman says this: “Scientists often wish powerfully for some theory to be true that is later proved wrong by the facts. Aristotle’s idea that the planets move in perfect circles was simple and elegant, but proved wrong by Brahe, Kepler, and Newton” (185).

Second, the notions of truth in a theory are somewhat logical. That is, like the scientific game of observing and naming with a rationalist’s head, conforming a theory to truth is using words and language to construct a metareality, or at least a meta language of reality. As I tried to show in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, logic is part and parcel of the phallic. Hence, western science seems to follow Aristotle’s phallogic.

Third, Lightman discusses something like centrum. That is, he says: “A novelist's story or characters cannot be proved wrong, but they can ring false and thus lose their power. In this way, the novelist is constantly testing her fiction against the accumulated life experience of her readers” (185). There is nothing extreme in what the novelist does, using her stomach and heart
to ring true. With Lightman’s use of the feminine pronoun (and mine too), there may be some thought that the novelist is more feminist by virtue of possibly being a woman.

However, the greatest agency is demanded by Lightman of someone other than the scientist and the novelist. The greatest choices are to be made by the translator who does more than just observe hard facts and name them logically and who does more than just write to ring true. That is, instead of alternating between science writing and artistic writing, or even talking or writing about the difference as Lightman does, Lightman’s translators have to translate both as scientists and also as artists and they do both at the very same time. This kind of acknowledgement of the “both / and” in contrast to the masculinist binary of “either / or” approaches the sort of methods in feminist rhetorical translating.

Feminist rhetorical translating is, to use the words of Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede, “an interactive means of discovering meaning through language” (“On Distinctions” 44). Even Aristotle’s Rhetoric, though perhaps rightly viewed as “manipulative, monologic, and rationalistic,” does not dictate translation must be also as manipulative, monological, and rationalistic. The stuff of hard science and the heart of art may and must come together in a feminist approach to translation that is truly rhetorical. Richard Leo Enos advises:

A feminist approach may not place the high value on “unity” that the traditional approach to Aristotle does, and may even argue that something is lost in striving for unity, because it also means that things that are not, or cannot be unified, within the theory are excluded. A feminist approach, in short, would be more open-ended and more inclusive, and even more accepting of features of rhetoric that don't necessarily all fit well together. (email communication)

40 Throughout the dissertation, I will use for Aristotle’s works the page system established by the classical philologist August Immanuel Bekker (1785-1871).
Such a self-writing of the history of women was Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s and her colleagues’ before The Women’s Bible. They wrote, for example, or rewrote rather Thomas Jefferson’s “Declaration of Independence” as their “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions,” which Cady Stanton read aloud at the first Woman’s Rights Convention in the United States in 1848. And before the Americans, French women not many years earlier in 1789 similarly wrote Rêquête des dames l'Assemblée Nationale (or Women's Petition to the National Assembly) in response to Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen (or Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen); and then in 1791, Olympe de Gouges entirely rewrote the man’s document as Déclaration des Droits de la Femme et de la Citoyenne (or The Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the Female Citizen) in a letter to queen Marie Antoinette. Self-history for women, with political implications, involved translation.

This includes both the religious translation and history writing of Bible scholars such as Phyllis Trible, Carolyn Osiek, April DeConick, Beth Sheppard, Carolyn Custis James, and Karen Jobes and also the postmodern translational work of literary scholars such as Luise Von Flotow-Evans, Michaela Wolf, Sherry Simon, Barbara Godard, Rosemary Arrojo, and Susan Bassnett.

See end note 3 above.

As phallica (or some such variant of transliteration) the word exists in at least twenty different languages. It is the transliteration of Aristotle’s Greek word. Transliteration uses the alphabet of the target language to keep the word fixed and abstract and rigidly-formed as if conforming to the original author’s intentions.

In his Preface to Plato, Eric Havelock says that Plato’s target is poetry. And Havelock adds, “The problem of the 'origins' of drama is of course usually viewed through the medium of Aristotle's Poetics” (60). Poetry as theorized in the Poetics is, in Havelock’s words, “a
compilation of inherited lore” (66). My translation is attempting to characterize mere and targeted poetry, or inherited lore, as what’s make-believe-esque.

46 In Chapter 3, I will say more about early resistances to translation by transliteration. For example, I will mention a non-feminist Ralph Lever in 1573 who called the transliteraton rhetoric “speechcraft.”

47 Mayhew, in his The Female in Aristotle's Biology: Reason or Rationalization, does determine that “Aristotle’s conception of the female is, in general and in many details, false.” His aim, however, seems to be to discredit other Aristotle scholars who find the Greek man to be a sexist misogynist. Mayhew adds: “But frequently, too little care is taken over rigorous scholarship on the part of some of his fiercest critics. Often, there is little concern for what precisely his views are on a particular issue. Nor is there much concern with presenting support for the claim that his arguments about females are little more than rationalization” (2).

Mayhew would, rather, have done well to review Gareth B. Matthews’s “Gender and Essence in Aristotle,” which considers whether Aristotle intends a “Complementarity Theory” or a “Norm-Defect Theory” of difference between the sexes; Mayhews carefully examines all of Aristotle’s writings on the difference to show that sometimes Aristotle does not seem to speak of females as defective males. But Mayhew also completely ignores the two best contemporary works that are concerned precisely with both Aristotle’s science and his philosophy on females and women. The best works are the following books by two of the “fiercest critics” of Aristotle’s sexism: Feminism In Greek Literature From Homer To Aristotle (first published in 1923) by F. A. Wright and The Concept of Woman: The Aristotelian Revolution 750 Bc-Ad 1250 (1997) by Prudence Allen.

translations of the Rhetoric by Jowett and Platt. I have checked Welldon’s translation of the Rhetoric which is a bit different: “It may be observed that in a woman the excellences or graces of the body are beauty and stature, those of the soul are self-command and an industry which never degenerates into vulgarity” (33). The italics seem to indicate Welldon’s translator interpolations; his “or graces” gives readers a right view of the ambiguity of the Greek ἄρετή.

Poster uses the translation by John Henry Freese (344).

Glenn uses the translation by W. Rhys Roberts (Rhetoric Retold, 213).

See endnote 49, above.

Logic, and Aristotle’s logic in particular, has long since its founder become a separate field of investigation altogether. Thus, not only is logic used in application, it is studied as a subject itself. To illustrate, I provide here the entry from the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy on Aristotle’s works on Logic:

I. Organon (Greek, instrument) The name traditionally given to the body of Aristotle's logical works: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations. The title reflects the Peripatetics' view that logic is not a part of philosophy, but a tool of all enquiry.

In Kant an organon is a system of principles whereby knowledge may be established.

Willis Barnstone says that taxis in Greece today have the word metaphor on them because they are carriers of people. (Poetics of Translation 1)

I do understand that “character” is an English word that is a transliteration of a Greek word; however, the two have become distinct enough, that I’m comfortable with using the English this way. Otherwise, it might be “temperament.”
Of course, and what fun too, this quotation here is an academic-English translation of Western feminist Hélène Cixous’s zany French, which she translates from the colorful Brazilian Portuguese of Latin American feminist Clarice Lispector.

While writing to the “average reader,” Kennedy specifies this: "Modern audiences for On Rhetoric fall roughly into four main groups, with considerable overlapping and many individual differences of opinion" (19). He says this in a little essay, "Aristotle's Original Audience and His Audience Today," in the “Prooemion” of the second edition of his translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Kennedy points his translation and this commentary of his at some of us: “modern readers” and “modern students” (xi). And he dedicates his writing “To My Grandson, Alexander Kennedy Morton, The Original Rhetoric for a Later Alexander” (v); we are reminded that Aristotle dedicated one of his treatises on ethics to his son Nicomachus, named after his father. Kennedy wants some of us, and his grandson, to read. Surely, he and the editors and textbook sales people of Oxford University Press, Inc., also aim for quite a few of us to buy this second edition of his translation. A few rhetoric professors are targets too. This is the added cost, if the rhetorical benefits, of higher education, if we may digress a bit. “Modern audiences for On Rhetoric” are audiences for Aristotle's work, and for Kennedy's. Kennedy says these “modern readers” include the following:

(1) “the classical philologists, specialists in Greek language, literature, and culture . . . who tend to pounce on the inconsistencies in the text and thus resist viewing it as a unity”;

(2) “the philosophers, largely scholars who study and teach ancient philosophy . . . skilled dialecticians, [who] are good at what they do and can easily overwhelm the average reader with their subtlety and learning, sometimes at the expense of distorting what Aristotle actually says”;
(3) “teachers of English composition and speech communication, whose primary interest is in the rhetorical theory found in the work . . . [who] are understandably inclined to use it as the basis of developing a comprehensive system of rhetoric, following out the implications of the text or imaging [sic] what Aristotle ought to have said but didn't”;

(4) “the literary scholars and critics . . . [whose] interest in the *Rhetoric* is largely confined to the third book, where Aristotle's theory of metaphor is of special interest . . . in conjunction with the *Poetics*” (19-20).

What is not clear is where in this list of “modern audiences” the “modern student” might be. And one wonders why Kennedy accuses philologists of “pouncing” and “resisting.” Has he himself avoided “easily overwhelming the average reader,” the very thing he attacks philosophers for doing in their “distorting”? Can we wonder how teachers of English composition and speech communication are more “understandably inclined” to do what they do, and how it is that Kennedy more understands them? It does seem that Kennedy thinks literary scholars and critics are a bit narrow in their “largely confined” and “special” interests.

Kennedy also reviews the “resumption of the ongoing scholarly discussion about the audience for which *On Rhetoric* was composed.” He says that Carol Poster says that Aristotle writes in this way:

> [F]or the student trained in dialectic who needs, particularly for self-defense or defense of Platonic-Aristotellean philosophy, to sway an ignorant or corrupt audience or to understand the functioning of rhetoric within the badly ordered state. The techniques described are dangerous, potentially harmful to both the speaker and audience, and ought not be revealed to the general readership of Aristotle's dialogues, but only taught within the controlled environment of
Aristotle's school, as part of the esoteric corpus of Platonic-Aristotelian teaching.

(244) (17)

Kennedy then concedes that what he excerpts from Poster is from her “prize-winning article.” Now we wonder who gave her the prize? Was it philologists, philosophers, teachers of English composition and speech communication, or literary scholars and critics? Is Poster one of these? And doesn't what she says make Aristotle more of a defensive specialist philosopher whose academic specialty trumps a social phenomenon he calls, “rhetoric,” a “dangerous, potentially harmful [thing] to both the speaker and the audience” (17)? So doesn't Poster seem to think that Aristotle uses his *Rhetoric* to fight against rhetoric? Indeed, Poster's article is entitled “Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Against Rhetoric.” But does Poster claim that Aristotle uses rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*? And doesn't she use it in her article? Just so we know, Kennedy, in his review of the first edition of his translation, slams philosophers for neglecting the rhetoric in all of Aristotle's writings, even the purely philosophic stuff. But, once again, aren't we digressing?

Kennedy seems to like better than Poster's article a long essay by Edward W. Clayton. Clayton reviews all the possible original audiences of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, “including the legislator of an ideal city, the Athenian public, the students in his philosophical school, or different audiences in different parts of the work, written at different times” (qtd by Kennedy 17). Kennedy says that Clayton “concludes that the students in his school are the most likely audience, agreeing in this with Poster, though without her emphasis on moral urgency” (17).

57 Poster goes on in an endnote to name various histories of U.S. composition; and she quotes Welch who sometimes incorrectly pigeonholes certain textbooks as part of the “Heritage School.” (See my endnote 3 above). Poster herself claims that “[s]everal current first-year composition textbooks rely heavily on Aristotle’s *Rhetorica*, including Sharon Crowley, *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students* . . . ; John Gage, *The Shape of Reason: Argumentative*
Unfortunately, Poster’s review is more than an overgeneralization; it is just wrong. Crowley and her co-author Deborah Hawhee really are concerned that Aristotle does not dominate their text. Some time back on Hawhee’s blog, she asked readers to give input on how to make more prominent the sophism and feminisms sections. In a more recent post, she says:

The textbook I co-author with Sharon Crowley occasionally needs to be revised. This is in part because textbook companies stop making money on editions after a certain point (that's another post), but also because for a book called Ancient Rhetoric for Contemporary Students, part (guess which part?) needs to be updated occasionally. For Sharon and me, one of the depressing parts of the revision process is looking around for the most current social issues that can newly enliven the ancient concepts: we always discover how some issues just don't lose their 'currency.' Thanks to the current administration, arguments have been resurfacing about abortion since Sharon's first edition. We wrote the third edition on the eve of the Iraq war, and while some of that material is out of date, and the arguments about war have shifted, well, this country still very much has its war on. And now, depressingly, the second edition's treatment of hate speech seems more relevant than ever, especially in my own community.

Moreover, Gage’s textbook is an amazing array of “discourse communities” from a variety of geographic locations, historic timeframes, and human cultures that inform students of composition. Furthermore, Horner’s book was never intended for the composition studies market; published a full decade before Poster’s criticism, the history of classical rhetoric even came with the publisher’s study guide.
Here are the different ways the traditional masculinist translators have rendered the Greek phrase as English. The phrase appears at Bekker page 1407a line 20 and Bekker page 1413b line 6. I have bolded the corresponding phrase in each:

1686 “NOW the Principle of Elocution, is **property of Language**, which consists in five things” (177). [The second passage is not available, as the page is missing from my only copy of this version of the *Rhetoric*.]

1818 “The principle, however, of diction is **to speak with propriety**; and this consists in five things” (218) “But it is necessary to know both these kinds of diction. For to know the one, is to know how **to speak properly**” (251)

1823 “IN style, the first thing is, that it be **Greek**, and grammatically correct. This depends on five points” (382). “To speak well requires the habit of **using the language properly and readily**” (413)

1890 “FOUR things are necessary to make **Language Pure**” (332) [The second passage is not available, as the page is missing from my copy of this version of the *Rhetoric*.]

1908 “These then are the elements of language. The first condition of style is **Purity**; and this depends on five things” (156).

1926 “But **purity**, which is the foundation of style, depends upon five rules” (371) “for the one requires a knowledge of **good Greek**” (419)

1954 “The foundation of good style is **correctness of language**, which is discussed under five heads:” “The written style is the more finished: the spoken better admits of dramatic delivery -- alike the kind of oratory that reflects character and the kind that stirs emotion. The **style of oratory** addressed to public assemblies resembles scene-painting. In the one and the other, high finish in detail
is superfluous and seems better away. The forensic style is more highly finished. Ceremonial oratory is the most literary, for it is meant to be read; and next to it forensic oratory.”

1960 “and this **purity of language** depends on five things” (194); “Debate demands the ability to utter **pure Greek**” (217)

1991 “Linguistic purity is produced by **five things:**” (225) “For the altercative involves knowing how to speak Greek, and the written involves” (242)

2007 “The first principle [arkhê] of lexis is to **speak [good] Greek** [to helênizein]” (207). “[Debate] consists in knowing how to **speak good Greek”** (227)

59 "Moreover, the view is actually held by some [i.e., Heraclitus] that not merely some things but all things in the world are in motion and always in motion, though we cannot apprehend the fact by sense perception" (*Physics* 253b 9).


61 Gorgias’ concluding sentence in his Praise of Helen is key: καὶ δόξης ἄμαθῶν, ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἐλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἔμοι δὲ παίγνιον.. He has intended a poetic punchline for his “literate” audience. In listening to a “reading,” they are to "hear" the rhythmic rhymes: *eboulethēn / Helen men*; *ton logon / egkomion / paignion*. And so they are to find in his very last word that the *logos*, or argument for Helen, is a *paignion*, or play on words. In effect, Gorgias plays a final trick on his audience. Any stability of logic (or literacy)
merely stands on the performance of words spoken. Eloquence, finally, rests on a \( \pi\alpha\gamma\nu\iota\nu \) (paignion).

Rhetorician Victor Vitanza has similarly played with this Greek word play by coining in English \textit{rhetorics} to bring together rhetorics-and-erotics.
APPENDIX A: PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Much research has laid the groundwork for the proposed dissertation to translate Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in a feminist rhetorical manner. Starting with dissertations and continuing with post-dissertation research, below, are bibliographies of previous research related to three general categories of works.

The first category is that of works by feminist scholars (rhetoricians, historians, and philosophers). These academicians have studied and written much on Aristotle with respect to women; and feminist rhetoricians more generally, but during the past few decades alone, have revolutionized the history of rhetoric by copiously re-writing it to include women (when once, for hundreds of years, rhetoric’s history, the history writing of rhetoric, and even methods of historiography in rhetoric were exclusive to men). A second related category includes works on classical Greek rhetoric from a more traditional (i.e., ungendered) perspective. Obviously, the ancient Greek rhetoricians have provided the earliest academic documents (i.e., primary sources) on rhetoric many of which are extant; in addition, contemporary researchers of rhetoric (as secondary sources) have produced volumes on just the key concepts of classical Greek rhetoric. Comprising the third category are the works of experts in translation or translation studies (including linguists, anthropologists, rhetoricians, literature researchers, and classics scholars); these have developed (a) theories on, (b) critical approaches to, and (c) numerous useful examples of rendering a text of one language into another.

I. DISSERTATIONS:

A. FEMINIST (RE)GENDERING OF THE CLASSICAL (MALE) TRADITIONS (OF RHETORIC AND THE NEW TESTAMENT)


Ballif, Michelle. “Seducing Rhetoric: Gorgias, Nietzsche, Baudrillard and the Woman with the Rhetorical Figure.” Diss. U of Texas at Arlington, 1992.


I. DISSERTATIONS:
B. KEY ISSUES OF ARISTOTELIAN AND GREEK RHETORIC
(NOT NECESSARILY FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE)


I. DISSERTATIONS:
C. TRANSLATIONS AND RHETORICAL TRANSLATION THEORIES


When listing post-dissertation research, I organize the three categories of research somewhat differently. The bibliographies can be grouped a bit more specifically. (The first two groups comprise the exam reading list for my written and oral qualifying exams; since exams, however, I have added to the second group two additional key Greek concepts: paqoj or “pathos”; and rhtorikh or rhetoric).
II. PUBLISHED RESEARCH:
A. WOMEN MAKING AND MAPPING THE CLASSICAL RHETORIC TRADITION
   1. WOMEN RHETOR(ICIAN)S MAKING THE CLASSICAL TRADITION

Asapsia of Miletus, Translated fragments in


Sappho, translated and Greek translated fragments in


Theano, translated fragments in


Phintys, translated fragments in


Perictyone, translated fragments in


Diotima of Mantinea, translated fragments in


II. PUBLISHED RESEARCH:
A. WOMEN MAKING AND MAPPING THE CLASSICAL RHETORIC TRADITION
   2. WOMEN RHETOR(ICIAN)S MAPPING THE CLASSICAL TRADITION


II. PUBLISHED RESEARCH:
   B. KEY CONCEPTS OF GREEK RHETORIC
      1. PRIMARY SOURCES (SOME IN TRANSLATION)


<http://www.library.northwestern.edu/homer>.

<http://www.library.northwestern.edu/homer>.

<http://www.library.northwestern.edu/homer>.

<http://www.library.northwestern.edu/homer>.

<http://www.library.northwestern.edu/homer>.


<http://www.library.northwestern.edu/homer>.


(Various versions and translations)


II. PUBLISHED RESEARCH:

B. KEY CONCEPTS OF GREEK RHETORIC

1. SECONDARY SOURCES

a. ἐνθύμημα or enthymeme


b. ἐπιδεικτικός or epideictic


c. εὑρίσκω or heuristic


d. καὶρός or kairos


e. πάθος or pathos


f. πίστεις or pisteis


g. ῥητορική or rhetoric


h. στάσις or stasis


i. τέχνη or techne


j. τόποι or topoi


II. PUBLISHED RESEARCH:
C. ON TRANSLATION

Translator’s notes and commentaries in the various English versions of Aristotle’s listed above, by: Theodore Buckley, Lane Cooper, John Henry Freese, George A. Kennedy, Hugh Lawson-Tancred, and W. Rhys Roberts.

<http://heymancenter.com/eventsmaterials/20050309speech_carson.pdf>


<http://heymancenter.com/eventsmaterials/20050309speech_nehamas.pdf>


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Baliff, Michelle. "Re/Dressing Histories; Or, on Re/Covering Figures Who have been Laid Bare by our Gaze." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 22.1 (1992): 91-7.


Enos, Richard Leo. “A's topoi.” E-mail to the author. 27 March 2007.


Farrell, Thomas B. "Kennedy's *Aristotle on Rhetoric* as a Contribution to Rhetorical Theory."


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---. *Traces of a Stream: Literacy and Social Change among African American Women.*


---. "When the First Voice You Hear is Not Your Own." *College Composition and Communication* 47.1 (1996): 29-40.


VITA

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TESOL
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ABSTRACT

A FEMINIST RHETORICAL TRANSLATING OF THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

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This project calls for and offers the beginnings of a new and substantially different translation of Aristotle’s dissertation, the *Rhetoric*. My undertaking is neither to offer just another translation nor to invent one more “new rhetoric”; but it is to recover very old discourses that may predate Aristotle, means of communication that he intends to suppress. These are the discourses (1) of women, (2) of wordsmiths, and (3) of weavers of ideas from one mother tongue into another. In more contemporary terms, they are (1) feminisms, (2) rhetorics, and (3) translations. The approaches that the project borrows from most are Jacqueline Jones Royster’s “afrafeminism,” Krista Ratcliffe’s “rhetorical listening,” and Kenneth Pike’s “tagmemics.” I have coined the phrase “feministic rhetorical translating” as a combination of feminist, rhetorical, and translational methods to expose Aristotle’s suppressive aims.

Traditional translators of Aristotle’s texts have been ostensibly faithful to Aristotle’s authorial intention. Thus, classicists have brought into English the linguistic and philological aims of this writer of various treatises; philosophers have rendered into our language his epistemic and logical goals; and some rhetoricians have translated the *Rhetoric* as if Aristotle really intended to be “rhetorical” (assuming that his treatise is the definitive canonical statement
on rhetoric and what it is to be rhetorical). Likewise, while recognizing Aristotle’s intentions as sexist, absolutist, and elitist (or phallogocentric), some feminist scholars ironically mirror phallogocentrism in their own absolute, gender-based opposition to his text.

In contrast, a feminist rhetorical translating of Aristotle’s central text on rhetoric demonstrates that Hellene discourse is womanly, is full of wordplay, and is richly translational even when Aristotle might intend it to be otherwise. This project, then, refuses the limited choice of either (1) the reception of the *Rhetoric* on the author’s own terms albeit as imagined by the translator or (2) the rejection of his work, a rejection as suppressive as Aristotle’s. A feminist rhetorical translating, rather, embraces the agency of a translator who would recognize the prejudices of Aristotle and yet would render these biases from her own perspectives, in her own language, in order to rectify them by her own intentions.