KINEMATIC RHETORIC

Non-Discursive
Time-Affect Images in Motion

Joddy Murray

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INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS KINEMATIC TEXT?

Everything in which we take the least interest creates in us its own particular emotion, however slight this may be. This emotion is a sign and a predicate of the thing. […] Everything has its subjective or emotional qualities, which are attributed either absolutely or relatively, or by conventional imputation to anything which is a sign of it. (51)

—Ernst Cassirer, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" (1868 [1992], 51)

Immanence Video Clip

This book articulates a theory of rhetoric in the age of texts in motion—or *kinematic* texts. In the short, time-based text above, there is a sense of speed, of anticipation: the text is layered with sounds and images that articulate meaning and emotion. There is an explosion of kinematic texts such as this one worldwide, and not just as part of the moving picture industry: moving texts are ubiquitous and growing exponentially in number and nearly anyone can create, edit, and distribute them using increasingly common technologies. The rhetorical aim for each of these texts is as diverse as one would expect and is present or common in nearly every variety of discourse. What's more, texts composed with time and duration as affordances rarely stay within commonly understood genres: digital hybridization is especially prevalent in kinematic texts as multimodal composing possibilities proliferate.

Given these changes, how are texts that move rhetorical? What is it about movement in general—and the textual relationship to space and time in particular—that creates persuasive and effective texts? How do rhetorical appeals operate in time-based texts? What affordances are available to texts that move? How can we teach others to create moving texts that best take advantage of their rhetorical aims and purposes? How are the rhetorical characteristics of a moving text different than that of a static text, especially in context of non-discursive, image-based texts? As rhetors compose kinematic

texts for audiences in the age of the network, there is a need for a rhetorical theory that begins to address some of these issues.

The past two decades have seen an explosion of rhetorical work around multimodality, multimedia, networked culture, virtuality, design, and composition. Much of this work has transformed the way rhetoric and composition (and several other disciplines and subdisciplines) regards reading (viewing), writing (producing/designing), and teaching. In *On Multimodality: New Media in Composition Studies*, Jonathan Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes argue, "[i]n our steady incorporation of new media and multimedia forms of composing into our curricula and pedagogies, we have begun to meet the challenges of expanded notions of authoring, composing, and literacy" (3). The book also recounts a kind of history of this work as computing technology advanced, moving from a device that made writing and teaching more efficient to one that, after it is connected to the internet, ushered in a "new era in our understanding of textuality, literate practice, and compositional possibility" (31). The history of this work indicates a trend, one that challenges the very nature of most disciplinary boundaries, both for those of us in rhetorical studies and for those who find their disciplinary home in other fields that want to claim a whole medium or mode as their own. In the introduction to *Passions, Pedagogies, and 21st Century Technologies*, Gail E. Hawisher and Cynthia Selfe indicate that "if we still concern ourselves with the study of language and the nature of literate exchanges, our understanding of the terms *literacy, text* and *visual*, among others, have changed beyond recognition," reminding us how such work often challenges traditional disciplinary boundaries (12). Indeed, rhetoric, from its earliest roots, was both a discipline and a nondiscipline: rhetors, since antiquity, had to "master all disciplines that constituted human knowledge, especially philosophy" (Kraus 66). Although mastery is as improbable as it is impossible in the networked age, when it comes to symbolizing as effectively and persuasively as possible, rhetors who consider both old and new modes in their rhetorical production provide themselves with a wealth of new affordances, even new audiences.

That said, rhetorical theory has been slow to think through the implications of dynamic text specifically. There is something profoundly different about texts that move—so much so that many would hesitate calling them "texts" at all, favoring many of the other terms embraced by mass culture: film, video, movies, compositions, soundtracks, symphonies, and so on. Of course, as "the world as text" cultural perspective underscores,[1] these terms also highlight modes of symbolic expression that use differing technologies to symbolize dynamically in duration and in time. Many have looked at various artifacts through a rhetorical lens in the history of media scholarship, but my aim here

is to theorize how to produce dynamic texts rhetorically in the context of the rise of the increasing potential that comes from our production capabilities in the age of networked devices. As future digital technologies become more immersive, more varied within the sensorium, even more challenging to the digital hybridity between virtual and actual worlds, our theories about how to produce them effectively and persuasively must evolve as well.

Kinematic Rhetoric attempts to theorize how dynamic texts—that is, texts composed with images in motion as a time-based phenomenon—are rhetorical: how these multisensory images operate as non-discursive language (performative and based in image) in contrast to static, discursive language (written/spoken). I use the term "kinematic" to draw etymologically both on its Greek roots, *kinema*, meaning movement, and its use in English (as in kinematic energy, or for the classical mechanics discipline of kinematics). The adjective "kinematic" and the noun "kinematics" also help to emphasize both the attempt to modify and name this rhetorical theory. As explained in some detail later, the neologism "time-affect image" is the basic building block of meaning for dynamic texts, revealing how meaning is composed in order to be persuasive and effective as language. I prefer the term kinematic precisely because of the way it characterizes the essential feature that defines these texts: as *movement* in time.

With the dominance of kinematic texts within the increasing variety and hybridity of textual practice, there is a growing chorus of scholars and educators who acknowledge the rhetorical exigency of moving texts in time: people, corporations, civic groups, governments, and alliances affect and are affected by them. The *why* for this theory is abundantly clear; the *how* is the central argument contained in the following chapters.

Symbolization and Textual Production

Not only do kinematic texts range widely in genre and purpose—from documentary to education, from advertisements to family events, from sound effects to soundtracks, from artist spaces to workplaces—they are also changing the relationship between authors and their environments, audiences, distribution networks, as well as actual and virtual realities. Though movement and rhetoric have always had a relationship (even our physical gestures during speechmaking have long been a part of a rhetor's delivery strategy), kinematic texts are not merely discursive texts delivered on a screen or through speakers. The delivery of digital kinematic texts can range from an e-mail attachment with a voice recording to a digital projection onto a building, but the rhetorical mechanism for creating effective texts that move (in landscape or in soundscape) demands its own composition model and theory of rhetoric.

As discussed more thoroughly later, I draw kinematic examples from the Internet Archive (as well as my own dynamic image and sound compositions) that are generally considered to be documentaries and/or music performances—that is, generally nonfiction, kinematic texts (though the distinction of "fiction" or "nonfiction" for sound compositions may make little sense). Certainly, any text in motion and in duration could be used as examples for this research, but nonfiction documentaries and sound performances are particularly well-suited as cultural artifacts with a clear rhetorical situation. A central tenet for these examples is that these artifacts, built from non-discursive images, are already articulate. There is no need for me to translate, or explicate, them into discursive text in order for them to have meaning. That said, I do try to show how the artifacts exemplify the theory, as the affordances of the ePub format allow.

It may be more important than ever to understand just how moving texts are persuasive and culturally constructed, especially given that they quite possibly may be the preferred type of textual production of the twenty-first century. Though dynamic texts and performances have existed throughout recorded history, modern technologies make it easier for nonspecialists to employ persuasive appeals and the values of multimedia to compose kinematic texts. As such, it becomes more important than ever to consider more than discursive textual production—texts commonly referred to as "language" because they are alphacentric—especially when our texts are becoming increasingly non-discursive and dependent on image and motion to symbolize meaning.[2] As we symbolize with motion, something significant happens to how we appeal to our audience (or even how audiences are imagined). Kinematic texts are not only quickly becoming the texts of choice for consumption, but they are also becoming the preferred symbolization method for production and distribution.

Expansion of Non-discursive Rhetoric

Kinematic rhetoric applies to texts in motion (through duration), and the underlining characteristic of these texts is that they are predominantly non-discursive images, whereas the traditional codex and other print-era texts may be considered primarily discursive in nature (with notable exceptions such as poetry, books with or completely composed of images, graphic novels and comics, etc.). In addition, because kinematic texts *move* through duration, and because they can also be simply animated words or sounds (such as the opening credits for a film, the digital crawl at the bottom of a newscast, or the short musical intro that serves as a transition between two video segments), the texts themselves are primarily non-discursive. Unlike static texts, kinematic texts convey meaning through dynamic images rather than through the static

word. Though these categories are not mutually exclusive (and the two tend to be mixed and composed with each other), kinematic texts tend to rely on non-discursive images in motion. So what are non-discursive images?

My previous book, *Non-discursive Rhetoric: Image and Affect in Multimodal Composition*, set out to define a composing model that allows for two types of symbolization practice, as also described by Susanne Langer: discursive and non-discursive. Discursive symbolization often relies on spoken and/or written, alphacentric symbols that are strung out sequentially, often in one particular order, to convey meaning.[3] Non-discursive symbolization, on the other hand, encompasses nearly everything else we do with our symbols and does not, for the most part, rely on alphacentricism: music, dance, architecture, gastronomy, perfumery, and so on, are all examples of the kind of symbolization practice we engage in as humans beyond putting "the best words into the best order."[4] Rhetors and poets have taken advantage of the two types of symbolization practices for millennia, but language continues to be thought of as primarily a discursive practice. Non-discursive rhetoric, in fact, endeavors to expand the term "language" so that it may include non-discursive symbolization as much as it includes discursive symbolization.

Because non-discursive symbols rely on image, they carry emotional meaning, or affect, along with them, and they are necessary in helping humans symbolize beyond what Langer in *Philosophy in a New Key* calls "the facts of consciousness" (36). Often, non-discursive meaning is perceived as a whole, even as it is strung out in time with multiple layers attached (as is the case for musical compositions and filmic texts). Images include all of the sensory information we are able to receive through our experiences in the world. The distinction between discursive and non-discursive is largely one of convenience, and given that our symbolizing practice is so often multimodal, the line between the two is blurry at best and, at times, overlapping.

Any rhetorical theory centered on kinematic texts must account for the way images function to carry meaning and emotions, but also how motion and duration carry meaning and emotions. Motion is itself a mode, a kind of symbol affordance, that allows for extra meaning-making through space and time. This book expands on my earlier work on non-discursive rhetoric by creating a special class of images in kinematic texts: non-discursive, time-affect images that move.

Cinema as a form of kinematic text is over a century old, yet, like photography, there is a surprising lack of rhetorical theory that struggles with questions like, "How do kinematic texts appeal to an audience to be persuasive?" and "How are the rhetorical appeals used in kinematic rhetoric?" Certainly, there is no shortage of texts that focus on interpretation of cinema and sound performances.[5] Audio compositions—that is, aural texts in motion—also have

their own body of scholarship. But this book is not directly concerned with critique or interpretation of cinema or music. Rather, the aim of this theory is to focus on how rhetors compose these dynamic texts for various rhetorical contexts and, as a consequence, how producers of these texts—that is, writers of kinematic texts—may compose them with audience expectations in mind.

Interpretation and analysis of kinematic text might be seen as a kind of rhetorical analysis, and there are similarities.[6] However, like the literary analysis of printed or static texts, some scholars who focus on interpretation, critique, and explication of kinematic texts are engaged in the reception of (what are mostly) fictional texts. Though there is much to learn from cinematic theory and music theory about kinematic texts—a considerable overlap in foundational theorists such as Bergson and Deleuze, for example—the focus here is to examine the kinematic textual production through a rhetorical lens. Interpretation and analysis of filmic texts function differently in the face of a perceived difference between fiction and nonfiction, real and the unreal, true and untrue (even in the face of postmodern and posthuman theories, and even with the rise of augmented reality in games and tourism apps).[7] Indeed, kinematic texts have enjoyed a long history of analyses as part of film and cinema studies, including the body of work on the craft of making film, largely written by artists and philosophers with experience in composing for the global moving picture industry: Siegfried Kracauer, André Bazin, Sergei Eisenstein, Christian Metz, Johannes Ehrat, Noel Carroll, and others—many of whom are relied on heavily throughout this book.[8] Likewise, musicologists have long delved into questions of musical composition and meaning: Leonard Meyer, Pierre Boulez, Eero Tarasti, and Liz Garnett, to name a few. The rhetorical theory suggested here is indeed multidisciplinary, drawing from philosophers, rhetorical theorists, film and cinema theorists, musical theorists, neuroscientists, and media theorists. Like many of the scholars above, the emphasis here is on the rhetorical production of kinematic texts and not as much on the analytical interpretation or criticism of kinematic texts.[9]

Rhetorical theory adds the perspective of the rhetor struggling to produce texts, moving or static, in order to effectively employ symbols. I especially like James A. Herrick's definition of rhetoric in his *History and Theory of Rhetoric*: "the systematic study and intentional practice of effective symbolic expression" (24). Instead of using the term language (which often refers to only discursive language), he uses the phrase "symbolic expression," leaving the medium or the mode wide open for rhetorical study as well as emphasizing the "practice" of producing texts (7). Work such as David Blakesley's edited collection, titled *The Terministic Screen: Rhetorical Perspectives on Film*, sets out to use rhetoric to add various perspectives to films, and to acknowledge "the emergence of rhetorical theory as a terministic screen for the analysis

and interpretation of films" (1). In contrast, this book aims to consider the nature and contribution of motion, time, and duration as crucial elements in textual production—as, in short, rhetorical theory. Kinematic texts, therefore, may benefit from this kind of theorizing within the framework of rhetoric because all moving images of any mode are included as unique "symbolic expression"—one that requires unique theories for its effective practice. Just as film theory and music theory set out to discover the epistemic features of their respective modalities, this rhetorical theory attempts the same.[10]

Textual Movement in the Digital Age

If one of the identifiable features in the digital age is that our texts are increasingly infused with multiple modes, then the digital age can clearly be characterized as becoming increasingly kinematic. Websites are more and more kinematic with increasingly numerous animations and layered sound images. Along with the ubiquity of motion graphics in everything from mobile phone apps to news and advertisement animations, there is an increasing number of texts that are infused with motion—sometimes in subtle, banal ways, sometimes in grand, spectacular ways.[11]

In August of 2009 (and for the first time ever), Americans conducted more online searches using YouTube as a portal than Google's main search portal, and at the time of this writing, at least 400 hours of video get loaded into YouTube every minute from all over the world—not to mention the amount on other video delivery websites like Hulu and Vimeo.[12] Though Google's acquisition of YouTube in 2006 makes these statistics more difficult to parse, the acquisition itself speaks volumes about the increasing prominence and desire for kinematic texts over static texts. Statistics like these are rarely even worth mentioning because they change so rapidly. But the trends are clear: more people all over the planet are consuming, producing, and disseminating kinematic content each day. According to the Pew Research Center and the Elon University's Imagine the Internet Center, the future trends are clear: "mobile, wearable, and embedded computing will be tied together in the Internet of Things, allowing people and their surroundings to tap into artificial intelligence-enhanced cloud-based information storage and sharing." Indeed, in *On Multimodality: New Media in Composition Studies*, Jonathan Alexander and Jacqueline Rhodes observe that "[v]ideo composing has become a key modality of meaning-making among younger generations of college students, so developing a critically literate approach to such textual production seems crucial," though the authors ultimately "question" this kind of textual production in writing courses because it calls to question their "ideologies of literacy" (71, 77). *Kinematic Rhetoric* does not address literacy, as such, but it

does advocate for the potential of kinematic, meaning making if nothing else because it sets out to define a rhetorical theory that may then be used by others to develop pedagogies to address kinematic literacies.

New media scholarship, digital rhetoric, and the digital humanities (DH) all have connections to the rhetorical theory here as technology continues to change our symbolizing practices and our mutual connectivity. Lev Manovich, in *The Language of New Media*, makes the case that new media in general is moving us into a world that is becoming more and more kinematic (78). Douglas Eyman, in *Digital Rhetoric: Theory, Method, Practice*, crystallizes how "networks, particularly the digital networks in which digital texts circulate, are also systems, and in this way they can be similarly seen as elements in a digitally networked ecology of overlapping (and networked) ecosystems […] in other words, networks are ecological entities" (85). Movement across networks using multiple modes through multiple nodes is already the reality of textual production and the future is trending toward more. The formation and spread of scholarship loosely labeled as the digital humanities (DH) has similarly reinforced the need for robust rhetorical theory that considers changes in our symbolization practices. Jennifer Glaser and Laura L. Micciche suggest, in fact, that English departments ought to be a welcome site for housing DH scholars because "DH represents a realistic and viable future for a field mourning a primarily textual past" as it "recuperates rhetorical study within English departments" (200).

What this book tries to accomplish is also part of a larger effort to integrate the discursive and non-discursive language necessary in this kind of scholarship. When I began this project, the limitations of ePub2 underwent a change to the newer advantages (and, still, limitations) of ePub3—a welcome change, but one that required retooling and some reimagining of the marriage between form and content. In a way, this text is a response to Gregory Ulmer's call in *Teletheory* to "imagine a different apparatus, beginning with a different technology" because he saw a need for academic discourse to unblock "the theorization of video" through the "desire to know, the love of learning" because "it is experienced emotionally, carried not in arguments but in images and stories, at the level of memory" (29). The assemblage before you is an experiential "unblocking" for this kind of theorization. It is also a humble beginning in that, on the one hand, I have a nearly unlimited ability to pick and choose and add more and more modes and media. On the other hand, in the vein that more is not always better—and that there are material realities around issues of copyright, file size, compatibility, readability/viewability— maintaining a focus on the theory itself necessitates some constraint.

Throughout the book, I use various nonfiction examples of kinematic texts that are freely available on the Internet Archive (archive.org)—some in video,

some in audio (since kinematic texts encompasses audio compositions as well). Though I'm using my own edited versions of these videos for practical reasons, I've also included external links to the online, full-length versions. The audio compositions are my own and I make no claims about their quality (nor do I make any claims about the quality of the videos used as examples throughout).[13] What matters is that these examples help to connect these theoretical concepts to actual kinematic texts in order to reveal some of the affordances of time-affect images in motion: how duration creates virtual resolution that amplifies and deepens the experience of texts through movement. However, it is not my intention to explicate or interpret discursive meaning for these examples or providing extensive rhetorical analysis of them—they are intended to already be articulate as they are, and they enact, to some degree, the rhetorical theory as it unfolds. The book itself, as an ePub, attempts to demonstrate some of its own rhetorical theory by including kinematic texts as the theory unfolds. As digital scholarship finds more of home in the academy, books like this one may become more common and, undoubtedly, richer with multimodality.

Chapter Summaries

The first chapter, "Motion and Image in Kinematic texts," asserts the way movement is theorized in the age of digital texts. Through his two books on cinema—one focused on the "movement-image" and the other on "the time-image"—Gilles Deleuze argues for the importance of moving texts as tools of language. Specifically, the terms "movement-image" and "time-image" help describe the underlying concepts that begin to define Kinematic images. The movement-image is hyphenated because the movement helps define the image and therefore cannot be left out of the concept. Deleuze credits the term movement-image to Henri Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (1896), and it is this concept that leads him to assert that the movement-image is integral to the symbol system—an indirect image of chronological time—and is, therefore, concrete. The time-image, consequently, is a direct image of time (time composed) and subsumes movement rather than derives from it. I argue in this chapter for a different term, the time-affect image, one that combines all three essential concepts for images in kinematic rhetoric: motion, time, and affect.

From this theoretical base, I move into my second chapter, "Composing Time," in order to describe how non-discursive images are amplified by Bergson's concept of "duration." Movement alone is not sufficient in building strong rhetorical appeals. Through movement in duration, appeals become amplified and contextual. Susanne Langer's concept of virtual space relates directly to this duration: that once "we are preoccupied with construing what

goes on in the direction away from us, we are no longer dealing with visual forms, but with things and their story" (*Feeling* 74). That is, Langer provides a way for the virtual to become animated. Duration connects time and movement through emotion, creating an increase in resolution for the rhetorical appeals present.

In addition, research by Ostrovsky, Andalman, and Sinha indicates how motion itself may be fundamental to understanding. Neuroscientists once thought that after years of blindness, the brain would not be able to process visual information, but Pawan Sinha and his colleagues are now debunking this notion. After treatment, Sinha's team recorded how the process of sight is built by the brain through experiencing dynamic information (motion), and the ultimate consequence of this information is that the brain can then teach itself how to see again—movement teaches vision. It may well be the case, therefore, that movement facilitates understanding, both through perception and our sense of self. Kinematic rhetoric has the potential to create extremely strong appeals, at least in part due to its neurological connections between motion and conscious becoming.

In "Immersion and Immanence in Kinematic texts," I transition from how kinematic texts utilize movement, duration, and affect through time-affect images to how kinematic texts create immersion rooted in Deleuzian "immanence." As opposed to transcendent forms, immanent forms privilege the complexities of time rather than the quantifiable neatness of space: "There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed […] It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality" (*Plateaus* 266). It is through immanence that kinematic texts are composed using the affordances of movement in space and time—texts that become effective and persuasive, whether intended in gaming or hyper-immediate kinematic texts. As a grounded construct, immanence means to become "the absolute state of movement as well as of rest, from which all relative speeds and slownesses spring" (267). Kinematic texts, as they are composed of time, are a multiplicity of virtualities embedded in movement. This is movement not as voyage but as rhizomatic middle—no beginnings, no endings, "it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing" (25). Immanence, the earthly rather than the transcendent, builds immersion into the virtual through movement.

It is the relationships between image, movement, time (duration), and immanence that lead to a rhetorical theory built around the affordances of motion—as well as a composing theory for kinematic texts. In the last chapter, "Composing Kinematic Texts," the rhetorical proofs are put into motion, as are the rhetorical canons. Like other composing models, this theory accounts for how a rhetor can compose with kinematic text to produce effective symbolic

expression with movement, affect, and duration. For instance, the appeal of *pathos* as a rhetorical appeal is commonly understood, but when pathos transforms through duration, its effect is amplified and made more intense as a state of becoming. Similarly, *kairos*, which is all about timing and movement, privileges occasionality as a continual opportunity to make meaning in duration. This chapter forwards a general theory of how image texts moving through time achieve different levels of sensed reality—both in and out of absolute time.

By creating experiences of becoming, the rhetor builds worlds of kinematic texts using time-affect images. I end with a gesture toward the gradual convergence of our symbolic/textual world and our material world, necessitating some future consideration on how such a immanent immersion will continue to change education and rhetorical production.

Animation 1

1

MOTION AND IMAGE IN KINEMATIC TEXTS

Real mobility, the very essence of motion, which is what imagined motion is, is not aroused by the description of reality, even when it describes the unfolding of reality. […] What I would actually like to examine in this work is how the imaginary is immanent in the real, how a continuous path leads from the real to the imaginary.

—Gaston Bachelard, *Air and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Movement* (1943 [1988])

Arise! Video Clip 1

The clip above, from *Arise! Women Protecting the Environment* by Lori Joyce and Candice Orlando (2012), opens with still video of landscapes, the sun, orange skies, and, most importantly, the faces of smiling women in outdoor, generally rural environments located in diverse corners of the globe. The background music before the voice-over narration is medium tempo with a strong beat and a voice intermittently singing a word, like an alarm, that punctuates the landscape visuals. The voice-over itself introduces the main arguments, but then yields the floor to three other women who emphasize their own point of view about women empowerment and environmental sustainability. All of this is readily observable in the video. Significantly, though, there is more going on in every second of this dynamic text than could in static texts, because of the layers of meaning, the visual and aural images, and the overall affect of seeing these women in these environments, composed together to forge a rhetorical message. It is persuasive and effective. But how?

Ultimately, my aim here is to offer a new term—the time-affect image—that theorizes a composite of movement, affect, and time in order to emphasize the interrelationships between them, and to gesture toward the complexity necessary for the rhetorical production of kinematic texts. Through his two books on cinema—one focused on the "movement-image" and the other on the "time-image"—Gilles Deleuze argues for the importance of moving texts

as tools of language. These Deleuzian theories help outline how movement itself works to persuade in kinematic text, whether through animation, sound, and/or the video camera. The layers of sound and visual images here overlap with the narrative in the introduction to *Arise!* and it is precisely the layering through duration that gives this kinematic text complexity and affective meaning. Unlike static texts, kinematic texts are cultural products made up of moving, non-discursive images. There is therefore a need for a kinematic rhetorical theory that informs rhetors about the affordances of kinematic texts, a theory that is crucial to understanding the opportunities these texts provide.

To some degree, rhetoric has long assumed a certain importance for movement in creating effective texts. Aristotle's Rhetoric refers to a text's ability to evoke "activity" through language. In chapter III of book II, Aristotle refers directly to a text's ability to move through the "hearers" seeing the action and, thus, giving life to our symbol-making:

> It has already been mentioned that liveliness is got by using the proportional type of metaphor and being making (i.e., making your hearers see things). We have still to explain what we mean by their "seeing things," and what must be done to effect this. By "making them see things" I mean using expressions that represent things as in a state of activity […] the things have the effect of being active because they are made into living beings; shameless behaviour and fury and so on are all forms of activity […] [it] represents everything as moving and living; and activity is movement. (1411b–12a)

Aristotle's activity, or movement, is a quality, an ability for a text to allow the viewer to not only "see" but also be "made into living beings." The crucial term here is "living," which I take to mean dynamic, not static—texts that are or seem to be alive, to change, in their meaning-making, whatever the combination of textual modes.

Therefore, it is image motion and duration that carry the defining mode in kinematic texts, regardless of the type of image involved (optical, auditory, olfactory, haptic, or gustatory). Textual movement cannot be underestimated or undervalued: it is nothing short of revolutionary, and advances in technology have made it more available and more producible (and recordable) than ever. It is a symbolic mode that interacts, animates, refreshes, combines, and separates, all within the multiplicities of duration—in short, it is a living, active, dynamic, non-discursive mode of symbolization. Fixity, as a quality of discursive text, was its own revolutionary technology, rescuing texts from their more ephemeral quality, privileging their ability to document and defy mortality (to some extent). In fact, without the lessons discursive text teaches about

the value of "fixing" text—that is, stilling meaning—the revolutions afforded to motion in kinematic text may not have been possible: as with discursive text, non-discursive motion relies on discursive fixity, often through advances in recording technologies. But symbols that move have their own special rhetorical power based on that movement and require some special attention of their own.[1]

In *The Power of Movies: How Screen and Mind Interact*, Colin McGinn summarizes the special attractiveness of film and cinema to the individual mind as a special form of consciousness set in a special environment (the movie theater). He identifies the intensity, or "quality," of the relationship between the "images on the screen" as we are "gripped": "The moving image itself seems an object of extraordinary potency" because "[i]n the movie-watching experience, we enter an 'altered state of consciousness,' enthralling and irresistible" (4). This type of ritualized experience does indeed seem to special and powerful. In the *Arise!* clip above, the combinations of visual and aural modes powerfully combine as the final woman interviewed states one of the main theses for the documentary: "Once you empower a woman, you empower a nation. So when we are empowered, the world is empowered. If we are strong, the world is strong. If we are healthy, the world is healthy" (00:01:06-22). McGinn's observation points to how in this special environment, a woman of color speaking English with an African idiolect, while speaking in some kind of grove or forested area, conveys both sincerity and strength in part by the way she emphasizes certain words with her voice (empower, world, strong, healthy). By comparing how the static version of these words differs in emotional intensity to the dynamic version, the rhetorical effectiveness is clear.

But it would be a mistake to only credit films and "movies" for this potency. McGinn spends considerable effort to show how this genre is distinctive in its ability to be so captivating. Clearly, however, movement has a special place in all modalities of textual production—of which filmic presentations are just a part. Texts in motion exist everywhere in many different guises and with many different technologies of production, consumption, and distribution. One need not only sit in a darkened theater to understand how the infographic spinning and pulsating in the corner of the television program does, at some level, contain similar provocations to the viewer's attention. Or how the electronic billboard beside a driver's daily commute may continue to draw some sense of fascination as colors and shapes dance across the billboard's screen. Or how, especially at the community fair, your attention is drawn to the lone saxophone player improvising near the fire hydrant, empty case opened for donations. Motion itself, whether visual or aural or any type of image, has the ability to teach perception; it can be simulated through all of the senses (including gustatory senses, as anyone who has careened over the crest of a

sharp hill at high speeds may attest). Motion through duration is a powerful meaning-maker, and as such is a persuasive tool for symbolization.

But motion, in itself, is only part of the way images that move impact an audience. Movement, the actual and virtual dislocation through space, relies on time, or duration. The very ephemeral quality that so vexed orality, the lack of fixity in time, becomes the progenitor of new possibilities through motion and the passage of instants in time-space. Granted, both fixed and dynamic texts have always employed strategies of their counterpart: oral texts could be made static through memory and the retelling of histories; moving texts rely at some level on words, dialogue, reproducibility, and recorded copies. Nevertheless, texts that move carry a special affordance to perception, to the imagination, to time itself, and to rhetoric's inventive and persuasive potential. As Bachelard states in the quoted epigraph, "The imaginary is immanent in the real": the connection between imaginaries and realities is motion in time.

Deleuze and Kinematic Text

In the preface of the first book, *Cinema 1*, Deleuze is careful to distinguish his work from other work that has been done on cinema, as well as establish kinematic texts as composed texts. He defines "types" of cinematographic meaning as those that do not "set out to produce a history of the cinema but to isolate certain cinematographic concepts" that are "not technical […] or critical. […] The cinema seems to us to be a composition of images and of signs" (ix). That is, Deleuze is not as interested in the techne or hermeneutics of cinema as much as he is interested in its "images and signs." This is an important distinction because the focus here, like in Deleuze, is on how kinematic texts function rhetorically, and how, as an assemblage, movement serves rhetorical aims.[2] It is not enough, for example, to view kinematic texts as cultural artifacts—though doing so can and does yield its own riches. Instead, by focusing on how movement is itself a part of non-discursive rhetoric, and on how motion has a special relationship to the way texts can be effective and persuasive through images in duration, new possibilities for rhetorical analysis and production become evident.

Deleuze's work on kinematic text provides a framework for connecting textual motion with rhetoric. As Ronald Bogue's study of Deleuze's work on cinema emphasizes, it is by establishing a "mode of thought" that makes Deleuze's philosophy integral to this type of inquiry:

Deleuze's object in Cinema I and Cinema 2 is to develop philosophical concepts that "relate only to cinema" […] with constant reference to a general conception of cinema as a mode of thought. That mode

of thought is inseparable from the films that embody it, but it requires a complex philosophical treatment of time, space, and movement to account for its diverse manifestations. (2)

In so doing, Deleuze highlights the importance of how these layers of symbols work to create non-discursive meaning in cinema: movement, itself, in time and space, becomes a kind of symbol-making employed to generate meaning. Deleuze, through his intense study of philosophical theorists such as Hume, Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson, Spinoza, and with his collaborations with the psychologist Felix Guattari, articulates the need for a more significant engagement with these texts: more than an analysis of individual films, Deleuze's work is a foray into the significance of movement within symbolic practice.

These books on cinema, however, have generally languished in the sidelines of intellectual history. As D. N. Rodowick states in *Afterimages of Gilles Deleuze's Film Philosophy*, a collection of essays devoted to Deleuze's work on cinema, "precious few film scholars in the Anglophone world […] found the books interesting or important" and he was "warned against devoting so much time to two books that many film scholars found marginal at best and incomprehensible at worst" (xiv). Rodowick's analysis only underscores how this work has become more salient than ever to textual practice in the digital age, especially as newer technologies emerge. "[A]s moving images became more and more electronic and digital," Rodowick asserts, "the destiny of the time-image and its immanent relation to duration, so closely tied to analogical and photographic materiality, was thrown into question" (xv). Consequently, rhetors require theory relevant to ever-changing technologies based less on material reality and more on a networked, self-replicating, algorithmic, and progressively aware digital reality. Just as it has been the case that rhetorical studies had to acknowledge and engage multiple modes of symbolic practices that defy the alphacentric bias of its printed, alphabetic history, rhetorical studies must now also acknowledge and engage the symbolic practices that defy a largely static language practice.

Obviously, film scholars eventually warmed to Deleuze, making him one of the most cited theorists in the discipline. Paul Patton's *Screen* review of Deleuze's two cinema books marks the work as somewhat transformational: "The concepts employed make no reference to the subjective capacities or intentions of individuals but rather to the types of image, sign and techniques of montage and shot composition employed," concluding that "[i]t is not because authors are great that their work deserves comment, but because their work invents new images or signs that they are great authors" (243). Ils Huygens recounts the history of film scholars' fascination with the "link between cinema and thinking," from Hugo Munsterberg's "cinema as

analogous to the human mind" to Germain Dulac's "cinema as a medium capable of visualizing (unconscious) thought processes." Huygens also states that "if we follow Deleuze's claims that cinema holds the capacity to transform thought," then "cinema has to be able to produce its own specific filmic ways of thinking." In addition, Deleuze's philosophical contributions manifested methodological consequences. For example, Felicity Coleman's book, *Deleuze and Cinema: The Film Concepts* (2011), claims to be one of the first "introductory guides to Deleuze's radical methodology for screen analysis" in part by emphasizing how his "method provides a positioning theoretical springboard for all types of enquiry" (6). Without question, the philosophy of Deleuze and his collaborators has influenced modern cinema theory.

It is Deleuze's attempts to deeply consider the connections between time, image, and meaning in a sustained manner that draw scholars to his work. In Gilles Deleuze's *Time Machine*, Rodowick asserts that Deleuze's cinema books contribute a "complex meditation on time," and that is his "central contribution to contemporary philosophy" (x). Rodowick also claims that "Gilles Deleuze's philosophy is, in the deepest and most complex ways, a philosophy of time," and though that may be the case, the central purpose of this book is to examine how motion and time are a tool for rhetors. For a kinematic rhetoric, then, the central question becomes this: What are the affordances of motion, movement, duration, and time that help create effective kinematic texts that persuade? Deleuze and some of his predecessors (notably, Bergson and Simondon) help provide some clarity and, in the end, help to suggest a new type of image as a central unit of meaning for this kind of production: the non-discursive, time-affect image.

Deleuzian Movement-Image

Continuity and the ability to link perception, affect, and action are central tenants to Deleuzian movement. The term "movement-image" describes the underlying concept that helps define a kinematic image that is still connected to its sensory-motor realities.[3] Deleuze argues both for the grounded, relatedness of the movement-image and against its limitation as only an indirect image of time. According to Rodowick's reading of Deleuze, "The movement-image provides only an indirect image of time because time is reduced to intervals defined by movement and the linking of movements through montage" (*Time Machine*, 11). Above all, the movement-image maintains its relationships:

> What matters is not who did the action […] but neither is it the action itself: it is the set of relations in which the action and the one who did it are caught. […] The essential point, in any event, is that action, and

> also perception and affection, are framed in a fabric of relations. It is this chain of relations which constitutes the mental image, in opposition to the threat of actions, perceptions and affections. (Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 200)

Similar to Aristotle's "activity," Deleuze distinguishes between "action itself" and its connectedness through a "chain of relations" that lead to a "mental image." Characterized by this type of movement continuity, the movement-image is not "an image to which movement is added" but is itself the image created from movement (*Cinema 1*, 2). It is in this way that Deleuze defines cinema as "the system which reproduces movement as a function of any-instant-whatever that is, as a function of equidistant instants, selected so as to create an impression of continuity" (5). It is important here to point out that the movement-image creates an illusion of continuity through care-fully composed instants, or a "fabric of relations": if there are cuts, the instant that follows the cut in the shot is conceivably continuous from the moment the cut broke the action (i.e., no flashbacks or flashforwards in time). Relations of moments and instants are consistent, returned to, and not random. "This tendency of returning to the acentered flux of matter is perhaps the central defining quality of kinematic movement-images" (Rodowick 32). It is also why Deleuze does not consider the movement-image as an indirect image.

The term "movement-image" is hyphenated because movement helps define two concepts at once: that images are in motion within a fabric of relations and that motion affects the meaning potential of the images. Because images are so important to thought and to composing, the hyphen actualizes the "both/and" character of the term: images that move as well as images that have meaning because they move.

Deleuze also defines movement-images as having multiple types of images, and it is here that the rhetorical potential of this term becomes clear for kinematic texts. Specifically, Deleuze defines three other types of movement-images: "The image of the cinema being, therefore, 'automatic' and presented primarily as movement-image, we have considered under what conditions it is specifically defined into different types […] perception-image, the affection-image and action-image" (*Cinema 1*, ix). The nature of cinematographic movement is defined here as non-discursive ("automatic"), dependent on motion ("active"), and affective (the inescapable result of using images to evoke emotion) (64–65). Each of these types are responsible for its own vari-ation of the movement-image: from perception in motion, to the absorption of affect, to the "design for an assumed end," or action (65). Significantly, these types of movement-image attribute three essential characteristics of how movement itself becomes image: through perception, through action, and

through emotion—all three of which are also highlighted earlier in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

The movement-image carries a locative effect through the bridged tensions that are irreducible and integral to the symbol system itself. As Deleuze states, "[t]he any-instant-whatever is the instant which is equidistant from another" because "[w]e can therefore define the cinema as the system which reproduces movement by relating it to the any-instant-whatever" (6). The movement-image is created through discrete instances with regular intervals. The movement is at once a symbol and an indirect time experience within subjective multiplicities of meaning. Similar to the way the eye captures a set of regular snapshots of visual information multiple times every second to construct the illusion of continuous reality, the intervals in-between each image are not perceived visually and are largely unknown. The lifespan of an entire entity may have been born, lived, and was extinguished in that interval, so however small the interval the fact of its existence only highlights the image of movement, not its objective reality.

The first of the movement-images Deleuze posits is the perception-image, characterized by the orientation of the subject:

> [W]e go from total, objective perception which is indistinguishable from the thing, to a subjective perception which is distinguished from it by simple elimination or subtraction. It is this unicentred subjective perception that is called perception strictly speaking. And it is the first avatar of the movement-image: when it is related to the centre of indetermination, it becomes perception-image. (64)

In this conception of movement-image, Deleuze emphasizes perspective as a function of the viewpoint of the observer of the movement. Each movement-image of this type orients us by providing a virtual perspective for the senses while keeping track of the actual orientation in space-time. In fact, the movement-image is, in part, the subtraction of these two orientations. For example, the image of movement experienced while watching video of a roller coaster filmed from the first car (while objectively sitting still all the while); or similar to the sensation created in a parked car if a car that is on each side suddenly begins to simultaneously roll backward. Deleuze carves out an "avatar" of the movement-image to emphasize this subjective effect of motion that kinematic texts are able to create through perception and perspective—a movement that is indeterminate yet perceived.

It is worth noting that Henri Bergson, in his essay "Images and Bodies," spends a great deal of time on the nature of perception, especially in its inherent disconnection between body and matter: "I call matter the aggregate

of images, and perception of matter these same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my body" (89). Perception is independent of image; in fact, images exist whether or not they are perceived, and the body as perceiver is included among these ever-existing images. The universe, for Bergson, is not simply comprised of only what we are able to perceive: science and its evermore sophisticated instruments that extend our perceptive abilities have shown this throughout recent history. In fact, perception by an image (the body) within the "aggregate of images" (the universe) is, in the end, all there is for Bergson: "But the truth is that the movements of matter are very clear, regarded as images, and that there is no need to look in movement for anything more than what we see in it" (89). This is in part the reason why each element in Deleuze's philosophy on cinema is an image element: a hyphenated reminder that as part of the aggregate of images, what we perceive as movement (or affect or action) is, ultimately, also image.

Additionally, ecological psychologists' view of perception also attempts to consider the aggregate over the whole. According to Joseph Anderson in *Moving Image Theory*, humans evolved within environments that present "patterned arrays of energies" that have tuned our senses not while in stasis but while in movement: "Of course, the properties of an environment are not static, and the perceiver does not remain stationary but instead moves through the environment" and, thus, "we do not passively catalogue random properties of the world as they are revealed to us though our senses; instead we actively look and listen (and touch, taste, and sniff) for the things that the environment might afford us" (2–3). That is, our perceptions are ecological in that we have evolved with them over time, and at least part of the way our perceptions function is attributable to our movement through our environment. Movement, evolutionarily, begets and alters perception.

The second type of Deleuzian movement-image is the action-image: the actions themselves create the image of motion, something obviously reliant on perception but distinct enough to require its own avatar: "[T]he incurving of the universe, which simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things […] is the second material aspect of subjectivity" and "just as perception relates movement to 'bodies' (nouns), that is to rigid objects which will serve as moving bodies or as things moved, action relates movement to 'acts' (verbs) which will be the design for an assumed end or result" (*Cinema I*, 65). The idea of "virtual action of things" may seem less strange in the era of 3-D arrows that seemingly fly out of screens, but the subjectivity of this movement is, again, key to the concept. The flying arrow action toward the viewer is experienced by the viewer as the movement-image particular to kinematic text that is very much like Deleuze's action-image. Unlike static texts that allow the imagination to be shocked or surprised—even

perhaps through a metaphor of movement as described through discursive language—only dynamic text has the ability to create such a particular, non-discursive image through motion, one that has been employed liberally in kinematic compositions to create rhetorical affect many times over. Aural kinematic texts may, likewise, create the sensation of action, say of galloping, simply with rhythms that are similar to hooves hitting the ground. The action-image brand of the movement-image is, for Deleuze, a form of realism:

> Qualities and powers are no longer displayed in any-space-whatevers, no longer inhabit originary worlds, but are actualised directly in determinate, geographical, historical and social space-times. Affects and impulses now only appear as embodied in behaviour, in the form of emotions or passions which order and disorder it. […] What constitutes realism is simply this: milieu and modes of behaviour, milieu which actualise and modes of behaviour which embody. The action-image is the relation between the two and all the varieties of this relation. (141)

That is to say, the action-image embodies behavior. What may seem realistic may be obviously unreal: "it does not exclude fiction or even the dream. It can include the fantastic, the extraordinary, the heroic and above all melodrama" (141). That said, this avatar of the movement-image makes an impression through behavior because "[i]n its most general definition, the impression is the inner, but visible, link between the permeating situation and the explosive action" (159). The inner link connecting perceived images of movement and embodied images is this notion of the action-image: a relational device between perception and conduct.

Of the three types of movement-image, the "affection-image" may be the most powerful since it connects the viewer with a sense of congruity in what is otherwise a very subjective reality. In fact, Deleuze characterizes it as "in-between" the "perceptive and active": "It is a coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself 'from the inside' (third material aspect of subjectivity)" as "[i]t relates movement to a 'quality' as lived state" (65). This type of movement-image connects to the multisensory absorption of kinematic movement: it is a continual engagement with the affective domain, and it is empathetic. "There is inevitably a part of external movements that we 'absorb,'" Deleuze continues, "that we refract, and which does not transform itself into either objects of perception or acts of subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality" (65). Deleuze carefully connects perception and action through the movement-image of emotion, or affect. He does this because he regards affect as the link between perception and action: "it

is precisely in affection that the movement ceases to be that of translation in order to become movement of expression" (66). In short, the affection-image avatar is the type of movement-image created in kinematic text that is as much from the expression of affect as it is an expression of motion, or action.[4] Expression, of course, is understood here as meaning production.

It may seem incongruous to combine the quality of motion with the quality of affect. Emotion and motion may seem too far removed from each other for the avatar Deleuze suggests to seem relevant to kinematic text. What's more, all text, whether discursive or non-discursive, has the capacity to be affective. But for Deleuze, and for the purposes of this book, the motion inherent in the affection-image relates directly to the experience that motion can create emotionally. Sudden acceleration or deceleration can lead to an emotion of surprise and/or fear; disorientation and rapid spinning can lead to an emotion of confusion, disgust, or illness. These are affects that derive (to various degrees) from the motion itself, and so can be thought of as an avatar to the movement-image. (For one example, review the video clip placed at the beginning of the Introduction.)

The three avatars of movement-image are combined in a montage of interacting moments. Rodowick summarizes the three through their resulting "lived states": "Where the perception-image describes the delineation of bodies, and the action-image acts, the affection-image relates movement to qualities or lived states […] the affection image defines how the subject perceives or experiences itself 'from the inside'" (37). The effort to link the subjective experience of motion to the movement-image is at the heart of kinematic symbolic practice. The operand expresses a relational power of the affection-image.

It is therefore clear that the connection between image and affect is crucial. Unlike discursive, alphacentric text, images function in our brains through two separate neural pathways: one that relays memory information, the other that relays emotional information (Ramachandran 162). Our brains require both streams of information for us to make connections to images that are familiar, or known to us. Just the same, Deleuze emphasizes the connection to emotions through perception and action, creating a link (through impulse) to affective, kinematic texts through movement. In fact, excising anything emotional from discursive text is considered professional, scientific, and academic. Attempts to do so in meaningful kinematic texts would be largely impossible, not to mention unwelcome.

As you listen here to the full musical composition that accompanies the video in the introduction (titled "Banta"),[5] you may notice how the sound movement is composed of movement-images that provide perspective, have action, and are emotional: Banta Audio Clip

As the piece transitions around the halfway point, its form differentiates as new timbres, signaled by the French horns, join the composition—a change in perspective. The drumming rhythm is constant, but varies in amplitude in order to emphasize new voices and textures. All the while, soaring human voices literally call out and increase in pitch and volume—an emotional ascendancy. Another rhetorical audience would "read" this example differently, of course, but the aural kinematic text above does contain movement-images composed in duration.

Given Deleuze's movement-image and its avatars in kinematic texts, the production of motion has powerful possibilities for rhetoric. By composing kinematic texts with these three movement-images as rhetorical affordances, rhetors can maximize the kinematic motion and its meaning-making capabilities. Whether through subjective perception, action, or emotion, kinematic text may persuade or be effective based on the careful use of these three types of movement-image. Like all things rhetorical, though, it isn't just *what* texts articulate but how and when.

Deleuzian Time-Image

Kinematic texts are composed in relation to frameworks of time, and as Deleuze points out in *Cinema 2*, the time-image provides a virtuality as well as a reality within kinematic texts:

> [D]irect time-image is the phantom which as always haunted the cinema, but it took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom. This image is virtual, in opposition to the actuality of the movement-image. But if virtual is opposed to actual, It is not opposed to real, far from it. Again, this time-image will be said to presuppose montage, just as much as indirect representation did. But montage has changed its meaning, it takes on a new function: instead of being concerned with movement-images from which it extracts an indirect image of time, it is concerned with the time-image, and extracts from it the relations of time on which aberrant movement must now depend. (41)

It is this quality of being able to produce image texts that are both within real time (with its own set of durations and movement-images) and outside of real time (with its movement among virtual timeliness) that manifest a hyperreality of time and space. The direct time-image is virtual and no longer connected with sensory-motor links. Time, essentially, symbolizes motion because it "provides the signaletic material itself" that "coincides with the feature of singularity separated from its motor associations" (43). It is as if

the two-dimensional, abstracted notion of a "sign" becomes a plastic, three-dimensional "signaletic material," rich with the possibility of composing with time itself as the stuff of symbolization. The time-image no longer follows the rules of continuity and, therefore, allows for nonlinear, nonchronological compositions. In short, a nonordered symbolizing practice.

Like his term movement-image, Deleuze's "time-image" has avatars as well, which are images based on past and present time. His conception of the passing of time includes overlap between the past, present, and future: "Time simultaneously makes the present pass and preserves the past in itself" and "[t]hese are the paradoxical characteristics of a non-chronological time: the pre-existence of a past in general; the coexistence of all the sheets of past; and the existence of a most contracted degree" (98). This view of time necessitates a simultaneity of past, present, and near-future: images no longer relegated to ontological, static relationships. The Deleuzian time-image constructs as it is constructed rhizomatically.

Deleuze references his debt to Bergson's influence here, specifically from *Matter and Memory*, and, importantly, connects the concept of time-image as both indefinite and finite. Bergson states, "The greater or less tension of their duration, which expresses, at bottom, their greater or less intensity of life, thus determines both the *degree of the concentrating power* of their perception and the *measure of their liberty*" (279, emphasis added). Clearly, the "intensity of life" can dull and/or amplify our sense of the passage of time and, subjectively, change our relationship, or dependence. Bergson also suggests such intensities may change even our sense of time as a finite construct: "The independence of their action upon surrounding matter becomes more and more assured in the degree that they free themselves from the particular rhythm which governs the flow of this matter." Bergson and Deleuze highlight here how time is not just an objective linearity: time is a subjective, experiential reality as well. The time-image, then, is a characteristic of kinematic text that may intentionally vary intensities, or concentrations, of time. The viewer may experience slowed time or accelerated time as perceived by the time-images composed in kinematic texts. In addition, duration creates an assuredness of the virtual as an expression of freedom, of the ungoverned quality the independent observer-self makes manifest as a result of their tension.

The time-image differs from the movement-image in that it is a direct image of time and that it no longer relies on an organic composition. According to Rodowick, "Since the interval functions as an irreducible limit, the flow of images or sequences bifurcate and develop serially, rather than continuing a line or integrating into a whole" (14). Time-images no longer privilege a transparent relationship to the flow of time; rather, time-images may be composed (as in edited, montaged, spliced, sped up, or slowed

down) for rhetorical effect and affect. These time-image linkages privilege unknown becoming over a predetermined chronological time. Ultimately, Deleuze opens up possibility by making the time-image an uncertain composition—thought itself becomes free to create the unknown rather than the predetermined present. "What the time-image presents directly is not time in itself; rather, time presents itself as a force," one that "subordinates or disrupts movement as spatial succession" (Rodowick 122). The subordination of motion as existing in spatial terms, then, opens up possibilities for kinematic texts; motion without spatial reliance as it exists in the force of time, as in musical compositions, opens up compositional spaces no longer wholly reliant on conventional reality, or clarity.[6] Rodowick characterizes Deleuze's spaces as intervals that no longer need to be "rational": "Images, and images and sounds, are no longer conjoined by rational intervals […] since sequences are formed not through linear succession in space and chronological succession in time but through the incommensurability of space and time reasserted in every irrational interval" (179). The time-image abstracts through virtual, or symbolic, time.

Deleuze refers to the time-image as "direct" because it is no longer subject to movement but a result of it. He clarifies the rarity of the direct time-image as "virtual sheets of past" rather than "de-actualized peaks of present," meaning that the virtue of the direct time-image is that it is no longer tied to any possible claims of truth as actual truth (*Cinema 2*, 130). Like oral or written texts that access the past or the future to appeal to audiences, kinematic texts create virtual time. On the other hand, unlike oral or written texts, kinematic texts have the added ability to step into and out of affective-images that become absorbed or reflected by the viewer. The rhetor has the means, therefore, to create an experience of becoming within a virtual world through time-images, all the while imbuing such a virtual world with what Deleuze calls the "power of the false": "It is the power of the false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistence of non-necessarily true pasts" (131). Ultimately, it is though embracing the creative freedom that comes from falsity that Deleuze links the power of the false to the time-image as the best hope for an unknown becoming: "By raising the false to power, life freed itself of appearances as well as truth: neither true nor false, an undecidable alternative, but power of the false, decisive will" (145). Rodowick also notes that the power of the time-image is born out of its ambiguity: it is the "quality of incommensurability" and "indiscernibility of the real and the imaginary in the image; […] undecidability of relative perspectives on the same event, both in the present and in the relation of present and past" (Rodowick 179). Perhaps counterintuitively, the time-image allows for

possibility because time itself becomes a mutable symbol and movement, or action, becomes its consequence.

From the standpoint of rhetorical production, it is therefore imperative to employ the virtual and the "power of the false" in order to employ the time-image, and, for Deleuze, this means creating an immersive state of immanence. "The time-image asks us to believe again in the world in which we live, in time and changing, and to believe again in the inventiveness of time where it is possible to think and to choose other modes of existence" (Rodowick 200). Deleuze equates this choice with the state of immanent becoming: "What the artist is, is creator of truth, because truth is not to be achieved, formed, or reproduced; it has to be created" (146). The result is the "creation of the New: creativity, emergence […] the production of shapes, reliefs and projections […] it is the artist, creator of the true, in the very place where the false attains its final power: goodness, generosity" (147). In rhetoric, truth is sometimes not the point (and truths are themselves dynamic and mutable); however, Deleuze's time-image frees a rhetor to create realities free of sequential discursivity by symbolizing with time and duration.

Time-Affect Image and Kinematic Text

Rather than constructing two types of images as Deleuze does (the movement-image and the time-image), I argue for a single concept of a non-discursive image that combines motion, affect, and time into a single concept: the time-affect image. Though the benefits of each individual term are clear, their combination removes any association with either a single, linearized notion of time or any ontological implications of time. In addition, the label time-affect image binds time and affect together in order to better suggest the intricate nature of the two as tools for meaning-making: how kinematic rhetoric is composed with time and affect through image. The time-affect image conceptually combines the Deleuzian movement-image with its counterpart, the time-image, as a direct (rather than indirect) symbolization of time. The affective is always part of the ambiguities and symbolic power of image and, as such, must also be highlighted. Through its association with multiplicities of time and multiplicities of affect, the time-affect image builds moving texts with the affordances of images—whether they are images of sound or balance, taste or smell, touch or temperature, sight or orientation, or pain. Digital technologies are not yet sophisticated enough for rhetors to digitally compose using time-affect images that cater to all of these types of images—digital interfaces and products for some of these images are either still out of reach or in their infancy (though I gesture toward a few in Chapter 4). But as they are developed, the compositional model offered in this book will accommodate authoring in those modes

just as it accommodates the more common digital forms available now. The point, therefore, is that just as the non-discursive image is the key unit for meaning-making in static texts, the non-discursive, time-affect image is the key unit of meaning-making in dynamic texts.

The non-discursive image, certainly as described by Susanne Langer in *Feeling and Form* (and also in *Philosophy in a New Key*), achieves its potential through its complexity and simultaneity. As such, the sum is greater than the parts, or types. These "presentational symbols" are "understood only through the meaning of the whole, through their relations within the total structure" (97). The parts of these images, then, do not necessarily add up to the entirety—the discourse cannot be parsed, necessarily, without reducing it to discursive language. Langer is careful to explain the interagency of feeling and form, almost to the point of making feeling, or emotion, its own symbol system.

What's more, Deleuze would probably be the first to complicate his types of images as distinct entities, stating in *Cinema 1* that his classification of images "is not merely a matter of adding images to one another, but of classifying types of images and of circulating in these types" (198). It is precisely this kind of circulating within these concepts that engenders a new classification, the time-affect image, due to the impossibility of effectively separating movement from affect, and to the impossibility of separating movement from duration. The time-affect image generates and amplifies affectivity through duration and motion, and is the key concept in kinematic rhetoric.

The combination of movement, time, and affect is the primary functional unit of meaning in kinematic texts, and it is precisely what makes this rhetorical theory "active," alive, and dynamic. Movement through duration, as already mentioned, defines the kinematic. By emphasizing the time-affect image, it becomes clearer what makes up the core of this compositional model. By manipulating time-affect images, rhetors are then capable of creating "effective symbolic expression."

Symbolization purveyed through time-affect images are distinct from static images structured in time, or from affective images. In order for dynamic images, which are always already affective, to become the central unit of meaning for kinematic texts, three conditions must also be present:

1. The image is a direct image of time (as in Deleuze's time-image).
2. It operates along the virtual linkage of affect (as in Deleuze's affection-image).
3. It is immanent in duration (as in Bergson's notion of durée, or pure duration).

First, the time-affect image functions as a direct image of time in that it is free from what Deleuze calls the "laws of organic composition" (*Cinema 1*,

151). Time-affect images are non-discursive images, free of sequentiality for meaning and affect (though also powerful in ordered sequences); they are direct images of time; they link movement and time through affect. Second, time-affect images are actualized by motion, and they combine components of both time and emotion. They generate and amplify affectivity through duration. Finally, the time-affect image evokes an immanent, rather than a transcendent, immersion in duration; they lead to immanence through immersion (and immediacy) in that they are grounded in time rather than geographic space. These three conditions create a particular non-discursive symbol, the time-affect image, that can then be used to create rhetorical arguments through kinematic texts.

The following example shows how these time-affect images collectively compose the rhetorical arguments in duration. Later in the same documentary that began this chapter, *Arise!*, Vandana Shiva discusses the importance of collecting and storing indigenous seeds, and as she speaks, she emphasizes the kairotic importance of her argument through the rhythm and rapidity of her speech, but also though her pauses as she searches for words: a nearly breathless rupture of the cadence that serves to underscore the timeliness of her brand of conservationism, both spiritually and as women in India— despite, perhaps even because of, the struggles of women: "When it comes to disappearance of water, disappearance of forest, disappearance of biodiversity, it is the women who do the ten year, fifteen year, twenty year struggles" (00:00:13–23). The non-discursive meaning built by these time-affect images (both aural and visual) conveys a sense of urgency as well as a rhetorical message. Arise! Video Clip 2

The music connects the argument to a culture with all of its spiritual and historical complexity. The video allows the viewer to witness women agriculturalists sowing the ground, conserving indigenous seeds, and interacting in their communities while building community seed banks. The montage is not necessarily sequential but it is immanent in that it is embedded in time in order to create its movement through duration. Emotionally, the rhetors construct a sense that this issue is timely and important, as well as sense of gratitude by composing these time-affect images in this way.

Motion and Non-discursive Symbolization: Movement and Meaning

The digital revolution has made it easier and more efficient to compose with non-discursive symbolization, and the trends for writing in the near term are for the proliferation of textual production that continues to blend discursive and non-discursive meaning-making. On the other hand, the amount

of non-discursive dominated texts, especially those that contain moving text, is growing. Like in our natural (nondigital) environment, motion and image is pervasive, but it is only relatively recently that our writing and rhetorical practices so easily include composing with images, motion, sound, and time.

Vilem Flusser's provocative text, *Does Writing Have a Future*, predicts the demise of wholly and exclusively discursive texts from the print era:

> Writing, in the sense of placing letters and other marks one after another, appears to have little or no future. Information is now more effectively transmitted by codes other than those of written signs. What was once written can now be conveyed more effectively on tapes, records, films, videotapes, videodisks, or computer disks, and a great deal that could not be written until now can be noted down in these new codes. (3)

Of course, Flusser emphasizes the ease of meaning-making through coding— its effectiveness. However, in doing so he underscores how discursive writing that is static and largely dependent on alphacentric notation ("written signs") is not as "effectively transmitted" when there exists non-discursive "codes" that are able to convey what once "could not be written." Flusser, in the 1980s, foresaw a future for writing practice that became increasingly non-discursive—increasingly image-based. He also saw the changes to writing (and, consequently, rhetoric) as a paradigm shift, a "new experience of space and time and so of a new concept of space and time into which the old experiences and concepts cannot go" (150). Such an experience might also present a problem:

> With digital codes, a new experience of time and space is emerging. Like a paradigm, it must obliterate everything that came before: all experiences that cannot yet be aligned under the old concepts of "omni-presence" and "simultaneity." Such experience cannot absorb but rather must destroy the alphabet. Images produced with digital codes are present everywhere at the same time (even on the opposite ends of the earth). They can always be called into the present, even in an unthinkably distant future. Concepts of "present," "future," "past," and especially "distance" and "proximity" (i.e., "spacing") take on new meanings. (150)

As has already been argued, the very concept of composing using the affordances of time is a revolutionary change in our rhetorical practice. It indeed asks us to "take on new meanings" of time and space, especially as rhetors compose with time-affect images. Flusser's prediction that the alphabet will be destroyed is likely an exaggeration since, as Bolter and Grusin

have shown, old technologies hang around for a long time, hybridizing with newer technologies and remediating (after all, stones are still being carved with alphabetic text and will likely continue to be in the foreseeable future).[7] Nevertheless, the amount and the proficiency of writing with new media and kinematic texts is likely to allow for only an increase in expressive capacity and potential.

Motion, consequently, carries an immense expressive potential that, unlike with alphacentric text, relies on both integration and differentiation to make meaning. Like other composing technologies that become increasingly available to the general public, motion and its associated literacies will continue to take time to achieve the height of their own rhetorical power as more and more nonspecialists gain the tools (and the will) to compose with non-discursive, time-affect images. Many have been consumers of these texts for generations: music and theater have been around for millennia. This theory, however, calls for rhetors to think deliberately and purposefully about how the images they compose function in motion, in time.

Movement, therefore, is impactful for an audience. Christian Metz, in *Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema*, writes that the movement is powerful in kinematic texts since it "produces the strong impression of reality […] [b]ecause movement is never material but is always visual, to reproduce its appearance is to duplicate its reality" (7, 9). Metz's emphasis on movement's connection to a perceived "reality" is undoubtedly part of its effectiveness—although a closer examination as to what constitutes reality and whether there are multiplicities of overlapping realities is missed here. Also, Metz overlooks how motion is more than just visual—it is detectable through many of the senses other than vision. But Metz's connection to the creation, or duplication, of reality is certainly consistent with Flusser's prediction of a paradigm shift for writing.

In addition, non-discursive symbolization using texts that move derive some rhetorical strength through their dreamlike quality. Susanne Langer's appendix on film in *Feeling and Form* proposes that what was then a fairly recent mode becomes a "new poetic mode," one that has as its "primary illusion" a kind of "virtual history" built from non-discursive forms: kinematic text "creates a virtual present, an order of direct apparition" similar to dreams (411–12). Virtual space is important to Langer as a way to characterize how the plastic arts come to make meaning. By labeling film as a poetic mode, she sidesteps the plasticity of the virtual kinematic image, although her connection to the dream state is often noted by film critics and philosophers.[8] For her part, though, Langer also attributes "immediacy and experience" as the most basic abstraction in filmic texts, topics covered more thoroughly later in this book.

Importantly, and in keeping with what Bergson and Deleuze have said about virtual time, Langer focuses on virtual space as "the primary illusion of

all plastic art" (71). Though she characterizes virtual space as "only visual," it is clear that she also means to imply that its primary characteristic is to be "intangible space," like the surface of a mirror (71). It is boundless space separate from the space we occupy:

> [I]t is limited by the frame, or by surrounding blanks, or incongruous other things that cut it off. Yet its limits cannot even be said to divide it from practical space; for a boundary that divides things always connects them as well, and between the picture space and any other space there is no connection. The created virtual space is entirely self-contained and independent. (72)

That is to say, Langer's virtual space is its own assemblage and as such has its own relation to time. It's not a division from practical space because it is completely independent of it. It is illusion, but its purpose is affective: "This [perceptual] form is a semblance of things, and the planes of vision, staggered one behind the other opposite the perceiving eye, are a semblance of space" because "[t]hey belong to that virtual space which is, I believe […] created symbols for the expression of feeling and emotion (73). This virtual space exists primarily for, and is informed by, our affective world. To make virtual space the primary composing space is to assert its affective connections to symbol making. This space is similar to what Deleuze and Guattari call the "plane of consistency" in *A Thousand Plateaus*: under the strata that are "animated and defined by relative speeds of deterritorialization" is the plane of consistency that "constructs continuums of intensity," creating a "continuity for intensities" (70). Like Langer, Deleuze and Guattari theorize a space that both connects and constructs a whole (or continuity).

Allowing virtual space to function primarily as non-discursive language with the express purpose of "vital" symbolization is to convey the primary illusion of virtual space. The virtual becomes inscribed with multiplicities. The articulation of virtual space through non-discursive symbols is crucial in theorizing about texts that move because of its independent relationship to time. Non-discursive language, therefore, is key to revealing how the rhetorical use of motion and duration is required in order to inscribe virtual space. First, non-discursive language is based in image; second, non-discursive language does not require sequential forms to make meaning—in fact, simultaneity is the more typical relation among forms; and third, the relation to time is a direct one, meaning the movements are not linked in the sensory-motor aspect of perception, affect, and action—rather, the coordinates of virtual space directly refer to virtual time. In other words, composing with non-discursive, time-affect images allows for the production of virtual time in virtual space.

Langer also implies an immediacy to virtual space, especially as multiplicities are introduced. She asserts that "[t]he primary illusion of virtual space comes at the first stroke of brush or pencil that concentrates the mind entirely on the picture plane and neutralizes the actual limits of vision" (84). A single connection to the plane of consistency (virtual space) creates multiplicities that "neutralizes" any limits placed on symbol making, primarily because composing with non-discursive images creates both ambiguity and polysemy in the process of production—in effect, building Flusserian "new codes" or Deleuzian "intensities" along the way. In sum, the potential for meaning using non-discursive, time-affect images is much more expansive, more complex, even more directly affective than choosing not to employ them.

Time-Affect Images and Aurality

Throughout this book, I emphasize repeatedly that when talking about images the intent is to talk about all the ways perception provides information to the body—image is what the brain constructs, usually holistically. But there may be some need to address aural images specifically here since sound and music are kinematic texts just as film and animation are kinematic texts, though our cultural history tends to keep them separate intellectually due to various academic and artistic traditions. It is outside the scope of this research to investigate how or why that is the case, but the division between aural and visual texts is undeniable. Clearly, they overlap in composition nearly always: when we listen to a symphony, we watch (or dream) along; when we view the cinema, we listen to both sound effects (Foley art)[9] and the musical score and dialogue. "[S]ound constructs knowledge via interrelationships between the body's sense perception, the mind's thoughts, and the affectivity of both," so it is crucial not to separate "the body from the mind" and "acknowledge those interrelationships and observe the interconnectedness as well as the separateness of those emerging meanings" (Riordan 204). Theorizing how aural symbolization creates meaning, or emotion, has its own academic history, some of which is relevant to this study, especially in the way music (or sound) can be thought of as language.

Like with alphacentric textual meaning, musicology has theorized about the relationship between music, meaning, and emotions. Leonard Meyer set out to investigate, specifically, the connection between music and meaning in his book *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (1956). He theorizes that there are three "stages" of meaning in music: hypothetical meaning, evident meaning, and determinate meaning (37–38). In the first stage, a "given stimulus invariably gives rise to several alternative hypothetical meanings" due to the fact that there are expectations of "probability relationships" in the face of "alternative

consequences" while listening to music—the more probable the expectation, the less ambiguity in the expression (37). Meyer describes here a kind of tension between what the listener in a given context expects and what is symbolized that gives rise to meaning.[10] The second stage of meaning, "evident meaning," arises when "the consequent becomes a physico-psychic fact and when the relationship between the antecedent and consequent is perceived." This stage not only relates to the immediate consequence but also to future consequences in the piece: "the motion […] may itself become a gesture that gives rise to envisaged and actual consequents and hence becomes a term or gesture on another level of triadic relationships" (38). Finally, "determinate meaning arises only after the work is timeless in memory, only when all the meanings which the stimulus has had in the particular experience are realized and their relationships to one another comprehended as fully as possible," meaning that this stage of meaning emerges through the relationships between hypothetical and evident stages of meaning.[11]

Meyer discusses how these stages of meaning lead to understanding, which then contributes to the affectivity of the music. He suggests that emotion is a "direct interaction between a series of musical stimuli and an individual who understands the style of the work being heard," but he also concedes that "[o]ften music arouses affect through the mediation of conscious connotation or unconscious image processes" (256). In fact, Meyer fully recognizes the importance memory has in constructing meaning and affect. Later, in an article he publishes titled "Meaning in Music in Information Theory," Meyer makes it clearer that what makes aural images musical is how much they deviate from the "normal course of stylistic-mental events" (415). He suggests there are three "varieties of deviation": the "normal (probable) consequent event may be delayed"; the "antecedent situation is ambiguous" because "several equally probable consequents may be envisaged"; and/or the event is unexpected, "improbable in the particular context" (415). Meaning and its affect in music, for Meyer, emerges through the probabilities of expectation and deviation—or, in slightly different terminology, through integration and differentiation of dynamic text.

Pierre Boulez suggests that musical language has both a technical and an aesthetic dimension. "The composer's primary consideration," he states, "must be the actual technique of his musical language" without lacking "any real aesthetic applicable to the linguistic developments in our music" (66). The meaning, or "realization" that comes from music is, according to Boulez, bound "by our past collectively as well as individually": it is the relationship between the technique and the thought, or abstraction (72). Similar to the relationship between craft and expression in alphacentric writing, Boulez sees the relationship between technique and abstraction as key to musicality. He also often

underscores the non-discursivity of music by emphasizing the "unimaginable power to 'what lies beyond language'" and to the power of "sonority" (188). His reference to "beyond language" is a gesture that emphasizes the limitations of discursive language and why, perhaps, musicality has its own attraction:

> Music has almost always claimed to possess a "magic" power, and in the case that we are discussing such power is exercised openly. The power of attraction that it exercises on the unconscious is both acknowledged and employed as such; and that is why musicians will always secretly prefer a "language" that puts no obstacles in the path of communication by means of sound. (188)

As such, musical language is non-discursive, bound up in our histories and cultures, and related to the author's (composer's) craft (technique).

Still, theories on musical semiotics have changed as musicologists theorize about the relationship between sound and meaning. Eero Tarasti's collection, *Signs of Music: A Guide to Musical Semiotics* (2002), attempts to bring together in one volume many approaches to "how musical understanding takes place, how it relates to other arts, and how we can describe these processes by an appropriate metalanguage and analytic method" (25). According to Tarasti, musical sign theory transitioned from formalism (Hanslick's "moving aural forms") to "music as narration," to Peirce's triadicity and Greimas's theory of "modalities" defined generally as "being" and "doing" (5–15). Ultimately, Tarasti recommends music semiotics move in "a more hermeneutic and phenomenological direction" in order for it to "play a crucial role in general semiotics" (25). Part of this transition must also be due to the way musical characteristics within a particular context also change meaning (after all, the rhetorical triangle also suggests a similar relationship between audience, author, and context). Dorothy Miell, Raymond MacDonald, and David J. Hargreaves, in *Musical Communication* (2005), propose three "determinants of the musical communication process […] namely the characteristics of the music itself; those of the people involved […] and those of the situation in which it occurs," adding that each determinant then "exerts a mutual influence on each of the others" (6). Musical theory and rhetorical theory have similarities in the way they position how texts carry meaning (especially non-discursive text).

Perhaps one of the most useful ways to think about time-affect images in aural, kinematic texts is through a phenomenological lens that acknowledges the connection between technology and composition (just as many writing theories have done). Aden Evens, in his remarkable book *Sound Ideas: Music, Machines, and Experience* (2005), draws his theory from "acoustics, psychoacoustics, and music theory" to get at "music as experienced"—its phenomenology

(x). Langer offered some insight along these lines, too, albeit as a logician, an art theorist, and a philosopher. Evens shifts the focus from "What is music" to "What is musical" because "it now appears arbitrary to draw a line between music and some other kind of sound," especially as he discusses the quality that is valued when using the term "music" (xiii). Most notable is his definition of noise:

> Perception contracts sound into sense, but noise is the uncontracted. Imperceptible, insensible, and sense-less, noise is the depth that give to be contracted. […] Though it is often the case that signal overwhelms noise, it is noise that binds the signal, that serves as a medium, a baseline, a plane of relief against which signal stands out. The background of noise means that the air that a sound vibrates is not at rest to begin with, and silence is never total. […] Sound is a modulation of difference, a difference of difference. (15)

Evens conceives of noise as a "plane of relief" that is more like a canvas, or a medium through which sound, and music, travels. Remarkably, it is the "difference of difference" that defines sound because even within each sound there is "a wave of rising and falling pressure, whose difference gives sound its character (15). Similarly, "meaningful sound—be it the articulate meaning of speech or the ineffable meaning of music—is to hear sound in motion, heading somewhere," which is to say that for music to carry meaning, it must also be in movement and in duration. "Creativity in music," Evens states, "is always a matter of finding a force of movement, a new coherence, a world that produces or explicates an intensity, by drawing on its implicated" (19). As a kinematic text, music builds affect through movement.

What's more, drawing from acoustics and from Karlheinz Stockhausen's theories on music, Evens discusses the structure of music as having an intimate connection to time itself. He uses Stockhausen's "temporalities" as not just an abstraction but also as material: "Certainly music is constructed from airwaves, vibrations of the air that determine sound's pitch and timbre, but it also involves crucially the vibrations of rhythm and of form" (31). Pitch is defined simply enough as frequency, and timbre (the shape of the wave), can be measured as "the rising and falling pressure" over time (32). Rhythm, similarly, is the "sudden or sometimes gradual alterations in one or more aspects of sound (pitch, timbre, amplitude, durations), but to constitute rhythm the occurrence of these alterations must not so frequent as to constitute a pitch" and it need not be recurring—though it often is (32). Finally, form is the "structural or conceptual elements of sound […] varied over time," as sometimes evident in "a shift of tempo, or by a change in lyrical content" (32). Musical composition,

then, is the act of combining the temporal elements of wave (including pitch and timbre), rhythm, and form in order to build intensities, worlds. Dreary Audio Clip

In "Dreary," each of these temporalities are apparent. Rhythm comes not only from both the initial guitar theme that repeats but also from the intermittent snare drum, first separately and then eventually together: a juxtaposition of rhythmic structures that may evoke a sense of dread, or grief. Pitch and timbre are heavily employed here and do most of the emotional work in this piece: the low-pitched full notes of the brass choir layered both separately and together with the very high-pitched oboe, all the while building chords that resolve but also are dissonant. There are four distinct alterations that indicate form: the first 12 seconds (guitar); the next section, 12 to 48 seconds, includes the snare drum, oboe, trombone, and brass choir, all of which are sometimes dissonant (especially how the oboe sometimes does not *fit in* with the brass); the next section, from 48 seconds to 1:20, combines the first two and includes some dynamic changes (volume changes); in the fourth section, 1:20 to 1:39, the guitar drops out and leaves sonic space enough to really highlight the horns; the final section brings back the guitar, drops the snare drum, and the brass choir then fades until the guitar-only section is repeated from the beginning. Though the goal here is not to interpret or explicate what this all *means*, by definition the piece does approach musicality as a kinematic text. Together, as the piece swells and retracts in volume, it breathes chords while complicating them with dissonance, and it shifts in form as if passing by, leaving the way it came: these time-affect images move in duration to produce meaning through affect.

Motion, Learning, and Symbol-Making

Movement, it turns out, may be at the very core of our ability to make sense of the world around us. From our earliest developmental beginnings, motion orients reference points that would otherwise remain a clutter or saturation of perception. It is through motion that information becomes distinct, disambiguated, and relative to the spatial orientations maintained in duration.

Motion is also key to learning. As one field of perception moves in contrast to another, it is the integration of the differences between the elements that creates a whole: a more accurate formulation of the environment. Relationships—connections—between existing concepts are what allow for the synthesis of new conceptualizations, which, in turn, become new concepts.[12] The animation of this process leads to a recognition of form, or meaning. According to Karen Lander and Vicki Bruce, studies on the recognition of faces demonstrate the importance of moving texts to facial recognition: "[O]ur experiments have

repeatedly revealed that difficult-to-recognize images can become quite easy to recognize when animated" (143). Specifically, when presented with dynamic (nonrigid) information, possibilities for learning emerge:

> We have outlined evidence to demonstrate the salience of dynamic information for event perception, face-categorization tasks, and—perhaps most surprisingly—face-recognition tasks. Across the range of situations explored, it seems particularly to be nonrigid movement patterns—either faces generally, or of specific faces—that aid the recognition of familiar faces." (141)

What this suggests is that motion may be as important to learning as the presentation of rigid information is, and when that information is dynamic then more information is perceived, not just recognized. This phenomenon is also observed by Dr. Pawan Sinha, and the results speak volumes about the connections between motion and learning.

Sinha's Work on Blindness and Motion

Research conducted by Ostrovsky, Andalman, and Sinha focused on blind children who recently regained their sense of sight, debunking the previous notion that brains could not learn to see after four years of blindness (1013). After treatment, Sinha's team recorded how the process of sight is built by the brain after it is newly acquired—that it is through experiencing dynamic information (or movement) that the brain teaches itself how to see. Through these varied texts focused on movement, I suggest that our proclivity for sight is seconded only by our brain's need for movement to differentiate what it receives, and it is this observation that leads to one reason kinematic texts have such strong rhetorical appeal: movement teaches vision.

Pawan Sinha, an MIT visual neuroscientist who gave a TED India talk in 2009 called "How Brains Learn to See," helped found Project Prakash, a scientific humanitarian effort to screen and, when possible, treat blind children in India. During this effort, Sinha challenged a previous understanding about how the brain learns how to see, even well after the point previously thought impossible. Sinha's team found that when blind people regain their sight, they learn to integrate what they can see through dynamic information, or motion. Sinha Video Clip

One implication of this research is in the notion of "dynamic information" itself. Key to this investigation into the rhetorical use of motion in kinematic texts is how motion creates understanding. It is precisely because we are able to process what our senses receive dynamically that we may, at least at one

point, integrate and then create representations of knowledge. Sinha seems to illustrate Deleuze's "coincidence of the subject and object" in defining the movement-image not as simply ontological but also as a means to integration. Said differently, it is through motion that we learn to differentiate and integrate our world, either real or created, for our own understanding. The rhetor who understands that the symbols in motion have an immanent use—one that grounds our understanding, then manipulates that baseline dynamic information—controls a means to make meaning through kinematic texts.

It is clear that dynamic information carries with it more than the content of what we sense, but also, through movement, a way to process what we sense. Motion creates meaning independent of the content of kinematic text, and, like all images, such meaning carries with it the potential for persuasion through the affective domain.

Motion, or dynamic information, theorized in this way, helps us feel, organize, and, ultimately, recognize our world. It is precisely our ability to dwell in image that kinematic texts create meaning in present time—the appeal of emotion within duration of the time-image. Movement has a much greater connection to the felt sense of our world than we may have previously understood, and is therefore key to understanding how kinematic texts persuade.

Differentiation and Integration in Non-discursive Symbolization

Dynamic information requires kinematic text: that is, text with motion in duration. The text simultaneously differentiates—displaces—as it integrates, or synthesizes. The operation requires differences and it requires similarities. Both work in concert in non-discursive symbolization to create meaning.

Bergson and Deleuze both emphasize the importance of differentiation and integration in thought, as contemporary neuroscience seems to reinforce. The two are important to consciousness, ideation, signification, affect, and, subsequently, rhetoric. Rodowick, in analyzing Bergson, specifies the importance that "association" has to thinking:

> In Bergson's view, thought always moves in two directions at once: while it unfolds along a horizontal axis, it also expands across a vertical axis. The former is an axis of association, it links related images through principles of similarity and contiguity, contrast and opposition. At the same time, associated images are distinguished, then grouped conceptually, into ever-growing ensembles or sets through a process of differentiation and integration. Through integration, related images are internalized into a conceptual whole whose movement expresses a qualitative change: the

whole is different from the sum of its parts. […] Across all levels there is both continuous linear movement by association and volumetric expansion through differentiation and integration. (10)

The association that "links related images" must also be "distinguished"—the two work together in thought. Images in motion assist this associative power since they differ foremost in duration (time) as much as in their content. The result is a whole that is not simply a "sum of its parts" because the feedback created in association expands as new similarities and differences grow.

Iteration, or oscillation, between associations leads to synthesis. Deleuze, in *Difference and Repetition*, calls this power of association a kind of "intensive quantity": "The affinity between intensive quantities and differentials […] should be grounded not upon the consideration of a series, the terms of a series and the differences between consecutive terms, but in the reciprocal synthesis of the Idea and relations of intensity in the asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible" (244). It is through a "reciprocal synthesis of the Idea" that thought proceeds: a relation not only between the "differences" but also between "reciprocal synthesis." Crucial to thought, then, is this flow or movement between difference and synthesis—between differentiation and integration—as an oscillation. Motion, therefore, is implicated not only in the way humans learn to perceive in development but also in thought. Ideas, as well as information, require dynamism to synthesize. The machinery of perception and thought may very well demand images in movement to be comprehensible and formative.

This chapter attempts to establish the crucial role of duration and time in kinematic rhetoric. Specifically, Deleuze's movement-image and the time-image motivate a new concept of the time-affect image: the fundamental building block of kinematic texts. Time-affect images are non-discursive images that rely on differentiation and integration to make meaning, and, as Sinha's work suggests, have direct qualities associated with the way our brains process dynamic information. The next chapter suggests how time-affect images may then be composed in duration, in becoming, and as data experienced in virtual time.

Animation 2

2

COMPOSING TIME

There is no "time" outside of the multiple ongoing processes of material becoming, the constant transformations, often invisible, that make up the life of apparently inert things. Every "thing" is in fact a process; all these processes, taken together, make up the world as the sum total of its immanent "times" […] that multiple temporalities inhabit but also exceed the human scale, with agency and processual transformation (immanent temporalities) inhering in all human and non-human processes of becoming.

—Russell West-Pavolov, *Temporalities* (2013, 3–4)

Color It Clean Video Clip 1

The clip above comes from a documentary titled *Color It Clean* (1966) and it provides a real-time look into janitorial work in a university setting at that time. After the opening credits, the camera focuses on a close-up shot of the janitor's cart as it is wheeled down an empty, echoing hallway. Throughout this example, the camera angles are dynamic and, sometimes, unusual: low-angle and high-angle shots are used often. But the most remarkable part of this example is in how time unfolds. As the worker wheels his cart, we watch him methodically dust and sweep the bathroom while two different voiceovers explain how the job is thankless, even perhaps unnoticed, harder and more complicated than people may think, and, ultimately, noble: "You can also take the viewpoint that the students and faculty are here for a purpose, and the reason that you're here is because they're here, and so you try to do a good job because you know it helps them do theirs better" (00:01:22–39). The voice-over also mentions what the common caricature of a janitor is as somebody who "doesn't have enough brains to come up out of the cellar" as juxtaposed by the real-time sweeping of the bathroom by the worker as he works to clean the bathroom from top to bottom (00:02:58–03:36). Perhaps witnessing not only the work but also the neatly dressed man labor while the narrator articulates the difference between being a janitor and the social stereotype of one, the viewer may empathize with the worker. Perhaps the extremely low

and high camera angles help the viewer understand the aesthetic, the grace, of the work. Either way, this kinematic text makes meaning through duration, and it is connecting both information and emotion along the way.

This chapter describes how non-discursive images are amplified by Bergson's concept of "duration." Movement alone is not sufficient to build strong rhetorical appeals, but movement in duration does: appeals become amplified and integrated. As mentioned in the first chapter, Susanne Langer's concept of virtual space relates directly to the affordance of duration: that once "we are preoccupied with construing what goes on in the direction away from us, we are no longer dealing with visual forms, but with things and their story" (74). That is, Langer provides a way that the virtual becomes animated. Duration connects time and movement through emotion, creating an increase in resolution for the textual appeals present. As West-Pavlov asserts in the epigraph, "multiple temporalities inhabit but also exceed the human scale," underscoring a more complex view of time as not singular, or linear, or even necessarily anything other than "multiple ongoing processes of material becoming and not necessarily of time and duration."

As explained briefly in the introduction, many of the kinematic examples used in this book come from nonfiction or documentary film archived on the Internet Archive (archive.org): founded in 1996, the archive sets out to "build an Internet Library" and contains archived web pages, books, video, audio, and software. The reasons for this choice are threefold: (1) the question about the differences between art (fiction) and rhetoric is ancient and, frankly, not very relevant to this study, so the more conservative solution is to leave art to the art critics and focus on nonfiction in this research; (2) the documentary is ideally suited to rhetorical analysis since the purpose is mostly to advocate for something—to make a change of some kind; and (3) these examples are free and in the public domain, a criterion important to the publication of this kind of scholarship. Generally, the examples are just that, examples intended for the illustration and demonstration of key concepts; there is no attempt here to find the "best" or most informative examples. But by stating the general criteria for how they were selected, at least the reasons are somewhat more transparent and open for further discussion elsewhere.[1]

Documentary texts also cannot easily dodge large, sociocultural and socio-economic tensions pervasive in society, giving them additional resonance as a rhetorical object of analysis (as in the extremely gendered language in the voice-over of *Color It Clean*). In Ellen Bishop's edited collection, *Cinema-(To)-Graphy*, Patricia Caillé suggests that the documentary is foremost a cultural artifact: documentaries "foreground their relationship to culture and the independent, low-budget character of their production, bringing to the surface certain assumptions about authorship and individual responsibility" as they

"flaunt their sense of commitment" (10). As advocacy, documentary film-making is rhetorical just as most other cultural artifacts are, and as examples of kinematic rhetoric it is particularly well-suited to many key concepts in this book, even as the genre continues to evolve.[2]

The documentary has another appeal for this research in that it must contend with issues of objective transparency, or the assumption of "Truth," just as photography and alphacentric texts did previously. Dirk Eitzen, in "Documentary's Peculiar Appeals," clarifies this practice: "Rather than seeing [documentaries] as fundamentally pernicious and misleading—as false claims to Truth, for example—it shows them to be based upon a natural and in general quite helpful tendency to regard reality, and by extension discourses about reality, as having certain real consequences that fiction does not" (196). The consequences may be "real" in the sense that they are, generally, practical concerns—the traditional stuff of rhetoric. Eitzen continues, "To try to flout this tendency, either with theoretical claims that documentaries are nothing more than fiction films in disguise, or with stylistic practices that thwart our efforts to tell which is which, is to undermine any power documentaries may have to really make a difference" (196). That is to say, the storied debate between the social and cultural impact of fiction as opposed to nonfiction is not really the point here (and will not be resolved, though the impact of both is readily clear). Instead, it is enough to say that as a genre, the effort toward significance over aestheticism must not be lost in the debate (and that aesthetics and style apply, obviously, to both).

The point of this chapter, however, is to show how duration, and specifically motion in duration, creates virtual amplification, or higher resolution, of texts in the process of becoming. Hall's *Color It Clean* opens with its discordant, orchestral chords that resolve moments later into a somewhat comical trombone line, and then the visual footage transitions from a tinted pink wall of urinals to the clarity of white. The amplification here through the juxtaposition of these virtual spaces is likely an attempt to demonstrate through music and color the transformative work of janitors who clean and sanitize our public spaces. The dramatic introductory music itself is also in direct contrast to the rest of the film, which has a much more subdued tone as the voice-over narration continues while the worker systematically cleans the bathroom. These time-affect images deepen the non-discursive experience of this kinematic text.

Bergson's Duration

Henri Bergson's duration (*durée*) influenced Deleuze greatly and was key to the way he theorized a philosophy using cinema (he is consistently clear that he is

not interested in theorizing cinema). It is duration that decenters notions of writing as "writing in space" to writing as "writing in time"—it necessitates the idea of time, of duration, as becoming (rather than just being, or Heidegger's *dasein*). Because we dwell in space, Bergson defines duration as continuity that "represents the whole":

> We can thus conceive of succession with distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is the account of duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space. (60)

Like an interlocking puzzle, Bergson describes the "succession with distinction" as both having elements that are impossible to analyze (to break apart) without the use of "abstract thought." The "being" referenced above is one that lacks memory—either for the past or projections for a future. Bergson goes on to suggest that duration begets space, and not the other way around, as a feeling of "pure succession": "we set out our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another; […] we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another" (60). Purity of duration lacks a notion of space: it is heterogeneous, borderless, indistinct, numberless, and porous. But once an "order of succession" is introduced, or once a succession is perceived "side by side" or "set out in a line," then the idea of space is introduced. Duration, as Bergson rightly emphasizes, cannot be an accumulation or a series of seconds or minutes or hours to be outside of any concept of space: "Pure duration, that which consciousness perceives, must thus be reckoned among the so-called intensive magnitudes […] it is not a quantity, and as soon as we try to measure it, we unwittingly replace it by space" (62). Bergson regards time as an "homogeneous magnitude"—that is, time as measured by science and clocks and used in formulas—to be an illusion. Consciousness knits motion together, it "is a mental synthesis, a psychic and therefore unextended process," or, by utilizing memory in consciousness as an organ of synthesis: "If consciousness is aware of anything more than positions, the reason is that it keeps the successive positions in mind and synthesizes them" (64).[3] Space, therefore, is a projection of time.

In short, Bergson posits two kinds of motion in space: one characterized by what we measure quantitatively through successive positions, the other

qualitatively through an internal conscious act of synthesis. It is ultimately through motion that duration becomes qualitative, projecting a sense of time into space. "Duration is neither linear nor chronological […] it presumes at each instant an unceasing opening onto an indeterminate future" (Rodowick, *Time Machine*, 24). Considered as conscious synthesis, time is always dynamic and never exclusively in the present. Also building on Bergson, West-Pavlov concludes in *Temporalities* that time is a process, an ontogenesis:

> There is no "time" outside of the multiple ongoing processes of material becoming, the constant transformations, often invisible, that make up the life of apparently inert things. Every "thing" is in fact a process; all these processes, taken together, make up the world as the sum total of its immanent "times." Going beyond the facile opposition of "human experience" of time vs. "public" or absolute time, […] multiple temporalities inhabit but also exceed the human scale, with agency and processual transformation (immanent temporalities) inhering in all human and non-human processes of becoming. (3–4)

The existence of "multiple temporalities" that "exceed the human scale" seems obvious, especially given the changes to perceived or absolute time resulting from physics and Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity, as well as our greater understanding of the universe. But time, even for Aristotle, is difficult to conceptualize.[4] In fact, according to Rene Thom, in *Semio Physics: Aristotelian Physics and Catastrophe Theory*, "[t]he primary experience in any receiving of phenomena is discontinuity," and "the impact of discontinuity is doubtless no stranger to Aristotle's *logos apaphanticos* that which gives semantic autonomy to a nuclear sentence" (3–4). Thom later suggests that it is the subjective experience of difference that is a "shock inflicted on our psychism by the outside world" and what, ultimately, may become our measure of successive positions in time (4). James Zebroski, in *Thinking Through Theory: Vygotskian Perspectives on the Teaching of Writing*, advocated for a perspective on time and writing that is plural ("'made up' of many temporalities interacting"), social ("human beings in community create various temporalities"), local ("time is dependent on local conditions"), and multidirectional ("to tamper with time's arrow") (209–10). The consequences of this kind of conception of time necessitate a rhetorical theory that accounts for composing with duration.

Bergson's rejection of time as an "homogenous magnitude" in favor of multiple temporalities allows for dynamic possibility rather than stasis. Deleuze's 1966 monograph, *Bergsonism*, paraphrases Bergson's duration as one of two types of multiplicity:

> One is represented by space […] It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of
> simultaneity, of juxtaposition, or order, or quantitative differentiation,
> of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and
> actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an
> internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of hetero-
> geneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a vir-
> tual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers. (38)

These multiplicities, according to Deleuze, differ in their locus of perception
and in their composition. The former is "actual" and is perceived externally,
made up of discrete intervals or successions that are spatial. The latter is "vir-
tual" and is perceived internally, made up of continuous, interpenetrating,
fused duration. Bergon's influence on Deleuze's notion of time and space,
therefore, distinguishes between the exteriority and the interiority of time: the
former that builds lines of extensities (space) and is flawed through the influ-
ence of consciousness; the latter that is unified and heterogeneous and is pure
and harbors infinite possibility.

Bergson clarifies the difference between the two multiplicities by suggesting
what may be a prototype concept for the difference between non-discursive
and discursive symbolization. It is "our perceptions, sensations, emotions and
ideas" that have "two aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the
other, confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get
hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-place forms
without making it into public property" (72–73).[5] In fact, Bergson argues that
the objectifying role of language is the practical reason discursive language
exists, and, in turn, results in a largely nonaffective symbol system:

> [O]ur outer and, so to speak, social life is more practically important
> to us than our inner and individual existence. We instinctively tend to
> solidify our impressions in order to express them in language. Hence
> we confuse the feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming,
> with its permanent external object, and especially with the word which
> expresses this object.[6] (73)

The confusion between the perpetuity of affect and the value of objectifying
affect with words is what troubles Bergson, and it is why valuing both without
bias makes sense.

Like asking language to objectify reality, the act defeats the intent. Duration
is one state of consciousness; it is "deep-seated" because there is "no rela-
tion to quantity," only qualities that "intermingle" (76). This intermingling
becomes a multiplicity: "The duration which they thus create is a duration

whose moments do not constitute a numerical multiplicity: to characterize these moments by saying that they encroach on one another would still be to distinguish them" (76). Duration, articulated this way, is characterized in the quality of these intermingling multiplicities. Quantifying it, making it ordered and numerical, diminishes its quality. Similarly, Adam Banks, in *Digital Griots: African American Rhetoric in a Multimedia Age*, advocates for this kind of intermingling, or mixing: "DJs are not mere ventriloquists […]; rather, their arranging, layering, sampling, and remixing are inventions too […] binding time as they move the crowd and create and maintain community" (24). When the choice is between signifying quality or quantity, it is the quality of the duration's affect, the "binding" of "time," that matters most.

In sum, Bergson clarifies these two multiplicities in that one is "of material objects, to which the conception of number is immediately applicable," and the other consists of "states of consciousness which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolic representation, in which a necessary element is space" (54). One multiplicity evokes divisible quantity, the other multiplicity evokes indivisible quality. The symbolic help Bergson mentions here creates space by attempting to symbolize time.

Duration, therefore, is a complex multiplicity, providing at once a numerical multiplicity evident by motion and a subjective, discontinuous multiplicity evident by duration. The objectifying and concretizing power of discursive language and of conceptualization construct the very limits to becoming and keep from us the riches of multitudes: Bergson's concern for over-objectifying reality is seated in his optimism that thought is limitless as long as we remember that our symbols are questionable objectifications: "we must distinguish between the unity which we think of and the unity we set up as an object after having thought of it […] [t]he unit is irreducible while we are thinking it and number is discontinuous while we are building it up" (52). Bergson warns, however, that as soon as we symbolize objectively, "it then appears to be divisible to an unlimited extent." It is the appearance of this finished, objective state that limits our thinking and expression. Bergson's notion of duration, then, erases the singularities necessitated by objectification.

In a sense, duration is pure analog, with no discrete entities or the demarcations and divisions necessitated by nomination. Duration is continuity; it is an indivisible multiplicity. Since Bergson defines space as "what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another" and is "thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a reality with no quality," his concept of time is "nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness" (57–59). The Bergsonian ghost inhabits space but does not create it.

What this allows for Bergson is a notion of duration that is independent of differentiation while maintaining its connectivity. Analog music, for example, takes its listener from statement to movement to finale (through the moments of crescendo and decrescendo), remaining connected in its entirety from phrase to phrase with an analog signal that is continuous; in contrast, the same music recorded digitally is actually made up of definite (though numerous), discrete, and singular quantities of frequencies and amplitudes that approximate (albeit increasingly well) the original. Bergsonian pure duration is similar to the analog signal, a kind of analog original, in a manner of speaking, to the digital approximation.[7]

The concept of "pure duration," as discussed by Deleuze in *Bergsonism*, is entirely qualitative and without any discrete elements whatsoever. Bergson stresses that "pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalise themselves […] it would be pure heterogeneity" (61). Such pure difference without reference to unity makes duration a becoming, a flux of changes that invite difference. As Deleuze comments about Bergson, duration becomes the "variable essence of things" while, at the same time, space becomes "itself grounded in being" (34–35). Crucial to an understanding of duration, as Bergson conceived it and Deleuze expanded upon it, is the way it is of a higher order than space and time. Duration is experiential time, and space tends to objectify it into quantifiable elements that have the effect of reducing the connections, the complexity, of experience. Pure duration is not quantified, only built and made more heterogeneous.

Consequently, duration expresses our analog experience outside of a quantified illusion. The multiplicity that becomes material and quantified, differentiated by degree, is "a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order […] it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual" (38). Pure duration, on the other hand, helps to define a different multiplicity, "an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, of difference of kind" and "a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers" (38). It is through duration that kinematic texts reconnect our symbolizing practice so completely with conscious existence because consciousness relies on the seemingly different processes of integration and differentiation.[8] Duration may hold the key to why texts in motion, with their continuity and heterogeneity, are able to arrest our consciousness: it is quite possibly an analog to the way our brains experience consciousness and its variation: "its perpetual living present" (Deleuze and Guattari 192). Duration is, in short, one key compositional element in kinematic rhetoric that has, as its affordance, an impact on the quality and heterogeneity of experience. Color It Clean Video 2

In the clip above from *Color It Clean*, the title's reference becomes clear as one janitor describes what he does through the metaphor of an artist in the studio. Specifically, while the video shows the worker collecting garbage off the floor with a dustpan and then dumping the trashcan into his cart, one of the voice-over janitors says, in a calm and steady voice, that "there is much more to janitoring [*sic*] than a person thinks" and that he views it as "more or less an art": "I have my supplies, and a studio, so to speak" (00:00:18–32). If one of the rhetorical aims of this piece was to humanize janitors, to help viewers connect to the largely unseen work they do, then his comparing himself to an artist may well be an effective use of ethos. Regardless, the time-affect images in duration construct a quality of time, regardless of its quantity.

Duration as Rhetorical

Since duration is one of the distinguishing features of kinematic text, it is vitally important to consider how it functions—how duration becomes rhetorical. For Bergson, pure duration exists as a kind of pure consciousness: simultaneity, synthesis, heterogeneity, and integration. Knowing this, the rhetor may compose texts that aim for these properties of duration, especially using multiple modes through non-discursive images. As Bergson seems to imply, discursive language has as one of its aims the requirement of employing language through sequence—successions of discrete symbols that require static order to make meaning. But such a symbol system is, on its own, ill-equipped to employ duration in dynamic texts; only non-discursive symbolization that employs multiple textual modes based in image can accomplish simultaneity and synthesis, heterogeneity, and integration.

Kinematic images in duration evoke simultaneity due to the gestalt properties of image: they do not rely on sequence to make meaning since meaning is already articulate all at once. In *The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information* (2006), Richard Lanham relates this simultaneity to the interplay between word and image: "When you look at images, still or moving, you apprehend them not element by element, as you read words, but all at once, as a single entity" and as a consequence, "two timescales operate here: sequential for the alphabetic text, instantaneous for the elevator movie" (83). Lanham's oscillation here between "two time scales" imply how the two Bergsonian conceptions of time (as evidenced by motion, and in pure duration) operate in apprehension, whether reading a book or watching a movie. In *The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts* (1993), Lanham similarly refers to this kind of "toggle" between "figure and ground," rendering "our decorum again self-conscious and interactive; it continually reminds us that the real basis of that decorum, of our social reality, is not fixed but

bi-stable" (82). As such, oscillation defines our common experience of texts and interfaces, whether or not those texts are static or dynamic. But kinematic texts, the kind that are dynamic and in duration, operate in the "instantaneous" timescale Lanham references here.

In addition, this type of oscillation in kinematic texts affects apprehension not only when there are words combined with images—or images of words, or images of sounds combined on the screen or in a theater or concert hall as part of the sets or costumes—but also in the very structure of these texts in duration: the sequencing of shots, the montage, the storyboard, the script. In fact, the storyboard itself exemplifies how both discursive and non-discursive language are not only composed together, in sequence, but also reliant on each other. Most of the words in a storyboard are there to help characterize the sequence, or the techne, involved in that shot. Something similar is at work in poetry: images dominate and words help with the sequencing and transitions—the biggest difference, of course, between kinematic texts and poetry is that the former can function well without alphacentric text (until the credits, anyway, though those too could be composed in an entirely filmic—if not laborious—way). This oscillation, then, between discursive and non-discursive symbolization helps structure the already articulate meaning-making going on within duration.

Here is a summary of the ways kinematic images rely on duration:

- Kinematic images in duration allow for synthesis because in its virtual space, knitted together by consciousness, a continuity develops that is conducive to a whole—the elements are interpenetrating and continuous.
- Kinematic images in duration are heterogeneous because they do not require divisibility, or the unity given to homogenous space. They are action-images, no longer divisible but able to carry contradictory emotions, ideas, and even "irrational cuts" of time and space.
- Kinematic images in duration are integrated because they are experiential and unquantifiable—subjective yet articulate and components of becoming rather than being. They participate in the oscillation between images in time and words in time, as apprehended as a multiplex of articulation.

Rhetors who wish to create effective kinematic texts, then, would seek content and methods that employ one or more of these elements.

Becoming Multiplicities

Bergson and Deleuze differentiate between "being" and "becoming" because the former is static and the latter is dynamic, which is also the core difference between static and dynamic text. According to Deleuze and Guattari,

multiplicities contain the "plane of consistency" and have as a primary quality variation. It is the tension between variation and consistency that allows for ontogenesis: "[a]ll multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this 'plane' increase with the number of connections that are made on it" (9). The "plane of consistency" is indefinite and independent, filling "all of their dimensions" and providing a primary illusion into which affective symbols become secondary illusions (multiplicities). "Multiplicities are defined by the outside," Deleuze and Guattari add, "by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization" because "[t]he plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities" (9). This suggests how "affective symbols" continually become multiplicities, and a reminder that all symbols are "secondary illusions" (the first illusion is space, or dimension).

The result is a non-discursive presentation of meaning, and, like in Langer, is characterized by affect and change: "Such form is 'living' in the same way that a border or a spiral is intrinsically 'growing': that is, it expresses life—feeling, growth, movement, emotion, and everything that characterizes vital existence" (*Feeling* 82). The connection to "vital existence" calls for a form of "direct recognition" that is as emotional as it is thoughtful (82). For Langer, becoming is a recognition that emotion is indistinct from thought and already articulate. The unity of both is in their state of becoming.

In *Cinema 1*, Deleuze also emphasizes a connection between unity and becoming. The unity of a single instance of kinematic text creates its own recognition through becoming: "[t]he shot indeed has a unity. It is a unity of movement, and it embraces a correlative multiplicity which does not contradict it" and as such "this unity is caught between two demands: of the whole whose change it expresses throughout the film; of the parts whose displacements within each set and from one set to another it determines" (27). That is, there is consistency in the changes of becoming, through movement: a "set" of multiplicities that help to define a "synthetic whole" in the context of its "montage of parts" (there is a fuller account of montage as juxtaposition later in Chapter 4). Again, multiplicities are set in motion and are therefore becoming. Deleuze also states that "the parts must be selected, coordinated, enter into connections and liaisons which, through montage, reconstitute the virtual sequence shot or the analytic whole of the cinema," necessitating some amount of coherence, or unifying element among shots (27). Too many multiplicities that lose coherence to the whole limits becoming and the quality of affect. In fact, in *Cinema 2*, Deleuze stresses how a "becoming" is also "an irreducible multiplicity," and that change is characteristic of such a state: "everything is changed in the perspective of time as becoming" (145–46). Clearly, for Deleuze, this is one of the differences between the movement-image and the time-image.

Deleuze's response to Bergson seems to drive much of what he says about becoming multiplicities. Ronald Bogue, in *Deleuze on Cinema*, summarizes Deleuze's "four moments" of Bergson's thought by pointing to first, his critique of "the conventional false dualisms of mind and body, quality and quantity, space and time"; second, to his distinction between "qualitative and quantitative multiplicities" and "thereby clarifying what conventional dualisms confuse through their spatialization of time"; third, "that the dualism of durée and matter is actually a monism of rhythmic contractions and relaxations of a vibrational whole"; and finally, fourth, when Bergson explains "how durée actualizes itself through the creative activity of the qualitative multiplicity, [which is] unfolding itself in the dual forms of the inorganic and the organic and in the plural forms of the various entities of the universe" (20–21). These four moments were influential on Deleuze, and help create a resolution of false dualisms necessitated by multiplicities that change within time. The "creative activity of the qualitative multiplicity" is Bergson's actualization of duration, and it is the basis for composing with time and it is what ultimately give Deleuze hope for philosophy.[9] Clearly, becoming multiplicities are important to any concept that can embrace seemingly obvious contradictions, but they also allow for the existence of both internal and external conceptions of time and space. Multiplicities of becoming are key to variation, and variation is key to the creative and dynamic production of kinematic texts.

The following aural composition, "Tabla Rasa," may provide an example of this connection between "becoming multiplicities" and variation: Tabla Rasa Audio Clip Rhythm dominates as the main compositional element in this piece, and the aural images vary quite a bit in timbre (with electronic, acoustic, and natural sounds) and especially in form. The kinematic text begins abruptly with little musical introduction and then changes form six times in the short piece. The rapidity of the rhythms, along with the variety of form and timbre, create a kind of breathless or agitated sense with backgrounds of rising pitch that, at times, build suspense. Rhetorically, these time-affect images construct multiplicities that evoke ontogenesis through change, while the rhythm provides unity as the woodwind solos create punctuated, "qualitative multiplicity": a call, or summoning. The example attempts to demonstrate how variation itself connects affect through duration.

Duration and Composing

Duration, as a continuity, offers composers a handle on various realities. In his lectures at Oxford, printed as "The Perception of Change," Bergson clarifies how "real duration" is the same as indivisible, nonchronological time:

> [R]eal duration is what we have always called time, but time perceived as indivisible. That time implies succession I do not deny. But that succession is first presented to our consciousness, like the distinction of a "before" and "after" set side by side, is what I cannot admit […] in space, and only in space, is there a clear-cut distinction of parts external to one another. […] We have no interest in listening to the uninterrupted humming of life's depths. And yet, that is where real duration is. (260–61)

The rhetor who can tap into the "uninterrupted humming" through movement accesses duration's indivisibility. In the same lecture, Bergson states, "If movement is not everything, it is nothing" and, later, he compares the indivisibility of music as a way to "perceive movement and change as independent realities" (258–59). In composing realities using kinematic text, two poles define the opportunities Bergson implies here: one pole is movement itself, with its immanent qualities based in pure duration; and there is indivisible change, with its constant flux and its "perpetual present" (262). On the one hand, whole realities are available as compositional elements; on another, duration is indivisible and only quantifiable from defined perspectives within space.

The access to "independent realities," without succession and constant change, leads to immanence. Rodowick characterizes Bergson's notion of pure duration as a kind of "universal change": "For Bergson the transcendental form of time is the *durée*, whose reality is an indivisible, ceaseless, and ever-changing flow […] in its primary form, time flows as the universal variation, or constant universal change, that Deleuze calls the plane of immanence" (123). Consequently, composing duration is also composing "indivisible" time. To divide time is to characterize it, or to manifest it in space, which, for Bergson, removes time from pure duration—or, to use Deleuze's notion, to no longer be immanent.

Composing duration, then, is a key concern for a rhetor interested in producing kinematic texts. Jean Epstein—a French filmmaker, author, and theorist—centers his cinematic theory on the unique revolution in thought brought about by the manipulation of the temporal dimension. In his book, *The Intelligence of a Machine*, it is the ability to see time slowed down or sped up, edited or reordered, that makes kinematic text "astounding": "the cinematograph […] multiplies and immensely softens the play or temporal perspective, training the mind for a gymnastics that isn't always easy: switching from an inveterate absolute to unstable conditionals," a "machine that stretches or condenses duration, demonstrating the variable nature of time" (18). For Epstein, this machine "is a concrete tool but its workings provide such a sophisticated semblance to the human mind," so much so that "we must

consider it a half-thinking: a form of thinking by the rules of analysis and syn-
thesis that, without the cinematographic apparatus, humans would have been
incapable of implementing" (18). The connection between the direct ability
to both alter the timeline and the rate of time is an emancipation for Epstein,
one that has direct consequences in the way cinema changes thinking. The
camera makes these changes in human thought possible, via its "rules of ana-
lysis and synthesis" even as it varies the perceived linearity of time. The very
manipulation of duration within composed kinematic texts offers the rhetor
not only the ability to provide an audience with alternate realities, but may
also create new ways of thinking as well. Eternity may be composed to seem
finite; ephemera may luxuriate in extended becoming. Epstein sketches this
affordance of time with this example:

> A short documentary describing, in a few minutes, twelve months of the
> life of a plant, from its germination to its maturity and its withering, up
> to the forming of the seeds of the new generation, is enough to make
> us accomplish the most fantastic voyage, the most difficult escape, that
> humans have ever attempted. Such a film seems to free us from terrestrial
> time, that is, solar time, a time that we felt nothing would ever liberate us
> from. We feel we are presented with a new universe, a new continuum,
> whose movement through time is fifty thousand times faster. (23)

Epstein captures both the otherworldliness and the liberation that accom-
panies the ability to manually manipulate "solar time" through kinematic
images. By changing the frame rate or direction, Epstein implies that one of
the most powerful rhetorical affordances in kinematic text is composing time
itself—not only the timeline of events but also the actual rate or direction of
the events in time: "leaves fly off the ground to perch themselves back onto tree
branches; raindrops shoot up from the ground toward the clouds; a locomo-
tive swallows its smoke and ashes, sucks in its vapor" (4). Perhaps it is easy to
forget how extraordinary it is to witness, for the first time, a film played back-
ward, a world in which leaves and rain defy gravity, or the entire lifecycle of
a plant growing, blooming, and decaying. Nevertheless, this kind of "fantastic
voyage" in alternative time creates powerfully rhetorical effects and affects.

As discussed already, movement and space-time are codependent. Epstein
also stresses the importance of movement in space-time as a "universe as
an always and everywhere mobile continuity, much more continuous, fluid,
and agile than our directly sensible continuity," or, a universe in which "cer-
tainty is alternatively the mother and the daughter of chance; life comes and
goes through substances, disappears and reappears, becoming vegetal where
we thought it mineral, or animal where we believed it vegetal and human"

(88). Movement, within Epstein's reproductive metaphor here, is the "mother and the daughter," the defining characteristic of time and mutability and "transmutations." Composers of duration—whether with aural images (such as in music), visual images (as in film), haptic images (as in the click and rattle of a roller coaster), gustatory images (as in culinary feasts), or olfactory images (as in walking the midway at a festival)—have the ability to compose realities using time-affect images such as these. By altering the very pace and rhythm of experience, rhetors who compose with duration construct symbolic worlds.

Reality, then, can too become a compositional element for rhetors to manipulate, and composing duration is key to that manipulation. Epstein argues, in fact, that his theory eventually defines reality in terms of time and time alone. "All the primordial semblances of everything that can or cannot be perceived and all that exists or does not," he says, "communicate among themselves, more than likely transform into each other according to particular laws, but also and above all according to an absolutely general law of correlation with the values that the time variable can adopt" (89). As a result, "[t]he unspeakable reality that we assume to be subjacent to all these qualities created by a temporal perspective is eager to clothe them according to whatever time dimension we lend to this reality" (89). Reality does not exist outside of time, and, for Epstein, without movement there is no time: "Time is the effect of a particular mobility of the elements of reality as they transit from past to future. Without this mobility there would be no time, and objects could not aspire to a temporal reality" (93). The linkage between movement, time, and reality is interlocked. In turn, Epstein summarizes his theory, as revealed by kinematic text, in this way: "[w]ithout movement, nothing can be real" because "[r]eality presents itself as a synthesis of substance and movement from which results its requisite space-time location and, potentially, its apparent determinism" (94). Movement, therefore, constructs reality because Epstein's movement is a form of becoming. Epstein clearly requires there be relation between elements, a movement among connections, for there to be substance and reality.

> [B]eing, as pure substance, has no more reality than space, time and cause. […] Since reality cannot be conceived as an elementary continuity, we must suppose that it is a collection of grains of reality. Indeed, in such discontinuity, relations of co-existence and succession can appear and install time and space. And it is from such reciprocal relations among elements that fundamental substance, mobile and granular (whatever it may be), receives the right of space-time existence, with a quadruple location and a logical orientation, without which there is no reality. (95)

Like Deleuze and Bergson, Epstein emphasizes realty as a set of relations, or connections, that are "bound up with time and space relations." These relations are "reciprocal" and they are "mobile and multiple." Movement in time, then, helps to construct being and becoming within and among composed realities.

Though Epstein is writing in reaction to Bergson's claims about time, duration, and substance (matter), the two are not incompatible.[10] Though Epstein asserts, quite rightly, that the quality of substance can change based on its quantity—that quality is even reliant on its quantity—he is in apparent opposition to Bergson's *Matter and Memory*. However, Bergson is fairly clear that "matter," or substance, "is an aggregate of 'images'" and that "by 'image' we mean a certain existence which is more than which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist calls a thing—an existence placed halfway between the 'thing' and the 'representation'" (81). Substance, for Epstein, varies in space-time due to, in part, a kind of entanglement between thingness and its symbol, which is similar to Cassirer's notion of thirdness or "continuity" of the interpretant (80). Like in quantum physics, what constitutes reality has and continues to change (i.e., the act of observation alters what is observed, or how quantum particles may be entangled). But this variance is a mutable "existence" for Bergson, one that is itself "a self-existing image," and these images form a collection that then becomes a substance. Epstein and Bergson seem to be both relaying a view of matter that is made up of shifting realities—in the mind for Bergson and in space-time for Epstein.

At its root, then, the act of composing time has far-reaching implications. In duration, the very consideration of information, or data, becomes active: dynamic and algorithmic rather than static and finite.

Cinema as Data

The digital world refigures reality in discrete units that are computable. One of Lev Manovich's main claims in *The Language of New Media* is "the virtual culture of a computer age is cinematographic in its appearance, digital on the level of its material, and computational (i.e., software driven) in its logic. […] Cinematographic images are very efficient for cultural communication" (180). Consequently, as kinematic texts merge with databases in digital culture, certain built-in (as well as future) operability becomes possible. For example, an application like Google Maps can integrate data search operability into what has traditionally been viewed as primarily visual information (such as finding phone numbers for businesses on the map, or for personalizing the map with custom information).[11] As kinematic texts are becoming more computable (digitized) and operable by the user, it is relatively easy to forget that the data

are always already embedded. Motion, whether programmed through code or encoded by a codex to be displayed on a screen, is bound by its data. Data, in turn, loses its reference to "raw information" and becomes virtual: the motion is the actualization of virtual data. Kinematic text, therefore, functions virtually as data.

Data structures hold some commonality with narrative structures. In Manovich's essay "Database as a Symbolic Form," the distinctions between narrative structures and database structures are blurred:

> Multimedia works which have "cultural" content appear to particularly favor the database form. Consider, for instance, the "virtual museums" genre—CD-ROMs which take the user on a "tour" throughout a museum collection. A museum becomes a database of images representing its holdings, which can be accessed in different ways: chronologically, by country, or by artist. Although such CD-ROMs often simulate the traditional museum experience of moving from room to room in a continuous trajectory, this "narrative" method of access does not have any special status in comparison to other access methods offered by a CD-ROM. Thus the narrative becomes just one method of accessing data among others. (81–82)

The data Manovich imagines here is manipulated by the user. His point, actually, is to subsume narrative as just one option of organization. But data of motion is also data that moves, especially in an environment that allows for continuous alterations, additions, and subtractions of data. Looked at this way, the database of movement is in flux just as the "output" is in flux. The museum experienced through the database and manipulated by the user is similar to the museum experienced through the database of kinematic text. Though the user has an option to alter the recorded experience, it may not be immediately obvious that the same is true of how motion in kinematic text is also interactive: other than the obvious changes in playback speed and direction, the user can choose to play the database in alternate formats, screens, languages, and, in some cases, even the narrative itself (alternate endings/beginnings and extended scenes, etc.). Many forms of kinematic texts are freely downloadable, ready to be further manipulated, changed, remixed, and sent back to the database as additional data.[12] Narratives, even in print culture, warp and recycle themselves in this way, too.

Even the animations that accompany websites and mobile applications are loaded with data that can track user preferences, link to other resources and/or products, and even change based on user activity on the screen. The data produced by the user experience then adds to the database, changing future

motions and animations in future versions of the data. Ultimately, Manovich claims that this alterability leads to "a collection, not a story," but it is possible that the story is the collection itself: narrative, conceived of a beginning, middle, and end, has changed in the modern era. Narrative is, at base, a collection of images. In fact, Manovich implies the same:

> The "user" of a narrative is traversing a database, following links between its records as established by the database's creator. An interactive narrative […] can then be understood as the sum of multiple trajectories through a database. A traditional linear narrative is one, among many other possible trajectories; i.e. a particular choice made within a hyper-narrative. Just as a traditional cultural object can now be seen as a particular case of a new media object (i.e., a new media object which only has one interface), traditional linear narrative can be seen as a particular case of a hyper-narrative. (87)

That the trajectory is a tracing by a user who creates a unique narrative is not difficult to foresee in both traditional and digital media: even the traditional act of reading can create a user-centered "alternative" narrative as interruptions or the time of day moves the reader to put down the book and experience other narratives, interlacing themselves with one or another; likewise, this is also the case with kinematic texts. The point is that the data is largely transparent to the user, though it is obviously crucial to what the user experiences—it is also symbolic, both internally to the media and, less directly, to the user's experience.

Any attempt to separate kinematic texts from their data, whether in analog or digital formats, is as much a "suspension of disbelief" as it is theater: the two coexist and always have. The difference is primarily in the ability for data to change dynamically and be manipulated automatically through algorithms. In short, new media data is computable: algorithms themselves function to create new data on the basis of its inputs and outputs. As will be considered in more depth in the next section, the algorithm actualizes data, which then actualizes text. The actualizing of data makes the algorithm another dimension of the virtual.

Not only is the algorithm a virtualization of first-order virtual data, computability makes yet another order of virtualization in the form of machine-level coding, or machine language. The operating system of computers functions, first and foremost, through the chipset and motherboard, and that language is actualized, first and foremost, by a binary code of 1s and 0s (which, to be a bit more specific, is actualized by the presence or absence of electrical current). Working backward, in order for the user to experience any form of new

media (i.e., media that is computable), then at least four levels of virtualization preceded that experience: data actualized by algorithm, which was actualized by machine language, which was actualized by binary code, which was then actualized by variations of electrical current. Interestingly, considered in this way, the presence or absence of electrical current is manifestly a physical, actual, noumenal, and, unlike quantum computing, only allows for two states, or phases, to compose its actualizations.[13] The number of potential outcomes is limited to two, at first. With each step of virtualization, however, the number of possibilities quickly become innumerable.

Consequently, as the database/narrative becomes accelerated—more sophisticated, networked, simultaneous, and with finer resolution—the experience of kinematic text will become, as is already the trend, more and more virtualized—more immersive, more immanent, and more affective.

Virtual Time-Affect

Virtual time-affect through the time-affect image is the emotional becoming of the time-image. According to Deleuze, the time-image is a kind of connection to our symbols through living presence and to the world—a linking of realities. What the time-affect image does is make manifest the emotional linkages that come with the time-image: linkages between emotion and image carried in duration. This vehicle for emotions is energized by the time-image, is constituted by it, and is commensurate with the possibilities of virtuality.

It is the possibilities afforded by kinematic text that offer whole new symbolic realms. These realms created by time-affect images may usher in new modalities still unknown, as well as alter thinking and encourage a belief in a hopeful future. According to Deleuze in *Cinema 2*, the preeminent affect that kinematic text generates is "belief in the world":

> The modern fact is that we no longer believe in this world. We do not even believe in the events which happen to us, love, death, as if they only half concerned us. It is not we who make cinema; it is the world which looks to us like a bad film. […] It is the world that is making cinema for itself. […] The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth, this link must become an object of belief. […] Man is in the world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. […] Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link. […] Restoring our belief in the world—this is the power of modern cinema […] we need reasons to believe in this world. (171–72)

The schizophrenia Deleuze refers to here is between moving, non-discursive images of the "optical and sound" situation and the feeling of belonging to it in such a way that the viewer can believe in the world. This is not about the suspension of disbelief or even whether or not the moving texts are about an unbelievable, irrational, or unlikely world. This plea is for believing again in the similarity between the fungible quality of existing in space-time and having symbols that function (symbolize) in space-time. Deleuze seems to have little admiration for the way "modern cinema" is different from "classical cinema," and those differences may be due to preferences more than theoretical disagreements.[14] That said, the impulse is to suggest that one vital affordance kinematic text can create is a connection between symbols (non-discursive images in motion) and the world, or the entirety of existence itself. The rhetor who is capable of creating effective and efficient texts for an audience composes time in order to relay a feeling, an affect, of immanence, of belonging to the world.

The unit of meaning for such a time-affect is the time-affect image: a non-discursive image relaying movement as affect in time. Unlike Deleuze's time-image, it's direct, not indirect, and it is at the heart of symbolizing meaning using the affordances of duration.

Space, Virtuality, and Kinematic Texts

Virtuality, variously defined and theorized, is a spatial concept in that its actualization occurs in some amalgamation of space-time. Though not always associated with the virtual space of, say, online video games, virtuality and cyberspace are often used synonymously: other space, the not-real space, or electronic space. This conception of the virtual is problematic since space is visualized as a non-thing, or as something other than material reality. It is the case, however, that virtual space is between, or a context, or, sometimes, a symbol for our own consciousness.

Pierre Lévy's book, *Becoming Virtual: Reality in the Digital Age*, broadens the concept of virtuality and presciently clarifies many of its misconceptions and stereotypes. As defined by Lévy, the virtual is not opposed to the real but to the problem-generating realm of the actual:

> The word "virtual" is derived from the Medieval Latin virtualis, itself derived from virtus, meaning strength or power. In scholastic philosophy the virtual is that which has potential rather than actual existence. The virtual tends toward actualization. […] The tree is virtually present in the seed. […] The virtual should, properly speaking, be compared not to the real but the actual. […] [T]he virtual is a kind of problematic

complex, the knot of tendencies or forces that accompanies a situation, event, object, or entity, and which invokes a process of resolution: actualization. (23–24)

Extending the example of the virtual tree within the seed, the "problem […] is the growth of the tree" and bounded by its "internal limitations, the seed will have to invent the tree, coproduce it together with the circumstances it encounters" (24). This concept of virtual exists in an actualizing space, even if that space is not directly perceived. By framing virtualization as the problem and actualization as the solution, the virtual becomes the space for invention, production, and composition into actuality. Virtualization, therefore, "can be defined as the *movement* of actualization in reverse" (26, emphasis added). It facilitates the transformation from the actual to the virtual, but virtualization "is not a derealization […] but a change of identity, a displacement of the center of ontological gravity of the object considered" (26). The "entity" becomes problematic and potential again.

Virtualization, for Lévy, is a kind of deterritorialized space. The concept of the virtual depends on a concept of space that is a no-thing or a deterritorialized "not there": "[t]hey are not totally independent of a referential space-time since they must still bond to some physical substrate and become actualized somewhere sooner or later," and, in doing so, "[t]hey intersect classical space-time intermittently, escaping its 'realist' clichés: ubiquity, simultaneity, massively parallel or distributed systems" (29). The "clichés" are received forms, latent symbolizations, and only apparent because, according to Lévy, they are in the process of actualization. Lévy concludes that "[s]ynchronization replaces spatial unity, interconnection is substituted for temporal unity" and the result is a virtual that "is not imaginary" because it "produces effects" (30). Virtuality, then, has to be other than a no-thing and it produces "effects"—its potential tends toward actualization. Kinematic texts produce affect through the effect of motion, duration, and non-discursive images, and cultivating the virtual is key to their production and rhetorical composition.

Conceptions of Space

Bergson, Epstein, Deleuze, and Langer all discuss space and it is worth noting how they are similar and how they differ since these conceptions are crucial for unraveling the relationships between space, virtuality, and kinematic text. They are summarized here, roughly in chronological order, in order to discern as many potential benefits for a theory of kinematic rhetoric.

For Bergson, space is made up of "indivisible process by which [the mind] concentrates attention" and a "material with which the mind builds up number, the medium" (53). Bergson's space contains "two very different kinds of multiplicity": one is "material objects" and the other is "states of consciousness" (53–54). Bergsonian space includes consciousness itself because we use "space" as a symbol for its various states. Like Lévy, space for Bergson produces effects in the material world.

For Epstein, "space does not possess any proper existence" because "it too is merely a relation, albeit of coexistence, between phenomena" (94). Space is made up of "displacements" that are measured by "sight, hearing, touch, even smell," giving form to "the imaginary space" (94). As such, Epstein makes space and time beholden to movement, or displacement. Movement for Lévy allows for the transformation of potential to actual, and Epstein deterritorializes space through the perceived imaginary.

For Deleuze, space is the interstitial "between" movements within immanence. "The plane of immanence," for Deleuze, "is the movement (the facet of movement) which is established between the parts of each system and between one system and another, which crosses them all, stirs them all up together and subjects them all to the condition which prevents them from being absolutely closed" (*Cinema 1*, 59). It is a "block of space-time, since the time of the movement which is at work within it is part of it every time" because "[t]he material universe, the plane of immanence, is the machine assemblage of movement-images" (59). Though defined as a "facet of movement," Deleuzian space becomes beholden to time (rather than the other way around), and space is constructed from movement in time. Like Epstein, Deleuze requires movement in order for space-time to exist. Space-time, therefore, contains the plane of immanence, and this, in turn, applies movement "between one system and another." Insofar as there is movement there is possibility, or temporal potential energy.[15]

Langer denies the objectivity, or reality, of space completely. She simply states that there are "spatial relations, but there is no concrete totality of space": "Space itself is amorphous in our active lives and purely abstract in scientific thought" and "it is a substrate of all our experience, gradually discovered by the collaboration of our several senses—now seen, now felt, now realized as a factor in our moving and doing—a limit to our hearing, a defiance to our reach" (71–72). Space is not concrete, but, like Bergson, it is a product of our senses in consciousness through relations. Langer also seems to highlight its importance in the present "now" and also in the limitations of our senses.

Each of these theorists link experienced, perceptual movement as a form of actualized space. Movement is reliant on time; the possibility of movement

is temporal potential energy. Space, then, is made up of relations, intervals, and connections experienced in motion and assembled as an immanent multiplicity.

Conceptions of Virtuality

Like with space, Bergson, Epstein, Deleuze, and Langer also all discuss virtuality in different ways. Again, they are summarized here, mainly to highlight how these four theorists took seriously the problem of virtuality. If space is defined as a nonexistent set of relations reliant on movement and consciousness within time, then virtuality is other—a different kind of movement in a different kind of time.

Bergson defines virtuality as like the image found in a mirror: "[o]ne might as well claim that the man in flesh and blood comes from the materialization of his image seen in the mirror, because in that real man is everything found in this virtual image," but "more is needed here to obtain the virtual than is necessary for the real, more for the image of the man is not first produced, and in addition one has to have a mirror" (230). Bergson's virtuality seems opaque, as compared to his discussion of space-time. Even so, virtuality requires more than what is "necessary" for the real, and it requires both the image and the interface or device (the mirror). Deleuze comments in more detail on Bergsonian virtuality in his book *Bergsonism*. Because Bergson makes past, present, and future coexistent, time, not space, becomes virtual. In *Time and Free Will*, Deleuze states, "duration is really defined by succession, coexistences referring back to space, and by the power of novelty, repetition referring back to Matter. […] Duration is indeed real succession, but it is so only because, more profoundly, it is virtual coexistence: the coexistence with itself of all the levels, all the tensions, all the degrees of contraction and relaxation" (60). In fact, duration defines the virtual once it is becoming. For Deleuze, Bergson's virtuality is a "continuous multiplicity" of the subjective experience. In this way, Bergson's definitions of space and virtual space are similar.

In contrast, Deleuze's own definition of virtuality is simply "real without being actual" (*Plateaus* 94). Rodowick specifies more about Deleuze's conception of virtuality as space that has lost its connection to movement, at least in part: "When the spatial and temporal coordinates of the image are indeterminate, no angle or movement defines the image as a necessary part of a given action or setting […] [i]n short, the space of the [movement-image] is virtual" (64). Setting a quality that elides both space and virtual space seems consistent with Deleuze's notion of the interstitial—the between-ness of space, having a simultaneous quality of being there and not there at the same time.

Therefore, Deleuzian virtuality must be distinguished from the possible. Lévy interprets Deleuze's distinction as one of existence: "[t]he possible is already fully constituted, but exists in a state of limbo" because "[i]t can be realized without any change occurring either in its determination or nature"; the "possible is exactly like the real, the only thing missing being existence" (24). The "possible" is the interstitial reality between movement-images. Through motion, virtual space becomes actual movement. Deleuze's distinction seems consistent with Lévy's emphasis that the virtual is to be opposed to the actual, rather than the real.

Dreams provide another landscape for virtuality. Epstein discusses the function of dream images within multiple temporalities: "a dream sometimes constructs a particularly intricate universe because it is multi-temporal […] [h]ence, when two or several components coincide and add up their effects into a dream image, that image, because it is located at the intersection of two or more times, finds itself fully determined by the causal function of each time at once" (81). The simultaneity of multiple timelines pinpoints a cause and effect relationship in time, and if the dream image and virtuality are at all similar for Epstein, then virtuality has coordinates in time. The "intersection of two or more times" stipulates a dream landscape made up virtual space and time interactions.

Similar to Epstein's connection to virtual dreams, Langer defines virtual space as intangible and independent. Like Bergson, it is a mirror-like world existing outside of the physical realm:

> Like the space "behind" the surface of a mirror, it is what the physicists call "virtual space"—an intangible space. This virtual space is the primary illusion of all plastic art. […] Being only visual, this space has no continuity with the space in which we live; it is limited by the frame, or by surrounding blanks, or incongruous other things that cut it off. Yet its limits cannot even be said to divide it from practical space; for a boundary that divides things always connects them as well, and between the picture space and any other space there is not connection. The created virtual space is entirely self-contained and independent. (72)

In discussing the plastic arts, Langer references primarily painting or sculpting here, but even so she is careful to stress the relational quality of virtual space. This conception of virtuality is completely cut off from humanity— inaccessible to our symbolic forms. On the other hand, Langer defines virtual space differently when discussing film (rather than painting) at the end of *Feeling and Form*, calling it "the dream mode" because it "creates a virtual present, an order of direct apparition," an "immediacy of experience" (412–13). Like in

Epstein, Langer's concept of kinematic text is dream-like. She suggests here that virtuality is time itself—or, as she puts it, "virtual history." The present-ness of motion knits an illusion of experience of now, and then now, and then now. Perhaps a better term for "virtual history" would be a "virtual present" in which the coordinates of time move continuously from moment to moment, even if the overall timeline (or narrative timeline) shifts in chunks from distant pasts or distant futures. The experience of the mode, Langer suggests, is one that creates a virtuality of time as its "primary illusion." For Langer, then, virtuality is beholden to time.

Each of these theorists connects space to movement in time, but this movement is somewhat disembodied—incorporeal. Virtuality is connected to dream-like symbolization and the illusion contained on the surface of a mirror. Virtuality is not all that different from space in that movement of time is continuous, but the coordinates of the continuity may shift or become simultaneous.

Lévy goes as far as to expand the notion of virtualization into the realms of body, text, and the economy. In fact, language itself is virtual:

> Three processes of virtualization led to the emergence of the human species: the development of language, the growth of technology, and the increased complexity of its institutions. Language virtualizes a "real time" that holds the living captive in the here and now. In doing so it opens up the past, the future, and time in general as a realm unto itself, a dimension with a consistency of its own. Through the creation of language, we now inhabit a virtual space—temporal flux taken as a whole—that the immediate present only partially and fleetingly actualizes. (92)

Not only is language virtual, it also ushers in what Levy claims are the cornerstones to humanity by creating a "temporal flux" of becoming. "We exist," he says, because "[w]ithout language we would be unable to ask questions or tell stories, both of which are ways of detaching ourselves from the present while intensifying our existence" by "partially" detaching ourselves "from current experience and remember, evoke, imagine, play, simulate" (92). Lévy sees language as the technology humans need to virtually "travel to other places, other moments, other worlds" (92). These "other worlds" are often evoked as we experience engaging texts, and in connecting language to the power of the virtual, Lévy links our humanity to our ability to coexist with our virtualizing capabilities, creating a cycle of virtualizing and actualizing that fosters the very existence of humanity. In doing so, Lévy connects our empathetic growth to the very variety of our virtualizing texts: "As languages become more complex and extensive, we increase the possibilities for simulating,

imagining, and helping others imagine an elsewhere, an alterity," and this, in turn, "reveals an important characteristic of virtualization: by undoing the here and now, it opens the way to new spaces, other velocities" (92–93). This is precisely what Deleuze may have meant about the importance of how kinematic texts help us to "believe in the world again"—perhaps, even construct alternative worlds and realities through virtual space and the affordances of time-affect images.

As such, the concept of the virtual as kinematic becomes clearer. Kinematic texts, symbolized as they are with moving, non-discursive images, operate in a milieu of virtual space because they are composed for nonactualized, disembodied time. As non-discursive texts, kinematic texts make meaning through movement and affect: the images themselves allow for a simultaneous detachment—a virtualization of body and meaning. The more "complex and extensive" these textual simulations are, the greater possibility there is for "helping others imagine" alterity: otherworldliness. The limitations of normal space-time are temporarily lifted, and the plasticity of composing using time-affect images reveals immanent possibilities.

Composing Time-Affect Images

To compose, or produce, or actualize the virtual "problem complex" through kinematic text is to create new possibilities of not only non-discursive images but specifically time-affect images: images of movement and duration through affect. The intended, rhetorical meaning for the text is inherently more than informative, or simply about communicating data. As already mentioned, non-discursive symbolization necessarily is affective, enhancing the capabilities of meaning to carry a charge of emotion as part of its meaning. What time-affect images add is the ability to further manipulate those affects through the selection and combination of virtualized time, actualized in the texts themselves. In short, time-affect images are the main building blocks, or units of meaning, in kinematic rhetoric.

This does not mean that kinematic rhetoric only requires time-affect imagery to be effective. Like any mode, the effectiveness of the imagery is entirely dependent on how the rhetor composes them. The producer of such text must still consider the canons from classical rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery), but in the context of kinematic rhetoric, the clay that is being manipulated is primarily the time-affect image: each rhetor must employ the will-to-invent in order to draft, revise, and deliver time-affect images all with the knowledge that comes from knowing audience expectations. As Collin Brooke notes in *Lingua Fracta: Towards a Rhetoric of New Media*, the "dialectical character of the rhetorical canons" requires that we see them "as actions, as

practices" within "a particular technological context" (xiii). The time-affect images used in composing rhetoric through motion, then, necessitate a consideration of the technological "ecology" that captures "the mutually transformative encounter" between the "proliferation of interfaces" that make these images possible (xiii). Specifically, his argument about the "vestigial" canons of memory and delivery is persuasive given the changes that facilitated print technology—confirming his larger point that this, in turn, demonstrates how the canons are themselves affected by changes in composing technologies. In fact, the inherited rhetorical tradition does evolve—even as parts may persist—depending on the degree the tradition is observed, ignored, or simply made into a template from which rhetorical analysis is taught and practiced. As Brooke states,

> [I]t is because the canons are beneath our notice that this version has gone uncontested. The canons are simply the canons. Unlike the three modes of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative, epideictic) or the three proofs (ethos, logos, pathos), taxonomies that also are part of our rhetorical inheritance, the canons lack a certain wholeness, a sense that they exhaust the given possibilities for the phenomenon they describe. Although it goes largely unremarked, that phenomenon is probably the writing process. (30)

Brooke's observation here is key in understanding the rhetoricity of non-alphacentric and multiple modes of composing: the rhetorical tradition provides one type of lens in thinking about how to compose rhetorically, but it is only one: "it is difficult to imagine a rhetorical activity untouched by ongoing developments in writing and communication technologies" because "[t]heir increasingly widespread integration into all facets of culture has encouraged scholars and teachers to reinterpret (yet again) the traditional canons of rhetoric" (Selber, *Rhetorics and Technologies*, 2). As such, the adjusted canons that Collin Brooke supplies in *Lingua Fracta* comprise another set of lenses that are useful to composing kinematic texts rhetorically and, therefore, deserve closer attention as they are set into motion.

Proairetic Motion

The invention of texts that move naturally necessitate the oscillation Brooke notes between hermeneutic and proairetic process, but with one important distinction. Instead of establishing the enigma and then providing the possibilities in a single instant of time, kinematic texts operate through the use of time-affect images that establish multiplicities of enigmatic moments and

vectors of possibilities that gesture in all directions, continuously. As will be discussed more later, the rhizomatic gesture is one that contains motions and direction: vectors.[16] The proairetic motion, then, is not of units of meaning but directions of meaning, a kind of rhizomatic oscillation between the problem (or virtual enigmas) and the possibilities of actualization. The rhizomatic motion of the time-image is continuously existing, preexisting, and postexisting as vector relationships. The time-affect images that build these relationships are the potential experiences induced by this motion. These relationships between the virtual and the actual, then, provide whatever amount of closure is possible. "A focus on the generation of possibilities," according to Brooke, "rather than their elimination" is the corrective his conception of invention seeks, and rightly so (86). Added to this, the rhizomatic motion of the time-affect image and proairetic invention becomes dynamic, distributed, integrated, and immanent. Closure, as Brooke suggests, is precisely this kind of synthesis: "Closure is no less important now that it ever has been, but with the advent of new media and interfaces that resist closure, proairesis provides and important corrective to the hermeneutically oriented inventional theory that has prevailed" (86). Another way to think of closure, consequently, is in the immanent quality of the time-affect image—a quality of multiplicities on the plane of consistency, all motivated in the rhetor by desire, or volition. The will-to-invent is the desire to oscillate in this hermeneutic/proairetic movement, and desire must not be overlooked as the motivating force of non-discursive symbolic production, as Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest as well:

> There is a continuum of all of the attributes or genuses of intensity under a single substance, and a continuum of the intensities of a certain genus under a single type of attribute. A continuum of all substances in intensity and of all intensities in substance. The uninterrupted continuum of the BwO [body without organs]. BwO, immanence, immanent limit. […] The BwO is the field of immanence of desire, the plane of consistency specific to desire (with desire defined as a process of production without reference to any exterior agency, whether it be a lack that hollows it out or a pleasure that fills it). (*Plateaus* 154)

The "lack" or "pleasure" of desire is characterized here as an interior "process of production," one that has the attribute of the will-to-invent. As Rodowick explains, "Bodies without organs can be conceptualized as 'bundles of virtual affect'" and "identity is a set of affects, the forces that a body can affect or which affect it" (154–55). Seen through this lens, the rhetor's will-to-invent must acknowledge the extent to which time-affect images operate in the audience's identification with multiple selves or others. The movement vectors

of proairetic actualization oscillating between the hermeneutic virtualization and rhizomatic motion constitute the process connecting desire and emotion (no matter how slight) and immanence.

Proairesis, or "choice of one thing before another," may also connote that the choice be motivated by reason as much as desire.[17] In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses choice as a kind of, though distinct from, voluntary action ("both children and the other animals share in voluntary action, but not in choice" and "acts done on the spur of the moment we describe as voluntary, but not as chosen"), and he also distinguishes choice from appetite, anger, wish ("though [choice] may be near to it"), or opinion; Aristotle places choice in reference to the good: "we choose what we best know to be good, but we opine what we do not know at all; […] even the name [proairesis] seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before other things" (1111b4–12a17). But proairetic motion in time produces vectors of possibility while in duration—making the process of invention more like play than reasoned choice. Obviously, experience (memory) is always present, but the playful "trial and error" of proairetic motion sets out to find one thing but, in the process, generates and limits others. Proairetic motion is inventive play; ultimately, there are choices made, but often the choices could not have been anticipated during the process. The simultaneity of non-discursive, time-affect images in motion and duration requires some amount of oscillation between auditioning possibilities and choosing them as they propagate through rhizomatic vectors in virtual time.

Play too is voluntary and a meaningful act of volition. Johan Huizinga, in *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*, characterizes play in culture as "an act of freedom," "it stands outside the immediate satisfaction of wants and appetites," "its secludedness, its limitedness […] limits of time and place"; "it can be repeated at any time"; and "[a]ll play moves and has its being with a playground marked off beforehand either materially or ideally, deliberately or as a matter of course" (8–10). Play, for Huizinga, is meaningful, a "significant function" in that "there is some sense to it" (1). Josh Daniel-Wariya, in *A Language of Play: New Media's Possibility Spaces*, argues that play ascends to the status of symbolization: "play—like words and images—is a resource used by people to express attitudes, to share ideas, and to persuade others" and, as a consequence, "play is at stake at all levels of composing, including invention, production, consumption, distribution, and access": it therefore is a language of play (33). Through the language of play, then, proairetic motion generates possibilities to determine, by choice, the time-affect images used in kinematic texts.[18]

As an example of how proairetic motion generates the possibilities for choice, consider the kinetic text "Chef." Chef Audio Clip

I knew I wanted something that generated a sense of gravity, or intensity, and deep resonance because, for me, the vibrations at lower pitches connect bodily, through the chest, and that matched the feeling (affect) I was attempting to generate. I used mostly the manual "keyboard" method of playing notes and chords, so I played around with a simple rhythm using one of the deepest instruments among the choices: the tuba. That choice sent me to find a trombone choir, and once I auditioned those timbres I knew immediately that the main components of this piece were in place (and that this choice meant that I would be using a lot of brass because, together, they resonated deeply). After looping the main tuba rhythm, I played with various melodic lines I might use for the trombone choir and then recorded the one that I chose was the best. Since my QWERTY keyboard is a poor substitute for a musical keyboard, I sometimes made "mistakes" by misplaying the intended note, but Garageband makes it easy for me to find that "wrong note" and move it to the pitch I wanted (or, sometimes, a pitch not anticipated or intended, but satisfying anyway). This process of auditioning, making mistakes, and then revising is fairly common when composing, especially when not using loops (though even with the loops, I sometimes edit them by duration, or copy instances of them and string those instances together to make new combinations). The result of the first section of this piece, using this general description of proairetic motion, occurs from 00:00:00 to 00:00:34 and before the solo trombone comes in. Other themes and instruments emerge during the remainder of the piece (namely French horns, trumpets, clarinet, snare drums, bass drum, and sleigh bells) but the initial theme is repeated and becomes the central theme.

The playground was the software and hardware running Garageband, and the play involved my auditioning choices of instrumentation, timing, layering, and volume changes: some choices led to others, some choices were quickly or eventually rejected, either during the auditioning process or after in the revision process. Either way, the proairetic motion allowed the kinematic text to become the virtual actualizing the real.

Pattern Motion

Arrangement, as Brooke notes, often denotes a linearity in text—that some may conceive of text as either arranged or not. Actually, since texts in motion are always becoming—simultaneously having qualities of the past latent in the present, and the future latent in the present—and since kinematic becoming is so important to what makes the time-affect image unique (through duration), a traditionalist view of arrangement is exceedingly inadequate. Brooke proposes as an alternative the canon of pattern, a view that is "free of sequential media"

that may "invent the kinds of intermediate forms and figures," which leave behind "containerism" so prevalent in print-oriented rhetorics (97). Indeed, the possibilities of patterns in motion acknowledge the "now-ness" and continuous repositioning of the deterritorialized kinematic text and its potentiality for alternate relations, or connections.

Patterns need not be repeatable to exist; some patterns, at the appropriate scale, are in fact impossible to repeat and yet are clearly evident. The myriad connections and disconnections in a lifetime of experiences, microbacterial encounters, gusts of winds, growths in skin and hair: all are identifiable patterns, but any attempt to recreate or repeat them identically would be frustrating, to say the least. On the other hand, fractal patterns seem to repeat without end, spiraling mathematically through extreme variations in form only to end up identical to itself in the end. Patterns and repeatability are related but not conditional, just as Deleuze's seed of a crystal implicates a becoming as a "burst of series" that creates an unfulfilled pattern:

> What we see in the crystal is no longer the empirical progression of time as succession of presents, nor its indirect representation as interval or as whole; it is its direct presentation. […] It is time itself which arises in two without completing it, since the indiscernible exchange is always renewed and reproduced. […] [T]he before and after are no longer themselves a matter of external empirical succession, but of the intrinsic quality of that which becomes in time. Becoming can in fact be defined as that which transforms an empirical sequence into a series: a burst of series. A series is a sequence of images, which tend in themselves in the direction of a limit, which orients and inspires the first sequence (the before), and gives way to another sequence organized as series which tends in turn towards another limit (the after). (*Cinema 2*, 274–75).

Just as the crystal's seed becomes crystal "without completing it," patterns in motion are incomplete, though they "tend in themselves in the direction of a limit": the pattern only offers the promise of possibility, of becoming.

Pattern motion is motion as form, as a "burst of series," but not necessarily as repeatability. It is difference and integration. It is a process of constructing time elements in order to create affect without limitations imposed by a static container. The arranged patterns of motion are liberated by planes of multiplicity—of becoming—while limited by short sequences in (a perceived) series.

In "Chef," the patterns that emerge in the variety of forms and timbres in the piece repeat but evolve. The opening notes become a heartbeat rhythm that unifies much of the kinematic text; the trombone choir repeats three times, but

at three different places and layered with three different contexts of accompanying instruments and percussion. The pattern in motion is the pattern that emerges over time, through the time-affect images, non-discursively. It becomes a form, but a dynamic one.

Perspective Motion

The oscillation between various frames and positions, especially to the degree that the text is deterritorialized, creates a motion in perspective. It is the case that perspective is not ever stable or static. But dynamic text only amplifies the inherent instability of perspective, much to the rhetors' advantage. In kinematic text, rhetors control not only the perspective of the motion, they also create motion through the dynamic qualities of perspective itself. Brooke's revision of Richard Lanham's AT/THROUGH oscillation to AT/THROUGH/FROM helps illustrate these dynamic perspectives:

> Is the desktop interface, then, something that we look at or through? The obvious answer is that it is going to depend on our level of comfort with the various metaphors operating there. It depends on where we look from. It may well be that the desktop has diffused sufficiently into our culture so as to become invisible, that it has become the perspective, but even this view assumes a stability on the part of the desktop that may be assuming too much. The point is that we as users participate in the construction of our interfaces. (134)

Certainly it is the case that the audience's culture alters the perspective of the interface and that new modes and literacies may affect how rhetors compose their texts for those audiences. Interfaces, as constructed by users (either in part or in whole), set perspectives from either/or to both/and—it facilitates the oscillation that is not static (Lanham's "bi-stable relationship" only infers that the relationship is not self-destructive). This emphasis of perspective reinforces just how transparent the interface is, ultimately, since users construct multiple perspective shifts dynamically.

By proposing perspective as more relevant to these modes than the classical conception of style, Brooke underscores how rapidly changing interfaces create the necessity for our participation in constructing some interfaces while remediating others. Remediation, as Bolter and Grusin emphasize in their book by that title, allows for the "representation of one medium in another," a quick stylization of a newer technology from older ones (151–52). The maintenance of older metaphors in newer technologies and interfaces creates perspective motion: it moves the interface perspective through time. What is most

important here is that perspective in motion demands more transparency, not less. To the degree that perspectives are transparent (that the perspective is immersive) is to the degree the kinematic text is immanent—able to affect and be affected by the text.

The time-affect image carries with it emotion and duration, and in that unfolding of worlds it creates perspective. The way a rhetor assembles the time-affect images—the manner through which perspectives move or not— determines the rapidity of perspectives and perspective motion in duration. The lack of connectedness in this motion—the degree of disconnection between transition points among perspectives—tends toward a disruption and territorialization of text. The rhetor chooses, based in part on audience expectations, to what degree the oscillation of this perspective motion is joined or disjointed, smooth or jagged, transparent or opaque—all through the choice of time-affect images within kinematic rhetoric.

In *Color It Clean*, Hall clearly wanted to include as many perspectives for the viewer as possible, though the camera itself was largely stationary. By including low-angle shots of trash being swept up from under and around the toilets within the stalls, for example, Hall's directing style, his perspective motion, augments what the documentary can argue: the perspective motion highlights the difficulty of the work. Conversely, when Hall chooses high-angle shots, the perspective motion shifts to the bigger picture, the scale and entirety of the procedures involved in doing the work.

Persistence Motion

Memory in rhetorical theory is evolving as digital networks expand and interconnect. Whole network ecologies continue to self-propagate. As Jan van Dijk notes in *The Network Society*, "we may call the twenty-first century the age of networks" since they "will be the nervous system of our future society" (2). Brooke's observation about memory is that it is the "retention or location of quantifiable amounts of information" (143). How information is gathered and retained—through various robust algorithms and databases— has consequences for cultural memory as well as individual memory.

Persistence, therefore, is the retention and interaction of networked information. As Rodowick explains, such memory is a returning force: "[M]emory is not what is recalled; it is rather that which returns," something "Deleuze calls an absolute memory, deeper perhaps than Bergson's pure memory, as difference in itself or eternal recurrence as the force of returning for that which differs […] [t]he relation of history and memory is equivalent to that of power and resistance" (205–6). That this persistence is a kind of return is consistent with the evolved notion of memory as it becomes dynamic and

active rather than static and passive.[19] For Rodowick, this persistence is a kind of "double becoming":

> This becoming, this absolute memory of resistance that founds all acts of resistance, is minoritarian. […] [T]he principal quality of the minor voice—in art or philosophy—is that of double-becoming. […] Their power is that of an anterior time, or time as anteriority. They speak "before" as the expression of a becoming or the immanence of an alternate mode of existence. The quality of becoming establishes a zone of exchange between the minor author and the people. (206)

By putting persistence in a motion of returning, possibilities open up rather than close down. The motion creates alternatives. Brooke calls this "persistence of cognition"—a perception of cognition, even if it is distributed cognition (144). He states that what persists during the process of aggregation is then perceived as a kind of cognition, often with very little direct input from the user: "[w]e take information, sometimes without being aware of it, and only notice it when that information connects with other data to form a pattern worth investigating" (166). This is how patterns and differences no longer are limited by "memory as storage" but become persistent as networked memory, much of which is aggregated and stored in "background processes" (Brooke 166). Persistence motion aids in becoming by networking networks: by connecting in duration the flow of information as it changes, adapts, and even operates through algorithms, patterns, and distribution channels. Persistence motion, therefore, is a kind of dynamic memory, a mutable memory through duration. It challenges authenticity and originality.

When "information connects with other data" and aggregates, the connections themselves are a kind of movement: connections, or traces, that are in motion themselves. In kinematic text, shifting traces help to define a kind of memory through its returns, its recurrences. As these traces, or persistent tracks, get expressed in time, the rhetor may choose the time-affect images that recall "'before' as the expression of a becoming" in order to set up an "zone of exchange" with the audience. Distributed across networks of traces, persistence in motion is a continual connection between the recent past-present and the soon to become present-future.

Again, in "Chef," persistence motion is evident in the choice of instruments over the course of the production of that kinematic text. One instrument, the tuba, connected backward to a personal experience in the symphonic band during junior high. I recall sitting in front of both the tuba and the trombones and how, at times, I was in awe of the sonic power they could release (when allowed or when messing around on their own). At the time,

that's all I could recall, but while auditioning different timbres for the introduction, the overwhelming sound of the trombone choir in its lower register pushed me to think of a potential future of how the piece might build, layer on layer, toward that kind of intensity. The same is true for the clarinet part in that piece. My band director at that time was a clarinetist, and he sometimes demonstrated themes or sections to the band using his own clarinet, an instrument that had a soaring sound (as do the French horns), a sound I wanted as a contrast to the other, deeply resonate themes in the piece. It is likely that I did not "know" or anticipate which of the various instruments I auditioned within the (extensive) catalog of possible sounds until I heard that clarinet, triggering in motion a persistence made available by the networks of data in the software. What persistence motion allowed was for the memory to connect past, present, and future while dynamically producing this kinematic text.

Performance Motion

Delivery of kinematic text is not merely a projection of a film or the playing of a recorded concert: as argued already, textual motion is pervasive in many forms on many kinds of interfaces capable of conveying motion. The notion of delivery, as Brooke points out, is limited by the common material connotations that exist with the term: "Delivery, in everyday parlance, is a transitive process; it is rare to speak of delivering without an object that is being delivered. […] [W]e need to think in terms of an intransitive, constitutive performance, rather than transitive or transactional delivery" (170–71). That is, Brooke pinpoints how delivery is too simplistic a term in observing the movement and context of texts (circulation) and formative power inherent in delivery itself (medium). He proposes a more nuanced view through the lens of performance:

> Circulation captures the importance of movement in the way that information spreads, but it is too easy to fall back into traditional characterizations of physical transfer. The equation of delivery with medium acknowledges the shaping role that information and communication technologies play, but it can too quickly become a static set of features that decontextualizes delivery. […] The strategy that I advocate here sees both circulation and medium gathered under the idea of performance. (176)

Because performance necessitates both the act of meaning (as context) and its form (as meaning structured by form), the term is indeed an improvement over delivery. Performance also implies an activity of becoming that is both

dynamic and multitudinous because it does not imply a singular act but a multiplicity accumulation, an assemblage, even a simultaneity.

Performance in motion is a double-movement: both the kinematic text as performance and the motion within the text as performance. Many images allow for immanent text: Deleuze's movement-image and time-image are among them. But the time-affect image constructs performance both interiorly and exteriorly: interior to the kinematic text, the rhetor may choose to employ multiple performances of motion using many different techniques to manifest specific connections of time and affect; exterior to the kinematic text, the rhetor may choose to what extent the motion will connect time-affect images with the emergent worldscape of other multimodal texts. The double-motion of kinematic rhetoric does rely on a performance motion, both as performed within kinematic texts and among kinematic texts, through time.

The performance motion in *Color It Clean* provides an example of this double-movement, one that is common to most kinematic texts. While one performance unfolds in time through the visual, time-affect images of the janitor performing his work, at the same time there is another performance through the voice-over, with its own aural, time-affect images working sometimes in tandem, sometimes in juxtaposition with each other. The other performance motion is of this kinematic text as a whole: performed, in this case, by a file with coded instructions, settings, parameters, and preferences saved in the codec (meaning coder and decoder). The first performance motion sets in motion the rhetorical affects composed by the rhetor; the second performance is also composed, more or less, by the rhetor given the choices made at the time: the performance of the whole through technology and its parameters. In the first case, the rhetor selects time-affect images (aural and visual) in order to persuade or advocate; in the second case, the rhetor chooses technologies that allow for the time-affect images to be performed. Interestingly, Brooke's point about the need to disassociate memory for materiality is reinforced here by the fact that the original version was likely filmed on acetate and projected on a screen; now, the Internet Archive allows over eleven different file formats (codices) when downloading this text. Since these files are all digital, the "original" version is not available, but my technological choice as to which file to download was made, in part, by how I intended to "perform" it in this book.

The key to composing kinematic texts is for the rhetor to compose time itself. This chapter explored Bergson to establish the importance of duration—and of pure duration—in the ability for kinematic texts to create multiplicities of becoming. Dynamic data, in the act of becoming, are algorithmically driven,

allowing for computable new media to alter itself in time. As a result, the virtual becomes actualized, in the form of text, but also in worlds and realities those texts encounter. The rhetor of kinematic texts composes time in order to create multiplicities of possibility and potential meaning. The next chapter, consequently, investigates the way in which the audience may experience kinematic texts as immediate, immersive, and, at its full potential, immanent.

Animation Clip 3

3

IMMERSION AND IMMANENCE IN KINEMATIC TEXT

[T]he mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is the result of a special procedure, namely, the shooting by the especially adjusted camera and the mounting of the shot together with other similar ones. The equipment-free aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate reality has become an orchid in the land of technology.

—Walter Benjamin*, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (1936, 233)

Hidden World Video Clip 1

In *Imagining a Hidden World: The Light Microscope* (1984), time-affect images are composed in part not only to demonstrate but also to amaze. As the clip above shows, kinematic texts have the ability to reveal worlds to our senses we would otherwise not be able to perceive: "All living things, when enlarged, show new levels of structure: from leaf, to cells, to the tiny living particles they contain" (00:01:16–27). Obviously intended as an instructional video, its ability as a dynamic texts to reveal not only the world but also the motion within that world is as much instructional as it is affective: the emotions may be subdued, but they stem from the expertise of the images Bruce Russell manages to capture through the microscope (presenting its own technological challenges), as well as the avant-garde, electronic music placed in the background as microorganisms dance with life. This is not only a strange world, it is also an immersive one. As Benjamin states above in the epigraph, the "mechanical equipment" has "freed" the "pure aspect" of what is witnessed by it, fading into an "equipment-free aspect of reality." Though the interface in this case is not completely unnoticeable, the kinematic text itself is alluring through its immersive qualities.

Immediacy, immersion, and immanence are key to understanding how kinematic rhetoric persuades differently than does static text, not just because

these terms help define the user's experience but also because they are what drive the act of becoming while directing, and intensifying, attention. As worlds—even small worlds—are put into motion, as the visual and aural images are composed to provide immediacy and immerse our reception of the text, we experience immanence in duration. *Imagining a Hidden World* would be effective as a picture book with the narration transcribed, but Russell's kinematic text is not only more effective, it is also affective as living creatures are paraded in front of the lens. He not only informs his audience about the history and basic use of the microscope, but he also connects us to this world as we are able to both attend to it and, through duration, help us *feel* its becoming.

As technological changes made Russell's film possible, these changes continue to reduce the space between texts and the audience. New media, according to Manovich, creates computable illusions. In fact, kinematic texts will gradually become as much the norm in our daily lives as the web browser: "It is appropriate to expect that the computer age will follow the same logic, presenting users with similarly structured perceptual experiences at work and home, on computer screens and off. Indeed […] we now use the same interfaces for work and leisure" (329). The prevalent worldview of cinema is based on a nineteenth- and twentieth-century notion that we must *go to it*, but it is already the case that kinematic texts are increasingly being woven into daily life, effecting the everyday experiences of becoming. For example, wearable interfaces and the Internet of Things shrink the distance between the users and the kinematic text much like the mobile smartphone has consolidated the distance between the user and the computer. The new media of the digital, networked age have made it possible to augment our affective experience of kinematic texts through their immanent duration.

Deleuze's concept of *immanence*—the fully immersive quality of movement-image and time-image—is particularly pivotal in understanding how kinematic texts create their own brand of persuasive appeals through the use of duration. In *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Deleuze and Guattari contrast this concept of immanence with transcendence: the former privileges forms that are composed with the complexities of time while the latter favors forms composed within the quantifiable neatness of space: "There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or at least between elements that are relatively unformed […] We call this […] the plane of consistency or composition […] It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality" (266). Through complex multiplicities of duration, immanence allows rhetors to compose within the "plane of consistency" in order to produce kinematic texts for an audience. As an immersive construct, immanence means to become "the absolute state of movement as well as of rest, from which all relative speeds and slownesses spring" (267).

Immanence, the worldly rather than the transcendent, becomes our immersion into the virtual through movement.

In *Cinema I*, and in describing the movement-image, Deleuze somewhat equates image to movement, and movement to embodiment, and embodiment to a "plane of immanence":

> We find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a world where IMAGE = MOVEMENT. […] There is nothing moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every thing, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its actions and reactions: this is universal variation. […] Me, my body, are rather a set of molecules and atoms which are constantly renewed. Can I even speak of atoms? They are not distinct from worlds, from interatomic influences. It is a state of matter too hot for one to be able to distinguish solid bodies in it. It is a rippling: there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high, nor low. […] This infinite set of all images constitute a kind of plane [*plan*] of immanence. The image exists in itself, on this plane. (58–59)

The renewal of the "body" that is "constantly renewed" through its "actions and reactions" is a "universal variation." Deleuze combines atoms and bodies through infinite images that are in a state of variation, of becoming, and are located in the plane of immanence. He reveals how moving images are part of "universal variation," a concept important for the "rippling" of time externalized from space, yet embodied in it.

In this chapter, the experience of the audience as viewer or receiver of kinematic text through the lens of immanence. Deleuze's non-skeptical view of the world—one that allows for change and for future, creative thought—is part of a positive view, or ultimate purpose, for kinematic texts, and so informs much of the way immanence is favored over transcendence. By rejecting a single, unified self, the process of self-making relies on movement and thus becomes central to the way advances in neuroscience make it possible to view feeling and the emotions within consciousness. Movement from the middle, or rhizomatic movement, emphasizes the "between" state of becoming, leading to ontogenesis rather than ontology. The chapter ends with some distinctions made between concepts of immediacy, immersion, and immanence.

Immanence and Transcendence

As opposed to transcendent forms, immanent forms privilege the complexities of time rather than the quantifiable neatness of space: "The plane of

organization or development effectively covers what we have called stratifica-
tion: Forms and subjects, organs and functions, are 'strata' or relations between
strata" whereas the "plane of consistency or immanence" is "on a plane of
consistency of variation, the plane of music" (271–72). That is, what Deleuze
refers to as static "stratification" is opposed by the dynamics, or variations,
of immanence, and it is appropriate that Deleuze should specifically refer to
music here. Frances Dyson, in *Sounding New Media: Immersion and Embodiment
in the Arts and Culture*, expands on this idea, adding that "'immersion'—a pro-
cess or condition whereby the viewer becomes totally enveloped within and
transformed by the 'virtual environment'" because "sound returns to the lis-
tener the very same qualities that media mediates: that feeling of being here
now, of experiencing oneself as engulfed, enveloped, absorbed, enmeshed, in
short, immersed in an environment" (1–2). As opposed to the organized strata
of "forms and subjects, organs and functions," the plane of consistency allows
for variation in time: its essence is that it is plastic, capable of change, and
variable. Immanence is not a static state, or even an ideal state. As opposed to
transcendent form, immanence is becoming, changing, moving.

The immanent is thus characterized by the material body and its
groundedness. According to Rodowick, "this replete state of the Image—what
Deleuze calls the 'plane of immanence'—is virtual to the extent that the body
and its needs place limits on what actually can be apprehended in matter"
(28). Deleuzian immanence is movement and change in duration. "The plane
of immanence is movement itself from the temporal perspective of an ever-
changing whole" (Rodowick 30). The worldly "whole" exists only within the
flux of time.

It is through immanence of this kind that a focus on composing texts in
motion has the potential of evoking such strong persuasive appeals such as
in gaming texts and hyper-immediate, kinematic texts. As an immersive con-
struct, immanence means to become "the absolute state of movement as well
as of rest, from which all relative speeds and slownesses spring" (*Thousand
Plateaus* 267). Kinematic texts, as texts in duration, contain multiplicities of
virtuality embedded in movement. "For Deleuze," concludes Rodowick, "the
cinema is ideally suited for promoting an intuition of duration because image
and movement are immanent to one another" (*Time Machine*, 43). As such,
images that move in duration help to construct immanence.

As mentioned already, Deleuze states in *Cinema 2* that the ultimate purpose
of cinema is to connect humankind to a belief in the world: "The cinema
must film, not the world, but belief in this world, our only link […] in our uni-
versal schizophrenia, *we need reasons to believe in this world*" (172). What's more,
in finding reasons to believe in this world, humanity is immanently grounded
in the body:

What is certain is that believing is no longer believing in another world, or in a transformed world. It is […] simply believing in the body. It is giving discourse to the body, and, for this purpose, reaching the body before discourses, before words, before things are named […] Give words back to the body, to the flesh […] Our belief can have no object but "the flesh," we need very special reasons to make us believe in the body […] We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are part. (172–73)

To be consistent with the rest of his theory on cinema, Deleuze's use of "word" may be shorthand for "symbol" or discursive language in general. The world is composing cinema, for Deleuze, *because* it wants to link to the body, making kinematic text an immanent set of modes that connect—affectively, intellectually—flesh to the world. This passage is striking in that it attempts to answer the unasked question, "Why kinematic texts?" The "ethic" or "faith" Deleuze highlights is one that is against a more cynical perspective and is hopeful—not hopeful in dogma, or ideology, but hopeful for embodiment, immanence, worldliness, and wholeness. As Rodowick observes, "[t]he creation of concepts and the powers of fabulation proper to cinema do not recall, they call forth" as they "summon or solicit the relations of forces or will to power that express the immanence of new modes of existence […] [a]s avatars of becoming, art and philosophy have a special relation to the virtual […] they incorporate or embody it" (208). Rhetoric, too, has a special relation to the virtual in that in its possibilities—its orientation toward the practical efficiencies of symbolization and all of its power—it may help others advocate for the "very special reasons to make us believe in the body" because, in its essence, modern rhetoric eschews the transcendental for the immanent, for embodiment.[1]

For Deleuze and Guattari, immanence, as opposed to transcendence, is rhizomatic. It is a "cultivation of tubers by fragmentation of the individual; a casting aside or bracketing of animal raising" (*Thousand Plateaus*, 18). The rhizome, as opposed to the transcendent or root-tree metaphor, is one that values deterritorialization over territorialization, flight over trace, and variation. But transcendence and immanence are not opposites; the latter works to disrupt the former:

The important point is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models; the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing, even if it engenders its own escapes; the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map, even

if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic channel. […] It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again. (20)

The rhizome "is perpetually in construction" and "perpetually prolonging itself" and, therefore, proves to be a powerful model for becoming. The qualities of the rhizome are that it "connects any point to any other point, and it's traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even nonsign states" and "[t]he rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple" (21). Importantly, it is composed "not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion" and "[i]t has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (*milieu*) from which it grows and which it overspills." Because the rhizome is made of lines rather than units, it is made up of plateaus that are "always in the middle, not at the beginning or end" (21). Deleuze and Guattari place such considerable importance on these "thousand plateaus" because they are each made up of "any multiplicity connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome" (22). Together, rhizomatic movement and the perpetual condition of becoming affords the possibility of immanence: of dimensions in networks of motion.

The rhizome is useful to many as a tool for analysis, especially of digital texts. Jason Helms, in the webtext *Rhizomics: Rhetoric, Technology, and New Media Composition*, uses the concept as a key analytic to the activity of theorizing about comics:

The rhizome—antidiscourse, antihierarchy—seemed a propitious introduction to comics, which resist definition and blur the line between image and text. To write comics is to write from the middle, between modes. To read comics is to enter between panels. In this sense each of the formalist definitions of comics, sequential art and image/text, focuses on either writers or readers, on production or consumption of rhizomatic text. ("Introduction")

To compose "from the middle" is becoming that is perpetual, but also illustrates "breaking off and starting up again" in duration. The "rhizomatic text" Helms discusses relies on the interstitial, the between-ness that focusing on the rhizome allows. I discuss this more later, but suffice it to say that this between-ness is important to the movement, individuation, and the production of kinematic texts.[2]

Immanence and Presence of Self

Immanence is, by definition, a kind of continual becoming—a presence of selfhood. According to Rodowick, "On the plane of immanence, movement-images are time itself as a becoming in space, or the form of time as change" (33). Alexander Galloway, in the *Interface Effect*, notes that the cinema actually erases the self because, he claims, it is entirely atomistic: "The penalties and the rewards are clear: to be 'kinematically' present to the world, to experience the pleasure of the movies, one must be a masochist" because "to be in a relation of presence with the world kinematically, one must subject the self to the ultimate in pain and humiliation, which is nothing short of complete erasure" (11). This perspective of the viewer presumes the loss of self in the act of experiencing kinematic texts, and that kinematic texts are "entirely" an internal experience. Though it may be the case that the act of being—with evolving time within the text, virtual or not—may *feel* similar to the loss of self, it is actually quite the opposite. Kinematic texts, through movement and time and through immanent rather than transcendent becoming, allow for grounded, experiential selves that are integrated and differentiated.

Antonio Damasio's book, *Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain*, is entirely focused on a theory of self derived from years of research as a neuroscientist. In it, he defines the self as a process, not a singular entity:

> There is indeed a self, but it is a process, not a thing, and the process is present at all times when we are presumed to be conscious. We can consider the self process from two vantage points. One is the vantage point of an observer appreciating a dynamic *object*—the dynamic object constituted by certain workings of minds, certain traits of behavior, and a certain history of life. The other vantage point is that of the self as *knower*, the process that gives a focus to our experiences and eventually lets us reflect on those experiences. (8)

While Galloway may be claiming that the kinematic self is made up entirely of the *observer*—a feckless "masochist" who helplessly and voluntarily observes whatever is flickering in front of the eyes and rumbling around in the ears—Damasio presents a "process" of self that is ongoing, dynamic. Damasio suggests, also, that the process of self is only part of the equation: the *knower* process allows for focus and reflection through *feelings of knowing*—a somatic marker "which joins the mind stream as an image, juxtaposed to the image that prompted it" in order to "accomplish a distinction between self and nonself" (9–10). Later, Damasio defines the material question of self-as-object: "a dynamic collection of integrated neural processes, centered on the

representation of the living body, that finds expression in a dynamic collection of integrated mental processes" (10). The self-as-knower is layered, evolutionarily, on the self-as-object because Damasio claims it was a "turning point in biological evolution"—it introduced a subjectivity to the self. The remarkable emphasis on these processes—both objective and the subjective—is how "dynamic" they are: movement seems crucial to these definitions of the self as process and motion is central to kinematic symbolization. Both the self-as-object and the self-as-knower are required to differentiate levels of selfhood as they correspond to different levels of consciousness: from "the protoself and its primordial feelings; the action-driven core self; and finally the auto-biographical self" (11). Both are clearly implicated in the production of an immanent state because both require duration and images.

The self process is also responsible for our subjective sense of consciousness. Images are central to consciousness, but images would flow whether or not the brain is conscious:

> Consciousness is not merely about images in the mind. It is, in the very least, about an *organization of mind contents centered on the organism that produces and motivates those contents*. […] The mere presence of organized images flowing in a mental stream produces a mind, but unless some supplementary process is added on, the mind remains *unconscious*. What is missing from that conscious mind is *self*. What the brain needs in order to become conscious is to acquire a new property—*subjectivity*—and a defining trait of subjectivity is the feeling that pervades the images we experience subjectively […] When the brain manages to introduce a knower in the mind, subjectivity follows. (10–11)

Without the self process there could be no conscious mind because, as Damasio defines it, the only difference between the unconscious and consciousness is "self," the "feeling" of experience. The conscious state is not only dynamic—made up of moving images—but our experience of selfhood defines our subjective knowledge of knowing. Said differently, images, movement, and our groundedness in our subjective experience of self combine to build consciousness. Kinematic texts may owe some of their rhetorical power to the similarity they have with our very ability to be sentient, or conscious.

The other remarkable aspect to these definitions is just how reliant they are on feelings, or affect. Subjectivity itself is dependent on the feelings associated with images in the "mental stream." Part of the integration of these processes is an integration of feeling woven into the very processes that define consciousness and selfhood. Just as feelings generated by dynamic images have an effect on how we see and learn (i.e., as shown in Sinha's work from Chapter 1), they

also have an effect on how we become within the worlds unfolding in kinematic texts. Dynamic images with their associated feelings are key to understanding consciousness and self processes. Indeed, since the self is in a constant state of becoming, referring to "the self" or even "myself" is actually only referring to the current "stream" of images marked by feelings of knowing. Any characteristics or qualities that describe "the self" are actually generalized categories in a constant state of flux: in time and in movement.

Movement implies space, and time begets space in our attempt to abstract, or signify, it. Damasio relates the brain's ability to maintain certain functions through the mapping of images: "Mapping is essential for sophisticated management, mapping and life management going hand in hand. When the brain makes maps, it *informs* itself […] when brains make maps, they are also creating images, the main currency of our minds. […] Action and maps, movements and mind, are part of an unending cycle (67–68). As in *Non-discursive Rhetoric* and again here, I argue that images are at the core of symbolizing and consciousness, but what Damasio insists here is that the act of mapping images is a kind of informing brought to consciousness through movement. The activity of mapping is not to create static, cartographic-like mental images. On the contrary, "brain maps are mercurial, changing from moment to moment to reflect the changes that are happening in the neurons that feed them" and, in turn, "reflect the fact that we ourselves are in constant motion" (70–71). In fact, the "drawing" itself of the map is actually the activation of some neurons and the deactivation of others: a lighting up of connectivity. There is an electrical flow of energy from one node to another—itself an act of motion, albeit at the speed of electrons. "Mapping applies not only to visual patterns but to *every* kind of sensory pattern the brain is involved in constructing," according to Damasio, just as an image is not just a perception of the eyes but of all our available senses: "Perception, in whatever sensory modality, is the result of the brain's cartographic skill" (72, 75). The ability to perceive multisensory images creates maps of images in the mind, as well as other images of neural activity that become an image to use later for recall (what Damasio calls "dispositions," as mentioned in Chapter 2, note 19).

Biologically, therefore, our senses, our thoughts, our consciousness, and even our processes of self all rely on images in motion. Movement in text provides a common nominal, phenomenal, and epiphenomenal presence: it is not just metaphor; it is not just an illusion created by rapidly fleeting static images in a frame. Existentially, movement is not just a modality: it is the substrate of becoming, of groundedness, of the state of living in the world. It is not an overstatement or a simplification to claim that movement, as much as any other ontological framework, is immanent becoming: "[i]n other words," Damasio states, "minds are not just about images entering their procession

naturally" but "[t]hey are about the cinema-like editing choices that our per-
vasive system of biological value has promoted" (76). The activity of selecting
images over time suggests their subjective value, and "[i]mages continue to be
formed, perceptually and in recall, even when we are not conscious of them"
(76). The values that are "stamped" are feelings, and feelings promote subject-
ivity and the self. If kinematic texts have the ability to give people what they
produce in some facsimile in their minds, then it must also provide opportun-
ities for these values, or feelings, to mark one image from another. Immanence
depends on this becoming, this living-while-feeling, that kinematic texts pro-
vide. Composing kinematic texts, then, has the opportunity to use moving,
dynamic images through real as well as virtual time to help audiences construct
the feelings that give them their rhetorical impact. As Damasio argues, "[w]hen
brains are forming perceptual images, the neurons of the separate regions that
contribute to the percept exhibit synchronized oscillations" and "could be the
secret behind the 'binding' of separate regions by means of time" so the brain
can "*relate* the maps to one another, in coherent ensembles" (93). The timing
Damasio discusses here is not only a particular event at a particular time. It is
also a recursive *series* of events over time: a duration. This duration helps to
"bind" one mapped region to another in order for one to "relate" to another.
This relatedness is based on duration through time, an oscillation of repeated,
recursive signals that are synchronized in order to interconnect.

Bergson's notion of duration seems more relevant than ever, not only to
kinematic texts but also to the relational mapping of the human brain. His con-
cept of duration relies on "mutual penetration" of successive moments that are
"without distinction" in that they related to each other on a continual plane (61).
Bergson's relational mapping is both integrative and differentiated. As Deleuze
puts it in *Bergsonism*, experiences are both continuous and heterogeneous:

> Bergson has no difficulty in reconciling the two fundamental
> characteristics of duration: continuity and heterogeneity. However,
> defined in this way, duration is not merely lived experience; it is also
> experience enlarged or even gone beyond; it is already a condition of
> experience. For experience always gives us a composite of space and
> duration. Pure duration offers us a succession that is purely internal,
> without exteriority; space, an exteriority without succession. (37)

Both Bergson and, later, Deleuze would seize on a notion of succession that
is both continuous and varied (integrated and differentiated), and that dur-
ation plays a role in the "organization of elements" is uncanny. Juxtaposed
with Damasio's suggestion that the timing of various mental maps is bound
by successive oscillations in order for them to relate, or organize, suggests a

remarkable similarity in thought. In fact, Damasio spends a lot of time and effort in *Self Comes to Mind* to make movement and integration key aspects of both selfhood and consciousness.

Similarly, the renowned neuroscientist Rodolfo Llinás asserts in his book, *I of the Vortex: From Neurons to Self*, that embedded in the way the brain controls movement is the very seed of sentience, or the emergence of selfhood and the mind. Specifically, Llinás asserts a kind of evolutionary energy management as key to the problem of how the brain controls movement and its ability to make predictions in time:

> *The brain's control of organized movement gave birth to the generation and nature of the mind.* Continuous-through-time control of movement, combined with simultaneous but independent control of individual muscles, leads to a physiologically untenable functional overhead for the brain, even if all neurons contained within it were used, which they are not […] this control must be labile. It must be able to reconfigure itself readily, allowing for a nearly infinite ability to appropriate need-to-use-this-moment-only combinations and recombination of muscle synergies. The ability of this control system to do so should mirror in time the transience of muscle configurations as they are recruited and discarded during a voluntary movement sequence. (50)

The burden caused by movement, in both synchronizing and combining muscles, comes with a "well-defined" calculation of time segments, or a predictive function (51). As the brain evolved to control movement—which, at a very basic level, meant it had to allow for nearly instantaneous reconfigurations of muscle control—it needed a way to segment time in order to predict the variety of muscle combinations and recombinations that may be necessary in especially quick movements. He gives, as one example, the need for just such a predictive function in boxing: "A boxer can deliver a punch in 100 milliseconds. If you don't see the punch coming you will not be able to dodge it" (51). Since that speed is at or even faster than what the eye physically needs to transmit a signal to the brain,[3] there is a distinct need to be able to predict the movement. "You must know that if the shoulder is moving forward, a punch may follow 200 milliseconds later. Boxing requires rapid prediction and rapid execution" (51). Being able to predict movement, therefore, is an important parallel process due to the physical limitations of eye-to-brain connectivity and the massive energy requirements of the brain. Presumably, such connectivity rates are also part of other sensory systems, such as hearing and touch. Regardless, the burden placed on the brain in managing these systems and then predicting future input suggests the centrality of movement to our very development as a species.

Llinás also connects this basic calculation of time segments to the brain's ability to configure the subjective self. He argues that "prediction is possible when well-defined segments of time can be calculated" and the "small fragments of time must be well defined so that they may be properly operated on, properly controlled" (51). This capacity to segment time for coordinated movement leads, then, to selfhood:

> The thalamocortical system is a close to isochronic sphere that synchronously relates the sensory-referred properties of the external world to internally generated motivations and memories. *This temporally coherent event that binds, in the time domain, the fractured components of external and internal reality into a single construct is what we call the "self."* […] Temporal coherence not only generates the self as a composite, singly perceived construct, but creates single seat or centralization from which to predictive function of the brain, so critical to survival, may operate in coordinated fashion. Thus, subjectivity or self is generated by the dialogue between the thalamus and the cortex; or to put it in other words, *the binding events comprise the substrate of self.* (126)

These "binding events" provide the coherence perceived as a self, or centralized subjectivity. The management and control of movement requires the brain to segment time, and the control of time provides a means for the centralization of a sense of self. Like Damasio's emphasis on a "binder" that helps connect various brain regions over time, Llinás' notion that "subjectivity or self" has as its foundation "temporally coherent" events that are necessary for a "predictive function of the brain." Selfhood, even consciousness itself, relies on duration that combines past, present, and the predicted future to emerge.

Presence of self, therefore, is a presence of both the self-as-object process and the self-as-knower process. Selfhood is not lost. It is not erased. Selfhood proceeds in the presence of body and knower, of object and subject. Selfhood as process is a selfhood of becoming in time. Texts that move, that literally become in time, have a special relationship to the brain because the self as process is a time-bound process, one dependent in part on movement. Therefore, kinematic rhetoric, through its ability to alter movement, duration, and affect, has a unique affordance: production of these texts are immanent and able to connect to the unfolding selves of the viewer.

Immersion in Static Text

Of course, static, discursive text has its own relationship to time, movement, and the self. The commonplace experience of "getting lost" in reading,

or losing time as the unfolding of images in discursive, alphacentric texts through the movement of narrative can be its own form of immersion through text. But immersion and immanence are simply not the same thing. Both static and dynamic texts often do have elements of discursive and non-discursive symbolization embedded in them: the non-discursive mental images cartwheeling by while reading a novel or poem, or the discursive narrative line, or plot, in a documentary or blockbuster film (often accompanied with actual words from time to time). It is the case that these two types of symbolization generally occur together. But to be immersed in a text, to feel embedded in the action or the world of the text, is an order of magnitude apart from immanence.

Immersion in discursive text is often an important goal of the writer. In Marie-Laure Ryan's book, *Narrative as Virtual Reality: Immersion and Interactivity in Literature and Electronic Media*, immersion is illusory outside of rootedness, or immanent experience:

> Immersion […] is the mode of reading of an embodied mind; interactivity/self-reflexivity is the experience of a pure mind that floats above all concrete worlds in the ethereal universe of semantic possibility. Literature thus offers a choice between the cerebral and the corporeal. […] [T]he mind's exile in the nowhere of incessant travel from sign to sign may lead to a deeper appreciation of what it means to have a body and to belong to a world. Self-reflexive and interactive reading can be used to enhance the reader's awareness of her desire for immersion by temporarily holding her virtual body out of the textual world. (355)

In other words, the act of immersion in static text is ultimately an experience of "the ethereal universe of semantic possibility" rather than a grounding, or becoming. What may be ultimately more similar to a transcendental experience, discursive immersion is indeed an embodiment, but an embodiment rife with self-reflexivity rather than selfhood. The body is "temporarily" held hostage while the "pure mind" is free to "float above all concrete worlds." As a "mode" of reading, Ryan concedes that immersion is an alternative, one of choice. The reader chooses to be immersed in the text, from "sign to sign," from moment to moment.

If discursive text leads toward transcendence rather than immanence, then the interpretive facilities of critique and examination—or hermeneutics—come to full fruition. The self is subordinated, though not displaced. What happens in immersion is a compromise with being, an imaginative emulation of kinematics, but not necessarily an act of becoming. As an imaginary act made of mental images, it is a valuable way to receive static texts, but it is

not the same as the level of immersion possible through the immanence of kinematic texts.

Immanence and Attention

As opposed to transcendence, immanence is a kind of grounding—an embodied reality with infinite potential. Immanence requires nothing other than attention, but attention is a scarce resource for any type of rhetorical text. Richard Lanham's book, *Economies of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information*, characterizes attention, making it and style the filters from which we turn an overabundance of information (mostly fluff) into knowledge (stuff): "economics seeks to describe" the scarcity of "human attention needed to make sense of information" because "the kitchen that cooks the raw data into useful 'information' is human attention" and it is "the attention economy that has created the paradox of stuff" (7). This paradox, according to Lanham, is the condition of having an abundance of data, or information, but necessarily any more wisdom because of it. Similarly, kinematic texts have the potential of overwhelming the audience with information. Like most compositions, the rhetor decides how much *copia* is right for the given rhetorical purpose. Some texts move in order to simply profit a little for the spectator's attention—like the animated infographic in the lower corner of a television screen, highlighting the newest or next program. Some texts move to help ground the action in becoming—like an extended shot of the youthful journey or the electronic music in *Imagining the Hidden World* while microorganisms wiggle in every direction. In either example, kinematic texts attempt to buy attention with movement and duration. As Lanham states,

> Information does not come in simple neutral boxes and its distribution is a more complex matter altogether. We need more capacious conception of human communication, one that can accommodate the full range of human purpose. All the more do we need it because the digital computer has created a new expressive space. The screen works differently from the page. Words don't stay put. They dance around. Images play a major role and they move too. Color is everywhere. And sound, too, spoken and synthesized. Above all, a different expressive economy prevails. The printed page depends on an economics of deprival. […] The digital screen depends on an economics of plenty. It allows competition between word, image, and sound for our attention. […] And this new rhetoric will have to be built on the digital expressive space as well as the printed one, and teach how to move easily from one to the other. (19–20)

Regardless how "easy" it is to move between print and image—between static and dynamic texts—it is the case that new technologies have made composing in multiple modes more the norm than the exception.[4] It may also not be the case that the printed, discursive world operates from an "economy of deprival," given the number and variety of printed texts with variously illuminated and/or illustrated modes—or even the riches of various stylistic, syntactic, and grammatical indulgences (though the materiality of a physical library and its lack of connectivity in comparison to a digital one is likely what he meant by "deprival"). Even so, Lanham's overarching point about the number of rhetorical challenges for composing multimodal texts may be eased given the number and range of available images, sounds, colors, movements, dimensions, and so on. And it is the case that some rhetoricians are also working to conceptualize how these new modes and their affordances can be taught and learned.[5] Part of the reason this book is subtitled *Non-discursive, Time-affect Images in Motion* is because, on the one hand, non-discursive language is ideally suited for composing in this milieu of multimodality; on the other hand, for reasons touched on already, putting time-affect images in motion has profound intellectual, rhetorical, and pedagogical implications. Lanham's call for rhetorical theory that takes these changes into account is precisely one that motivates this book.

To reiterate the importance of movement to immanence, recall the "plane of consistency" as explained by Deleuze and Guattari, especially after considering Lanham's "fluff and stuff" mentioned above. The plane is infinite, and it is composed of multiplicities. The "plane of consistency" is a model in constant "construction or collapsing," "breaking off and starting again" (20). In short, immanence does not "stay put" and it does "dance around" while depending on an "economics of plenty" (Lanham 19–20). This constant variation, the "universal variation" of Bergson, is in a state of flux, a state of always becoming, and, as such, vies for the audience's attention.

Movement from Rhizomatic Middle

Kinematic text signifies flux. As a text of time, it is a multiplicity of virtuality embedded in movement. This is movement not as voyage but as rhizomatic middle—no beginnings, no endings, "it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing" (*Thousand Plateaues*, 25). The rhizome is "alliance, uniquely alliance"; its "fabric" is "the conjunction": "[t]he middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed"; it is "*[b]etween* things" and that "does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or

end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle" (25). This conception of the middle, of "interbeing," is powerful for kinematic rhetoric because it illustrates a kind of movement related to composing, sequencing, and pacing. Speed and momentum swell like a tidal wave, a cascading snowball. Paradoxically, such power is internally composed of itself: the stream erodes its banks; the wave is composed of its own finite self; and the snowball consumes its brethren. Each builds from itself, enlarging and becoming through its own moving inertia. Composing in this way, with movement as the force from which rhetorical power becomes manifest, reinforces the importance of amplitude, reiteration, linking, and connecting from the middle.

The middle is also a form of ontogenesis—of always becoming. Muriel Combes, in her analysis of Gilbert Simondon's *Psychic and Collective Individuation* (*L'individuation psychique et collective*), links being and individuation with the principle that the individual is an operation, or process:

> The individual is thus neither the source nor the term of inquiry but merely the result of an operation of individuation. This is why the genesis of the individual remains a question […] only as a moment in a becoming of being, a becoming that sweeps it along. When we retrace the genesis of physical and biological individuals or of psychic and collective reality, we always focus on the becoming of being, precisely because it is being that is individuated. As such, being can be adequately known only from its middle, by seizing it at its center (*by way of* the operation of individuation and not *on the basis of* the term of this operation). (2–3)

Simondon emphasizes throughout his theory of individuation and transindividuation that the individual is defined by the process of individuation and not the reverse. The process of individuation necessitates a building out from the center, a movement from the core, in which an individual is individuated through a multiphasic system containing potential energy. According to Combes' reading of Simondon, "the individual is not a definitive being, finished upon arrival," rather "[i]t is the partial and provisional result of individuation in that it harbors a preindividual reserve within itself that makes it susceptible to plural individuations" (15). The relation between the potential energy of the preindividual and the outcome of ultimate individuation(s) is not unlike the rhizome in its unending unfolding. In essence, being is a relation: "Being itself now appears as that which becomes *by linking together*" (17). Simondon's theory of collective individuation is, at base, a movement of connectivity, of interlaced relationships: "Without a doubt, the ontological postulate, or rather, the ontogenic postulate, central to a philosophy of individuation is that individuals *consist* in relations, and as a consequence, relation

has the status of being and constitutes being" (Combes 21). Like the neural network of the brain, or the ecologies in nature, it is relation and connectedness among nodes (individuals) that defines them as much as the nodes themselves. Without connecting relations, Simondon argues, the notion of individuality is lost, and the "activity" of individuation "is an activity of amplification of being (Combes 24). Amplification as an activity, then, relates directly to kinematic texts and movement in time, since the predominant affect of duration within the rhetorical appeals is a kind of intensification (as discussed more fully in the following chapter).

Simondon's often cited work, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, frequently evokes the metaphor of the seed and crystal, as does Deleuze, because it is a rhizomatic metaphor of becoming, rather than being. Reality itself is as much a reflection of the machine as it is of humanity due to the mutuality of their copresence:

> The presence of man in regard to machines is a perpetual invention. Human reality resides in machines as human actions fixed and crystallized in functioning structures. These structures need to be maintained in the course of their functioning, and their maximum perfection coincides with their maximum openness, that is, with their greatest possible freedom in functioning. (4–5)

What is in perpetuity is the intermingling of machine and human, all the while maintaining a structure that is as free and as open as possible. This leads, according to Simondon, to a reintroduction to "an understanding of the nature of machines, of their mutual relationships and their relationships with man, and of the values involved in these relationships" (6). The fusion of information and the forming of relationships is characteristic of kinematic rhetoric: "Mechanical reproduction of art changes the reaction of the masses toward art" because the "progressive reaction is characterized by the direct, intimate fusion of visual and emotional enjoyment with the orientation of the expert" (Benjamin 234). Becoming, as fed by the solution, or milieu, is a network of relations that are concomitant and crystalline. Combes points out that for Simondon, these relations allow for an individual's becoming: "The individual is not finished but limited, that is, capable of indefinite growth" in that the "individuation of a crystal offers undoubtedly the purest example of this constituting power of relation as limit; provided that we respect the required conditions, we need only put a crystal back in its solution to see it grow in all directions" (20). The crystal is never singular, always potential, and becoming. "[T]he individual, in effect, is not an absolute; by itself alone, it is an incomplete reality, incapable of expressing the entirety of being; and yet it is not illusory either, and, associated with a milieu of the same

order of magnitude retaining the preindividual, the individual acquires the consistency of a relation" (Combes 21). The resulting relations constitute being, and the rhizome illustrates becoming. The middle is not a fixed point, or center, as much as it is a catalyst for layers, or strata.

The crystal and the rhizome share the quality of becoming in all directions. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the crystal metaphor also relates content and expression:

> When content and expression are divided along the lines of the molecular and the molar, substances move from state to state, from the preceding state to the following state, or from layer to layer, from an already constituted layer to a layer in the process of forming, while forms install themselves at the limit between the last layer or last state and the exterior milieu. Thus the stratum develops into epistrata and parastrata; this is accomplished through a set of *inductions* from layer to layer and state to state, or at the limit. A crystal displays this process in its pure state, since its form expands in all directions, but always as a function of the surface layer of the substance, which can be emptied of most of its interior without interfering with the growth. (60)

The "inductions" are ontogenesis in action: seeds spawning crystalline formation in "all directions" and "as a function" of the crystal itself. As an image, crystalline formation demonstrates rhizomatic movement: from all directions, no ending, no beginning. Phases—from one state to another—individuate and transindividuate, are both before and after. Such contradictions may seem too difficult to imagine, but in thinking about states of matter, for example, it is not uncommon to consider water as solid, liquid, or gas: even the crystallization of water requires a seed to get started. Hidden World Video Clip 2

Imaging a Hidden World uses a microscope, colored light, and polarizing lenses to capture amazing footage of crystals in a state of active becoming. The crystals grow "in all directions" as a "function of the surface layer and state to state," made even more striking with the use of red and green light while enhancing and augmenting the time-affect images assembled. The background music changes from an electronic-inspired, relaxed-tempo melody at the beginning, and then to up-tempo Bach piece complimenting the energy of the growing crystals. In this clip, the whole is much more than the parts as the experience of these visual and aural images helps to embody something outside of our normal experience. The voice-over states this almost directly: "Many subjects are more interesting to look at in dark field; it is as though you have shrunk to their size, examining them in their own hidden

world" (00:00:23–32). Immanence grounds this immediacy and embodies it through this kind of kinematic text.

Movement conceptualized as rhizomatic and from the middle is a mode of becoming that is a multiphasic multiplicity. Rhetors effective in producing kinematic texts connect the textual movement to the viewer's innate experience of becoming—an experience of movement that is always from the middle.

Hypermediacy and the Rhizome

There are various types of immediacy, depending on the level of immersion involved, or the transparency of the interface. J. David Bolter and Richard Grusin, in *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (1999), distinguish between immediacy and hypermediacy in this way:

> Where immediacy suggests a unified visual space, contemporary hypermediacy offers a heterogeneous space, in which representation is conceived of not as a window on the world, but rather as "windowed" itself—with windows that open on to other representations or other media. The logic of hypermediacy multiplies the signs of mediation and in this way tries to reproduce the rich sensorium of the human experience. […] In every manifestation, hypermediacy makes us aware of the medium or media and (in sometimes subtle and sometimes obvious ways) reminds us of our desire for immediacy. (34)

As immediacy depends on transparency, hypermediacy is not fully transparent and depends on an opaque interface with obvious "handles" or affordances. The environment may be richer—with a "rich sensorium of the human experience" made accessible—but it is also not as immersive as a fully transparent interface.

Like the rhizomatic middle, hypermediacy strives for kaleidoscopic views in many directions, all at once. The transparency of immediacy "attempts to achieve through linear perspective a single, 'right' representation," while the representation of hypermediacy "becomes the sum of all the unconventional, unusual […] ways of looking" (84). Because the interface is part of the rich experience, the two become intertwined, oscillating between the transparent immediacy of the multimedia and the more opaque, but interactive hypermediacy of the interface.

The consequence, then, of full immediacy, or complete immersion, is a completely transparent interface. As Jason Farman suggests in *Mobile Interface Theory: Embodied Space and Locative Media*, it is the disappearance of the interface that allows for immediacy: "Instead of the excessive visibility of our systems,

ubiquitous or pervasive computing often seeks to create an environment in which the technologies remain invisible" (7). Once these technologies become transparent to us, unnoticed, then the experience becomes more immersive. "Instead of being conscious of our interactions with the interfaces," says Farman, "we simply act intuitively with our environment and it responds accordingly. […] Immediacy privileges a seamless connection to our media so that they fluidly integrate with our bodies and our surroundings" (7). Farman goes on to state that a "pre-digital form" of this level of transparency "is going to the cinema," though the technologies behind kinematic texts are not completely transparent there either ("going to" the cinema requires some interface opacity: the screen, people, projection, speakers, etc.), and these texts are usually digital (7). But unlike immediacy, immersion does not necessarily require a transparent environment, and even the materiality of embodiment may be suspended. What immersion allows, however, is both the conscious "knowledge" of the interface while somewhat willfully ignoring the interface much in the same way an athlete or an artist may ignore the crowd in order to fully attend to the task at hand. In addition, one defining characteristic of such intense attention is the "loss of time": becoming replaces being as immediacy yields to immersion. A world of hypermediacy is a rhetorically constructed reality—a world authored by rhetors.

Gaming and Kinematic Text

In considering kinematic texts, it may be the case that video games and the gaming industry are too often considered as an afterthought.[6] It has been the case for quite some time that the world's gaming industry is considerably larger than the world's motion picture industry, and that the games being developed are increasingly sophisticated and graphically intense. As such, producers and coders for the gaming industry understand the importance and power of creating immersive environments: these rhetors use kinematic texts to persuade their audience (the players) to spend money on consoles, games, and mobile apps so that they can then spend hours playing the games themselves.

Gordon Calleja's *In Game: From Immersion to Incorporation* (2011) suggests a distinction between immersion as an atomistic experience and immersion as a relatedness, stressing that gameplay has dimensions both inside and outside of the game: "One of the most commonly yet vaguely deployed concepts in the industry and academia alike is immersion—a player's sensation of inhabiting the space represented onscreen" because "[o]veruse of this term has diminished its analytical value and confused its meaning, both in analysis and design" (3). Rather than conceiving of immersion as a single experience, Calleja views it as blending different experiential phenomena afforded by involving gameplay.

He proposes a framework (based on qualitative research) to describe these phenomena: the player involvement model. This model encompasses two constituent temporal phases—the macro, representing offline involvement, and the micro, representing moment-to-moment involvement during gameplay—as well as six dimensions of player involvement: kinesthetic, spatial, shared, narrative, affective, and ludic (35). The intensified and internalized experiential blend can culminate with *incorporation*—a concept that Calleja proposes as an alternative to the problematic immersion. "Incorporation," he argues, "is a more accurate metaphor, providing a robust foundation for future research and design."

Gaming, and play in general, has enjoyed little esteem in scholarly theory, though that seems to be changing. Play, and the immersive benefits of games, shares many of the affordances as kinematic texts, and the two are converging: "Play is always opposed to purpose just as style is always opposed to substance. Purpose is serious; play is not. […] Seriousness is to behavior as clarity is to writing" (Lanham 176). That is, Lanham puts on his "productivity spectrum" (or "motive spectrum") gaming on one end, play on the other, and purpose in-between the two. As Daniel-Wariya also points out, play is "rhetorical in that it is simultaneously something humans do and that environments *have*" (33). This space is composed space: "[t]he environments most commonly associated with play are the virtual environments of videogames, and these spaces are designed with deliberate rhetorical intent" (33). Both Lanham and Daniel-Wariya acknowledge both the rhetoricity of play (gaming) and the bias against it as unproductive and trivial.

Vilem Flusser's essay, *Into the Universe of Technical Images*, presciently predicts the dominance of digital texts, or "technical objects," and the rise of networked culture that operates primarily through play. For Flusser, image is the central concept of a future, "telematics" society that, ultimately, is free to "play" and create in a "dreamworld":

> [P]eople will sit in separate cells, playing with their fingertips on keyboards, staring at tiny screens, receiving, changing, and sending images. Behind their backs, robots will bring them things to maintain and reproduce their derelict bodies. People will be in contact with one another through their fingertips and so form a dialogical net, a global superbrain, whose function will be to calculate and compute improbable situations into pictures, to bring information, catastrophes about. Artificial intelligences will also be in dialogue with human beings, connected through cables and similar nerve strands. In terms of function, then, it will be meaningless to try to distinguish between natural and artificial intelligences (between primate brains and secondary brains). The whole thing will

function as a cybernetically controlled system that cannot be divided into constituent elements: a black box. (161)

Despite the obvious subjugation of body to near disembodiment, Flusser's vision for the future of technical images is ultimately hopeful. His prediction, published originally in 1985, forecasts a future of image production for the sake of "improbable" information generation—that is, the generation of entirely new knowledge through novel information and processes. The "game" he describes is a dialogic exchange between humans, other humans, and machines (or other intelligences) through the manipulation of images. The important point here, though, is that Flusser elevates play as a central, not peripheral, utilitarian and utopian condition of human activity: "People are not creators but players with prior information, only they, in contrast to the world, play with a purpose to produce information […] human information is synthesized far more quickly than so-called natural information. […] And this is because nature plays without purpose, by sheer chance, and human beings play using dialogue" (89–90). Dialogue, or sequential, discursive exchanges, slows down the "play" because it is too controlled. Setting aside the entirety of Flusser's telematics society, the notion of dialogue as a game—a "controlled" game of chance—is germane to how moving texts within gameplay are both informative and immersive. Flusser connects selfhood to this kind of dialogic game: "the so-called 'I' forms a nexus point in an web comprising streams of information in dialogue, storing information that has passed through" (91).

New knowledge and new processes of knowledge require a kind of symbolic production that carries less discursivity and more willingness to rely on the unintended. The self, the "nexus point" in the individuated brain, is then able to achieve what for Flusser is the ultimate aim of a fully telematic future:

> At this nexus point, unpredictable, improbable computations occur, new information. This new information is experienced as intentional, freely controlled, because each "I" is a unique nexus point, distinguished from all other nexus points in the web by its position and the information it stores. […] And the telematic society would distinguish itself from earlier societies only insofar as its cerebral-net character has become conscious, enabling us to start consciously manipulating the net structure.

Flusser's telematic society creates new information by playing through "improbable situations" converted into technical images.[7] Far from simply a method to keep the audience's attention or pass the time, gaming in this context becomes a way to connect and to ultimately create new information. In Flusser's universe, connectivity and relations between nodes become the self's

primary activity, and this activity succeeds cybernetically when the network as a whole is "consciously" manipulated.

Those who seek to manipulate and produce technical images are, according to Flusser, envisioners—a relatively new kind of textual producer. Flusser distinguishes them based on the fact that the technologies needed to compose are relatively new:

> The point is that all technical images have the same basic character: on close inspection, they all prove to be envisioned surfaces computed from particles. […] *Envision*, then, should refer to the capacity to step from the particle universe back into the concrete. I therefore suggest that the power to envision first appeared when technical images were invented. Only since we have had photographs, films, television, videos, and computer screens have we been able to understand what it means to envision […] technical images are objective depictions of events in the particle universe. (33–35)

The ability to manipulate "particles" using the apparatuses of the modern era makes Flusser's telematic society possible. Whether these technical images are "objective" is no longer really a valid or important claim: whether discursive or non-discursive, one type of text can be just as subjective as any other type of text (even technologies themselves cannot be considered wholly objective in nature). The subjectivity in our symbolization systems might even be considered their greatest asset. An "envisioner" is a producer of technical images: a rhetor can compose kinematic texts from these images, or whatever other kind of texts desired. The ineffability of subjectivity—of ambiguity brought with images and emotion or the attempt to express the inexpressible—is a strength of non-discursive images that is equally relevant to gaming and virtual environments as it is to film or music.

In effect, envisioners are rhetors who understand how to manipulate images—whether static or dynamic—in order to create. Non-discursive symbolization is fundamental to playing the game and, perhaps, interfacing between human and nonhuman intelligences (such as artificial intelligence, or AI). Russell's kinematic text, for example, reveals a world, but through his manipulation of the images and sound in the text, he envisions dynamics for us in a way that is truly "improbable" crystallizations. Hidden World Video Clip 3

Immersion as Movement in New Media

Computable media, or new media, is an elevation of the algorithm and relational database structures over raw data and information. Digital media clearly

remediates old media as changes revolutionize the processes of production, distribution, and consumption. The medium itself offers its own relationships, as Markos Hadjioannou observes in *Light to Byte: Toward an Ethics of Digital Cinema* (2012):

> A new medium is thus a portal in time to previous technologies as well as various formations of its own history, and the space of meaning that takes place in the subject's interactive exchange with it. It expresses a mediation as a spatiotemporal point of access to an involvement in creativity that links the individual both to the world and to her- or himself. A medium is thus simultaneously a language of its technical interiority and a passage of interactions where the old (in this case celluloid cinema) is brought in direct contact with the new (the digital) through the vulnerability of a cultural and creative context (i.e., cinema as an institution consisting of the expressive input of moviemakers and viewers alike). (12)

As a portal, the medium as a "language of its technical interiority" exists both in the near past, the present, and the near future. As such, the relationships between the medium, its duration in time, and its "passage of interactions" allow for differences in "expressive input." The digitization of kinematic texts "set up modes of exchange with the world" (12). Digital media, therefore, allow for a significant increase in the number of practical inputs for the rhetorician: "the technological aspect of cinema becomes the platform onto which the image gains the dual role of revealing a passage to reality and of involving the spectator in this potential" and "what is necessary for this relation to take place is the presentation of reality as unpredictable, as untamed by reason, as the ambiguity of the chance occurrence" (23). Movement in new media, as a compositional affordance, expedites this kind of relationship between a version of reality contingent on the ineffable and the ambiguous. Using image in this "dual role," between potential knowledge and "revealing a passage to reality," has long existed with older media technologies.[8]

Bolter and Grusin base their theory of remediation on the various levels of immediacy and hyperactivity inherent in the affordance of the writing technologies. Immersion and immediacy are common concepts in how to characterize some of the rhetorical differences between kinematic texts that move and discursive, static texts. To add movement to text brings a different level of experience to the audience, and those experiences make it possible to be more rhetorically effective.

Though immediacy is similar to immersion, there are some differences. Playing a video game may be an immersive experience—the otherworldliness

is consciously palpable and affective through its time-affect imagery—but the controllers and the peripheral data readouts in the edges of the experience (providing whatever data or score information available to the player) may keep the player in a somewhat regular oscillation between interface and the game experience. Immediacy demands a homogenous experience whereas immersion allows for a more heterogeneous experience similar to the hypermediacy that Bolter and Grusin suggest. As discussed already, the level of transparency of the interface directly influences the level of immediacy for the user.

As the difference between mind and digital technology blurs with more and more transparent interfaces, new ideas about inquiry need to be developed. In *Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology*, Andre Nusselder states how the blur between real and virtual may come to redefine epistemology:

> Digital technologies may penetrate the human mind to such an extent that a reconsideration of the whole field of epistemology might result. When the images of our interfacing with technology appear with such intensity that they seem to be the thing itself, there is a shift from the realm of representation […] toward the realm of "presentification." (60)

Movement itself, however, is immersive, regardless of what else is happening with the interface. Movement demands attention; it defines much of how differentiation and integration of dynamic information operates in our mind and our senses. Movement is not an interface; kinematic texts create immersion in new media environments especially because of the connection between duration and emotions. The presence of movement in a hypermediated environment increases immersion for that environment. In new media—that is, computable media—the movement may occur as simply as a spinning icon, a bouncing letter, color changes, short animations, or even full-screen video. The interface might remain cluttered with competing toolbars, dials, menu options, links, or static texts, but the presence of movement is an increase in the degree of immersion. The oscillation between AT/THROUGH/FROM slows, even ceases, as immersion takes over from hypermediacy and the moving texts capture attention. Though immediacy and immersion are similar but related concepts, immersive texts that move lead to immanent experiences of becoming: a central rhetorical affordance of non-discursive, time-affect images.

Movement in the Era of New Media

The era of new media is steeped in multiple modes, and increasingly kinematic texts are embedded within or are the dominant nature of our daily

mediated experience. Even the slightest effects of movement can be found in alphacentric texts: scrolling, fading in and out, bouncing, swirling, swiping, and so on. Kinematic text also remains a fascinating, if not sometimes overused and ill-considered, basic animation found in everything from presentation slides, to news tickers or crawlers at the lower third of news broadcasts, to the opening credits of many blockbuster films. From the small screen to the large, textual movement dominates new media compositions.

Lev Manovich makes a similar claim about the centrality of cinema in new media—in fact, he very nearly defines cinema as the first *new* medium: "cinema was from its beginnings based on sampling—the sampling of time […] we can say that cinema prepared us for new media" because "[a]ll that remained was to take this already discrete representation and to quantify it […] what cinema accomplished was a much more difficult conceptual break—from the continuous to the discrete" (50). The "conceptual break" between analog experience and digitized, discrete experience may be one of scale. As already mentioned, discrete interactions occur even at the neuronal level (the synaptic bridge), though many other processes mitigate that experience (relative levels of hormones, or enzymes, etc.). Manovich points to "sampling of time" because those become the meaningful building blocks of kinematic texts—the time-affect image. The manipulation of time through sampling makes it a truly one of new media:

> Although computer multimedia became commonplace only around 1990, filmmakers had been combining moving images, sound, and text (whether the intertitles of the silent era or the title sequences of the last period) for a whole century. Cinema was the original modern "multimedia." We can point to much earlier examples of multiple-media displays, such as medieval illuminated manuscripts that combine text, graphics, and representational images. […] Therefore, if cinema sampled time but still preserved its linear ordering […] new media abandons this "human-centered" representation altogether—to put time fully under human control. (50–51)

The control of time and therefore movement in cinema, for Manovich, defines the user experience, and the interface can "impose its own logic" (65). In *The Interface Effect*, Alexander Galloway argues that Manovich's "grand argument" is about mediation itself: "that to mediate is really to interface, that mediation in general is just repetition in particular, and thus that the 'new' media are really all the artifacts and traces of the past coming to appear in an ever expanding present" (10). Galloway shares the critiques of others that what Manovich's emphasizes about cinema is also "his greatest vulnerability"

because "one loses the social forms" (5). Nevertheless, Manovich's focus is on the importance of cinema—both in its sampling of discrete data and its abundance of multimodality—and he underscores the need for theory about how the production of these texts becomes effective and persuasive. Movement has its own rhetorical affordances, and that has been evident from the beginning because those affordances are unique.

Why is this the case? What does visual movement do for new media that the static image, color, sound/music, or other modes not do? In the economics of attention, there simply is not enough to go around. Movement sweetens the deal: "Our eyes are programmed to detect motion" because "we like it" (Lanham 92). In fact, "[w]hen we see text move, we are drawn into the movement" and "when the movement takes us to a land where meaning has visual embodiment, we pay attention to it" (92). Lanham connects our evolutionary preference for vision and movement to at a more instinctual level, our attention. The idea of visual embodiment connects to immersion because movement, via attention, arrives at embodiment through immediacy:

> And so we are looking at two kinds of "seriousness." In alphabetic seriousness, we concentrate on looking through the notational system to the abstract reasoning beneath it. We build a monopolistic attention economy. In pattern-poetry seriousness, we accept a bi-stable seriousness that allows us to toggle from word to image, from at to through, and back again. Digital expression, the familiar computer screen, creates, and assumes, a bi-stable seriousness. (Lanham 85–86)

This "bi-stable seriousness" oscillation is similar to the simultaneity of self, selves, and projected selves, all within a context that continually emerges. In *Universal Sense: How Hearing Shapes the Mind*, Seth Horowitz explores how attention and emotion are also very much connected to our fastest sense, that of hearing:

> The long, subtle buildup of arousal that occurs as you realize that something is wrong with your environment when you don't hear things you expect and the sudden onslaught of fear and the associated physical responses that occur when you hear a sudden, unexpected sound out of your line of sight show how these two systems are interrelated. Hearing is the sensory system that operates fast enough to underlie both. (104)

No wonder that the visual and aural combination is able to arrest our attention as they do, and given their close connections to emotion, they are formidable candidates for symbolization of kinematic rhetoric.

Movement in new media does more than fix attention or craft meaning: movement makes transparent data streams that come from our perceptions of the world around us. As Lanham states, "We want words to move for the same reason we want everything else to move, because movement means life, and the space and time in which life exists" (86). Kinematic texts move because our existence in and out of our own environment moves: motion is an existential quality. The embodied immediacy of movement helps create the otherworldliness of kinematic texts.

Immersion Between: The World of Kinematic Text

Between worlds of movement, between kinematic worlds, between images in a filmstrip, there is a gap, an interstitial other. Deleuze credits the gap for the inducement "outside a thought": "[w]hat counts is on the contrary the *interstice* between images: a spacing which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it […] [g]iven one image, another image has to be chosen which will induce an interstice *between* the two" and doing so is "not an operation of association, but of differentiation […] or of disappearance" (*Cinema I,* 179). Correspondingly, between worlds of kinematic texts there are inducements that operate between them toward thought. Operative here is Deleuze's emphasis on choice: "Given one image, another image has to be chosen" reinforces the role of the rhetor to choose time-affect images that help make a world, even induce an immersion between worlds: "[b]etween two actions, between two affections, between two perceptions, between two visual images, between two sound images, between the sound and the visual: make the indiscernible, that is the frontier, visible" (180–81). For Deleuze, the gap between worlds and between frames of kinematic text is essential to understanding the potential for thought (though the literal gap no longer exists in the same way for digitized kinematic texts). It is not a closed system (internally or externally)—both the producer and receiver, as we know, construct the text. But worlds are constructed this way as well: a world of becoming through motion, emotions through duration, and data through a progression of moving images.

Immersion, thought of in this way, allows for this permeation of the gaps. It allows the outside, unthought into the gaps between time-affect images, as well as the outside, unthought into gaps between kinematic texts, whole or in part. It allows for differentiation and integration, appearance and disappearance, silence and music. Immersion between worlds connects relationships and makes meaning through motion.

This chapter suggests that immanence plays a special role within kinematic texts through processes of self, consciousness, sentience, and attention.

Rhizomatic motion, the "between-ness" of immanence—and its association with immediacy and immersion—leads to a potential for thought and new worlds of becoming. It is the composing of these kinematic texts—their appeals, values, embodiment, and materiality—that leads to a composing model for kinematic rhetoric.

Animation Clip 4

4

COMPOSING KINEMATIC TEXTS

> The techne of rhetoric, as the art of persuasion, of forming belief, structures the emotive framework which creates the tension within which [symbolizations], questions that are dealt with, and actions that are discussed, acquire their passionate significance. It creates a tension through which the audience is literally "sucked into" the framework designed by the author.
>
> —Ernesto Grassi, *Philosophy as Rhetoric: The Humanist Tradition*
> (1980, 26)

Executioner Video Clip 1

As producers of symbols, the inevitable question is not only *with what* tools but *how* and *what for?* We compose non-discursive images to express ourselves and affect our environment and societies, and our world. Grassi notes in the epigraph that rhetoric provides a "tension through which" the audience is "sucked into" the argument. This chapter argues for a rhetorical theory and a composing model that accommodate kinematic text. In the clip above, *Interview with an Executioner* (2011), the rhetorical work being done is overt, both in the discursive narration and in the non-discursive layers of sound: the heavy drums and rhythms like a ticking clock; the visual time-affect images of the gas chamber itself, the motion of passing prison bars and chain-link fence, both with prisoners behind them. Compositions of kinematic texts such as this one are not only aimed to persuade a particular audience but also to be effective in conveying information as well as affect.

Rhetors composing kinematic texts direct the attention of the audience in order to provide a multisensory experience in duration. Sheena Rogers, in "Through Alice's Glass: The Creation and Perception of Other Worlds in Movies, Pictures, and Virtual Reality," states that the filmmaker's main task is to curate the information (the content) for the audience: "One of the filmmaker's tasks is to select, record, display, and guarantee the information we need in order to understand the natural meaning of the movie" (223). This guarantee, obviously, depends on the rhetor's knowledge of audience expectations and

what might be done with the text to meet those expectations. For example, the documentary above, produced by Amnesty International, begins with a narrator who declares that the main purpose is to provide a different perspective on capital punishment—that of the executioner: "One of these executions was particularly problematic for him because of the strong possibility that he executed an innocent man, Edward Earl Johnson" (00:00:46–01:10). While this is said, the camera scans by a series of prison cells while the ticking music continues, each with African American male prisoners laying or sitting on their small beds. It ends with a swell of music just as we see for the first time Johnson as he is placed backward into his cell, the doors closing in front of him. This text begins this way to situate and contextualize the reality of the prison situation, and not in a generalized way. We see Edward Earl Johnson, bespectacled, behind bars just after the voice-over suggests that he may be "an innocent man."

Movement and time is about action and change, both of which can reinvent discourse, thought, and conceptions of our world. Pierre Lévy emphasizes how important an active language is to rhetoric:

> Rhetoric designates the art of acting on others and the world by means of signs. At the rhetorical or pragmatic stage, we are no longer concerned solely with representing the state of things but also of transforming them, and even creating a reality out of language, that is, a virtual world. […] Language only truly comes into its own at the rhetorical stage, when it feeds off its own activity, imposes its objectives, and reinvents the world. (104–5)

Such a view of rhetoric emphasizes activity and pragmatism, but also a non-cynicism "creating a reality out of language." It is a hopeful view of rhetoric that places at its core the way movement and actualization make meaning through non-discursive language production. "Technology," according to Lévy, "also possesses its own rhetoric in the sense that its movement is not limited to the accumulation of practical or useful artifacts and tools, which save time and energy" (107). Similar to Deleuze and Flusser, the ultimate aim is to foster new discourse, new thinking, and new orientations to potential knowledge. "Technological discovery opens the way to radically new possibilities whose development culminates in the creation of an autonomous world. […] But the production of artifacts reaches the stage of rhetoric when it participates in the creation of new ends" (107). This "creation of new ends" is rhetorical production, and kinematic texts are the composition of new worlds made up of movement and time-affect images. As rhetors utilizing non-discursive images in motion, they "curate" a kinematic rhetoric using multiple modes, through movement and duration.

One crucial dimension of this movement is affect as experienced through time. Images are inevitably coded with affect: there can be no separation of mind/body or image/emotion. Consequently, the rhetorical proofs of antiquity, emotion (or affect) is really at the heart of each of the three: logic and indirect affect in duration, ethics and credibility as indirect affect in duration, and emotion as direct affect in duration.

Rhetorical Appeals and Duration

This chapter forwards a general theory of how time-affect images moving in duration achieve different levels of sensed reality. It is this quality of being able to produce image texts that are both within real time (with its own set of durations and movement-images) and outside of real time (with its movement among virtual timelines) that manifest a hyperreality of time and space.

Like oral or written texts that access the past or the future to appeal to audiences, kinematic texts can create virtual movement-images. However, unlike oral or written texts, kinematic texts have the added ability to step into and out of affective-images that become absorbed or reflected by the viewer—as in the camera's ability to highlight social relationships through proximity without the use of any spoken or written discourse whatsoever. In *Writing Space: Computers, Hypertext, and the Remediation of Print*, J. David Bolter describes how changes in writing technologies have moved the perceived writing space from the noumenal to the phenomenal: "With any technique of writing—on stone or clay, on papyrus or paper, and on the computer screen—the writer may come to regard the mind itself as a writing space" (13). Writing has always involved technology. In Stuart Selber's introduction to his edited collection, *Rhetorics and Technologies: New Directions in Writing and Communication*, this relationship between writing and technology is not as distinct as is often assumed: "In both theoretical and practical terms, technology does not really function as a separate category or subcategory of consequence" because "[i]t tends to infuse each and every area of the discipline, even under fairly narrow circumstances" (2). Through technology, the rhetor has the ability to create experiences of becoming—of creating worlds using time-affect images—and imbuing them with emotions along the way that deepen the virtual experience through movement. As a consequence, each of the traditional rhetorical proofs are subject to reinterpretation, given how motion and duration allow for the composing of time-affect images to indirectly or directly carry emotion.

Logos in Duration

Logic, variously considered, has as one of its main tenants a systematic core based in validity and verifiability. In the plural, logics refer to certain

types of systematic thinking, procedural and standardized. Perhaps the most celebrated rhetorical appeal, logic carries with it the cultural capital of the Enlightenment, the scientific revolution, and countless advances in nearly every field. Though likely a part of the human condition, its recent history is one of a guiding star, often celebrated as the core principle behind anything worth pursuing.

The problem with logic, set within a historical framework, is that it is often considered as unassailable and as a window into objective truth. Though often exhaulted, rhetorically speaking, logic is only one of the rhetorical appeals. Logical appeals are often at the root of movements advocating for the greatest—and the most horrific—human events in history (this is true of all the proofs, but worth mentioning here). Not surprisingly, it is also not always the most effective appeal to be used at the given rhetorical moment because the other appeals may prove more suasive (sometimes even within the name of logic).

So what happens when logic is stretched into multiplicity? To follow Bergson, one type of *logos* in duration would be a succession of logical appeals coming from a variety of sources, not necessarily in order, all having more or less effect on their own but also an effect of amplification over time. It is not surprising that one golden standard for academic discourse is the use of a variety of sources, each with their own level of logical appeal. Overall, through amplification, *logos* in duration creates a consistency of argument, an impression of rigor, even the appearance of debate (though rarely counterfactual debate).

Logic in duration creates dynamic concepts rather than fixing them. For Deleuze, the difference between discovery and creation hinges on the difference between being and becoming. As explained by Rodowick, Deleuze emphasizes creation over discovery: "For [organic regimes] it is the *discovery* of concepts through negation, repetition, and identity toward every more self-identical Being; for [crystalline regimes] it is the *creation* of concepts through difference and nonidentity in a continually open Becoming" (*Time Machine*, 85). Discovery implies a preexistence and a finitude, and the ability to create concepts (rather than a discourse of logical "negation" or "repetition"): discursive logic stills while dynamic logic creates. *Logos* in "pure duration," however, precipitates enculturation and complexity that may be intolerant of the established framework. Because this multiplicity is so fused and heterogeneous, *logos* in duration may ultimately persuade through such small increments that the individual elements, claims, and warrants blend to become indistinguishable. More subtle than the amplification effect, *logos* in duration may simply exhaust the audience's capacity for attending to the very feature of logic that is so appealing: a step-by-step accrual of evidence-based claims. The resulting

text may relay content but not necessarily establish the intended persuasive purpose or aim.

In kinematic texts, *logos* in duration amplifies itself and has the benefit of persuading using its multiplicities as a strength. An example might be a kinematic text that offers many logical relationships between concepts from many eras, disciplines, and perspectives, all the while carrying emotions along the way.[1] On the other hand, *logos* in duration fuses its claims and warrants so thoroughly that it may actually work against itself, becoming less persuasive, or, through cultural reproduction, becomes *doxa:* a doctrine that defies the use of logic in discovery of new meaning. Stiegler, in "The Discrete Image," provides some clarification on how this kind of synthesis through *logos* may operate in kinematic texts:

> By utilizing the discontinuity of the image, they put continuity to work on the side of the spectatorial synthesis. […] On the side of production and of realization, we are not engaged in synthesis: we are engaged in analysis. And it takes a good artist to let the spectator make the synthesis. The artist's job is to assemble the analytic elements such that the synthesis will be made more effectively. This assembling is a *logos*. The spectatorial synthesis will be made as much by the play of retinal persistence as by that of expectations of sequential connections […] which efface the discontinuity of a montage all the more effectively the more cleverly it is orchestrated. These expectations […] are the phantoms and phantasms that inhabit every consciousness which are reactivated or reanimated by the image-objects. Animation is always reanimation. (156)

For Stiegler, the audience creates a synthesis, a continuity, despite the "discontinuity of the image." It is the *logos* of assembly, guided by the "phantoms and phantasms" of consciousness, that creates effective synthesis. The rhetor, or Stiegler's "artist," constructs the elements for this "spectatorial synthesis" and functions to set the stage for a conversion from discontinuity to continuity. Even in continuity, the spectator may be as much fascinated by what images are absent than present (i.e., what may yet be discovered).[2]

One example for this appeal in duration would be a text that chronicles the destruction left by every hurricane ever filmed in order to encourage disaster preparation, but ultimately having the effect that hurricanes are not survivable and preparation is pointless. *Logos* in duration, however, employs images and, therefore, carries some amount of emotion as well. Few would look at scene after scene of leveled homes and neighborhoods and walk away with only a logical conclusion from them. Indeed, the emotional intensity created by that shot after shot of "facts" can effectively build emotional intensity

without any direct, affective "content" whatsoever (i.e., homeowners weeping about the loss of their home). *Logos* in duration may become just an attempt at using time-affect images as illustration or reenactment, but doing so inevitably carries with it emotional content as well and rhetors attempting to appeal through logic must be aware of the emotions also being constructed along the way.

Ethos in Duration

The time-affect image excels at creating both appeals of credibility and morality/ethics. The motion itself communicates a kind of *reality* that is often so familiar to our human experience that we are tempted to believe what we experience (this is similar to the phenomenon of printed or photographed text that became *real* because it became objectively and materially present). But what happens to *ethos* when it is in duration?

In *The Virtual Life of Film* (2009), Rodowick asserts that it is the ability for kinematic texts to capture and replay history that makes them uniquely a reflection of our values and ambitions—that it is not enough to ask how our kinematic productions appeal to our ethics, but to build a healthy skepticism as to how moving images prove themselves to be moral or credible. Rodowick argues for an "ethics of time" rather than space:

> Among film's possible automatisms, the most fundamental involve the expression of temporality. Film's virtual life is sustained by its relationships with time. The powers of analogy are not those of representations or of a spatial mimesis, but rather of duration. If photography and film are the matrix from which time-based spatial media evolve, then an ontological examination of the medium, no matter how variable or unfinished, leads to the surprising conclusion that what we have valued in film are our confrontations with time and time's passing. (73)

Despite any claims about photography or film capturing "objective reality," Rodowick's pragmatism simply states that capturing motion in any genre reflects our values (just as it might be said about most other modes of textual production), especially as it relates to "time and time's passing." He asserts that "the power of analogy" comes from "duration" itself because of "our confrontations with time." Ethical or credibility appeals in motion are augmented by not only the composed reality of the duration but also the virtual reality in "time's passing." This is especially true as filmic text leads to self-reflection and self-examination: "[i]n both fiction and nonfiction cinema, the aesthetics and the ethics of film are closely linked to historical powers of

documenting and witnessing wherein the camera confronts the prior exist-
ence of things and people in time and in space, preserved in their common
duration" (74). Such circumstances may make *ethos* in duration fairly auto-
matic when dealing with historical events and recorded with aural and/or
visual time-affect images, though the rhetor's credibility may be called into
question if there is no acknowledgment that even the "documented" images
are selected, altered by technology and its interfaces—to say nothing about
how they are altered again by the audience reception of them. Rodowick
continues by stating that kinematic texts also provide "a way of revivifying
a kind of questioning that explores our sensuous contact with images and
recharacterizes their (visible and outward) perceptual density in a way that
also leads us inward—a self-examination of our relation to time, memory, and
history" (75). In other words, the very duration that amplifies the ethical and
moral questions of "things and people in time and in space" may lead to self-
examination *differently* than in other modes—different, in part, because of their
"common duration." The emotion carried along with the questions of ethics
and credibility is drawn out, as is the exploration of our "sensuous contact
with images," making the entirety of the kinematic, multimodal experience
a compounded one. The point, again, is how *ethos* amplifies in duration: time
and motion working to amplify and intensify not only the ethics but also the
emotional effects of those ethical/moral/credibility appeals.

What's more, *ethos* in duration operates in-between symbol and meaning: the
strength of ambiguity propels an inward journey for the audience. Rodowick
connects outward ambiguity with "inward movement":

> What we register and seek to overcome or redeem in looking at
> photographs and films is a temporal alienation, a felt displacement
> in relation to things and their histories, whether natural or social, not
> only because they are in the past, but because we ourselves are subject-
> ively immersed in passing time or the flow of life. […] Film and pho-
> tography aid us in this overcoming because their semantic reticence or
> ambiguity […] ignites an inward movement characterized by memory
> and subjective reverie. This is an interior wandering sparked by external
> sensations. […] [T]he psychology of film spectatorship is marked by a
> peculiar ebb and flow, from exteriority to interiority and back again. (77)

For Rodowick, the "flow" between our inner life and our exterior world "ignites"
our "overcoming" of linear time and memory. It promotes self-examination,
but also an opportunity to appeal to the ambiguous: the unknown. The rhetor
who is able to tap into this "interior wandering" between the kinematic texts
and the spectator has the ability to influence, or compose, alternate possibilities

for the sake of the rhetorical aims and purposes at hand. Duration and relief from "temporal alienation" intensify how appeals of ethics/morality and credibility may facilitate ambiguity as, at least, a destabilizing element and, at most, a persuasive one.

Similarly, establishing renewed relationships between subjective experience and external possibility carries a profound ethical potential. Hadjioannou examines how the possibilities of digital kinematic texts offer such relationships within the ethical domain: "[celluloid] forges a guarantee of the world despite the subject's visible absence, thus placed in the ontological configuration of the image on grounds other than an ocular detachment of the subject—in the sense, that is, of a Cartesian schematization of knowledge" (216). I equate Hadjioannou's "Cartesian schematization of knowledge" with Deleuze's term "immanence," despite the fact that Hadjioannou claims it to be ontological. Because the image is on "grounds other than" the subject makes a credibility based on the "guarantee of the world"—a plane of consistency. According to Hadjioannou, this guarantee leads to exactly what Deleuze asks of kinematic texts in general—*belief* in the world: "At the same time […] the celluloid image creates a potential for believing in the world because it depicts a reality that exists, albeit within constantly renewable limits of *being*—a world of a becoming expressed in the creativity of differentiation" (216). Set into motion, Hadjioannou's *being* transitions to Deleuze's *becoming.*

The *ethos* involved here has a renewed relationship with the world of possibility, rather than alienation, through kinematic texts—just as Deleuze suggests. Thus, "the immediate availability the technology creates for archiving and retrieving information creates a potential for experiencing the world *in the act*" and therefore rescue any sense of a closed withdrawal (Hadjioannou 216). The distinction Hadjioannou makes between celluloid kinematic text and digital kinematic text is, in the end, not ethically significant: they both, in the end, point to renewal and possibility: "the definite division between cinema's current technological modes of creation and perception points to a potential for treating knowledge as a force of change continually renewed by strands of thought interacting with, and transforming, one another" (217). Like Flusser's role for technical images, Hadjioannou's vision for the continual change in "strands of thought" transforms the nature of the interaction between creation and perception. In short, the continuity, or duration, of "interacting […] and transforming" is a change agent, and change agents in motion, in kinematic texts, bring both emotion (indirectly through time-affect images) and ethos together to persuade.

Ethos in duration, then, substantially renews creative possibility, relationships between internal and external subjectivity, and opens the potential for *becoming.* The rhetor who effectively appeals to an audience through *ethos* in

duration opens up both worldly values of time and inward, self-examination. Kinematic texts provide the affordances of motion and duration in order to construct these possibilities and connections.

Pathos in Duration

Pathos as a rhetorical appeal is commonly understood, but when *pathos* transforms through duration, its effect is amplified and made more intense. More accurately, because emotions are ever-present in image, emotions achieve a higher resolution in moving texts. The metaphor of resolution works particularly well here since it is not so much the nature of the feeling evoked from the emotions that changes; rather, it is the ability of the emotion to affect change even when barely used because the emotion is held not for a static frame but for a particular duration of frames. Deleuze calls this type of symbol the affection-image: "[t]here is inevitably a part of external movements that we 'absorb', that we refract, and which does not transform itself into either objects of perception or acts of subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and the object in a pure quality" (*Cinema I*, 65). This type of movement-image connects to our absorption of the text: its direct engagement with the affective domain. Just the same, Deleuze illustrates the connection to emotions in kinematic texts by emphasizing how linking the subject (the viewer) with the object (the viewed) in movement creates a moving affect: a higher resolution, or intensification, of affect through duration.

In *Action, Emotion, and Will* by Anthony Kenny, duration is a property of affect, one that allows for overlap and blending of various feelings and emotional states: "Duration, intensity, and blending are properties shared by feelings of all kinds, whether perceptions, sensations, or emotions" (38). In Kenny's effort to separate the definitions of sensation, feeling, and emotion, he emphasizes the impact that duration has as something more common to our perceptions than to our emotions. The "bodily-sensations" that are "halfway between perceptions and emotions" are more dependent on time: "All feelings have duration; but perceptions and sensations are much more closely tied than emotions to time which is the measure of local motion" (40). It is motion through time, through duration, that Kenny specifies as the primacy of perception. As perception connects through motion and time, affect is intensified, blended.

Kenny, therefore, ties the difference between sensation and emotion through our relationship to the external world. He points to the way objects help to define emotions:

> The most important difference between a sensation and an emotion is that emotions, unlike sensations, are essentially directed to objects. It is

possible to be hungry without being hungry for anything in particular,
as it is not possible to be ashamed without being ashamed of anything in
particular. […] It is not in general possible to ascribe a piece of behavior
or a sensation to a particular emotional state without at the same time
ascribing an object to the emotion. (41–42)

Just because feelings lead—through duration to sensations, and through
the objects of perception—to emotion, the emotions themselves may not
manifest outwardly. Manifesting an emotion is different than experiencing
it: "Emotions, like other mental states, may be manifested or kept to oneself.
[…] But though one *can* experience an emotion only if one *can* manifest it,
it does not follow that one *does* experience an emotion only if one *does* mani-
fest it" (43, Kenny's emphasis). Clearly, the connection is complex between
feeling/sensing, emotions, and manifesting emotions. Nevertheless, the rhetor
has the ability to appeal through the emotions and through the objects of per-
ception, as well as through the duration of feelings in the mind's perception of
sensations in time and in motion.

Dolf Zillman's essay, "Kinematic Creation of Emotion," coins a phrase
that simultaneously summarizes the effect of *pathos* in duration but, in reason-
ably empirical ways, also accounts for the building or transfer of affect in the
form of excitation. His analysis leads to a "principle of excitation transfer"
experienced by audiences who are viewing kinematic texts:

It is established beyond doubt that excitation, once triggered, decays
rather slowly. For all practical purposes, it takes at least three minutes,
often ten or more minutes, on occasion hours for excitation to return to
normal levels. This is for reasons of hormonal mediation. Specifically,
excitatory reactions are instigated by the release of adrenal hormones
[…] and, to a lesser degree, of gonadal steroids […] into systemic circu-
lation. The excitatory reactions persist until these agents are metabolized
[…] Excitation in response to particular stimuli, then, is bound to enter
into subsequent experiences. In case of contiguously placed discrete
emotions, residual excitation from the first thus will intensify the imme-
diately subsequent emotion, *regardless of differences in kind*. Moreover,
depending on the strength of the initial excitatory reaction and the time
separation of emotions elicited at later times, residual excitation may
intensify experiences further down the line. This is the principle of exci-
tation transfer. (165, emphasis mine)

No matter what affective "excitation" creates a stimulus, the hormonal and ster-
oidal residues will continue to circulate in the body, resulting in one kind of *pathos*

in duration. Once more, if enough stimuli continue to evoke additional excitations, the amount will simply quantitatively build, intensifying as it does through time. These two types of duration, then, have a lasting effect on the audience and, if composed in a determined rate, will amplify the overall affective appeal.[3]

Warning

The following video from *Interview with an Executioner* depicts the death of a rabbit within a gas chamber using cyanide gas. The death occurs in the footage between 1:32 and 1:48 minutes. You may choose to avoid the footage located between these time stamps. Executioner Video Clip 2

The juxtaposition here between the rabbit violently dying in a gas chamber and the way death-row inmates discuss what it is like to wait for their execution is obviously composed to utilize *pathos* through duration in order to amplify a non-discursive argument against capital punishment. It is both a demonstration and an illustration, and the choice of a furry rabbit over, say, a box of crickets, is an undoubtedly deliberate choice intended to maximize the pathetic appeal. In addition, earlier in the clip, the executioner at the time, Don Cabana, describes how, after the execution, it became clear that the State of Mississippi made a mistake in executing Johnson: "The former Governor since that time had kinda come to the conclusion that this boy probably was innocent" (00:00:04-11). As Cabana continues to describe how he and the governor had "hope" that Johnson was guilty to assuage their conscience, the visual images show Johnson interacting with friends and family, dressed in his orange prison uniform and talking on the phone when Cabana's voice-over says "and I carried out an execution on an innocent kid" (00:00:21–00:00:33). The power of montage here not only evokes emotions but also appeals through *ethos* in duration as the word "innocent," spoken by the executioner, overlaps images of Johnson while he was alive. As in most types of rhetorical texts, rhetorical appeals rarely act alone.

Moreover, pathos in duration not only has the ability to amplify one time-affect image, but the succession of images, given the right timing, may result in an overall sense of emotional intensity. Dolf Zillman, in "Cinematic Creation of Emotion" proposes seven principles (or dramaturgy, to use his phrase) that rhetors may employ to make the most out of the effects of *pathos* in duration. Loosely paraphrased, they are the following: (1) Terminate the scene before the "excitatory residues" have dissipated on their own in order to have them build in subsequent scenes. (2) The higher the magnitude of the intensification of subsequent scenes depends on how much is residual, and how much new excitation is generated. (3) The more rapid the scenes that contain new excitations,

the more the overall affect. (4) The more rapid the subsequent scenes become, the more the overall affect. (5) There exists a law of diminishing returns: the more the arousal levels increase in subsequent scenes, the less excitation they generate. (6) If arousing scenes are followed by unarousing ones, then the shorter the unarousing scenes the greater the overall affect. (7) There can be no intensification of affect if the excitatory residues from previous scenes are allowed to completely dissipate (167).

These "excitatory residues" may be another way of considering the intensi-fication that happens as emotions are expressed in duration. What's more, because each of the appeals for time-affect images include an element of affect, these residues may be equally relevant to the other appeals (as well as *kairos*). Either sequentially, or all-at-once, or haphazardly arranged over time, a scaffolding of emotional intensity accounts for the way *pathos* in motion ampli-fies over time. This amplification, itself from the classical tradition of rhetoric, may move as tensions and resolutions play out in kinematic text. Obviously, if the text is short in duration—say a short animation of a bouncing letter— then the intensification of emotion is short and probably hardly noticed (though nevertheless present). Emotions need not be extreme to be present, and duration need not be chronologically extended to have some affect from its time-affect images. It is even the case, as it is with all of these appeals, that duration might allow for additional complexity, or blending, of emotions in time. As such, appealing to the emotions through time-affect images offers an opportunity for ambiguity and ineffability to yield somewhat. Nevertheless, as rhetors compose and manipulate movement and emotions, intensification and amplification result in an appeal of *pathos* in duration.

StuxNet Example

To illustrate, consider a video created by Patrick Clair, a self-described spe-cialist in "visual storytelling" because his videos "focus on combining striking imagery with effortless viewer comprehension" (Clair's website). The video, titled "The Anatomy of a Virus," was produced about the infamous StuxNet computer virus, the first weapon made entirely out of code.[4] First, just listen to the narration in the first few seconds of the video, and then compare it to the full video that follows. Stuxnet Audio Clip

Now, as you watch the full animation, notice how the images and the motion used in the graphic amplify the emotional charge intended by the rhetor. Stuxnet Video Clip 1

Given the two versions, it is clear that through motion, a few repeating techniques are used to amplify the sense of urgency for this issue. First, by often employing a "fly-over" motion in which the viewer "flies" from one

scene and/or detail to another, the speaker seems to be showing us surveil-lance (complete with a drone) while sometimes illustrating threats (architec-tural drawings of sensitive nuclear facilities and power grids), sometimes demonstrating complexities (moving lines that spread radially and exponen-tially outward) like a contagion, all with the cumulative effect of leading the viewer from one central question to another, building tension along the way. Stuxnet Video Clip 2

Second, at the end of the first section, when the headline "Everything Is Normal" declares itself, the text swipes in over these swirling complexities of graphics that blend into a red background. The background slowly rotates to one side while a crystalline growth spreads from one side (an allusion to a virus in a culture, perhaps). Stuxnet Video Clip 3

In describing the capabilities of StuxNet, Clair creates a few moments that use movement not to just illustrate content but also to use movement to make subtle claims about the *consequences* of StuxNet the weapon. After the "Everything Is Normal" headline, the graphic on the screen flashes to white and sandy yellow, then bands begin moving up and down (similar to the horizontal hold of old television sets gone awry), followed by the original graphic in red, turned on its side. Watch the transition again in half the speed. Stuxnet Video Clip 4

While being careful not to make too much out of this very brief transition between two sequences, it is worth unpacking some of the *reasons* why these design choices may be rhetorically significant. Just when the message of the virus is saying "Everything Is Normal," the author creates a flash of white light and an animation of electronic interruption (even the soundtrack has the white noise associated with the loss of a signal). Perhaps the consequence alluded to here visually is of the actual New Mexico testing ground explosions carried out in the 1940s and 1950s; perhaps the electronic disruption is merely an audio analog to catastrophe.[5] Whatever the actual reason, the emotional effect is certain: this is a place the author wishes to underscore the *feeling* of what happens when StuxNet does what it is designed to do—just when every-thing seems to indicate "normal," the virus strikes. At the end of the video, this message is reinforced by another transition in which you see and hear a celluloid film strip slap against its reel while a pink-shaded nuclear lab is revealed through the lens of a microscope.

My point is not that this kinematic text *means* one thing in particular—this and all the other examples in this book, after all, rely on polysemy and that is a strength of non-discursive, time-affect images in general; my point is that these rhetorical choices definitely create an intensification affect in the viewer through the movement and images (aural and visual) composed by the rhetor (Clair), and that kinematic texts offer a potential for the amplification of the rhetorical appeals through duration. Even within a few seconds, even in what

amounts to be a simple transition from one scene to another, the kinematic text functions to both direct attention while boosting the overall emotional charge crucial to the persuasive appeals. In the end, *The Anatomy of a Virus* is composed rhetorically to create the affective arousal this animation shapes for its audience.

Kairos in Duration

Kairos is about the *opportunity* for meaning within a given context. Though not a rhetorical proof or appeal, its strength in rhetorical studies is all about timing: the right moment may yield what Eric White calls an "improvisational readiness" for "a unique opportunity to confer meaning on the world" (14). In *Kairomania: On the Will-to-Invent*, White's view of *kairos* depends on an openness to the dynamics of time and its becoming:

> Gorgias of Leontini, a sophist of the Greek Enlightenment […] privileged *kairos* as the master concept in his rhetorical theory. […] For Gorgias, *kairos* stands for a radical principle of occasionality which implies a conception of the production of meaning in language as a process of continuous adjustment to and creation of the present occasion. […] This subordination of meaning to occasion entails the view that the truth of an utterance is immanent and not anterior to the situation of the utterance itself. […] Or to put it another way, there is no meaning outside of a specific context of rhetorical persuasion. (14–15)

Kairos, in this way, is already a force multiplier, embedded in unfolding time. The rhetor who is able to fully consider each moment in the pursuit of available arguments does so within the constructs of continuously morphing circumstances. Obviously, contexts change continuously and are not singular but multitudinous: *kairos* is always already a multiplicity, and to refer to an *instance* of context would seem impossible, if not disingenuous. White acknowledges the inability of thought "to impose a lasting unity on the multiplicity of experience," and, in doing so, highlights the importance of *kairos* on the meaning attributed to symbols. Unlike the three rhetorical appeals, *kairos* is always already imbued with duration—its manifestation comes from the experience of overlapping worlds with pasts, presents, and futures. As Deleuze explains in *Cinema 2*, time coexists in chronological and virtual states: "the crystal constantly exchanges the two distinct images which constitute it, the actual image of the present which passes and the virtual image of the past which is preserved" (81). Crystalline time, for Deleuze, allows two distinct images of time, and as such, *kairos* has two distinct worlds of opportunity for the rhetor: a present that is still breaking free of the past, and a future that is

already affected by the present. Because the symbols are in motion, the rhetor may choose to chart multiple pathways of past-present or present-future—forward looking or backward through time. Without the constraints of a fixed time, an unfolded time allows for movement in many possible spatiotemporal directions through virtual time. Time, in short, is malleable, plastic, and available for manipulation in the production of time-affect images.

Conversely, Bergson's notion of subjective time depends on interiority—that without consciousness and memory, time lacks duration: "it is impossible to distinguish between the duration, however short it may be, that separates two instants and a memory that connects them, because duration is essentially a continuation of what no longer exists into what does exist" (208). Thought of in this way, duration leads to the integration of memory and selfhood because it "implies consciousness" (208). For Bergson, this interiority of subjective time *creates* duration through its linkages with memory and consciousness, and only pure duration allows for an exteriorized time without these two facets. To put *kairos* in duration would be to fully engage the interiority of consciousness into a continuity of possible opportunities for meaning-making and, therefore, rhetorical kinematic text.

Deleuze, on the other hand, suggests that our interiority is actually interior to time itself; time is "the only subjectivity" and "it is we who are internal to time, not the other way around" (82). By flipping Bergson's notion of time as subjectivity to a notion that our subjectivity *is* time, Deleuze privileges virtual time as our authentic experience of it: "[s]ubjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul of the spirit, the virtual" because "[t]he actual is always objective, but the virtual is subjective" (82–83). Virtual time, for Deleuze, is defined through affect and the self. In order to take advantage of the *kairotic* moment, therefore, the rhetor must embrace virtual time as a subjective reality rather than as an objective one. The rhetor, in this instance, must evoke the possibilities of improvised readiness, employing opportunities that affect the process of selves within an audience.

By dwelling within multiple selves at multiple times in multiple contexts of interiority and exteriority, *kairos* takes on its full realization in the duration and virtual time of moving symbolizations. In space, *kairos* highlights the different relative value an audience may assign as the duration of multiple times is juxtaposed one upon another by the rhetor. Through movement, *kairos* becomes an element of unfolding juxtaposition—a boundary that instructs and prioritizes our attention in any given moment:

> [E]specially when we are ourselves the author, an analogous process can be triggered: we constitute a sheet of transformation which invents a kind of transverse continuity or communication between several sheets,

and weaves a network of non-localizable relations between them. In this way we extract non-chronological time. We draw out a sheet which, across all the rest, catches and extends the trajectory of points, the evolution of regions. This is evidently a task which runs the risk of failure: sometimes we only produce an incoherent dust made out of juxtaposed borrowings; sometimes we only form generalities which retain more resemblances. But it is possible […] to succeed in inventing these paradoxical hypnotic and hallucinatory sheets whose property is to be at once a past and always to come. (123)

Deleuze speaks of an author here who "catches and extends the trajectory of points" in order to compose. There is risk in that by doing so the rhetor may "only produce an incoherent dust made of […] borrowings"; but success may bring "hypnotic and hallucinatory sheets" that perpetuate in possibility. The key for *kairos* in duration would be to seize, or capture, the possibilities in nonchronological time, not just chronological time.

Kairos in motion defies simplicity because it must be multivariate and unobstructed: both broad in possibility and expansive in opportunity. However, for rhetors, movement allows for many evolutions and juxtapositions in subjective time that may connect emotionally with the becoming selves in the audience: "It is cinema which, in an endeavor to sketch the present, prevents the past from being debased into recollection" (124). But each past may also recall "imagination, planning, judgment" imbued with feeling: "It is feeling which stretches out on a sheet and is modified according to its fragmentation" (124). Composing time-affect images in motion makes use of multiple contexts that are "at once a past and always to come" and imbued with memory and emotion.

In pure duration, the opposite is the case—feeling is abandoned for objective reality divorced from consciousness. To dwell or become concentrated in the moment, rhetors employing *kairos* may find opportunities within these contexts that blur fantasy and reality in such a way as to unhinge specific memories among instances in time. Rather than surveying the multitudes of contexts in order to be ready to improvise though juxtaposition and obviate the one intended to direct the audience's attention, *kairos* in pure duration becomes a disconnected actuality in which any objective priority may take importance within chronological time. As Rodowick explains,

Once chronology is pulverized, time is fragmented like so many facets of a shattered crystal. The chronological continuum is flayed, shaving past, present, and future into distinct series, discontinuous and incommensurable. […] The spectator's apprehension of what comes next is equivalent to a dice throw. Time no longer derives

from movement; "aberrant" or eccentric movement derives from time. (*Time Machine*, 5)

The result is an extreme disconnection through the construction of increasingly focused contexts that are unmoored from a self affecting a self. "Inside and outside, mind and body, mental and physical, imaginary and real are no longer decidable qualities" (5). Time—as sought by opportunity within contexts unmoored in linearity and "incommensurable" with the past, present, or future—amplifies motion itself.

The Happy City Example

In *The Happy City* (1959), produced by William Deneen, *kairos* in duration through opportunities for multiple timelines and through a disconnected actuality in time. At the beginning, people who have leprosy move through rough countyside. This motion highlights their plight. Happy City Video Clip 1

We see a migrating line of refugees in Burma making their way to the Kengung Leprosy Colony. On the journey, the exiled live on whatever sustenance they can carry or harvest en route. The music starts out with harp glissandos and a theremin-like set of isolated pitches. The context is a humanitarian one: the effort to make known a remote place that harbors people with a disfiguring (and misunderstood) disease. The kinematic text highlights the injustice of the context: scarcity, resolve, injustice, pain. The voice-over suggests that the journey is long but the people are hopeful. While watching footage of people moving through the brush, people setting up tents from branches, children laboring along with adults, and, occasionally, a shot of a hand with missing fingers or missing toes, the voice-over sums up the grim scene this way: "They bring little with them; they have little to bring but their pain, and hope that at the end of the road there will be help" (00:01:16–01:21). Clearly, all three of the rhetorical appeals in duration are employed here.

Soon, though, the context changes. We see the colony that has been built for those who suffer with leprosy and an excited welcome celebration for the filmmaker complete with drums, dancing children, people obviously in generally good health, and generosity. The effort, rhetorically, is to juxtapose the context before this colony with the context after, highlighting *kairos* in duration. Doing so implies that this colony is an opportunity, not only because it does good things for people in need but also because the audience watching may want to contribute to its success in some way, financially or otherwise, in order to avoid the first context in favor of the second.

As the documentary continues, we see that in their isolation the colonists are constantly in danger of marauders and "terrorists" who invade the camp

for its (largely donated) resources. The appeals serve the obvious purpose of persuading people to contribute revenue for the mission and, likely, for those who serve this community. As a kinematic text, the changing contexts are an application of *kairos* in duration. The former, the kind of *kairos* that manipulates multiple timelines to construct a feeling of vulnerability for the colony, both in its success and its security; the latter, a kind of kairos that dwells in a disconnected actuality to construct a sense that, despite the colony's success, it could help more people in a better way with more resources. Happy City Video Clip 2

The voice-over implies this second kairotic context by stating, "Beyond the table itself and instruments, there is yet no other equipment in the hospital, not even beds, but the building at least is here and perhaps the rest will come" (00:00:02-14). The visual, time-affect images here show the surgeon in action, operating in a room with a nurse and a patient. The action is a disconnected actuality because the voice-over is talking about what is not in the room, what is not available to the surgeon. The *kairos* in duration provides an opportunity for rhetoric along the lines of "if you help us, we can better help them."

The more this kinematic text continues to provide an emotional context for the other appeals in play, the colony's continued victimhood becomes a singular, differentiated context no longer focused on the surrounding events that established the colony, but on the multitude of contexts within the colony itself: the concentration of a kairotic moment showing the urgency and frailty of the colony, despite its previous success and improvements. If the purpose is to make sure charitable assistance continues, it is *kairos* within duration that works to highlight the overall status of the colonists as victims.

As soon as a rhetor defines a context for *kairos*, it is complicated by the surge of alternate, unavoidable, and continuous pre-present, present, and post-present variations. Because duration begets motion, *kairos* in motion complicates opportunity. As White notes, "the will-to-invent, to make sense of one's experience, depends on a deliberate refusal to acknowledge the irreducible nature of the present," and that delusion continues with any attempt to halt or make static the dynamic nature of time (77). Rather, *kairos* becomes a suite of variations on a theme that manages opportunity as a becoming multiplicity: it amplifies opportunities for rhetoric—a "stance for experience"—while remaining irreducible (160).

The Values of Multimedia in Kinematic Rhetoric

Time-affect, non-discursive images are a subset of all non-discursive images and therefore share many of the same characteristics. In *Non-discursive Rhetoric*, I explain the five values of non-discursive rhetoric and identify them as image,

unity, layering, juxtaposition, and perspective (173–82). With the addition of motion within duration, these values each contribute a prioritization of composing practices for rhetors (both individually and in various combinations). It is also the case here, as it was in *Non-discursive Rhetoric*, that these values are not meant to be exhaustive, or a taxonomy of any sort. They provide a way for rhetors to engage kinematic texts in motion using a few meaning-making values reliant on qualities of movement, time, and affect.

As such, the following adapts and expands on the original values of multimedia and considers them in light of dynamic, non-discursive texts rather than static, non-discursive texts.

Image Value in Motion

Considered the unit of meaning for non-discursive symbolization, image remains at the core of non-discursive meaning-making in general and kinematic text in particular. Specifically, the time-affect image, with all of its multiplicities of becoming, provides the rhetor with the most essential building block for constructing kinematic rhetorics. Through duration (and through the power of dynamic information to make meaning in the brain), the movement-image becomes actualized and affective: emotions are always already steeped in whatever time-affect image the mind receives and formulates with or without its senses. The value of time-affect images is so central to this theory of kinematic rhetoric that it is worth summarizing their characteristics, as explained in previous chapters:

- Time-affect images are actualized by motion, and they combine components of both time and emotion. They generate and amplify affectivity through duration.
- Time-affect images are non-discursive images, free of sequentiality for meaning and affect (though also powerful in ordered sequences); they are direct images of time; they link movement and time through affect.
- Time-affect images evoke an immanent, rather than a transcendent, symbolization of duration; they lead to immanence through immersion (and immediacy).
- Time-affect images utilize differentiation and integration as a process of becoming in duration; the very process of differentiation and integration is the key to the way the brain wires and rewires itself, to evolving selves, and is vital in the brain's processing of perceptual images.
- Time-affect images are rhizomatic; movement as rhizomatic, from the middle, has no beginning, no ending, but always *between*: a connective to relationships, a conjunction of between-ness.

- Time-affect images are both individuated and synthesized; because they are rhizomatic, they are always becoming: simultaneously the particle and the wave, the thread and the fabric.
- Time-affect images are synchronous and asynchronous; because they are rhizomatic, they are both in time and out of time; in reality and out of reality; virtualizing time-affect images actualize from the past a present that is leading toward the future.
- Time-affect images, as employed by rhetors through appeals in motion, are themselves always already affective; they inevitably carry emotion within duration, so they bring emotion to *logos*, *ethos*, and *kairos*.

The most important unit of meaning-making in kinematic rhetoric, then, is the time-affect image. Together, they constitute the layers of time and affect through duration and movement in order for rhetors to compose kinematic texts.

Consider "Corset" and its aural, time-affect images: Corset Audio Clip The cello that begins the piece is layered with a background, electronic beat evocative of clapping and is heavily syncopated with a hip-hop thumping style. After the introduction, the bagpipes come in followed by a running electric base line, a repeat of the bagpipes, and then a trumpet choir (00:00:08-30). These time-affect images are in duration and carry emotions—for me, they include being startled, even a bit discombobulated, as the initial chords are disrupted by the electronic, syncopated rhythm; the bagpipes disrupt the electric bass line, and the trumpets punctuate and disrupt the entire phrase. The meaning-making here is instant by instant as the text moves in duration; it is non-discursive and ambiguous. The text is grounded and I feel it in my body as it proceeds from section to section. As certain instruments and phrases change, they also repeat, providing differentiation and integration. The rhizomatic middle keeps associations and connotations continually breaking off and reforming, defying translation, and though there is a whole—all of "Corset" together—there are also particular, individual moments that stand out (i.e., bagpipes). This piece exists in virtual space that unfolds synchronously while asynchronous emotions and connoted images connect and disconnect through time. In short, all of the characteristics of time-affect images are evident in this example of kinematic text.

One quality of all images that time-affect images share is the ability to symbolize what is often considered ineffable, or too ambiguous, for discursive, static texts. As part of the increasing repertoire of symbolization tools, time-affect images carry a special ability to symbolize time and affect through motion. As the following values make clear, composing with time-affect images creates complexities among the variations of images in motion.

Unity Value in Motion

Though moving images have a somewhat innate ability to garner attention, the effective kinematic rhetor values unity by focusing the audience's attention through building immanence and employing multiple time-affect images. In doing so, no matter how deterritorialized and captivating the text, the rhetor may achieve the purpose within that rhetorical situation. Unity allows motion to disambiguate as well as integrate: it connects, relates, and builds a world. Truly immanent unity provides simultaneity and efficiency because the text, though perhaps dreamlike, is also experiential.

Unity as a value of kinematic text functions through synthesis. Sergei Eisenstein, in *The Film Sense* (1947), characterizes unity as the synthesis that reveals the "meaning" of kinematic texts:

> This brings us to the basic and primary matter that forms *the definitive inner synchronization—that between the image and the meaning of the piece.* The circuit is complete. From the same formula that unites the *meaning* of the whole piece (whether whole film or sequence) and the *meticulous, cunning selection* of the pieces, *emerges the image* of the theme, *true to its content.* Through a fusion, and through that fusion of the logic of the film's subject with the *highest form* in which to cast this subject, comes the full *revelation* of the film's meaning. (86)

Eisenstein values a fusion, a synthesis, which creates a whole from a "*cunning selection* of the pieces"—in other words, the value of unity. Synthesis is important to unity, although not necessarily of the whole but also of the parts, and not necessarily for a single or "true" meaning. Unity allows for diverse, pluralistic, even contrasting time-affect images, but unifying time-affect images work to create a whole, however fleeting or lasting.

Unity in motion reveals patterns among time-affect images: patterns that appeal to the audience in various ways; patterns that allow for recognition and repetition. Without any amount of unity, it might be said that the kinematic text lacks composition, so to compose effective texts that move may mean to compose sequences, or durations, with varying levels of synthesis, depending on audience expectations. Because these texts move within duration, unifying time-affect images may aid synthesis; the lack of unification in motion reduces it. The will-to-synthesize, in other words, is the desire to assemble and compose time, but it might result in interwoven *unities* with various levels and states of *unifying* time-images. In fact, the very act of objectifying a single unity, according to Bergson, frames and halts continuity: it no longer is in pure duration (52). Unity itself—static, objectifying—may actually make duration less

experiential if quantified by spatial relations that reduce the complexity of the kinematic text. Spatial unity must be replaced by temporal unities.

That said, as in other non-discursive symbolizations, unity enables coherence, provides connections across intervals, and allows for the time-image to function as an indivisible multiplicity. In "Corset" above, one unifying element among all the time-affect images that comes in and out of the composition is the cello and electronic rhythm—it often dips quite low and breaks away for a second, but it does exist throughout (all but the last few seconds).

Layering Value in Motion

The value of layers in kinematic texts is perhaps the most multimodal of all the values and, perhaps, one of the most common. Layers are routinely utilized in dynamic texts using various forms of time-affect images including, to name a few, sound and music consisting of anything from oral discourse, to amplified sound effects, full musical scores with many musical voices, scrolling or static alphabetic text displayed in duration, computer-designed special effects, and so on. These layers are sometimes static and dynamic, synchronous and asynchronous, coherent, integrated and distributed. The composing process itself likely utilizes software with interfaces that include multiple timelines with layers of motion and overlapping elements and transitions, all the while allowing the rhetor to produces dynamic, kinematic texts. Layers are valued in non-discursive rhetoric because, like image, they do not rely on sequentiality to make meaning, though together they provide crucial rhetorical tools. Simultaneity, as a characteristic of becoming, is of prime importance to layers in motion.

Eisenstein discusses the elements, or structure (through the metaphor of an orchestral score), of composition as having both vertical and horizontal dimensions: "[e]ach part is developed horizontally" but "the vertical structure plays no less important a role, interrelating as it does all the elements […] with each given unit of time […] through a *simultaneous advance* of a multiple series of lines, each maintaining an independent […] and […] total compositional course of the sequence (74–75). In effect, Eisenstein's structure of time-based composing (whether for music or film) explicates the power of layers, "of a multiple series of lines," that are simultaneously individuated and combined. The affordances of manipulating not only the layer but also the combination and the *number* of layers are powerful rhetorical tools.

It is worth noting, however, that unlike the static image, layering with time-affect images (that are, by definition, in duration) is also a key component to composing time itself. Ultimately, the rhetorical appeals become modified as layers of duration are modified. Composing effective rhetorical texts in

motion—that is, producing kinematic rhetoric—relies on the composition of the layers themselves *as well as* the composition of the duration among the various layers as a whole. Relations in this network are numerous, varied, and complex.

The seed/crystal metaphor in Deleuze and Guattari highlights the rhizomatic function of moving from "state to state" or from "layer to layer," in rhizomatic becoming (60). It is multiphasic and plastic, and the motion itself manifests time-affect images in layers that were formed, are formed, and are "in the process of forming." Such conceptual layers constitute the substance of ontogenesis itself, a key aspect of kinematic time.[6] Kinematic texts, composed in layers with time-affect images, allow rhetors to construct immanent experiences. The layers in "Corset," as in many of the previous audio compositions, are introduced and then combined so that, in one part of the composition, most layers are operating at the same time (see 00:00:33–40).

Juxtaposition Value in Motion

The opening up of the possible through motion is, ultimately, one of the most effective goals of kinematic rhetoric. Juxtaposition, as is the case for all non-discursive symbolization, creates a space for connection between difference and repetition—between differences among time-affect images—thereby creating powerful rhetorical effects. Not unlike metaphor, time-affect images in juxtaposition allow for emotion-laden images in duration that, for example, linger against fleeting and felicitous symbolization, as well as remain against lugubrious and accelerated symbolization. Time itself is available for manipulation, and it too has the quality of being juxtaposed with itself, or variations, or various relativities.

Much has been theorized about the unique power of montage in cinema. One of the earliest advocates of montage is Sergei Eisenstein, and he defines montage as a property that combines at least "two film pieces of any kind, placed together" resulting "inevitably" in "a new concept, a new quality, arising out of that juxtaposition" (4). The act of producing a montage is an act of ideation and creation: "the juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot—as it does a *creation*," as opposed to "a sum of its parts" because for "every such juxtaposition *the result is qualitatively* distinguishable from each component element viewed separately" (7–8). For Eisenstein, kinematic texts are indeed created with an apparatus (the camera), but they are also created through the editing process, as well as through the composition of time and motion within the shot into various montaged sequences. The act of editing, therefore, is an act of creating meaning: "no matter how unrelated [the shots]

might be, and frequently despite themselves, they engendered a 'third some-thing' and became correlated when juxtaposed according to the will of the editor" (9). The "third something" is an acknowledgment of the power of juxtaposition to create connections for the audience that would not otherwise be likely.

Accordingly, montage—or juxtaposition in motion—is more like revi-sion than editing: the decisions and consequences of changing a sequence by adding or taking away sequences change the *meaning* of the sequence much like adding, moving, or removing chunks of discursive text does. As is true with static non-discursive text (i.e., photography), editing/revising text changes its meaning, and juxtaposing text creates that "third something" Eisenstein refers to above: "it is precisely the *montage* principle, as distinguished from that of *representation*, which obliges spectators themselves to *create* and the montage principle […] achieves that great power of inner creative excitement in the *spectator* which distinguishes an emotionally exciting work from one that stops without going further than giving information or recording events" (35). The meaning—the "inner creative excitement"—for the audience depends, at least in part, on the way the juxtaposition connects to emotion in order to be effective. For Eisenstein, the whole purpose of juxtaposition is to evoke emotions: both "the *shaping and intensification* of emotion" and the "dynamic-ally emerging emotion" constructed through movement (43–44). Though he comments that montage is not the only means for composition, his attention to it underscores how it and juxtaposition are powerful tools in producing kinematic texts.

However, Arnheim's caution that it is possible to overemphasize the importance of montage in kinematic text is also warranted here. In the *Art of Film* (1933), Arnheim's concern is that juxtaposition can be "excessive": "It was the Russians who first realized the artistic potentialities of montage; and it was they who first made an attempt to define its principles systematically" and "they are inclined to consider montage as the only important artistic film feature" (87). Excessive fragmentation, for Arnheim, seems to be at the root of his critique of film in general, but especially of "talkies" that combine image and dialogue together. Writing in 1938, he condemns sound-enabled cinema as incomplete because "a true fusion of word and image is impos-sible if the image on the screen were ever shut off so that the dialogue could try to 'take over'" (210). Arnheim suggests that the "fundamental defect" of kinematic texts is their "fragmentary nature" (210). The rhetorical value of parallelism notwithstanding, juxtaposition and fragmentation may be exactly what the rhetor intends, and, for more modern audiences at least, the very frustration at this fragmentation may be the purpose behind the time-affect images selected.

Advances in sound technology, as well as advances in software used to compose with sound and music, certainly mitigate this concern about fragmentation of image and sound to a great extent, but montage and juxtaposition apply to all of kinematic text, including images of sight, sound, and other modes. Because these are time-affect images in motion, the value of juxtaposition applies as much to time-affect images as emotion as well. As a compositional tool for rhetors, the value of juxtaposition in kinematic text builds argument through image, just as it does in static, non-discursive symbolization.

Perspective Value in Motion

Perspective in motion allows for a kaleidoscopic potential in image-making. The transition from one perspective to another, or from one instance of a singular perspective to another instance, can purposely be jarring or smooth, opaque or transparent, continuous or temporary. In kinematic rhetoric, changes of perspective brought on by a time-affect image in motion may have an intensity reminiscent of Lanham's AT/THROUGH oscillation or Brooke's AT/THROUGH/FROM oscillation. As mentioned in the last chapter, Brooke recategorizes the classical canon of style into one of perspective: "in the creation of perspective, [there is] an emergent quality of a specific interaction among user, interface, and object(s), drawing on each without being reducible to any of those factors" (140). By thinking about the interface as an oscillation that includes perspective, the dimensional nature of dynamic text becomes contextual, integrated. Varying perspectives allow for varying viewpoints, and that is indeed a rhetorical affordance valuable to rhetors. By offering shifting temporal perspectives—movement relationships in time—the rhetor also creates immanence: a bodily connection to virtual time.

Both Deleuze and Epstein offer the notion of perspective in motion as a training tool for the audience to *learn* how to read the motions of time that can be as challenging cognitively as motion may be physically.[7] As mentioned already, Deleuze emphasizes the subjective sensation of motion that perspective can create (as part of the *perception-image* he theorizes). Jean Epstein emphasizes the way kinematic texts help the audience learn to adjust to a "temporal perspective" that readies the mind "for a gymnastics that isn't always easy: switching from an inveterate absolute to unstable conditionals" (18). Changes in perspective, whether in time or in point of view or space, must be calibrated with the intent of the rhetor and knowledge of audience expectations for the desired rhetorical purpose or aim.

Perspective in motion, therefore, creates possibilities for multiple and varying points of view, all for rhetorical purposes. By shifting to a perspective that moves, time itself becomes part of the perspective since duration provides

movement its context. Perspective in music is evident in everything from the directionality of sound itself, in the perspective(s) taken by the director or performer, and in what Evens calls the way the will informs the entire composition: "[t]he will affirms the whole of the music along with a perspective" and consequently "two musicians playing together can both be immersed, can both become equal to the music without necessarily equal to each other, without losing the distinction between them" (138). In *Interview with an Executioner*, the entire perspective of the issue is shifted from the outset from the more common telling (the story of the victim) to a less common one (the story of the executioner); this was a rhetorical decision that implies an argument that from either point of view, capital punishment is rife with error and uncertainty.

These values of multimedia for non-discursive, time-affect images provide specific compositional tools rhetors can employ to create kinematic texts.

Sensed Reality in Kinematic Rhetoric

Ultimately, theorizing a higher resolution of *pathos* as an appeal for kinematic texts is inadequate because it does not address what happens to the whole of our sensed operations and affectivity in reality, digital or physical (which is, increasingly, a distinction without a difference). Kinematic texts are composed within and among frameworks of time, and as Deleuze points out in *Cinema 2*, the time-image provides a virtuality as well as a reality to kinematic texts: "direct time-image […] goes beyond the purely empirical succession of time—past-present-future" because it is "a coexistence of distinct durations, or of levels of duration" and it is "virtual" (xii; 41). It is this quality of being able to produce time-affect images that are both within real time (with its own set of durations and movement-images) as well as outside of real time (with its movement among virtual timelines) that manifest a hyperreality of time and space—a change in our sensed reality. Like oral or written texts that access the past or the future to appeal to audiences, kinematic texts create virtual time-affect images in duration. On the other hand, unlike oral or written texts, kinematic texts have the added ability to step into and out of time-affect images that become absorbed or reflected by the viewer. The rhetor has the ability, therefore, of creating an experience of becoming, of creating a virtual world through time-affect images that are imbued with emotions.

As the production, editing, distribution, and consumption tools advance, so does the general sense of how kinematic texts operate from a rhetorical point of view. As Lanham notes,

Perhaps the most powerful of all, the editing of moving images, of home videos, has become a consumer-level phenomenon. When you

use a simple film-editing program like Apple's iMovie you become self-conscious about how moving images work in a way that no other means of engagement can equal. You can snip and clip and reassemble with a few mouse clicks, and the more you become a video editor, the more conscious you become of the medium you work in. You have become used to looking at rather than through. That is what editing of any sort is all about, but it seems especially dramatic when you can edit movies that until recently you could only look at. (143)

The "self-consciousness" Lanham describes here is nothing less than a new literacy: a way to make meaning given the tools of language—in this case, mostly non-discursive language. The tools, such as film-editing software, often mimic the discursive through its interface, but that is more about learning the new software (by borrowing from more known interfaces, such as the codex and/or word processor) than it is necessitated by the kinematic text itself. Lanham's point about how kinematic texts "work in a way that no other means of engagement can equal" because as they are created, the worldliness of the process of creating them is undeniable. As with music and sound editing, working with visual or aural time-affect images constitutes nothing short of composing a sensed reality.

It is the case, however, that kinematic texts composed by everyday rhetors have been slow to innovate. Mitchell Stevens, in *The Rise of the Image, the Fall of the Word*, suggests how simply pointing a camera at the reality in front of our senses is not taking advantage of all that kinematic texts can provide: "once we move beyond simply aiming cameras at stage plays, conversations or sporting events and perfect original uses of moving images, video can help us gain new slants on the world, new ways of seeing" because it can "capture more of the tumult and confusions of contemporary life than tend to fit in lines of type" (18). Becoming rhetorically literate in composing kinematic texts provides an opportunity for an improvement in all that language can offer in complex contexts. "Through its ability to step back from scenes and jump easily between scenes, video can also facilitate new, or at least previously underused, ways of thinking. […] I believe video too will prove 'a recipe' for new kinds of 'wisdom'" (18–19). Like Deleuze and Flusser, Stevens can see how the meaning-making potential of kinematic texts may lead to more knowledge, more wisdom. Tracey Bowen and Carl Whithause, in *Multmodal Literacies and Emerging Genres*, stress this point even further by stating that "what it means to be literate in the world today is changing" as is the "shapes and forms of academic knowledge" (4). Whether or not it will result in wisdom, it must be the case that literacy in new symbolic practices such as composing (creating and revising) with kinematic texts opens possibilities for expression, argument,

narration, and description not yet fully realized. But to engage all of what affords the time-affect image, we may well be on the cusp of complicating the very notion of sensed reality.

What Is Sensed Reality?

Though it may not be productive to question the nature of reality in the scope of this work, negotiating what reality means in the context of kinematic texts becomes too relevant to ignore since, as discussed already, the dissolution of the technical interface (as well as the immersion into immanence) demands some consideration of the real. After all, the body and the mind experience kinematic texts similar to the way they experience the world. In Bernard Stiegler's book *Techniques and Time, 3: Kinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*, the reality provided by our senses and what he calls "technoscience" is one of continuous change: "technoscience explores possibles of which the real is but a transitory concretization, a momentary stasis within a process, and one that can never stop the process of becoming in order to be transformed" because "in the classical age, stability was the rule and change the exception; today, in an age of permanent innovation, it is stability that has become exception and change the rule" (202). Arguably, it is not stability or the fact of change that is different between these two "ages" as much as it is the rate of change: the classical age, within its own reality, experienced vast amounts of change, of course. But recent advances in common, daily experiences with technology—and the symbolization that technology enables—are accelerating without a doubt.[8] What Stiegler wants to ultimately point to, however, is how such a change in the centrality of technical advancement leads to a shift in perceived reality:

> But when science is no longer classical its pretensions to be an ideal of pure constativity are diminished: as technoscience, it *becomes* performative: the possible no longer exists for its being a modality of the real. More precisely, it is the real that becomes a provisional (i.e., current) perspective on the possible. The possible breaks with the real. Science then explores all possibles, abandoning the ideality of being. […] Submission of the possible to the real signifies permanent metaphysical thinking, installation and perpetuation of the opposition of being and becoming. (204)

The real, in Stiegler's formulation—as it is subsumed by the possible—is less than ideal since it leads to the "subjugation of the possible to the authority of the supreme real" (204). Stiegler's economic critique notwithstanding, the

elevation of the possible over the real is precisely the strength and value of the imagination and, consequently, the essential determining factor for future realities. Interestingly, Stiegler also cautions "scientists" to "think twice" and acknowledge the new, "contemporary anguish" of modern reality: "My assertion is simply that the occlusion of the *novelty* of the current state of things absolutely must cease, however difficult, delicate, austere, and lengthy the required explication might be," adding "[d]ifficult, delicate, austere, and long to be sure, such a project is also *exciting*—at least as much as science and technoscience themselves" (207). Reality, for Stiegler, must acknowledge the discontent, or malaise, of contemporary society as it confronts the constant technological changes of everyday life. The desire for reality, especially in documentary genres, need not negate a desire for the possible: "Documentary, in recording historical reality, incites a desire for the real both as knowable, and hence mastered by our knowledge of it, and as prior to and evading our mastering of it as the radically contingent" (Cowie 3). Desiring the real, even reporting it, confounds malaise through the possibility of mastery in the face of the elusive.

This state of reality in relation to technology is troublesome for many theorists. In fact, in his *Technics and Time* books, Stiegler often acknowledges his debt to Gilbert Simondon's work, especially *Psychic and Collective Individuation*. Simondon addresses the problem of detachment and alienation between human culture and technical culture, and his view is much more positive than is Stiegler's, as Muriel Combes notes,

> Ultimately, then, Simondon discerns the "true way to reduce alienation" […] in "transindividual collective" as an amplifying mode of relation between humans, which is the flipside of nonservile relation to nature. As his commentators have often noted, reducing alienation means showing that technical objects are not the Other of the human, but themselves contain something of the human. […] But it is critical to understand that what technical invention carries is *not what is specifically human in the human*; it is "this charge of nature that is conserved with individual being, and which contains potentials and virtuality" […] this is the very charge from which transindividual is constituted. (77)

Reality becomes a battle between technical objects and human culture and may be at the core of some of the escapist critiques made about, and sometimes embraced by, kinematic audiences in general. The differences between escaping reality and being immersed into alternate worlds of immanent multiplicities is significant, however, though there is something to be said for a suspicious—or reflective— attitude about the relationship between the two.

This generally reflective attitude about technical objects may account for Simondon's emerging importance to rhetorical theory. In "Technical Mentality," Simondon directly addresses the notion that human reality is under assault by technical objects:

> [T]here exists a technical mentality, and that this mentality is developing, and is therefore incomplete and at risk of being prematurely considered as monstrous and unbalanced. It requires a preliminary attitude of generosity toward the order of reality that it seeks to manifest. […] We will try to show that the technical mentality is coherent, positive, productive in the domain of the cognitive schemas, but incomplete and in conflict with itself in the domain of the affective categories because it has not yet properly emerged. (1)

Simondon acknowledges the importance of "affective categories" in relation to technology, as well as the role of the will. Both Stiegler and Simondon call for more consideration of this novel reality: that theorists carefully contemplate whether our being is a "mode of the real" (as Stiegler cautions), and that theorists not prejudge technical objects as "monstrous and unbalanced" (as Simondon cautions).

The benefit of Simondon's technical mentality is that, like Deleuze, he constructs a reality that is open to possibility and not a closed system in which novelty gets closed down. For Simondon, the correct attitude toward technology leads to this kind of enhanced possibility: "If one seeks the sign of the perfection of the technical mentality, one can unite […] the manifestation of cognitive schemas, affective modalities and norms of action: that of the *opening*," and from this opening a "[t]echnical reality lends itself remarkably well to being continued, completed, perfected, extended" (13). This "technical reality" is one of possibility, revision, and reform. Reality is malleable through mentality. Reality is, therefore, composed and, therefore, a potential for rhetorical production and analysis.

Any sensed reality in the age of kinematic texts, then, may in part be bound in this struggle between technical objects (the apparatus, software, and hardware) and the way human culture influences and experiences them. Rhetoricians who use kinematic texts to convey meaning are also conveying some combination of this debate, if not indirectly, through the way reality and its time-affect images are constructed. Walter Beale, in *A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric*, summarizes two axes and four categories of "philosophical and dialectical antinomies involved in the human understanding of reality" (66). The actual map (or graph), he develops and explicates is less germane here than his summary about the way theorists commonly discuss reality: "[i]n sum, along

one axis we 'arrest' experience either as static (product, system, or substance) or as dynamic (process or action); along the other, we arrest experience either as a thing-in-itself, different from other things and isolated from the observer, or as a thing-as-experienced, in interaction with the observer, and absorbed into other experience" (67). A view of reality as "dynamic" and as an act of becoming is consistent with the way Bergson and Deleuze theorize immanence and time, a "thing-as-experienced." Beale's "motivational axes" set a stage in which discourses about reality can be plotted and identified. Nothing seems as obvious as reality, though it is clear that realism may be discussed in radically different ways.[9]

Rhetorical production, and its emphasis on rhetorical situations (its various cultures, contexts, purposes, topics, audiences), has ample opportunity to expand its domain to the construction of rhetorical realities.[10] Kinematic rhetorics offer the ability to manipulate perceived reality toward rhetorical ends—as indeed has been the case since the inception of kinematic textual production. Like other forms of non-discursive symbolization, producing kinematic text requires much the same kind of analysis of the contexts and situations as is the case for discursive texts, but with the potential for composing realities not otherwise possible or predicted.

Reality in Real Time

Both Bergson and Deleuze favor a conception of time that is outside of real time, but they both discuss real time, or chronological time, as experienced as a consequence of action and movement. Bergson acknowledges the perception of time as chronological, or moments in succession, but also points to such a perception as limiting at best:

> It is certainly possible to perceive in time, and in time only, a succession which is nothing but a succession, but not an addition, i.e. a succession which culminates in a sum. […] No doubt it is possible, as we shall see later, to conceive the successive moments of time independently of space; but when we add to the present moment those which have preceded it […] we are not dealing with those moments themselves, since they have vanished for ever, but with the lasting traces which they seem to dispense with this mental image. (50)

The succession of moments, for Bergson, is the succession of the images of moments, making chronological time a virtual phenomenon made up of "lasting traces." The realness of time passing through reality is evidenced by the perception of these successive images.[11] Perceptions of actual sensations

within time work to reinforce the illusion of real time: "[w]hen, with our eyes shut, we run our hands along a surface, the rubbing of our fingers against the surface, and especially the varied play of our joints, provide a series of sensations, which differ only by their *qualities* and which exhibit a certain order in time" and this "experience teaches us that this series can be reversed, that we can, by an effort of a different kind […] in reverse order: relations of position in space might then be defined as reversible relations of succession in time" (59). Similar to what Llinás asserts about the basic calculations of movement in time segments, Bergson's reinforcement of successive time through successive perceptions builds a kind of reality in absolute, linear time. But he is also clear that this is a version of time that is wholly reliant on perception and, to some extent, memory (as opposed to pure duration).

Chronological time is not a direct representation of time. Deleuze, in *Cinema 2*, discusses chronological time only as an "indirect representation" of such action: "[w]e can say in general that time is the object of an indirect representation in so far as it is a consequence of action, is dependent on movement and is inferred from space" and "no matter how disordered it is, it remains in principle a chronological time" (128). Deleuze associates chronological time with the "organic" or "normal" in cinema (as opposed to "crystalline," as discussed already): meaning it maintains its connections to the "sensory-motor schemata" so that "characters react to situations or act in such a way as to disclose the situation" (127). As such, time remains chronological because the actions and movements enact an unfolding situation. This is reality in time through motion, and, for Deleuze, it is most representative of classical cinema. In short, reality in real time is, as Rodowick observes, a kind of continuity: "the passage from one shot to the next is motivated by a spatial contiguity that follows a line of action as well as a linear chain of causes and effects" (110). The continuity of real time is motivated by spatial relations in motion.

However, with the possibility of multiple realities, kinematic texts only gain combinatory possibilities. Rodowick asserts that digital kinematic text increasingly calls into question the importance of reality in textual production:

> The electronic image has not come into being *ex nihilo* from the invention of digital information processing, but through a series of displacements in the relationship between the formative and constitutive elements of moving-image media: how an image is formed, preserved, placed into movement, expresses time, and is presented on detached displays. […] The digital image is more and more responsive to our imaginative intentions, and less and less anchored to the prior existence of things and people. […] Cinema will increasingly become the art of synthesizing

imaginary worlds, numerical worlds in which the sight of physical reality becomes increasingly scarce. (*Virtual*, 86–87)

Questions between what is real and what is not—what is fiction and what is truth—are largely beside the point. Reality from a textual production standpoint is anchored only to the relationships between the text and the observer: between what is perceived and what is affectively evoked. Image generation has always served our "imaginative intensions," but to the extent that textual production becomes more immersive, more immediate, and more immanent is to the extent that the question of "what is real" becomes an echo. Reality in real time may become our textual reality in kinematic time.

These notions that real time is successive time, bound by the material results of movement and action, are familiar but too simplistic. Time is manipulated in kinematic text and in nature—Einstein's theory of relativity suggests as much—and anyone who has experienced changes in perceptions of chronological time can intuitively confirm: abundant activity creating a perception of "time going fast," as opposed to little activity creating a perception that "time went slowly" as one example. Time, or flux, is not like a clicking metronome of digits and numbers; it is more like an imaginative crystal, becoming from the middle.

Reality out of Real Time

Kinematic texts create realities outside of chronological time, even if the created reality is simply a recording of a parking lot at night: time and its affordances become a compositional tool. Bergson and Deleuze both theorize about this other form of time—composed time, rather than "real" time—as a way to make room for new realities. Bergson contrasts chronological time, or successive time, with his concept of duration. Pure duration, the opposite of any notion of successive time, is a construct of consciousness:

> Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would not longer *endure*. Nor need it forget its former states [...] but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole. (60)

Time as *duration*, then, is an amalgam of the past with the present, and it is "pure" when it lacks ego (or the individual's subjective separation of past from present and future—i.e., memory). Duration implies space, for Bergson, since

"from the moment when you attribute the least homogeneity to duration, you surreptitiously introduce space" (61). Thus, reality out of chronological time is constructed through duration.

Deleuze takes these ideas from Bergson and uses them to evoke the possibility of building realities. Time is no longer "normal" or "organic," linked to successive, unbroken sensory-motor moments; time is crystalline: "what we will call crystalline description stands for its object, replaces it, both creates and erases it [...] and constantly gives way to other descriptions which contradict, displace, or modify the preceding ones" because it is "the description itself which constitutes the sole decomposed and multiplied object" (*Cinema 2*, 126). Crystalline time is separated from physicality and can lead to direct images of time: "Having lost its sensory-motor connections, concrete space ceases to be organized according to tensions and resolutions of tension, according to goals, obstacles, means, or even detours" (128–29). Time becomes and expresses movement directly, rather than the opposite with movement indirectly implying time. As Rodowick observes of Deleuze, "the logic of space gives way to one of time and aberrant movement"; rather, "time is given for itself in displacements of space organized by irrational intervals and false continuities" (110). For Deleuze, time is a direct image in this case because it is no longer linked to "sensory-motor connections" that imply them. This is a reality outside of real time, or chronological time.

Kinematic texts, composed with time-affect images, express emotion and movement in duration. They are therefore able to create realities, whole worlds, gathering whatever attention is available to discern them.[12] Reality out of chronological time is a rhetorical reality: a construct of composing effective spaces using time itself as its non-discursive stylus.

Time-Based Composing

One goal of addressing how to be persuasive with movement in symbolization is to articulate a composing model for kinematic texts. This section expands on the non-discursive composing model first introduced in *Non-discursive Rhetoric* by adding the dimension of movement. In a sense, the model itself is also in motion and, therefore, is representative of how motion fits into the larger scheme.

Composing Model for Kinematic Texts

In *Non-Discursive Rhetoric*, I set out to build a composing model centered on image as the primary unit of language. The resulting model "not only acknowledges the role of image, emotions, will, and consciousness" in composing,

"but it centers on them" (151). The model itself is in motion because it "relies on a dynamic conception of composing," and because it contains a "bridge" between the discursive and the non-discursive forms of language. This bridge, through the energy in the dynamics of the model, relies on the alternation or oscillation between discursive and non-discursive composing based on the inventional needs of the rhetor within the compositional milieu:

> For too long, genre issues have been conflated with compositional issues, so much that separating the two may seem at times impossible. This model sidesteps that issue by simply allowing a composing model that does not privilege the "rational" or the "logical" as the way to create worlds through language. Instead, it opens up possibility unencumbered by dichotomies that have proved divisive and unhelpful in past notions of writing, and, especially, consciousness. Reason and logic still have their place, but this model does not *require* discursive text, much less a particular disciplinary genre. (153)

In fact, the composing model proposed in *Non-discursive Rhetoric* remains relevant to symbols in motion, in part because the model uses motion to help integrate and differentiate consciousness, will, emotion, and image.

Instead of requiring a new model, therefore, all that is needed is the addition of time, in the form of time-affect images, as a progenitor of movement within the will-to-integrate. Duration and its rhizoid quality of becoming from

the middle adds motion to the non-discursive side of the bridge, building in the plane of immanence and immersion. The composing model, itself in motion, creates non-discursive motion within the will-to-integrate: "The reentry systems, or parallel pathways, which connect every portion of our cortex to itself provides a system of self-integration *while at the same time* allowing for differentiation of systems" (148). By adding virtual time (and its associated time-images) to the will-to-integrate and differentiate, the composing model can now build meaning through duration.

Reality as Text: Mobility, Holography, and Future Rhetorics

The material realities of textual production, the embodiment of those realities, and the rate of media convergence between and among those realities make opportunities for kinematic rhetoric rife with possibility. Jason Farman, in *Mobile Interface Theory: Embodied Space and Locative Media*, theorizes the connection between movement and embodiment:

> As we produce the social spaces around us, both materially and across digital networks, we are engaging in the production of space through movement. […] [T]he sensory-inscribed body is always implicated as a sensory-inscribing body. Therefore, as we engage the emerging mobile media era and the various spaces produced, we can find ways to practice this mobility as a type of dwelling. We can practice movement that is not indelibly linked to ideas of progress and obsolescence. Instead, we can practice movement as a dwelling, as a sensory-inscribed practice of location rather than flow. The result will be a practice of embodied space that values the unique characteristics of place, the ways that mobile media inform those characteristics, and a dwelling that gives both the environment and the people within that space deeper significance. (141)

Bodily movement necessitates "dwelling" and "embodied space": a kind of kinematic text in and of itself. Mobile media production may "produce social space around us," but a rhetor composing for this mobility is composing time-affect images: affective images in duration. To dwell is certainly a "characteristic of place," but it is also a characteristic of time, of duration. As interfaces recede, as dwelling becomes more immediate, mobile technologies become more immanent through the time-affect images they produce.[13]

Farman rightly emphasizes the role of mobile media in creating space. Like Jay Bolter in *Writing Spaces*, Farman emphasizes the need to acknowledge the production of space: "[w]e often discuss spaces as places we enter, inhabit, move through, and leave" because "[t]hey are there before we arrive and

they'll be there after we leave," but "space needs to be considered as some-
thing that is *produced* through use" since "[i]t exists as we interact with it—and
those interactions dramatically change the essential character of space" (18).
This "sensory-inscribed" production of space does become "a lens for all of
our interactions with mobile interfaces" in a similar way that kinematic texts
compose space by composing time (19). As our interfaces become increasingly
mobile, increasingly immersive and immanent, and increasingly networked in
digital as well as physical movement through time, the ability to compose (and
become literate) with time-affect images also increases.

As both the kinematic text and the audience/viewer become increasingly
mobile, so too will there be opportunities for kinematic rhetoric. As locative
media moves through time, the spaces themselves are available for rhetorical
production.[14] Rhetorical theory must account for this kind of textual produc-
tion, even as interfaces and embodied space merge, overlap, and forge new
relationships with the material world.

Holography and 3-D Production

One obvious change in our textual production that involves advancing kine-
matic text is in holography and 3-D kinematic texts. Already well-established,
these types of textual production continue to rapidly advance. As kinematic
texts leave the limitations of two-dimensional surfaces and screens, rhetorical
possibilities of depth also become available for time-affect images:

> Three-dimensional dynamic text can literalize many of the metaphors
> we use to describe what happens in a flat printed text. Not only do we
> strive to see "what's behind" an argument, but "what's at the bottom"
> of it, where its "center" is, where you can "get your bearings" in it or
> "clarify your position on this issue," or "take a stand," or "draw back
> from a conclusion," because we yearn to use the orienting powers our
> species evolved to deal with the three-dimensional world. These vener-
> able metaphors betray thought. They suggest that a dynamic imagin-
> ation has stood behind fixed text from the beginning. (Lanham 97)

Like embodied spaces in time, embodied three-dimensional space in time is
just that much more immanent. There are more potential connections between
inner and outer worlds, and there are more rhetorical affordances available for
effective kinematic texts. Just as rhetors learn to efficiently and effectively con-
struct three-dimensional objects using 3-D production technologies, they must
also be proficient in producing three-dimensional kinematic text, whether or
not the technology is *actually* three-dimensional or a simulation. Lanham's

suggestion that the imagination itself is dynamic echoes Bachelard: "it is in the *act itself*, lived as a unified whole, that dynamic imagination must be able to experience the double human destiny of depth and height" because "Dynamic Imagination […] allows us to understand that something within us rises up when some action penetrates deeper—and that, conversely, something penetrates deeper when something else rises" (108). Both Lanham and Bachelard are tapping into the connection between composing with both "depth and height" as helping us to reach our full potential as individuals, as well as reach our full capabilities in our symbolization practice.

In addition to 3-D textual objects, holography has an immense potential in building immanent time-affect images for an audience. Just as the ubiquity of kinematic production has increased the ease and availability for rhetors to construct kinematic texts, rhetors will likewise be able to produce holographic kinematic texts. Holography is a "true" 3-D technology:

> True-3D imaging and display systems are based on physical duplication of light distribution. Holography is a true-3D technique. There are significant developments in electro-holographic displays in recent years. Liquid crystal, liquid crystal on silicon, optically addressed, mirror-based, holographic polymer-dispersed, and acousto-optic devices are used as holographic displays. There are complete electro-holographic display systems and some of them are already commercialized. (Yaras, Kang, Onural 443)

What this means for a rhetorical theory concerned with kinematic text is that the basic principles of composing with time-affect images ought to apply to emerging technologies, especially as the interfaces change and become more immediate, immersive, and immanent. Holographic textual production in duration is simply another application of the principles of kinematic rhetoric, as explicated here.

Specifically, time-affect images in holography have at least these rhetorical affordances in common:

- Time-affect images in holography remain the crucial building block for meaning-making; as images move in holography, actualized by motion, they combine both time and emotion, generating and intensifying affectivity through duration.
- Holographic time-affect images are non-discursive images, free of sequentiality for meaning and effect, and as direct images of time they link movement and duration through affect.
- Time-affect images in holography are immanent symbolization of duration.

- Time-affect images in holography both differentiate and integrate through dynamic images, creating meaning much the same way the brain does.
- Holographic time-affect images contain rhizomatic movement from the middle, have no beginning or ending, and are connective.
- Holographic time-affect images are synthesized and individuated and, as rhizomatic image, are in a constant state of becoming.
- Time-affect images in holography are both synchronous and asynchronous, are in time and out of time and in reality and out of reality; virtualizing time-affect images in holography exist in the pre-present, the present, and the post-present.

Unique to holography, however, are these particular characteristics of time-affect images:

- As time-affect images in holography, there exists the added affordance of depth of movement and, therefore, a rhetor may create time-affect images that differentiate and integrate through depth, as well as in translation across a two-dimensional plane (or through the image of depth that shifts in perspective and scale).
- Time-affect images in holography virtualize solidity and, therefore, actualize material conceptualization from the virtual to the actual.

In sum, as interfaces continue to fall away or disappear, and as rhetors compose kinematic texts through holography, time-affect images retain the characteristics as discussed earlier. In addition, the ability to compose material reality through virtualized holographic time-images allows kinematic rhetoric to become ever more immanent.

Haptic, Olfactory, and Gustatory Images in Kinematic Rhetoric

The digitalization of sensory perceptions other than audio and visual continues to expand rhetorical practice into new realms of composing. Rhetorical production for our olfactory, haptic, and gustatory senses would allow for the complete expansion of digital composition of worlds. Granted, pre-digital versions of these types of textual production have existed for centuries: composing fabrics and textures for rhetorical effects, composing perfumes and fragrances for rhetorical effects, and composing cuisines and recipes for rhetorical effects, to name a few examples. But digitizing these particular modes of text has not become ubiquitous, as yet.

Even so, just as *Non-discursive Rhetoric* forecasts a need for kinematic rhetoric, this book in turn forecasts a need for haptic, olfactory, and gustatory

rhetorics as they become digitized and common enough for compositions by the everyday rhetor. Just as fabrication of textures, fabrication of perfumes, and the fabrication of food are fairly common in pre-digital form, the full digital fabrication of compositions using these modes will likely become more common as technologies change and emerge. Subsequently, this suggests the existence of time-affect images particularly well-suited to these other senses, and through differentiation and integration, the possibility of constructing worlds through kinematic rhetoric.

Again, composing with haptic, olfactory, and/or gustatory, time-affect images is not entirely conjectural—efforts are already underway for many of these modes. The effort to digitize and, therefore, compose olfactory texts on command already has some momentum:

> A miniature plastic globe, or dongle, it is a little smaller than a cherry tomato, and connects to the audio socket of a smartphone. Download the relevant app, and the device can be activated either independently, by the user, or remotely, when another Scentee owner gives it a call. The dongle glows blue and emits, in a delicate flourish that resembles the vapour from an e-cigarette, the fragrance from whichever chemical cartridge has been loaded into it. Available scents include bacon, short ribs, coffee and buttered potato. (Chalmers)

So too is an effort to digitally create haptic images:

> Disney Research, a division of the film company, is particularly active. One system it developed, called REVEL, projects texture on smooth objects. With that technology, it might be possible to feel the material in a sweater before you buy it online. It can work on any surface, including furniture, walls, tabletops, or human skin, through vibrators embedded in a chair. It can help make a player feel as if he or she is driving a race car, complete with skids and collisions. There are haptic keyboards coming. (Shurkin)

And there is also further development of digital gustatory images:

> It may soon be possible to virtually experience [taste] as enjoyed by a character in a movie or a video game, aided by a new method for digit-ally actuating the sense of taste through electrical and thermal stimula-tion of the tongue. […] Dr. Ranasinghe decided to investigate electrical stimulation of the taste buds on the tongue, but combined this with thermal stimulation, which is also known to alter the perception of taste.

He developed a tongue interface that can apply both kinds of stimulus. […] The tongue is then placed between the silver electrodes, and the resulting sensations are compared to taste references and described by the subject. (Dodson)

What Chalmers, Shurkin, and Dodson are reporting here are advances in aspects of the production of olfactory, haptic, and gustatory digital images. It is important to note the fact that these technologies may well one day lead to the production of kinematic texts that are layered with aural and visual, time-affect images, but also haptic, olfactory, and gustatory, time-affect images. Imagine what rhetorical possibilities await that rhetor who has so many possible modes available to digitally compose a truly immersive world of kinematic text.

Three-dimensional production is analogous evidence of the ability to actualize virtual images into material reality—in essence, to symbolize actual, material worlds of text. What this will call for, in due time, is a rhetoric of multimodal actualization, rather than composition: a theory of rhetorical production for material actualization itself.

Animation Clip 5

FREQUENTATIO

So long as one tries to evade the symbolic form which mediates the
"expression of the Idea," one cannot study the process of that expression,
nor point out precisely how it differs from other activities. But as soon
as one admits that "expressive form" is a special kind of symbolic form,
interesting problems present themselves for solution.

—Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form* (1953, 385)

Hidden World Video Clip 4

Russell's kinematic text has an uncanny way of presenting a kinematic style
that is at once full of information, but also very much alive in its becoming.
The voice-over states, for example, "The plant's food-making bodies resembling
green jelly beans now show up clearly" (00:00:09-14). The "jelly beans" are also
moving within the plant, so Russell uses them to not only direct our attention but
to also show the activity in his kinematic text: Aristotle's directive that texts have
"liveliness" and use "expressions that represent things as in a state of activity"
resonates here. Later in this clip, Russell demonstrates the relationship between
contrast and resolution in observing an almost transparent creature through the
microscope, but I take these words beyond their literal meaning: "These strange
creatures could only be seen by closing the iris beyond the normal amount in
order to gain enough contrast to make structures like the eye, and heart, observ-
able" (00:00:50–01:02). As the voice-over describes a technical relationship
between the microscope and what it can present, the visual, time-affect images
transform from what looks like a dirty lens to the unveiling of a creature, its eye,
and its heart—an unveiling through motion and duration to reveal something
experienced visually, but also something felt emotionally.

In the epigraph above, Langer insists that any "special kind of symbolic
form" may yield riches as we "study the process of that expression." Contrast
and resolution, similar to differentiation and integration, aid in our composing
practices because the very biological mechanisms that frame our sensed reality
are built from them. Kinematic rhetoric, therefore, composes kinematic
texts using time-affect images in a similar way. Whether the text is a brief

animation at the corner of a screen, a musical performance, or a full-length, photo-realistic film, kinematic texts rely on the time-affect images that are non-discursive, affective, rhizomatic, and immanent. At the core of this type of rhetorical composition—and the basis for its relative effectiveness—is the ability for kinematic texts to convey affect in duration through textual motion.

This theory of kinematic rhetoric accounts for characteristics and affordances of kinematic texts: movement—a quality neuroscience links to neuronal capacities of sentience, to networked relationships of evolving selves, and to the very way the brain learns to integrate its perceptions. It elicits several possible connections to mind, time, space, and virtuality. Static information simply does not exist in body or in time the same way: even libraries filled with static texts exemplify movements and circulation over time. The opposite of movement is not stillness—after all, dwelling in stillness is also dwelling in time; the opposite of movement is apathetic nonexistence in nonsubjective (selfless) time.

Affect in Dimension

Dimension, from the Latin *dimensionem*, means "a measuring" and provides some insight into our spatial biases: that some would create space in order to create time as a measure. Bergson and Deleuze, among others, reverse that order of things: with the dimension of time comes space. To talk of a space-time continuum is to acknowledge the murkiness of this distinction, but reversing the bias serves an important end: with duration evoking space, duration renders an increase in dimension. At the heart of this operation of time is the increased resolution of space and, as has been theorized here, its rhetorical effects.

Affect in duration is rhetorical production of emotion in time. As a consequence, the values of multimedia and the rhetorical proofs are intensified and amplified. Just as the affective domain remains ineffable within discursive practice, non-discursive affect is articulate and, in the case of the kinematic time-affect image, resonant.

Rhetors who wish to compose effective and persuasive kinematic texts do so with time-affect images in order to *measure out* the intensifying amplification of emotion. By composing time itself, rhetors connect the audience with an immanence, an embodiment—the groundedness of affect. Reality, in short, becomes the actualization of the virtual text of kinematic images. The trend in technological advances means we will become better at digitizing all of the sensory images, and once we put them in duration, we will have access to new, time-affect images ready for rhetorical production of a truly immanent and immersive variety. We will compose worlds we can experience not only visually and aurally but also haptically, olfactorily, and gustatorily.

Rhetoric in Motion

Movement and motion, as discussed here, are not merely a translation across distance. Often, no actual distance is involved, especially in digital texts. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes movement and pleasure through the creation of form (shaping):

> For every movement (e.g. that of building) takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has made what it aims at. It is complete, therefore, only in the whole time or at that final moment. In their parts and during the time they occupy, all movements are incomplete, and are different in kind from the whole movement and from each other. […] Plainly, then, pleasure and movement must be different from each other, and pleasure must be one of the things that are whole and complete. This would seem to be the case, too, from the fact that it is not possible to move otherwise than in time, but it is possible to be pleased; for that which takes place in a moment is a whole. (10.4)

Though Aristotle discusses movement more thoroughly in the *Physics*, his consideration of the affective "completeness" of pleasure is in relation to the incompleteness of movement in time. Because "all movements are incomplete," the idea of a singular movement, or movement outside of time, seems impossible with this view. Pleasure, or desire, may be an emotion that is whole in time, but it must follow that the effect of time on pleasure is extension: because of movement's incompleteness, and because pleasure is complete, "it is possible to be pleased" because "it is a whole." Similarly, this is the time-affect image (representing here an image of a pleasurable form, like a building) intensifying through motion and duration.

Kinematic rhetoric therefore builds effective and persuasive kinematic texts by composing time-affect images that leverage time in duration, emotion, and non-discursive images. Moving rhetorics are rhetorics of time: movements as a modality employ rhetorics of duration. Whether as a methodological tool through rhetorical analysis or as a composing model for kinematic texts, time-affect images offer rhetors considerable tools in production, distribution, and consumption of textual artifacts. All of the economic, moral, practical, philosophical, communal, cultural, and political concerns that rhetors analyze and produce—along with all of the accompanying issues, responsibilities, and dangers they are rightly concerned about—remain just as germane for kinematic rhetoric as for any other. That said, the rhetorical theory offered here ought to aid in the production of kinematic texts, as well as serve as a possible springboard into the best literacy practices for those learning to compose with, and in, time.

Coda

This electronic book—in both its modes and its use of integrated video, hypertext, and image—has attempted to marry in a modest way both the worlds of static and moving texts. Certainly, for the foreseeable future anyway, academic texts will continue to rely on robust hybrids of discursive and non-discursive text in this kind of theory-making. This ePub may not be entirely novel in this way, but it is indicative of a future for academic textual production. As Lanham argues in *The Economics of Attention*, the future of literacy is one of both abstraction (discursive text) and three-dimensional objects in the world (non-discursive text), a kind of literacy: "[w]e want to bring the world of literacy, and all that literacy carries with it, into the world of objects" (84). The oscillation Lanham imagines here is a multimodal experience with the world (or with worlds) as text. To produce these texts, however, we need a kinematic rhetoric.

Presses such as this one prove itself to be on the forefront of new kinds of texts in academic scholarship, as many in digital rhetoric and multimodal studies have recommended.[1] Born-digital texts that are not meant to be printed in order to be distributed or received have a future in our academic discourse just as they have already in other parts of our textual experiences. Many of the concepts in this book are directly applicable to how we may begin to compose arguments using the affordances of kinematic text through video, animation, holography, and so on.[2] Whatever the next great dominant textual mode may be, our rhetorical theory must continue to ask the question, "How can I manipulate these new modes of symbols to serve my rhetorical aims?" If we realize that there is no coherent answer to this question, then there must be a demonstrable need for yet another rhetorical theory.

Acknowledgments

Animation Clip 6

NOTES

Introduction: What Is Kinematic Text?

1   A common understanding among those in cultural studies is that the object of analysis in knowledge production is not limited to print or alphacentric objects. Kathleen Berry, in *The Dramatic Arts and Cultural Studies* (2002), states that "the world as text […] means any symbolic representation that contains shared symbols, meanings, representations, rituals, knowledge, or other elements" (6).

2   Images are defined here as much more than what the eyes physically perceive: they are, themselves, not beholden to any single sense. Auditory images, gustatory images, olfactory images, and haptic images all are as much part of the general term "image" as the optical image.

3   One characteristic of left-brain thought is that it excels at sequentiality, whereas the more creative, right brain is often characterized as excelling in gestalt thought that is less reliant on sequence and more reliant on context for meaning.

4   Wordsworth's concept is much more nuanced than this, I acknowledge, because the word "best" often engaged a thorough knowledge of denotative and connotative meaning.

5   Throughout this book, I refer to texts as a generic concept meaning, simply, a collection of symbols that may take any mode or medium. I do not limit "text" to a single type of production, distribution, or consumption. The term also helps in avoiding the fact that most "films" are not materially images chemically printed onto acetate; it also sidesteps the issue of whether a purely digital collection of computed binary code is the actual text and the experience of those texts is a performance. All texts are performed, at some level, especially since the translation of synaptic electric potential into neuronal networks could be viewed as a performance, making the very mechanical act of neuron operation an outcome rather than the ontological existence of materialized text. As a consequence, all symbolization practices are capable of composing texts.

6   Interpretation takes many forms in many disciplines. David Bordwell suggests in *Making Meaning: Inference and Rhetoric in the Interpretation of Cinema* (1991) as much: "Taking meaning-making as a constructive activity leads us to a fresh model for interpreting films. The critic does not burrow into the text, probe it, get behind its facade, dig to reveal its hidden meanings. […] On the constructivist account, the critic starts with aspects of the film ('Cues') to which certain meanings are ascribed. An interpretation is built upward, as it were, gaining solidity and scale as other textual materials and appropriate supports […] are introduced" (13).

7   I say this while acknowledging, at the same time, that some would concede that texts
    have the ability to be epistemic and, therefore, contribute to the manifestation of our
    reality—whether or not the text is labeled "fiction" or "nonfiction" or some combin-
    ation of the two. As augmented reality, virtual reality, and other forms of "reality" per-
    meate our symbolic modes of consumption, production, and dissemination, perhaps
    these differences will begin to converge. Bump Halbritter, in *Mics, Cameras, Symbolic
    Action*, goes as far as to say that "[a]udio-visual writing […] is so powerfully epistemic
    because it asks students to confront, head on, the cognitive and affective processes of
    writing" (233).

8   See *Film Theory and Criticism*, edited by Gerald Mast, Marshall Cohen, and Leo Braudy.

9   According to *The Oxford Guide to Film Studies* by John Hill and Pamela Church Gibson,
    film studies as a field is largely based upon "the science and techniques of film, its
    physics and chemistry, the practices and possibilities of the camera and the other
    apparatuses of film making […] [and in the] widespread discourse of film science and
    technique in the culture at large, from the journals of professional cinematography all
    the way through to the lively market in special effects" (3).

10 In Johannes Ehrat's significant book, *Cinema and Semiotic: Peirce and Film Aesthetics,
    Narration, and Representation*, the significance of film theory as an investigation on
    meaning is explicit: "This book is about film, not films. The business of film theory is
    theory, not the interpretation of films. In principle, we must assume film to be a cer-
    tain kind of meaning, a cognitive conduct. That is, film theory scrutinizes meaning as
    such, and does so in its cinematic specificity" (3).

11 "The banal, the everyday and unremarkable is always the best site to anchor theory"
    (Kress 67).

12 This statistic is according to comScore's Video Matrix, a for-profit audience meas-
    urement service for digital marketing agencies (www.comscore.com). The number of
    hours uploaded comes from Google's own "Trends" page.

13 It is also worth noting that my process for making these audio compositions is gen-
    erally a process of both using presampled loops, my own electronic instrumenta-
    tion, and some sound effects and then stitching them together in layers using Apple's
    Garageband software. After some revision, the file is exported into an audio file (AAC)
    and then converted into the MP3s required for ePub3.

1 Motion and Image in Kinematic Texts

1   Noel Carroll, in *The Philosophy of Motion Pictures*, confirms motion to be central to
    kinematic texts: "I defend the notion that cinema is best understood in terms of the
    category of the moving image. […] I will argue that our object of study here is more
    fruitfully conceptualized under the broader category of the moving image than it is
    under the rubric of film, narrowly construed" (3).

2   In no way is this book an explication of Deleuzian philosophy, or any other philosophy
    for that matter. An analysis of Deleuze and his influences and collaborators (particu-
    larly Henri Bergson and Felix Guattari, among others) serves here to help build the
    concept of kinematic rhetoric.

3   Deleuze credits movement-image to Henri Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (1896) in that
    he borrows Bergson's notion of duration—a heterogeneous, interpenetrating, quan-
    titative multiplicity—or the "act of tension or extension, in short, on pure mobility"
    (165). Though I examine Bergson's idea of duration more thoroughly in Chapter 2,

it is sufficient at this point to simply underscore Bergson's contribution to Deleuze's ideas about cinema because it provides the framework for much of his work.

4   Emotion (from émouvoir in French), after all, has as its Latin root *moveo*, which means to stir up, arouse, or excite. Whereas the Latin noun *motus* refers to motion and emotion, simultaneously.

5   Unless otherwise noted, the sound compositions in this ePub are my own compositions. I make no claims about their quality and I only use them here because (1) the copyright is not an issue, and (2) they do provide sufficient illustrations of the rhetorical concepts being discussed.

6   Susanne Langer, in *Philosophy in a New Key*, emphasizes the power of music as a symbolic form precisely because of its ambiguity: "*music at its highest, though clearly a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol.* Articulation is its life, but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression. The actual function of meaning, which calls for permanent contents, is not fulfilled: for the assignment of one rather than another possible meaning to each form is never explicitly made" (Langer's emphasis, 240).

7   See *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (1999) by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin.

8   See, for example, Deer's "Strindberg's Dream Vision: Prelude to the Film" (1972), Eberwein's "Film and the Dream Screen: A Sleep and a Forgetting" (1984), and Nadaner's "Film and Cognition: A Critical Review of Current Theory" (2015).

9   Hear some Foley art by William Dyer, from a galloping horse, to a shattering window, to footsteps in grass.

10 In *Non-discursive Rhetoric*, I relay a similar theory of language offered by Earnst Cassirer, based on the tension between the "named and the unnamed, self from other, utterable from unutterable, and discursive from non-discursive" (21).

11 Much like C. S. Peirce's concept of "triadicity," Meyer relies here on a definition of meaning as a triadic relationship that is mediated (determinate stage) between quality (hypothesized stage) and event (evident stage). See Peirce's "The Principles of Phenomenology" in *Philosophical Writings of Peirce* for a more detailed account of his three "modes of being" (75).

12 "If we start to understand connection as a form of writing, then articulation theory can offer us a way to understand the 'mere' uncreative act of selection and connection as very active and creative" (Wysocki et al. 226).

2 Composing Time

1   Clearly, the very selection of any examples demonstrates a bias, at some level, of my own, no matter how unbiased the intent. The selection of examples in any work ought to invite questions, and that is true here as well.

2   Keith Beattie's book, *Documentary Display: Re-viewing Nonfiction Film and Video*, makes the case that documentary filmmaking must evolve:

> The documentary image as a purveyor of information and knowledge is an aspect of documentary display, though no longer a privileged and exclusionary feature of documentary representation. Separated, or freed, from the immediate demands of knowledge production, documentary display entertains, startles and excites in ways which produce pleasure—the great repressed in analysis predicated on documentary as a sober discourse. Within its multiple enhancements documentary display helps shift documentary theory […] into new terrain, away from a focus on sobriety, rectitude, literalism, and a public

service educative function, towards an emphasis on the arresting, playful, ambiguous, entertaining and pleasurable capacities of nonfiction imagery. (5)

3   Definitions of time, as noted by Russell West-Pavlov in *Temporalities* (2013), have always been troublesome: "Time has been the object of countless scientific or philosophical definitions, from the Greek Presocratic philosophers onwards. It can be defined mythically, poetically […] It can be gestured at indexically, as in Heidegger […] It can be enumerated ostensively […] It remains all-pervasive, yet elusive" (4).

4   Aristotle's definitions of time are somewhat contradictory with each other. In *Aristotle on Time: A Study of the Physics*, Tony Roark suggests the philosopher is both optimistic and conservative: "One of Aristotle's first conclusions about time […] is that it must be some aspect of motion" (219a9–10) and that "phantasia ('imagination') plays a crucial role in perception," therefore "making possible the possession of mental states about the past and the future" (6–7). In other passages, Aristotle suggests that "Plato's identification of time with motion was in error, but it was a forgivable error and one that Aristotle regarded as helpful in discovering the genuine nature of time"—that is, its relationship to motion, but not its dependence of it (218).

5   However, Bergson finds some benefit of discursive language: "Our tendency to form a clear picture of this externality of things and the homogeneity of their medium is the same as the impulse which leads us to live in common and to speak" (76). That is, it is the discursive qualities of language that provide a force that creates societies, even beset with symbolic substitutes for lived experience, that have the ability to become "a step toward social life" (76).

6   Valentine Moulard-Leonard clarifies the difference between memory and perceptions for Bergson in this way: "Although Bergson sees a mere difference in degree between matter and conscious perception, he establishes a difference in kind between perception and memory—even though, practically, perception and memory are inseparable" (31).

7   This is an imperfect metaphor, of course, since much music today is produced, distributed, and consumed through digital means, and at some level, even our hearing process through a (largely) neural network of synaptic firing is also like digital 1s and 0s, presence and absence of electricity. As Evens states about digital music, it has limits and it has potential: "Despite its tendency to reproduce the same pattern again and again and despite its perfect memory and its ideal abstraction, the digital in its structure inherently engenders a reflection on its own limits. For the digital introduces a distance between the musician and the music, a distance that mediates but that also opens a space of reflection" (123).

8   Edelman and Tononi claim that brain activity is not uniform or homogenous. The brain relies on complexity and integration in order to be conscious as part of its "dynamic core" and to "emphasize both its integration and its constantly changing composition" (144). Such integration, coincidently, "cannot be localized to a single place in the brain," a point that underscores Bergson's notion of pure duration as virtual and continuous (144).

9   In *What Is Philosophy* (1994), Deleuze and Guattari lay out a means against chaos through an understanding of science, art, and philosophy: "If the mental objects of philosophy, art, and science (that is to say, vital ideas) have a place, it will be in the deepest of the synaptic fissures, in the hiatuses, intervals, and meantimes of a nonobjectifiable brain, in a place where to go in search of them will be to create. […] That is to say, thought, even in the form it actively assumes in science, does not depend

upon a brain made up of organic connections and integrations: according to phenomenology, thought depends on man's relations with the world" (209).

10 The translator of *The Intelligence of a Machine*, Christophe Wall-Romana, observes on many occasions—both in the translator's note and in the endnotes to the translation—that Epstein is arguing "in absentia" with Bergson "throughout the book" (iv).

11 Mapping, or cartographic theory, is a vibrant area of study. See *Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory* by Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin, and Chris Perkins (2009): "As conceptions and philosophies of space and scientific endeavour have shifted so has how people come to know and map the world" (1).

12 Chuck Tryon, in *Reinventing Cinema Movies in the Age of Media Convergence*, states how remixes may become the equivalent of "snack foods" by allowing for short-term, political satire and parody: "In addition to parodying movie trailers themselves, video mashup producers have also used the language of fake trailers to serve other, more explicitly political purposes, usually via an explicit partisan stance on a political candidate or issue" (166).

13 In quantum-based computing, the number of possibilities for computation are likely to be vastly greater, dramatically increasing the capabilities of such a device. Quantum computing will no doubt change the relationships described here, but not the basic point: virtualization and actualization of data create computable possibilities.

14 As mentioned already, Deleuze is careful to clarify that his theory "of cinema is not 'about' cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other practices" (280). His distaste for "modern" or "new" cinema, then, seems to be contrary to an otherwise clear attempt to allow cinema to be a heuristic for theory, even as this distaste leads him to claims about the way modern cinema breaks "the sensory-motor link (action-image)" (173).

15 Deleuze and Guattari, in *What Is Philosophy?* elaborate that the plane of immanence enjoy both the "creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane": "Concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them" (36).

16 Flusser, in *Gestures*, asserts that such gestures may also be a controlling mechanism:

> This is exactly the reason video, as a tool, fascinates us. It permits us to discover potentialities unknown either to those who invented it or to those who paid for its production. And it permits us to steer its development in another direction. Of course video may engage the same gestures that were foreseen when the intention was modeled. In this case, analysis will show that we are under the control of the power behind the apparatus. Behind the gestures of the video maker working in and for the system, we will be able to discover the ways and means the system has of programming us. (145).

17 Aristotle, in *Movement of Animals*, also connects reason and desire: "the living creature is moved and goes forward by reason of desire or purpose, when some alteration has been set going on the occasion of sensation and imagination" (701a4–a6).

18 There has been much interest in theories of play in Rhetoric and Composition: see Rouzie (2005), Gee and Hayes (2010), Bogost (2010), and Colby, Johnson, and Colby (2013). For connections between gaming play and learning, see James Gee's two books: *What Video Games Have to Teach Us about Learning* (2007) and *Good Video Games + Good Learning* (2007); for an exploration of sociability and massive

multiplayer online games (MMOGs), see T. L. Taylor's *Play between Worlds: Exploring Online Game Culture* (2006).

19   Damasio suggests that the neuroscience of memory is a dynamic one. The brain constructs memory "dispositions" that are maps, are themselves implicit, and are unconscious (150–54). In order for us to have a memory, it must be performed through many of the same neural networks that recorded the disposition in the first place (150). As such, a memory or set of memories are dynamically performed during recall. "The dispositional space is that in which dispositions hold the knowledge base as well as the devices for the reconstruction of that knowledge in recall. It is the source of images in the process of imagination and reasoning and is also used to generate movement […] When dispositional circuits are activated, they signal to other circuits and cause images or actions to be generated" (153).

3 Immersion and Immanence in Kinematic Text

1   In *Rhetorical Bodies* (1999), edited by Jack Seltzer and Sharon Crowley, the various authors in the collection consider both the relationship of rhetoric to materiality and to the body: "the moment was right for a reconsideration of the material situatedness of literate acts, for a rethinking of how rhetorical practices are related to the real conditions of life that give them life, and for a renewed investigation into the rhetoric of material practices themselves" (vii).

2   Several other academic theorists have adopted the rhizome as part of their theory over the last five years or so: Jeffrey's *The Posthuman Body in Superhero Comics* (2016); Levine's *Forms: Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network* (2015); and Campbell's *Music after Deleuze* (2013), to name a few.

3   Estimates range, for a nonilluminated, distinct image, anywhere between 100 milliseconds and 400 milliseconds is required to receive an external image in the brain, depending on the persistence of vision in the visual cortex (Coltheart 57–58). A study by James Davis, Yi-Hsuan Hsieh, and Hung-Chi Lee, titled "Humans perceive flicker artifacts at 500 Hz" (2015), notes that if the light source is modulated in intensity, the ability to perceive a flickering screen increases significantly: "When the modulated light source is spatially uniform, we obtain a contrast sensitivity curve that matches that reported in most textbooks and articles. Sensitivity drops to zero near 65 Hz. However, when the modulated light source contains a spatial high frequency edge, all viewers saw flicker artifacts over 200 Hz and several viewers reported visibility of flicker artifacts at over 800 Hz. For the median viewer, flicker artifacts disappear only over 500 Hz, many times the commonly reported flicker fusion rate" (2). This suggests that motion, or variability, improves perceptual ability.

4   Lanham claims the central importance of digital technology is that it has put revision "into the center of creativity," thereby it "lubricates human invention and expression" by making "oscillation easier" between AT/THROUGH.

5   See Duffelmeyer and Ellertson (2005), Dunn (2001), Fleckenstein (2003), Heywood and Sandywell (1998), Lopuck (1996), Murray (2009), Roswell (2013), and Selber (2004), to name a few.

6   Aslinger and Huntemann make the case that digital media studies—a much broader category that includes gaming studies—are growing and changing:

    Scholars, activists, and educators are using games and digital media to teach 21st-century literacies and approaching various media forms as opportunities

for teaching system-based and design-based thinking. Too many scholars to mention are working through the relationship between diverse but interlinked media platforms, technologies, and experiences, challenging "medium-specific" modes of analysis that have been central to some cinema and television studies approaches. New models of spectatorship, sharing, the dynamics of platforms, ecosystems of communication activity, norms and transgression, and distribution and circulation are being elaborated and debated" (10).

7   As I argue in "Complexity Leadership and Collective Action in the Age of Networks," the unpredictable nature of novel combinations of information is a powerfully creative tool: we must "learn to embrace this complexity, compose nodes that increase the number of connections within the network, and communicate through multiple modes over digital networks so as to keep multiple types of discourse available for more members of the community who would like to be involved. By leveraging complexity itself, multitudes of network agents collaborate to find solutions to difficult problems by discovering what emerges in unpredictable ways" (514).

8   See Andriopoulos's "Kant's Magic Lantern: Historical Epistemology and Media Archaeology." In it, he states, "Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion transforms the material apparatus of the magic lantern and its use in the visual medium of the phantasmagoria into an epistemological figure. Kant distinguishes between optical and transcendental semblance. Yet he describes our tendency to mistake a subjective idea for a material object by drawing on contemporaneous optical projections. The analogy between pure, speculative reason and the visual instrument of the magic lantern is thus inherent to and constitutive of Kant's critical epistemology" (61).

4 Composing Kinematic Texts

1   In *Documentary Time: Film and Phenomenology*, Marlin Wahlberg emphasizes the connection between filmmaking and historical moments in documentary films: "the ephemeral and concrete work in cinema of mediated rhythm, stasis, and the existential impact of the film image as a trace of the past represent two overlapping concerns of image and time that have always appealed to filmmakers and film critics" (xv).

2   "The plentitude held out by the movies […] is ultimately satisfied neither by spectacle nor by the artistically adorned image, but by the sense and process of discovery that occurs across and through […] the screen. […] Fascination comes not through dazzling presence but through haunting absence, as recorded traces of a subject lead us in search of it" (Andrew 25).

3   Zillman adds that, specifically in cinema, the effects of excitation transfer are overlapping and potentially prolonged: "[T]he distressing experience of suspense is arousing, and residues of this arousal linger through resolution and intensify the experience of relief and euphoria. […] The more intense the suspense-induced distress, finally, the greater the excitatory residues that come to energize joyous reactions to the satisfying outcomes of the resolution" (166–67).

4   "Anatomy of a Virus" is an infographic dissecting the nature and ramifications of StuxNet, a weaponized computer virus. This was produced for Australian TV program HungryBeast on Australia's ABC1. Direction and Motion Graphics: Patrick Clair (antibody.tv). Written by: Scott Mitchell. Production Company: Zapruder's Other Films.

5   The first atomic test by Oppenheimer's team of scientists took place on July 16, 1945, near Socorro, New Mexico. Code named "Trinity," the test detonated an implosion-design plutonium device nicknamed "The Gadget." On the 70th anniversary of the test, the Los Alamos National Laboratory is now home to the Trinity supercomputer—one of the most powerful supercomputers in the world.

6   Layers, or any other value of multimedia in motion, are subject to the rhetor's understanding of audience expectations. In *The Virtual Life of Film*, Rodowick explains how there may be trends to minimize the appearance of layers: "Despite the intrinsic separability of image components and the potential for controlling an infinite number of layers with respect to any of their variables or values, under the pressure of perceptual realism the predominant aesthetic of compositing stresses smoothness, continuity, and seamless boundaries between combined elements" (170).

7   Virtual reality games and simulations run the risk of being so convincing to the body wearing the devices that people can actually be nauseated, even motion sick: in fact, the condition is called "visually induced motion sickness (VIMS)" (see "Features of Postural Sway Signal as Indicators to Estimate and Predict Visually Induced Motion Sickness in Virtual Reality" by Chardonnet, Mirzaei, and Merienne).

8   In "The Law of Accelerating Returns," Ray Kurzweil claims that the state of techno-logical acceleration is faster than previously thought: "An analysis of the history of technology shows that technological change is exponential, contrary to the common-sense 'intuitive-linear' view. So we won't experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century—it will be more like 20,000 years of progress (at today's rate). […] There's even exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth" (381).

9   According to Berys Gaut, there may be seven types of realism in cinema: "content realism (actual events and objects), illusionism (events and objects seem real), photo-realism (animated events and objects seem photo-real), ontological realism (objects and events have a causal relationships), epistemic realism (there is strong evidence that objects and events depicted are real), perceptual realism (pictures look more like their objects and events), and transparency realism (the mechanisms of the technology are not evident to the viewer)" (60–94).

10 Lloyd F. Bitzer's *The Rhetorical Situation* (first in 1969 and then again in 1994) details the concept much more fully than what is necessary here—a rhetorical situation incorporates "exigence, audience," and "constraints" (8). It is worth noting, however, that Bitzer's discussion of the rhetorical situation, though broadened as discourse, is discussed as a singular concept. It seems reasonable that various rhetorical situations may coexist within various multiplicities of duration and movement.

11 Stiegler, in *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*, seems to agree with the limited notion of real time: "so-called real time is not time; it is perhaps even the de-temporalization of time, or at least its occultation; yet it is still nonetheless time, industrially 'won,' and thus also lost—which is to say radically understood as apart from the clock, as capital, the extreme modality of 'preoccupation'" (63).

12 In *Filmosophy*, Daniel Frampton summarizes the relation of film to reality in this way: "It appears that film, in some of its forms, can rejig our encounter with life, and perhaps even heighten our perceptual powers. Cinema allows us to re-see reality, expanding our perceptions, and showing us a new reality. Film challenges our view of reality, forcing a phenomenological realization about how reality is perceived by our minds" (3).

13 Ernst Cassirer, in *Symbol, Myth, and Culture*, draws an inverse relationship between immediacy and "intellectual" symbols: "His immediate, his concrete experience of

life fades away in the same degree in which he approaches his higher intellectual aims. What remains is a world of intellectual symbols, not a world of immediate experience" (154).

14 Examples abound: wearable technologies, augmented reality applications, embedded displays, and so on. As the interface and material reality merge, potential rhetorical spaces also emerge.

Frequentatio

1 In their chapter "Digital Humanities Scholarship and Electronic Publication," Douglas Eyman and Cheryl Ball make the case that "there will be a strong turn toward screen-based scholarship" as digital rhetoric and the digital humanities continue to grow and engender new grant opportunities (66). They also make the case that "it is important to pay attention to the affordances and constraints of these platforms and to carefully consider the intellectual, social, and technological support structures that need to be used in the construction and dissemination of scholarly multimedia work" (66).

2 Flusser, in a series of lectures that became the book *The Philosophy of Language*, argues that the use, exploration, and bodily experience of our symbols is a kind of human expression of beauty: "all forms of mental activity, are the progressive elaboration of symbols […] [because they] transform the dormant potentialities within them into realities […] For whoever engages in thought through body and soul, to think […] is the constant discovery of enigma as the fundament of thought. This discovery is what I called 'beauty,' and it is to such frightening beauty, which philosophy discovers, if it is honest" (12–13).

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