

BLUECOATS AND BUTTERNUTS:
UNION SOLDIERS AND COPPERHEADS IN THE OHIO RIVER VALLEY

by

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Bluecoats and Butternuts

When word reached the Union that rebels had bombarded and forced the surrender of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor, the nation was galvanized for war in a way it had never been before. “It is true,” wrote historian Frank Klement, “that partisanship seemed to disappear in the opening days of the Civil War.”¹ As in most conflicts, it did not take long for the initial good feelings to subside shortly after the actual business of war began. Union discontent with the war began soon after the first setbacks, and would ebb and flow with the tide of battle until the spring of 1865, when the end was truly in sight.

This discontent expressed itself in a number of ways, most especially in the political arena. The president, for the first time, was a member of the Republican Party. The Democrats were out of power, a position unfamiliar to them since 1853. In addition, politicians the party’s traditional area of strength, the South, had quite literally left town. The Party was faced with the unenviable choice of opposing the coming war, which was being prosecuted by their political enemies. Some chose not to. Stephen Douglas, nominee of the party’s northern faction from 1860, argued before his death that Democrats should rally behind the new president and put down the rebellion. Other notable Democrats, including Governor Horatio Seymour of New York, followed his example. But not all were so willing to sell what they saw as their principles or interests to the new party. Most commonly, they are known as Copperheads. The origins of the term are unclear, but its ready association with the poisonous snake seems appropriate.²

¹ Frank Klement, *The Copperheads of the Middle West*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 2.

² Jennifer Weber, *Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2-3. Weber also discusses other terms, in particular ‘Butternuts,’ which she defines as “geographically restrictive” to the Midwest. Soldiers in their letters used the terms interchangeably, and in the context of this paper they should be considered synonymous.

With a power base in the Midwestern states, the Peace faction of the Democratic Party was able to make some electoral inroads, and could even consider doing so in the most unlikely of places: the army.

The army by itself was hardly a Republican organ. Lincoln was the first Republican to assume the mantle of Commander-in-Chief, and many of the new Republicans had been Whigs, the party that opposed the Mexican War. Many high-ranking members of the army were Democrats, including two future Presidential candidates. As Klement notes, when the call to serve went out, volunteers from both parties filled the ranks. Some were certainly Republicans. Lincoln voters, they believed in the right and duty of the federal government to preserve the Union. Others, though, were Democrats, including whole regiments such as the 109th Illinois and 20th Massachusetts.³ The Midwest in particular was a hotbed for the Copperhead movement, in part due to the area's pro-Democratic populace, especially so when compared to the eastern states, in particular those of New England. As the war progressed, and news from home blurred any distinctions between "Copperhead" and "Democrat," many soldiers with Democratic leanings began to question their loyalty to the party. My contention is that the view of many soldiers was tilted towards the Republican Party due to the overwhelming perception that all Democrats were Copperheads, in spite of potential Democratic leanings from the soldiers themselves.⁴

³ Joseph Allan Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 1.

⁴ In his book Lincoln and the War Democrats: The Grand Erosion of Conservative Tradition, (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975), Christopher Dell includes an appendix listing all the Union generals he could categorize as Democrats. Though some of his evidence is tenuous, it does illustrate the widespread appeal of the Party, and includes more notable and definite Democrats such as George McClellan and Winfield Scott Hancock. Joseph Allan Frank's book With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), also mentions the high number of Democrats in the officer corps, and identifies the relationship between Republican soldiers and Democratic officers as a source of strain within the army. Frank is also the one who identifies the Copperhead regiments.

In this instance, the Ohio Valley is defined as several Midwestern states bordering the Ohio River. The paper will focus on soldiers from the states of Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky. The Ohio forms at the confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers in Western Pennsylvania, runs through present-day West Virginia, forms the northern border of Kentucky and southern border of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois before emptying into the Mississippi near the city of Cairo, Illinois. Major cities located along the river include Pittsburgh at the headwaters, Cincinnati, Ohio and Louisville, Kentucky. In spite of western Pennsylvania's proximity to Ohio, in many ways the state shares more with its eastern neighbors, including having the vast majority of its men serving in the Eastern armies. West Virginia, carved from the seceded state of Virginia and accepted as a state in 1863, has its own complicated history and because of that relationship to Virginia is also Eastern in character.

Of the three definitively Midwestern states, Ohio and Indiana were chosen because of their proximity to the largest parts of Kentucky as well as the resources gleaned from their archives. Illinois is very similar, but unlike Ohio and Indiana does not have as much of a critical relationship with Kentucky due to the minimal border they share. All three Midwestern states had significant Copperhead populations, and all three remained loyal for the duration of the war. Lincoln had been victorious in both Ohio and Indiana during the 1860 election, key cogs to his capturing the White House. Kentucky, as befitting their neutral stance, did not go for either party, but instead to John Bell and the Constitutional Union Party.

Ohio contributed the third highest amount of soldiers to the Union cause, trailing only New York and Pennsylvania. The state was led first by Republicans William Dennison and David Tod, then by the Union Party's John Brough. Still, it was a divided state. The Copperhead movement was particularly strong, and several key figures were native Ohioans.

Notable Ohio congressmen who were known Copperheads included the truly radical Alexander Long, who argued that the South should simply be let go, George Pendleton, who would be nominated as the Democratic Party's vice presidential candidate in 1864, and Clement Vallandigham, the historical archetype of Copperheadism. Indiana contributed over 200,000 men to the Union cause. During the war, the state would remain in the Republican column due to the efforts of Governor Oliver P. Morton. Indiana had a strong Democratic population, and in the early days of the war, Senator Jesse Bright was in fact expelled from the Senate for a letter he had written to Jefferson Davis.⁵ Morton replaced him with a War Democrat, Joseph Wright. In both states, trade with Kentucky along the Ohio River constituted significant part of their economies. This trade became even more vital during the war as Kentucky became a staging area for Union assaults. It also made the two states targets, as both suffered from the raiding of John Morgan and other Confederates.

Kentucky presents a far more complicated political situation. Rather than seceding to join the Confederacy, Kentucky chose to remain neutral. Kentucky's fate, like the other Border States that did not choose rebellion, was the result of the particulars of geography and population. Maryland, with its border to the nation's capital, was not allowed to choose its course. Lincoln and the Union Army forced their loyalty, regardless of the populace's feelings. Delaware never had great interest in secession, though its two Senators James Bayard and Willard Saulsbury kept the state firmly Democratic during the war. Missouri most resembled Kentucky in population. Ardent pro-slavery forces had been one of the flashpoints in 'Bleeding Kansas' during the previous decade, and Missouri bushwhackers were experienced fighters.

⁵ Bright's misstep was twofold. First, he had addressed the letter to "His Excellency., Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederation," supposedly recognizing the office as legitimate. More seriously, the letter contained a recommendation of an arms dealer to Davis. Bright was the only Senator from a Northern state to be expelled (all others were Southerners from seceded states), and to this day he remains the last expelled Senator in American history.

Kentucky though, unlike Missouri, was a strategic location. Its position near the Ohio, Mississippi, Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers made holding the state a high Union priority. From this, one can see the origins of reports that Lincoln pronounced that while he hoped to have God on his side, he must have Kentucky.”⁶

Lincoln would have Kentucky early on. Confederate General Leonidas Polk made one of the South’s first great blunders when he invaded and took the town of Columbus. Polk would compound his mistake by failing both to capture the more important city of Paducah, and to reinforce Confederate defenses at Fort Henry along the Tennessee River. Ulysses Grant would make sure those mistakes were capitalized upon. Upset at Confederate intrusion, the state government asked Washington for aid, a request with which the President and Congress gladly complied. Kentucky, though divided internally, would remain officially part of the Union.

It is for this reason that Kentucky is included in this study. The Bluegrass State’s official loyalty made it an important part of electoral politics during the war. Unlike Tennessee or Louisiana, states captured by Union troops during the early years of the war, Kentucky maintained full representation in Congress and a vote in the 1864 presidential election.⁷ Kentucky does present a difficult location to understand. While officially loyal, the Copperhead population in the state was notably more vibrant and violent than in states of the Upper Midwest. In fact, Kentuckians fought on both sides of the war. Most of these pro-Confederate Kentuckians, though, would be unlikely to participate in Union elections. The ones that formed official regiments left the state to join Confederate armies farther south. Others remained as guerrilla fighters, and would be a perpetual thorn in the side of Union troops in the state.

⁶ James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 284.

⁷ The one notable exception to this would be Andrew Johnson, from loyal Eastern Tennessee, who remained in the Senate prior to his election to the Vice Presidency in 1864.

Then came the Copperheads. The nature, composition, extent and influence of the Copperhead movement have been the subject of debates since the days of the war itself. Earlier interpretations tended to be nationalistic and oppositional. They accepted Lincoln as the secular saint, the Republicans as the party of right, and condemned wartime opposition as conspiratorial and dangerous. Wood Gray, in his book The Hidden Civil War, is the most notable example of this school of interpretation. Gray describes the movement as “defeatist,” and as a very real threat to the war effort. In addition to this generalized nationalism that condemned the Copperhead movement, Gray does make some valuable additions to the scholarship of the movement. Focusing as he did on the Midwest, Gray is able to discern some tangible reasons for wartime opposition that resulted from the region’s particular geography, both social and physical.⁸

Though the scholarship of Gray and others like him dominated the century that followed the war, the growing movement towards revisionism in the historical profession leaked into the study of Copperheads. Leading the revisionist charge (really, the only participant in the Copperhead field) was Frank Klement. Klement authored a number of books and articles that challenged the prevailing consensus regarding the extent and influence of the Copperhead movement in the Midwest. Klement was very critical of this consensus, denouncing it as Republican propaganda. In particular, Klement attacked the notions that Copperheads represented a great threat to the Union and the war effort. Favorite Republican bogeymen such as the Order of American Knights and the Knights of the Golden Circle were found to be virtually nonexistent, where historians such as Gray had taken their presence at face value.⁹

⁸ Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads, (New York: The Viking Press, 1942), 15.

⁹ The Copperheads of the Middle West is a good overview of the whole of the movement. Klement takes particular aim at the secret societies myth in Dark Lanterns: Secret Political Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984).

The most recent work to come out on the Copperheads does not actually focus on the Midwest. Jennifer Weber's Copperheads examines the movement on a national basis. Though she avoids the worst excesses of Gray's denunciations, she is certainly critical of the Copperheads. She refers to them as being relatively naïve in their approach to the war, hoping that peace could be achieved with reunion. She also sides with Gray in suggesting that the Copperheads were legitimate threats to the Lincoln administration and the prosecution of the war. This was not within their control, though, as Copperhead popularity rose and fell with the fortunes of Union armies. Still, the Copperhead movement represented a key constituency within the Democratic Party, and had fortunes not taken such a sharply positive turn for the North in the fall of 1864, the Copperheads' man may well have sat in the White House.¹⁰

The key historical debate about the Copperheads then seems to be asking what they wanted and how close were they to achieving it. While going back and forth over the extent of their influence on war policy, both sides can at least acknowledge their existence. Who were the Copperheads? In the Midwest, they represented a confluence of interests. Old sectionalism worked for some, feeling that the interests of the East were subsuming those of the West. For some, family played a role. The southern portion of these states, in particular Ohio and Indiana, had been populated by Southerners moving north, and family ties remained strong. For some, it was economic, as they felt the kinship of an agricultural lifestyle rather than support in the coming Industrial Age. And for others, it was political. Democrats still regarded themselves as the party of Jefferson, of Jackson, men who called for limited government and supported the rights of states to make their own decisions on policy. These influences amongst the populace made fertile ground for Democratic Party leaders looking for issues to exploit and votes to

¹⁰ Weber, Copperheads.

recruit.¹¹ Joseph Allan Frank's With Ballot and Bayonet is one of the few books that discuss the relationship between soldiers and Copperheads, though it is part of his much larger narrative focused on soldier's views of politics overall. He identifies key fears of the soldiers as rioting and the potential for Copperheads to aid a Confederate invasion of the North as their main concerns. These concerns are manifested through some letters, as will be discussed later.¹²

It is noted in other sources and worth mentioning here that while Copperheads and other Peace Democrats were anti-war, they were not pacifists.¹³ The most famous of the Copperheads, Clement Vallandigham of Ohio, ardently supported the Mexican War, and managed to argue over that war with Lincoln (during the latter's days in the House of Representatives) nearly as much as the Civil War. Violent rhetoric was certainly not beyond the scope of Copperheads, as some notables called for a northern rebellion, Midwest secession, or even more extreme, the assassination of the President.¹⁴ They should best be described as "anti-Civil War," and not strictly anti-war in principle.

The sources used in this work are letters written to and from Union soldiers who resided in the states in question. Letters were an important part of the soldier's daily life. Bell Irvin Wiley's The Life of Billy Yank discussed the importance of writing home to many Union soldiers. Men wrote on various topics, mostly sharing the experience of battle and camp life to those who would know little of it. Many of these letters were long and discussed all aspects of

¹¹ All three touch on these influences to some degree. Further explication on the enduring notion of Jeffersonian limited government amongst the Party faithful comes from Jean Baker, Affairs of Party: The Political Culture of Northern Democrats in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

¹² Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet, 176-178, 184.

¹³ Weber, Copperheads, 6. Weber distinguishes Copperheads from religious objectors such as Quakers and Mennonites, who chose to not fight rather than actively oppose the war.

¹⁴ Marcus Pomeroy, editor of the *LaCrosse (WI) Democrat* and *New York Paper*, wrote editorials that may have strongly suggested killing Lincoln as the best course of action to ending the war. Though he was not involved the actual assassination plot, Klement cites that he remained under suspicion following the President's death ("'Brick' Pomeroy: Copperhead and Curmudgeon," in Frank Klement, Lincoln's Critics, Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Books, 1999, 143).

army life. A single letter could include news on the newest town entered, recent battles, and interesting conversations recently had, in addition to thoughts on politics of the day. References to Lincoln, Copperheads, or other political topics could be as simple as several lines or a paragraph in a four page letter.¹⁵

The letters reveal the relative levels of literacy of the soldiers. The high literacy rate of the Civil War armies has provided the historian with a wide variety of sources beyond the basic reports of generals and politicians. The average “Billy Yank” was more literate than his “Johnny Reb” counterpart, and his letters express a variety of motivations for fighting. The letters are filled with creative spelling and invented words, while some manage to lack for punctuation. For the most part, misspellings have been corrected only so far as to avoid complete misunderstanding on the part of the reader, and punctuation to create a better sense of comprehension in the author’s intended point.

In addition to writing letters, soldiers were recipients of much mail from home. Wiley writes that soldiers considered mail call one of the most exciting moments of the day. Whatever a soldier was doing at that time would be stopped in order to receive news from home. James McPherson, writing of the soldier’s daily life in For Cause and Comrades, supports Wiley’s findings. Soldiers begged their families to write more and letters, especially when supportive, played an important role in morale.¹⁶ Much like the soldier’s own letters, his letters from home contained a great deal of news. Family stories and local gossip filled pages. Also included, and important to this study, were reports from home of local political activities. Especially in rural parts of the Midwest, where the local politicians were or could be recognizable figures, soldiers

¹⁵ This paragraph and those that follow referring to letter writing in Wiley are from: Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank, (New York: Charter Books, 1952), 183-190.

¹⁶ James McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 132-133.

learned of rallies and speeches. These letters formed the basis for their understanding of the Copperhead movement.

Supplementing these letters were newspapers sent to the army from various sources. Aided by the literacy of Union soldiers, newspapers were exceedingly popular within the camps. Soldiers would receive local papers as supplements to their letters from home. They also had access to the larger national papers, such as the New York *Herald* and *Tribune*. A soldier with some money, or a group of soldiers with enough money pooled together, could purchase a subscription, or simply a copy from the many sutlers that roamed Union camps. The acquired papers could then either be passed among the men for individual perusal or shared via a man with a strong voice.¹⁷ Newspapers of the era were still heavily partisan, and no doubt the various viewpoints they provided helped to color, shape and challenge what soldiers felt they knew about the war.

This paper is divided into three parts, meant to build the perception soldiers had of Copperheads and then allow those perceptions to play themselves out in the political arena, highlighted by two key elections. The first section deals with the relationship between soldiers and Copperheads on the home front. A great deal of this information comes from newspapers and letters from home. These sources focus on the Copperheads and their anti-war activities, likely because these were the more interesting things to write about. It also tracks soldier reaction to this news from home, and the overwhelming negativity with which such actions are viewed. The second section deals with the experience of soldiers in the field, and the relationships they had with civilians in the divided state of Kentucky. It is here that Kentucky plays a large role for the reasons explained earlier. The third section, after having established the general negative feeling towards Copperheads, shows where such reactions did not automatically

¹⁷ Wiley, *Billy Yank*, 153-154.

pigeonhole men as hardboiled abolitionists, or even staunch Republicans. By the end, using the 1863 Ohio gubernatorial and 1864 Presidential elections as marks, the vote still went Republican, based in part by the general negative reaction generated by Copperheads and the belief that such men had taken over the Democratic Party. As such, in these elections, the choice was not between Democrat and Republican, but rather Copperhead and not.

Most of these men served in the various Union armies that made their way through Kentucky, Tennessee and further south into Georgia. Various, they were in the Armies of the Cumberland, Ohio and Tennessee, as well as local home guards throughout Kentucky, such as the Louisville Home Guard. Their military experiences are, as such, those of the more successful Western armies. It is probable that this success played into a greater optimism regarding the chances for Union success, making them less amenable to Copperhead arguments about the “failure” of the war effort. Their ranks included prolific letter-writers, the occasional gem of thought, diaries both comprehensive and sparse, and the general assortment of individual personalities found in any large group. Men such as the dour Robert Winn and the enthusiastic William Henry Pittenger, families with large letter collections such as the Dows and Dunns, both with many members adding their opinions, all added to the collection and narrative of these tumultuous times. All had something to add when the discussion turned to politics.

Part I: A Fire in Our Rear

“Because they gathered around enemies of our country to the cause for which I have sacrificed my all to defend. If not friends of our country, they much need be enemies of mine, for who oppose the government for which I fight, oppose me so surely as twice two make four. I have and will make them. They cannot take the soldier by the hand and look him square in the eye and bid him welcome home. I’ve met them. I tell them by their greeting, those are wounds that outlive the wounds of mortal combat on the battlefields of our country. They will live upon the memory of the soldier whilst he breathes the breath of life for they can never be forgiven or for forgotten. To think that those whose lives and property we have saved and protected by standing as a wall of fire before or between them and enraged foe for nearly 3 years – to think that they will act and treat us thus is almost intolerable. Can we call it anything but treason? Yes, and they are traitors and to be consistent should seek protection beyond our lines and under the detestable rag of our enemies.”¹

While on leave at home in early 1864, Ohio soldier William Henry Pittenger lamented the lack of support he felt from the home front. While he had been in the field fighting for Union, there were those at home working not to support the cause, but actively undermine it. Pittenger’s diary entry for that January day reveals the full spectrum of emotions many soldiers felt when news came from home regarding these Copperheads. His sadness, resentment and anger all boiled over when confronted with direct contact of the news he had been hearing. While soldiers had a number of opportunities to be at home, letters written by friends and relatives provided the source for most of their experience with Copperheads. The reaction to these letters will be the source for understanding soldier sentiment toward Copperheads.

Being separated from home did not mean being cut off from the news of home. By means of letters, soldiers stayed in regular contact with friends and relatives back home, and these letters can teach us a great deal about the way in which many soldiers experienced the Copperhead movement. Very few soldiers came into direct contact with the dissenting forces.

¹ Entry of January 15, 1864, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, hereafter cited as OHS.

Instead, they relied on friends and relatives to provide news of their actions. Much as soldiers would take the opportunity to detail their exploits in battle, letters from home discussed politics and campaigning.

These letters back and forth expressed the wide range of emotions and opinions evoked by the presence of openly antiwar members of society. In most cases, these were negative reactions. Anger was the most common response, as soldiers expressed their dislike of Copperhead activists and politicians undermining their efforts in the field. This anger sometimes even morphed into threats against Copperheads, with soldiers boasting of actions they would be sure to take against these traitors when they returned from the war. But there could be more than just simple anger.

The soldiers' emotional response to the Copperhead movement also took the form of a concerned sadness. Many soldiers felt concern that by openly criticizing Lincoln or the war effort, Copperheads were only giving aid to the Confederacy. Southerners, they reasoned, would be emboldened by the continued undermining efforts from the home front and thus become even more determined to hold out. Soldiers also expressed concerns over the actions of local government. This would be one instance where their separation becomes most evident, as they were prone to react negatively to news of any possible resistance to the war effort from within state governments.

Not all emotions were negative, though. Especially when discussions turned toward the punishment they were ready to give out to Copperheads, a perverse kind of hope seeped through their writing. Soldiers were ready to finish the job out in the field so as to return home and deal with the traitors behind them. This also became an opportunity for many soldiers to express their own superiority and worldliness. Should Copperheads find themselves in the field, their

objections to the war, and especially their support of the South, would likely evaporate. As the Confederates raided into parts of the Union such as Kentucky and Ohio, Union soldiers openly wondered if perhaps now, faced with the reality of the Rebel army, the Copperheads would still be such ardent sympathizers.

Robert Winn, a British immigrant to Kentucky who joined the Union cause, fell to feelings of negativity. Letters to his sister reveal Winn's pessimism at the prospects of Kentucky and other Midwestern states remaining loyal to the Union. When asking if his adopted state would "forsake the path of loyalty and forsake the thousands of brave men she has sent out," Winn could only express the fear of his comrades, saying that "we fear she may."² He imagined Copperhead domination at home, a Union "full of the temporizers, traitors in some such a combined form, and secret like the Knights of the Golden Circle." The consequences of this control would be most dire for soldiers such as him, for he would now be facing "the South full of drilled soldiers and arms, ammunition, forage and supplies of every description, and masked batteries at every important point and road."³

Winn's support for the Union stemmed in part from his own personal anti-slavery stance and his belief that only by eliminating slavery could the nation ever truly reunite. He saw through the Copperhead complaints about liberties and rights a defense of the indefensible institution. "The Union as it was, was the cry," he attributed to these antiwar factions. "Death to Abolitionist and secessionist alike the enemies of slavery," he heard in their cries. And consistent with his pessimistic view of the Union, he concluded by remarking that without "any hope of the North taking even a moderately Anti Slavery stand – I naturally lost all confidence."⁴

² "Robert Winn to Sister," July 12, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, Kentucky, hereafter cited at FHS.

³ "Robert Winn to Sister," July 25, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

⁴ "Robert Winn to Sister," August 17, 1863, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

Not all soldiers shared Winn's darker pessimism. "Such dastardly humans are not to be feared," was the initial verdict rendered by Pittenger.⁵ This kind of defiance in the face of opposition from the home front usually evolved into expressions of anger. Thomas Speed wrote to his parents that "my blood boils when I think of those who complain."⁶ Soldiers did not, it seems, particularly care for having their cause mocked and their efforts denigrated by complainers. "I think if many political grumblers could see the work that [the soldier] is doing," wrote Speed again, "they would be reminded that there are more important things to think of than niggers [*sic.*]"⁷

Some soldiers let their anger go even farther, devolving into calls for a kind of witch-hunt at home. Ohio soldier John Dow asked his sister to give him the names of Copperheads in Newton Township. This statement takes on a considerably darker tone when the request is followed by Dow's assertion that "the soldiers are all down on the Copperheads of the north."⁸ Other requests and calls for information went home. Kentuckian Matthew Cook wrote to his sweetheart Martha Winn (sister of the aforementioned Robert Winn) that this would be a good job for "Home Unionists" to collect "legal evidence" of the disloyalty of others.⁹ Indiana soldier Joseph Airhart even went so far as to ask his friend Stephen Emert to "[k]eep the Butternuts down." If Emert did not, Airhart warned that, "when I get back there I will have them and you both to clene [*sic.*] out."¹⁰

⁵ Entry of February 26, 1863, "Diary of William Henry Pittenger," OHS.

⁶ "Thomas Speed to Parents," July 1, 1863, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS.

⁷ "Thomas Speed to Parents," May 27, 1864, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS. The use of racially offensive language has been left as is, as it helps to better illustrate the prevalent feelings of the day, which will become important later in this work.

⁸ "John Dow to Sister," May 8, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁹ "Matthew Cook to Martha Winn," September 7, 1863, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁰ "Joseph Airhart to Stephen Emert," June 2, 1864, Stephen Emert Letters, Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, hereafter cited as IHS.

This disloyalty, more often written as ‘treason,’ became a common charge leveled against these home front agitators. “[O]ur Government finds itself assailed by a class of persons at home who would yield it, Judas-like, into the hands of the enemy, or sully it by a dishonorable compromise with the hosts of treason,” warned a soldier letter printed in a pro-Union pamphlet distributed in 1863.¹¹ Some calls even came for those at home who did support the Union cause to keep Copperhead materials away from the army, again calling it treasonous. An Ohio soldier wrote that he and his comrades “want none of their vile letters, speeches, or papers here.”¹² Indiana soldier George Vanvalkenburgh wrote to his wife, “they are crying peace peace, but still they are doing all they can to prolong the war...so that they can have the manner of settling the war themselves.” He was certain it would be detrimental to the North, “because [the Democrats] are their southern brethren,” and, “their northern democrats want to give them what there is left.”¹³

In both styles of complaint, these letters were part of those chosen by pro-Union societies and printers to distribute widely. Printers used the soldiers as vehicles to promote the Republican viewpoint that Copperheads and Peace Democrats were traitors. Soldiers in this way indirectly became part of the Republican Party’s campaign to win elective office, helping to politicize the Army. One, titled “Echo From the Army,” made clear soldiers’ concern at the aid being given to the Southern cause. Soldiers had quickly come to realize, or “to awaken to the consciousness,” in the parlance of the day, “that a set of men who had carefully remained at home, were conspiring, with double-dyed treachery, to sell them to the enemy.”¹⁴ Accusing

¹¹ “A Voice From the Army on the Opposition to the Government,” in *The Loyalist’s Ammunition*, Philadelphia, 1863, OHS.

¹² *The Echo From the Army: What our Soldiers say about the Copperheads*, (The Loyal Publication Society: New York, 1864), OHS, 1.

¹³ “George Vanvalkenburgh to Wife,” March 30, 1863, George W. Vanvalkenburgh Papers, FHS.

¹⁴ *Echo From the Army*, 3.

Copperheads of cowardice and scolding the grumbling heard from home, soldiers were angry at those who chose not to aid the cause “by their presence in the ranks,” instead staying behind in order that they might be “aiding and abetting rebels by keeping up a fire in our rear.”¹⁵ These concerns were likely a case of preaching to the choir. While in some cases family members disapproved of the war or the reasons for it, many were devoted to the success of the Union in the hopes that by supporting the Union, they were supporting their soldier relative. A soldier could charge that, “[t]he rebels of the South are leaning on the northern democracy for support, and it is unquestionably true that unjustifiable opposition to the Administration is giving aid and comfort to ‘the enemy.’”¹⁶ The home folks had good reason to oppose Copperhead ambitions.

This argument would actually run both ways. Lincoln, the Democrats argued, was the candidate the Confederacy truly wanted to see win the election. “We all know,” a Democratic campaigner proclaimed to an audience in New Haven, Connecticut, “that the secession leaders aided and abetted the election of President Lincoln for that very purpose,” “The war cry of the South,” he continued, “was not so much -- ‘We will not submit to the Constitution.’...as ‘we will not have these men to rule over us.’”¹⁷ The policies of the Administration, he said, “has tended to breathe a spirit of defiance and desperation into the breasts of every southern man and woman and child,”¹⁸ The war’s end would only come through more pain and suffering, for Lincoln could only succeed in encouraging dissent. By blaming secession on Lincoln, some Democrats hoped to paint the war as a “Republican” war, one which the South, as an unwilling party, was dragged into as a defense against despotism and tyranny.

¹⁵ Echo From the Army, 4.

¹⁶ Echo From the Army, 4. “The Democracy” refers, here, to the Democratic Party.

¹⁷ “Great Speech of Hon. Robert C. Winthrop, at New London, Conn....” Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865: Volume II, edited by Frank Freidel, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 1086.

¹⁸ “Great Speech,” 1081.

Confederates certainly did their part to promote this idea.¹⁹ Editorials from Southern papers appeared in Democratic pamphlets, and others made their way north through operatives and activists. “Abraham Lincoln is the South’s best ally,” declared an editorial from Richmond, which claimed that he “effectually succeeded in calling out and combining every element of resistance in the South.”²⁰ The editorials promised the possibility of reconciliation, or at the very least some kind of peace with the North if Lincoln should lose the election. A writer from Georgia promised that, “if Gen. McClellan should be elected, a cessation of hostilities will follow. The war will be suspended.”²¹ The South had left because of Lincoln, and would not return for him.

Not every charge that Copperheads were aiding the South came attached with the accusation of treason. For some, this aid was unwitting, though not something to be condoned. Soldiers who communicated this idea seemed to be under the impression that if Copperheads simply knew that their activities were aiding the South, such activities would be curbed, if not necessarily stopped outright. This kind of attitude did have some basis in fact. Joanna Cowden notes that even the infamous Vallandigham did not oppose the war effort because he wished to see the nation split asunder. Vallandigham and others opposed the war on the grounds that reconciliation would be best achieved through conferences and compromises.²² It was

¹⁹ Larry Nelson’s book *Bullets, Ballots, and Rhetoric* discusses this idea more fully, and especially considers the official efforts of the Confederate government to influence the election, specifically to ensure Lincoln’s defeat.

²⁰ “Hear Hon. Geo. H. Pendleton,” *Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865: Volume II*, edited by Frank Freidel, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 1126-1127.

²¹ Anonymous, “The Presidential Canvass in the United States,” Augusta, GA, *Chronicle & Sentinel*, *The Civil War: Primary Documents on Events from 1860 to 1865*, edited by Ford Risley, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004), 258.

²² Joanna Cowden, “*Heaven Will Frown on Such a Cause as This: Six Democrats Who Opposed Lincoln’s War.*” (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001), 155.

Vallandigham and his followers who popularized the slogan, “The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was.”²³

As soldiers spent more time away from home, it is likely a disconnect began to form between them and those at the home front. This certainly appears to have been the feeling among many soldiers, particularly those who wrote of Copperheads. The reasons for this disconnect, they believed, stemmed from the lack of experience Copperheads had in the field. Without knowing what Confederates were truly like, or what it meant to face them in battle, it was considerably easier to campaign against soldiers doing just that. This did not stop a soldier from dreaming, of course, and the possibilities of Copperheads coming face to face with the cause they were supporting looked to soldiers like a possible education.

Soldiers were not necessarily shy about expressing their desire to see Copperheads face the enemy. “[I]t would do change a good many of them if they would come out and see how the thing is going,” wrote an Ohio soldier to home. “I think if some of them Butternuts were to come down here and run up against some of these Gray Johnnies,” he continued, “they would change their opinions suddenly.”²⁴ Vanvalkenburgh thought the grumblers from home could learn a good deal from the people being liberated in the South. Writing from Eastern Tennessee with Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland, he felt, “If they could only see how some of the people live here in East Tenn. they would be content with their lot and be perfectly happy with whatever their lot may be.”²⁵ Given the historic and familial relationships between many Midwesterners, especially those who became Copperheads, and Southerners, this particular line of thought appears less convincing. In many cases, these individuals were likely aware of the

²³ David E. Long, The Jewel of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln’s Re-Election and the End of Slavery, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1994), 42.

²⁴ “A. L. Gierhart to William Cook,” September 20, 1864, A. L. Gierhart Papers, OHS.

²⁵ “George Vanvalkenburgh to Wife,” February 14, 1864, George W. Vanvalkenburgh Papers, FHS.

realities of Southern life, and possibly favored them. What they were not likely prepared for was the introduction of Southern troops and the hardships that could follow. Some soldiers played up that possibility. “The rebel sympathisers [*sic.*] of Ind.,” wrote Floyd Thurman to his brother, “will rue the day when an armed body of men comes into her lines in battle array”²⁶

That day in fact came during the summer of 1863. Confederate Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan took his band of Confederate Light Cavalry first into Kentucky, then across the Ohio River into Indiana and Ohio. William Pittenger announced the news in his diary, saying that, “We [the soldiers] learn that Morgan with 10,000 men has crossed the Ohio, into Indiana.” His follow-up is more telling, as he then writes, “Good, just what we need, the one thing which will bring people to their senses. Let them see the show, not without paying. They seem to have forgotten that there’s a monstrous death struggle going on for the life of this nation.”²⁷ Just in case the message were not clear enough, he repeats it a week later, saying, “The tramp of the Morgan horse and the clank of the sabre came home to the Copperheads, good – good.”²⁸

Though Morgan would retreat by the end of the summer, escaping a Union jail in the process, his specter would remain over the Ohio Valley area. News of Morgan running around the Midwest again, though untrue, would occasionally circulate in the region. Even so, news of Morgan moving north brought out in some the desire to see home front Copperheads taught a lesson. As late of July of 1864, Ohio soldier William Helsley mentioned to his wife, “we got the news today that old Morgan was in Ohio at or near camp Dennison...if it be true he will make some of the old copperheads squirm”²⁹ Though Morgan was likely not in Ohio at that time, he was still making raids into Kentucky. Robert Winn noted one of these invasions, again looking

²⁶ “Floyd Thurman to Brother,” March 4, 1862, Floyd Thurman Civil War Letters, IHS.

²⁷ Entry of July 13, 1863, “Diary of William Henry Pittenger,” OHS.

²⁸ Entry of July 20, 1863, “Diary of William Henry Pittenger,” OHS.

²⁹ “William Helsley to Wife,” July 28, 1864, William Jefferson Helsley Papers, FHS.

to use it as a teachable moment for Copperheads. “I wish he’d capture the Capitol and hang out the dirty Confederate Rag and give the State a humbling generally.”³⁰ By 1864, Winn does not appear to have been particularly threatened by Morgan’s presence in Kentucky, which may say as much for the effectiveness of Morgan as it does about antiwar opinion.

Anger at Copperhead agitation could easily degenerate into threats made by soldiers. Pamphlets did not ignore these threats, though some appear to have been downplayed when made to be part of official publications. Not only were soldiers unhappy with the presence of Copperheads, but the sentiment existed to do something about it. Some threats were open, while some meant to be ‘surprises’ for Copperheads when soldiers returned home at war’s end. Some of these letters were no longer even threats of future violence, but stories told by soldiers detailing actions they had already taken. Already facing the ultimate price for their patriotism, Union men appeared to have little patience for those who would suggest their cause was less than worthy.

Not all threats against Copperheads were written by soldiers. Some came from home. These letters expressed the frustrations of friends and family, and undoubtedly rubbed off on soldiers who were already opposed to Copperheads and their activities. From Cincinnati, M. L. P. Thompson wrote that “[t]he wrath of loyal people is pretty nearly up to the Exploding point,” and that when it reached that point, “there will be a general smoking of the copperheads,”³¹ Other letters from home implored soldiers “to shoot every d-d Copperhead, shoot them if you have to let the rebel go,”³²

Soldiers responded with their own threats of violent retribution. Much of it came in the form of future hoping. When the war ended, and soldiers would return home, that would be their

³⁰ “Robert Winn to Sister,” June 10, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

³¹ “M. L. P. Thompson to Forlan,” February 24, 1863, M. L. P. Thompson Papers, OHS.

³² “Ruther Tanner to William,” August 9, 1863, William Tanner Papers, FHS.

chance to confront Copperheads directly about their treason. “I want to have the time come,” wrote George Vanvalkenburgh, stationed in Bowling Green, Kentucky, “when the union men of this state can have proper revenge for the wrongs they have received by the rebs and I think I should not have to wait long to see it.” Many of these soldiers hoping for the chance of retribution had their ideas of how their revenge should take place. Vanvalkenburgh suggested to his wife that “if them d-d northern copperheads[sic.] were all hung it would be the means of bringing the war to a more speedy termination and save the lives of many a brave soldier.”³³ John Dow wrote to his wife that many of the men he served with agreed, and were willing to help, saying that “they [the soldiers] would rather Kill a northern [copperhead] than they would half a dozen rebel soldiers.”³⁴ Dow himself suggested that the situation would improve “if they would serve some more of the Copperheads the same way,” as the infamous Vallandigham, and be either arrested or removed (or perhaps, just as Vallandigham, do both!).³⁵

Some of these threats were given with the idea that Copperheads would have to be foolish to set foot in Union camps. As such, these threats became more wishes, soldiers hoping that opportunities for retribution would be handed to them by fate or Copperhead stupidity. This seems to be the perspective of Thomas Honnell. Writing home to his friend Benjamin Epler, Honnell expresses contempt for Copperheads. He accused them of foolishly caring only about Vallandigham’s election to the Ohio governorship (this letter coming in 1863 during the campaign), and not paying any attention to the important matter of when and how the war should

³³ “George Vanvalkenburgh to Wife,” April 5, 1863, George W. Vanvalkenburgh Papers, FHS.

³⁴ “John Dow to Ann,” May 20, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS. Words in brackets added for clarification.

³⁵ “John Dow to Sister,” May 16, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

end. He warns that if any Copperhead were to appear in camp and speak as they were at home, “[t]he Soldiers would skin him alive.”³⁶

In some cases, these threats carried with them predictions of future events. Because soldiers tended to exaggerate the presence of Copperheads in the North, some started to believe that the war would end only when the opportunity to stamp out Peace Democrats at home presented itself. “[T]here is a good prospect of war in the Northern States,” Ohio soldier William Helsley wrote back home to his wife. Helsley actually appeared thankful that if this war were to come, he was in the army down south. Still, he knew his duty, “if I was at home and the Copperheads made any trouble I would have to help to fight them”³⁷ Indiana soldier Thomas Canaday welcomed this potential northern war, telling a friend at home, “I am in favor of fighting this war through until secesh [*sic.*] is wiped out both south & north.”³⁸

Soldiers took the opportunity to suggest their responses to these Copperheads for when they finally did return home. At home in Indiana, Stephen Emert received these warnings from his friends and family. Joseph Airhart singled out a John Whitely as the target of his wrath, and asked Emert to “just save him till I come home and I will straiten him out.”³⁹ Upon learning that there were many Butternuts at home, S. C. Lee told his friend Emert, “I should like to bee [*sic*] there and have sum of My Friends there with Me.”⁴⁰ Even if Lee’s intentions were not violent, the statement that he would not be going alone suggests the need for backup should nonviolent plans go awry. Matthew Goodrich, not a friend of Emert’s, instead asked his father for names of

³⁶ “Thomas Honnell to Respected Friend & Adopted Brother (Benjamin Epler),” September 17, 1863, Thomas C. Honnell Papers, OHS.

³⁷ “William Jefferson Helsley to Wife,” August 28, 1864, William Jefferson Helsley Papers, FHS.

³⁸ “Thomas Canaday to Stephen Emert,” March 15, 1863, Stephen Emert Letters, IHS.

³⁹ “Joseph Airhart to Brother and Sister,” June 5, 1864, Stephen Emert Letters, IHS.

⁴⁰ “S. C. Lee to Friend,” June 18, 1863, Stephen Emert Letters, IHS.

some Copperheads, so that when he returned home he would “have the pleasure of letting them know what I enlisted for.”⁴¹

Not all soldiers were limited to dreaming about the possibility of revenge. Soldiers home on leave, rather than discuss the reasons for their enlistment and fighting with rhetoric, were expressing themselves in a decidedly rougher fashion. “I find the Copper-Colored Brethren in Ohio are taken and done,” a Sergeant Gregg notes to his family, “for Uncle Sams boys returned from the field – Some of them [Copperheads] get justly rough lessons once in a while”⁴² Acting in groups, Union soldiers were able to exact retribution on individuals they had identified as their enemy at home. William Tanner told the story of an incident where the regiment met a Copperhead while in camp. “[T]he boys put a rope around an [his] neck and drew him up.”⁴³

When describing this attempted hanging of a Copperhead, Tanner somewhat disappointedly noted that the incident ended when “the officers came along and stopped,” the soldiers.⁴⁴ These kinds of moments were mostly undertaken by the enlisted men. Officers in the Union Army generally frowned upon poor treatment of civilians, especially in the time prior to Grant and Sherman’s hard war campaigns that began in the summer of 1864. William Pittenger notes a similar moment when his regiment was still in an Ohio camp. A scout from his regiment captured “a blackhearted Secessionist” while on patrol, a man the soldiers promptly put up as an “exhibition.” The next day, a dissatisfied Pittenger notes, “The man who we had on exhibition yesterday was released last night by Gen. Sturgess.”⁴⁵ Notably, these events tended to take place before soldiers left their home states for the fields of the South. There will be a further discussion of this kind of contact in Part II.

⁴¹ “Matthew Goodrich to Father,” May 24, 1863, Matthew Goodrich Papers, FHS.

⁴² “Sergt. Major Gregg to S. C. G. and Family,” February 22, 1864, Gregg Family Papers, FHS.

⁴³ “William Tanner to Brother and Sister,” August 5, 1863, William Tanner Papers, FHS.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Entry of May 8, 1863, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” FHS.

While soldiers angrily discussed violence against Copperheads, the not so peaceable Peace Democrats were involved in activities of their own. Antiwar activity was not merely a position calmly defended by oratory and controlled from above by capable leaders who directed the people at benign events such as picnics and rallies. Copperheadism, especially in its Midwestern hotbed, took on a number of violent forms. Clashes between sides were not uncommon, and sometimes even took place at Republican campaign events. Word of these intimidation attempts reached Union soldiers, and increased their worry for the safety of the friends and family left behind. These worries undoubtedly helped to turn soldiers away from the political party with which the perpetrators were so easily tied.

Soldier fears over violence were well-grounded, as word coming from home would demonstrate. “The Butternuts have burned one meeting house and partly tore down another,” wrote Sarah Lundy to a friend, “because the minister preached good Union sermons and not in favor of Vallandigham.”⁴⁶ Robert Winn retells a story for his sister of “a dark picture of rebel chivalry.” When a Kentucky man had, “got a little too much liquer,” he started to talk about his support of Lincoln and the Union, “and would have told them more but they knocked him down and stamped him until he had to be carried away.”⁴⁷ Sometimes this violence extended even against soldiers. Ann Dow described to her soldier brother John an incident where a number of Copperheads in Holmes County, Ohio crashed a Union camp, and stole a cannon from nearby Bladensburg. The situation was apparently serious enough that the Governor sent troops to help calm the situation down.⁴⁸

Most Copperhead activity revolved around the disruption of Republican and Union political events. Not content to hold their own rallies, anti-war Midwesterners targeted the

⁴⁶ “Sarah Lundy to Mr. J. O. Martin,” June 8, 1863, Sarah Lundy Correspondence, OHS.

⁴⁷ “Robert Winn to Sister,” September 7, 1863, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

⁴⁸ “Ann Dow to Bro. John,” June 21, 1863, Dow Family Papers, FHS.

opposition party's events for agitation and even violence. Sarah Lundy described an Ohio rally which the Copperheads tried unsuccessfully to stop from meeting. Once this objective failed, they resorted to pelting the convention goers with stones as the event ended. Lundy noted, "some of the Ladies were hurt severely with stones."⁴⁹ It appears stone-throwing was the disruption of choice, as Ann Dow told of a similar event, also in Ohio, where someone she and her brother John knew had his arm broken by a stone. "[T]he butternuts disturbed the meeting," she said, noting that "there was a group of men hollering for Vallandigham."⁵⁰ Indeed, a meeting not disrupted by Copperheads appears to have been news of its own, as M. L. P. Thompson took the time to relate that "not a copperhead hissed," at a Republican rally in Cincinnati.⁵¹

As stories such as these made their way into the minds of soldiers, they combined with previously examined fears of a Northern civil war started by these southern sympathizers. "I'm afraid the butternuts will make trouble in the North this fall," stated one soldier succinctly.⁵² Luther Thustin expressed his concerns that the "violent & defying" Copperheads were ready to exploit dissatisfaction with the war and begin rioting in the North.⁵³ Some of these concerns were slightly exaggerated. Robert Winn repeated to his sister overheard news that, "you were expecting a party of 800 Southern patriots at Hawesville to cut the throats of persons loyal to the Lincoln dynasty." To the modern reader, the number may seem a bit over the top, though the mixture of concern and confusion is evident when Winn follows by asking, "how is it?"⁵⁴ In the aftermath of elections, being able to look back on their earlier concerns, some soldiers readjusted

⁴⁹ "Sarah Lundy to Friend," August 12, 1863, Sarah Lundy Correspondence, OHS.

⁵⁰ "Ann Dow to John," August 10, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁵¹ "M. L. P. Thompson to Forhan," February 24, 1863, M. L. P. Thompson Papers, OHS.

⁵² Thomas Honnell to Friend," August 23, 1864, Thomas C. Honnell Papers, OHS.

⁵³ "Mr. Garnett to Major L. T. Thustin," June 3, 1863, Luther Thayer Thustin Papers, FHS.

⁵⁴ "Robert Winn to Martha Winn," ca. August 12, 1863, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

their views of Copperhead brazenness, while still attempting to justify their earlier worries. S. C. Alden does such when he writes in October of 1863, after the Ohio gubernatorial election, “I did have some fears that after all the blowing there might possibly be some violence offered on election day but when it came to the test they [the Copperheads] were too peaceable in principle to make any disturbance, though they had threatened to make Abolition blood run like water.”⁵⁵

Not all campaigning by Copperheads involved provoking Republicans and soldiers. Democrats had their own campaigns and rallies during the Civil War years and were every bit as determined to win as they had been before. The Democrats were the established political party, and brought into the conflict a nationwide operation that helped them to keep competitive even with a significant chunk of their party’s base suddenly no longer considering themselves American citizens. By the 1860s, the Democrats had already been operating for three decades, growing their organization and, Jean Baker suggests, their own culture of campaigning for offices.⁵⁶ Soldiers, most of whom supported Republican and Union Party candidates, were not immune from hearing about and experiencing Democratic campaigns.

These discussions on campaigning provide a window into the mid-nineteenth century political process. Certainly, there can be a great focus on the speeches, rallies, picnics, parades, and other social activities political parties used to gather support and promote their positions and candidates. They also show the ways in which campaigns portrayed their opposition and negatively interacted with them. Intimidation, disruption and individual acts of violence were not uncommon, and soldiers were made fully aware of their happening.

⁵⁵ “S. C. Alden to Miss Jane Berry,” October, 1863, Samuel S. Miner Papers, OHS. This assertion that Copperheads were “too peaceable in principle” echoes the paradigm illustrated in Neely’s The Union Divided, where he asserts that it was respect for the Constitution and the electoral process that helped to control anti-Administration and anti-Republican violence.

⁵⁶ Baker, Affairs of Party, mostly Chapter 7, “The Meaning of Elections,” 261-316.

The most obvious example of Democratic campaigning is the rallies and picnics they set up for that purpose. Vallandigham discussed the success of these rallies in a private letter to Thomas Seymour of Connecticut. “The meeting yesterday at Indianapolis was immense & full of courage & prudent firmness. Without exaggeration the number may be set down at 40,000.” Vallandigham was not prepared to let the rallies alone speak for the cause, but promoted it with pamphlets and other published materials. He writes in the same letter to Seymour, “In a few days, a short address will appear from me which will defeat the whole purpose & show that, South or North, I am the same Union man, & devoted to the same principles which I have ever maintained.”⁵⁷ Running for political office, Vallandigham hoped to keep his Union credentials, such as they were, as strong as possible. Vallandigham was not necessarily a Confederate supporter. In fact, his position, argues Cowden, is the more moderate Peace position, hoping for a compromise that would restore the Union.⁵⁸ Vallandigham could certainly be accused of naiveté, especially by a modern audience, but not of direct Southern sympathies.

Letters and diaries made note of rallies and events throughout the Midwest. Even brief statements reveal a level of newsworthiness for either soldiers or their loved ones. Pittenger’s diary contains the entry, “Copperheads making more demonstrations in Logan Co., Ohio,” while a letter from Sarah Lundy notes a “secesh meeting” in a nearby town.⁵⁹ Others wrote of the rallies, describing themselves as less than impressed at what was seen and heard. Robert Winn described a Democratic meeting to his sister, calling it, “characteristic of the Copperhead Party.” His complaint regarded the speeches that were given there, as he called them, “too silly to pass my kind of review.” He closed his thoughts with his hope that such sentiments as were

⁵⁷ “Clement Vallandigham to Horatio Seymour,” May 21, 1863, Clement Vallandigham Letter, OHS.

⁵⁸ Cowden, *Heaven Will Frown*, 168. Cowden contrasts Vallandigham’s position with that of the more radical Ohio representative Alexander Long, who advocated letting the Southern states secede without any Northern resistance.

⁵⁹ Entry of March 28, 1863, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS; “Sarah Lundy to Friend,” July 6, 1863, Sarah Lundy Correspondence, OHS.

expressed there would not carry the day, though it is possible with his pessimism that he was not ready to believe that.⁶⁰ Ann Dow, writing to her soldier brother, was also not taken by the rallies, calling them “so insulting.”⁶¹

Sometimes, rallies were held in response to Republican campaigning, or the other way around. Both sides dueled with campaigns, and used them almost as primitive polling. When talking about a Republican meeting in Ohio, Sarah Lundy expressed a concern that a “week previous to that the Copperheads had a large meeting and it was feared by many that Tuesdays meeting would fall below theirs in regard to numbers.”⁶² Copperheads held rallies for similar reasons. A letter from Illinois told of a Copperhead picnic, “about 5 or 6 miles from there [a Republican picnic] so as to get the men to go there, and so they would not have enough men to raise the pole.”⁶³ Sometimes, the two even held parades in front of the other, leading to direct confrontation. This confrontation need not be violent, as Isaac Wilson Dow described, saying:

Week ago last Monday night I was over to Alleghy[?] to a republican meeting. They had a nice time, big crowd, good speeches and fine music. The copperheads had a meeting there the same night. It did not amount to much. they come over from Pittsb. in great array with all kinds of devices on their banners, marched up to the Democrat Head Quarters. They had one speech when the Republican Band played Rally Round the Flag which made the copperheads mad. They gave three groans for Old Abe then started for Pittsburgh. The republicans had the best band of music I ever heard. They played Red White + Blue, Hail Columbia, Star Spangled Banner mighty nice.⁶⁴

Not all campaigning was local. While Vallandigham was the key figure in the Midwest, especially his home state of Ohio, his fortunes waned after losing the Governor’s race in 1863. By 1864, attention had shifted to national politics, and the Copperhead hero became their Presidential nominee George McClellan. With a national focus, more national events came into a soldier’s view. Writing from Connecticut, R. G. Holt told a friend that “[Fernando] Wood said

⁶⁰ “Robert Winn to Sister,” October 21, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

⁶¹ “Ann Dow to John,” October 15, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁶² “Sarah Lundy to Friend,” August 12, 1863, Sarah Lundy Correspondence, OHS.

⁶³ “Bella to Brother, Ike,” June 24, 1863, Rockbridge, Illinois Papers, OHS.

⁶⁴ “Isaac Wilson Dow to Sister,” October 20, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

in a speech mad at Norwalk, ct. that if he was Gov of Conn that no more men should go to the war unless they went over his dead body and he believed that Thomas H. [Seymour] the democratic nominee for Gov believed as he Wood did so you see we have them here as well as in Ohio.”⁶⁵ Other soldiers noted or were made aware of the great celebrations that accompanied McClellan’s nomination. “The Democrats nominated their man for President last Wednesday,” said Annie Spence to a John Hamill, continuing, “they had a big time in Delphi that night a firing the canon and drinking whiskey. I expect that they felt happy.”⁶⁶ More succinctly, Franklin David Witwer noted in his diary, “butternuts had quite a jolly time today over the nomination of McClellan.”⁶⁷

In their campaigning, Copperheads used whatever resource was at their disposal. One that came up on occasion was the use of women in rallies, a strategy that seemed to carry some unexpected consequences. Ann Dow, writing to her brother John, talked about this use of women. “The Vallandinghamers are going to have a grand meeting in Newark To-morrow [this being in August]. They are trying to get up a pack of thirty-four girls in every township.” Ann seemed less than convinced that this was going to work, saying, “I expect they do not agree very well here. Some of them won’t go because others are going,”⁶⁸ In a letter the following day, written as more details about the rally had come to her attention, Ann notes the leader of the girls, a Miss Nellie Pence, who she flatly identifies as, “the biggest toad in the puddle.”⁶⁹ She told John of a similar story in September. A “grand demonstration” to be held in Mt. Vernon involving the women seemed destined for trouble because the girls, “are all squabbling among themselves.” “A great many of them won’t go,” she noted, “because Call is going and she has

⁶⁵ “R. G. Holt to Friend Atkinson,” March 12, 1863, R. G. Holt Papers, OHS.

⁶⁶ “Annie Spence to Mr. J. A. Hamill,” September 4, 1864, John Alexander Hamill Papers, IHS.

⁶⁷ Entry of September 3, 1864, “Franklin David Witwer Diary,” FHS.

⁶⁸ “Ann Dow to John,” August 23, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁶⁹ “Ann Dow to Brother John,” August 24, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

heard about it.”⁷⁰ Women appeared to be unreliable Democratic operatives at best, though the shortcomings Ann Dow mentioned seem just as likely to appear if Republicans tried a similar tactic.

Democrats were not going to forgo the soldier vote if they could help it. John Vaught noted an invitation he received to, “a Supper of Butternut Soup.” While he may have thought that, “I can make a dish of soup of hard tack and beans that would prove more healthy than Butternut Soup,” it is telling that the Democrats would be sending such an invitation in his direction.⁷¹ Soldiers were brought into the campaign in other ways. Some even were running for office as Democrats. Thomas Maholm told to his brother that a Captain Putman was running for legislature, and that while doing so he had published a list of names supporting him. This list, to Maholm’s surprise, included his brother John! Without knowing whether John actually supported Captain Putman or not, Thomas clearly did not support the idea of such a list of support. “I want to know if there is no way among you to stop such men as him from making use of your names for political purpose,” he wrote, and, “I wish your officers and privates would draw up some resolutions that would settle him forever”⁷²

More than resolutions were drawn up. Some soldiers took an active part in campaigning. Lewis Hanback, a soldier who had mustered out following service with an Illinois regiment. Hanback was with one of his officers, a Colonel Smith, and reported on their campaigning activities.

Yesterday Colonel Smith spoke in Browning, a Copperhead hole on the Illinois River. He spoke there last Tuesday night and so stirred up the Copperheads that nothing would do but that we should come back to Browning and meet their Champion, have a discussion. The Colonel agreed to come back and Friday at 2 o’clock P.M. was set for the meeting. Well the time came round and we came back to Browning and at the

⁷⁰ “Ann to John,” September 17, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁷¹ “John W. Vaught to Mr. William C. Magill,” January 27, 1864, William Magill Letters, IHS.

⁷² “Thomas T. Maholm to Brother John,” August 16, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

appointed hour proceeded to the School House there we waited nearly an hour a few came straggling in but no Champion of Democracy made his appearance. Finally the Col. commenced speaking and continued for half an hour when in came the Democratic Champion a Major Cummings a renegade soldier who says he left the army because he couldn't fight for the nigger. The Colonel spoke an hour. Cummings followed in another hour in which did not answer a single point but abused "Old Lincoln" and the Abolitionists. The agreement made about the speaking was that Col Smith should speak one hour Cummings to follow in a reply of One hour and a Quarter Col Smith to have half an hour to reply, but just as soon as Cummings got through with his speech he left taking all the democrats with him....As the Democrats were leaving the house their ladies shouted "Cowards Cowards" Quite a respectable number remained and Colonel Smith replied in a short speech after which the meeting broke up....the Democrats felt decidedly mean I do not think they will get over it this fall Really I do not know whether this will interest you or not.⁷³

Colonel Smith's attempted debate with the "Copperhead Champion" fell flat on its face, and while an ardently pro-war man like Hanback could very easily take this as a general sign of Copperhead cowardice, we have little way of knowing if this was a pattern of activity or an isolated incident.

Campaigning was not relegated to events at home. Some Copperheads, especially family members, took their campaign to the field. Instead of general statements and pamphlets sent to cover the whole of the army, these appeals were directed at family members who served. John Dow told of "a fellow in our company that gets the most discouraging letters you ever heard of from his sister." Her arguments, as Dow understood them, were straightforward, claiming the war as one about blacks and not Union. "[S]he writes and tells him how fast the niggers are coming into Ohio and how they [unintelligible] the White Women."⁷⁴ Wives would write such letters to their soldier-husbands. Henry Schmidt of Kentucky appears to have received one from his wife Cate. His response referenced her previous letter which stated "that I Should Resign and go home that we wasent [*sic.*] Fighting for the Union but that we were Fighting for the Nigros." Schmidt scolded her for her accusations. "Peoples that think or Say so," he wrote, "are

⁷³ "Lewis Hanback to Hattie," October 8, 1864, Lewis Hanback Letters, FHS.

⁷⁴ "John Dow to Maria," May 22, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

Copperheads.”⁷⁵ Families were not the only sources of these letters. Dow mentioned a soldier named Dave who received letters from female Vallandigham supporters.⁷⁶ Knowing the role that women could play in a man’s decision to enlist, it can easily be seen how such letters would prove potentially effective. Dow seems to have doubted the overall efficacy of these letters. “What Soldiers are left,” he observed, “are true Blue. What few Butternuts we had have either deserted or resigned.”⁷⁷

While many men expressed their concerns about Copperheads campaigning and agitating the population, some turned their attention to those actually in office. Disagreement between military and civilian government were hardly new to the history of warfare, and the Civil War was no different. Resolutions that worked their way through the various state legislatures, as well as perceived shortcomings of specific politicians were made known to the army, and many soldiers reacted to them as one would expect. The potential efficacy of such resolutions and even their chances of actually passing were not as likely discussed. Their very presence, proposed by Copperheads (who, perhaps more importantly, were also Democrats) in the legislatures, was demeaning enough to the Union soldier.

Because of their rather open membership and ability to contain a wide variety of opinions, state legislatures became one of the key loci of Copperhead activity. Once in office, the ability to write and promote resolutions and legislation that would weaken the war effort, or at the very least bring about their desired end of a peaceful compromise, could easily make Copperhead efforts appear outsized relative to their actual numbers. This tactic was not limited to the state level, as members of the US House of Representatives, in particular New York’s

⁷⁵ “Henry Schmidt to Cate Schmidt,” March 14, 1863, Schmidt Family Papers, FHS.

⁷⁶ “John Dow to Sister,” October 2, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁷⁷ “John Dow to Bro. Tho^s,” May 30, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

Benjamin Wood made use of their ability to introduce antiwar petitions and resolutions.⁷⁸ The most notable part of this strategy was its utter failure of effecting the policy called for. Lack of Democratic power in the House made Wood little more than a gadfly.

This did not make similar resolutions from Midwestern state legislatures any less abhorrent or treasonous to soldiers in the field. “We learn that the Legislature of Illinois has made a motion to withdraw her troops from the field. Shame,” wrote Pittenger in his diary. “Also...the Legislature of Indiana has refused to give Gov. Morton’s message a reading.”⁷⁹ Indiana soldier Robert Hanna remarked on both his home legislature and that of Illinois, and a set of counter-resolutions drawn up by Indiana officers. Reflecting the urge for violent retribution he wrote, “If necessary, we will come back & Hang the whole congress.” He coldly added, “Traitors will not fare so well in Indiana as they have down here [Murfreesboro, Tennessee].”⁸⁰

Some soldiers knew which party was to blame and were not shy about making sure that opinion was shared. “There is beyond all doubt a growing feeling in the North against this war, and the men who have always been the humble slaves of Southern Aristocrats are fostering it by all the means in their power,” wrote Channing Richards in his diary. “Very naturally,” he continued, getting to the direct accusation, “it raises its treasonable head under the name of Democracy but shame to say, it controls more than one Legislature and openly proclaims its opposition to ‘coerture’ [*sic.*] in our National Council.”⁸¹ Along with to us now familiar refrains of treason and Southern sympathy came from some the painful thought that the government that claimed to support them was turning its back on the army. “Are those with whom we have

⁷⁸ Representative Wood of New York, on July 13, 1861, 37th Cong. 1st sess., *Cong. Globe*, 116; Representative Wood of New York, on July 15, 1861, 37th Cong., 1st sess., *Cong. Globe*, 129.

⁷⁹ Entry of January 21, 1863, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

⁸⁰ “Robert Hanna to Mrs. R. B. Hanna,” January 29, 1863, Robert Barlow Hanna Family Papers, IHS.

⁸¹ Entry of February 19, 1863, “Diary of Channing Richards,” Channing Richards Papers, FHS.

implicit confidence and trusted to our homes and firesides turning traitors to us?" asked Pittenger. "In the name of High and Holy Heaven are we thus to be destroyed, sacrificed and degraded? Is it possible?"⁸²

Legislatures were not the only targets of anti-government feeling from the midst of soldiers. Governors received sanction from some corners of the army. While in large part this criticism was likely muted by the fact that many governors in the Midwest were Republicans that held strong pro-Union and pro-war positions, they were not immune to the occasional complaint. Floyd Thurman of Indiana wrote that he and his compatriots in the cavalry felt, "Governor Morton has not treated us with due respect." Accusations had come to the camp that the Governor, likely taken aback by concerns that soldiers were deserting the military due to the influence of Copperheadism and secret societies, had named Thurman's 1st Indiana Cavalry regiment as one "tinctured with butter nutism." The cavalry, Thurman continued, "have done hard service for twenty months always obeyed orders and have lost but a few by deserting." Thurman does offer the possibility that "this is a mistake of the Gov beyond a doubt *if he made the assertion.*"⁸³ Thurman's ability to disbelieve that Governor Morton would have denounced the cavalry lends itself to believe the Governor's words were far less harsh and perhaps misinterpreted. Still, this shows the sensitivity many soldiers felt towards not only criticism, but the potential for betrayal.

While politics can be local, they are certainly national in scope as well. Individual states could propose to remove their troops, but only the national government could truly end the war. Early in the war, the ever-present pessimism of Robert Winn was in fact not in force as he discussed the actions of the national government. While he showed some disgust for national

⁸² Entry of January 21, 1863, "William Henry Pittenger Diary," OHS.

⁸³ "Floyd Thurman to Brother," March 4, 1862, Floyd Thurman Civil War Letters, IHS. Emphasis added.

leadership in any of its forms, he was also careful to note the lack of resolution in that regard. Winn expounded that, “it seemed to me the Generals, Secretaries, Congress and the President for the last three months Congress was in session did not want – or at least did not care to stop the war. At least they squabbled about this and that but never showed anything like energy till the close of the session.”⁸⁴ Perhaps there was hope for the Union after all. As the war progressed, and the campaign for the Presidency came into focus by mid-1864, the goal of the Copperheads to take control of the government and end the war that way became clear, at least to Thomas Honnell. “Their only hope now,” he wrote of the South, “is that their northern friends McClellan & his Copperhead supporters will gain the power and compromise – or in the other words – submit to them and let them Establish their Confederate Monarchy.” In a conclusion that seems prescient, Honnell slyly added a dig at McClellan’s chances, commenting that, “We have every reason to be encouraged.”⁸⁵

Even while out in the field, soldiers were able to experience the presence of Copperhead agitators at home in particular ways. Letters and diaries reveal that being away from home did not mean total isolation from the news of home. While it is conceivable that the accounts they read and reacted to were exaggerated, their perception is important. The Copperhead movement was quite real in the Midwest, and very powerful in the Ohio Valley area. Congressmen like Vallandigham, and George Pendleton, who became McClellan’s running mate in 1864, came from southern Ohio and represented Peace Democrats on a national level. It is only natural then, that word of their exploits, and more importantly those of their followers, would reach men in the fields. Once this word got out, the soldiers reacted in visceral ways. This image of Copperheads

⁸⁴ “Robert Winn to Sister,” August 17, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

⁸⁵ “Thomas Honnell to Friend,” September 25, 1864, Thomas Corwin Honnell Papers, OHS.

dominated the view many soldiers received of Democratic actions from home, and likely turned them away from voting for such a party.

Part II: Union Sentiment and Secession Holes

“Dear me how strong is the contrast of Union Sentiment on the Banks of the La Belle Rivere say the fluttering handkerchiefs of our better halves and hear the shouting hurras of the men and boys as we pass along and also how strong by way of contrast is any want of Union sentiment made thereby and In particular do I [sic]. A point in time after passing Maysville – a loyal U family on the Ky. side did salute us most heartily with the U. flag up side down, not an unfit emblem of Old Ky’s Distress in the present struggle and then to the house of their next neighbor so cold and so sullen not a cheer or a sign of good wishes made manifest as we pass by and made doubly more so by the contrast of their neighbors on both sides of them”¹

As the war progressed, and the armies advanced, contact between Union soldiers and the civilians who opposed them remained a constant aspect of life. The two Kentucky neighbors Thomas D. Phillip and his regiment passed illustrate the tensions faced not only by soldiers as they advanced into territories with ever increasing southern sympathies, but between the families in that tense area. The experiences of Union soldiers with these Confederate sympathizers differed from those back in their homes. These instances touch upon the day-to-day activities of armies and the organization’s relationship with civilians as a whole. Sometimes, the line Northern troops saw between sympathizer and soldier could be very blurred indeed.

Resistance to the war was not limited to the home front. In fact, the areas of these Midwestern states that tended to sympathize more strongly with the Confederacy were the southern sections, those closest to the frontlines. Union soldiers marching through southern Indiana and Ohio, heading towards that Mason-Dixon Line of the West, the Ohio River, could very easily find themselves in uncomfortable and unfriendly territory. The situation grew even more tenuous after crossing the river, as troops marched through uncertain Kentucky.

¹ Entry of November 16, 1861, “Thomas D. Phillip Diary,” FHS.

Kentucky was the focus of many of these encounters. Guerrilla activity in the state was not uncommon, and Confederate sympathizers found no lack of hiding spots. Dashing Confederate cavalry commander John Morgan raided Kentucky through the war, and even used it as a base for the occasional thrust into Northern states such as Ohio and Indiana. As the debate within towns raged over which side to take in the conflict, soldiers found themselves squarely in the middle. Though the whole of the state was initially neutral, individual cities and towns took strong stances, and the residents made sure passing soldiers knew their orientation.

Considering the degree to which many Kentuckians opposed the Union cause, as compared to other states, this can be a difficult case to study. Various degrees of Copperhead sentiment existed in Ohio and Indiana. Some claimed to favor Union, as they called for an end to the war through negotiation and reconciliation. Others declared that if the Southern states wished to leave, then it was their right, the North ought to let them go and it was quite simply none of their business. Different though these stances may have been, they were similar in that they were rhetorical, or at the very least political in the way of a town hall meeting. But, if war is politics by another means, then some Kentuckians were willing users of another mean. While an actual Confederate was a rare kind to be found in Ohio or Indiana, the distinction between Confederate and Copperhead in Kentucky was thin and malleable. As explained in the introduction, these men, these violent resisters are going to be counted in the realm of Copperheads provided that they did not serve in the official Confederate army. After some initial wavering, Kentucky would remain Union, and the state's votes would still very much count. Unlike other states with guerrilla problems such as Tennessee, Kentucky would still have a direct role to play in national politics of the era.

Not every town was dangerous, though. In many parts of this border region, Union sentiment ran high. These were areas that had been threatened by Confederate forces, or simply places where the majority of the population would rather have stayed with the Union. Soldiers from northern states noted the sendoff they received from the locals. These good feelings extended into Kentucky, and even into some parts of Tennessee. Cheering crowds, waving flags and other symbols of support were a welcome intrusion into the otherwise repetitive and mundane military day of marching and drill. Many soldiers took the time to mention the support they received from certain towns they passed through.

As the western Union armies mustered in the late summer of 1861, support for the cause was widespread and fervent. Democrats of the region generally fell in line with the prevailing sentiment, following the lead of the nationally-recognized Stephen Douglas, a fellow Midwesterner. Douglas's support for Lincoln and the war was echoed in the parades of Ohio. William Henry Pittenger's experience leaving Ohio was typical of the war's early days. Calling the need to say so "needless," and proceeding to mention it anyway, Pittenger's fellow Ohioans, "thronged around to look upon those who had sacrificed their all to go forth to engage in the holy cause of defending their country's rights....Thousands had gathered there to witness our departure and to bestow the wish of success." Betraying the emotion of the moment for many, Pittenger also noted the, "faces...mottled with sorrow and warm hearted tears."²

The celebration continued to the state's borders. Pittenger describes Lawrenceburg, Ohio as home to, "the most patriotic friends and people we have yet found." He continued, saying the, "reception in the city was gratifying indeed, attest 10,000 of the citizens gathered on the levee to witness our departure for the West, there to engage in the common defense of our country. We

² Entry of August 2, 1861, "William Henry Pittenger Diary," OHS.

received many hearty cheers when we pushed from the shores of old Buckeye.”³ Accounts from Indiana were not as glowing, but Robert Hanna remained optimistic. Commenting that the area around his position in Kentucky was, “half ‘secesh’, + half union,” he added that, “if Indiana pours herself in here for a while, I guess the union side will be considerably in the majority.”⁴

Hanna’s optimism was not necessary in all of Kentucky. As a divided state, Kentucky possessed many towns and cities that expressed their support for the presence of Union troops. “The majority of the people here are Union,” wrote Ira Goodrich from an army camp in the state. “We are treated very cordially by the citizens all,” he added, “Union or Secesh.”⁵ Union sentiment stretched even to the southwestern part of the state, on the Tennessee border. Lewis Dunn reported similar good will in the same area. “[A]s good luck may have it instead of getting words we got better. Cheering was it to hear the union Sentiments exclaimed as we passed along. Greenville in [Muhlenberg] Co. was illuminated with union flags. Yes I may say from Calhoun to the Tenn. line.”⁶ This extended farther into Christian County. “The union men of the country,” Dunn would write in 1863, “are uncompromising men. They say that if no other policy will sustain the union but to free the negro let them go before we would let this Glorious Cause that we are fighting for fall.”⁷ As will be discussed further in Part III, emancipation remained a significant issue even amongst Union troops. Following the issue of the Emancipation Proclamation, the fact that the citizens of Christian County were so willing to support the Union as to accept the liberation of slaves speaks to the depth of their Union fervor.

Even farther south, into Tennessee, blue-coated soldiers met with hospitality and even cheering. In the summer of 1863, John Dow was in eastern Tennessee, and he acknowledged

³ Entry of August 18, 1861, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

⁴ “Robert Barlow Hanna to Wife,” August 20, 1862, Robert Barlow Hanna Family Papers, IHS.

⁵ “Ira Goodrich to Cousin Sarah,” May 9, 1863, Ira B. Goodrich Letter, FHS.

⁶ “Lewis R. Dunn to Father,” February 17, 1862, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

⁷ “Lewis R. Dunn to Father,” April 14, 1863, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

that portion of the state was, “all union,” and that, “the Boys gets great encouragement from the People and nearly every Arise? that I have passed you can see the Stars & Stripes floating from the door.” Reflecting on the distressing news he must have been hearing from home, Dow further added: “If one half of the People of Ohio are as loyal as the people of East Tenna. there would be no party-ism.”⁸ Still, danger could abound in this decidedly Confederate state. Lewis Dunn contrasted the cheering of Kentucky with the very dissimilar response from Tennessee. “[T]hey were as still as a mouse; had nothing to say.” Maybe quiet, but certainly not lacking for resentment and malice towards the Union armies. Dunn mentioned orders that, “a Soldier is not allowed to buy a thing from a citizen of eatable kind for Several Soldiers has been poisoned.”⁹ Grey-clad troops were not the only threats to face men in hostile territory.

Kentucky’s place in the war is sometimes difficult to get a grasp upon. The Bluegrass State faced many questions regarding its loyalty to the Union and the Northern cause. In some cases, this led to Unionism. In others, Union soldiers are able to question both the sincerity of the state’s loyalty, and sometimes by extension, the sanity of its population. Taken as a whole, Kentucky’s civilians showcased the collective schizophrenia to be expected of a state on the frontier of war. The fervor directed in favor of the Confederacy was tied, by the soldiers, back to the news from home about Copperhead agitators. This direct experience with Southern sympathizers helped to direct men’s ire towards Copperheads, further entrenching the image in their minds.

Coming to the state as a foreign immigrant, Robert Winn is sometimes able to be very harsh towards his adopted home. Added to his trademark cynicism, the sarcasm practically oozes from his letters when the conversation turns to Kentucky’s citizenry and their loyalty.

⁸ “John Dow to Sister,” August 24, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

⁹ “Lewis R. Dunn to Father,” February 17, 1862, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

“We are in a State that cast an almost unanimous Union Vote, Unconditional Union,” he wrote at one point, “but what does it signify – when and how was such a remarkable change effected in the minds of Kentuckians? Does anybody suppose that Kentucky would have cast any Union Votes, much less a majority, without the presence of Federal soldiery.”¹⁰ “It is a wonderful thing this Kentucky loyalty,” he wrote at another time, for “they (the Kentuckians) all full of the greatness – the goodness of Ky. in giving half her proper quota of men to the Government.” And just in case Martha had thought him serious in this instance, he concluded by adding that, “every man she has in the Rebel Army has let her off from sending two to the U. S. A.”¹¹

Coupled with cynicism over the citizens of his state, Winn expressed concern at the fate likely to befall the state from the enemy. “A great deal of us,” he wrote, referring to himself and fellow soldiers, “believe Kentucky will be overrun yet and the desolation now existing in the Eastern part of Virginia and northern Mississippi carried there.” As for the proper response to such an invasion, Winn stated his objection to actually forcing the Confederates out. “In such an event the power of all these yellow shouldered rascals [a reference to the yellow insignia of rank of Union generals] would not keep us here to defend the property of rank rebels. These fellows are heartily detested. I consider them next to the Devil only worse.”¹² Matthew Cook shared some of his future brother-in-law’s negativity towards the state, even if he fell short on the sarcasm. Writing to Martha over his fears of the citizenry, he stated, “I hope the rebels will conscript Ky. if the Government won’t – for the rebels in the rear are more dangerous than in front.”¹³

Other soldiers expressed their objections to the less-than-loyal opinions and actions they saw in the borders of the Bluegrass State. Kentucky soldier Thomas Speed, writing to his

¹⁰ “Robert Winn to Sister,” August 8, 1863, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹¹ “Robert Winn to Sister,” March 17, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS, emphasis in original.

¹² “Robert Winn to Sister,” c. August 12, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹³ “Matthew Cook to Martha Winn,” July 13, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

mother, expressed the concern that, “Kentucky is in a Miserable Condition. I wonder how long it will last.” Being a native, Speed’s thoughts also turned to his mother’s safety, as he wrote, “I suppose the rebels around you are very bitter – do you have anything to do with them?”¹⁴ Others serving in Kentucky dealt with the populace, and did so with much reluctance. Julius Stedman complained to his father of the price gouging done by the citizens. “The Kentuckians charge us four prices for every thing we get from them....This I look upon as no good omen of their loyalty”¹⁵ Doubts existed even into the very late stages of the war. Lincoln’s new Attorney General, and native Kentuckian, James Speed wrote to his mother, “I can see that the people of Kentucky want to go to the very verge of anarchy before they can be brought to their senses.” This came in late March, less than a week before the fall of Richmond!¹⁶

When not questioning the loyalty of Kentucky the state, many soldiers remained more than willing to complain about the conditions they faced that surrounded their dealings with civilians who were less receptive to Billy Yank’s presence among them. In contrast to the tales of cheering and flag-waving crowds in some towns, others were marked with a decidedly Southern temperament. The soldiers labeled these people and towns “secesh,” a shorthand form of “secession” and “secessionist,” and a common epithet thrown at many Confederates and their northern supporters. Whether in the requisition of goods, verbal disagreements, or merely sullen and angry stares, Confederate sympathizers who met the army were determined to make sure their dislike was made known.

The most common way for Union soldiers to come into contact with civilians, and for those civilians to make a soldier’s life difficult, was in the requisition of supplies for the army.

¹⁴ “Thomas Speed to Parents,” June 29, 1864, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS.

¹⁵ “Julius Stedman to Father,” December 27, 1861, Julius Caesar Stedman Letters, FHS.

¹⁶ “James Speed to Mother,” March 26, 1865, Speed Family Papers, FHS. This Speed is unrelated to the previously cited Thomas Speed.

Early in the war, it was the policy of the US government to reimburse civilians for the provisions given, and the army paid what was asked. As mentioned in previous letters, those civilians with Confederate sympathies were not above making some money off of the army. Instead of refusing to aid the soldiers, they would either offer their goods at exorbitant prices, or provide a discount to Confederates with similar requests. “There is an old bachelor,” wrote George Vanvalkenburgh, “lives out where we go on picket and you would think to hear him talk that he was one of the best union men in the world but when the rebels were in here he told them that he would give them two good fat sheep for every union man that they would kill.” Added to this general distrust was the resentment Vanvalkenburgh felt at the army’s duty to the ‘old bachelor,’: “But we have to guard his property and if the quarter master goes there and gets any corn, oats and hay he must have just as much pay as though he [the old bachelor] was the best union man in the country”¹⁷

Not all requisitions came from Union payment. Some, especially in the early days, were items taken from those who did not wish to see troops in their homes. “Before the soldiers came here,” wrote Watson Goodrich, “the people were secessionists, but many left when the union troops came. Several of the houses are now vacant.” Not willing to let such a good situation go to waste, the army commandeered these houses, “and the officers have generally good quarters in them.”¹⁸ Henry Hibben also reported vacant houses in his travels with the army. In a town where, “people...are all secessionists and sympathize with the Rebels,” Hibben noted that, “Many of the people have fled and left their houses, fearing that we would murder them.”¹⁹

As the war went on, the army needed more, and appears to have been less willing to pay what was asked. “The Soldiers have taken every thing the Citizens have,” wrote John Dow, “and

¹⁷ “George W. Vanvalkenburgh to Wife,” March 30, 1863, George W. Vanvalkenburgh Papers, FHS.

¹⁸ “Watson Goodrich to Friend Alvin,” November 26, 1861, Watson Goodrich Papers, FHS.

¹⁹ “Henry B. Hibben to Sister,” October 30, 1861, Kephart Family Papers, IHS.

our commissaries had to issue rations to them to keep them from Starving.” Expressing the desire of these civilians to get out from under the hard hand of war, he continued, “They are all Sick of the war and are willing to Settle with Uncle Samuel on any terms.” In the end though, Dow’s lack of sympathy is what comes through. “They all claim to be good union men,” wrote the implacable Union soldier, “but there was not a man voted for the union in this (Franklin) County.”²⁰

Thomas A. Phillip recorded a meeting with several Copperhead civilians in his diary, a story which carries both aspects of Copperhead resentment towards soldiers, and Copperhead threats levied at civilians who may have been less enthusiastic about the Southern cause. While requisitioning supplies at the farm of a man named Jenkins, Phillip observed the tale:

“about 12 o. clock our steam boat landed at the Rebel Jenkins farm – which is some 7 miles long and about 5 miles wide...the companies searched the Houses they did not find much in the Houses except the wife the Father & Mother in Law of the Rebel Jenkins who said that the farm belonged to them and that there was not anything belonging to Jenkins unless it was some stock and produce...The Mother in [law] of Jenkins was quite Secesh and called our officers and men some very hard names...about 5 O’clock the Regt formed on the level Sunday morning the citizens feeling much relieved that some one had come to protect them, for the Rebel Jenkins has threatened to burn the place and destroy the Stores belong[ing] to Uncle Sam.”²¹

For Jenkins and his kin, it wasn’t enough to harass the soldiers. Their daily regimen required terrorizing the whole of the area. The activities of Phillip’s “Rebel Jenkins” are very similar to some of the guerrilla activities Union soldiers and other civilians were subject to around the area, though those will be discussed later.

Other soldiers shared similar experiences even without the need to gather supplies. “[Y]ou ought to know that there can be no worse copperheads hissing “treason to freedom” anywhere than those that I now have to associate with,” wrote Robert Winn from an encampment

²⁰ “John Dow to Sister,” July 12, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

²¹ “Thomas A. Phillip Diary,” pg. 13-15, FHS.

in Kentucky.²² “Hopkinsville is a splendid place for troops to be station,” added Lewis Dunn, “though I can’t say much about this town though...they are all Rebels.”²³ Walker Porter, when describing a particular day’s march, also mentioned the loyalties of the towns through which he passed. He was willing to note the exception, though, and described the town of Crittenden by saying: “Saw the first union flag flying that I have seen in Ky. received with cheers.”²⁴ Robert Hanna put forth a similar description, referring to the place he was at as being populated with, “Rebel with some few exceptions.” In a somewhat revealing observation, he noticed that, “All of the exceptions are those who are [without slaves].”²⁵

Thomas D. Phillip (not related to the previously mentioned Thomas A. Phillip) mentioned similar experiences in the various towns through which he passed. While the life of a soldier on the march does not generally contain a great deal of excitement, it is notable that each town entered receives special mention based on the reception given. In some cases, such as Bardstown, the site is simply labeled, “a Secesh hole”²⁶ In another instance the prior day, in Mt. Washington, Kentucky, the soldiers appear to have done a little more to draw attention to themselves. While again referring to the town as, “a secession hole,” Phillip also draws attention to the fact that the regimental band was, “playing Yankee Doodle,” as they passed through. He concluded with a description of the citizens’ response: “No one saluted or cheered us but on the contrary they all looked sullen and bad.”²⁷ Several days later, after making similar observations about the town of New Haven, Phillip also added an opinion regarding the areas of support and derision. “I notice,” he said, “that we are cheered and saluted in the country. When in the towns

²² “Robert Winn to Sister,” September 12, 1863, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

²³ “Lewis R. Dunn to Father,” April 9, 1862, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

²⁴ Entry of September 20, 1862, “Walker Porter Diaries,” FHS.

²⁵ “Robert Barlow Hanna to Wife,” January 24, 1863, Robert Barlow Hanna Civil War Papers, IHS.

²⁶ Entry of December 12, 1861, “Thomas D. Phillip Diary,” FHS.

²⁷ Entry of December 11, 1861, “Thomas D. Phillip Diary,” FHS.

that we have passed through the people appear to be cold and indifferent, not caring much for the Union.”²⁸

As he and his regiment marched south, William Pittenger of Ohio recorded similar thoughts about the various towns through which they passed. A series of entries from September of 1861 reveals the sentiment encountered in some towns. “We have on exhibition a blackhearted Secessionist who was captured by our scout last night.” More than just any secessionist, “He is mounted and is a Capt. of a cavalry camp, armed with a double barrel shotgun,” which certainly make him something of a prize.²⁹ Unfortunately for Pittenger and his compatriots, the next day’s entry includes the information: “The man who we had on exhibition yesterday was released last night by Gen. Sturgess.” Pittenger was also willing to report from amongst the men that, “There is great dissatisfaction in camp on account of his doing but he was released for lack of evidence.”³⁰ Men such as this captured captain were actually rather hard to come by, as Pittenger observed a few days later, writing, “There is scarcely an able bodied citizen to be found, as they have nearly all joined the Rebel army.”³¹ Not that such men were impossible to find. An entry from November mentioned that a few men tried to get some chickens from a “old Secessionist,” who responded rather violent. One of the soldiers received for his effort, “some 70 shots in the back which will no doubt prove fatal.”³²

Any army worries about spies, and the possibilities are even more pronounced in the uncertain territories these Union armies traversed. There are likely a great deal of stories around Civil War spying, both from the perpetrators and the soldiers who caught them. Thomas Phillip passes along one such incident in a diary entry from January 1862. “It was rumored,” he wrote,

²⁸ Entry of December 14, 1861, “Thomas D. Phillip Diary,” FHS.

²⁹ Entry of September 9, 1861, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

³⁰ Entry of September 10, 1861, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

³¹ Entry of September 15, 1861, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

³² Entry of November 18, 1861, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

“that Genl. Nelson had discovered two female spies in the persons of two daughters of a famer adjoining our [camp] who came to him for passes to cross the lines.” The passing of civilians through camp was not in and of itself an unusual occurrence, but he continued: “on looking at them, [General Nelson’s] suspicions were awakened and putting his hand on their persons he drew out of their bosoms Several letters giving an account of our camp, and also the plans thereof.”³³ Phillip did not mention (and likely did not know) what hint General Nelson received as to the intentions, nor what became of the two would-be spies.

More dangerous than spies, and more present in this tenuous area, were guerrillas.³⁴ Rather than express their distaste for the Union with cold stares, exorbitant prices and the occasional poisoned offering, some took matters a step further. Joining the Confederate army was one such method, while going underground was another. Guerrilla fighters, also sometimes called Bushwhackers by the soldiers they harassed, threatened the Union army in all theaters of the war. In Kentucky, they also could target civilians, including those whose relatives fought. “[T]his country is well adapted to Guerilla warfare,” explained soldier Aetna Pettis, “as they are well acquainted with the country”³⁵

Robert Winn both gave and received stories of guerrillas. A raid on the town of Hawesville was related to him in July 1864. “I have to thank you for the full account of the depredations of the Guerrillas in Hawesville,” he wrote to his sister Martha, also adding that he would be “grateful for the smallest particulars of their operations.”³⁶ About a month later, Hawesville was attacked again, and this time it was Robert sharing the story. “Hawesville has

³³ Entry of January 14, 1862, “Thomas D. Phillip Diary,” FHS.

³⁴ While researching at the Filson, one of the staff shared a local joke: In the North, dissenters were referred to as ‘Copperheads’; in Kentucky, dissenters were called ‘Confederates.’ A bit overstated, but in many ways apt in describing the situation occasionally faced by Union armies.

³⁵ “Aetna B. Pettis to Julien,” March 17, 1863, Aetna B. Pettis Papers, FHS.

³⁶ “Robert Winn to Sister,” July 8, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

been invaded again by the Hancock renegades, the guerrillas, said to be 150 men.” This account is also notable as it relays the response Union troops were giving when they finally encountered these bushwhackers. “The Gun boat shelled the town, or rather that part occupied by the rebels – and they were of course driven out....Yesterday evening I saw a rebel ironed off – he had betrayed three of the 92nd Ill. Mtd. Inf. into the guerrillas’ hands – and one of them escaped – and has identified the chap. I guess he will hang. A woman and family were brought in – they had one trunk with them – she had harbored guerrillas, and was an abandoned character – her house was burned.”³⁷ As to be expected, Union soldiers were not prepared to treat these assaults with much kindness. It should also be noted that these responses came in the summer of 1864, when general Union policy appeared to be growing much harsher.

Guerrilla activity varied depending on the site and need of the men, as Amelia Winn related to Martha. Though herself not a soldier, her experience was not likely atypical in that part of Kentucky, nor was it unlikely to find its way to the ears of Robert Winn and other soldiers. “[M]y neighbors is all agoing to leave Kentucky on account of the rebels,” Amelia wrote, adding, “I would leave but I want to see [the neighbors] out.” Adding to her account were descriptions of guerrilla activity, mostly related to the items they stole, which included, horses, clothes and money. Amelia also mentioned the growing fear visible in these Rebels as the war progressed. In December 1864 she wrote, “The rebels will do all they can til the union Soldiers comes in Kentucky. The rebels says this is the last effort they will make if the union does whip them”³⁸

Word of guerrilla activity threatening the homes and families of Union soldiers crept through the ranks. Martha Adams, writing in August 1864, complained about the “numerous and

³⁷ “Robert Winn to Sister,” August 1, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

³⁸ “Amelia Winn to Sister,” December 20, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

bold,” guerrillas in the countryside. “Uncle James’ rebel friends fled,” she continued, “and warned him not to stay out there, so for some time we have had the pleasure of his company.”³⁹ Thomas Speed also mentioned his concerns over such activity in his letters to both parents and friends. “I hope the Guerrillas will not pester you while we are gone,” he wrote in one letter to his parents. To a friend named Will he wrote, “I have been wondering for some time past where you were – and in suspense about you being in guerrilla country.”⁴⁰ The young Speed was able to relate the tales of guerrilla action to his parents from Will, writing, “he [Will] says the guerrillas are thick and troublesome.”⁴¹ While sharing on another occasion the possibility of raids into Kentucky, Speed coldly remarked, “I suppose though they are heartily welcomed there by most of the people.”⁴²

Other raids occurred near larger cities. Writing from Bowling Green, Kentucky, Henry Shouldise outlined such an attack. Near the city, a guerrilla force had, “stopped the Steamer Betty Gilmore and threw two thousand bushels of corn in to the river and all of the government supply and paroled all the soldiers that was on board and they also Stopped [a] train of cars and burnt them and put Steam on [the] locomotive and Started it back to run in to the passenger train.”⁴³ Kentucky was not the only site to raids by Confederate guerrillas. Some raids struck even into Union territory. “We are having a series of Rebel raids here now, wrote Cornelius Madden from a Union hospital in New Albany, Indiana (located across the Ohio River from Louisville). “[T]he first was under Hines which was captured with the exception of the Capt and one other man. They escaped by swimming the Ohio River.”⁴⁴

³⁹ “Martha Bell Speed Adams to Jimmy,” August 8, 1864, Speed Family Papers, FHS.

⁴⁰ “Thomas Speed to Parents,” July 1, 1863, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS; “Thomas Speed to Will,” July 4, 1864, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS.

⁴¹ “Thomas Speed to Parents,” December 14, 1864, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS.

⁴² “Thomas Speed to Parents,” November 11, 1864, Thomas Speed Papers, FHS.

⁴³ “Henry Shouldise to Sister,” March 3, 1863, Henry Shouldise Letters, FHS.

⁴⁴ “Cornelius J. Madden to Son,” June 23, 1863, Cornelius J. Madden Letters, OHS.

While not a soldier who experienced guerrilla attacks, Samuel Haycraft helped to catalogue their activities. Haycraft was the Clerk of Hardin County, Kentucky, and his journal entries from 1862 through 1865 outline the various incidents in which his residence of Elizabethtown was involved. As the campaigns began to pick up in 1862, Haycraft outlined the challenge facing Kentucky and its citizens: “Kentucky is now passing through a fiery ordeal. She is invaded by the rebels to the amount of nearly 200,000, and there is now in the field on the part of the government in Ky. 150,000 fighting men.”⁴⁵ In June 1863, he wrote, “a band of guerrillas entered into town, stopped a train of cars loaded with horses, helped themselves & left.”⁴⁶ In late March of 1864, fears of another raid were kindled. “On yesterday & last night there was some fears of Guerrilla bands now roaming this country. On Friday 25 of this month about 18 miles from Town, our late Sheriff Isaac Radly was robbed of upwards of \$100 a watch & a horse, and let go at their headquarters (as they termed it) at James Wades, a Secessionist.”⁴⁷

Several entries surrounded a raid, or series of raids, by guerrillas into Elizabethtown around Christmas of 1864. On the 23rd, Haycraft noted, “At night there was an alarm of Confederate troops or guerrillas in town.”⁴⁸ The next day’s entry began simply: “Town entered by rebels.” Haycraft continued by saying the invaders burnt the rail depot, captured some Union soldiers and then lit the railroad bridge on fire. After a Union detachment initially forced the Rebels out, they returned later that night to set the bridge on fire again. In spite of twice being set alight in one day, the bridge would be saved.⁴⁹ The next day, Christmas, fears of a renewed

⁴⁵ Entry of October 10, 1862, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

⁴⁶ Entry of June 13, 1863, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

⁴⁷ Entry of March 27, 1864, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

⁴⁸ Entry of December 23, 1864, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

⁴⁹ Entry of December 24, 1864, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

assault on the town remained as a train “carelessly” crossed the still-standing bridge, even though, “it was ascertained that a band of Guerrillas were hovering around Town.”⁵⁰

Even into the very end of the war, guerrillas were a danger for Haycraft and his home town. His accounts from the final months, though, also revealed the tremendous degree to which the guerrilla forces had been weakened by Union pressure and the ever-more certain coming end to the war. In early January, 1865, Haycraft wrote, “On this day at about 10 o’clock AM The citizens were alarmed by the sudden appearance of some rebel cavalry in Town.” This appearance would prove almost comical, for, “the fear soon subsided when they found out their force was only 35.” “[T]hey soon left under the flag [of truce],” he continued, “but broke the truce by taking (blank) head of horses”⁵¹ Still, the end was near, and in late April Haycraft was able to write the following entry: “Genl. Palmer came from Louisville and read the surrender of a rebel Guerilla Co. Capt. Duval & his men.”⁵²

In addition to this relationship with guerrillas, Haycraft also was near the activities of the famous raider John Morgan. Though he was a commissioned general in the Confederate army, Morgan used his men in the manner of a guerrilla force. They terrorized towns, burned buildings, stole goods, killed and captured soldiers, and generally made a nuisance of themselves to Union troops in the area. Haycraft appears not to have met Morgan’s men personally, but relates their activities. In October 1862, Haycraft wrote of one of Morgan’s raids:

“On this day the rebel Genl. John Morgan entered Elizabeth Town at night with 15,000 cavalry, robbed the post office of this Town, & burnt a railroad bridge 2 miles from Town. At 2 O’clock at night Morgan learned that he was pursued by United States troops from Louisville, he having searched the Clerk’s office and some private houses, left in a hurry. His retiring pickets were fired on by the advance of the Federal troops, but suffered no hurts. The Federal troops being infantry did not pursue. As he retired his

⁵⁰ Entry of December 25, 1864, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

⁵¹ Entry of January 9, 1865, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

⁵² Entry of April 26, 1865, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

command committed various robberies of horses, Store goods, money, etc. He was last heard from at Leitchfield, Grayson County.”⁵³

Even into December, Haycraft had Morgan’s exploits to keep his journal entries lively. “Genl. Morgan came in with 5000 cavalry & about a Dozen pieces of artillery and after firing 107 shots into Town captured the 91 Regt Illinois, about 500. Next burnt the Rail Road bridge, the Depot with about 3500 bushels of wheat (private property), Parks house & also the military stockade. Took all the horses nearly in Town & for miles around & many thousand Dollars worth of dry goods, boots, shoes, &c.”⁵⁴ The havoc wreaked by Morgan and others certainly kept the attention of Haycraft and the area’s Union soldiers, and provided more than a little extra danger in the uncertain ground upon which they tread.

Not every enemy faced was a Confederate soldier, and not every Copperhead was back at home. Union soldiers encountered resistance and resentment in the towns through which they marched. These meetings with ‘secesh’ were as much a part of the coloration of a soldier’s mindset as any rally, speech or pamphlet from home. In either case, there were people actively campaigning against their mission, and understandably soldiers took considerable offense to that. These collective experiences with Copperheads both at home and in the field took their toll, and when the time came to make a choice in the election, such pictures were clear in the soldier’s mind. In the modern view, making such a decision to oppose Copperheadism seems somewhat obvious. As the elections drew near, the issues of the day were discussed with more fervor than before. Both at home and in the camps, not every soldier would reject out of hand the positions of the men they otherwise considered to be their enemies.

⁵³ Entry of October 20, 1862, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS. Leitchfield is approximately 30 miles from Elizabethtown.

⁵⁴ Entry of December 27, 1862, “Samuel Haycraft Journal,” FHS.

Part III: The Greatest Battle

“I had the pleasure of taking a part in a conversation at the Guard House last night on the Emancipation & Negro Enlistment Policy, and had the majority of the crowd on my side – or rather I was with the majority, but a rare thing you know. We all agreed that the U. S. had to right to Arm the Niggers – that it was expedient depends with the worst enemies of the Negro Soldier, upon the question whether it is necessary to keep them out of the army. All agreed that they would have a dozen niggers in the army rather than serve another term. Some of them had niggers and advocated Emancipation – while that question with some degenerated into Extermination.”¹⁵⁷

Robert Winn is, amongst his peers in the service, noteworthy partially for the clarity and education he displayed in his letters. Beyond an understanding of grammar and spelling hard to come by in some cases, Winn was also capable of expressing his opinions in a way that spoke to real intellectual thought. What his telling of this February, 1864 meeting suggests is that he was not alone in the ability to express thoughts and debate them. While the debates he engaged in with his sister Martha center mostly on religion, he was clearly competent on other topics. Discussed here amongst his fellow soldiers were the issues of emancipation and its implications. The conversation itself is indicative of the disagreements with which members of the army could concern themselves.

What this passage also indicates is the lack of any kind of monolith when one talks about “soldier opinions.” When it came to politics and political identification, these soldiers were not uniformly Republican. Even those that were Republicans did not sign on to the entire Republican platform without reservations. Still, soldiers were as much political beings in the field as they had been at home before the war. Soldiers shared their views with one another, and on key issues of the day such as the draft, slavery, emancipation and even the many wartime elections, their opinions differed and some even found agreement with the very Copperheads

¹⁵⁷ “Robert Winn to Sister,” February 25, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

against whom they railed. They carried their opinions from home into the field, and while much likely remained consistent, the experience of the war perhaps modified some of their positions.

Klement's interpretation is exceedingly useful here, but so are some of the older histories he helped generally to disprove. Wood Grey's The Hidden Civil War, an earlier, more nationalistic interpretation of Midwestern Copperheadism begins the examination of the movement as a particularly regional phenomenon. This is not to say that anti-war Democrats existed only in the Midwest, or that there were in fact no Copperheads in the eastern states. While New England and New York remained traditional hotbeds of abolitionism, and subsequently Republican politics, Peace Democrats were numerous and vocal, including the Wood brothers in New York City and Governor Seymour of Connecticut. Still, the more grassroots kind of Copperheadism seen in the Midwest in many ways stems from the peculiarities of the region. While undergoing rapid transformation and industrialization, the Midwest remained more agrarian than the Northeast. The southern regions of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois in particular were populated with immigrants from states whose secession had caused the War.

Deciding to fight in the war was not undertaken only by Republican citizens in the Midwest (of which there were certainly plenty). The earlier days of the war in particular saw large enlistments of men driven by a common patriotism and desire to see the Union reunited. Potentially skeptical Democrats were defeated, but unbowed, and Senator Stephen Douglas' support of Lincoln and the war effort undoubtedly helped to convince them to join the army. Joining the army did not, though, eliminate the backgrounds and histories many individual soldiers brought to the field. Midwestern Copperheadism arose from more than just Southern ancestry. Klement notes that antiwar sentiment in the region grew from a host of factors,

including economic and religious concerns.¹⁵⁸ These concerns were not easily rectified by enlisting and heading off to war. Even out in the field, these differences exposed themselves, and sometimes Union troops and home front Copperheads were not quite as different as the soldiers sometimes imagined.

In some instances, these leanings toward anti-war sentiment came from divided families. As the nicknames suggest, the Civil War did pit families against one another, and while they were not always brother against brother, cousins could very easily find themselves fighting for, or at least supporting, different sides. The Dunn family in Kentucky was one such family. From Grayson County, Kentucky, the Dunn family, led by patriarch Vincent Dunn, lived on both sides of the nation's cultural (if not physical) divide. John Walker, a cousin of the Dunns, writing to extended family, expressed the hope that, "I will get to meet some of my old 'Cesesh' Friends." His visitor list was not just confined friends, though. "As I understand," he continued, "Uncle George & John are both in the 'Cesh' patch. If we ever get in that country I intend to Call and see them"¹⁵⁹

Several months later, John repeated his desire to visit his Rebel relatives. "I want you to give me uncle George Watts' address. I want to write him. I understand that him and uncle John are both Rebels but I Cannot help that I will write to him any how." Though interested in reconciling with his cousins, Walker still could not muster sympathy for them or their cause. "I do think it is too bad that we have two in our number that turn against as good a government as this and use their influence to try to assist those southern fire eaters in tearing down those Glorious old Stars and Stripes that waved over and protected them so long, but so it is."¹⁶⁰ This

¹⁵⁸ Klement, *Copperheads*, 37.

¹⁵⁹ "John H. Walker to Uncle and Aunt," September 4, 1862, Dunn Family Papers, FHS. The terms "cecesh" and "cesh" in this instance are different spellings of "Secesh," described in Part II.

¹⁶⁰ "John H. Walker to Uncle," December 12, 1862, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

idea of protection from the government harkens to other complaints made about Copperheads, suggesting their support for the Confederacy would weaken considerably if only they knew the truth of Confederate action, discussed in Part I.

The divided family also had some Confederate sympathies. A relative of the family, James, writing to his brother in 1863, expressed his feelings on the matter. “I love the constitution and the union,” he said. “As it was it was the best in the world. We can have no better.” James then revealed his affiliation by saying that same Constitution, which he loved as the best in the world, “is in tatters from top to bottom.” “I am a Rebel,” he concluded, “I can not help it.”¹⁶¹ James was not alone in his declaration. “I have almost Came to the conclusion,” wrote John Walker in his earlier letter, “that this is a fulfillment of the scripture we are taught that brother shall rise against Brother and father against son and son against father. Have we not a full specimen of that in this present rebellion?”¹⁶² Indeed, it seems, they did.

Of the many issues that divided the country prior to and during the war, slavery was chief among them. Even amongst the soldiers, slavery was a critical issue for the war’s duration. Opinions about slavery and blacks as a race were mixed. There was some support for blacks, their freedom, or at the very least their dignity. In some cases, this support translated into a respect borne of personal interaction. Such interactions, while not completely out of question in civil society, were undoubtedly facilitated by the movement of the army through areas densely populated with slaves. Mixed with this, though, was the ever-present racism of the age. Added to the background of these men, especially the Kentuckians for whom slavery was a part of the state’s law, virulent anti-slave and anti-black sentiment still held significant weight amongst many soldiers.

¹⁶¹ “James P. to Brother, April 16, 1863, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁶² “John H. Walker to Uncle,” December 12, 1862, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

Isaac Dale of Indiana favored fighting on behalf of the slaves. His reasons far from represented any kind of desire for racial equality. Instead, his focus was on the practical nature of slave labor in the progress of the war. Responding to a letter from a friend, Dale refuted the argument of many Copperheads, that the war was no more than a cover for freeing blacks. “They write and tell me that we are fighting for nothing else, only to free the niggers and they say let him alone where he is. I say not, for we find him making breast works and in fact they are doing as much for the rebs and are fighting for them”¹⁶³ Dale zeroed in on one of the South’s hidden advantages: that of a forced labor supply to do the logistical work of the army, freeing up more men to fight when needed.

Many men may not have started the war as opponents of slavery. Soldiers were exposed to new experiences being in the army. These men now had a chance to observe blacks in a setting outside of slavery. They were especially able to observe their abilities as fighting men, which promoted a level of racial understanding the previously had not existed. Robert Hanna spoke of having a servant, “& as he thought he could shoot a traitor as well as any one I furnished him with a gun, which he keeps in good order,” Armed blacks, long the bogeyman of the South, became a reality, as well as the outcome Hanna foresaw. “If we have a fight,” he wrote, “I intend him to have a chance to shoot some rascal of a traitor. I think a traitor is not half as good as a nigger,” Hanna is even willing to go farther, saying that, “if I had my way of it, I should take every nigger in the country, arm them, drill them, & put them to shooting the traitorous rascals down here whenever they could be found.”¹⁶⁴ He went even farther than Isaac Dale in suggesting that black troops could not only be removed from helping the Confederacy, but instead could be put to better use fighting for the Union.

¹⁶³ “Isaac Dale to Friend,” June 19, 1863, Stephen Emert Letters, IHS.

¹⁶⁴ “Robert Barlow Hanna to Mrs. R. B. Hanna,” September 11, 1862, Robert Barlow Hanna Civil War Papers, IHS.

The experience Thomas Speed of Kentucky reflects more the changes in soldier opinion. “There is a division of Negro troops here, a great many of them from Ky. I met one yesterday from Hopkinsville who recognized me and seemed overjoyed to see me.” At the very least, Speed had met these men before, but now could look at them with a newfound respect. “You must not turn up your nose when I say they fight splendidly,” he wrote, trying to convince a friend who likely shared his prior prejudices. Speed even noted the change in his whole regiment. “I saw them tried yesterday,” he continued, “and our Regiment saw it, and they all acknowledge that ‘We have to give it up – old Nigger will fight.’”¹⁶⁵ They did indeed fight, to the number of approximately 130,000 men.¹⁶⁶ There were a number of issues revolving around the use of black troops, among them pay and the response of the Confederate government. What appears not to have been an issue, at least for the fighting men of the North, was the courage and capability black troops brought to the field.

As would be expected, many troops expressed the stinging racism of their times. Many of these letters were written contemporaneously to the ones previously cited, showing the division of opinions within the ranks of men. Their frequency relative to more respectful remarks suggests most likely that many men were unwilling to change their minds or to feel any kind of kinship with blacks, encountered or otherwise. Slavery and race relations were sensitive issues that had created the actual war. Even within the North, abolitionism and racial egalitarianism (such as that occasionally supported by Lincoln and other leaders of the Republican Party) were far from universally accepted. When the soldiers came from areas steeped in Copperhead sentiment, such feelings were easily summoned in writing.

¹⁶⁵ “Thomas Speed to Will,” February 12, 1865, Speed Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁶⁶ Number given by President Lincoln, cited in James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 769.

Sometimes, this racism expressed itself as denial. Even Isaac Dale, so willing to fight and stop slaves from aiding the Confederacy, believed there to be more at stake than simply emancipation. “They might talk about us being nigger lovers,” he said, referring to Copperheads back home, “but the way it is they have no right to call us that and it is treason to do so and if I ever get back and they tell me that I have been fighting for the nigger and nothing else I will set some of them up for 90 days.”¹⁶⁷ We cannot expect a soldier such as Dale would simply accept that fighting against slavery was the only aim of the war. Even we in the present day cannot do that. Dale likely fought for many of the other reasons Northerners fought for the Union. Still, his very negative reaction to the accusation that he was fighting because of a love for blacks belies a man uncomfortable with the suggestion.

While men like Dale lashed out at those who made such accusations, others accepted them, and acted accordingly. Lewis Hanback noted that a Democratic candidate in a local election, “a Major Cummings,” was, “a renegade soldier who says he left the army because he couldn’t fight for the nigger.”¹⁶⁸ Not all men left as Cummings apparently had, but they willingly expressed their dissent with the prospect of fighting in support of blacks. Hiram Wingate received a letter from a friend serving in Tennessee in early 1863. Wingate had advocated to him previously that the war was being fought on behalf of blacks. Now, the friend would respond that, “I am of the same opinion as yourself.” Wingate’s friend goes even farther, showing the spread of such sentiment within at least his own circle. “It is the Opinion of the Soldiers,” he wrote, “that we are fighting against the North and South and for my part I do not care how soon it Stops”¹⁶⁹ Not all men stopped coming, though. A letter from Kentuckian A. G.

¹⁶⁷ “Isaac Dale to Friend,” June 19, 1863, Stephen Emert Letters, IHS.

¹⁶⁸ “Lewis Hanback to Hattie,” October 8, 1864, Lewis Hanback Letters, FHS. Referenced in Part I.

¹⁶⁹ “To Friend Wingate,” February 18, 1863, Hiram Wingate Papers, FHS.

Dow registered his surprise that the sons of local “Butternuts” had joined the army. “I shouldn’t think they would Let their boy come to fight an abolition War.”¹⁷⁰

For some men, an even worse prospect than fighting for blacks was fighting with them. Not all men reacted with the respect of a Thomas Speed. “I heard today they Was enrolling the negros in Barren Co.,” wrote W. C. Jones home to his mother. “If they Want me to fight,” he said, “they had Better keep the negros Back.”¹⁷¹ Other soldiers tried to discourage black recruitment. Robert Winn noted the effort made by some officers. Bill, a black boy in the 14th Infantry Regiment, “was out with a few more recruiting among the sable camp followings.” He continued by noting that, “The leader made a very powerful appeal to some of Bill’s friends but without success.” Winn knew who he blamed for the lack of support, saying, “the Kentucky Regular Constitutional conservation – Negro Hating – slave loving herd around, ridiculed them out of some no doubt.”¹⁷²

Benjamin Smith Jones felt similarly to that “slave loving herd.” While other soldiers welcomed black troops, or at least allowed their respect to be earned, men like Jones were never prepared to accept such a thing. “I Saw Something at Shelmound that I did not want to See. I Saw a regiment of negros. That is Something that you never saw. I reckon it is Something that I don’t want to see any more if I Can help my Self.” For Jones, arming blacks was only the beginning. Writing in February 1863, after the implementation of the Emancipation Proclamation, Jones simply does not believe that would be the end of it. “I reckon that the negros will be freed before this war is ended and then old abe Lincoln will be Satisfied.” Not content to speculate on future policy, Jones expressed his disdain towards the President further, saying, “I wish that he had to Sleep with a negro every night as long as he lives and kiss one’s

¹⁷⁰ “A. G. Dow to Tom,” July 30, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

¹⁷¹ “W. C. Jones to Mother,” December 18, 1863, Civil War Letters, FHS.

¹⁷² “Robert Winn to Sister,” April 18, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

ass twice a day”¹⁷³ His position changed very little over the next year, as a letter from March 1864 expressed a similar sentiment. “This is nothing but an abolition war. It is for nothing, only to free the negros.” Even after seeing these men in action, Jones was unprepared to accept their presence in the army. “I Can See negros every Day with guns and they Stand guard as Same as I do...Lemuel if I had my way at the abolitionist party I would kill every one of them.”¹⁷⁴

This racism played an ugly and not altogether unimportant role during the political campaigns of many Democrats. Lincoln in particular was the subject of many outbursts. The famous “Lincoln Catechism,” published during the 1864 presidential race, referred to the President as “Abraham Africanus the First.” The Catechism made several other references to Lincoln and the Republicans as “agents for negroes,” and claimed that they have, “no other God but the negro.”¹⁷⁵ Lincoln and others certainly believed slavery and race had played a role in the campaign, or at least made this claim after the election had passed. Lincoln and noted abolitionist Frederick Douglass certainly cited the victory as a statement of the people that slavery should be abolished throughout the nation.¹⁷⁶ Democrats certainly put emphasis on the slavery issue during the campaign, but questions about its overall effectiveness in garnering votes outside of their own base remain.¹⁷⁷

Fears of racial equality were mixed in with the specter of a newly-coined phrase: miscegenation. Miscegenation was an invented term, meaning the mixing of races. A pamphlet

¹⁷³ “Benjamin Smith Jones to Brother,” February 12, 1863, Civil War Letters, FHS.

¹⁷⁴ “Benjamin Smith Jones to Brother,” March 9, 1864, Civil War Letters, FHS. Jones likely means he would kill every abolitionist, not every black, but in either case, the sentiment remains the same.

¹⁷⁵ “Lincoln Catechism” found in *History of American Presidential Elections, Volume II: 1848-1896*, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), 1214-1244.

¹⁷⁶ Michael Vorenberg, “‘The Deformed Child’: Slavery and the Election of 1864,” *Civil War History* Vol. XLVII, No. 3 (2001): 240.

¹⁷⁷ Jennifer Weber argues that slavery and race was a central tenet in the Democrats campaign (*Copperheads*, 185), while Vorenberg suggests the stance cost the party during the election (“‘The Deformed Child,’” 245). Jean Baker actually argues that race itself, separate from the slavery issue, did not become a central Democratic theme until 1868 (*Affairs of Party*, 301).

produced in late 1863 claimed the theory that such mixing was meant to further the development of humanity. The pamphlet, far from academic, was a fake. It had been written by David Goodman Croly and George Wakeman, employees of the New York *World*, a fiercely Democratic paper. Their hope was that noted abolitionists would give support to the pamphlet and would claim the “anonymous” author as one of their own. Thus, they would tar the abolition movement (and hopefully by extension the Republican Party) with the position that mixing the races was not only ideal, but the true aim of emancipation. These claims would play on common fears held by many whites of the day, especially in the South but elsewhere as well, of the nearly predatory sexuality of blacks.¹⁷⁸ While mentions of miscegenation or similar terms (melaleukation and amalgamation were also commonly used), do not appear in the writings of these Ohio Valley soldiers, they seem connected with Copperheads and society at large enough that such a concept would have come to their attention, and thus subsequently played a role in their understanding of the war.

The slavery issue came to resolution with the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation in September of 1862. I will not attempt any kind of thorough discussion of Lincoln’s varied concerns revolving the decision to involve emancipation as a war aim of the Union. That discussion belongs to many others whose focus is the President himself. It is enough for the purposes of this work to say that Lincoln knew that, as he put it, “a house divided against itself cannot stand,” and that true reconciliation between North and South would be impossible without the elimination of the day’s great issue. Antietam victory in hand, Lincoln braved the negative reaction at home and abroad to announce that come the new year, slavery

¹⁷⁸ A good treatment of the growth of the miscegenation issue in the later years of the war can be found in Sidney Kaplan, “The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864,” *The Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 34, No. 3, (Jul. 1949). Vorenberg’s article “The Deformed Child” and Long’s *Jewel of Liberty* also discuss the issue in the larger context of slavery and race relations.

would no longer be recognized or protected within the Confederacy. Interestingly, the announcement did not draw much comment from soldiers in this region. Kentucky being a slave state, it would seem strange that the introduction of emancipation as a war aim would draw so little comment.

There were certainly large swaths of the army that supported Lincoln's announcement. Indiana soldier W. K. Hoback, writing to his sister, spoke of the widespread acceptance of the measure. There were, he wrote, "No thoughts of any thing like growing angry with the administration," and he personally would, "cordially endorse the proclamation nigger and all." This is not to say that soldiers did not feel pressure to do otherwise. "There are some people at home," he added, "writing to their friends in the army trying to disquiet them and discourage them and induce them to desert and offering them protection if they will come home." Without knowing how Hoback's comrades responded to these offers, he merely offered the warning that men who followed the advice of such letter writers, "had better be careful. They seem to forget that they are violating a positive order...falling under the sentence of the 20th Article of war."¹⁷⁹

As mentioned, there were very few references to the actual proclamation by many soldiers. Some comments appear to have been mixed in with the general sentiments on race and race relations. Generally, though the announcement of emancipation and the actual implementation of the Proclamation merited little mention for many soldiers. Some do not appear to care, such as Thomas Honnell. Writing to his friend Benjamin Epler, Honnell expressed his desire to continue fighting, and appeared to downplay the importance of

¹⁷⁹ "W. K. Hoback to Sister," March 13, 1863, Kephart Family Papers, IHS. The 20th Article of War, from the Revised US Army Regulations of 1861, governs travelling while on duty as a soldier. When given an order to report to a specific place, the soldier must account for any activity undertaken prior to reporting and an explanation for any delay. Desertion, especially at the behest of relatives, was not likely considered good reason for failing to fulfill one's duty. The soldier was liable to court martial for desertion, punishable by death, while the family member offering aid could also be punished under federal law at the time.

emancipation. “The blood of our fallen Comrades would cry out against us if we did not fight on until we establish those principles for which they fought and died.” Lest Epler be confused as to what those principles may or may not have been, he continued: “We fight not to free Negroes or to enslave Whites.”¹⁸⁰ The common argument that the freedom of blacks would only lead to a restructuring of the racial hierarchy was rejected outright, at least by Honnell.

Many men do not appear to have been opposed to the emancipation of slaves, but seemed less than enthusiastic about the Lincoln Administration’s course of action. They worried more about the potential fallout in the country and the nation. Ben Bristow, not a soldier but a Louisville lawyer, wrote to his friend, future Attorney General James Speed, in 1864, and expressed his concerns over the effects of emancipation. “The conduct of certain officers & other persons in connection with the negro question is causing great dissatisfaction and doing a real injury to our cause in Ky.,” he wrote. Denying that he was obsessed, as some would suggest, with the “negro question,” Bristow tried to clarify his position and the potential pratfalls. “I do not believe the Govmt. can be permanently reestablished without the abolition of slavery and for this reason I desire it to be abolished but I want it done legally.”¹⁸¹

Never one to sugarcoat his opinions, Robert Winn on several occasions stated his belief that the army, and likely the nation, was not ready for emancipation. “I may state for your information,” he offered to his sister in February of 1862, “that I believe a law abolishing slavery at the present time would have the tendency to prolong the war, and slavery too.”¹⁸² And just in case she may have thought this changed into the summer, he offered the following thought in July. “The western army is thoroughly devoted to the Divinity of Slavery,” he wrote, continuing, “I hear among...Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois troops that Congress has no right to free

¹⁸⁰ “Thomas Honnell to Friend,” September 25, 1864, Thomas Corwin Honnell Papers, OHS.

¹⁸¹ “Ben Bristow to James Speed,” June 23, 1864, Speed Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁸² “Robert Winn to Sister,” February 21, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

the slaves of even Rebels in arms – and such an attempt would justify a revolt of the troops in favor of the South.”¹⁸³

That would not affect his opinion, of course. “So bad as the war is, on both sections its prosecution on a radical plan, if it could be done and not divide the Northern forces, would be decidedly the best.” He hoped for anything to end the difficulties of the troops and bring the war to its swift and proper conclusion. “But,” he added, “if radicalism must sever the Border States and Nor’western States, it will prolong the war indefinitely and probably cause defeat – and thus make another war necessary.”¹⁸⁴ He told his sister, “On [the issue of] Emancipation however if I thought it worth while and had the opportunity of voting, I would vote for it of course.”¹⁸⁵

Beyond personal support for emancipation, Winn also held the view that the war needed such a change. “I can’t see how the war can end without the destruction of Slavery.” He would continue with his typical predictions of dire straits, writing: “if the immediate end of it was attempted, the blood that has been spilt in this war would be nothing to what would be then, now the end of such a state of affairs would be like the millennium – afar off.”¹⁸⁶ These threats of bloodshed aside, the circumstances of not ending slavery were far worse. Another letter outlines this thought process:

“I could not see that a long bloody war with a compromise for its end – and slavery consequently in the ascendant – as being much better than a short one with one half of the nation free and the other a separate slave government (a thing that would die of necessity soon). You may say we would have war under this divided state of the country – well would we have peace under the Compromisors? No! Another and more violent rebellion would result.”¹⁸⁷

By 1864, these predictions of gloom regardless of the status of slavery had faded from Winn’s letters. “Emancipationists are increasing in numbers, and in boldness – even in Ky. Regts.,” he

¹⁸³ “Robert Winn to Sister,” July 21, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁸⁴ “Robert Winn to Sister,” July 25, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁸⁵ “Robert Winn to Sister,” June 15, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁸⁶ “Robert Winn to Sister,” July 12, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁸⁷ “Robert Winn to Sister,” August 17, 1862, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

wrote in a letter from March of that year. Robert Winn never lacked for opinions and observations when they related to any matter, and the army's discussion of slavery and emancipation was no different. Though not wholly enthusiastic about the plan of Lincoln's Party, Winn would at least concede that the Democratic solution, as expressed by the Copperhead faction, was no better.

In 1863, with the war continuing and the end far from sight, both sides needed more men. Though it was the Confederacy that first resorted to forced conscription in order to fill its ranks, Lincoln and the North would soon follow suit. Conscription, also called the draft, was a controversial policy from the beginning. Resistance to it came from all corners of the Union, not just the copper-tinted Midwest. Rioting over the draft consumed several northern cities, most famously in New York. This kind of forced service was new in American history. In all, approximately 776,000 men in the North received draft notices. Of those, only 46,000 actually ended up serving in the army.¹⁸⁸ Much like their civilian comrades from around the nation, soldiers from the Ohio Valley did not have a unified opinion on its usefulness and efficacy.

There were certainly positive reactions to the news. Echoing the complaints soldiers made about Copperheads (the ones expressed in Part I), several men expressed their delight that such men would have to face the guns. "Traitor element in the north quaking in their boots over Abraham calling," wrote William Henry Pittenger. "Yes," he continued, "Abraham has called and they'll have to go, for he says 500,000 against the 10th of March, 1864." Lest Pittenger's opinion were not clear earlier, he adds the thought that this activity is "Good, good, more than good."¹⁸⁹ Lewis Dunn chimed in similarly, this time even naming someone he wished to see wear Union blue. "I wish they would draft Jess," a name from home, "as he is a good Rebel, and

¹⁸⁸ Eugene C. Murdock, One Million Men: The Civil War Draft in the North, (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1971), 356.

¹⁸⁹ Entry of February 7, 1864, "William Henry Pittenger Diary," OHS.

make him fight for the Government as he claims protection under it”¹⁹⁰ In a later letter, this time to his sister, Dunn added that, “I was glad to hear of the draft in KY.” He also added the comment, “I guess a good many has payed out.”¹⁹¹ This is one of the few references made to the controversial policy of commutation, whereby a drafted civilian could avoid service either by paying a \$300 commutation fee to the government to avoid fighting, or could hire a replacement in his stead.

Some support for the draft was cloaked in concern that it might not happen. John Dow expressed this concern for himself and his fellow soldiers. “I hope the President will enforce the draft,” he wrote, “for if he does not I am afraid he will lose the vote in the army, for I hear a great many say that if he don’t enforce they will not vote for him. I have about come to the same conclusion myself.” Dow continued with the practical considerations of the men he served with, saying, “We want more men, and if they will not volunteer why not draft them? Unless he [Lincoln] follow up the victories he had won this summer they will do us no good.”¹⁹² Robert Winn was similarly concerned, but in his own pessimistic way did not believe change would come. Writing in May 1864, he criticized the President’s lack of action on the issue, saying, “Lincoln could have drafted men – can do it, but won’t – no, the idea is by hook or crook to keep the worthies that are at home out of it – by enlisting negros and pressing veteran volunteers.”¹⁹³

Other soldiers, likely more supporters of the draft, worried that Copperheads at home would resist. “If there is any fighting to be done in the north, it will likely come off when the draft is made,” wrote Harrison Canaday to a cousin in Indiana. Not one to sit idly by in such a

¹⁹⁰ “Lewis Dunn to Father,” June 2, 1864, Dunn Family Papers, FHS.

¹⁹¹ “Lewis Dunn to Sister,” June 18, 1864, Dunn Family Papers, FHS. Only reference to bounties.

¹⁹² “John Dow to Brother Thomas,” September 14, 1864, Dow Family Letters, FHS. The victories Dow is referring to are most likely those of his own regiment, the 31st Ohio, in Sherman’s recently completed Atlanta campaign, but possibly also including Grant’s advancement on Richmond in the East.

¹⁹³ “Robert Winn to Sister,” May 5, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

circumstance, Canaday added, “if the Copperheads are bound to kick up a muss, they will very likely get mussed to their hearts content. I keep a good supply of cartridges on hand.”¹⁹⁴ Other soldiers worried about the prospects of violence in the North. “It is much talked in camp,” noted John Hilliard, “that there is much excitement, and much feeling shown against the war, and if the President should order a draft it would be resisted. how is it? is it so or is the cry of the democrats for political purposes?”¹⁹⁵ Even locals wondered what would happen. “The copperheads here seem to think more about the election than about the draft,” wrote Ohioan Sarah Lundy to a friend in New Jersey.¹⁹⁶

Not all reaction was positive. Though negative responses never reached the level of the infamous rioting in New York City, some soldiers expressed concerns as to the effect such a law would have on their families. “Well Billey,” wrote Benjamin Jones to his brother, “what do you think about the Conscript law? Do you intend to stand it or not? I will tell you what I think of it. I don’t think that they will Conscript the Boys in Kentucky but if they do I don’t Want you to stay to see it.” Instead, Jones extended an offer to his brother to join his regiment, the 21st Kentucky Infantry. “[Y]ou Must not think that I am trying to get you into the army,” he added, “for I had rather suffer death almost than to See one of my brothers come into the army”¹⁹⁷ Jones’s comment bears some similarities to those of Democrats who opposed the draft and slavery. Many Democrats saw a sinister irony in forcing men to fight so that slaves could be emancipated.¹⁹⁸ In spite of these misgivings, the soldiers’ view that drafting would give the Copperheads what they deserved made opposing the draft a tricky proposition for Democrats.

¹⁹⁴ “Harrison Canaday to Cousin,” June, 1863, Stephen Emert Letters, IHS.

¹⁹⁵ “John T. Hilliard to Friend,” January 7, 1863, Civil War Letters, FHS.

¹⁹⁶ “Sarah Lundy to Oliver,” October 10, 1864, Sarah Lundy Correspondence, OHS.

¹⁹⁷ “Benjamin Smith Jones to Wm. C. Jones,” May 15, 1863, Civil War Letters, FHS. This prior listed Jones letter, previously cited in Footnote 17, expresses his contempt for blacks and Lincoln’s support thereof.

¹⁹⁸ Baker, *Affairs of Party*, 154.

Franklin David Witwer had served in the army until his enlistment expired in April, 1864. He returned to Ohio, in the area of Dayton. Dayton was the political base of the infamous Vallandigham, and teemed with Copperheads. As the draft came in September of that year, Witwer noted the activities of Copperheads and the army in the execution of the law. In early September, with the Presidential election nearing, he noted, “Butternuts had quite a jolly time today over the nomination of McClellan. They are also preparing to resist the draft.”¹⁹⁹ By month’s end, that concern of resistance was shown to be mere bluster. The entry for September 29 stated: “Draft came off today, butternuts raging. Some swear they won’t go.”²⁰⁰ Several weeks later, in mid-October, the call finally came in. “Twelve Soldiers came here this morn; their work is to Notify Drafted men,” he wrote. Rather than any sort of violent retaliation, Witwer observed, “The butternuts are trying to get on the good side of them,” perhaps hoping to avoid service. Witwer was not prepared to let such machinations go unchallenged. The former soldier added that he would, “try to keep the boys posted as to who all is all right...and who [isn’t].”²⁰¹

And then the elections came. For some, elections are a cathartic experience. They are a time when disgruntled voters are able to effectively register their displeasure with the party or individual in power by taking a deliberate action towards removal. Likewise, the candidate and party’s enthusiastic supporters are given an opportunity to express their satisfaction and work to keep those individuals whom they favor in power. For many others, of course, no such feelings accompany the election, perhaps merely the feeling of accomplishing one’s duty to the continued operation of the democratic republic. People may quibble over the difference in parties, or positions as they ranged from election to election. In some years, the oft expressed belief that

¹⁹⁹ Entry of September 3, 1864, “Franklin David Witwer Diary,” FHS.

²⁰⁰ Entry of September 29, 1864, “Franklin David Witwer Diary,” FHS.

²⁰¹ Entry of October 15, 1864, “Franklin David Witwer,” Diary, FHS.

differences are cosmetic perhaps carries some validity. In the case of many Civil War elections, that was not the case, especially from 1863 onward. With the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the elevation of slavery's eradication to equal level with restoring the Union as a Northern war aim, elections became significant choices between the purposes of the war, or even whether the war itself should continue.

Much as with any other issue previously discussed, elections brought out opinions of all kinds. As mentioned at the outset of this section, even voting for the Republican candidate did not equal a full endorsement of his positions, nor did it mean such for Democrats. "All men opposed to Father Abraham's way of doing business are not in favor of Jeff Davis' way – nor of Vallandigham's," wrote Robert Winn. Though the army as a whole strongly supported Lincoln and the Republicans, the support was not universal. "[W]e have one staunch Democrat, 'old Chick,'" Winn noted. "Old Chick" was not shy in his opinions about Lincoln, and even told Winn that he would not have joined the army if he knew what was to come with their mission. This is not to say that Chick in any way supported Southerners. "Chick is one of the men that propose going into an independent company with Spencer Rifles on being mustered out of the U. S. Service – to clear out our share of Ky.," shared Winn. Winn even appears to endorse the idea, suggesting Chick as perfectly qualified for the position. "Wouldn't he make about as good a Guerrilla as any of the rest – he hates Abolitionists and Foreigners enough I know."²⁰² Democrat, of course, is not the same thing as Copperhead. As manpower changed over the years, the camaraderie of the army solidified. "What soldiers are left are true Blue," wrote John Dow, and, "What few Butternuts we had have either disserted or resigned."²⁰³

²⁰² "Robert Winn to Sister," August 1, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS, emphasis in original.

²⁰³ "John Dow to Bro. Thos.," May 30, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

In 1863, a critical election took place. The seat for Ohio Governor was open, and the race was bitter. The Democrats nominated as their champion Clement Vallandigham, the infamous Copperhead from Dayton, and a former member of the House of Representatives. Vallandigham had been arrested by General Ambrose Burnside in May of that year for a speech denouncing the war and Lincoln. A military tribunal convicted Vallandigham and sentenced him to two years imprisonment, but Lincoln decided to exile Vallandigham to the Confederacy, a course less likely to make a martyr of the man. Shortly after his escort across Union lines into Confederate-held Tennessee, Vallandigham found himself unwelcome in the South as well, and left for Canada. It was in Windsor, Ontario that he received the nomination and campaigned for the office. Opposing Vallandigham was John Brough. Brough was in fact, like Vallandigham, a Democrat. Unlike his opponent though, Brough was a member of the War faction in the party, a supporter of the late Stephen Douglas, and generally approving of the anti-slavery direction the war had been taking. By this point, the Republicans, especially in the treacherous Midwest, had subsumed their name for the Union Party, an attempted alliance involving themselves and War Democrats. Dissatisfied by the weak leadership of the current Unionist governor David Tod, the two factions in the party replaced him on the ticket with Brough, setting up the race.

Ohio was one of the few states in 1863 that allowed soldiers in the field to vote in elections. As such, the men in camps and on the front lines did not need to take convenient leaves or to have their enlistments expire to make their voices heard. With the opportunity to vote finally in hand, soldiers seemed excited for the possibilities. Though some may have had reservations about Lincoln and the probable plans of the Republicans, Vallandigham was a favorite target of scorn. "I do not believe Vallandigham [*sic.*] will get a Single vote in our

Division or Camp,” wrote John Dow to his sister. He continued, saying, “the Army will not vote for a man who is not in favor of fighting the Rebels until they Surrender.”²⁰⁴

Dow’s prediction seems to have been close to the mark. After he and his men voted, he wrote again. “The Election went off yesterday,” he said. “We anticipated a good shelling from the rebels as would undoubtedly have hindered the Election but there was not a Shot fired...I have now heard the result yet but do not think Vallandigham [*sic.*] got a Single Vote in our Regt or Brigade Either.”²⁰⁵ Thomas Honnell expressed a similar situation from his camp. “The Election went off very quietly here, though there was great excitement But we succeeded in defeating that Traitor Val by a handsome majority.”²⁰⁶ William Pittenger, in his diary, expressed the day slightly more poetically, but also included some interesting statistics. His entry for October 13 reads as follows:

“Well I suppose this day has been celebrated by and among the greatest battles for liberty ever fought, not of blood, but of the greater privilege of the American citizen, the right of suffrage, a battle between treason and loyalty at the ballot box. We have confidence that the victory has been all over today. Our Regt., and I blush to say it, gave for treason, Vallandigham [*sic.*], 8 votes, but for loyalty 550. The 63rd had but 3 for treason, the 27th 28 for treason, the 43rd 57, making 97 for treason, we the Ohio brigade. This better than we expected yet not so good as we would that it had been. Shame, eternal shame, upon our soldiers who voted for a traitor. Why, Voted for the very thing against which he is fighting, for all know Vallandigham [*sic.*] to be a traitor, or at least all intelligent persons. Such, in order to be consistent should desert the first night they’re on picket, that’s what’s the matter.”²⁰⁷

Those few men who voted for Vallandigham did so under the suspicions of their fellow soldiers, such as those expressed by Pittenger. There do not appear to be, as Pittenger would suggest, any great number of desertions in the days following the vote. When all the votes were counted across the state, Brough would easily defeat the absent Vallandigham, keeping the noted

²⁰⁴ “John Dow to Sister,” October 9, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

²⁰⁵ “John Dow to Sister,” October 14, 1863, Dow Family Letters, FHS.

²⁰⁶ “Thomas Honnell to Brother Henry,” October 26, 1863, Thomas Corwin Honnell Papers, OHS.

²⁰⁷ Entry of October 13, 1863, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

Copperhead out of office and maintaining an important political position in the column of Lincoln.

In 1864, Lincoln's great moment of truth came. The President would face re-election, and the war, both its progress and goals, would be the main issue. Lincoln's popularity fluctuated with the successes and failures of the army. He experienced high tide in the days following victories, such as the dual successes of Gettysburg and Vicksburg in early July 1863, and Chattanooga later that fall. Consequently, defeat and lack of movement hurt his standing, particularly setbacks at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, or the late summer 1864 stalemates outside of Petersburg and Atlanta. Lincoln was acutely aware of the relationship, and as the victories diminished in that summer (combined with a continually climbing body count), the President pondered his administration's potential end. Most famously, he wrote the famous "blind memorandum," which stated that he and his cabinet would cooperate with the President-elect.²⁰⁸ After fighting off an internal challenge from the more radical wing of his party to have John Fremont contest his nomination, Lincoln selected Tennessee Democrat Andrew Johnson as his running mate, cementing the ticket's Unionist credentials.

Sensing a golden opportunity, the Democrats gleefully tried to milk the war's failure as much as possible. In the days prior to the current protocols of nominating conventions, where the party in power is given the honor of going last, both parties held conventions whenever they pleased. The Democrats, trying to capitalize on the momentum of the late summer as much as possible, succeeded in pushing their convention back to late August. Gathering in Chicago, the party's own internal factions debated, and their disagreements provided a fractured party to oppose the President. The Peace faction was given the prime position of composing the Party's

²⁰⁸ Story cited in McPherson, *Battle Cry*, 771. The memorandum received the descriptor "blind" due to Lincoln's insistence that his Cabinet sign the document without having seen it, likely as a demonstration of faith in his leadership.

platform for that year. Led by Vallandigham, the platform contained the famous “Peace Plank,” which declared the war to be “four years of failure.” As Copperheads wrote the platform, the War Democrats were permitted to select the candidate. Led by men such as Party Chairman August Belmont, they settled on George McClellan, former commander of the Army of the Potomac. Further deference was given to the Peace faction when George Pendleton, a Representative from Ohio and a noted Vallandigham ally, was tabbed as the vice presidential candidate. In an inauspicious and telling start to the campaign, McClellan accepted the nomination, but repudiated the platform, in particular the Peace Plank. To add to their troubles, between the nomination and acceptance, word came north that Sherman had defeated Hood in Georgia and captured Atlanta.²⁰⁹

The Democratic platform made its way to the soldiers, and they reacted with a predictable outrage. Thomas Honnell sneered at what the opposition party offered to the army. “The Chicago Convention offers the Soldiers its protection. Such protection as Wolves would offer Lambs. They will not give a man or a Dollar to continue this war but they will support and Protect the Soldiers! How preposterous McClellan tries to gain votes by Declaring war in his letter of acceptance. But his blind is too thin, We can see through. We can’t trust him.”²¹⁰ Not all saw the platform as total surrender. Robert Winn, never one to avoid the chance at a clever solution, saw the platform as an opportunity. “I would like to apply,” he offered, “the proposed resolution of the Peace Democrats to the Chicago Convention – for each delegate of war proclivities to join the army – so – let men who teach soldiers to permanently fix themselves in the army – let them volunteer for 5 years at least.”²¹¹ Undoubtedly, Winn would not have voted

²⁰⁹ This basic narrative is repeated, but first given by Harold M. Dudley in his article “The Election of 1864,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Mar., 1932): .

²¹⁰ “Thomas Honnell to Friend,” September 25, 1864, Thomas Corwin Honnell Papers, OHS, emphasis in original.

²¹¹ “Robert Winn to Sister,” October 26, 1864, Winn-Cook Family Papers, FHS.

for McClellan, given his strong previously mentioned support for emancipation. He does, though, take the opportunity to voice his opinion that not all was well with the Republicans, and that maybe not all soldiers would be so enthusiastic.

With suffrage being extended nationally to a wartime army for the first time in the country's history, soldiers in many more states had the opportunity that Ohioans did in 1863. Of the 25 states that made up the Electoral College for the 1864 Presidential election, 11 extended the vote to their fighting men, among them Kentucky and Ohio.²¹² A. G. Dow expressed concerns over the direction of the soldier's vote in a letter to his son serving in the army. "How do the soldiers like the Peace Candidate for President, can they vote for Vallandigham & Seymour's candidate?" he queried. Answering his own question, and revealing his sympathies, he responded with, "I think not." Next, he exposed the reason for his concern, mentioning that, "Your Officer Carlisle sent home for some Democrat tickets."²¹³ As voting in those days was done by filling out a party's ticket, or at least could be, asking for Democratic tickets suggested the presence of Democratic voters in the ranks. Not all men were as concerned as the elder Dow. Thomas Honnell boldly stated to a friend, "I have not a single McClellan man in My Company and I don't want any. We have about a dozen in the Regt But they are so ignorant they don't know any better."²¹⁴

William Helsley had some concerns, but his were about the result of the vote at home, where the question was more likely to be decided. "[I]f he [Lincoln] is defeated, I will get out of the service as soon as can, for by all that good an lovely I will not serve under a d-d old

²¹² Tennessee and Louisiana, though fully under Union control by this time, were in the early stages of Reconstruction, and their citizens not permitted to vote. The other 9 states were California, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wisconsin.

²¹³ "A. G. Dow to Son," September 25, 1864, Dow Family Letters, FHS. "Seymour" is Thomas Seymour, governor of Connecticut and another high profile Peace Democrat.

²¹⁴ "Thomas Honnell to Friend Sallie," October 26, 1864, Thomas Corwin Honnell Papers, OHS.

Copperhead if can help it, and if Mack is elected President we can just give up for the South will get their independence before he is in Power one year.” Lest the reader think Helsley were not serious in his charge, he continued, saying, “I would rather lose every cent I have got then see the Copperheads get their man elected if I could.” Switching to a description of the army’s opinions, Helsley expressed a point of view similar to many others. “There is a few men that will vote for the Copperhead candidate in the army but they are scarce. I have tried to find out the opinion of the soldiers and they are very near all for old Abe.” He ended the letter with a request for the recipient, a family member: “Tell father I want him to vote for Abe.”²¹⁵

Lincoln, it would appear, did not need the vote of the elder Helsley. When the election finally came, aided by Sherman’s gift of the city of Atlanta, Lincoln was the landslide winner. There would be much rejoicing in soldier camps. William Pittenger, never afraid of his emotions, or the occasional hyperbolic outburst, celebrated in his diary. “The day of the greatest battle and I believe the greatest victory, though without the loss of a man, has been fought and I know won today,” read his entry for November 8, 1864. “Need I say,” he continued, clearly feeling the need to say, “it was the election of Abraham Lincoln to another term?” In addition to celebrating Lincoln’s victory, Pittenger added another group to share in the glory. “Yes,” he said, “the soldier who aimed his piece properly and fired and killed a dozen Rebs, the right of suffrage.”²¹⁶

As Pittenger said, Lincoln handily won re-election. His 212 electoral votes blew out McClellan’s 21, as the President won every state except Delaware, Kentucky and New Jersey. Not every state allowed its soldiers to vote. Amongst the states focused upon in this study, Kentucky and Ohio did, while as previously mentioned Indiana did not. Ohio, in fact,

²¹⁵ “William Jefferson Helsley to Mary,” September 8, 1864, William Jefferson Helsley Papers, FHS.

²¹⁶ Entry of November 8, 1864, “William Henry Pittenger Diary,” OHS.

contributed over 41,000 votes to Lincoln, the most of any state's soldier vote. Ohio actually went the furthest into the soldier voting policy, as their vote total for McClellan of 9,757 was second only to Pennsylvania. Their overall vote total of 50,903 was by far the highest in the Union. The 80% of Ohio's total that went to Lincoln surpassed the national soldier vote of 77%. Kentucky, with 2,823 McClellan votes to Lincoln's 1,194, was the only state where McClellan won the soldier vote, with 71%. Kentucky's Lincoln vote was the second lowest in the Union, ahead of only Vermont's 243. It should be noted that Vermont had a grand total of 49 McClellan voters, the sum of their voting soldiers being less than 300. Amongst the soldiers of these states, Lincoln's 77%, heavily weighted with Ohio votes, mirrored the national soldier percentage. Compared to each state's popular vote percentage, Ohio's soldiers outpaced the population's 55%, while Kentucky's soldiers mirrored their state's 30%. Combined, Lincoln collected 52% of the votes in both states. Adding Indiana's popular vote to the equation, and Lincoln percentage remained roughly the same, less than his national percentage.²¹⁷

The picture painted of soldiers in the previous two sections suggests a group bitterly opposed to Copperheadism in all of its forms. This characterization is not truly disproved by the evidence here, which adds nuance to our understanding that profile. Many men outright rejected the statements and positions of the Copperhead movement. Some of their positions, though, especially those involving race and the draft, found common ground with these supposed diametric opposites. These men in blue, giving their blood to the cause of Union, were Republicans and Democrats. They came from a bitterly divided region, and in some ways reflected those divisions. What's more, they were not afraid to express those differences, either in public discussions, private letters, or through the act of voting.

²¹⁷ Election numbers from Schlesinger, Presidential Campaigns.

The key point here is the large degree to which these soldiers associated Copperheadism with the Democratic Party. Some of this is a failing of the Party to differentiate between the two. Then again, it is very difficult to differentiate when there are not as many differences as one would like. What can be seen here is that while soldiers were not willing to accept all tenets of the Republican platform as their own, when it came time to make a choice for the election, the choice was clear. They accepted the Republican line, because in their perception the Democratic Party offered nothing but disdain for the war in which these men had given so much, and a war in which they still believed.

Conclusion

If Sherman's capture of Atlanta had sealed Lincoln's fate, then it appears that it sealed the Confederacy's as well. With Lincoln re-elected and the last hope for compromise and negotiation gone, it would be only a matter of months before Lee and Johnson were forced to surrender the remnants of their armies at Appomattox and Durham Station. Defeated as they had been in 1860, the Democrats were bound to another four years out of executive power. Even worse, gains from the Congressional midterms of 1862 were reversed, and the Republicans were firmly in control again. In March 1865, with the war nearing its conclusion, Samuel Dorr offered the confidence of the army. "We all feel here very hopeful about the country and quite confident that Grant, Sherman, etc. are masters of the situation," he wrote. "The Southerners and their sympathizers in the contrary," he continued, "are much depressed confining themselves for the most part to assertions that the South will never give up & others like it."²¹⁸ With Lincoln firmly ensconced in the White House for another four-year term, the war would near its end and the Copperheads would lose their purpose for existence.

As the Confederacy stared its mortality in the face, so too did Copperheads. They would remain as members of the party, still active in American politics, and for many years to come. Their main issues, though, had been taken off the table, resolved by the voters and soldiers. With the war's necessity and progress no longer in doubt, many turned their attention to the coming Reconstruction, and would work to maintain as much of the status quo as possible in the now-reunited South. In general, they would blend back into the Democratic Party, joining sides over the new issues that would cause standard intraparty warfare. The difference was, of course,

²¹⁸ "Samuel Dorr to Mr. Slafter," March 24, 1865, Dorr Family Papers, FHS.

that these issues would no longer carry with them the burden of betting against the government in a war. For example, Copperhead vice presidential candidate George Pendleton was the same man who sponsored the noted Pendleton Civil Service Act of 1883.

Not all soldiers were Republicans, of course. Many of the officers in particular, both political appointees and professionally-trained men, who had come in as Democrats remained as such. These were some of the War Democrats, the faction that had supported Lincoln's prosecution of the war, even though they may have disagreed on some of the President's means of waging it. Winfield Scott Hancock followed his namesake as a presidential loser in the election of 1880. Other former soldiers who found a place on the Democratic ticket in the coming elections included vice presidential candidates Francis P. Blair (1868) and Benjamin Brown (1872). Their presence appears to have been more the exceptions, rather than any kind of extensive pattern within the ranks.²¹⁹

Driven by their wartime experiences, many soldiers became more active politically in the years that followed the war. Many joined veterans organizations, which grew into powerful political forces as their numbers swelled. The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the most notable Union veteran group, could very well have been named "The Grand Army of the Republican Party" in its early days for its strong affinity for the Party's radical wing. In elections both local and national in the immediate aftermath of the war, the GAR's ability to mobilize the soldier vote, as well as the propaganda boost it supplied to the candidate with their support, made them a powerful electoral weapon.²²⁰ After a membership lull in the 1870s, the

²¹⁹ Appendix 2 in Christopher Dell's Lincoln and the War Democrats names many officers from the Union army that in some context were labeled Democrats. Some of these labels, such as calling Ulysses Grant (who served two terms in the White House as a Republican) a Democrat, are dubious, but the list at least makes for interesting reading.

²²⁰ Mary R. Dearing, "Veterans in Politics," in The Civil War Veteran: A Historical Reader, ed. Larry M. Logue and Michael Barton, (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 285.

group's numbers and influence swelled again in the 1880s and 1890s. By this time, individuals voted less "how they shot," and rather towards which candidate promised a larger pension. In many cases, this appears to have been the Republican candidate, and GAR leadership was certain to make sure their members were aware of such a fact.²²¹

For the soldiers, the war not only had a profound impact upon their lives, but also on their politics. While the army's ranks contained men of all political persuasions in 1861, the four long years of war had given many a similar outlook. The Copperheads may not have been the lone faction of the Democratic Party, but for many soldiers the differences between "Democrat" and "Copperhead" had been rendered meaningless. It had been Democrats that had rallied against their cause at home, Democrats who had harassed their numbers in the field, and Democrats who nominated candidates that tried to declare their sacrifice a "failure." Unable to control the Peace faction of their own party, Democrats as a whole suffered the results when the time for voting came. The perception that there was no difference existed in the minds of these men, these soldiers, and the Party would find their message emphatically rejected.

There is an adage that in politics, perception is reality. For Democrats, the perception amongst the soldiers was that the Party of Andrew Jackson had become the Party of Jefferson Davis. On the issues, soldiers could consider different viewpoints, and even hold contradicting opinions to the Republican Party. On many occasions, on issues of the draft, slavery, confiscation, and other controversial Lincoln policies, individual soldiers disagreed with one another. Rarely, though, did these disagreements cast favorable light onto the opposition party. Indeed, when the time came for decision-making, it was only one side that benefitted. Sometimes, even, especially on issues of race, soldiers may have found themselves agreeing with Republicans. Others simply decided that regardless of the other issues, they could not vote for

²²¹ Larry M. Logue, "The Reality of Veterans Voting," in Logue and Barton, ed., Civil War Veteran, 310-314.

candidates whose supporters claimed that the war as a failure. The overwhelming news from home about Democratic campaigning tied them irrevocably to the dastardly Copperheads. Lacking the ability to make the distinction when it would matter the most, the Civil War era Democrats faltered amongst some of the period's most notable actors.

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ABSTRACT

BLUECOATS AND BUTTERNUTS: UNION SOLDIERS AND COPPERHEADS IN THE OHIO RIVER VALLEY

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This paper examines the relationship between Union soldiers and their encounters with Copperheads, members of the Peace faction of the Democratic Party. It encompasses soldiers' experiences both on the home front, as described in letters from family and friends, and in the field, marching through territory with residents who resented and disapproved of their presence. An important facet of this relationship is the way in which these accounts of Copperhead agitation clashed with the political leanings many soldiers may have had towards the Democratic Party. Although some positions, such as pro-slavery and anti-emancipation, had sympathetic ears amongst the army, the consistent drumbeat of anti-war sentiment from the Copperheads drove soldiers towards the Republican Party. This most notably shows during elections, especially in the key elections for Ohio Governor in 1863 and U.S. President in 1864.