

ARISTOTLE, *RHETORIC* III:
A COMMENTARY

by

JOHN WALT BURKETT

Bachelor of Science, 1989
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

Master of Arts, 1997
Reformed Theological Seminary
Jackson, Mississippi

Master of Arts, 2005
Mississippi College
Clinton, Mississippi

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
AddRan College of Liberal Arts
Texas Christian University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

May 2011

Copyright by
John Walt Burkett
2011

PREFACE:

OBJECTIVES AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This new commentary on *Rhetoric* III serves the purpose which the text held at the Classical Lyceum: elucidating Aristotle's theory of style (*lexis*) and arrangement (*taxis*) for scholars, teachers, and practitioners of rhetoric. This commentary provides a much needed update to the last commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Book 3, published by the Cambridge classicist E.M. Cope in 1877, because Cope's commentary is now understood as a misinterpretation that reads Aristotle Platonically, takes seriously only rational appeals, assumes a mimetic theory of language, and misdefines central concepts like the enthymeme and common topics. Providing a new interpretation, this commentary has several specific objectives, methods, and features that are discussed below in detail but that may be summarized by three adjectives: Grimaldian, rhetorical, and accessible.

This *Grimaldian* commentary applies the new rhetoric philosophy of William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., which he explicates in *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1972) and in his two-volume commentary on *Rhetoric* I (1980) and *Rhetoric* II (1988). In these works and others, Fr. Grimaldi creates an integrated and contextual interpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (outlined below). The current commentary complements (in both senses) Grimaldi's scholarship by applying his integrated hermeneutic to *Rhetoric* III.

This *rhetorical* commentary considers the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric* since Aristotle typically practices what he teaches: writing with enthymemes, drawing premises from shared knowledge, defining by metaphor, clarifying by antithesis, and arranging units by thesis, analysis, and synthesis. The commentary observes how Aristotle applies his three rhetorical appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, *logos*), his theories of propriety (*prepon*), exotic (*xenos*), and virtue

(*aretê*) in style, the role of philosophical pairs, and the systems of Greek imagery, all of which create a unified and interactive theory of invention, style, and arrangement. Attention is given to Aristotle's theory of metaphor regarding the extent to which metaphors enable logical inference, comprise his technical terms, and give shape to his interactive theory of rhetoric.

This *accessible* commentary features text, translation, comments, and glossary for readers who may not be familiar with Aristotle's idiom but who have an interest in his rhetorical theory and technical terms. Finally, incorporating recent scholarship, this commentary provides insights from classical rhetoric and new rhetoric, showing their interrelationship and how contemporary research in rhetoric builds on and helps to elucidate Aristotle's expansive rhetoric as a general theory of language.

Given this rewarding research, I wish to express my gratitude to many: Aristotle for his "afternoon" lecture notes *On Rhetoric (Peri rhêtorikês)* from his esoteric library at the Lyceum; Erasmus for discovering Aristotle's Greek text in 1508 in Venice; Rudolphus Kassel for his superior critical edition of the Greek text; William M.A. Grimaldi for discovering the philosophical hermeneutic of the *Rhetoric*; George A. Kennedy for his fine literal translation; Richard Leo Enos for his helpful suggestions and his kind guidance during the research-writing process of this commentary; invaluable feedback from Professors Richard Enos, Kurk Gayle, Ann George, and Dan Williams, who have contributed to the commentary's richness of insights; and my dear wife and son for their patience and encouragement.

CONTENTS

Preface	Objectives and Acknowledgments	ii
Contents	Table of Contents	iv
SIGLA	Abbreviations	v
Significance	Need for a New Commentary on Aristotle’s <i>Rhetoric</i> III	vii
Argument	Rhetorical Philosophy of William M. A. Grimaldi, S.J.	xxi
Chapter 1	Arts of Rhetoric	1
Chapter 2	<i>Lexis</i> : Virtues	55
Chapter 3	<i>Lexis</i> : Frigidity	113
Chapter 4	<i>Lexis</i> : Simile	127
Chapter 5	<i>Lexis</i> : Correctness	141
Chapter 6	<i>Lexis</i> : Expansion and Concision	157
Chapter 7	<i>Lexis</i> : Propriety	166
Chapter 8	<i>Lexis</i> : Rhythm	188
Chapter 9	<i>Lexis</i> : Syntax	199
Chapter 10	<i>Lexis</i> : Urbanity and Metaphor	229
Chapter 11	<i>Lexis</i> : <i>Energeia</i> and Metaphor	257
Chapter 12	<i>Lexis</i> : Situation and Media	291
Chapter 13	<i>Taxis</i> : Parts of an Argument	309
Chapter 14	<i>Taxis</i> : Introduction	324
Chapter 15	<i>Taxis</i> : Counteracting Attacks	350
Chapter 16	<i>Taxis</i> : Narration of Facts	365
Chapter 17	<i>Taxis</i> : Proof and Refutation	388
Chapter 18	<i>Taxis</i> : Interrogation	413
Chapter 19	<i>Taxis</i> : Epilogue	425
Conclusion	Interactive Rhetoric	435
Glossary	Glossary of Greek Terms in <i>Rhetoric</i> III	439
Bibliography	Bibliography of Works Cited	477

SIGLA

- Biographical Dictionary* William Smith, ed. *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology*. 3 vols. London and Boston, 1849.
- Cope E. M. Cope. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary*. 3 vols. Ed. J. E. Sandys. London: Cambridge UP, 1877.
- Cope, *Introd.* E. M. Cope. *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices*. London: Cambridge UP, 1867.
- ERC Theresa Enos, ed. *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition*. New York: Garland Publ., 1996.
- Grimaldi William M. A. Grimaldi. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Commentary*. 2 vols. New York: Fordham UP, 1980, 1988.
- Grimaldi, *Studies* William M. A. Grimaldi. *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric*. 1972. All citations refer to the reprint: Enos and Agnew 15-159.
- Kennedy George A. Kennedy, trans. and ed. *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2007. Citations refer to the 2007 edition with introduction, translation, notes, and appendices.
- LSJ H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. McKenzie, eds. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Rev. and augm. with Supplement. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996.
- OCD Simon Hornblower and Anthony Spawforth, eds. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd ed. rev. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.
- Smyth H. W. Smyth. *Greek Grammar*. Rev. G. M. Messing. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984.
- 1403b 6 Bekker numbers are listed in each chapter's outline and comments as the standard form of reference in Aristotle's works. The first four digits (i.e., 1403) signify page number, the letter (a or b) column number, and the last digits line number, based on pagination in the Berlin Academy edition of *Corpus Aristotelicum*, 1831, edited by A. I. Bekker.
- 3.1.1 Text references within comments are abbreviated by chapter conventions: e.g., 3.1.1 refers to Book 3, chapter 1, section 1. The Greek text is that of Kassel's 1976 edition. Translation is Kennedy's second edition, 2007.
- Texts All references to classical authors are to Loeb Classical Library editions (LCL), referenced by Bekker numbers, unless indicated.

Complete references to all sources, cited throughout this commentary in brief fashion, can be found in the Bibliography.

ABBREVIATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS

References to Aristotle's works normally consist of an abbreviated title, a book number, a chapter number, a section number (if any), and a specification of page, column, and line in the standard edition of the Greek text by Immanuel Bekker (1831). In the text of this commentary, titles are spelled out, but often abbreviated in notes and citations. Since there is no universally agreed set of abbreviations, those adopted are fairly standard among publishers. Abbreviations are based on the Latin translation of the Greek title. Those below are found in this commentary.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviated title	Latin title	English title
<i>An</i>	<i>De Anima</i>	<i>On the Soul</i>
<i>APr</i>	<i>Analytica Priora</i>	<i>Prior Analytics</i>
<i>APst</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>	<i>Posterior Analytics</i>
<i>Cat</i>	<i>Categoriae</i>	<i>Categories</i>
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>Int</i>	<i>De Interpretatione</i>	<i>On Interpretation</i>
<i>Met</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i>	<i>Metaphysics</i>
<i>Phys</i>	<i>Physica</i>	<i>Physics</i>
<i>Poet</i>	<i>Poetica</i>	<i>Poetics</i>
<i>Pol</i>	<i>Politica</i>	<i>Politics</i>
<i>Rhet</i>	<i>Rhetorica, Ars Rhetorica</i>	<i>Rhetoric</i>
<i>Soph El</i>	<i>De Sophisticis Elenchis</i>	<i>Sophistical Refutations</i>
<i>Top</i>	<i>Topica</i>	<i>Topics</i>

SIGNIFICANCE:

NEED FOR A NEW COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC* III

What the Scottish philosopher Sir William Hamilton witnessed, “Aristotle’s seal is upon all the sciences, his speculations have determined those of all subsequent thinkers,” is true of the *Art of Rhetoric* (ca. 335 BC).¹ Since this single, ancient text has the privileged status as *fons et origo* for the rhetorical tradition, rhetoricians have a situation like no other in that the origin continues to sustain deliberations about rhetorical theory and practice. With the renaissance of rhetoric beginning in the 1960s, contemporary scholars have devoted more attention to understanding the doctrine and details of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* than in any other century. Since Aristotle compiled a complete corpus of treatises on rhetoric by his contemporaries and predecessors in his lost *Synagôgê technôn* (ca. 360-355) and added his own great insights, Aristotle thus provides us with an encyclopedic and expansive theory of rhetoric that is bound to philosophy through logic, to ethics through propriety, and to poetics through his theory of style. In comparison, according to Paul Ricœur, the latest treatises present “restricted rhetoric,” reducing the classical art to merely one of its parts (9). For these several reasons, including developing a discipline essential to education, communication, and human welfare, rhetoricians are now giving more attention to Aristotle’s treatise than ever before in the long history of rhetoric. Resulting from this recent resurgence, contemporary rhetoric is partly, and sometimes

¹ Sir William Hamilton (1788–1856) was a constant student of Aristotle, after whom he cast his Scottish common-sense philosophy (*sensus communis*) with the aid of Thomas Reid; quotation in *Discussions in Philosophy, Literature and Education* (Edinburgh 1852-53), also quoted in Prestonia Mann Martin, 37. Hamilton would agree with contemporary common-sense philosophers regarding Aristotle’s importance for the disciplines: “Aristotle may be regarded as the cultural barometer of Western history. Whenever his influence dominated the scene, it paved the way for one of history’s brilliant eras; whenever it fell, so did [hu]mankind” (Ayn Rand).

largely, Aristotelian, and is actively recovering, understanding, and appropriating this one foundational text.

Since Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is still producing new insights and conversations about rhetorical theory, the text has continuing relevance to our discipline and work as scholars, teachers, and practitioners of rhetoric. Understanding the text of the *Rhetoric*, therefore, is important for our present progress and even for our identity in the province of rhetoric. Edward P. J. Corbett agrees, calling Aristotle's *Rhetoric* "the fountainhead of all later rhetorical theory" (543). William W. Fortenbaugh calls the treatise "fundamental" for antiquity and for the present state of rhetorical scholarship ("Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*" 107). James A. Berlin avows, "Aristotle has provided the technical language most often used in discussing rhetoric—so much so that it is all but impossible to talk intelligently about the subject without knowing him" (767). Hugh Lawson-Tancred states that Aristotle's text is still yielding surprises and insights (44). Umberto Eco adds that "of the thousands and thousands of pages written about metaphor, few add anything of substance to the first two or three fundamental concepts stated by Aristotle" (*Semiotics* 88). Accessing fundamental concepts, technical terms, and even new insights from an old text, however, is fraught with problematic barriers because Aristotle's text is dense, disjointed, and difficult, and no recent commentary on Book 3 exists. Given these barriers to understanding, the purpose of the current commentary is to elucidate the text of the *Rhetoric* for scholars, teachers, and practitioners of rhetoric who may not have familiarity with classical languages.

The last commentary on the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in English was published in 1877, written by the Cambridge classicist Edward Meredith Cope (1818–1873) and revised and edited by classicist John Edwin Sandys (1844-1922). As we now understand the *Rhetoric*,

however, Cope's *Commentary* renders a misinterpretation that takes seriously only rational appeals and, correspondingly, assumes a mimetic theory of language and style.² These Platonic assumptions are due, certainly, to the authors' academic training as Victorian classicists, not rhetoricians. As a result, Cope's *Commentary* has diverted readers from understanding many key concepts, such as the definition of enthymeme, the equality and interaction of Aristotle's rhetorical appeals (*pisteis*) of *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, the inferential function of common topics (*koinoi topoi*), and the cognitive functions of metaphor that constitute its hybridity as a trope and topic of invention useful for creating knowledge, learning, and a shared view of reality. Throughout his lengthy *Introduction* (1867) and three-volume *Commentary* (1877), Cope assumes that rhetorical and logical reasoning differ in form only: "the enthymeme differs from the strict dialectical syllogism only in *form*," so that rhetoric is judged as an imperfect expression of logic (*Commentary* 2.221; cf. *Introduction* 102-4).³ At the level of formal definition, Cope

² Rationalism is a philosophy of language, and thus meaning, that treats language as a species and imperfect expression of logic, where "logic," in the tradition of Plato's theory of forms and modern analytic philosophy, is believed or assumed to be eternal, timeless, non-linguistic, and unconditioned by sociohistorical contexts. Rationalism is often defined according to the relationship between logic and rhetoric; for instance, Newton Garver defines rationalism as "the whole tradition in which language is conceived as founded on logic rather than on rhetoric" (Preface xiii). In this sense, Plato and Cope are rationalists because they privilege *logos* above the relative equality of Aristotle's three rhetorical appeals and above particular, cultural contexts. Correspondingly, a mimetic theory of language views language, in its proper function, as a passive copy of some other, extralinguistic reality located in an external world of objects or an internal world of ideas; in either case, the work of language "is to reflect, often inadequately or incompletely or downright misleadingly, something that is outside itself" (LeFevre 98). As a result, rationalist philosophy defines itself against rhetoric, depreciates the role of language, devalues the work of style, and seeks to make "clear logic" the only standard of human communication rather than the rhetorical standard of audience adjudication.

³ Cope is confused further by following William Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic* (1860), which makes three mistakes: first on form, considering the enthymeme an incomplete syllogism; second on structure, inventing the third-order enthymeme wherein the conclusion is suppressed; and third on matter, drawing a distinction in which the syllogism deals in certainty while the enthymeme in probability (Burnyeat 5). Hamilton's speculations have been accepted by nearly

misunderstands the enthymeme, defining it as a species of syllogism (which Aristotle never writes), and he completely overlooks the enthymeme's inclusive subject-matter (*pragma*, *êthos*, and *pathos*) in its role of relating the three rhetorical appeals (discussed at 3.1.3; cf. Grimaldi 1:39; *Studies* 145-56). Misinterpreting Aristotle's unifying, thematic concept leads to many more misstatements in Cope's *Commentary*, reinforcing a ritual of rationalism while omitting the dynamic human aspects of rhetoric for which Aristotle considered rhetoric to be a distinct, necessary, and general art of language.

Signaling a departure from Cope's Victorian tradition, William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., has written a pioneering set of commentaries: *Rhetoric I* (1980) and *Rhetoric II* (1988). In these he reinterprets the treatise in light of Aristotle's own text and corpus. In Fr. Grimaldi's career in service to the field of rhetoric, he began but was unable to finish or produce *Rhetoric III*. The resulting century-wide gap in scholarship is conspicuous because no commentary on Book 3 exists that applies current understandings of Aristotle's theory to his text.

In the meantime, in the last 135 years since Cope's *Commentary*, much has changed concerning the role, status, and uses of rhetorical theory. The changes impinge extensively on audience, for Aristotle has once again a wide, interested audience of his *Rhetoric*, an audience extending far beyond departments of classical literature to various disciplines, including history, philosophy, theology, anthropology, sociology, semiotics, linguistics, literature, and law. The primary audience for the *Rhetoric* remains scholars of rhetoric, including rhetorical critics, communication theorists, and composition scholars, witnessed by an increasing number of textbooks in communication and writing studies featuring Aristotle's rhetorical appeals and the

everyone, including Cope. In his *Introduction*, Cope follows Hamilton's doctrines, but an added note on page 103 specifically rejects Hamilton and returns to the traditional, but still inadequate, definition of enthymeme as an incomplete syllogism (103n1).

rhetorical triangle based on the three appeals.⁴ In our current renaissance in rhetoric, beginning in the latter decades of the twentieth century, rhetoricians have written a wealth of articles and books on the *Rhetoric*, and many more that reference its theory, giving us a greater understanding and appreciation of Aristotle's extensive treatise on rhetoric.

Before the resurgence in rhetoric, in contrast, scholars largely viewed Aristotelian rhetoric as poor logic. Textbooks on logic and rhetoric consistently treated (and continue to treat) the enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism rather than a "rhetorical syllogism" as Aristotle describes it (1.2.8). George A. Kennedy observes that twentieth-century translations of the *Rhetoric* (before his 1991 translation) all "were made at a time when the subject of rhetoric was distrusted in academic circles and readers were unfamiliar with its technical vocabulary" (xi). This academic spirit produced biased and simplified translations and no commentaries. In the mid-twentieth century, for instance, Sir David W. Ross, editor of a critical edition of the Greek codex, viewed the *Rhetoric* as "a curious jumble of literary criticism with second-rate logic, ethics, politics, and jurisprudence, mixed with the cunning of one who knows well how the weaknesses of the human heart are to be played upon" (1949, 275). Likewise, Sir G.E.R. Lloyd in his major study on Aristotle asserts that the *Rhetoric* "discusses the tricks of the trade, the various devices the public speaker may use to win his case" (273). Ross's and Lloyd's disparaging statements express their rationalist readings of the *Rhetoric*, views that see it as a minor and peculiar work in the Aristotelian corpus, not as the "*antistrophos* [counterpart] to dialectic," to use Aristotle's own metaphor, but as a subordinate and inferior part of his

⁴ The phrase "rhetorical triangle" does not occur in classical rhetoric but is commonly used today to refer to both Aristotle's three rhetorical appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, *logos*) and the "communication triangle" derived from Aristotle's appeals for describing the dynamic elements of the rhetorical situation: speaker/writer (ethical appeals), audience/readers (emotional appeals), topic/message (logical appeals), and text with context in the middle of the triangle since the text is influenced by all three means of persuasion (cf. discussion of rhetorical appeals at *Rhet* 3.1.3).

dialectics. The rationalist sort of reading of the *Rhetoric* separates *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos* as categories of artistic proofs and then subordinates rhetorical deduction, induction, and common topics as subsets of *logos*, creating a hierarchy where Aristotle does not. According to this still dominant interpretation, Aristotelian rhetoric is indeed a jumble of “second-rate logic” rather than a general theory of language that is fundamental for audience-centered communication.

The traditional reading still prevails, but it is now insufficient and widely discredited in rhetorical studies by an increasing array of more informed interpreters who view rhetoric as a basic humanistic discipline that applies rhetorical reasoning to subject, speaker, and audience. *Contra* Cope, Ross, Lloyd and a host of similar-minded scholars, the major alternative interpretation comes to us from Grimaldi, the twentieth century’s foremost expert on the *Rhetoric*. In *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (1972), Grimaldi provides an integrated philosophy of Aristotelian rhetoric that he applies in his two-volume *Commentary* on the treatise. Based in studies of the Greek text, he soundly challenges the traditionalist and modernist (post-Enlightenment) views of the *Rhetoric* by providing his own interpretation that brings coherence and insight to the subtle unity and insightfulness of Aristotle’s thought. On the structural level, Grimaldi makes the deductive enthymeme (and the inductive example) the central form of rhetorical inference, and he sees special and common *topoi* applicable to all three artistic proofs: *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. How Grimaldi interprets Books 1-2 directly applies to Books 3, for he asserts the unity of the treatise, the generative function of *koinoi topoi*, which apply equally to metaphor, figures of thought, and arrangement, and the importance of understanding the *Rhetoric* within the context of Aristotle’s corpus as outlining a general theory of language. Grimaldi provides eight salient features of his integrated hermeneutic of the *Rhetoric* (discussed below under Argument). Contemporary rhetorical scholars may disagree

with Grimaldi on details, but they agree with his larger outlines and with the idea that enthymemes may contain rational, emotional, and character appeals. It is not an exaggeration to state that contemporary Aristotelian rhetoric is built on Grimaldi's scholarship, making the "Grimaldian tradition" a centerpiece of the renaissance in rhetoric.

Given its importance, the *Rhetoric* is still a difficult book to understand, witnessed by an enduring history of misinterpretation and misappropriation. The text is densely written, Aristotle does not always define his terms, and he writes in enthymematic form, modeling the rhetorical syllogism for readers, which also means an audience has to supply much of the theory from other parts of his treatise, his corpus, and his culture. Even the best readers need help understanding the text's outlines, terms, context, and meaning. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a text that calls for commentary and discussion. Complementing the objectives of Grimaldi's commentary, this new commentary seeks to elucidate the text of *Technê Rhêtorikê*, Book 3, for rhetorical scholars, teachers, and practitioners, offer a better understanding of an ancient yet eminently practical handbook. Since the *Rhetoric* is most probably Aristotle's lecture notes, which he would elucidate for his afternoon classes at the Lyceum, any new commentary should serve a similar purpose: to elucidate the text for contemporary scholars and students of Aristotelian rhetoric.

The significant scope of the new commentary concerns three related issues: accessing the primary source, mediating the primary source, and remedying the scarcity of commentary on *Rhetoric* III. Concerning the first issue, rhetorical scholars find it tremendously difficult to build on classical rhetoric because they cannot easily access primary classical sources or commentaries on those primary sources. This problem impedes the progress of rhetorical scholarship and theory, and the problem asks for a relevant, usable, insightful commentary. The second issue concerns audience, specifically the task of mediating and popularizing a classical text for an

audience which could most benefit from that text while also including insights from contemporary research. This leads to a third issue about the relative scarcity of recent literature on Book 3. Contemporary scholars have focused on the heuristics in Books 1 and 2, leaving relatively scarce scholarship on Book 3. Topical studies exist, but they are few. Thus, the new commentary also serves as a call for more study of *Rhetoric* III in order to fill the gap in our understanding of the fountainhead text and its contemporary relevance.

Concerning the progress of our humanistic discipline, many scholars attest that misunderstandings run rampant regarding Aristotelian rhetoric, a situation that exists for lack of access to primary sources and the stringency of intellectual traditions. Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede in 1984, for instance, warn that a tendency exists in new rhetoric “to define itself *against* the classical tradition,” and consequently this trend has led to “unfortunate oversimplifications and distortions” of Aristotelian rhetoric (“On Distinctions” 37, 49). More recently, Alan Gross, Robert Gaines, and Michael Leff suggest that the last “half century of scholarship on the *Rhetoric* in speech communication and composition theory constitutes a virtual museum of misappropriations” (Gross 25). Nancy Anne Myers agrees, suggesting in her dissertation, “Whose Aristotle? A Dialogic Reading of Aristotle’s ‘*Rhetoric*’ in Rhetoric and Composition Studies” (TCU, 1997), that the textbook industry consistently overrides scholarly genres on and translations of Aristotle’s text. The *Rhetoric* has become an exemplar of *eisegesis*, of reading oneself into a complex text.

Placing this problem in a grander timeframe, one sees that our era is repeating a long history of misreading the *Rhetoric* since its Western reception and translation in 1508 in Venice. In “The Reception of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in the Renaissance,” Lawrence D. Green describes the strong impetus to misinterpret: “local needs and immediate arguments in the Renaissance shaped

the overall understanding of Aristotelian rhetoric,” in which Western rhetors read a Ciceronian Aristotle, Byzantine rhetors a Platonic Aristotle, and dialecticians a Scholastic Aristotle (337). What Green concludes about the past applies today: “The [different] perspectives were needed to elucidate a malleable and difficult text but, even more, Aristotle’s text was needed to validate those perspectives” (348). Similarly, Eric A. Havelock and George A. Kennedy have commented on the heavily Platonic idiom in which most classical texts are interpreted, including Aristotle’s texts (Havelock, *Literate Revolution in Greece* 9; Kennedy, “Responses” 244).⁵ For these reasons, common understandings between contemporary and historical scholars of rhetoric can be illusory and misleading. In response to this problem, readers of the *Rhetoric* should give due attention to their rhetoric, being on guard against Platonic and rationalist assumptions. For what readers finally want, as much as possible, is Aristotle’s idiom and thoughts on rhetoric.

Rhetorical theorists and teachers are drawn to Aristotle’s authority and his practical concepts, but lack insight into his text and theory. Despite (or due to) having a number of translations, Aristotle’s dense and difficult text is such that it requires commentary to shed light on the theory, language, and context that inform the text. The same scholars who point out this problem have also called rhetoricians to study and produce resources so that readers can understand better Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

In the field of rhetorical studies, this staid problem arises, in part, because scholars do not have access to primary sources which are locked away in classical languages. Furthermore, commentaries on primary sources mystify most rhetorical scholars because they are written by

⁵ Kennedy observes: “Our friends the philosophers have begun to take more note of the *Rhetoric* in their study of Aristotle, not out of a willingness to approach philosophy as rhetorical discourse but in apparent hopes of weaving material from the *Rhetoric* more tightly into the network of Aristotle’s philosophy. All too many students of Aristotle are, in their heart, Platonists” (“Responses” 244).

classicists who often have little regard for audiences without facility in classical languages.

Access to the terms and meanings of primary sources is a significant problem in the ancient field of rhetoric. This problem calls for quality commentaries that mediate to some degree the gap between classical sources and contemporary scholars in the field of rhetoric.

A second concern regards mediating an ancient text for contemporary rhetoricians. This new commentary hopes to address this task in three ways: it applies Grimaldi's philosophy of Aristotelian rhetoric to Aristotle's text; it garners the best recent scholarship for elucidating the text and its contexts; and it addresses scholars, practitioners, and teachers of rhetoric (which is a different audience from prior commentaries on the *Rhetoric*) by supplying text, translation, and commentary for those who would most benefit from such a threefold approach.

Contemporary scholarship on the *Rhetoric* builds directly or indirectly on Grimaldi's pioneering research. The current commentary seeks to apply the philosophy and methodology published in Grimaldi's *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* to the details of Book 3. One of Grimaldi's main tenets is the theoretical and textual unity of the *Rhetoric*, a precept that pertains directly to Book 3 since some scholars have wrongly viewed it as a third appendage and afterthought. This commentary seeks to convince them otherwise.

In harmony with Grimaldi's approach to audience, this volume seeks, as he states in his preface, "to make Aristotle's statements about rhetoric accessible and understandable to scholars working in the field of rhetorical studies but not actively engaged with the Greek language or classical scholarship" (1:viii). Grimaldi accomplishes his objective in some degree, but he also undercuts his objective by directing all of his comments to the reading of the Greek codices. To benefit fully from his commentary, a reader must read and reference the Greek text. This "qualified reading" reduces his stated objective and his real audience.

The present volume includes text, translation, and commentary in order to realize Grimaldi's original objective for extending audience accessibility. This commentary includes the following three features: First, it follows Rudolf Kassel's critical edition of the Greek text. Second, it includes George A. Kennedy's excellent English translation because his is now the standard translation, draws primarily from Kassel's text, applies Grimaldi's insights in his commentaries, and follows closely the Greek text's syntax, thus making Kennedy's the appropriate translation for a Grimaldian commentary. Third, the commentary applies Grimaldi's philosophy and approach to the *Rhetoric*, and it appropriates the best of recent scholarship about the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. The commentary on Book 3 will help readers understand better the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, for in each treatise Aristotle refers to the other, indicating the interaction between poetical and rhetorical style. This interaction suggests a double significance for understanding Aristotle's theory of style and arrangement.

A note on Rudolf Kassel's text: *Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica"* (Berlin, 1976) is the latest and best critical edition of the Greek text according to scholars. Kennedy bases his translation on it, calling Kassel's text "moderately superior" ("Two Contributions" 86). Friedrich Solmsen lauds it as established on "exceptionally solid foundations" (Review 68). Edward Schiappa praises it, and Martha Nussbaum describes it as "the only soundly and intelligently reconstructed" text, which is "far superior" to all previous editions (qtd. in Schiappa, "Importance" 207). John T. Kirby calls it simply "superb" (521 n17). Grimaldi typically follows Roemer's Teubner text (Leipzig, 1923), but Grimaldi reports that he "was able to consult it [Kassel's text]" before his commentaries went to print (1 :vii). The Kassel edition now stands as not only the latest but also the standard Greek text, also having the benefit of a thoroughly researched apparatus.

Kassel, Kennedy, and Grimaldi are in general agreement that the text of the *Rhetoric* is fundamentally unified and authentic. Kennedy writes, “The text of *On Rhetoric* that we read today is substantially the text left by Aristotle at his death and preserved in his personal library” (17). Showing agreement, Kassel adds three kinds of brackets in the Greek text: *supplenda* in angle brackets, signifying additions for clarity’s sake; *additamenta aliena* in single brackets, signifying additions from an alternative manuscript family; and in double brackets some passages that he regards as late additions by Aristotle himself (not an editor) to an otherwise completed text (Kassel xix; cf. Solmsen’s Review of Kassel, *Aristotelis “Ars rhetorica”* 70). Although the double brackets are speculative (such as those in 3.9.2), the three bracket types are rare and primarily serve clarity, signaling confidence in the text from Kassel and from those ancient scholars who read and copied the manuscripts.

How Kassel defines the place and value of the two manuscript families (named A and β) he describes in *Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Berlin, 1971), based on research published five years prior to his edition of Aristotle’s text. A word on the two manuscript heads: MS A is codex Parisinus 1741 (tenth century, Constantinople), which is the earliest and best manuscript, obtained from Greek scholars in Venice. In 1508, Erasmus received it from the hand of the Byzantine émigré and Venetian printer Aldus Manutius, published that year by his Aldine Press in *Rhetores graeci*, edited by Demetrius Ducas (Geanakoplos 226; Kennedy 310; Solmsen 68). MS β is not extant but reconstructed from two Medieval Latin translations (thirteenth century, Italy), the first by Bartholomew of Messina, Sicily, and the second by Willem van Moerbeke in the pontifical court of Viterbo, Italy, urged on by Thomas Aquinas, thus composing the later and alternative manuscript head (Kennedy 308; Solmsen 68). From these Eastern and Western manuscript families, due to Kassel’s thorough research into them, “we are on much firmer

ground than were earlier students of the work,” writes Solmsen, for where Parisinus 1741 was once considered the *codex unicus*, it is still the *codex optimus* but with every textual knot and alteration traced back to a cause (Solmsen 68-69).

In addition, a contemporary reading of Aristotle should be rhetorically vigilant by observing the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*. While philosophers tend to apply a rationalist, logocentric approach, seeking to read Aristotle’s logic into and then out of his *Rhetoric*, a rhetorical reading points out how Aristotle is a rhetorician from first to last. A rhetorical reading observes how Aristotle applies his three rhetorical appeals (*êthos, pathos, logos*), including his many metaphors, analogies, enthymemes, audience-centered pronouns, and the cultural character of his many references, names, and illustrations. The current commentary considers the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*, discovering Aristotle’s multiple appeals and the extent to which metaphors comprise his technical terms.

Aristotle provides a theory of rhetoric for addressing the whole person as a nexus of mind, emotions, and character because he is concerned with the totality of audience response to logic, aesthetics, ethics, and emotions. Nonetheless, this expansive and balanced interpretation of the *Rhetoric* is a contemporary achievement, the fruit of textual and historical scholarship. This view is not shared by Victorian authors and rationalist scholars who privilege logic above text and reduce humanity to mind (“thinking thing”), thus miswriting their commentaries for their audience of philosophers and classicists. For instance, Victorian rationalism is perfectly reified in Cope’s *Commentary*, rendering it useless, except for its admittedly superb historical research.⁶

The scholarly climate is changing in the province of rhetoric. Premier studies by

⁶ Cope’s *Commentary* is as influential as ever as a public domain book, available at *Google Books* in Portable Document Format (PDF), reproduced in print by Nabu Press in 2010, and reproduced in electronic text by the *Perseus Digital Library*, serving as the only commentary notes via convenient links next to the electronic text and translation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

Grimaldi have challenged and changed the received interpretation, first in his dissertation, “The Enthymeme in Aristotle” (1953), second in his series of articles published as *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (1972), and third in his two-volume commentary, *Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Commentary* (1980, 1988). Fourth, a prolific half-century of scholarship has significantly advanced our understanding of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in both its doctrine and details, including its contemporary relevance for rhetorical theory and practice. For instance, based in Grimaldi’s exposition of the *Rhetoric*, Lunsford and Ede conclude that “Aristotle’s elegant theory” should be the foundation stone and “model for our own *antistrophos*” of rhetoric and writing studies (“On Distinctions” 49). In this tenor, so that rhetorical studies may reach its full potential, this commentary follows the Grimaldian tradition and applies the best of recent scholarship on three of the four Aristotelian arts of rhetoric: style, arrangement, and delivery, as found in Book 3.

ARGUMENT:

RHETORICAL PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM M. A. GRIMALDI, S.J.

A persistent historical debate about rhetoric stems from one central question: what is the relationship among *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*? As in all philosophy and rhetoric, inquirers find the Athenian founders addressing fundamental questions and engaging in dialogues on divergent answers. On this central issue about the theory of language and human discourse, Plato privileges logic because he seeks intuitive, abstract truths to serve as objective criteria by which to found a system of certain knowledge.⁷ Plato's rationalist rhetoric, therefore, consists of a "natural order" of dialectic before rhetoric, in which he first discovers and secures his premises through subtle logical analysis and second presents his truth through artful, often mythical rhetoric. Likewise, Platonic philosophers privilege logical discourse over against the pragmatics of situation and audience because Platonists tend to devalue the relationship of language and life occurring in specific situations that integrate reason, emotion, and ethical character. Aristotle, however, though Plato's pupil and the founder of formal logic, considers the three rhetorical appeals to be relatively equal, especially when addressing a general audience, for he recognizes that people are as important as principles in the art of discourse. Aristotelian rhetoricians recognize that people and principles both have fundamental importance: rhetors speak to audiences consisting of whole, integrated persons, who are a nexus of intellect, character, emotions, and impulse, even when adjudicating principles of truth, justice, and expediency.

⁷ Plato privileges logic and depreciates rhetoric because he distrusts the senses, as found in his epistemic theory of *recollection* (*anamimnêsis*), a view that all sensory information is faulty so that an unknown cannot be learned, only intuitively recollected (*Phaedo* 75e; *Meno* 80d). Contrary to Plato's mysticism, Aristotle affirms the role of the senses (mind, body, world) so that sense perception is a valid source of information and learning by experiential *collection* in memory (*mimnêsis*). The rhetorical tradition follows Aristotle's "common sense" epistemology and theory of experiential learning, including Cicero and Augustine (cf. *Confessions* 10.8.12).

Plato and Aristotle continue to represent the two major views regarding the relationship among the rhetorical appeals, views respectively called rationalism and rhetorical reasoning, or what Grimaldi calls “epistemology of the probable” (*Studies* 26).⁸ Although both value reason, Plato and Aristotle have different approaches to rhetoric because they start with different goals and values. While Plato privileges abstract principles, Aristotle understands rhetoric to be an eminently human art of discourse. Thus, Aristotle balances principles and people in the *Rhetoric* by giving equal weight and treatment to logical, ethical, and emotional modes of persuasion. Especially when seeking to understand Aristotle’s treatise on rhetoric, readers should not overlook this distinctive balance from the philosopher of common sense. This fundamental distinction between rhetoric and logic has rarely been heeded in history or applied in regard to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, that is, until recently when Grimaldi, through his career of studying the treatise’s Greek text, rediscovered that Aristotle views rhetoric as a general and balanced theory of language.

What Grimaldi discovered was that translators and commentators were largely misinterpreting Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* by reading it through Platonic and rationalist traditions. Lawrence D. Green observes the scope and history of this problem, stating that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* has been consistently misread since its Western reception in 1508 because scholars have interpreted the text according to their intellectual contexts, which have “shaped the overall

⁸ Rationalism is the philosophy of language in the Platonic tradition founded on logocentrism and recognized by its system of philosophical pairs in binary opposition. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato evinces many such hierarchical pairs: reality/appearance, knowledge/opinion, reason/sense, soul/body, being/becoming, unity/plurality, divine/human, philosophy/rhetoric. The prevalence of philosophical pairs in Western culture indicates the extent to which rationalist systems influence cultural traditions and ordinary thinking, but rationalist dyads are problematized and dissociated by recognizing their rhetorical construction starting with Heidegger’s historical *Dasein* and rhetorical criticism (cf. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* 1 ff.; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric* 421).

understanding of Aristotelian rhetoric” (“Reception of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” 337). Against an history of misinterpretation and misappropriation, Grimaldi rediscovered Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric through a career of studying the text of the *Rhetoric* and the Aristotelian corpus. His rediscovery, in turn, has helped to spark the Aristotelian currents of the contemporary resurgence in rhetoric.

When the American Philological Association, seeing the need for a new commentary on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, approached Fr. Grimaldi of Fordham University about the task, he gladly accepted, having written his dissertation on the “Enthymeme in Aristotle” (Princeton, 1953) and having spent much of his career understanding the *Rhetoric*. In response, Grimaldi wrote two commentaries on *Rhetoric* I and II, in 1980 and 1988 respectively. Grimaldi has not only written the only twentieth-century commentary on the *Rhetoric*, but he also provides the most accurate, most transforming, and best interpretation of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*. What distinguishes Grimaldi’s scholarship is that he seeks to be textually and contextually accurate, following neither Platonic philosophy, nor Ciceronian rhetoric, nor modern rationalism, but Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric. This new commentary on *Rhetoric* III applies Grimaldi’s philosophy and methodology, seeking to be textually and contextually accurate. It is hoped that this commentary will complement Grimaldi’s scholarship and fill the gap left by the absence of his third volume.

According to Grimaldi’s major works, especially his two-volume *Commentary* and *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (1972), a Grimaldian commentary has eight distinctive features plus an Aristotelian methodology. The following section outlines Grimaldi’s philosophy of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in its eight characteristic features.

(1) Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals are equal: Grimaldi finds that “for Aristotle the very essence of the rhetorical art is constituted by an intimate fusion of the intellectual and appetitive

elements,” entailing a view of people and language that calls the rhetor to consider equally the three artistic appeals or *pisteis*: *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos* (*Studies* 36). Because of the intimate integration of intellect, character, emotion, and impulse in the logistic soul (*nous logistikos*), *êthos* and *pathos* are as substantial parts of the art as *logos*; this view *contra* Cope, Ross, and the host of traditionalists who interpret Aristotle Platonically, privileging rational appeals (*Studies* 62; “Rhetoric and the Philosophy of Aristotle” 373). Although Aristotle argues that rhetoric is rational and thus an art (*technê*) and severely critiques sophists who misuse emotional appeals, nevertheless, Aristotle stresses that reason alone is not adequate for moving the practical intellect (*dianoia praktike*) toward reasoned judgment (*krisis*), belief (*pistis*), and action (*praxis*).⁹ Aristotle writes, *logos* is “the strongest of the *pisteis*” (1.1.11), *êthos* almost “the controlling factor in persuasion” (1.2.4), and *pathos* causes “people [to] come to differ [change] in their judgments” by holding valid emotions (2.1.8). The complete rhetor, therefore, must consider all three artistic *pisteis* in order to perceive and present the possibly suasive means of decision for any given subject. Grimaldi frequently repeats this holistic perspective of rhetoric; for instance, “in rhetorical discourse, as far as A[ristotle] is concerned, person speaks to person in the effort to communicate, and this means the whole person: cognitive–affective–volitive” (2:5). In effect, Grimaldi concludes, “we have here the very *psychagôgia*, or appeal to the whole person in his intellectual and emotional life, which Plato discussed in his *Phaedrus*,” a discussion about uniting logical and sociological rhetoric (*Studies* 38; cf. *Phaedrus* 271d).

(2) Aristotelian rhetoric is a general theory of language: Aristotle explains rhetoric to be a

⁹ Keith V. Erickson describes the Academics’ position on true and sophistic rhetoric: “True rhetoric is interpreted as an ideal rhetoric practiced by principled rhetoricians/dialecticians with pure motives, while sophistic rhetoric is viewed as false or sham persuasion, lacking in art, and practiced by self-serving men with base purposes,” hence the ill repute of the professed sophists at Athens in the fifth century (*Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric* 7).

general theory of language use concerning contingent reality; this view *contra* Cope, Ross, Kinneavy, and literary theorists who view rhetoric as a quality of language use, as a technique, and just one language art among many competing arts of discourse. The idea that Aristotle's theory of rhetoric is as extensive as serious discourse is a theme that runs throughout Grimaldi's *Studies and Commentary*. Grimaldi explains: "Aristotle's point of departure on the nature of rhetoric begins with the idea that rhetoric is quite simply the art of language"; and again: "Rhetoric is general and touches all areas of human knowledge wherein man attempts to convey understanding to another whether it be philosophy, literature, or the physical sciences" (*Studies* 67). Discussing "deliberation," Grimaldi writes, "A[ristotle] extends rhetoric to the whole area of human inquiry," for questions open to deliberation is rhetoric's "general subject matter" (1 :54). Aristotle's broad conception of rhetoric is shared by Isocrates and Plato, who concern themselves with the intimate association of matter and form, cognition and expression: "This meaning of rhetoric is readily acknowledged in Isocrates, and it is found in the *Phaedrus* when Plato sets down the norms acceptable for an 'art' of rhetoric" (*Studies* 67; cf. *Phaedrus* 277b-c). According to these fourth-century rhetoricians, "Rhetoric was certainly not mere speech-making for any one of them; rather it was the heart of the process by which man tried to interpret and make meaning for himself and others [of] the world of the real" (*Studies* 67; cf. Grimaldi 1:45, 56a33). These thinkers recognize the three literatures (poetics, logic, and rhetoric), but they emphasize that rhetoric in particular transcends disciplines, making the art of rhetoric a general theory of language for the real world of contingent reality.

(3) Enthymeme is the center: The deductive enthymeme (and inductive example) is the master structural form in the *Rhetoric*. In form and function, the enthymeme is a syllogism: Aristotle defines it as a syllogism, calls it a "rhetorical syllogism" (1.2.8), describes it as a

“relaxed syllogism” (μαλακώτερον συλλογίζωνται [*malakôteron syllogizôntai*]) (2.22.10), and illustrates it variously in the *Rhetoric* as an inverted syllogism, often including antithesis, metaphors, and other features of style suitable for general and creative discourse (cf. 1.1.1-3). This view is distinct from Cope’s traditional doctrine whereby the logical syllogism is the genus and the enthymeme a species, defined as an abbreviated syllogism that has one premise missing or suppressed. According to Grimaldi’s interpretation, the enthymeme bears the three *pisteis* or modes of persuasion, known as *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos* but better understood as *êthos*, *pathos*, and *pragma* because *logos* (a notorious homonym) has frequently caused confusion and reduction of the formal and material elements of argumentation (Grimaldi 1:39; *Studies* 145 ff.). This understanding of inclusive subject-matter is distinct from the philosophical tradition, for which the enthymeme bears only logical proof and by which artistic appeals, enthymeme, examples, and all common and specific topics are subsets of *logos* understood as logic (*logikê*). Rather than exclusive logic, the unifying theme of the *Rhetoric* is the inclusive enthymeme and the example. The enthymeme in form is “relaxed” and variable; in subject-matter is inclusive and creative; in function involves logical inference, producing reasonable persuasive force in argumentation; and in rhetorical method or practice often involves stylistic features, including antithesis, parallelism, metaphor, maxim, rhetorical question, and all of the stylistic features treated in Book 3. For this reason, the enthymeme cannot merely be an abbreviated syllogism, as misdefined by Cope, textbooks, dictionaries, and much of the rhetorical tradition.¹⁰ In his article,

¹⁰ Grimaldi comments that “the *locus classicus* for the common interpretation of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism” (i.e., with one of the premises or the conclusion missing) is *Rhet* 1.2.13, 1357a16 (1:57). This misinterpretation, Grimaldi notes, “goes back to the distinguished Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias of the third century A.D.” (1:57). Major dictionaries follow this philosophical tradition of misdefining the rhetorical enthymeme: “a syllogism in which one of the premises is implicit” (*Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, 11th ed., 2008, s.v. “enthymeme”). Likewise, Noah Webster’s *Dictionary* of 1828 and 1913:

“The Centrality of the Enthymeme,” Grimaldi affirms, “There can be no question that for Aristotle the enthymeme was the focal point of his analysis of rhetoric,” being the rhetorical form that he regularly employs in the *Rhetoric* (*Studies* 68). Again, “Like the metaphor in poetry, the enthymeme in rhetoric fuses [different kinds of] knowing in the person, [and] makes the act of knowing a total perception of intellect, emotion, feelings” (26).¹¹ When Aristotle calls the enthymeme the “body of *pisteis*” (1.1.3), he means a form that is able to carry the three means of persuasion, thus giving rhetoric its dynamic and reasonable force that asks for the informed response of the whole person (*Studies* 146; Grimaldi 1:8, 54a15, s.v. σῶμα τῆς πίστεως).

(4) Πίστις has a range of meaning: The term *pistis* has a range of meaning beyond “[logical] proof,” and is best translated according to context, generally as “mode of persuasion.” Grimaldi observes, “In actual fact the word πίστις [*pistis*] in Aristotle’s text will not sustain the univocal interpretation (i.e., proof, way of proving), which has been imposed upon it” (*Studies* 69). Scientific “proof” is a semantic anachronism that scholars have forced on *pistis* in Aristotle’s text. Rather than simply logical “proof,” Grimaldi finds a broad semantic range: five meanings of the term according to context in the *Rhetoric*. Three primary meanings exist for *pistis*: (1) Persuasion: the state of mind of conviction or belief, which results when a person

“Enthymeme, n. [Gr. to keep in mind, consider; in + mind, soul.] (*Logic*) An argument consisting of only two propositions, an antecedent and consequent deduced from it; a syllogism with one premise omitted; as, We are dependent; therefore we should be humble. Here the major proposition is suppressed. The complete syllogism would be, Dependent creatures should be humble; we are dependent creatures; therefore we should be humble” (*American Dictionary of the English Language*, 1913, s.v. “enthymeme”).

¹¹ Grimaldi’s distinction between emotions and feelings comes from Aristotle’s formal analysis of *pathos* in *Rhetoric* II, where two aspects of *pathos* are distinguished by intensity and recognition. Grimaldi comments: “All emotions are feelings, but all feelings are not emotions,” for feelings are simple affective states requiring no antecedent recognition, while emotions are “complex affective states of stronger intensity” aroused by one’s recognition of a stimulus, such as an object or situation (Grimaldi 2:15, 78a20; cf. *Met* 1022b15-21 and *EN* 1105b19 ff.).

judges and accepts a proof or demonstration; (2) Means to persuasion: the logical instrument of the reasoning process in deduction or induction that will create conviction or belief in an audience; and (3) Source of persuasion: the source material—based in *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*—that will create conviction or belief in an audience. Grimaldi also finds two lesser meanings of *pistis*: (4) Pledge or word of honor that instills belief, and (5) Body of a composition, which is a technical meaning in Book 3 for “that part of a speech wherein one formally demonstrates one’s thesis or proposition” (*Studies* 70; cf. 1:19-20, 1:349 ff.). Not a univocal term for logical “proof,” *pistis* has a semantic range determined by context, generally describing the means of persuasion, conviction, or belief in regard to the whole person: mind, emotions, ethical character, and volition.

(5) *Koinoi topoi* are formal modes of inference: Aristotle theorizes a dynamic, heuristic function of *topoi* for the creation of subject-matter and inferential forms of argumentation. In his article, “The Aristotelian Topics,” Grimaldi observes, the topical method has not been fully understood since Aristotle because “a partially misdirected emphasis [was] given to the method by Cicero,” who recognized commonplaces as ways and means for discovering ideas but not the formal structure of arguments (1; *Studies* 126). Elsewhere Grimaldi states, “Cicero’s *Topica* does seem to have no more in common with Aristotle than its title” (Rev. of *Aristotelis Topica* 315n2). Aristotle, in his classification of the two species of *topoi*, distinguishes between ἴδιοι τόποι [*idioi topoi*] or εἶδη [*eidê*]: specific or material topics in Book 1; and κοινοὶ τόποι [*koinoi topoi*]: common or formal topics in Book 2, which, writes Aristotle, “apply to all [three species of rhetoric]” (2.22.17). In the recovery of the full topical method, Grimaldi affirms that the Aristotelian *topoi* should be understood in two senses: (1) “commonplaces” or sources for invention of content, as already familiar to the rhetorical tradition, and (2) “axiomatic forms, or

modes of inference,” which give shape to probable knowledge, as discussed by Vico and rediscovered in the late twentieth century (*Studies* 126-27; “Aristotelian Topics” 4). In the second sense, unique to Aristotle, the *koinoi topoi* are formal topics because they “may be said to be imposed as forms upon the material in order to clarify and determine it further” (137). *Koinoi topoi* are modes of inference that give shape to enthymematic reasoning in rhetoric. In Book 3, Aristotle describes the functions of metaphor in terms of *topoi*, suggesting that metaphor is a stylistic syllogism capable of creating inference. The *topoi* exemplify the dynamis of Aristotelian rhetoric for inventing content and giving form to enthymemes on any given subject. The twenty-eight *koinoi topoi* in Book 2 fall into three logical patterns, according to Grimaldi: cause-effect, more-less, and forms of relationship (*Studies* 134; cf. *Top* 1, 101b 15 ff.). As sources for argumentative forms, Aristotle’s common topics are universal modes of inference, transcending all fields of knowledge and showing how Aristotelian rhetoric is a general theory of language.¹²

(6) Aristotle presents an interactive theory of language: Grimaldi emphasizes that Aristotle has a philosophy of language that is not passive but interactive with thought, showing “an awareness of the intimate relation between thought and language” (*Studies* 21). This theory is fundamentally different from Cope’s copy theory of language and his corresponding misrepresentation of Aristotle and Greek rhetoric generally. Cope assumes that language is mimetic and can ideally be “a colourless medium” representing ideas and objects (*Introd.* 277). Language in its proper function is a passive copy of extralinguistic realities, including internal ideas and external objects, according to Cope’s assumption of naïve realism, based in a mimetic

¹² In addition to that discussed by Grimaldi, Aristotle includes a topical procedure for his treatment of *taxis* in Book 3. Thus, Aristotelian *topoi* have three distinct heuristic functions for discovering subject-matter (1.4-15), inferential forms (2.20-23), and localized responses to the particular needs of each part of a composition (3.14-19). See discussion at 3.14.11 (1415b25) and 3.15.2 (1416a6); also cf. Enos, “Ciceronian *Dispositio*” (1985).

theory of language common to English empiricism and Platonic expressivism (LeFevre 99). For this reason, Cope regularly uses the phrases of ornamentation, separating thought from style, for instance, calling metaphor a “generally useful ornament of speech” (*Introd.* 286; cf. 293, 318). In contrast, Greek education emphasized “the study of language as the medium whereby man interpreted reality to himself and to others” (Grimaldi, *Studies* 21). For rhetoricians like Isocrates, rhetoric is a “creative entity: ποιητικὸν πρᾶγμα [*poiêtikon pragma*]” (Grimaldi, *Studies* 20; cf. *Against the Sophists* 12). With this concern of early rhetorical theory, Aristotle focuses on the cognitive functions of language, including metaphor, antithesis, and *energeia* (*Rhet* 3.10.6). Accordingly, Grimaldi writes that the central issue of “rhetorical study as seen in Aristotle is that all significant human discourse is structured language,” and moreover, “by way of structure, enables language to become an effective medium whereby man apprehends reality” (*Studies* 20). A theme in the *Rhetoric* is the interaction of cognition and expression, especially in Book 3, making Grimaldi’s theory of language appropriately attentive to the epistemic functions of style and arrangement.

(7) Aristotle’s corpus is unified: Grimaldi argues that the *Rhetoric* is a text that has a meaningful context in Aristotle’s corpus; this view *contra* traditionalists such as Jakob Wisse who “emphatically refrain from using the rest of the Aristotelian Corpus in interpreting the *Rhetoric*” (2), who thus decontextualize the treatise to fit their rationalism. In “The Unity of the *Rhetoric*,” Grimaldi begins by asserting, “Any effort to understand Aristotle’s *Art of Rhetoric* must begin with its place within his philosophy,” because the meaning of his technical terms depends on his organic, conceptual network of interlocking, mutually supportive ideas and principles within his corpus (*Studies* 32; Edel 41-42). Aristotle explicitly shows the unified, interactive relationship of theorized terms within his corpus by referring readers of the *Rhetoric*

to his other works, including those works on dialectic, epistemology, psychology, ethics, poetics, and metaphysics. Since the *Rhetoric* provokes readers to ask cross-disciplinary questions regarding philosophy, psychology, ethics, and logic, Aristotle invokes his other writings, frequently alluding and providing cross-references to his literary corpus to answer theoretical questions. The *Rhetoric* is consonant with his general thinking, showing that Aristotle is a consistent philosopher with a well-constructed conceptual network within his corpus that informs the *Rhetoric* (*Studies* 32 ff.; Edel 42).

(8) Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a unified text: The unity of theme, theory, and structure leads Grimaldi to assert the unity of the *Rhetoric*; this *contra* many scholars from Friedrich Marx to George A. Kennedy, who assert the development theory of the treatise, which accordingly was redacted by later editors, especially the third book because it does not directly concern invention. According to Grimaldi, while Book 3 "might possibly stand by itself, it makes sense only in terms of what has preceded it" (*Studies* 58). Although Grimaldi recognizes the difficulties in asserting a unified text, he thinks "these problems are not intractable" enough to deny the text's basic, theoretical coherence (*Studies* 59). After a careful analysis of the problems in the three books, Grimaldi asserts, "the work is fundamentally unified and from the hand of Aristotle," a conclusion he makes based on the centrality of the enthymeme in the treatise, its consistent thematic development throughout, the integration of principles and concepts, and "a unified structure open to no major contradictions" (59). Grimaldi thinks that there are possibly *lacunae* (gaps), interpolations, and editings that have entered some manuscripts in the course of time as can be expected in a classical text, but his analysis suggests that the text is fundamentally unified and authentic (59-60). A minority opinion today in the wake of redaction criticism, Grimaldi's is the majority view in light of history, agreeing with the most important primary source on the

issue, the second-century biographer of Greek philosophers, Diogenes Laërtius, who testifies of Aristotle's works that their "genuineness is undoubted" (*Lives* 5.13). Thus, aware of the possible positions on the unity of the *Rhetoric*, Grimaldi soundly argues for the most reliable, unified text, including unity of theme, theory, and structure.¹³

These eight salient features, in summary, constitute a Grimaldian interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of rhetoric as distinct from traditional readings of Aristotle. The eight features work coherently together, giving insight to the doctrine and details of Aristotle's thought on the rhetorical nature of language. As a consequence, Grimaldi sees a holistic dynamism in Aristotelian rhetoric functioning as both a theoretical and practical art. He defines Aristotelian rhetoric as the generation and communication of discovered judgments that appeal "to the *whole* person, the composite of intellect, feelings, emotions, and character" (1:350). The Aristotelian rhetor is both investigator and communicator who prepares whole persons to make reasoned judgments on any given topic; for audience is always the judge and rhetoric is always directed toward creating a particular judgment, opinion, or attitude, being an incipient action. Aristotle's dynamic, holistic view of rhetoric is antithetical to Plato's representation of sophistic rhetoric in many of his dialogues, but Aristotle's view of rhetoric has similarities to Plato's notion of "true rhetoric" in the *Phaedrus*, where Plato characterizes rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία (*psychagôgia*) (271d), the art of guiding souls or, more generally, rhetoric as an art of leadership (*Studies* 37-39;

¹³ Kennedy holds to the development theory but agrees with Grimaldi that the *Rhetoric* is fundamentally unified in theme and theory. Diogenes Laërtius is used to support both views, as Kennedy comments: "The list of Aristotle's writings given by Diogenes Laertius (5.24) contains an *Art of Rhetoric* in two books [*Technês rhêtorikês a' b'*] and a separate treatise [*Technê a'*], *On Style*. The usual view has been that Andronicus, the first-century-B.C.E. editor of Aristotle, combined them into the *Rhetoric* as we know it" ("Reworking Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" 181).

“Rhetoric and the Philosophy of Aristotle” 373).¹⁴

In his *Commentary*, Grimaldi’s methodology is Aristotelian, following enthymematic and paradigmatic modes of argument: thesis, analysis, and synthesis. He writes first a thesis by making a proposition about an opening statement in the chapter or about a key term or concept directed toward the major theoretical issues of Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric. Second, he analyzes judiciously the text in its primary context, elucidating key words and passages by respecting authorial intent as understood by lexical, syntactical, and grammatical usage and meaning; and he analyzes secondary contexts, including the Aristotelian corpus and prominent commentaries, both historical and contemporary. Third, Grimaldi synthesizes what he finds in his grammatical and historical studies, often commenting on the relationships among ideas in a way that illuminates our understanding of Aristotle’s principles and theory of authorship. Grimaldi’s interpretive methodology, often called Aristotelian and similar to the historical-critical method, seeks to understand words and phrases in their immediate and historical contexts. This commentary is Grimaldian by applying his methodology and philosophy to the Greek text of Book 3. This commentary reviews philological issues raised by interpreters of Aristotle’s text and corpus, which in sum comprises the three rich contexts surrounding the text.

Since Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is an ancient text that has meaningful contexts, three historical

¹⁴ Assessing Plato’s rhetoric against rhetoric, Schiappa and Taylor advise “two valuable hermeneutic practices: learning to read Plato rhetorically and learning to look first and foremost at primary textual material for our understanding of individual Sophists” (“How Accurate is Plato’s Portrayal of Gorgias of Leontini?” 30). R.L Howland serves as a rare exemplar of such an approach, who concludes that Plato’s “attack on rhetoric” in *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, and *Phaedrus* “is intended to refer to Isocrates as the most influential contemporary teacher of it [Gorgianic rhetoric]” (“The Attack on Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*” 151; cf. Schiappa and Taylor 29). Given this good possibility, one should not merely accept Plato’s dialogues as accurate accounts, but as engaged in interested rhetoric, particularly against Isocrates and his *paideia*, for which, in an historical irony, Plato coined *rhêtorikê* for what Isocrates had for years called *philosophia* (Howland 159; Schiappa, “Did Plato Coin *Rhêtorikê*?” 457; Cole, *Origins of Greek Rhetoric* 2).

layers of meaning inform our understanding of Aristotle's treatise. These three contexts are primary sources, historical secondary sources, and recent secondary sources, which together help create an understanding of Aristotle in light of Aristotle. Primary sources are Aristotle's text within his own corpus and culture. For understanding Aristotle's primary context, Grimaldi has two sound principles, for an interpreter should understand Aristotle's text in reference to the thematic unity of the text and his corpus, especially his *Poetics*, *Topics*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the authors to whom he refers and alludes. Secondary sources are of two types: historical and recent. When Cicero or Quintilian, for instance, claim to interpret Aristotle, their comments are historical secondary sources. The present commentary includes secondary sources of historical significance as far as they provide insight into Aristotle's text and theory of style and arrangement. Recent secondary sources have improved our understanding of primary and historical sources. Unlike Grimaldi's *Commentary*, this volume does not interact extensively with Spengel's *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica* I-II (Leipzig, 1867), for though it is the latest commentary (in Latin) after Cope's, Spengel gives minimal treatment of Book 3. The current volume interacts with a wealth of recent scholarship, from Cope's prolix *Commentary* to the many topical studies of current date.

All three types of sources (primary, historical secondary, and recent secondary) inform a reading of Aristotle's text. Accordingly, this commentary applies some insights but works against others that have clouded an understanding of Aristotle's text and theory. The present volume on *Rhetoric* III is an historical reconstruction of the text's language and meaning in light of Aristotle, in light of historical commentary, and in light of recent scholarship.

Based in a sound Grimaldian philosophy and methodology, this commentary seeks to be an historical reconstruction for rhetorical theorists and to a lesser degree a contemporary

appropriation for practitioners. One who makes an historical reconstruction “attempts to understand the contributions of past theorists . . . to understand the cultural context in which these theories originally appear”; one who makes a contemporary appropriation “attempts to utilize the insights of past theorists or practitioners in order to inform current theory or criticism” (Schiappa, Introduction xi). As an historical reconstruction for scholars and practitioners of rhetoric, the commentary asks and seeks to answer, “What does Aristotle mean by *lexis* and *taxis*? How does he theorize these metaphors as part of a *technê* concerned with three species of rhetoric?” As a contemporary appropriation for teachers and practitioners, the commentary seeks to be accessible and useful for those who have little familiarity with Greek but want to understand Aristotle’s text, theory, and technical language. Similar to Aristotle’s expositions on rhetoric at the Lyceum in the mid-fourth century, what a good commentary seeks to do is to provide readers with insight into Aristotle’s text and theory in a way that presents his handbook’s theoretical and practical implications to the reader. In this , the present commentary hopes to elucidate Aristotle’s text—the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*—for rhetorical theorists, teachers, and practitioners alike.

CHAPTER 1

ARTS OF RHETORIC

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

1.1-2. Arts of rhetoric with a review of Books 1-2 (1403b 6–1403b 18)

DEVELOPMENT

1.3-7. Delivery or *hypokrisis* (1403b 18–1404a 12)

1.8-9. Style in poetry (1404a 12–1404a 36)

TRANSITION

1.10 Style in prose (1404a 37–1404a 39)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

1.1. Ἐπειδὴ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἓν μὲν ἐκ τίνων αἱ πίστεις ἔσονται, δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, τρίτον δὲ πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου, περὶ μὲν τῶν πίστεων εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ πόσων, ὅτι ἐκ τριῶν εἰσι, καὶ ταῦτα ποῖα, καὶ διὰ τί τοσαῦτα μόνα· ἢ γὰρ τῶ αὐτοῖ τι πεπονθέναι οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ τῶ ποιούσ τινας ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς λέγοντας, ἢ τῶ ἀποδεδείχθαι, πείθονται πάντες. εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, πόθεν δεῖ πορίζεσθαι· ἔστι γὰρ τὰ μὲν εἶδη τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, τὰ δὲ τόποι.

1.1. Since there are three matters that need to be treated in discussion of speech—first, what will be the sources of the *pisteis*, second concerning the *lexis*, and third how the parts of a speech must be arranged [*taxis*]*—*an account has been given of the *pisteis* and their number, including the fact that they are drawn from three sources and what sort of things these are and why there are only these [three]. (All people are persuaded either because as judges they themselves are affected in some way or because they suppose the speakers have certain qualities or because something has been logically demonstrated.) An account has also been given of enthymemes and where they are to be found. (There are on the one hand species [*eidê*] of enthymemes and on the other hand there are topics.)

1403b 6. The first sentence is a transition, related to the previous sentence at the end of Book 2, since Aristotle lists and summarizes the unifying, thematic concepts from Books 1-2. These central heuristic concepts include (1) the three *pisteis* or means of persuasion, consisting of *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*; (2) the enthymeme, a “rhetorical syllogism” (1.2.8); and (3) specific

topics (εἶδη [eidê] of Book 1.4-14) and general or common topics (τόποι [topoi] of Book 2.23), from which a speaker or writer is able to generate respectively the matter and the form for enthymemes.

1403b 6. τρία [tria] (three): To introduce Book 3, Aristotle names in order of treatment three of his four “arts” (canons, crafts, offices, or procedures) of rhetoric: first, invention (*heuresis*) of “thought [*dianoian*]” (1403a6) through the use of “places” or strategies (*topoi*) for discovering the material and formal means of persuasion (*pisteis*) in Books 1-2; second, *lexis* (style of language); and third, *taxis* (arrangement). In sections 3-7, Aristotle remarks on *hypokrisis* (delivery or presentation), his fourth, undeveloped art with memory (the fifth art) being assumed within delivery. Isocrates may have been the first to distinguish the three fundamental arts of rhetoric; for in his treatise *Against the Sophists* 16-18 (ca. 390), he indicates that he teaches composition according to invention, arrangement, and style, giving style the most emphasis (Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 42-43). While the sophists and Isocrates teach rhetoric as formulae, Aristotle regards rhetoric as a faculty (*dynamis*) of mind (1.2.1).

The three arts are arranged “according to nature [*kata physin*]” by which Aristotle means the process of creation (3.1.3, 1403b18). The statement does not infer a linear creative process, but rather, as practitioners of rhetoric know, a dynamically recursive process as the protracted composition process of the *Rhetoric* itself testifies.¹ The treatise’s arrangement is analytical, reflecting an order of process, not necessarily by order of importance because the three arts are intertwined. Invention comes first, treating discovery and choices of the means of persuasion;

¹ Scholars agree that the composition of the *Rhetoric* was a lengthy research process involving extensive synthesis of sources and development of Aristotle’s technical terms. In the *Rhetoric*, three general periods of composition are evident that span Aristotle’s public career: during his academic residency in Athens (367-347), during his research residency in Asia Minor and Macedonia (347-335), and during his Lyceum residency in Athens (335-323) (Brandes 1-4; Kennedy 4-6; Cope, *Introd.* 39 ff.).

lexis is second, treating choices of words, syntax, sound, rhythm, figures, and urbanity; and *taxis* is third, treating choices of arrangement at the structural level of an argument. Since Aristotle defines rhetoric as an art of invention, a “faculty [*dynamis*] for seeing [*theôrêsai*] the available means of persuasion” (1.2.1, 1355b26), he gives invention priority of place and process, preceding style and arrangement in his treatise. Nonetheless, Aristotle treats style and arrangement as inventional arts, often with their own topical procedures, and he recognizes that invention occurs within the constraints of a selected genre, arrangement, and style of rhetoric. Between *lexis* and *taxis*, Aristotle develops his analysis from small to large units of meaning, starting with choices of words (3.2-9), choices of syntax (3.10-12), and choices of arrangement (3.13-19). Though these processes are distinct for purposes of analysis and discussion, they are not separate in the communicative process because the entire process is linguistic, involving intellectual processes of orality and literacy, effecting significant overlap between invention, style, and arrangement. Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric is distinctive because he recognizes how invention, style, and arrangement are intertwined, a feature that becomes especially evident as the discussion of *lexis* and *taxis* develops according to epistemic *topoi*. Mutuality among the arts of rhetoric shows that Aristotle considers rhetoric to be not merely a formal (sophistic) art but primarily a functional art, or ability (*dynamis*), for creating arguments and making appropriate choices in light of situation and audience.

Aristotle developed the concept of rhetorical arts (canons or methods) from his readings of rhetorical handbooks compiled in his now lost *Συναγωγή τεχνῶν*. Composed *ca.* 360-355, the *Synagôgê technôn* was a complete corpus of practical handbooks that Aristotle collected from his predecessors, the earliest rhetoricians: Empedocles, Tisias-Corax, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, Theodorus, Antiphon, Lysias, Licymnius, Isocrates, and others; these Aristotle

supplemented with his own views on rhetoric (Kennedy 5, 297 ff.; Enos, *Greek Rhetoric* 57-78; Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* 5; Erickson, “Lost Rhetorics” 6).² This studious approach accords with the inductive, descriptive methods that so many associate with the name of Aristotle in his vast inquiries into knowledge. Given this heritage in the *Synagôgê technôn*, the *Rhetoric* can be viewed as an encyclopedic treatise systematizing many successful practices of persuasive communication along with Aristotle’s contributions to the art (Poster 226). From a literary perspective, Hugh Lawson-Tancred observes that Book 3 “amounts to the first systematic study of the nature of prose style in the history of Western literary criticism” and, moreover, “the first true study of literary style as a universal vehicle for thought” (Introduction 32). Since the *Synagôgê technôn* and the *Rhetoric* were esoteric works, kept in the Lyceum (*Lykeion*) and not available to a general audience, information about the lost anthology arrives only after Aristotle’s library “was seized by the Roman general Sulla and sent to Rome around 83 BC,” where the scrolls were “arranged” by the grammarian Tyrannio and subsequently “published” by the philosopher Andronicus of Rhodes, head of the Peripatetic school at Rome (Kennedy 308;

² As a researcher, Aristotle typically begins his investigations with summary histories of disciplines of inquiry, histories that serve rhetorical-aporetic invention, both as places to start and as references for checking his own speculations about various *aporiai* (puzzles, problems, questions) that preoccupy the field. Concluding a logical treatise, Aristotle discusses his inductive procedure with respect to rhetoric: “On the subject of rhetoric there already existed much material enunciated in the past, whereas regarding reasoning [*syllogizesthai*] we had absolutely no earlier work to quote but were for a long time laboring at tentative researches” (*Soph El* 34, 184a9-184b3). Regarding aporetic invention, Aristotle begins his inquiry of metaphysics by surveying various *aporiai* in the field: “it is necessary that we should first review the things about which we need, from the outset, to be puzzled [*aporêsai*]” (*Met* 2, 995a24). Aristotle’s customary procedure is to build on the work of his predecessors, grateful for past discoveries, critical in evaluation, and searching for *aporiai* as problems to solve and questions to address (cf. Grimaldi, “How Do We Get?”).

Brandes 5; Lord, “On the Early History” 140).³ After this date, knowledge about Aristotle’s esoteric anthology of rhetoric arrives via lengthy quotations from Diogenes Laërtius (third century AD), Dionysius of Halicarnassus (first century BC), and from three works by Cicero (first century BC).⁴ Diogenes Laërtius lists the titles of Aristotle’s vast works of over two-hundred treatises, reporting this lost anthology as “*Technôn synagôgê a’ b’*” where *a’* and *b’* refer to two numbered papyrus scrolls (*Lives* 5.24.21; cf. Kennedy 297n9). While most handbooks on rhetoric in the fourth century focus on arrangement and style (a practice Plato chides as superficial rhetoric in *Phaedrus* 266d ff.), Aristotle introduces rhetorical invention and delivery as counterparts, or analogues, to dialectical invention and dramatic delivery, respectively. The latter would effectually assume extant methods of memory in Athenian drama. Thus, either in developed or in embryonic form, Aristotle sets the foundation for the five traditional arts of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery). These five arts appear first in the anonymous, pseudo-Cicero *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ca. 86 BC) and in Cicero’s *De Inventione* (84 BC). In *Brutus* (46 BC), Cicero states that rhetoric is “an art made up of five great arts” (6.25), establishing the Aristotelian tradition of five arts of rhetoric (cf. Solmsen, “Aristotelian Tradition” 216-29).

1403b 11. κρίνοντες [*krinontes*] (judges): This key term has general reference to all those who have a power or ability of discernment, decision, vote, or critical evaluation in either

³ The date is approximate. Carnes Lord dates Sulla’s acquisition of Aristotle’s library at the fall of Athens in 86 BC (“On the Early History” 140). The account and dating of events regarding the Aristotelian Corpus are recounted contemporaneously by Strabo, *Geographica* 13.1.54, and a century later by Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1.

⁴ Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Isocrate* 18), and Cicero (*De Inventione* 2.2.6, *De Oratore* 2.38.160, and *Brutus* 12). Kennedy quotes Cicero’s description of Aristotle’s *Synagôgê tekhnôn* (297). A collection of ancient testimony regarding the fine stylistic quality of Aristotle’s exoteric dialogues is assembled by W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta* (1955).

judicial, deliberative, or epideictic genres of rhetoric (LSJ 997). “Judges” or “critics” (both terms derive from κριτής, *kritês*) are those who evaluate the merit or quality of a policy, case, address, or artistic work according to principles of *êthos*, *pathos*, *logos* and situational propriety. Judgment, as Grimaldi points out, is “the very object intended by rhetorical argumentation, i.e., personal conviction which will motivate personal action,” making rhetoric an art of audience-centered communication (*Studies* 88). In rhetoric, judges have the last word; accordingly, “*krinate* [you judge]” is literally the last word of the *Rhetoric* (3.19.6). The *Rhetoric* itself is primarily deliberative rhetoric in that it offers advice about future actions and since Aristotle views rhetoric as a hybrid of “dialectic and ethical studies, which is rightly called politics [*politikê*]” (1.2.7). Moreover, whenever Aristotle discusses history and whenever he criticises sophistic rhetoric and praises his favorite authors’ urbane expressions, he practices judicial and epideictic rhetoric. In this sense, readers of the *Rhetoric* are deliberative, judicial, and epideictic “judges,” functioning respectively as critics of political, historical, and literary and cultural studies under the auspices of rhetoric (cf. 3.19.6, 1420b3).

1403b 13. ἐνθυμήματα [*enthymêmata*] (enthymemes): Aristotle reviews the heuristic sources of enthymemes, derived from specific topics (εἶδη [*eidê*]) and common topics (τόποι [*topoi*]). Grimaldi has commented extensively on these uniquely Aristotelian topics of invention.⁵ To recap, when Aristotle discusses the enthymeme in Books 1-2, he organizes sets of specific and common *topoi* to serve respectively as material and formal heuristics for enthymemes. In Book 1, the specific topics (*eidê*) help generate material for statements regarding

⁵ *Topoi* as commonplaces precede Aristotle, but what is unique to Aristotle is his development of a system of *topoi* as inferential forms of invention. Solmsen comments: “He replaces this [commonplace] method by an altogether different system of τόποι, conceiving the τόπος as a type or form of argument of which you need grasp only the basic structural idea to apply it forthwith to discussions about any and every subject” (“Aristotelian Tradition” 218; cf. *ERC* 724-25, s.v. “Topics”).

the three species of public discourse (cf. Grimaldi 1:94, 59b25-32). In Book 2, Aristotle lists twenty-eight common topics (*koinoi topoi*) to serve as “axiomatic forms, or modes of inference” for generating enthymemes pertaining to all argumentation (Grimaldi, *Studies* 126). *Koinoi topoi* “[apply to] all [species of rhetoric]” (2.22.17). Aristotle organizes his heuristic procedure around *topoi* because he considers them the essential templates for generating both matter and form for argumentation. Grimaldi classifies the twenty-eight *koinoi topoi* of Book 2 into three types of inferential patterns: (a) antecedent-consequent, cause-effect, (b) more-less, and (c) variously relations (1:356; cf. *Studies* 356). Similarly, Richard M. Weaver categorizes *koinoi topoi* in four helpful categories: definition (genus), causality (cause-effect), analogy (similarity and dissimilarity), and testimony or authority (“Language is Sermonic” 1354; cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 125). These forms of inference comprise the majority of arguments, serving to create and communicate new knowledge by demonstrating a conclusion (cf. 3.13).⁶ In the *Phaedrus*, Plato discusses two major dialectical heuristics, “clear definition” and “dividing by classes” (265d), and he engages in comparison-contrast and argument by analogy and testimony in his rhetorically striking myths (274c ff.). Though Plato and others practice a topical method, only Aristotle develops the method into a system of intellectual strategies for general use in dialectic

⁶ Following Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian create a topical system of rhetoric; for instance, Quintilian names ten topics: arguments are either *causes, effects, subjects, adjuncts, opposites, comparisons, names, divisions, definitions, or witnesses* (*Institutes of Oratory* 4). However, Cicero and Quintilian misunderstand that Aristotle’s common topics are, in fact, modes of formal inference. Grimaldi comments: “Many commentators, from Cicero on, have fastened upon the content (the particular topics) and then reduced the topics to the mere mechanics of invention, i.e. ways and means of developing and enlarging upon a theme” (*Studies* 126). Elsewhere Grimaldi states, “Cicero’s *Topica* does seem to have no more in common with Aristotle than its title” (Rev. of *Aristotelis Topica* 315n2).

and rhetoric. Clearly, Aristotle gives central place to heuristic *topoi* for creating enthymemes and communicating knowledge.⁷

1.2. περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἔχόμενον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον.

1.2. The next subject to discuss is *lexis*; for it is not enough to have a supply of things to say, but it is also necessary to say it in the right way, and this contributes much toward the speech seeming to have a certain quality.

1403b 15. λέξεως [*lexeōs*] (*lexis*): Refers to *selection*, the word's originary metaphor, signifying an inseparable, interactive relationship between *logos* and *lexis* given that selections of style and sense are suitable only in view of the whole and the rhetorical purpose. *Lexis* is derived from the Proto-Indo-European verbal “*leg-*” (the same root as *logos*) and the suffix “*-sis*” designating an action or abstraction, such as process, condition, or quality (Smyth 230, 244 [§840a2, §865]; Gross and Walzer 200). Derived from a particular usage of *legō*, *lexis* refers to the action of selecting, such as “pick up, pick out (such as stones for building),” and speech actions, such as “select, choose, reckon, count, and recount or tell” (LSJ 1033), thus referring to choices of words, phrasing, syntax, sound, rhythm, and ideas. Martin Heidegger finds a similar meaning: “*Legō, legein*, Latin *legere*, is the same word as our *lesen* (to collect): gleaning,

⁷ By direct or indirect descent, the “methods of exposition” procedures in contemporary composition and communication derive from Aristotle’s common topics. As Robert J. Connors has traced the recent history, Fred N. Scott and Joseph Denney in *Paragraph-Writing* (1891) made “the first truly popular codification” of the common topics for paragraph development in a composition book (448). Their topical method included “Contrast, Explanation, Definition, Illustration, Detail, and Proofs,” and these heuristic procedures have grown and diversified to dominate the methods approach in writing instruction (448-50). Methods of exposition are a heritage of Aristotle’s topics of invention, being perennially practical for developing enthymemes, paragraphs, and whole compositions (cf. *ERC* 248-50, s.v. “Exposition”).

collecting wood, harvesting grapes, making a selection” (131). In addition, primary connotations of *lexis* include *rhythm*, *variation*, and *gathering*, all associated with selection.⁸

The feminine noun *lexis* (genitive *lexeôs*) works as a category for the various elements of *style* and as an ability for *selecting* the right words.⁹ As a category, *lexis* is rightly translated as *style*, referring to all of the subsequent features, syntactical forms, values, and practices of style throughout chapters 1-12. As an ability, *lexis* refers to selection of appropriate “diction” in word choices and phrasing (LSJ 1038). In the Hellenistic era, Dionysius Thrax (170-90 BC) uses *lexis* to refer to choices of single words (*Art of Grammar* 8). Aristotle’s usage of *lexis* has a range of meaning, from the category of *style* to the ability of *selecting* appropriate methods and forms for composing a *logos* (speech or argument) (cf. *Poet* 19-22; Grimaldi 2:369, 03a36).

The metaphor of *selection* is always inherent in *lexis*, signified by the dative case of instrumental means, or what Aristotle would call the efficient or motive cause. When Aristotle

⁸ Three connotations in the etymology of *lexis* are rhythm, variation, and gathering, especially building materials. First, *lexis* has associations with rhythm and variation. In Plato’s *Laws* 7 (795e), *lexis* refers to rhythmical movements “in which the style of the Muse is imitated [*Mousês lexin mimoumenôn*]” in graceful dance. In Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1449a20), “comic diction [*lexeôs geloias*]” occurs with reference to dancing in Satyr plays, suggesting associations of rhythm and variation. Second, architectural metaphors are common in artistic language, including *legere*, so that choices of *lexis* are compared to selecting “stones for building.” Quintilian expands the *artificium* metaphor, describing invention as gathering materials and arrangement as organizing the materials “disposed in regular order [*dispositio in ordinem*]” (*Institutes of Oratory* 7, preface).

⁹ Like *rhêtorikê* itself, most technical terms in Greek rhetoric have feminine gender. Kennedy elaborates: “Greek nouns have grammatical gender, and as a result of the conventions of Greek word formation most rhetorical terms in Greek are feminine. . . . The Greek words for city [*polis*], political assembly [*ekklêsia*], and law court [*agora* and *dikê*] are also feminine. It is not clear, however, whether the ancient Greeks were conscious of rhetoric as operating in feminine space” (xiin1). In “Reworking Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*,” Kennedy begins to apply the theory of gynesis to the *Rhetoric*, observing that “a feminine principle” is seen “in the grammatical gender of some basic qualities and institutions” (172). Kennedy concludes with a modest proposal: “Aristotle and the Greeks generally thought of masculine *logos* as working within feminine civic space, the contained and the container” (173).

speaks of *lexis*, such as “compose in language [*tê lexei diathesthai*]” (3.1.3, 1413b20), he does so using the dative case of instrumental means: “how to compose this [these subjects, *pragmata*] by means of language,” not locative place “in language” (Smyth 346 ff.).¹⁰ Dative of means and location are often conflated in translations regarding language itself, but the difference is significant for understanding Aristotle’s theory of *lexis*. Applying Aristotle’s “four causes” to rhetoric helps elucidate the difference (cf. *Phys* 194b; *Met* 1013a). For rhetoric, thought (*dianoia*) is the material cause, referring to subject-matter (*pragma*), itself caused artistically by various heuristic *topoi*. *Lexis* considered as dative of location is the formal cause, referring to the form into which material (i.e., thought) is put or already exists, and regards style as a formal art. *Lexis* considered as dative of instrumental means is the efficient cause, referring to *how* something happens, and regards style as a functional or motive art for discovering the available means of language for producing meaning and response in view of audience.¹¹ The final cause (*telos*) in rhetoric is persuasion or, more objectively and artistically, the discovery of the available means of persuasion (1.2.1). According to the grammar of formal and efficient causes, *lexis* means not merely formal “in-scription” in language, but primarily functional methodology “via language,” both meanings supported by the *selection* metaphor in the word’s etymology. While rhetorical invention concerns the creation of thought (“*what* to say”), *lexis* along with

¹⁰ In discussions of language, English usage seldom distinguishes between dative of *means* and dative of *location*, both translated as “in language.” The English preposition “in” is governed by associations with the modern metaphor for language as a container, inscribed by the modern contents/container binary opposition for thought and language. To modern sensibilities, “in language” means “in container,” a transient and disposable location for eternal verities.

¹¹ Aristotle regularly considers human art (*technê*) to be the “efficient” or “motive” cause. For instance, in *Physics* 2.3, art is the origin of change regarding statue-making: “For both [artistic] actions and tools may be means, or ‘media,’ through which the efficient cause reaches the end aimed at” (195a2-4). Unlike material and formal causes, the efficient cause is distinct from and precedes the objects upon which it operates.

taxis concern choosing which thoughts to use, which words, which syntax, which arrangement (“*how* to say it *in* and *via* language”) to create the experience of learning with pleasure leading to informed suasion. Aristotle’s theory of style is epistemic and functional: the interrelationship between cognition and expression, *what* and *how*, is mediated by efficient or motive causes, creating a dynamic and purposeful functionalism.

Opposition between thought and style (*what* and *how*) is neither a rigid nor a natural dichotomy. The division of Books 1-2 (invention) and Book 3 (style and arrangement) is an analytical dichotomy, not definitional, created for purposes of analysis and arrangement. Stephen Halliwell agrees, asserting that Aristotle’s analytic arrangement and vocabulary do not reflect a “radical separation of style from sense” (“Style and Sense” 66). Following the Platonic tradition of expressivism, however, many interpreters assume a thought/expression or substance/style dichotomy, reading a philosophical dualism onto classical rhetoric. Definition by dichotomy is a Platonic methodology that Aristotle severely criticizes, describing it as “a weak syllogism, since it begs the point which it is required to prove, and always reaches a more general conclusion than is required” (*APr* 1.31, 46a33-35).¹² The Platonic method involves three problems: (1) tautology, the logical fallacy of begging the question; (2) over-generalization leading to over-simplification; and (3) fallacy of language, giving the appearance of clear classification when, in fact, contrast does not define.

¹² *Prior Analytics* 1.31: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις οἷον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμὸς· ὃ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, συλλογίζεται δὲ ἀεὶ τι τῶν ἄνωθεν (46a33-35). Later in the section, after demonstrating the fallacy of definition by division, Aristotle concludes: “Thus it is evident (1) that this method of inquiry is not adapted for every investigation, and (2) that it is useless even in those cases for which it is supposed to be especially suitable” (46b36-38).

Contrariwise, Aristotle provides positive definition by metaphor in the *Rhetoric*.¹³ Throughout Book 3, Aristotle adopts or creates metaphors to describe the dynamic, interactive relationship between *dianoia* and *lexis* (cf. 3.2.1 and 3.14.1). In addition to *lexis* with its inherent metaphor of *selection*, a prominent example is *metaballein*, in the phrases “speak the same thought in different words” (3.12.3, 1413b22) and “change enthymemes into maxims” (3.17.17, 1418b33). As discussed in chapter 12, this verb (having the *meta*- prefix like *metaphora* and the *ball* root like *parabolê*) may be accurately rendered as “change course” or “change direction” based in imagery of movement of travel along a pathway. *Metaballein* and *lexis* illustrate the classical model for style: style is *navigation*, choosing a course. Overlooked by other interpreters of classical style, this Hellenic metaphor is part of the Greek system of imagery, showing language to have an active role in orienting perspectives. This active account of language is very different than the passive, mimetic theory assumed by many interpreters, as implicit in modern metaphors for style (i.e., a “container” like a glass, blank slate, empty page, or *tabula rasa*, into which one pours the preexistent “substance” of ideas and facts for a table of “contents”). Thus the modern dichotomies: thought/expression, contents/container, substance/style, inside/outside.¹⁴ These rationalist binaries are also hierarchies since they devalue language and

¹³ Aristotle’s use of definition by metaphor is described throughout the commentary. Metaphor is “positive” definition because it involves the ability to perceive likenesses and also differences. A vivid example is Aristotle’s definition of “definition” using ὄρος (*horos*), literally “boundary stone” (e.g., *Rhet* 1.10.19). Definition by metaphor is the most common method of definition, as witnessed by the metaphorical basis of world-views; for instance: man or woman is a thinking-thing for modernism, a soul for romanticism, an animal for behaviorism, an enigma for existentialism, an interpreter for constructionism, a fallen image for Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions, an off-spring or creature of God in religion generally, and a rational creature for Aristotle.

¹⁴ Metaphors are inherent in a culture’s language and logic, including binary oppositions. Modernist metaphors create the substance/style dichotomy shaping modern culture’s perception and valuation of language arts. Each single dichotomy is but one part of a larger cultural logic,

subordinate style to outside status and function: supplement to thought and external “packaging.” This common perspective is inscribed by socially justified belief, itself inscribed in metaphors, but the modern metaphors must be put under erasure in order to understand Greek rhetorical style and how Aristotle understands *lexis*.

Translating languages having different master metaphors is a translation of culture. An interpreter should be aware of a language’s systems of imagery and beware of false cognates amid binary terms. Rhetorical awareness of this kind has been lacking among interpreters of classical rhetoric, revealing the need to elucidate the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*, especially for understanding style. The Platonic thought/expression hierarchy, for instance, has frequently resulted in misinterpretations of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the rhetorical tradition. This sort of misinterpretation is what one finds in E.M. Cope’s great *Commentary* on Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, wherein Cope exiles language from “inside” thought to “outside” expression, thus denigrating “mere style” with a rigid opposition between signified and signifier (Cope 3:2; Cope, *Intro.* 278-82).¹⁵ Assuming the theory of Platonic expressivism, Cope displays a mimetic view of

including the following modernist binaries: fact/value, reason/faith, mind/body, logic/rhetoric, object/subject, public/private, philosophy/literature, etc., which construe a simplistic or false understanding of each term (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* 25-30). Since metaphors function as “stylistic syllogisms” (cf. 3.2.6 and 3.10.2), one’s own cultural metaphors and values must be recognized in order to interpret, understand, and appreciate another culture’s language and logic—an application of the Greek dictum, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, “Know thyself.”

¹⁵ Cope recapitulates his mimetic theory of language, attributing it to Aristotle, by writing that *lexis* refers to “the kind of language used, quite independently of the arguments” (3:2); again, “mere style, as distinguished from thought and matter” (*Intro.* 278); and again, “the office of language is to express our meaning” (*Intro.* 282), always interpreting *lexis* as “after thought,” thus exiling style to expression. Cope is not unique in maintaining an extralinguistic, “pure” consciousness, for rationalist thinkers consistently overlook the linguistic character of consciousness: Plato’s forms, Hume’s perceptions, and Kant’s categorical forms, for instance, are non-linguistic, rendering their ideas anachronistic today. Beginning in the twentieth century, linguists, psychologists, and phenomenologists discovered and emphasized the semiological conditioning of consciousness and experience, which today is almost universally admitted. The

language (copy theory) so that style is ornamentation added to preformed thought rather than viewing style as concomitant with thought. Unlike Aristotle, Cope does not acknowledge the extent to which style structures thought, including the creative, structural ability to form inferences and new ideas. Aristotle presents style, and especially metaphor, with a consistently epistemic function that has more in common with the new rhetoric of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, who view metaphor and analogy, for instance, as “important in invention and argumentation fundamentally because they facilitate the development and extension of thought” (*New Rhetoric* 385). Likewise, Aristotle treats metaphor rhetorically since “metaphor most brings about learning” and “creates understanding and knowledge” in a way that is “pleasing” (3.10.2). What interests Aristotle is style’s rhetorical work, not its passive representation or its ornamentation.

Beyond a dualistic view of style as a “shell” imposed upon thought or an “ornament” added to thought, the Aristotelian theory of style views language as interactive with thought. His functional, interactive view is often described by the metaphor *organic*, indicating that just as form and substance are inseparable in nature, so in style are form and thought interrelated. Using this language, Grimaldi asserts, “Aristotle’s view of discourse is organic, not separatist” (*Studies* 156). This organic, epistemic theory of style originates with Aristotle since he is the first to show how style and thought are inseparable “through nature, purpose, logic, arrangement, and other features” (Butler, *Out of Style* 25; Kinneavy, *Theory of Discourse* 358). James Kinneavy reports the history of these two prominent theories: the “shell” view of style is characteristic of “the entire sophistic (or stylistic) group of rhetoricians,” including Plato, Stendhal, Edmund Burke, De Quincey, the Geneva School of linguistics, and Cope as evident in his commentary; in

(re)discovery that language is not only rhetorical but also epistemic calls for the reinterpretation of the rhetorical tradition, of which Aristotle’s expansive *Rhetoric* functions as the *fons et origo*.

contradistinction, the “organic” view of style includes Aristotle, Cicero, Longinus, Augustine, Ben Jonson, John Middleton Murry, and Kinneavy along with the traditions that each theorist represents (*Theory of Discourse* 358-63). The contrast between these two theories of style highlights how the Platonic tradition of expressivism, including Cope’s dualism and mimetic theory of language, have worked to misconstrue Aristotle, who views style as a mode of argumentation for advancing relationships concerning the structure of reality.

Three observations or facts displace the separatist or shell theory of style, thus making way for a more accurate interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of style. These reasons concern the nature of language generally, Hellenic language particularly, and Aristotle’s unique insights on the cognitive function of style. First, language, including style, is never merely external and never mere orality but completely synthesized with cognition and writing so that rhetors always work “*in a language and in a logic*” whose signifying structure is largely governed by cultural metaphors and graphic literacy (discussed in 3.12).¹⁶ Second, Hellenic metaphors strongly shape an interactive relationship between thought and style, for when Aristotle arranges *dianoia* and *lexis* as a pair (cf. 2.26.5; *Poet* 1450b4-13, 1456a34), the terms are never a simple opposition because Hellenic systems of imagery shape the pair’s integral relationship (discussed below).¹⁷ Third, Aristotle perceives logical inference as a function of style, including antithesis but

¹⁶ The phrase with emphasis is Derrida’s. What Derrida asserts about inhabiting language, and not merely using it, is significant for appreciating translation and rhetorical style: “the writer writes *in a language and in a logic* whose proper system, laws, and life his discourse by definition cannot dominate absolutely. He uses them only by letting himself, after a fashion and up to a point, be governed by the system” (*Of Grammatology* 158). The “system, laws, and life” of a language include its systems of imagery, metaphors, and philosophical pairs in binary opposition, which must be understood to render an accurate interpretation.

¹⁷ Emphasizing the role of imagery in language, Kennedy asserts the thesis, “Writing is prior to speech but not prior to rhetoric,” in which writing, or “grammatology” as described by Derrida, is understood as arche-writing, referring to the systems of imagery in language, and rhetoric is defined as “energy existing in life” and inherent in communication (“Hoot” 13).

especially metaphor, being a *tropos* (“turn”) but primarily a *topos* of invention, a “stylistic syllogism” that creates knowledge with quick and thus pleasant learning (discussed in 3.2.6, 3.10.7, and 3.11.5; cf. Grimaldi 1:21, 55a8, for a discussion of syllogism).

While modern metaphors relegate style to form and expression, Hellenic metaphors for style are robust and dynamic because they do double-duty for art and life, based in the association of finding and navigating a “path” or “way” (ὁδός). *Hodos* or “path” is such a common metaphor for intellectual ways, means, methods, and artistic pursuits that it forcefully works in classical languages and in the art of rhetoric, associating rhetoric with the metaphor “journey along life’s way” (LSJ 1199, s.v. ὁδός).¹⁸ Encompassing notions of place, timing, and means/ethics, the pathway metaphor has contributed to the rich language of Greek rhetoric. In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, the results of the *hodos* metaphor include the following key terms:

- *Methodology (hodos poiein)*: meaning “to make a path,” providing the language and rationale for defining rhetoric as a method (*meta-hodos*) and art (*technê*) (1.1.2);¹⁹
- *Topoi*: heuristic “places” of discovery along the pathway (1.4-15; 2.19; 2.23; 3.15);
- *Virtues of style (lexeôs aretê)*: choices of diction and direction along the way (3.2);
- *Prepon*: propriety in choosing the middle way, Latinized as *via media* (3.7);

¹⁸ Cf. Greek LXX translation (ca. 250 BC) of Psalm 1:1 comparing life choices to choices while travelling along a “way” (*hodos*), as found also in translations.

¹⁹ In 1.1.2, Aristotle combines terms of pathway and theory: “[I]t would also be possible to do the same by [following] a path [*hodos poiein*]; for it is possible to observe [*theôrein*] the cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art [*technê*]” (1.1.2). Translators variously render the phrase, ὁδός ποιεῖν (*hodos poiein*) as “systematically” (Roberts), “reduced to a system” (Freese), “reducing the process to a method” (Cooper), and “[following] a path” (Kennedy), but the phrase literally means “to make a path,” based in the root metaphor of “pathway.” The parallelism indicates that Aristotle associates the infinitive *poiein* with the following infinitive *theorein*, showing that the verbals are meant as synonyms: both “making a path” and “seeing a reason” mean “to methodologize” or “to theorize” about the *technê*. Aristotle’s intention is to craft a theorized, methodical art of rhetoric, from invention to style to arrangement.

- *Navigation* (inherent in *lexis* and *metaballein*): choosing or changing a course of direction through rhetorical “passages” (3.1-12);
- *Periodos* (*peri plus hodos*): periodic style of syntax, including antithesis and balanced clauses, coined by Aristotle as a grammatical-stylistic term (3.9; Kennedy 214);
- *Agôn* in *lexis agônistikê* (oral debating style): style as strategy, likened to movements along pathways on a field of battle (3.12; cf. LSJ 18, s.v. *agôn*);²⁰
- *Taxis*: “arrangement,” being a military term for ordering and arranging troops along strategic lines and paths (3.13; cf. Kennedy 230);
- *Stasis* (*amphisbêtêsis*): place of conflict between contrary movements along a pathway, metaphorically referring to the disputed issue (3.15.2; cf. Dieter 216);
- *Diabolê* (from *diaballô*): meaning “throw over” or “carry across” a path, metaphorically referring to “attack” (3.15; LSJ 389);
- *Diêgêsis*: “leading through” the facts or events as along a narrative pathway (3.16);
- *Prooimion*: a composite of *pro* plus *oimos*, meaning “way, road, path” (LSJ 1206), likening introductions to “path-makers [*hodopoiêsis*]” preparing the way for continuing along the path (3.14.1, 1414b21).

This list of metaphors derived from *hodos* is not exhaustive, but the list demonstrates that the key terms of classical rhetoric are metaphors, *hodos* being one of the “root” metaphors and certainly the most dynamic and productive, possessing what Aristotle calls *energeia* (cf. 3.11.1-5).

While Aristotle never states that *lexis* is *hodos*, his language implies the relationship.²¹ Rhetoric is a method (*meta-hodos*) of thinking (*dianoia*) and wording (*lexis*) along the heuristic

²⁰ *Agôn* survives with the root metaphor “argument is war” (cf. Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* 4).

pathway through positions, places, and passages. The many metaphors in rhetoric arising from *hodos* seem to have developed with the art of rhetoric as part of the system of Greek metaphors. For instance, both Gorgias and Plato call rhetoric the “psychagogic art [*psychagôgia*],” a term referring to “guiding souls” along a pathway to the end of persuasion, but their term is a turn upon *hodêgia*, the standard *hodos* metaphor for guiding and teaching (Plato, *Phaedrus* 271d; Murphy and Katula 41; LSJ 2026).²² In developing his technical vocabulary, as Grimaldi points out, Aristotle’s “general approach to a problem was to work from out of the tradition,” finding his metaphors like enthymeme already in the Greek language and the early rhetorical tradition (*Studies* 88). Aristotle develops this language envisioning the rhetorician as a walker (*peripatêtikos*) who finds and navigates pathways through positions, places, and passages among civic spaces (Kennedy, “Reworking Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* 171).

Style is navigation (*hodeuô*): a journey of invention in the discovery of expression. Inherent in *lexis* and arising from the *hodos* conceit, the navigation metaphor strongly shapes an integral relationship between *lexis* and *dianoia* and between rhetorical style and invention. For these reasons, the navigation metaphor complicates the modern dualism of substance/style in at least three ways, regarding subject-object relations, perceptions of audience, and theory-practice integration. First, regarding subject-object relations, the navigation metaphor signifies not simply a spatial object, privileging the metaphor of objectivity, but also a spatial-temporal experience, envisioning the engagement of subject with object. The difference is reductionism versus holism.

²¹ Quoting common metaphors from well-known speeches, Aristotle calls Iphicrates’ phrase, “My path of words [*hodos moi tôn logôn*],” a metaphor from analogy (3.10.7, 1411b2).

²² The *hodos* conceit in the context of eloquence occurs as early as the eighth-century hymn to the Muses in Hesiod’s *Theogony* (1.103). Jeffrey Walker describes this occurrence, wherein the eloquence of prince and poet is “figured as the ability to deflect or ‘turn aside’ the listener’s mind from its current state or path” (*Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* 4).

While modern metaphors privilege the object, leading to the illusory idea of pure, individualistic induction, classical metaphors impart a balanced view of language based in common human experience, displacing neither object nor subject, privileging neither space nor time, but both, associating language with physical and intellectual movement, or a dynamic *journey*. Second, regarding perceptions of audience, the navigation metaphor personalizes rhetorical style because it envisions audience in a face-to-face meeting, whether that meeting occurs as an oration before an assembly, as a roadside dialogue perhaps under a plane tree, or as a battle-like confrontation on a field. In either case, style is not static “packaging,” but a dynamic, social *encounter*. Third, regarding theory-practice integration, the pathway-navigation metaphor creates integration and mutuality between invention and style since both are methodological arts and both involve the creation of inferential forms, such as metaphor enabling inference and easy learning for new ideas. Thus, “finding a way” and “navigating the way” are not necessarily different processes in rhetoric: the pathfinder must navigate *in* language, and the navigator may blaze trails of discovery *by means of* language. Rhetorical invention and style have a cause-effect, lead-follow relationship that may occasionally or frequently be reversed. Speakers and writers of all kinds discover Aristotle’s interactive theory of *lexis* to be true; stated in general terms: practice is from theory, but also theory is from reflective practice. Arising from the *hodos* conceit, the navigation metaphor envisions style as a journey of invention in the discovery of expression.

1403b 17. ὥς δεῖ εἰπεῖν [*hōs dei eipein*] (necessary to say it in the right way): Here is Aristotle’s purpose statement regarding the necessity of studying style. The short section is a single enthymeme (one thought in Greek and one complex sentence in translation), illustrating enthymematic form and inferential function. After the proposition (e.g., “it is necessary to study rhetorical *lexis*”), the supporting rationale is given: “for it is not enough to have a supply of

things to say but it is also necessary to say it in the right way”; followed by a further reason or result: the appearance of “a certain quality” for the argument (*logos*). As Kennedy notes, “In Aristotle’s own writing enthymemes often take the form of a statement followed by a clause introduced by the Greek particle *gar* [γάρ], which gives a supporting reason [and sometimes a corollary]” (xii). Kennedy’s translation follows closely the Greek syntax, wherein the statement of proposition is followed by a semicolon and the particle *for*, after which are the supporting reason(s) and result(s). Since Aristotle generally writes his treatises (probably being his lecture notes) in rhetorical form, one notices that an enthymeme is a “relaxed syllogism” (2.22.10), often an inverted syllogism as in this section, usually suited for a general audience and treating the subject-matter of practical reason (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 146). Rhetorical form is Aristotle’s preferred and common mode of discourse in his extant treatises, suggesting that his treatise on rhetoric is intended as a general theory of language and discourse. Kennedy comments on the rhetorical forms and construction of Aristotle’s major treatises.²³ Aristotle’s appealing, practical reason for treating rhetorical *lexis* is that human sensibility for a certain quality or character of thought and presentation demands it.

Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric focuses on invention, “supply of things to say,” as well as style in Book 3, how “to say it in the right way,” in a manner that recognizes the integration of style and sense in view of audience. Modern translators, however, render a thought/style dualism where Aristotle makes an invention/style distinction, indicative of his interactive theory of style.

²³ Kennedy proposes that philosophers should read Aristotle’s treatises as rhetorical constructs: “They might, for example, begin to observe the system of imagery prevailing in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is filled with teleological, emotionally based metaphors. What appear on the surface to be rational arguments are at the most usually enthymemes, not syllogisms, and their persuasive quality is often derived from ethos and pathos. They should explore also the concept of the audience in each of the treatises, seen for example in the patterns in which Aristotle shifts from use of the first person singular to the first person plural” (“Responses” 246).

For instance, Freese: “for it is not sufficient to know *what* one ought to say, but one must also know *how* to say it.” Most modern translators (Cope, Roberts, Cooper, Freese, Lawson-Tancred) render a conventional *what-how* distinction, but some like Cope assume that thought (an articulated *what*) is prelinguistic and can exist prior to language (*how* of style). Cope separates *what* from *how* in his phrase, “quite independently of the arguments” (3:2).²⁴ However, the passage has no signs that Aristotle has dualistic assumptions, so Kennedy’s more literal rendering is preferable: “supply of things to say” for invention, and “right way” for style. Halliwell renders a similar translation, adding an explanation: “This [distinction] does not amount to a radical separation of style from sense. What it does represent is, first, an analytical distinction between the subject-matter and the linguistic fabric of a speech, and, secondly and accordingly, a model of two different aspects of the process of rhetorical creation” (“Style and Sense” 66). Aristotle makes a distinction for purposes of analysis and arrangement, not for definition. The distinction is also practical, for it is certainly possible for a rhetor to have proofs and evidence but not be able to translate subject-matter into successful style and arrangement, or vice-versa, to start with a standard genre or arrangement and need to create or supplement it with the means of persuasion and clear statements capable of creating a shared perspective.

A parallel passage regarding the necessity of both style and sense is found in *Poetics* 17: “It is necessary to construct plots [*mythous*] and to work them out with diction [*lexei*], with the situation as much as possible before the mind’s eye [*pro ommatôn*]; for thus, seeing things most vividly, as if present, one will discover what is appropriate [*heuriskoi to prepon*]” (1455a22-25,

²⁴ At 3.1.2, Cope equates style with impression: “‘for it is not sufficient to know *what* to say, it is necessary also to know *how* to say it; and this contributes greatly to the impression conveyed of a certain *character* in the speech’ The tone of voice, the expression of the features, the gestures employed, the kind of language used, quite independently of the arguments” (3:2, emphasis in original). By separating style from thought, Cope misrepresents Aristotle as a stylistic dualist.

my translation).²⁵ The stylistic terms, visualization (*pro ommatôn*) and propriety (*to prepon*), apply to thought and style because, for Aristotle, visualizing the situation helps create and select appropriate plots, arguments, and style; this insight on the visual nature of thought becomes a key component of his metaphorology (cf. 3.10-11). Throughout Book 3, the analytical style-sense distinction “gives way, where the details of *lexis* are concerned, to an awareness of the many ways in which stylistic choices can help to determine both the significance and the expressive force of what is conveyed by words” (Halliwell, “Style and Sense” 67). In the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*, Aristotle shows that style and thought are coextensive and integrated in the processes of developing a composition. Later orators in the Aristotelian tradition would phrase the same principle as the union of *sapientia et eloquentia* (wisdom and eloquence), which makes a *perfectus orator* (Cicero, *De Oratore* 13.59; Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* 4.5.7).

1.3. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι· τρίτον δὲ τούτων, ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὐπω δ' ἐπικεχίρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψωδιᾶν ὅψε παρήλθεν· ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγωδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικὴν· ὅπερ ἕτεροὶ τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήσιος.

1.3. The first thing to be examined was naturally that which comes first by nature, the facts from which a speech has persuasive effect; the second is how to compose this in language [*lexis*]; and third is something that has the greatest force, but has not yet been taken in hand, the matter of delivery [*hypokrisis*]. Even in regard to tragedy and rhapsody, delivery was late in coming to be considered; for originally, the poets themselves acted their tragedies. Clearly there is something like this in rhetoric, as in poetics. Some others have given attention to the latter, among them Glaucon of Teos.

1403b 19. πράγματα [*pragmata*] (facts): A key term (*pragmata* is plural of *pragma*) referring to the factual “subject-matter” or “facts” within a formal argument (*logos*), as distinguished from appeals outside of the subject, including some but certainly not all appeals to

²⁵ *Poetics* 17: δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα ὁ ὁρῶν ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνώμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὕρισκοι τὸ πρέπον (1455a22-25).

character and emotion (cf. 1.1.3, 1354a15, and Grimaldi 1:9, 54a15:2). For Aristotle, argument from the factual subject-matter (*pragma*) is primary so that an audience can make an informed judgment; without factual information, rhetoric becomes empty and deceptive. Referencing a basic distinction, Aristotle regards the means of persuasion as “in the subject” itself (πίσταις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι [*pisteis en autô tō pragmati*]) and “outside of the subject” (τὰ ἔξω τῶν πραγμάτων [*ta exô tōn pragmatôn*]) (cf. 1.1.3). Persuasion in the subject comes about by rhetorical or dialectical argumentation about *pragmata*, including a balance of the three appeals. Persuasion outside of the subject is unbalanced, appealing to character and emotion with little or no reference to and reasoning about factual information. Balanced presentation, however, involves an integration of the three kinds of subject-matter (*êthos*, *pathos*, and *pragma*) in view of audience and contingent, practical knowledge (cf. 2.1.2 and 3.17.1-9; Grimaldi 2:5-7, 77b24). The Academic distinction between rhetoric *with* dialectic (Plato’s “true rhetoric”) and rhetoric *without* dialectic (sophistry) characterizes much of the dialogue between philosophy and rhetoric since Aristotle. Following Aristotle’s assertion of the equality of the three appeals, Cicero and Augustine sought the objective of unifying wisdom and eloquence (*sapientia et eloquentia*) in a philosophic rhetoric.

Grimaldi, following Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lysias* 19), makes an important distinction among three meanings of *logos*, referring to factual material (*pragma*), forms of inference (*enthymêma*), and speech or argument (*logos*) generally (1:39, 56a1:3). This range of meaning is significant for rightly understanding the equality of the artistic sources (*pisteis entechnoi*). Frequently, commentators confuse and then reduce the formal and material elements of persuasion. Cicero, Quintilian, Cope, and Spengel, for instance, fail to adequately distinguish

between *logos* and enthymeme (Cope 1:5-6).²⁶ As a result, the three artistic *sources* of persuasion become unequal *modes* of persuasion, wherein the third appeal (*logos*) provides the only subject-matter for reasoning by enthymeme. Dionysius and Grimaldi, however, recognize and distinguish between formal and material elements of enthymematic persuasion. Therefore, they interpret *pragma* as referring to the factual subject-matter, “subject matter which submits to reason and offers a logical explanation of the subject,” while *enthymêma* refers to the rational form that organizes all three artistic sources of persuasion (1:39; *Studies* 146). The three artistic sources are *pragma*, *êthos*, and *pathos* since these three *pisteis* name “the substantial elements which enable a person to lead an other toward belief or conviction” (145). Grimaldi comments, defining these terms:

These *pisteis* are *pragma*, the logical and factual presentation of the subject-matter, those rational probabilities, opinions, truths about the subject which translate it to the mind as reasonable; *ethos*, the element of the personal, the person of the speaker and the auditor, his style, so to speak, as it is affected by and flows into the subject-matter; and finally *pathos*, the interplay of feeling, sensibility, emotions in relation to the subject of discourse. (*Studies* 145)

The three appeals categorize the intellectual and psychological forces of persuasion. An orator creates coherent discourse by organizing the three material sources within the three forms of inference: the logical syllogism for organizing sources of rational knowledge, the rhetorical enthymeme for arranging sources of practical knowledge, and the stylistic metaphor for creating shared perceptions of reality. These forms are methodological instruments for reasoning from the

²⁶ Cope calls *êthos* and *pathos* “auxiliary and subordinate” to *logos*, and he compiles a list of citations in his commentary of those who mostly agree with him (Cope 1:5-6, 1:28-29; Cicero, *De Oratore* 2.27.115, 121, and 128; Quintilian, 6.2.18-19).

three material sources to create learning and persuasion. Together, material sources are known as the rhetorical appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*), but it is necessary to distinguish the meaning of the third appeal (*logos*) between *pragma* and *enthymêma*, designating respectively the material and formal elements of factual persuasion.

1403b 20. τῆ λέξει διαθέσθαι [*tê lexei diathesthai*] (compose in language): *Lexis* here refers to “language” generally and connotes three ideas: first, the distinction of *lexis* from subject-matter (*pragmata*), that which is composed by means of language; second, the identification of *lexis* as a category referring to Book 3.2-12; and third, the identification of *lexis* as a functional art of language. In the phrase, *lexis* is in the dative case, indicating neither dative proper (indirect object), nor dative of location (i.e., “in language”), but dative of instrumental means: e. g., “how to compose this [subject, *pragmata*] by means of language” to produce persuasion (cf. Smyth 346 ff.). Though the latter two usages seem possible, the locative dative requires “the aid of a preposition” and a concrete noun, being “used only of proper names” (Smyth 351 [§§1533-34]). These two requirements are absent from the passage; therefore, the dative of instrumental means is the correct interpretation. Since *lexis* is an abstract noun, it must always be read as referring to means, particularly a methodological art of function. Since in the context Aristotle is speaking of means (“how to compose”), he describes *lexis* as a methodology for selecting the best forms and functions of language. In addition, *lexis* is understood as a methodology by its etymology and its inherent metaphor of *selection*, signifying choices of diction, phrasing, syntax, sound, rhythm, figures, and timing in view of their aesthetical and rhetorical functions in a situation (cf. 3.1.2). For the Greeks, as Grimaldi comments, “content is inextricably bound in with the medium, that the ‘what’ of one’s statement is eminently qualified by the ‘way-in-which’ or ‘way-by-which’ one expresses the statement” (*Studies* 16). In his

remarks, Grimaldi renders the “way” (*hodos*) metaphor as dative of instrumental means, highlighting the method-motive aspect of style. When language itself is being described, English usage seldom distinguishes between dative of means and dative of location. Translations inevitably indicate the latter, “in language,” a usage implying and facilitating the modern misrepresentation that style is only a formal art (i.e., “packaging”). This construal is a mistake, not supported by the grammar, context, etymology, and principle Greek metaphors. The primary usage of *lexis* refers to its efficient cause, style being an art of means regarding how language functions to create meaning and holistic, psychological response, including the nexus of intellect, emotions, and ethical principles that are thoroughly integrated in all human response. Hence, the major principle of “*rhetorical style*” is function, especially pedagogical function. Form always serves function, their respective roles seen as a cause-effect relationship in view of audience. Since thought exists only in language, incarnate in particular words, style is seen as the effective means of causing results or producing response. Style as a formal art treats grammatical, syntactical, rhythmical, melodic, and figural forms, but form is rarely an end but always a means to a certain function. Style as a functional art focuses on anticipated effects, such as the available means of language for teaching, pleasing, and moving an audience toward informed persuasion (cf. the discussion of *lexis* at 3.1.2).

1403b 22. ὑπόκρισιν [*hypokrisin*] (delivery): Aristotle introduces rhetorical delivery as the counterpart or analogue to poetic performance, drawing similes from acting, specifically rhapsody and drama. According to the division of *what* to say and *how* to say it, *hypokrisis* and *lexis* are posited in the *how*-to-say-it or stylistic category. Unlike *lexis*, Aristotle views delivery as largely a matter of natural talent, but like *lexis*, delivery has “great effect” upon an audience. In *Poetics*, delivery is excluded from the poet’s art because it properly belongs to the actor’s art.

Unlike most poets, orators both compose and deliver their speeches. By stating that delivery is an art, Aristotle must argue against Plato to some extent (cf. *Republic* 3.395e–396b, 397a). Kennedy comments: “Among the traditional parts of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery), delivery is prior to the others” in terms of “physical motion in response to some exigence,” for which reason *actio* (action, acting) often serves as the Latin translation for *hypokrisis* (“Hoot” 12; cf. *ERC* 1, s.v. “Actio”). When understood in its most general sense, rhetoric is *energeia*, that is, emotional, physical, and intellectual energy that becomes communication in response to a rhetorical exigency.

Aristotle’s introduction to delivery lists a few features without treating those features, such as vocalization and tonal inflection. Conspicuously absent are features of bodily language, such as gestures, mannerisms, posture, eye contact, and facial expressions. Although Aristotle writes within an oral culture, his brief statements on delivery do not seem to consider how an orator may combine both inventing and performing of a speech when thoughts become language in the mind, nor the techniques of composing for delivery, nor the art of memory. Aristotle lists briefly variables of voice, suggesting in effect that treatment of vocal delivery is sufficient since acting is a matter of talent and practice, or that another should treat more fully the subject of delivery.

1.4 ἔστι δὲ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρησθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλη καὶ πότε μικρὰ καὶ μεση, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξεῖα καὶ βαρεῖα καὶ μέση, καὶ ῥυθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἕκαστα. τρία γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ἃ σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δ’ ἔστι μέγεθος ἁρμονία ῥυθμός. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὔτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μείζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικούς ἀγῶνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτῶν.

1.4. It is a matter of how the voice should be used in expressing each emotion, sometimes loud and sometimes soft or intermediate, and how the pitch accents [*tonoi*] should be intoned, whether as acute, grave, or circumflex, and what rhythms should be expressed in each case; for [those who study delivery] consider three things, and these are volume, change of pitch [*harmonia*], and rhythm. Those [performers who give careful attention to these] are generally the

ones who win poetic contests; and just as actors are more important than poets now in the poetic contests, so it is in political contests because of the sad state of governments.

1403b 28. πάθος [*pathos*] (emotion): Delivery is a matter of both emotional expression and emotional appeal. Concerning an orator's expression, Aristotle shows that the rational sources of argument (*logos*) cannot be separated from *êthos* or *pathos* in practice, though one may consider them separately in theory. All three sources of rhetorical appeal are intimately interrelated, thus rendering rhetoric a general and natural theory of language (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 15 ff. for more on this theme in Aristotelian rhetoric).

1403b 31. μέγεθος [*megethos*] (volume): “Megaphone” is a close transliteration for “volume” in Greek. Aristotle names three levels of volume (loud, soft, intermediate) for expressing three emotional levels of rhetoric, a precursor to the three levels of style, or *genera dicendi*: grand (or majestic), middle (or temperate), and plain (or subdued) styles.

1403b 31. ἄρμονία [*harmonia*] (change of pitch): refers to changes of intonation, especially by variation of the voice. For the ancient Greeks, with their pitch-accents sounding like musical notes, sound variation affects sense, aesthetics, and response to a significant degree. In his study of ancient Greek euphony, W.B. Stanford remarks that a classical stylist, to please an audience, would “as Dionysios says, either select words containing chiefly the pleasant-sounding letters, or else—and better, since variety is an essential of good style—he should blend the rough with the smooth, the hard with the soft, the cacophonous with the euphonious, the difficult to pronounce with the easy to pronounce, the short with the long, so as to produce an agreeable mixture” (*Sound of Greek* 56).²⁷ Variation is pleasing and effective, including variation in pitch, euphony, wording, syntax, and imagery within an oration. In stylistics, the created or assumed

²⁷ Stanford summarizes theoretical aspects of sound and style that derive from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition* (12.130.23 ff., 12.134.7 ff., and 16.160.8 ff.).

relationship between sound and sense is known as imitative form, the idea that sound mirrors meaning, or that words have outer sounds and inner meanings having some correspondence. Thus, a beautiful harmony and rhythm convey an aesthetical impression, to the emotions at least, of a good and worthy message. Qualities of euphony translate to qualities of meaning since the ancient Greeks did not dissociate the good from the beautiful, largely due to their assumptions about imitative form, or mimesis in words (Stanford 99 ff.; see discussion of imitative form at 1404a21).

1403b 31. ῥυθμός [*rhythmos*] (rhythm): Refers to any regular recurring motion. Rhythm concerns ordering words and phrases into patterns of cadence and balance. Many rhetorical figures, such as rhythmic triads and parallelism, form the patterns for rhythmic cadence and balance. Quintilian, in his section called “Difference between rhythm and metre,” discusses these related but distinct terms: “Rhythm consists of lengths of times, while meter, besides length, requires the times to be in a certain order; thus the one seems to refer to quantity, the other to quality [i.e., syllables must be in a certain order]” (9.4.46). Two other differences exist: “Rhythm has indefinite space, meter definite; meter runs in a certain circle, rhythm flows on as it has commenced, as far as the μεταβολή (*metabolê*), or point of transition to another kind of rhythm; and meter is concerned only with words, while rhythm is applied even to the motions of the body” (9.4.50). Aristotle considers rhythm to be a significant part of rhetorical delivery, but applies rhythm only to voice.

1403b 35. μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτῶν [*mochthêrian tôn politôn*] (sad state of governments): The adjective refers to moral deprivation or incapacity, such as “*wickedness, depravity*” with political connotations, thus social “corruption” (LSJ 1149). The adjective expresses condemnation but also a realistic appraisal of the *polis*. The corruption refers to

practical reasoning skills and discernment that affects the moral fabric of society: government and audiences, based in the predilection for appearances over arguments among decision makers. The same word concludes the next section, “corruption of the audience” (3.1.5), and similar terms occur throughout Book 3 (cf. 3.14.8). These adjectives reveal Aristotle’s feelings about *pathos* as well as his realistic but disdainful appraisal of audiences who would be persuaded by emotional appeals rather than attending to the duty of reasoning about serious matters. For this reason, Aristotle draws an analogy between actors and orators because in his experience people are moved to opinions more by emotion than by facts or principles. For Aristotle, rhetorical delivery is an *antistrophos* (analogue) to acting.

1.5. οὐπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὄψε προῆλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ [1404a] φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον. ἀλλ’ ὅλης οὐσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό γε δίκαιον μηδὲν πλείω ζητεῖ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς μήτε λυπεῖν μήτ’ εὐφραίνειν· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε τὰλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδείξαι περίεργα ἔστιν· ἀλλ’ ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν.

1.5. An *Art* concerned with [the delivery of oratory] has not yet been composed, since even consideration of *lexis* was late in developing, and delivery [1404a] seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood. But since the whole business of rhetoric is with opinion, one should pay attention to delivery, not because it is right but because it is necessary, since true justice seeks nothing more in a speech than neither to offend nor to entertain; for to contend by means of the facts themselves is just, with the result that everything except demonstration is incidental; but nevertheless, [delivery] has great power, as has been said, because of the corruption of the audience.

1403b 35. τέχνη [*technê*] (*Art*): Aristotle is aware that what he is composing is new, not that delivery is a new art but that a methodical handbook of the art is new (thus Kennedy’s italics of *Art*). Even if his treatment of delivery is brief and a vulgar matter to him about appearances and mere emotion, nevertheless, Aristotle rightly gives delivery the dignity of a *technê* alongside the other arts of rhetoric. Delivery thus becomes the fourth art of rhetoric, which in Aristotle’s mind subsumes within it methods of memory, traditionally the fifth art of rhetoric.

1403b 36. λέξις ὀψέ [lexis opse] (*lexis* was late): Prose style arrived late on the scene compared to poetic style in formal developments of the language arts.

1404a 2. δόξαν [*doxan*] (opinion): This clause, “the whole business of rhetoric is with opinion,” summarizes the practical and functional nature of rhetoric: to create or influence *doxa*. Grimaldi defines the term: “*Doxa* is the manner of knowing in which sensible reality presents itself authentically to man,” referring to probable knowledge of contingent situations and sensible reality; therefore, *doxa* “is, in the last analysis, the only valid way to know things which come to be and cease to be” in the real world of contingent reality (*Studies* 61).

The term *doxa* has a broad semantic range in Greek, but tradition and translators often follow Plato’s restricted meaning of *doxa* as “opinion,” defined in opposition to *epistêmê* or “firm knowledge.” For Plato, *epistêmê* derives from intellectual intuition of mind (νοῦς, *nous*), that is, direct apprehension of universal forms in the noumenal realm. By identifying *epistêmê* with *nous*, Plato makes a rigid, absolute distinction between *epistêmê/nous* and *doxa*, so that “Plato (even with his acceptance of ὀρθὴ δόξα [*orthê doxa*] in the *Meno*) did not recognize the area of contingent reality and probable knowledge as absolutely valid ground for real knowledge” (Grimaldi, *Studies* 35). Plato criticizes poetry and rhetoric as dealing with *doxa* as opposed to *epistêmê*, based in his rationalist separation of “mere” phenomena from “real” noumena (*Republic* 506c). To raise *epistêmê* to ideal status, Plato subordinates *doxa* to caprice in the shadowlands of existence. Thus, the *epistêmê/doxa* opposition is a creation of Plato and certainly does not reflect a natural, normal, or common usage of these terms.

For Aristotle, *epistêmê* derives from demonstration: logical analysis of scientific facts, such as cause, necessity, essentials, and universals in natural philosophy. He also uses *epistêmê* for logical analysis of metaphysics (first philosophy). In his analysis of knowledge, Aristotle

distinguishes between *epistêmê* and *doxa*, both deriving from the apprehension of sensible reality, whereby *epistêmê* is from apprehending essences and *doxa* from apprehending attributes and situations amid contingent reality (*APst* 1.33, 88b30-89b6). Aristotle distinguishes *epistêmê* and *doxa* as two different objects of sensible knowledge, but his two modes of apprehension that occur “at once [*hama*]” can prove to be a problematic distinction (*APst* 89b3; cf. Edel 195-207 on intuitive induction, *epagôgê*). The point is that *epistêmê* and *doxa* have a semantic range, differing from Plato to Aristotle to common Greek usage, and Aristotle often invokes common usages in the *Rhetoric*.

Aristotle recognizes the important and dynamic function of *doxa* regarding informed opinion and experiential knowledge of contingent reality. In Greek, *doxa* has a semantic range centered in “aspect” that concerns the metaphysical distinction between “being and seeming,” as Heidegger describes: “The term *doxa* names various things: 1) aspect, or respect, as glory; 2) aspect as the sheer view that something offers; 3) aspect as merely looking-so, “seeming” as mere semblance; 4) a view that a person constructs for himself, opinion” (110). In Heidegger’s interpretation, *doxa* is an extension and disclosure of being (*das Sein*), including, for instance, attributes of a discourse from at least two perspectives: the view of appeal “in which something proffers itself,” and the view humans have of the appearance (205). *Doxa* as aspect is found in Aristotle’s rendering of “seeming” (*phanênai*), such as a speech or a speaker “seeming to have a certain quality” (3.1.2, 3.14.7). *Doxa* as aspect accounts for its Hellenistic usage as “glory” in the Christian New Testament, for instance, “the glory of the light [*tês doxês tou phôtos*]” of the glorified Christ (Acts 22:11). In common Greek usage, then, *doxa* and *epistêmê* are not opposites but often have the same meaning, differing in mode of knowledge: *doxa* referring to phenomena

apprehended by the senses and *epistêmê* referring to rational or scientific abstraction.²⁸ Creating a rationalist opposition, Plato subordinates and restricts *doxa* to its most minimal (since Plato distrusts the senses), but Aristotle does not make the same opposition and would understand *doxa* in its prevailing meaning as the necessary means of understanding contingent reality. Rejecting Plato's philosophical pairs, Aristotle recognizes the importance and dynamic range of *doxa* since truth is an uncovering (*alêtheia*) or discovery apprehended by the senses and represented with immanent ideas. Thus, in Greek usage, *doxa* seldom means mere, unwarranted opinion, but primarily informed, warranted opinion, that is, knowledge learned and justified by experience.

Aristotle creates rhetoric for the real world, but he also makes material and formal distinctions between "opinions" (*doxa*) and "reputable opinions" (*endoxa*). The material distinction concerns quantity (i.e., time and reputation) and how quantity justifies quality for *doxa* to become *endoxa*, or received, recognized, reputable opinions in a culture, ranging from popular wisdom in the form of maxims to the esteemed wisdom of the most informed and wise. Grimaldi comments, "ἐνδοξία can be correctly described as generally accepted opinions of such a character that they are entertained by reputable people; cf. *Top.* 100b21-23" (2:356). In *Topics* 1, Aristotle provides a definition: "Reputable opinions [*endoxa*] seem right to all or to the majority or to the wise [*sophois*]—even that is [*toutois*], to all or to the majority or to the most famous and

²⁸ Bernard A. Miller makes a study of *doxa* in "Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of *Doxa*," wherein he agrees with Heidegger that *doxa* refers to phenomena "conditioned by immanence rather than transcendence" (34). Bernard concludes: "But insofar as Being is conceived as an active presence in the world, rather than seeing the world as a mere copy of Being that subsists in some great beyond, *doxa* as glory and glorification is a necessary consequence of Being as immanence. It might be possible, then, to see *doxa* apart from its contrast with *episteme* and on its own merits, as designating a reality that is the substance of the semantic environment of the here and now. 'Reality' is thereby secured as much within the domain of rhetoric as within Plato's metaphysical system, though *episteme* will remain forever blind to that fact" (39).

reputable [*endoxois*]” (100b22-23, my translation).²⁹ The definition is a tautology, beginning and ending with *endoxa*, wherein the first term refers to *logos* and the last term to *êthos* of persons esteemed for their learning, which accords with Aristotle’s procedure in practical philosophy of deferring meaning to wise persons, *phromimoi* (cf. *EN* 2.16; cf. discussion at 3.2.1). Moreover, the syntactical chiasmus with end-rhyme (*homoioleuton*) emphasizes the culturally situated status of reputable opinions. The chiasmus-definition illustrates the interaction of *lexis-logikê* and how Aristotle underwrites his dialectics with his rhetorical theory of socially constructed *endoxa*. Aristotle’s rhetoric indicates that differences between *doxa* and *endoxa* are not fixed but variable and are important community determinations for what will be the shared set of truths and “givens” in a culture (cf. Lloyd Bitzer, “Rhetoric and Public Knowledge”).

For Aristotle, the formal distinction between *doxa* and *endoxa* concerns their place in argumentation. At 2.25.2, Aristotle writes, “for the syllogisms are derived from commonly held opinions [*endoxa*] and many opinions are opposed to each other” (1402a33-34).³⁰ Commenting on *endoxa* and enthymemes, Grimaldi affirms “the close relation between enthymeme and logical syllogism because the intellect constructs both in its effort to arrive at what *is* the truth in a given case, or the *truth as far as it can be discerned*” (1:23, 55a12-18). The deductive forms of syllogism and enthymeme employ subject-matter from both *endoxa* and *epistêmê* in an effort to adjudicate the probable truth of a matter. Since the goal of rhetorical invention is to discover the available means to create or change opinion (*doxa* or *endoxa*), then reputable *endoxa* serve as an

²⁹ *Topics* 100b21-23: ἐνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Note that the definition is a chiasmus (a parallel form of inversion structured as A-B-B-A); it also features end-rhyme, or *homoioleuton*, wherein the first *côlon* ends with *sophois* and the second with *endoxois* (cf. 3.9.9, 1410b1 for discussion of *homoioleuton*).

³⁰ *Rhet* 2.25.2: οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοισ ἐστίν (1402a33-34).

important and large class of those means; in other words, rhetorical syllogisms are the formal means by which rhetors reason from *endoxa* to *doxa* (cf. *Rhet* 1.1.11, 1355a29; *Top* 100a20). In rhetoric, *endoxa* have great significance for creating common ground.³¹

One aspect of *doxa* in Aristotelian rhetoric derives from developments in psychology. Aristotle developed a tripartite faculty psychology, including sensation (*aisthêsis*), intellect (*nous*), and desire, appetite or will (*orxis*) (*EN* 6.2.1). According to Aristotle's holistic psychology, "thought by itself moves nothing" (*EN* 6.2.5). To activate the intellect, the will must be moved by the emotions to make a choice; and choice concerns informed opinions about the probability of outcome. It follows that rationality is not enough to teach, delight, and move oneself or another person; logic must be rhetorical by speaking to the whole person: mind, emotions, and will, respectively. In *Aristotle on Emotion*, Fortenbaugh shows how Aristotle's tripartite psychology maintains an intimate association between emotion and both the non-logical and logical halves of the soul (63 ff.), wherein that connection is mediated by *doxa*, which shapes emotional response and is open to persuasive *logos* (68).

1404a 4. τὸ γε δίκαιον [*to ge dikaion*] (true justice): Aristotle contrasts "true justice" with its human application, for in the process between discovery and decision lies the "necessity" of rhetorical delivery. For Aristotle, justice is a semi-Platonic form or ideal, but justice is found in the demonstration of the facts of the matter. Aristotle holds that justice requires "demonstration" (ἀποδείξειαι [*apodeixai*]), logical persuasion by syllogism or enthymeme from the facts alone; everything else is extraneous to the subject (*pragma*). Nevertheless, because audiences do not discover justice but decide it, between alternative speakers who "contend" their

³¹ For discussion of *endoxa* and maxims (*gnômê*) creating common ground, see 2.21 and 3.17; cf. also Grimaldi, *Studies* 149-56; Lloyd Bitzer, "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge"; and Ekaterina Haskins, *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle* 23-30.

case, the process of deciding justice is subject to emotional and character appeals in the art of delivery (cf. 3.12.2). Delivery has “great power” over justice in proportion to the “corruption of the audience,” in so far as rhetorical delivery is persuasive not *from* the subject but *of* the subject through emotional and ethical appeals (cf. 3.1.3, 3.13.1, and 3.14.8). As Poster argues, “Rhetoric is indeed the counterpart to dialectic in that it discusses things which are in doubt, but the doubtfulness of its objects is not entirely due to their epistemological status but also to the uncertainty of judgments with respect to the application of imprecisely written laws in badly ordered states” (244). For Aristotle, judicial rhetoric is an unfortunate necessity but also and primarily a realistic and responsible practice of audience-centered communication.

1.6. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν· οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ’ ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.

1.6. The subject of *lexis*, however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show and intended to affect the audience. As a result, nobody teaches geometry this way.

1404a 6. τῆς λέξεως [*tês lexeôs*] (of *lexis*): The phrase “subject of *lexis*” marks this section as a digression from the art of delivery to the art of style (in §§ 3-5 and 7), a change of focus that has implications for interpreting the remarks as pertaining to either acting or style. Introduced formally in chapter 2, *lexis* has broad reference to *how* things are said generally, including expression in oral performance. In 3.1.3 (1403b20), the general usage of *lexis* summarizes the whole subject of Book 3, while the term *dianoia*, “thought” (2.26.5) summarizes Books 1-2. Regarding the “small necessity [*micron anagkaion*]” of style for “all teaching,” Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out that stylistic choices “stand out, in a way that takes on significance only in terms of the end pursued. But this reference to the situation and to the way of handling it might not be grasped by someone who does not recognize the connection between

thought and action” (*New Rhetoric* 155). Among degrees and kinds of argumentation, distinguished by Cicero as duties of the orator (teach, delight, and move), the more a rhetor views the situation as “teaching,” the plainer the style and its significance, but when a rhetor views the situation as also necessitating the creation of delight and moving an audience to informed persuasion, then stylistic choices have greater perceived significance because language becomes action having “significance only in terms of the end pursued.”

1404a 9. διδασκαλία [*didaskalia*] (teaching): That Aristotle mentions teaching and rhetorical concepts together shows that he thinks of rhetoric as a general theory of language. *Lexis* is a “small necessity” in teaching, often conducted in the plainest style, but *lexis* has greater significance for more public contexts and more persuasive modes of communication, though Aristotle regards clarity as both the prerequisite and the culmination of style (cf. 3.2.1 on clarity).

1404a 11. φαντασία [*phantasia*] (forms of outward show): Traditional translations of *phantasia* allow the general context on delivery to overwrite the immediate digression on style, also emphasizing the diminutives “small necessity” and “some difference,” thus diminishing the role of style in creating clarity and denigrating style along with Aristotle’s bias against delivery. Therefore, traditional translations of *phantasia* focus on “mere” appearances: “outward show” (Freese and Kennedy), “fanciful” (Roberts), “all imagination” (Jebb) “mere display” (Lawson-Tancred), and in Cope’s *Commentary* “mere fancy (φαντασία ‘the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality’)” (3:8). These translations seem to confuse the arts of style and delivery, not recognizing the distinction or that Aristotle has momentarily switched subjects. Thus Cope continues: “These tricks and graces of style, declamation and acting have no power of instruction,” supporting his reading of Aristotle by quoting from Plato’s *Gorgias* (463c and 502e) (3:8). Plato would support the traditional glosses, but context is less certain. As José M.

González has recently suggested, *phantasia* means “imagination” and could certainly refer to Aristotle’s visual psychology and the figural character of language, wherein imagination is “the re-presentation of appearances or images” (LSJ 1915). When *phantasia* is read as imagination, González asserts, Aristotle “instructs us to view *lexis* against the background of his psychology, as mediating the rhetorical task” (99). This interpretation supports Aristotle’s functional view of style, especially his theory of metaphor in creating clarity and shared perspectives of reality (cf. 3.2.8, 3.10.2). Either interpretation of *phantasia*, which occurs only once in Book 3, depends on context, but in this brief digression on style, it is certainly possible that Aristotle previews his discussions on the virtue of clarity and how figural visualization creates the most learning in teaching situations.

1.7. ἑκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταῦτὸ ποιήσῃ τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασιν δὲ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινες, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις· καὶ ἔστι φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἐντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίγνεται πάλιν ἄθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μείζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

1.7. Whenever delivery comes to be considered it will function in the same way as acting, and some have tried to say a little about it, for example, Thrasymachus in his *Emotional Appeals*. Acting is a matter of natural talent and largely not reducible to artistic rule, but in so far as it involves how things are said [*lexis*], it has an artistic element. As a result, prizes go to those who are skilled at it, just as they do to orators on the basis of their delivery; for written speeches [when orally recited] have greater effect through expression [*lexis*] than through thought.

1404a 14. Θρασύμαχος [*Thrasymachus*]: The sophist Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (ca.430-400) wrote a now-lost treatise wherein he discusses ἐλέοις [*eleois*], “emotional appeals,” or specifically “pity.” In his treatise, titled *Eleoi* or *Emotional Appeals*, he advances the art of rhetoric by theorizing *pathos* as an “appeal to the emotions by means of elocution and ‘action’ (delivery), and in the development of prose style by his attention to rhythm and to the building up of periods” (*OCD* 1516, s.v. “Thrasymachus”). In *Sophistical Refutations* (34, 183b), Aristotle credits Tisias, Thrasymachus, and Theodorus as those who found and advanced the art

of rhetoric (cf. Kennedy 294 ff.). In Plato's *Phaedrus* (267c-d), Socrates sarcastically dismisses their manuals of rhetoric, stating, "For tearful speeches, to arouse pity for old age and poverty, I think the precepts of the mighty Chaldeonian [Thrasymachus] hold the palm, and he is also a genius, as he said, at rousing large companies to wrath, and soothing them again by his charms when they are angry, and most powerful in devising and abolishing calumnies on any grounds whatsoever" (267c-d).³² Since emotion (*pathos*) is outside of the logical subject and facts (*pragmata*), *pathos* can support or detract from *pragmata* by rousing either valid or invalid emotions. The last phrase of Plato's passage refers to the rhetorical practice of *dissoi logoi*, or "contrasting arguments," the practice of arguing both sides of an issue, which became a common exercise in classical education. As a species of *pathos*, Aristotle equates delivery and acting, recognizing how the grand style of oral delivery (*lexis agônistikê*) powerfully affects an audience's emotions as compared to written works which achieve emphasis by a different but related written style (*lexis graphikê*) (cf. 3.12).

1404a 18. γραφόμενοι λόγοι [*graphomenoi logoi*] (written speeches): While Aristotle is a writer and reveals a proclivity for the written style (*lexis graphikê* at 3.12), at a practical level he acknowledges the actor's expressive art in delivering stylized content to the audience since, as he writes, "it involves how things are said [*lexis*]." For this reason, Aristotle understands acting, delivery, and pronunciation to be one of the artistic canons of rhetoric.

1404a 18-19. μείζον ἰσχύουσι [*meizon ischuouisi*] (greater effect): A speech's "effect" is measured not by rhetorical or poetic qualities, nor even by the quality of thought, but by the character of the response that it evokes from the audience because rhetoric is an art of function

³² Plato, *Phaedrus*: τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἐλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνη μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσει τε αὐτὸν πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπάδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολᾶς ὅθεν δὴ κρᾶτιστος (267c-d).

and causation. A skillful delivery can transform a written speech weak on ideas and make it extremely effective; likewise, poor delivery can ruin a well-prepared speech. As Aristotle recognizes, delivery is a practical matter and artistic skill that affects the successful reception of a message, so delivery should be a proper part of the art of rhetoric.

1.8. ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινήσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματά ἐστίν, ὑπήρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἢ τε ῥαψωδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε.

1.8. The poets were naturally the first to set in motion [study of verbal expression]; for words are imitations, and the voice, the most mimetic of all our parts, was there to start with. Thus, the verbal arts were established: rhapsody and acting and the others.

1404a 20. οἱ ποιηταί [*hoi poiêtai*] (the poets): Who are “the poets”? Since his treatises mention many, Aristotle means the long tradition of Greek epic and dramatic poetry that started with Homer, “the supreme poet” (*Poet* 4, 1448b34), Hesiod, Sappho, the rhapsodists, and include Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Cleophon, Chaeremon, and Antiphon, who provide prominent examples in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* (cf. *Poet* 1-6, also Enos, *Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle*).

1404a 21. ὀνόματα μιμήματά ἐστίν [*onomata mimêmata estin*] (words are imitations): Greek theories of vocal imitation set the context for this statement, first regarding *mimêsis* of words (*onomata*) and second regarding *mimêsis* of sound (*phônê*). In Plato’s *Cratylus*, Socrates explores two commonly held theories regarding the nature of words: first as “an instrument for distinguishing the elements of reality [*ousia*],” whether conventional or natural, and second as a “vocal imitation [*mimêsis phônê*]” or re-presentation of what it signifies (388c, 423b). Most commentators assume that the first theory on semiotics provides the context, but this view disregards that Aristotle is recounting the ancient history of vocal arts. By ignoring this phonetic context, Aristotle’s statement seems to be a Platonic proposition on semiotics, deriving from Plato’s *Cratylus* (423a), in which Socrates questions whether language is conventional (arbitrary)

or natural (mimetic). Both Cope and Kennedy assume the semiotic view, asserting that Aristotle is contradicting his own theory of words set forth in *On Interpretation* 1-2 (Cope 3:10; Kennedy 196n12). In the context of verbal arts, however, one may surmise that Aristotle is referring to phonetics, particularly the commonly held belief and theory that sound imitates meaning to a large degree, a theory called imitative form.³³ Based on context, the phonetic view of Aristotle's statement seems preferable to an assertion of semiotic theory, whether language is a conventional system of symbols or perhaps "imitative" of (human) nature in some sense. In the following discussion, the semiotic possibility is addressed first while the phonetic interpretation is discussed below (see 1404a 21. φωνῆ [phônê]).

On Interpretation 1-2 seems to frame Aristotle's theory and distinctions of speech and writing. In section 2, he discusses briefly his conventional theory of language, which is taken to be his actual and traditional view. There, he calls words "symbols" and states, "A noun [*onoma*] is a sound [*phônê*] having meaning established by convention alone" (16a19-20).³⁴ Aristotle focuses on sound and symbol, adding, "No sound is by nature a noun, it becomes one, becoming a symbol" (16a26-27). This clear proposition seems to contradict *Rhetoric* 3.1.8: "words are imitations" of phenomena. However, the theory of the sign concerns two processes: the assigning

³³ Stanford provides a careful study of imitative form, remarking that this classical theory is now neglected in an age of print and silent reading, but also how common and how careful the ancients were in emphasizing sound and similarities in sound to indicate affinities in meaning: "Every reader of Greek literature knows how deeply this belief . . . was rooted in the thoughts and emotions of the Hellens. We recall how names . . . were solemnly believed to have expressed the destinies of their bearers. Indeed, what seems to us little more than a mere jingle or a pun could reverberate like the voice of destiny to a Greek tragedian and his audience. This was essentially a matter of sound, not spelling, of hearing a name instead of seeing it" (*Sound of Greek* 11-12; in the same work, see also "Mimesis in Words," pp. 99-121).

³⁴ *On Interpretation* 2: "Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνῆ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου (16a19-20).

of the signifier (sound and symbol) and the perception of the signified (phenomena). In this two-part bond, which process is in view depends on the context and emphasis.

In *On Interpretation* 1, Aristotle introduces a speech/writing dichotomy: “Words spoken [*phônê*] are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words [*graphomena*] are the signs of words spoken” (1.16a4-5).³⁵ Thus, the oral word (*phônê*, *vox*, voice) is the original, natural sign while the written word (*grammè*, *verbum*, letter) is the artificial, cultural, “sign of a sign.” The passage continues: “But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs [or primary signs: *sêmeia prôtôs*], are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies” (1, 16a7-9; cf. *An* 3.6). References to “same” phenomena, namely mental impressions of objects and the objects themselves, indicate that Aristotle considers how human nature and the natural world give some degree of consistency to the linguistic system of signs. Aristotle uses terms and concepts that derive from both conventional theory (language as symbol) and natural theory (language as image or copy). How should one understand Aristotle’s statements since he seems to subscribe to two theoretical views on language?

In *De la grammatologie (Of Grammatology)*, Jacques Derrida delimits Aristotle’s language on language, distinguishing primary signs (*sêmeia prôtôs*) for internal, mental phenomena of voice from secondary signs for external symbols of writing. By examining the speech/writing dichotomy, Derrida describes how Aristotle views writing as “phonetic writing,” a symbolic transcript of natural language spoken by the mind or soul (33). Derrida points out the

³⁵ *On Interpretation* 1: “Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὡς περ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρῶτων, ταῦτα πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα, πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτά (16a4-9).

Platonic gesture in *On Interpretation* 1 (corresponding to “words are imitations” in *Rhetoric* 1404a21) wherein Aristotle privileges the *phônê* by assuming unmediated access to mental experiences, and wherein he exiles the *grammè*, viewing writing as mediated, instrumental, and interpreted, “the signifier of the signifier” (7). In this sense, the first signifier (*phônê*) is a type of internal, natural language, but the second signifier (*grammè*) represents external, conventional language, what Aristotle calls symbols, spoken or written. According to Derrida’s interpretation, “the voice, producer of *the first symbols*, has a relationship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind. Producer of the first signifier, it is not just a simple signifier among others. It signifies ‘mental experiences’ which themselves reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance” (11). In this first instance, Aristotle follows his mentor and subscribes to “the heritage of that logocentrism which is also phonocentrism: absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning” (11-12). Although he is not a philosophical idealist as his mentor, Aristotle perpetuates the theory of natural language in some of his references to voice, but his general view is conventional language in the form of sensible, symbolic words that may be spoken or written. Unlike contemporary theorists, it does not seem that Aristotle theorized about the effect of the external on the internal or about the extent to which culture influences interpretation through language.

Aristotle develops a figural theory of language that may be called metaphorical, for he suggests in many places that words mediate ideas and that language and thought are imagistic and full of metaphors (discussed at 3.10-11). Aristotle advances a *via media* position on language that avoids Plato’s idealism and Protagoras’s relativism in the *homo mensura* doctrine. Since he always qualifies his statements on language theory, never running to an excess in any one direction, one may expect him to hold a theory more nuanced than the terms by which he

expresses it. As one might expect from a moderate thinker, Aristotle expresses a mean that balances nature and culture to develop a theory of figural language in the sense that words mediate ideas and that language and thought are highly visual and interactive. Aristotle's theory of language is more nuanced than that of his mentor, indicating the value of an inductive rhetoric for expressing natural forms in figurative, conventional language. His figural view of language enables Aristotle to use either the term *mimêsis* or symbol (metonymy), depending on the process or emphasis he desires in a given context as long as he qualifies it, which is what one finds in such passages.

In the current passage of *Rhetoric* 3.1.8, Aristotle focuses on voice since he is recounting a natural history of the verbal arts, including delivery. In his enthymeme, the term *mimêsis* expresses causation and development. A parallel context exists in *Poetics* 1-3, where Aristotle discusses a natural history of poetry, a psychological-mimetic cause of poetry developed because "man is by nature inclined toward imitation [*mimêsis*], melody, and rhythm" (*Poet* 1.4). These natural propensities, including the psychological pull of *mimêsis*, developed by the entelechial principle from improvisations into the formal genres of tragedy, comedy, and epic drama. In Aristotle's view, then, literary form and rhetorical delivery develop by the principle of entelechy from natural propensities within the psyche of poet and audience alike, a theory that Kenneth Burke develops in *Philosophy of Literary Form* (pp. 1-137).³⁶

³⁶ A key term for Aristotle and for Burke is entelechy, describing the dynamism of forms (*eidê*) in particulars in the realms of nature, language, change, and becoming. Aristotle coined the term *entelecheia* by combining three Greek roots: *en* (within), *telos* (end, purpose), and *echein* (to have); the *-eia* suffix indicates the natural process of development (Lindsay 268; Smyth 231-32). From its three roots, entelechy describes the dynamic relationship among form, function, and action (*eidos*, *telos*, and *energeia*) and is rendered in English as "having the end within itself," "realization of essence," "fulfillment," and Burke's "principle of perfection."

1404a 21. φωνή [*phônê*] (voice): Aristotle asserts that “voice is most mimetic,” providing a phonetic context for his statement, “words are imitations.” Regarding the dramatic verbal arts (poetic rhapsody, rhetorical delivery, and acting), *phônê* signifies a theory of verbal aesthetics, voice expressing the holistic union of meaning and emotion in both speech and music. On vocal aesthetics, the ancient rhetoricians testify that sound was a primary concern in the language arts. Dionysius of Halicarnassus remarks, “The art of public oratory is, after all, a kind of musical art” (*On Literary Composition* 11.124.20). Quintilian emphasizes that orators ought to be familiar with the theory and practice of music, observing that “grammar and music were once united,” attested by ancient Greek poets who considered “grammar subject to music” (1.10.9-17).³⁷ After all, the earliest Greek name for poetry was αἰδῆ (*aoidê*) meaning “ode” or “song,” for the poet was called a “singer” or “bard” (αἰδός [*aoidos*]) long before he was called a “maker” (ποιητής [*poiêtês*]) (LSJ 172); moreover in classical education, music and poetry were taught together in the discipline called *mousikê* (Stanford, *Sound of Greek* 27).

In ancient Greek, the song/speech dichotomy was fluid rather than fixed since a sing-song melody exists in speech, especially in Greek with its melodic pitch-accents. The Greek pitch-accent, or acoustical variations in tone, had a twofold function: one practical to distinguish between similar phonetic words, such as βίος (“life”) and βίός (“bow”), and a second aesthetic that prescribed the basic melodic pattern in the Greek language (Stanford 30). For its aesthetic qualities, classical poets and orators understood language to be a kind of music, signifying an integration of semantics and sentiment (28). The Greek musicologist Aristides Quintilianus describes how a tone of voice exists lying between singing and speaking, in which pitch-accents

³⁷ Quintilian illustrates: “Caius Gracchus, the most eminent orator of his time, behind whom, when he spoke in public, a musician used to stand and give, with a pitch-pipe, which the Greeks call a *tonarion*, the tones in which his voice was to be exerted” in case his voice went off the best pitch levels (1.10.26; cf. Plutarch’s *Lives*, *Caius Gracchus* 3.2).

are pronounced more like musical notes than speech-tones, “the intermediate voice-movement, the one in which we make our readings in poetry” (*On Music* 1.4).³⁸ While this intermediate voice-movement was everyday in poetry recitations, Cicero speaks of canticles in oratory (*cantus obscurior*, “restrained singing”), and Plutarch describes a musical, aesthetic effect in rhetoric, wherein orators use a dramatic vocal style close to singing in specific moments in a speech such as the epilogue (Cicero, *Orator* 57; Plutarch, *Moralia, Table-Talk* 633b). Quintilian interprets Cicero’s phrase *cantus obscurior*, describing how pronunciation of words is to be drawn out with the vowels stretched (*trahenda*) and the throat opened wide (*aperienda*) in a manner more like singing than speaking (11.3.167), although the tone and length of syllables could be varied and stretched even more in exclamations, such as *me miserum, me infelicem* (“O wretched, unhappy me!”) (11.3.172).³⁹ The term *phônê* expresses a theory of verbal aesthetics in rhetorical oral performance, a theory that represents an integration of the rhetorical appeals, especially meaning and emotion.

1.9. ἔπει δ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν [δὲ] δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου. καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν τοὺς τοιοῦτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. τοῦτο δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἕτερα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν πρόπον, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοίωτον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων [ἀφείκασιν] ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δ’ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκόσμου, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἐξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφείκασιν· διὸ γελοῖον μιμῆσθαι τοῦτους οἱ αὐτοὶ οὐκέτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.

1.9. Since the poets, while speaking sweet nothings, seemed to acquire their reputation through their *lexis*, a poetic style came into existence [in prose as well], for example, that of Gorgias. Even now, the majority of the uneducated think such speakers speak most beautifully.

³⁸ Aristides Quintilianus (third century AD) wrote both *On Poetics* and *On Music*. In the latter, he explores music’s rhetorical aspects, including its educational and psychotherapeutic uses (*On Music* 2; *OCD* 161, s.v. “Aristides Quintilianus”).

³⁹ Jon C. R. Hall culls together many sources to describe classical rhetorical delivery, including voice, in “Oratorical Delivery and the Emotions: Theory and Practice” (pp. 218-34) in *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*, eds. Dominik and Hall (2007).

This is not the case, but the [proper] *lexis* of prose differs from that of poetry. It is clear from what has happened [in other literary genres that the direction of development is away from the use of poetic diction]: for the makers of tragedies do not continue to use the same style, but just as they changed from tetrameters to the iambic meter because it was most like ordinary speech, so also they have abandoned the use of words that are not conversational, with which they had at first ornamented their diction as the writers of hexameter poetry still do. As a result, it is absurd to imitate those who themselves no longer use that style of speech.

1404a 25-26. ποιητικὴ . . . λέξις [*poiêtikê* . . . *lexis*] (a poetic style): Prose writers developed their style of writing by borrowing the poetic style since poets first developed a poetic *lexis* with a theory of aesthetics. Gorgias is the well-known example of a prose writer imitating poetry, which, then as now, sounds overtly contrived. Originally, as in Gorgianic style, prose looked to poetry for its pattern, but later the gaze was reversed when the unpoetical, educated speech (what Isocrates calls *politikoi logoi*) became the standard of language even for the poets. Aristotle views the beginning of this revolt from poetic *lexis* evidenced in Euripides, for in chapter 2, Aristotle advises “choosing words from ordinary language as Euripides does and first showed the way” (3.2.5). It is noteworthy that Aristotle has no technical term for “prose” as he does for poetry (*poiêtikê*), a fact of classical Greek that reveals just how innovative Aristotle is in writing a treatise on prose style. Without a technical term for prose, Aristotle employs such descriptives as *logos* of rhetoric (3.1.9, 3.2.6), “bare words” (*psilois logois*) (3.2.3), and “ordinary language” (*dialektos*) (3.2.5).

1404a 28. ἕτερον . . . λέξις [*hetera* . . . *lexis*] (*lexis* of prose differs from that of poetry): This major proposition provides the formal cause for Aristotle writing a book on *lexis* as part of a treatise on rhetoric. The formal cause (essence) of Book 3 is to be a series of propositions, both describing and prescribing the essential characteristics of prose style and arrangement as distinct but not wholly separate from poetic style. In *Poetics* 25, Aristotle comments: “loan words [*glôttai*], metaphors [*metaphorai*], and many stylistic abnormalities [*pathê tês lexeôs*]: we allow

poets these,” adding that “poetry does not have the same standard of correctness [*orthotês*] as politics, or as any other art,” where politics refers to practical reasoning in both public and private life (*Poet* 25, 1460b12-14). Prose and poetic styles differ enough to make them two separate species or modifiers of *lexis*, but as will be seen, the two species of style share so many commonalities that Aristotle wisely avoids making a rigorous distinction between prose and poetic styles.

1404a 31-32. λόγῳ . . . ὁμοιότατον [*logô . . . homoiotaton*] (ordinary speech): For prose style, “ordinary speech” is the standard that prose writers seek to attain because it is most conversational (διάλεκτόν [*dialekton*]). In chapter 2, however, Aristotle seeks a mean between ordinary speech and poetic language that an audience will find striking or exotic.

1.10. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὐχ ἅπαντα ὅσα περὶ λέξεως ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἀκριβολογητέον ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ ὅσα περὶ τοιαύτης οἴας λέγομεν. περὶ δ’ ἐκείνης εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

1.10. Thus, it is clear that we need not go into detail about all matters concerned with *lexis*, only about what applies to the subject we are discussing. Concerning the other style there is a discussion in the *Poetics*.

1404a 39. περὶ ποιητικῆς [*peri poiêtikês*] (in the *Poetics*): This is the first of five references in Book 3 to the *Poetics*, four of which occur in chapter 2, or here in the transition to chapter 2, where Aristotle indicates the interrelationship and distinctions between poetic and prose styles.⁴⁰ Aristotle was the first literary critic to develop an audience-centered theory of literature by considering how drama affects audiences with pity (*eleos*), fear (*phobos*), and *katharsis* (*Poet* 6). Since Aristotle’s approach to poetics is preeminently rhetorical, focusing on audience response, and since his theory of rhetoric draws extensively from poetic diction, all

⁴⁰ Six cross-references to the *Poetics* (five in Book 3) occur in 1.11.29, 1372a2; 3.1.10, 1404a39; 3.2.2, 1404b8; 3.2.5, 1404b28; 3.2.7, 1405a6; and 3.18.7, 1419b6. Two other cross-references occur in Book 3, where Aristotle mentions his *Theodectea* (3.9.10, his lost survey of the rhetoric of Theodectes) and his *Topics* (3.18.5).

species of metaphor especially, it is not surprising that he cross-references his treatises on poetics and rhetoric. In a rewriting of history, reversing what modern historians, such as Charles Sears Baldwin, consider a traditional division between the practical prose of rhetoric and the aesthetic expression of poetry, Jeffery Walker finds that, in fact, rhetoric and poetics both derive from an ancient need for eloquence, argument, and persuasion among princes and poets alike, where rhetoric is an art of argumentation “*that derives originally from the poetic tradition and that extends, in ‘applied’ versions of itself, to the practical discourses of public and private life*” (*Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* viii, emphasis by Walker).⁴¹ Gerald F. Else finds a similar interrelationship, asserting, “Poetic and rhetoric had been sister-arts in Athens since the late fifth century; he [Aristotle] developed them concurrently and borrowed much from each art into the other” (Else 111). Walter R. Fisher comments, “Prior to the pre-Socratics and to Plato and Aristotle, ‘mythos and logos, imagination and thought,’ were ‘not yet distinct,’” also observing that the “story of logos and mythos parallels the story of orality and literacy” (6).⁴² The cross-influence extends both ways: Aristotle’s logic and rhetoric influence his poetic theory, evidenced

⁴¹ Charles Sears Baldwin’s 1924 study, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic*, exemplifies modern history, advancing so-called “neo-Aristotelian” perspectives that continue to prevail in histories of literature and rhetoric. Baldwin’s thesis is that poetry and rhetoric are fundamentally different and even incompatible, though the ancients often confused the distinction. Baldwin’s rigid dichotomy is based in part on Aristotle: “The two great works of Aristotle on composition, the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetic*, presuppose an ancient division” (1). Baldwin qualifies his dichotomy by affirming common ground in diction, though rhetorical style is logical and poetic style emotional: “Rhetoric and poetic connoted two fields of composition, two habits of conceiving and ordering, two typical movements. The movement of the one the ancients saw as primarily intellectual, a progress from idea to idea determined logically; that of the other, as primarily imaginative, a progress from image to image determined emotionally” (2).

⁴² Fisher notes further distinctions: “The issues in the orality-and-literacy story are how the mind is constituted and what the consequences are for human consciousness. At issue in the story of the interrelations of logos and mythos is which form of discourse—philosophy (technical discourse), rhetoric, or poetic—ensures the discovery and validation of truth, knowledge, and reality” (6). Cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 19-21; cf. also Ong, *Orality and Literacy*.

by his term *sympnein* (“consequently,” “it follows”) used in *Poetics* 8-9 (Else 112); poetics also stimulates Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, indicated by the influence of the poets Homer and Antimachus (among others) on Aristotle’s writing style, acknowledged by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (3.6.7 and 3.11.3-4) and evident in his speculative and scientific discourses, including metaphysics, ethics, and biology (cf. discussion at 3.6.7). Leonard Nathan observes, “The convergence of the two arts here [in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric at 1.2.1] is so obvious that any account that ignores the strong presence of either is incomplete” (*ERC* 613, s.v. “Rhetoric and Poetry”). From a writer’s perspective and with Aristotle’s rhetorical terms, Nathan adds that “the individual artist—rhetorician or poet—will use any means available, whatever its name or class, to consummate a desired end. Our theories ought, then, to reflect this reality if they are to be taken as serious accounts of the way rhetoric and poetry actually work” (*ERC* 614). Based on much evidence, Else, Walker, Fisher, Nathan and others reject the modern historical judgment with its rigid dichotomy between rhetoric and poetics, finding the history of the language arts complexly interrelated since antiquity.⁴³

In Aristotle’s brief history of style in *Rhetoric* 3.1.8-9, what one finds are interconnected branches of the language arts, accounting for the many references in *Rhetoric* III to his *Poetics* and to Homer but also accounting for the rhetorical determination of separate treatises based on the roles of audiences (cf. *ERC* 576). Based in audience expectations of style in different cultural situations and based in cultural distinctions between mimetic and nonmimetic discourse, Aristotle confines his *Rhetoric* to prose style and refers to his *Poetics* for formal categories

⁴³ The overturning of modernist historical judgment was predicted by C.S. Lewis in the early twentieth century: “Rhetoric is the greatest barrier between us and our ancestors,” for “nearly all our older poetry was written by men to whom the distinction between poetry and rhetoric, in its modern form, would have been meaningless”; moreover, “If ever the passion for formal rhetoric returns, the whole story will have to be rewritten and many judgments may be reversed” (*Oxford History of English Literature* 3:60-61).

regarding diction, metaphors, humor, and arts of language. Aristotle's cross-references reinforce the principle of interpreting the *Rhetoric* in the context of Aristotle's corpus because each treatise is part of a consistent and rather comprehensive method of inquiry, which includes a "clearly analyzed conceptual network" (Edel 42). According to Abraham Edel, a conceptual network "consists of a group of basic concepts associated in such a way that starting with any one leads to others, thus establishing interconnections within the group" (41). As a whole, the network shows "the division of tasks among the concepts, their interlocking roles, how they reinforce one another, and redundancies that over guarantee a result" (42). *Network* and *organic* are disciplinary metaphors describing the distinctions with interconnections among Aristotle's corpus, including his accounts of the language arts. Grimaldi agrees that Aristotle is a consistent and often systematic philosopher having a unified corpus (*Studies* 32 ff.). Cross-references in the corpus reveal Aristotle's basic distinctions and interconnections, indicating awareness of variable and functional differences drawn lightly with a dotted line.⁴⁴

W.S. Howell, in *Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic: Studies in the Basic Disciplines of Criticism* (1975), discusses the reasons for the historical distinctions in the language arts which originate with Aristotle. Howell explains that the basic difference between poetics and rhetoric is not that poetry is aesthetic and rhetoric is persuasive, for these are common properties and aims of both arts, shared by degree (45). Rather, Howell writes, "The basic distinction drawn by Aristotle between the poem and the oration, or in broadest terms between poetical and rhetorical literature, is that poetry is mimetic, and rhetoric, nonmimetic" (49). Artistic "*mimêsis* of an

⁴⁴ Distinctions among the language arts are often drawn according to Aristotle's various modes of reasoning: formal logic in *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, and *Prior and Posterior Analytics*; rhetorical reasoning in *Rhetoric*, *Topics*, and *On Sophistical Refutations*; and narrative reasoning in *Poetics*. Central to the three modes of rationality, and thus the three language arts, is demonstration or argumentation (cf. Fisher, "The Connection with Logic," 24-54).

action” is one of the *archê* or “first principles” of fictive discourse (*Poet* 6, 1449b24). The supple term *mimêsis* (μίμησις), whose meaning Aristotle wisely sketches rather than defines, may be understood as “fictive representation and imaginative ‘enactment’ of experience,” especially human experience represented in art, since artistic *mimêsis* has the “capacity to convey ideas whose depth Aristotle regards as reaching towards the significance of the ‘universal’” (Halliwell, Introduction 8). Mimetic literature includes genres of tragedy, comedy, epic, and lyric poetry, and it would include many modern literary genres, such as prose fiction and narrative poetry (Howell 50). The rhetorical effect that mimetic literature seeks—through plot, character, spectacle, diction, and melody—is *katharsis* of emotions, and in comedy laughter (*Poet* 6, 1450a13-14). The rhetorical effect that nonmimetic literature seeks is informed suasion, leading an audience to intellectual conviction, emotional acceptance, and identification of character. Belonging to rhetorical, nonmimetic discourse as specified in the *Rhetoric* are the three broad categories of judicial, deliberative, and epideictic species of oratory, but since Aristotle considers rhetoric to be a general theory of language, rhetorical discourse by implication includes all forms of expository, scientific, philosophical, historical, and argumentative prose, especially for a general or popular audience (Howell 51). Having no rigid distinctions, poetic discourse is generally mimetic, aiming to effect *katharsis* or laughter in an audience through the imagination, while rhetorical discourse is generally nonmimetic, aiming to lead an audience to persuasion through various appeals to the whole person.

Rhetoric and poetry employ eloquence appropriate to their typical spheres and situations but for the common purpose of informed suasion (Walker 4; Else 157). Aristotle’s famous distinction between history and poetry, for instance, indicates difference but also connection between rhetoric and poetics. In Aristotle’s plain terms, “the difference is this: that the one

relates actual events, the other the kinds of things that might occur. Consequently, poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more to the universal, while history relates particulars” (*Poet* 9, 1451b4-8).⁴⁵ The context for this distinction resides in a clarification of three concepts: probability (*eikos*), possibility (*dynata*), and actuality (*genomena*). With the zest of solving a paradox, Aristotle seeks to show that a poet may create poetry from actual, historical events, yet remain a poet, because some (but not all) particular events can be probable and possible, “the kind of things that might occur” (*Poet* 9, 1451b29-32; cf. *Else* 113). According to Aristotle’s argument, poetry may treat historical events when those events relate “more to the universal,” showing “probability,” so that an audience finds the historical *mimêsis* reasonably believable (*Else* 112-13). Aristotle develops his argument in order to break the mistaken barrier between poetry and history, and likewise poetics and rhetoric. In this sense, poetry may be historical, and history may be more of a narrative art than a social science.

The final distinction between the language arts is a rhetorical determination regarding response. As Howell suggests, “What differences there are between persuasion and catharsis are implied by Aristotle to be definable only as we concentrate upon the differences which we ourselves can discern between our reaction to an effective *mimesis* and our reaction to an effective statement and its proof” (71). This fine distinction is ultimately rhetorical. Observing the fine distinctions and many interconnections, Aristotle organizes the literary disciplines with

⁴⁵ See discussion on historiography at *Rhet* 3.16.11, 1417b14; cf. also the many analogies and “same effect” passages that compare poetry and rhetoric in chapter 14 (*Rhet* 3.14.1-6).

dotted lines and cross-references.⁴⁶ Having an organic or networked theory of the language arts, Aristotle develops the methods of nonmimetic authorship in the *Rhetoric*, and in Book 3 the methods of *lexis*, for which Aristotle makes the specific distinction, with interconnections, between poetic and prose theories of style.

⁴⁶ For discussion and a ten-year debate on this issue, argued by Wilbur Samuel Howell and Kenneth Burke, see Howell, *Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic*, especially the Introduction (7-11) and the last essay: "Kenneth Burke's 'Lexicon Rhetoricae': A Critical Examination" (234-55).

CHAPTER 2

LEXIS: VIRTUES

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 2.1. Virtues of prose style: clarity and propriety (1404b 1–1404b 5)

DEVELOPMENT

- 2.2-7. Components of clarity and propriety (1404b 5–1405a 6)
 2.8-9. Creating metaphors that are clear and exotic (1405a 6–1405a 14)
 2.10-13. Sources for creating metaphors (1405a 14–1405b 21)
 2.14. Sources for creating epithets (1405b 21–1405b 28)

TRANSITION

- 2.15 Importance of moderation (1405b 28–1405b 33)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

2.1. [1404b] ἔστω οὖν ἐκεῖνα τεθεωρημένα, καὶ ὠρίσθω λέξεως ἀρετὴ σαφῆ εἶναι (σημεῖον γὰρ τι ὁ λόγος, ὥστ' ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον), καὶ μήτε ταπεινὴν μήτε ὑπὲρ τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν· ἢ γὰρ ποιητικὴ ἴσως οὐ ταπεινὴ, ἀλλ' οὐ πρέπουσα λόγῳ.

2.1. [1404b] Let the matters just discussed be regarded as understood, and let the virtue of style [*lexeôs aretê*] be defined as “to be clear” [*saphê*] (speech is a kind of sign, so if it does not make clear it will not perform its function)—and neither flat nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate [*prepon*]. The poetic style is hardly flat, but it is not appropriate for speech.

1404b 1. λέξεως ἀρετῆ [*lexeôs aretê*] (virtue of style): Aristotle defines the first virtue (*aretê*: excellence, quality, virtue) of style to be clarity (σαφῆ [*saphê*]). Clarity is first because it is an indispensable requirement, being both a prerequisite for other features of style and the culmination of style. The role of style as *saphê* is “to make the meaning manifest [*dêloi*],” where the verb *dêloô* means “make visible or manifest” and “to be clear and plain” so that an audience

can “possess a meaning” (LSJ 385). In translation, Kennedy conflates *saphê* and *dêloi* as “clear” and “make clear,” but *dêloi* refers to making the meaning clear. Thus other other translations of *dêloi*: “convey a clear meaning,” (Cooper), “make the meaning clear” (Freese), “convey a plain meaning” (Roberts). Likewise, the basic meaning of the adjective *dêlos* is “clear to the mind,” “manifest,” and “visible,” terms that are significant for Aristotle’s theory of visualization in psychology and metaphor (LSJ 384; cf. *ERC* 106, s.v. “Clarity”).

Defining the virtue of style as clarity, Aristotle creates an enthymematic argument in the form of an inverted syllogism: (A) Style should be clear (*saphê*) because (B) speech (*logos*) is a sign (*sêmeion*), (C) and speech/signs have the function (*ergon*) “to make the meaning manifest” (*dêloi*). The supporting middle term of the rhetorical syllogism is *sêmeion*, meaning “probable sign” and having the function of conveying knowledge of that which is signified.⁶¹ Based in the function of the sign, Aristotle considers the first function of style as creating clear meaning, both as the prerequisite and the culmination of style. Since clarity is the first “virtue of style,” Aristotelian style is preeminently a theory of audience-centered communication.

After emphasizing clarity, Aristotle immediately modifies the term with “propriety” (πρέπον [*prepon*]), defining it as a mean between extremes. Propriety is the principle of wisdom for choosing the mean and for balancing contrary principles of style according to the situation. In this context, propriety adjudicates between a clear style that could be “flat” (ταπεινή [*tapeinê*]) and excessive “dignity” (ἀξίωμα [*axiôma*]) for the subject and for the argument (*logos*). In a parallel passage in *Poetics*, Aristotle notes the importance but inadequacy of clarity alone:

“Excellence of style [*lexeôs aretê*] is being clear without being common [*tapeinê*]. Now clearest

⁶¹ Aristotle defines *sêmeion* in *Prior Analytics* (2.27, 70a7-9) and discusses signs as the basis of enthymematic argument (*Rhet* 1.2.16-18, 1357b1-21, and 2.25.12, 1403a1-15). Cf. Grimaldi 1:63-65, s.v. σημείων; Grimaldi, “*Semeion, Tekmerion, Eikos* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.”

is that style which uses words in their prevailing meaning [*kyriôn*], but not overly common [*tapeinê*]” (*Poet* 22, my translation).⁶² For a theory of style, clarity is indispensable but not enough. Aristotle repeats that rhetorical style needs to be clear while avoiding *tapeinê*, a term variously glossed as “common, vulgar, flat, banal, bald, dull, low, poor,” all adjectives warning against clarity alone and calling for a due proportion of ornate, striking, or exotic style (cf. “exotic [*xenos*]” style at 3.2.2, 1404b 9). Clarity modified by due propriety, however, introduces artistic judgment. The second virtue of style, *prepon*, depends on adjudication of several factors, including the subject, language itself, the situation, and audience. In his introduction to rhetorical style, Aristotle immediately names the two most important virtues of style: clarity and propriety. In the next section, he adds ornateness (3.2.2) and later grammatical correctness (3.5.1).

Aristotle’s star pupil Theophrastus (*ca.* 370-285) later “put the finishing touches to his master’s work” and arranged the “virtues of style” into a finished system according to the four Aristotelian headings:⁶³

1. Correctness (*hellênismos*) by applying grammatical conventions;
2. Clarity (*saphê*) by using prevailing meanings of words;
3. Propriety (*prepon*) by applying the doctrine of the mean;
4. Ornateness (*kosmos*) by using orderly and pleasing language, subdivided into three categories: (a) selection of words (*eklogê*), (b) composition of words into sentences (*synthesis*), and (c) figures of thought and of language (*schêmata*).

⁶² *Poetics* 22: Λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι. σαφειστάτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἢ ἐκ τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ ταπεινὴ (1458a17-19).

⁶³ This outline condenses Solmsen’s article, “The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric” (219-20). The order in which Aristotle introduces his four virtues begins with clarity and propriety in chapter 2, correctness in chapter 5, and ornateness throughout chapters 2-12, though ornateness (*kosmos*) is used twice in the *Rhetoric* (3.7.2, 1408a14 and 3.14.11, 1415b38).

Theophrastus outlines a helpful system of diction, but his rearrangement obscures Aristotle's consistent rhetorical approach, arranged according to function. For Aristotle, clarity and propriety are the controlling principles. All other virtues of style serve these two; correctness serves clarity, and ornateness works for propriety. As Kennedy comments, "[Aristotle's] emphasis on clarity as the most important requirement of good oratorical style is consistent with his stress on logical proof in the earlier books and his dislike of the style of the sophists" (198). Aristotle makes clarity the prime value and accomplishment of prose style, creating a mode of expression that is both efficient and elegant.

In the balance between clarity and correctness, one can only speculate about how Aristotle would side on the value-laden clearness-correctness issue. The strict classical norm was to advocate clarity through the use of ordinary, everyday expressions, but rhetors including Quintilian repudiated whatever was offensive to grammatical purity (cf. *Institutes of Oratory* 1.5.5 and 8.2.24). The lone exception is St. Augustine, who asks, "For what is the good of correctness of speech if the understanding of the hearer does not follow it, since there is absolutely no reason for speaking if they for whose instruction we speak are not instructed by our speaking?" (*De Doctrina Christiana* 4.10.24).⁶⁴ The rhetorical question is a "radical concession" whereby Augustine departs from the norm by allowing an occasional barbarism or solecism to secure clear understanding amid diverse, general audiences (Sullivan 82). Though Aristotle considers clarity to be both a prerequisite and the culmination of style, he equally holds correctness ("good Greek" [*to hellenizein*]) to be a virtue and first principle (*archê*) of his theory of style (3.5.1).

⁶⁴ Augustine's Latin reads: "quid enim prodest locutionis integritas, quam non sequitur intellectus audientis, cum loquendi omnino nulla sit causa, si quod loquimur non intellegunt, propter quos ut intellegant loquimur?" One may note the multicultural and multi-class context in *De Doctrina Christiana* 4.10.24.

Kosmos (κόσμος), a subcategory of *lexis* alluded to here, is a rich term whose basic meaning is “order” in the sense of observing order or creating order out of chaos, order that has form and function, fashion and honor, beauty and dignity in the whole and in the parts (LSJ 985). The noun derives from the verb κόσμεω (*kosmeō*), meaning “to put in order, arrange, prepare.” In translation, “ornateness” reduces *kosmos* to subjective “pleasing,” reinforcing the modern bias against “mere style,” while the classical concept of order-ornateness gives prominence to form over matter or how form shapes matter for both use and beauty. For rightly understanding the rhetorical virtue of *kosmos*, an interpreter should remember that English *cosmos* and *cosmetics* both come from this Greek noun. In classical usage, *kosmos* refers to an aesthetic sense of order, used to describe the beauty of the stars in the heavens and the beauty of jewelry and fine language (Kennedy, “Hoot” 18). Aristotle has also written a treatise titled *Peri Kosmos, On the Universe*.

Aristotle’s neologism *lexeōs aretē* means “virtue of style” or “stylistic excellence” and itself exemplifies the striking diction suggested throughout chapter 2. *Lexeōs aretē* occurs three times in Aristotle’s writings (*Rhet* 3.2.1, 1404b1 and 3.12.6, 1414a22, and *Poet* 22, 1458a17). The phrase’s opposite occurs in *Poetics* 25: “*pathē tēs lexeōs*,” meaning afflictions or abnormalities of style (1460b12). Signifying quality, *aretē* means “excellence,” being a common term in Aristotle’s ethical philosophy for “moral excellence” or “virtue.” Although English “virtue” connotes “manliness” and “virility” (Latin *virtus* derives from *vir*, meaning man or male), Greek *aretē* means excellence in quality or capacity. In ethical philosophy, Aristotle develops *aretē* to mean a habit of character for choosing the golden mean between extremes in regard to any action or desire according to the standard of prudent persons (*phronimoi*); the extremes represent vices of excess or defect, whereas *aretē* indicates a deliberate, informed

choice of the mean (*EN* 2.6.16). In his coinage “virtue of style,” Aristotle illustrates the golden mean, finding a phrase that is clear, meaningful, and striking.

Aristotle’s theory of *aretê* refers not merely to the mean between extremes, but primarily to a cultural standard of “best sense,” which is often “common sense” (*sensus communis*), embodied in an idealized “prudent person” (φρόνιμος [*phronimos*]). In this manner, Aristotle’s theory of *aretê* is itself a golden mean between Platonic idealism and Pythagorean relativism, wherein the final arbiter of choice is the “*phronimos*,” as Aristotle writes in his definition: “*aretê* is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the *phronimos* would determine it” (*EN* 2.6.15). Between the phrases, “relative to us” (relativism) and “by principle” (absolutism) interposes the *phronimos*; Aristotle suggests that an inquirer should ask him what to do and learn from the *phronimos*. Lois S. Self asserts, “The ideal practitioner of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* employs the skills and qualities of Aristotle’s model of human virtue, the *Phronimos* or ‘man of practical wisdom,’ who is described in the *Nicomachean Ethics*” (131). For Aristotle, *phronimos* is *nomos*, or should be normative. In *Rhetoric* 1.7, Aristotle advises, “And what the wise [*phronimoi*]—either all or many or most of the most authoritative—would judge or have judged the greater good are necessarily so regarded, either absolutely or in terms of the practical wisdom [*phronêsis*] by which they made their judgment” (1.7.21). In deliberating a course of moral or stylistic action, Aristotle defers judgment to the *phronimoi*, the persons and their principles, for adjudicating what is excellent.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ *Phronimos* is also significant in Christian ethics; for the apostle Paul expects the churches to become prudent: “I speak as to wise men [*phronimoi*],” he writes, “judge [*krinate*] what I say,” as he makes good judgment and conduct the test of wisdom (1 Cor. 10.15).

Throughout his *Ethics*, Aristotle submits the measure of excellence to the *spoudaios* (good person), the *dikaios* (just person), and the *phronimos* (prudent person). By this inductive practice, Aristotle rejects Plato's pure deductive principles; he also dismisses Protagoras's *homo mensura* ("man the measure") doctrine; and he develops the doctrine of "*phronimos mensura*," so that the good, just, prudent person is the measure of all things, including ideas of morality and style. In this regard, Aristotle incarnates his ideals of virtue, justice, and wisdom in prudent persons, or aggregates of such persons, to whom he often refers and by whom he defers meaning in his treatises. These real, situated persons, by their familiar phrases and maxims, serve as Aristotle's norms and examples, who socially justify belief, practice, and conventions in each culture. Throughout *Rhetoric* III, Aristotle illustrates this theory of *lexeôs aretê* by quoting well-known rhetors. By observing excellent examples and the principles that inform them, rhetors may develop informed habits of stylistic choices. Looking to excellent models, rhetors develop a similar sense for what is right and appropriate until they develop the ability to surpass their models.

Similarities exist between language and conduct, including three practical rules that Aristotle provides for hitting the mean (cf. *EN* 2.9, 1109a 20 ff.). First, since one of the two extremes is a more serious blunder than the other, Aristotle advises that rhetors "avoid that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean," which is to say, avoid the greater vice (*EN* 2.9.3). This advice means that rhetors use a plain style rather than an extravagant one because misunderstanding is the greater error. Second, Aristotle cautions that the precise location of the golden mean will not be the same for everyone in view of a person's "besetting error [*hamartia*]," so "by steering wide of our besetting error we shall make a middle course" (*EN* 2.9.5). This principle applies to the concept of rhetorical voice by exercising humility and control

above displays of much knowledge. Third, Aristotle cautions against pleasure (*hêdonê*), “for when pleasure is on her trial we are not impartial judges” and likely to err (*EN* 2.9.6). In rhetoric, this principle applies to invention and style, for one may seek to avoid (or to apply) a pleasurable style for the sake of the message’s receptivity by an audience. Like virtues in ethics, “virtues of style” may be difficult to acquire at first since they require training and practice, but with practice they eventually become habits, like “second nature,” and often become pleasurable for oneself and others according to conventions and the situation.

1404b 2. σημεῖον [*sêmeion*] (sign): Classifying speech as “sign,” Aristotle defines linguistic function in terms of semiology and audience-centered communication; signs are communicative media between rhetor and auditor that should be clear and unimpaired to perform their proper function. The parenthetical clause beginning with “sign” is a supporting proposition explaining why the first virtue of style should be clarity; for quite simply, without perspicuity language fails to communicate as judged by the audience. Therefore, Aristotelian style is a theory of audience-centered communication.⁶⁶

1404b 4. πρέπουσαν [*prepousan*] (appropriate): *Prepon* is the central principle of *lexis* and for wise choices in all matters of rhetoric. After necessary clarity comes *prepon* (propriety, appropriateness, decorum), which is Aristotle’s controlling principle in artistic creation and choices of style. Style should be appropriate in three senses: appropriate for the subject (*pragma*), for the speech (*logos*, argument), and for the situation (*idion* or *kairos*), especially audience. To apply propriety, a rhetor suits the language to the subject in order to advance the message, and also conforms to the mode of communication to attain an audience’s understanding

⁶⁶ Cf. discussion of *sêmeion* at 3.2.1, 1404b2. The term is defined in *Prior Analytics* (2.27, 70a7-9) and discussed in relation to the enthymeme (*Rhet* 1.2.16-18, 1357b1-21, and 2.25.12, 1403a1-15). Cf. Grimaldi 1:63-65, s.v. σημείων; Grimaldi, “*Semeion, Tekmerion, Eikos* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.”

and attention. Since *prepon* is a virtue based on the mean between extremes, Aristotle suggests that orators ought to seek an appropriate mean between common and poetic styles of language in view of the subject so that an audience will find the language fascinating and striking, which Aristotle will later call “exotic style” (1404b9). As the modifying principle of stylistic choice, *prepon* has a direct influence on the later Latin development of *genera dicendi*, or three stylistic levels, respectively regarding plain, middle, and grand style.

To prepon as a concept derives from three cultural contexts: geometry, ethics, and common sense. *Prepon* refers to logical proportionality in the context of geometry, practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) in the context of the golden mean, and classical good sense expressed in the Greek motto *mêden agan*, “Nothing in excess!” Each of these contexts needs explanation because *to prepon* names Aristotle’s controlling set of principles for how a rhetor envisions and enacts the rhetorical *pisteis*, *lexis*, and *taxis* according to subject, speech, and situation.

As a first context, the term has theoretical roots in Plato’s Academy as a geometric principle (a law of nature) with applications to human relationships. In the *Gorgias*, for instance, setting forth propositions regarding natural and social proportionality, Socrates states:

Wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion [*koinônia*] and friendship [*philia*], by orderliness [*kosmiotês*], temperance [*sôphrasynê*], and justice [*dikaiotês*]; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call the whole of this world by the name of order [*kosmos*] not of disorder or dissoluteness. Now you, as it seems to me, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality amongst both gods and men: you hold that

self-advantage is what one ought to practice, because you neglect geometry.

(507e-508a)⁶⁷

For Plato, geometry existed before creation, a premise deduced from mind and nature. Applied to human society, geometry's conceptual cognates include *prepon* and justice. If people perform and speak what is appropriate, they display justice and virtue (*Gorgias* 507b). Proportionality is thus simple realism, which operates on a principle of equation, correspondence, or what is just, equitable, and right. Whatever is beyond equity, or just measure, produces excess or deficiency, and these are easily perceptible, like the tally of items in a ledger, as an offence to decorum, friendship, and *êthos*, and as language that results in unsociable *faux pas*.

As a second context, *prepon* derives from Aristotle's doctrine of the mean in his ethical philosophy, which when applied to rhetoric designates excellence of style as a mean (μεσότης [*mesotês*]) between the extremes of bald prose and poetical flourish. Related to the mean, *prepon* refers to proportionality but also to the cultural standard of "common sense" (*sensus communis*), embodied in "prudent persons" (*phronimoi*) (cf. prior discussion at 3.2.1, 1404b1, regarding the relationship among *prepon*, *lexeôs aretê*, *sensus communis*, and *phronimoi*; also cf. *EN* 2.6.16).

As a third context, propriety has ancient cultural roots related to the phrase *mêden agan*, translated as "Nothing too much!" or "Nothing in excess!" This phrase is said to have been inscribed in the outer-court of Apollo's temple at Delphi (Plato, *Charmides* 164d-165a). The inscription alludes to the cultural wisdom of *sôphrosynê*, which Helen North defines as the civil virtue of "self-knowledge and self-restraint" (vii). *Prepon* as propriety, restraint, and apt degree

⁶⁷ Plato, *Gorgias*: φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὡς Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ [508a] γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν, ὡς ἑτάϊρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν. σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς οὐ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τούτοις, καὶ ταῦτα σοφὸς ὢν, ἀλλὰ λέληθέν σε ὅτι ἡ ἰσότης ἡ γεωμετρικὴ καὶ ἐν θεοῖς καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγα δύναται, σὺ δὲ πλεονεξίαν οἶε δεῖν ἀσκεῖν· γεωμετρίας γὰρ ἀμελεῖς (507e-508a).

is a common theme in Greek literature (North 1 ff.). Even Plato uses the terms of propriety and impropriety (*euprepeia*, *aprepeia*) when he considers the issue (utility, effects, morality) of written rhetoric (*Phaedrus* 274b). *Prepon* based in proportionality, sense for the mean, and cultural good sense is seen as a fundamental Greek and Western value encapsulating the desire to know and to choose what is good for the situation, or in the repeated phrase of Thucydides, “what was called for in each situation” (1.22.2).

Although occurring only in Book 3, *prepon* informs Aristotle’s entire theory of rhetoric because *prepon* is the fundamental principle for making sound choices: choices for *lexis* and when evaluating the available means of persuasion in the anticipated rhetorical situation.⁶⁸ While logic regards formal validity, rhetoric may be defined as “the general study of the aptness and ineptness of the use of various expressions” in various rhetorical situations (Garver, Preface x). In this sense, *prepon* is the principle of wisdom in all adjudications recognized as rhetorical. Solmsen observes, *prepon* is “subdivided in accordance with the three πίστεις” (219). Specifically, *prepon* adds wisdom to rhetorical reasoning, consisting of six elements: possible appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, *logos*), possible issues and relevance (*staseis*), possible forms (enthymeme and example), possible strategies and sources (*topoi*), possible style (*lexis*), and possible arrangement (*taxis*).⁶⁹ Among many possibilities discovered by means of rhetorical reasoning, *prepon* is the guiding principle of choice regarding *why* or *which*, *when* or *where*, and

⁶⁸ *To Prepon* and adjectival *prepousa* occur six times in the *Rhetoric*: 3.2.1 (1404b4), 3.2.3 (1404b17), 3.2.5 (1404b31), 3.7.1 (1408a10), and 3.12.6 (1414a24 and 1414a27). Although *to prepon* occurs only in Book 3, the principle applies to all choices in rhetoric, such as selecting the appropriate arguments, appeals, style, and arrangement for any given audience and situation.

⁶⁹ Fisher outlines rhetorical rationality in five principles: “(1) concepts of what is rhetorically reasonable, (2) ways of constructing and deconstructing arguments, (3) means of discovering what is sayable, (4) alternative ways of presenting arguments, and (5) ways of deciding when and why an argument is relevant” (41). Presumably these principles refer to what are called *pisteis*, *taxis*, *topoi*, *lexis*, and *stasis* in the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition.

often *how*. The relationship between *prepon* and the rhetorical appeals, for instance, means that a rhetor will adjudicate not only the appropriate style but also the appropriate argumentative strategies for each means of persuasion. In view of subject, speech, and situation, *prepon* is the guiding principle of wisdom, including proportion, sense for the mean, and cultural good sense.

2.2. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σαφῆ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ κύρια, μὴ ταπεινὴν δὲ ἀλλὰ κεκοσμημένην τὰλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς· τὸ γὰρ ἐξαλλάξαι ποιεῖ φαίνεσθαι σεμνοτέραν· ὅπερ γὰρ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας, τὸ αὐτὸ πάσχουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν.

2.2. The use of nouns and verbs in their prevailing [*kyrios*] meaning makes for clarity; other kinds of words, as discussed in the *Poetics* [chapters 21-22], make the style ornamented rather than flat. To deviate [from prevailing usage] makes language seem more elevated; for people feel the same in regard to word usage [*lexis*] as they do in regard to strangers compared with citizens.

1404b 5. ὀνομάτων [*onomatôn*] (nouns): The term literally means “name” and refers to nouns, but includes proper and common nouns and pronouns, also including proper and common adjectives derived from nouns (Kennedy 276n26). Nouns properly denote “first substances,” and hence subjects, in contrast to ῥῆμα [*rhêma*] and here ῥημάτων [*rhematôn*], which denote verbs, predicates, and expression, also being the roots for *rhêtos*, rhetor, and rhetoric. Together, Aristotle refers to subjects and predicates, the defining parts of a sentence, which with proper usage may be made clear.

1404b 6. κύρια [*kyria*] (prevailing meaning): Since words are public property, words only have common meaning according to prevailing common usage. As Kennedy notes, “*Kyrios* refers to the prevailing meaning in good current usage and may also be translated ‘proper’ in the sense found in dictionary definitions”; moreover, the term may not indicate the semantic,

etymological, or essential meaning of a word, but how the majority of a population normally uses the word, in which case context largely determines meaning (198n15).⁷⁰

1404b 7-8 τὰλλα ὀνόματα ὅσα εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς [*talla onomata hosa eirêtai en tois peri poiêtikês*] (other kinds of words, as discussed in *Poetics*): The second reference to his treatise *Poetics* (chapters 20-22 on *lexis*), specifically refers to diction and its list of word categories in *Poetics* 21.1-3. After stating that nouns (*onomatos*) come in various lengths of syllables and compounds (single, double, triple, and polysyllabic), Aristotle provides the following “species [*eidê*] of word”: “Every word is either a *kyrion* or *glôtta* or *metaphora* or ornament, or coined or lengthened or abbreviated or altered” (1457b1-3).⁷¹ Aristotle’s eightfold category of words may be enumerated as follows:

1. *Kyrion*: standard word in its prevailing and proper meaning
2. *Glôtta*: strange word of a foreign “tongue”
3. *Metaphora*: metaphor
4. *Kosmos*: ornamental word
5. *Pepoiêmenon*: coined word or neologism
6. *Epektetamenon*: lengthened word form
7. *Hyphêrêmenon*: abbreviated word form
8. *Exêllagmenon*: altered word form

⁷⁰ *Kyrios* has a semantic range centered in the power of judgment and decision. *Kyrios* is the common word for *master* or *lord*, such as “masters of the *polis*” in Isocrates (*Encomium of Helen*) and in Aristotle (*Athenian Constitution*), and elsewhere. In the Septuagint and the New Testament, *kyrios* is the common translation for Lord, master, and authority in Hellenistic Greek.

⁷¹ *Poetics* 21: ἅπαν δὲ ὀνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑψηρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον (1457b1-3; my translation is based on Kennedy 276; cf. *Rhetoric to Alexander* 23.1, 1434b33-34, which has a three-fold list: simple, compound, and metaphorical words; also cf. Isocrates *Evagoras* 9, quoted below).

From this list of words, Aristotle singles out *kyrion* and *metaphora* as the most useful in prose, though all words may be used under the virtues of clarity and propriety in order to create an efficient, effective, and exotic style of rhetoric. The general principle is that poetic diction is ornamental and amplified while rhetorical diction aims for clarity and the appropriate mean between common and decorous language. However, style always regards balancing conflicting principles, a negotiation introduced with the next term in Aristotle's theory of style.

1404b 9. ξένους [*xenous*] (strangers): The term for "strangers" derives from a root from which English gets "xenophobia" and similar terms about the "other," contrasted with *politas*, or "citizens," and distinct from *barbaroi*, "foreigners," who do not speak Greek. Athenians would call other Greeks, such as Spartans or Corinthians, *xenoi*, which is commonly rendered as "strangers" or "foreigners" but refers to those from other Hellenic regions, from "out of town," and who spoke a different dialect of Greek. The *xenos*-term provides an important analogy between perception of people and of style. This insight becomes Aristotle's dynamic metaphor for his style of exoticism in prose composition. This "exotic style," based in the *xenos*-term, qualifies and interprets the principle of propriety by identifying a certain style between what is excessively poetic and everyday prose that is too flat and common. The exotic style uses metaphors to create both clarity and attention by defamiliarizing the familiar in a way that winsomely attracts attention. Commenting on Aristotle's theory of prose style, Hugh Lawson-Tancred remarks that the treatment of style gains its coherence from "the pervasive view that the primary concern of the stylist is to evoke a tone at once close to, and in interesting contrast with, that of his subject-matter; the ideal, in fact, is a kind of controlled exoticism" (33). The figure of a well-to-do stranger speaking one's own language in a different dialect, idiom, and intonation provides an instance of defamiliarizing the familiar, because this person uses ordinary words

diversely, slightly different, slightly deviant, between the common and the poetic, to which people give fascinated attention. *Xenos* is Aristotle's living metaphor for creating a striking, dynamic, and even cross-cultural theory of prose style (cf. "exotic" diction within poetry in *Poetics* 22, 1458a21-22).

2.3. διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν, ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν μέτρων πολλά τε ποιεῖ ταῦτο, καὶ ἀρμόττει ἐκεῖ (πλέον γὰρ ἐξέστηκε περὶ ἅ καὶ περὶ οὓς ὁ λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ δούλος καλλιεπέιτο ἢ λίαν νέος, ἀπρεπέστερον, ἢ περὶ λίαν μικρῶν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ ἀυξανόμενον τὸ πρέπον), ἐν δὲ ψιλοῖς λόγοις πολλῶν ἐλάττωσιν· ἢ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις ἐλάττων.

2.3. As a result, one should make the language unfamiliar; for people are admirers of what is far off, and what is marvelous is sweet. Many [kinds of words] accomplish this in verse and are appropriate there; for what is said [in poetry] about subject and characters is more out of the ordinary, but in prose much less so; for the subject matter is less remarkable, since even in poetry it would be rather inappropriate if a slave used fine language or if a man were too young for his words, or if the subject were too trivial, but in these cases, too, propriety is a matter of contraction or expansion [of what is being said].

1404b 11. ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον [*xenên tēn dialekton*] (unfamiliar language): Derived from the *xenos* metaphor, this fascinating phrase can be rendered "strangely common" (literally), "foreign air" (Freeze and Cope), and "unfamiliar air" (Roberts), where *dialectos* refers to common modes of language, expression, or dialect (LSJ 401). This odd coupling of terms, *xenos* and *dialectos* (exotic dialect) refer to common language used in striking, arresting, and memorable ways, referring to the practice of defamiliarizing the familiar. Aristotle's "strangely common" phrase is an instance of illustrating what he describes, as is his rhetorical practice. Kennedy notes, "The view of literary language as 'defamiliarization' has been greatly extended in modern times by the Russian Formalist School" (198n16); but one should recognize that mimetic literature is a mode of poetics according to Aristotle while his view of prose style has the aim of turning common terms into striking phrases that create new perspectives, similar to what Burke calls "perspective by incongruity" (*Permanence and Change* 67 ff.). As an

interpretation of *prepon*, appropriate prose style is not only a mean between common and ornate diction, but also common terms turned in striking ways to create new perspectives.

Emphasizing his interpretation of *prepon* as “exotic style,” Aristotle adds an argument constructed according to his fourth common topic, namely, “the more and less,” often called the argument from degree (cf. 2.23.4 [Topic 4]). Paraphrasing, he writes in effect, “Since even in dramatic poetry it is necessary to use language appropriate to character and subject, how much more in prose style!” In the form of an enthymeme, if one consents to the first proposition (Aristotle considers it obvious), then one readily assents to his conclusion that *prepon* is more necessary in prose style, practiced as common words turned into unfamiliar phrases, thus creating new perspectives of reality.

1404b 11. θαυμαστοὶ [*thaumastai*] (admirers): The striking, exotic style that Aristotle advocates has its basis in common human behavior and has an objective of gaining audience attention. Aristotle describes people as “admirers [*thaumastai*]” of the “marvelous [*thaumaston*],” especially perhaps in the theatrical, spectator society of classical Greece. If people admire what is “marvelous” and thus “sweet [*hêdu*],” then the rhetorician has only to compose in such a way that gains attention through admiration, an objective that is especially valuable in introductions.

Discussing the introduction (*prooemion*), Aristotle uses similar language for similar purposes, observing that audiences are attentive to “things that concern themselves [*idiois*], marvels [*thaumastois*], and pleasures [*hêdesin*]” (3.14.7, 1415b1-2). By this emphasis, since attention is necessary so that the audience will hear the rhetor’s arguments, Aristotle suggests that a goal of rhetorical style is to gain audience attention, mentioning several methods:

- Attention to character: appealing to *êthos*, a rhetor may seek to secure attention through admiration (*thaumaston*), either admiration of the rhetor or of some association, such as the rhetor's office, role, or recognized acquaintances.
- Attention to marvels: appealing to *pathos*, a rhetor may secure attention by discussing marvels (*thaumastois*) that an audience will find wonderful and thus "pleasing" (*hêdu*), or possibly the opposite.
- Attention to proofs: appealing to *logos*, a rhetor may invent and introduce new proofs by which to live and for making judgments about social action, leaving the audience baffled, perplexed, or astonished (*thaumaston*) (Enos and Lauer, "Meaning of Heuristic" 206).
- Attention to problems: appealing to audience values and concerns, a rhetor may frame a discourse as a "problem [*problêma*]," arranging it as a problem-solution genre to secure attention (discussed at 3.13.2, 1414a 35).

Winning audience attention requires an understanding of the dynamics of rhetoric, suggesting that a rhetor choose appropriate appeals, style, and arrangement for gaining the attention required for the argument. The styles proposed in the current section appeal to an audience's sense of admiration and wonder. Winning an audience's favor, of course, is the role of the rhetorical appeals, and here Aristotle shows how closely knit style is with all three appeals: *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. As goals of rhetorical style, attention gains an audience's ears while admiration gains mind and heart (cf. 3.14.7, 1415b1 for discussion on attention).

1404b 16. ἐπισυστελλόμενον καὶ ἀυξανόμενον [*episystellomenon kai auxanomenon*] (contraction and expansion): Propriety (*prepon*) is a mean between extremes, and in ornate language the mean exists between concision and expansion. As in all discussions of style, what Aristotle advocates is a fine line between conflicting principles, such as between native and

exotic words, natural and marvelous language, as well as contraction and expansion. The principle of *prepon* is the key arbiter, asking for wisdom in this negotiation in order to select the mean and proper balance between competing stylistic principles.

2.4. διὸ δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιούντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως ἀλλὰ πεφυκότης (τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούναντίον· ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἐπιβουλεύοντα διαβάλλονται, καθάπερ πρὸς τοὺς οἴνους τοὺς μεμιγμένους), καὶ οἶον ἢ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἄλλότριαι.

2.4. As a result, authors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally. (The latter is persuasive, the former the opposite; for people become resentful, as at someone plotting against them, just as they are at those adulterating wines.) An example is the success of Theodorus' voice when contrasted with that of other actors; for his seems the voice of the actual character, but the others' those of somebody else.

1404b 18-19. μὴ δοκεῖν [*mê dokein*] (without being noticed): A central principle in Aristotelian rhetoric, balanced with other principles, is that an author should compose and speak in such a way that his rhetorical art is not noticed, especially in judicial and deliberative situations. An audience should not give extensive attention to a rhetor's artificial prose style. In rhetorical discourse, hiding art is a virtue, so a rhetor should guard against elaborate "art for art's sake" (*ars gratia artis*) or rhetorical "art for persuasion's sake" because "people become resentful, as at someone plotting against them." In the simile, the term "plotting" (*epibouleonta*) is always negative, always injurious, meaning "treachery," "laying snares for," "contriving against" (LSJ 626). Instead of agonistic "plotting," what an audience desires and trusts is clear and candid communication. This principle means that art must be tempered by propriety to an audience's sensitivity. Kennedy remarks that this is "perhaps the earliest statement in criticism that the greatest art is to disguise art" (198n18). The principle of hiding art is functional since the main consideration is the focus of audience attention. A mode of *mimêsis* is also in view since the rhetor seeks to imitate what is natural discourse, which may result in hiding artful or

abnormal forms of expression. In prose composition, obvious artificiality signals a fault or “frigidity” (discussed in 3.3.4).

1404b 19. πεφυκότως [*pephykotôs*] (naturally): This term, along with the topic of concealing art (and later frigidity), implies a rhetorical application of Aristotle’s poetic doctrine of *mimêsis* (defined as imitation of human action) since a credible prose style is that which imitates or seems to resemble what is in the bounds of natural or normal social-linguistic practices: “how people customarily speak (and write),” Aristotle suggests.⁷² In *Poetics* 25, Aristotle never defines *mimêsis* but describes its broad applications: “Since the poet, like a painter or any other image-maker, is a mimetic artist, he must represent, in any instance, one of three objects: the kind of things which were or are the case; the kind of things that people say and think; the kind of things that ought to be the case. These are conveyed in a diction which includes loan words, metaphors, and many stylistic abnormalities: we allow poets these” (1460b7-12).⁷³ Since rhetorical art normally does not employ “stylistic abnormalities [*pathê tês lexeôs*],” the rhetorical artist creates *lexeôs aretê* with fewer resources, using everyday words, seeking a balance between common and ornate language, and working to defamiliarize familiar words in order to imitate linguistic experiences “which were or are the case” for the sake of clarity and propriety. In this sense, Aristotle combines his rhetorical and mimetic theories. The

⁷² *Mimêsis*, Halliwell comments, “had been active in a great deal of earlier Greek thinking about poetry and other arts. . . . Aristotle employs *mimêsis* as a supple concept of the human propensity to explore an understanding of the world—above all, of human experience itself—through fictive representation and imaginative ‘enactment’ of experience” (Introduction to *Poetics* 8).

⁷³ *Poetics* 25: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μιμητῆς ὁ ποιητῆς ὡσπερ ἀνεὶ ζωγράφος ἢ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη μιμῆσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐν τι αἰεὶ, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷα φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. ταῦτα δ’ ἐξαγγέλλεται λέξει ἐν ἢ καὶ γλωτταὶ καὶ μεταφοραὶ καὶ πολλὰ πάθη τῆς λέξεώς ἔστι· δίδομεν γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς (1460b7-12).

aim of the prose stylist is to speak or write naturally because what is socially natural is normal and thus credible. Excessive artifice (*peplasménōs*: “artifice, by pretense” [LSJ 1363]) is disastrous to persuasion because artifice is interpreted as cunning, thus arousing suspicion, mistrust, and resentment in an audience. Aristotle is acutely aware that audience opinion is “the whole business of rhetoric” (3.1.5). What Aristotle advises about prose style always has the functional aim of maintaining a trustworthy *êthos* that supports appeals to an audience’s reason, character, and emotions, making *lexis* primary.

1404b 22. Θεοδώρου φωνη [*Theodôrou phônê*] (Theodorus’ voice): The chosen example comes from acting, and like the comments on delivery, Aristotle focuses on voice. The example is a simile drawn from drama and highlighted with contrast or antithesis, which he uses in many examples and discusses at 3.9.9.

2.5. κλέπτεται δ’ εὖ, ἐάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῆ· ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε-πρῶτος. ὄντων δ’ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν, τῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων τσαυτ’ ἐχόντων εἶδη ὅσα τεθεώρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιήσεως, τούτων γλώτταις μὲν καὶ διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ πεποιημένοις ὀλιγάκις καὶ ὀλιγαχοῦ χρηστέον (ὅπου δέ, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, τό τε διὰ τί εἴρηται· ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον γὰρ ἐξαλλάττει τοῦ πρέποντος),

2.5. The “theft” is well done if one composes by choosing words from ordinary language. Euripides does this and first showed the way.

Since speech is made up of nouns and verbs, and the species of nouns are those examined in the *Poetics*, from among these one should use glosses and double words and coinages rarely and in a limited number of situations. (We will later [3.7] explain where; the reason has already been given: the usage departs from the appropriate in the direction of excess.)

1404b 24. κλέπτεται [*kleptetai*] (“theft”): The best art is hidden art. “Stealth” or “concealment” is an accurate translation, no less so than “theft” from a term from which English derives kleptomania. Kirby comments: “*Kleptein* carries a specific connotation of ‘stealing’ but, more generally, of ‘stealth’ . . . It is possible that Aristotle’s concept of artistic concealment here ought to be connected with Gorgias’ doctrine of *apatê*, the ‘deception’ wrought by Attic tragedy”

(541n78). Creative use of common diction can conceal art, as opposed to elevated diction, high stylistic levels, and excessive figures as found in some poetic styles. Art concealed by ordinary diction refers not to a stylistic art but to rhetoric's fundamental art of inventing ideas and artistic appeals, which an orator can embody, conceal, and develop in any number of various word choices for an audience. If art is flagrant, the theft is detected, and an audience will tend to distrust an orator, which is fatal to persuasion. What John Keats has stated, "We distrust literature which too obviously wants to convert us or influence our views," applies also to artificial rhetoric.

1404b 25. Εὐριπίδης [*Euripidês*]: Aristotle has mentioned in 3.1.9 that poets, beginning with Euripides, composed dialogue passages in ordinary, conversational diction. Now Aristotle refers to Euripides as an example of how to conceal art by using ordinary language or conversational diction (*dialektos*), producing an imitation of natural speech.

1404b 27. ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων [*onomatôn kai rhêmatôn*] (nouns and verbs): The repeated reference to nouns and verbs, subjects and predicates, emphasizes the theme that prose and poetic styles are distinct but not separate (cf. discussion at 3.1.10 and 3.2.2). Having different functions and goals, their styles are distinct; having similar media and a common language, their stylistic resources overlap. In this vein, Aristotle advises composers to avoid poetic excess but not poetic resources of language. The third reference to *Poetics* directs the reader to chapters 20-22, an account of *lexis* suited for poetic *mimêsis*, or imitation.

1404b 30-31. The parenthetical phrase "we will later explain" refers to 3.7.11 regarding *to prepon* and the similarity between impassioned prose and poetry. In passionate language, poetic or prose, it is more appropriate to use poetic diction, such as the three mentioned here: First, "glosses" (γλώτταις [*glôttais*], literally "tongues") by anatomical metaphor refer to

strange words and phrases of a foreign dialect or language.⁷⁴ Second, “double words” (διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι [*diplois onomasi*]) refer to long, drawn-out, compound words. Third, “coinages” (πεποιημένοις [*pepoiêmenois*] literally “made up” words) refer to words or expressions invented for the situation, such as during the process of composing or speaking (cf. *Poet* 21, 1457b1-3). These three classes of poetic expressions are usually inappropriate for prose because they deviate from conventional usage, tending toward excess and exaggeration or obscuring perspicuity and propriety.

2.6. τὸ δὲ κύριον καὶ τὸ οἰκείον καὶ μεταφορὰ μόνα χρήσιμα πρὸς τὴν τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων λέξιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι τούτοις μόνοις πάντες χρῶνται· πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις· ὥστε δῆλον ὡς ἂν εὖ ποιῇ τις, ἔσται τε ξενικὸν καὶ λανθάνειν ἐνδέχεται καὶ σαφηνιεῖ. αὕτη δ' ἦν ἡ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ λόγου ἀρετή.

2.6. A word in its prevailing and native meaning and metaphor are alone useful in the *lexis* of prose. A sign of this is that these are the only kinds of words everybody uses; for all people carry on their conversations with metaphors and words in their native and prevailing meanings.

Thus, it is clear that if one composes well, there will be an unfamiliar quality and it escapes notice and will be clear. This, we said, was the virtue of rhetorical language.

1404b 31. τὸ κύριον [*to kyrion*] (prevailing meaning): *Kyrios* indicates common meaning (*sensus communis*), how the majority of a population normally uses the word, which may not be the semantic, etymological, or essential meaning of a word (Kennedy 198n15; cf. discussion of *kyrios* at 3.2.2, 1404b6). Concerning language, *kyrios* is a sociological foundation of rhetoric, referring to the need to discourse in the common language. *Sensus communis* is the later epistemic principle in classical, describing social determinations of shared meaning, a concept indicated by and forming the basis for Aristotle's usage of *kyrios*. In classical Greek, the concept has two meanings: first, *sensus communis* is generally synonymous with *doxa* as the

⁷⁴ *Glôtta* means “tongue,” a term Aristotle uses in his biology to refer to tongues of animals (e.g., cf. *History of Animals* 2.6 ff. and *Generation of Animals* 5.6 ff.). By metaphor, *glôssa* has come to mean strange words of a foreign dialect or language (cf. *Poet* 21, 1457b1, and discussion at *Rhet* 3.2.2, 1404b7-8).

“common opinions” of the ordinary person; second, *sensus communis* has a technical meaning in Aristotle’s *De Anima*, accounting for how humans recognize both particular items and their general categories (426b8-427a15), a faculty Thomas Aquinas calls *sensus communis* (Schaeffer, *Sensus Communis* 2).⁷⁵ Both meanings of *sensus communis* are epistemic, signifying how people in community create practical judgments in determinations of meaning, from the prevailing meaning of individual words to determinations of value judgments. *Kyrios* is semantically centered in *authority*, which is decentered in language, belonging to the people who daily use and shape prevailing idioms (LSJ 1013). Aristotle subscribes to this obvious, democratic application of *kyrios* in the prevailing meaning of words.

1404b 32. τὸ οἰκεῖον [*to oikeion*] (native meaning): In addition to *kyrios*, Aristotle adds a second modifier in order to contrast native, vernacular terms as opposed to foreign terms and meanings. In chapter 5, Aristotle extends this principle to “good Greek” generally, concerning the need for native conventions of usage for the sake of clarity and correctness.

1404b 32. μεταφορὰ [*metaphora*] (metaphor): In this first mention of metaphor in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle asserts the pervasiveness of metaphor in ordinary conversation and language and, therefore, the usefulness of metaphor “in the *lexis* of prose.” In the supporting proposition,

⁷⁵ John D. Schaeffer defines the concept: “*Sensus communis* is grounded in the language, literature, and institutions of a community and relates to the community’s political and social world, a relation that is consensual and concrete. *Sensus communis* provides a historical continuity within which the community can interpret its own policies and make its own decisions. Because of these characteristics, *sensus communis* is not amenable to ethical relativism” (150). In terms of “the authority of interpretive communities,” Stanley Fish describes the epistemic function of *sensus communis*: “While relativism is a position one can entertain, it is not a position one can occupy. No one can *be* a relativist, because no one can achieve the distance from his own beliefs and assumptions which would result in there being no more authoritative *for him* than the beliefs and assumptions held by others, or, for that matter, the beliefs and assumptions he himself used to hold. The fear that in a world of indifferently authorized norms and values the individual is without a basis for action is groundless because no one is indifferent to the norms and values that enable his consciousness” (319).

“for all people converse with metaphor,” the rationale is a major or universal premise, also associating metaphor as equal in function with native words (*oikeiois*) and words in their prevailing, ordinary meanings (*kyriois*). In enthymematic form, Aristotle asserts that metaphor is an appropriate part of prose style because ordinary language is full of metaphors. Kennedy comments: “Ordinary language contains many metaphorical expressions [some of which] have often lost their force, e.g., ‘It’s raining cats and dogs,’ ‘The sun is smiling,’ etc.” (199n22). Whether dead or living metaphors, Aristotle seems to perceive their pervasiveness in ordinary yet analogical, imagistic language. Kirby comments: “[Aristotle] by no means restricted metaphor to poetic or extraordinary contexts”; moreover, “his remark that ‘everyone converses using metaphors’ may be seen as actually prescient of the cognitive approach” of metaphorology, an approach in later statements that metaphor creates knowledge (“Aristotle on Metaphor” 539; cf. *Rhet* 3.10-11). The claim that “all people carry on their conversations with metaphors” also implies that Aristotle’s treatment of rhetoric is a general theory of language because it claims to treat ordinary conversation and discourse (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 16-17).

Metaphora is a classical coinage, first occurring in Isocrates, *Evagoras* 9 (ca. 370), when Isocrates claims to banish poetic embellishments like metaphor from his prose, even though his prose contains many striking examples of metaphor, a few quoted by Aristotle (*Rhet* 3.10.7) (LSJ 1118).⁷⁶ Concerning this enigma, Kirby proposes, “*Metaphora* (like *enthumêma*) meant

⁷⁶ Isocrates, *Evagoras* 9: “For to the poets is granted the use of many embellishments [*kosmoi*] of language, since they can represent the gods as associating with men, conversing with and aiding in battle whomsoever they please, and they can treat of these subjects not only in conventional expressions, but in words now exotic [*xenoi*], now newly coined [*kainoi*], and now in figures of speech [*metaphorais*], neglecting none, but using every kind [of form, *eidos*] with which to embroider their poesy.” Greek text: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ δέδονται κόσμοι· καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἷόν τ’ αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι καὶ διαλεγόμενους καὶ συναγωνιζομένους οἷς ἂν βουλευθῶσι, καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις, τὰ δὲ καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπέιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν.

something different to Aristotle than to Isocrates,” for it is probable that “by metaphor Isocrates meant elaborate formal analogies in the style of the Homeric simile,” which would explain why Isocrates restricts *metaphora* to poetic verse while at the same time using metaphor in his own prose orations, or what Aristotle and the tradition after him formally call metaphor (526). Since *metaphora* was a neologism of Athenian rhetoricians attempting to describe language, one may expect semantic and theoretical range, in part explaining the tensions in its technical usage and in Aristotle’s theory between his formal categories and his functional and psychological insights about metaphor.

Metaphor in Aristotle’s treatises has two references: one formal, abstract, and logical (especially in *Poetics* 21-22, to which he refers in this chapter), and one functional, concrete, and psychological with reference to audience response (occurring frequently in the *Rhetoric*, as in chapters 2, 4, 10, and 11). Between his formal categories in *Poetics* and his functional explorations of metaphor in the *Rhetoric*, tensions develop because Aristotle works with two distinct but related investigations of metaphor. As Kennedy notes, “Style in poetics is an aspect of imitation [*mimêsis*], in rhetoric of persuasion [*pithanon*]” (197n14; cf. 1.2.1). Aristotle seems to recognize the formal-functional tensions while advancing his metaphorology from a stylistic trope to a cognitive theory focusing on pedagogy, especially in chapters 10 and 11.

In this passage, Aristotle implies that metaphor consists of *one* word, similar to a neologism or a gloss, and Cicero has repeated and transmitted this mistake (cf. *De Oratore* 3.38-39). This error can be corrected from Aristotle’s formal definition of metaphor in *Poetics* 21 (examined below) and from his many examples (3.10.7). Though tropes do consist of one word, metaphor proper (metaphor from analogy) cannot consist of a single word because metaphor

involves a form of predication hinged together with a copula, as Aristotle clarifies in 3.11.11: “[Similes] always involve two terms, as does metaphor from analogy” (cf. 3.10.3).

Defined, *metaphor* means “transference” (literally “carrying across”) of a word from one object of reference to another. Aristotle provides a formal definition in *Poetics* 21, 1457b6-9: “*Metaphora* is an application [*epiphora*] of a name [*onoma*] to an another/alien thing [*allotrios*]: either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy [*analogon*]” (my translation).⁷⁷ Aristotle’s famous definition of metaphor by metaphor first describes what metaphor is, then outlines formal categories of metaphor, wherein are four species. The definition has three “crucial elements which can be found in various forms in most definitions of metaphor since Aristotle,” these being similarity (*analogos*), difference (*allotrios*), and additional application or cross-predication (*epiphora*) (Haley 9).

The definition’s first key term is analogy (*analogos*), signifying similarity since metaphor in all of its varieties involves the observation of likenesses (*homoia*) across different species and genera in the process of reasoning about resemblances in the world. Observing likenesses involves making some kind of analogical or proportional connection between dissimilar items among different conceptual domains. Moreover, metaphor not only derives from “seeing likeness,” but describes this observing, reasoning process itself. The metaphorical, analogical process is the fundamental cognitive process, epistemologically prior to and

⁷⁷ *Poetics* 21: μεταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον (1457b6-9). Gayle provides the following translation: “A carrying *across* is a carrying *upon* the name of another, either from or by some similar statement on a statement,” noting that *metaphora* is an *epiphora* is a statement that is a metaphor; and comments: “Thus, there’s the actual doing of what Aristotle is describing! There’s a practicing of what he preaches! The ‘another’ is difference, the foreignness; the ‘similar’ is the likeness, the analogy. Kirby is right to point out the common root of the separate words, but in Aristotle’s Greek, a metaphor is made of the two words” (Gayle). Cf. 3.4, 3.10, and 3.11 for discussion of Aristotle’s formal metaphor, wherein metaphor is the genus and simile the species.

interconnected with all other processes of reasoning (discussed further in 3.10.7 and 3.11.5 with reference to *Topics* 1.18, 108b7-14).

The second key term is *allotrios*, signifying duality since the term means “belonging to another” and “foreign, strange” (LSJ 70). The term is equivalent to the Latin *alter*, suggesting alterity and difference. Thus, Kennedy translates the term as “alien” and insists that “every metaphor is *allotrios* (alien)” (276, 219n102). According to Paul Ricœur, “The Aristotelian idea of *allotrios* tends to assimilate three distinct ideas: the idea of *deviation* from ordinary usage; the idea of *borrowing* from an original domain; and the idea of *substitution* for an absent but available ordinary word” (20). Ricœur suggests that *deviation* or “categorical transgression” is the most significant idea because it can involve a mode of discovery for creating new meaning through metaphors: “metaphor destroys an order only to invent a new one,” a way of using metaphor for re-describing and re-viewing reality (22).

The definition’s third key term is *epiphora*, referring to cross-predication and often glossed as “movement” (Kennedy), “transfer” (Golden, Telford), “application” (Butcher, Else, Janko). Literally, *epiphora* means additional (*epi-*) offering (*phoros*; cf. Latin *forum*), such as extra payment, second donation, increased carrying, bearing twins, and additional assignment, load, or application (LSJ 671, 1951; Kirby 532). By the predication *metaphora* is *epiphora*, “Aristotle risks tautology,” according to Kirby, because “both *metaphora* and *epiphora* stem from the same root *pher-/phor-*, meaning ‘carry’ or ‘transfer’” (532). *Metaphora* means “carrying across” or “transference” of a word (a noun or adjective, for both are included in *onomata*) from its ordinary or “literal” usage to a new, alien application that can be highly figurative (532). As Kennedy comments, “*Metaphor* is itself a metaphor and literally means ‘carrying something from one place to another, transference’” (*Rhet* [1991] 222n25). Thus, in a

double movement, Aristotle uses metaphor for *metaphor* and defines *metaphor* by metaphor, illustrating what he describes, including sameness (*analogos*) and strangeness (*allos*) in the very definition. Additionally, metaphor is definitional in form by involving synthetic identification or implicit comparison (“this *is* that”), and is definitional in function by indicating or implying the assignment of a new category for understanding a concept (“this is *of* that [genus]”).





In *Poetics* 21, Aristotle outlines his fourfold categories of metaphor: “genus to species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy” (*Poet* 1457b8-9). The first three categories describe the tropes of synecdoche and metonymy, involving substitutions of single words (cf. examples at 3.2.10). According to Aristotle’s *Categories* 1, two things are named “synonymous [*synônyma*]” when they share a common genus and thus common essence and definition, so that “a man and an ox are called ‘animals’” (*Cat* 1a6-12; cf. Eco, *Semiotics* 91). In this sense, the first three categories of metaphor are forms of synonymy, for synecdoche and metonymy are substitutions of name within the same genus. Applying the definitions of Groupe μ (a group of semioticians at the Center of Poetic Studies in Belgium), one can delineate Aristotle’s formal categories of metaphor along with the inherent taxonomy:

1. Metaphor from genus to species: generalizing synecdoche. E.g., “My ship stands here,” where *standing* is the genus that contains «lying at anchor» among its species.
2. Metaphor from species to genus: particularizing synecdoche. E.g., “Yea, Odysseus did ten-thousand noble deeds,” where *ten-thousand* is a species of the genus «many».
3. Metaphor from species to species: metonymy (condensing or symbolizing the intangible). E.g., “Drawing off his life with bronze” and “cutting with tireless bronze,” where *drawing off* and *cutting* are both species of the same genus «taking

away». Formally, $A/B = C/B$ represents the species-to-species contiguous transfer of metonymy, wherein the common genus (term B) is implied and unstated.

4. Metaphor from analogy: metaphor of identification and simile of comparison, between similar sets of items in different genera (cf. 3.4.4). E.g., “Old age is the sunset of life,” according to Empedocles, where the species *old age* in the genus «lifecycle» is comparable with the species *sunset* in the genus «solar day», so also the reverse: “Sunset is the old age of day.” Formally, $A/B = C/D$ represents proportional metaphor as explained in *Poetics* 21 (1457b16-29, translation by Kennedy 276).

The four categories of metaphor can be arranged visually since Aristotle defines metaphor formally according to an inherent taxonomy, where genus is placed on top and species below:

<p>1. Genus to species (generalizing synecdoche) “My ship stands here.”</p> 	<p>2. Species to genus (particularizing synecdoche) “Odysseus did ten-thousand noble deeds.”</p> 
<p>3. Species to species (metonymy) “Drawing off his life with bronze” “Cutting with tireless bronze”</p> 	<p>4. Proportional metaphor “Old age is the sunset of life.”</p> 
<p>Chart 2.1: Aristotle’s taxonomy of metaphor in <i>Poetics</i> 21</p>	

The fourth category, proportional metaphor, is metaphor proper and the most prominent in the *Rhetoric*. According to Groupe μ , “Metaphor is the product of two synecdoches” resulting from their conjunction, implying that in a formal sense synecdoche is the fundamental trope and that proportional metaphor the most complex (107).⁷⁸ Proportional metaphor has several species, including epithet (3.2.9-14; 3.6.3), simile (3.4, 3.11.11), verbal irony (3.11.6-10), riddle (3.11.6), hyperbole (3.11.15), and *prosôpopoiia*, meaning “make into a person” (from *prosôpon* for “face” or “person” and *poiein* for “to make”). From *prosôpopoiia* derive the two modern terms of personification and anthropomorphism, differentiated by the Aristotelian essence-attribute distinction respectively; for instance, “blind justice” indicates personification, and “laboring ants” anthropomorphism. Proportional metaphor also includes catachresis wherein the vehicle, or phoros, stands in for a missing tenor, or theme ($A/B = x/D$), explained and illustrated in *Poetics* 21 (1457b25-29).⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Groupe μ is the pseudonym for a group of semioticians at the Center for Poetic Studies at the University of Liège, where μ stands for *metaphore*, and whose study of metaphor is found in *Rhétorique générale* (1970), translated as *A General Rhetoric* (1981), wherein they delineate tropes and metasemes (esp. chapter 4, pp. 90-126). Groupe μ distinguishes two types of metaphor: conceptual metaphor (Σ) and referential metaphor (Π): “To construct a metaphor, we must couple two complementary synecdoches that function in a precisely inverse way and that fix an intersection between the terms *S* and *R* [where *S* is the starting term, *R* the resulting term]. In mode Σ [logical sum], the metaphor obtained will be based on the semes common to *S* and *R*, while in mode Π [logical product] it will be based on their common parts. Therefore, the only two possible combinations will be Σ and Π ” (109-10). This concept-reference dichotomy, if accepted, would apply to all species of metaphor.

⁷⁹ The terms *vehicle* and *tenor* derive from I.A. Richards, having become standard terms among literary critics for designating the two “sides” of metaphor (*Philosophy of Rhetoric* [1936], 89-138). For rhetoricians, Chaim Perelman has introduced the terms *phoros* and *theme* for describing the same; *phoros* meaning “bearing” or “vehicle” derives from Greek *phoros*, found in *metaphora* (*New Rhetoric* [1958] 373). *Phoros* refers to the concrete, “figural” icon in the sphere of the senses, while *theme* refers to the abstract, “literal” idea in the spiritual sphere. For example, given Empedocles’ metaphor, “Old age is the sunset of life,” the term *old age* is the theme; the term *sunset* is the phoros, creating semantic tension with the theme and causing one to focus on the phoros as a first step in interpreting the metaphor. In philosophy, Max Black uses

Aristotle views catachresis as proportional metaphor with a lack that is formally insignificant, but functionally important because the lack indicates a need filled by the catachresis metaphor when there is no proper word available. Aristotle neither provides a distinct name for catachresis nor discusses it beyond illustration in *Poetics* 21, but using the same examples, he discusses the functions of catachresis in the *Rhetoric* (3.4.4, 3.11.11-13) under the topics of metaphor and simile. The term catachresis (*katachrêsis*) means “over use” and “debt” and was applied to metaphor in the second century BC, referring to “analogical application” (LSJ 921). Derrida views Aristotle’s examples of catachresis as particularly significant since they indicate the “metaphorization of metaphor” wherein “all the terms in an analogical relation already are caught up, one by one, in a metaphorical relation,” merging phoros and theme to create a “negative addition” of meaning (“White Mythology” 243). Analyzing Aristotle’s illustrations of catachresis, especially “sowing his divine fire [*speirôn theoktistan phloga*]” (*Poet* 21, 1457b28-29), Derrida proposes: “Thus, metaphor means heliotrope” (“White Mythology” 251). In Derrida’s analysis, heliotrope is the metaphor of metaphors in Aristotle’s metaphorology and theory of *mimêsis*, while catachresis exemplifies how metaphor pervades (the lack within) language imperceptibly. In this sense, Aristotle shows more than he knows in his formal analysis of metaphor.

In outlining formal categories of metaphor, Aristotle “*changes his game*,” observes Umberto Eco, when he shifts from taxonomic form to cognitive function with the fourth category of metaphor, perhaps without realizing it. Eco explains this oft-misunderstood shift:

focus and *frame*, frame for the proposition, focus for the phoros (*Models and Metaphors* [1962], 27-28). In cognitive linguistics, George Lakoff has introduced conceptual domains: *source domain* is the phoros, *target domain* is the theme (*Metaphors We Live By* [1980], 252-57). Hereafter, this commentary uses Perelman’s set of terms, phoros and theme.

[I]n speaking of the first three types, he explains *how* a metaphor is produced and understood, whereas in speaking of the fourth type he explains *what* a metaphor enables us to know. In the first three cases, he says *how* the metaphorical production and interpretation *function* (and that he can do because the mechanism, which is synecdochic, is rather simple and is based on the inflexible logic of a Porphyrian tree, however that tree is selected). In the fourth case, Aristotle tells *what the metaphor says*, or in what way it increases our knowledge of the relations between things. . . . The Aristotelian proportion[ate metaphor] is an empty schema where infinite pieces of encyclopedic information can be inserted; but what a metaphor allows us to know has more to do with those inserted items of knowledge than with the schematic relation that is filled up. (*Semiotics* 99-100)

As a result of interpreting proportionate metaphor as simply a fourth form, the rhetorical tradition has overlooked the cognitive function of proportionate metaphor that Aristotle develops in chapters 10 and 11. This oversight is lamentable because the metaphorological tradition has “frequently ignore[d] the most ingenious and vigorous of Aristotle’s conclusions, that the metaphor is not only a means of delight but also, and above all, a tool of cognition” (Eco, *Semiotics* 100).

Metaphor is a *tropos* (“turn”) that is also and primarily a *topos* (“place”) of invention. As Eco has emphasized, metaphor is an inferential form that “increases our knowledge of the relations between things.” If the enthymeme is a “rhetorical syllogism” (1.2.8), then the metaphor is a “stylistic syllogism” since both forms are methods for creating logical inference and new knowledge. As Grimaldi has explained, the difference between inferential forms like syllogisms and enthymemes lies not in their subject-matter but in their structural form: “the only

permanent element in ‘syllogism’ is its structure as a form of inference. Its apodeictic, dialectical, rhetorical character is determined by its content, or the source material it uses” (*Studies* 146; cf. Grimaldi 1:21, 55a8, for a discussion of syllogism). Moreover, each inferential form has a particular purpose or functional specialty: “Just as the scientific syllogism organizes the sources of knowledge, so the rhetorical syllogism can organize the sources of conviction” (*Studies* 145). If the dialectical syllogism features and is designed for epistemic reason, and the rhetorical enthymeme for practical reason, then what is the rhetorical function of metaphor? The functional specialty of metaphor is creating new perspectives: new understandings, new interpretations, and new paradigms based in analogical reasoning, which are also pleasant because visually concrete. Metaphors give audiences new eyes for perceiving new conclusions about likenesses and relationships in the world; yet, because metaphors are often as invisible as one’s own eyes or as everyday as language, people tend to overlook the multiple ways for how metaphorical propositions imply inferences and create the possibility for new conclusions. The ability to create inference plus pleasant learning makes metaphor a powerful thinking tool in the teaching-learning process of communication. Aristotle observes this combined effect: “Metaphor most brings about learning” and “creates understanding and knowledge” that is also “pleasing” (3.10.2). As examples of this rhetorical function, one may look to Aristotle’s defining terms in the *Rhetoric*, for every one of them is a proportional metaphor, comparing and identifying rhetoric with other *technê* or with cultural root metaphors, thus creating associations, knowledge, and learning (cf. 1.1.1, 2.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.14.1, and discussion at 3.1.2). As a *topos*, an implicit syllogism (i.e., syllogism in a nutshell), that is also a *tropos*, metaphor exemplifies the *dynamis* of rhetorical style in its ability to create and share new understandings with pleasure and suasion.

The *Rhetoric* features proportionate metaphor because it is the most rhetorical in the sense that it creates and communicates the most learning (cf. 3.10.2-7; 3.11). In addition, proportionate metaphor communicates *well*, making metaphorical expressions the most admired and well-liked, showing them to be the foremost examples of urbanity (3.10.7). Metaphor from analogy is regarded as metaphor proper, involving a form of cross-predication that defines an item according to analogy and genus. In this sense, metaphor creates identification between a subject and a subject complement (predicate nominative) by showing partial synthesis and links of comparison-contrast between items in different genera (cf. 3.11.11). Contrary to Aristotle's formal categories, similes are not proper metaphors but figures of thought, though in formal terms they are similar to metaphor and can be sources for metaphors (as he clarifies in 3.2.9). In chapters 10 and 11, Aristotle pursues a fuller discussion of the form and function of metaphor. For now, one should observe that Aristotle thinks of metaphor as a category and composite concept.

2.7. τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῶ μὲν σοφιστῆ ὁμωνυμῖαι χρήσιμοι (παρὰ ταύτας γὰρ κακουργεῖ), τῶ ποιητῆ δὲ συνωνυμῖαι. λέγω δὲ κύρια [1405a] τε καὶ συνώνυμα οἷον τὸ πορεύεσθαι καὶ τὸ βαδίζειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ κύρια καὶ συνώνυμα ἀλλήλοις.
τί μὲν οὖν τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι, καὶ πόσα εἶδη μεταφορᾶς, καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο πλεῖστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραὶ, εἴρηται, καθάπερ ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς·

2.7. The kind of words useful to a sophist are homonyms (by means of these he does his dirty work), to a poet synonyms. [1405a] By words that are both in their prevailing meaning and synonymous I mean, for example, *go* and *walk*; for when used in their prevailing sense, these are synonymous with each other.

Now what each kind of word is and how many species of metaphor there are and that metaphor has very great effect both in poetry and speeches has been said, as noted above, in the *Poetics*.

1404b 38. ὁμωνυμῖαι [*homōnymiai*] (homonyms): By use of homonyms (equivocal words, having one sound but two or more meanings) Greek sophists allegedly composed fraudulent arguments in which one *logos* shifted meaning with two or more *logoi*. Aristotle

indicts sophists who employ ambiguous homonyms to make spurious arguments. Homonyms are the sophist's tools to do "dirty work" (κακούργει [*kakourgei*]), he writes, a word that has connotations of evil, such as "work wickedness" through "captious or unfair arguments" (LSJ 864; cf. *Gorgias* 489b). At the beginning of *Categories* (1.1) and *Sophistical Refutations* (1.7), and its counterpart in the *Rhetoric* on verbal fallacies (2.24.2, 1401a13), Aristotle defines the term homonym, employing several examples. For instance, the first word in *Categories* is *homōnymia*, "homonyms," which are defined as words with similar names but having "the name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being different" (1.1).⁸⁰ Following Aristotle, Francis Bacon in *Novum Organum* (1.43) chastises the ambiguity of homonyms. He names them "idols of the marketplace" (*idola fori*) for being illusions or prejudices in language resulting from false correspondence between *verbum* (word) and *res* (thing) (Bizzell and Herzberg 746). Aristotle and Bacon assert that language is not a neutral medium of communication but a medium that structures perspectives, for homonyms can lead to obfuscation, confusion, and empty controversies, but can also create urbane expressions (cf. 3.11.7-8). Aristotle holds that language itself as a semiotic system is morally neutral but never structurally neutral, always viewing language as dynamic, creative, and providing a perspective.

However, Aristotle also claims that clever use of homonymy can create well-liked expressions, memorable in both sound and sense. For this reason, he devotes several sections to homonymy in his treatment of urbanities, *ta asteia* (cf. 3.11.7-8). Appropriate use of homonymy is a matter of intention, whether a rhetor intends to deceive through an unperceived double identity of a term or intends to create a clever, memorable expression suitable for perceiving the

⁸⁰ *Categories* 1: Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος (1a1-2).

“different senses [*all’ allôs*]” (3.11.7, 1412b 9), leading to surprise, insight, and pleasure. For Aristotle, rhetoric, like language itself, is morally neutral, but he also always assumes an ethical rhetor for whom rhetoric is an ability “to see the available means of persuasion” rather than the available means of delusion or deception (1.2.1).

1404b 39. συνωνυμίαι [*synônymiai*] (synonyms): Why are synonyms useful to a poet?

They are useful for sound effects and nuances of meaning, not to create ambiguity like the sophists but to create various figures, sounds, and connotations of meaning. For Aristotle, single-word tropes, like metonymy and synecdoche, are synonyms.

2.8. τοςούτω δ’ ἐν λόγῳ δεῖ μᾶλλον φιλοπονείσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅσῳ ἐξ ἑλαττόνων βοηθημάτων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ τῶν μέτρων. καὶ τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα ἢ μεταφορά, καὶ λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὴν παρ’ ἄλλου.

2.8. In speech it is necessary to take special pains to the extent that speech has fewer resources than verse. Metaphor especially has clarity and sweetness and strangeness, and its use cannot be learned from someone else.

1405a 7. βοηθημάτων [*boêthêmatôn*] (resources): Because prose has fewer “resources” or “remedies” than verse (μέτρων [*metrôn*]), Aristotle proposes that a rhetor should “take great care” in “loving labor” (φιλοπονείσθαι [*philoponeisthai*] “build as a labor of love,”) with those fewer resources that are appropriate for prose. These resources he begins to describe, beginning with metaphor. On the affectionate term “loving labor,,” Aristotle seems to reveal and commend his own attitude toward the craft of writing, indicating his *pathos-philos* (emotional friendship) with the art of rhetoric in his prolific practice as a writer.

1405a 8. τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν [*to saphes kai to hêdu kai to xenikon*] (clarity and sweetness and strangeness): Aristotle extols metaphor by multiplying three significant adjectives, each connoting a particular virtue of style. Carefully wrought metaphors provide “clarity” because good metaphors create quick insight and learning; “sweetness” or

“pleasure” (*hêdon*, cf. English “hedonic” and “hedonistic”) because people delight in appropriate word pictures and the quick learning that comes from them; and “strangeness” (from *xenos*) results in defamiliarizing the familiar and familiarizing that which is strange, striking, and exotic. By well-turned metaphors, creative orators and writers make the ordinary strange and the strange ordinary; they draw similarities that instruct and synthesize old ideas in new ways; they create new meaning for ideas and feelings which are hard to express. As a result, metaphors help create an exotic rhetoric that both instructs and fascinates an audience. This style of metaphoric rhetoric Aristotle extols for its multiple effects.

1405a 9. λαβεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν [*labein ouk estin*] (cannot be learned): Aristotle suggests that metaphor “is not learned from others” through training; the verb λαβεῖν [*labein*] has the image of *catching* a concept from another. Aristotle probably has in mind the three sources of learning, oft stated by Isocrates: talent, training, and practice. In *Poetics* 22, Aristotle makes a similar statement, suggesting that metaphor-creation is a talent, knack, or ability: “but much the greatest asset is metaphor; for this alone cannot be learned [*labein*] from another and is a sign of natural ability [*euphyias*]; for to use metaphor well is to see [*theôrein*] similarities [*homoion*]” (*Poet* 22, my translation; cf. *Top* 140a8-11).⁸¹ The translation “natural ability” is as viable as traditional renderings focusing on “inborn talent” (Epps), “natural gifts” (Halliwell), or “genius” (Butcher), suggesting an aristocratic and Platonic perspective of education. Metaphor-creation as a human ability seems to fit the context of the *Rhetoric*, where the ability to “see” or “theorize” about

⁸¹ *Poetics* 22: πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι. μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο οὔτε παρ’ ἄλλου ἔστι λαβεῖν εὐφυΐας τε σημείον ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ εἶ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὅμοιον θεωρεῖν ἔστιν (1459a5-8). The term *euphyias* means natural ability or propensity and, far from elitist talent or special genius, can refer to a human ability that children have: metaphor-creation is child’s play. For instance, my two-year-old son created the metaphor “bow” for pretzel because he cannot pronounce the proper name and has noticed the similar shape between bows and pretzels and the similar bilabial sound ([p] and [b]), thereby creating a metaphor from analogy.

similarities can be learned by theory, practice, and each person's intellectual maturity. Why would Aristotle point out the sources (*topoi*) from which metaphors are created if he did not think that learning the sources would help in the process of creating metaphors? In the following sections, Aristotle suggests that metaphors are created from analogy (3.2.9), from riddle, or *ainigma* (3.2.11), and sources like homonym, hyperbole, and proverbs (3.11). From such sources, one may recognize latent metaphors and actualize them.

2.9. δει δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα καὶ τὰς μεταφορὰς ἀρμοστούσας λέγειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀπρεπὲς φανεῖται διὰ τὸ παρ' ἄλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὡς νέω φοινικίς, οὕτω γέροντι τί· οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πρέπει ἐσθῆς.

2.9. One should speak both epithets and metaphors that are appropriate, and this will be from an analogy. If not, the expression seems inappropriate because opposites are most evident when side-by-side each other. But one should consider what suits an old man, just as a scarlet cloak is right for a young one; for the same clothes are not right [for both].

1405a 10. ἐπίθετα [*epitheta*] (epithets): An epithet is any characterizing word or phrase that accompanies (as a modifier) or replaces (as a metonymy) a proper name, especially a person's name. Thus, modifiers, metonymies, and metaphors are part of a rhetor's resources. Epithets are common in Greek literature, and Homer introduced many: Zeus the "cloud-gatherer" (*nephelêgereta Zeus*), "flashing-eyed" Athena (*glaukôpis Athênê*), "much-cunning" Odysseus (*polumêtis Odysseus*) (*Odyssey* 1.44, 1.80, 2.170). Similarly, Aristotle renamed his star pupil, friend, and successor: "He bore the name of Tyrtaeus, and it was Aristotle who renamed him [*metônomasen*] Theophrastus on account of his graceful style" (Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives* 5.38).⁸² An exalted epithet, Theophrastus means "divine-sounding speech [*phraseôs thespesion*]," where *thespesion* (cf. English *thespian*) may allude to the poet Thespis (sixth century BC), who, according to his legendary epithet, is the first actor and the founder of tragic drama: Thesp is

⁸² *Lives* 5.38: τοῦτον Τύρταμον λεγόμενον Θεόφραστον διὰ τὸ τῆς φράσεως θεσπέσιον Ἀριστοτέλης μετωνόμασεν (translation by R.D. Hicks).

emerged from the chorus acting various individual roles by switching masks. Aristotle credits Thespis for adding prologue, speech, and acting to choral performance of dithyrambic poetry representing Greek mythology, thus suggesting a choral-speech-delivery association of the epithet Theophrastus (*Poet* 4; *OCD* 1510, s.v. “Thespis”). Aristotle refers to the sources of epithets and metaphors, for he writes that these derive from analogy (*analogos*), the fourth of his formal categories of metaphor (cf. *Poet* 21, 1457b6-9). The process of comparison, considering what is suitably similar across genera or conceptual domains, is how one creates an appropriate epithet or metaphor. Likewise, the process of contrast, considering what is dissimilar or unsuitable, is how one creates an inappropriate epithet or metaphor. Thus, comparison and contrast are heuristic strategies for creating metaphors and epithets that cast clear or tinted light on a subject (cf. 3.6.7).

1405a 12. ἐναντία [*enantia*] (opposites): Although Aristotle uses the term *antithesis* only at 3.9-11, he frequently refers to the practice of antithesis as his favorite figure of syntactical style and as his first common topic of invention. Here he notes its pedagogical function: “opposites [*enantia*] are most evident when side-by-side each other,” such as thesis next to antithesis (cf. 3.9.9). In Book 2, the first common topic is argument “from opposites [*ek tôn enantiôn*]” (2.23.1; cf. Grimaldi 2:294). Antithesis is Aristotle’s syntax of choice because it creates the most learning and creates a “clear-cut epistemology” based in the methodology of contrasting opposite ideas (Enos, “Epistemology” 51). Juxtaposing contrastive ideas is a philosophical method of inquiry into reality and into argumentation about the same (Enos 45; Untersteiner, *Sophists* 201). Applying these principles to propriety, Aristotle advises that epithets and metaphors from analogy are most appropriate, but if they are not proportional, then the expressions will seem excessive and inappropriate (*aprepes*) because juxtaposed metaphors,

when out of proportion to what they represent, will reveal more clearly the inherent false analogy and impropriety.

1405a 14. πρέπει ἐσθής [*prepei esthês*] (right clothing): In this classical metaphor, Aristotle compares words to clothing, providing fitting cover for thought. The metaphor is not definitional but part of an illustration for considering the implicit comparison: “one should consider what suits an old man” and what is suitable for each kind of person, tailoring style to *êthos*. This advice alludes to the topics of character in Book 2 (2.12-17), in which Aristotle surveys characters of people based on age, wealth, power, and fortune. Grimaldi comments: “the actual purpose of chaps. 12-17 with its study of the major character types is to show the speaker how his ἦθος must attend and adjust to the ἦθος of varied types of auditor if he is to address them successfully” (2:186). Adapting *êthos* to that of the audience is a matter of choosing suitable style as much as suitable arguments. By the clothing metaphor, Aristotle does not suggest that style is a mere shell or ornament for preexistent thought because the focus is on what is appropriate: words that are fitting for speaker, subject, and audience. The metaphor suggests that rhetorical style is similar to style in fashion, in which some styles are suitable for different categories of people. By mentioning age in his example, which is the first *topos* of character, Aristotle expects his students of rhetoric to apply the principle by suiting the style to the situation.

Aristotle subsumes under *metaphora* all of the metaphoric tropes, including proportional metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, as well as some figures of thought, such as simile, hyperbole, proverb, and epithet (cf. 3.11.11-15). In Aristotle’s formal categories, metaphor is the genus wherein reside four tropes and some figures of thought that function according to the principle of substitution or transference (*epiphora*), such as from literal to figurative meaning (cf.

discussion of metaphor at 1404b32). Since Aristotle interprets metaphor in all its species as a *trope* (“turn”) that transfers meaning and as a *topos* (“place”) of invention, the Aristotelian theory of metaphor cannot be merely decorative devices.⁸³ Rather, Aristotle emphasizes the cognitive function of metaphor and the organic inseparability of thought and style (cf. 3.10.2, 1410b13).

The concept of metonymy is pervasive in *Rhetoric* III, identified as Aristotle’s third formal category of metaphor from “species to species” (*Poet* 21, 1457b8). The term metonymy is absent from Aristotle’s corpus because the noun had not yet been coined in the fourth century, though the verb *metonomazô*, meaning “call by a new name,” is common in classical texts; the noun *metônymia* appears in the Hellenistic period (LSJ 1121).⁸⁴ The first definition of metonymy is found in the fourth book of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (ca. 86 BC), a book that contains a dictionary of stylistic terms. Formerly attributed to Cicero, the anonymous Latin handbook has the following definition: “Metonymy [*Denominatio*] is the figure which draws from an object closely akin or associated an expression suggesting the object meant, but not called by its own name” (4.32.43).⁸⁵ Examples follow of substituting a name of the greater for that of the lesser, or the name of the invention for that of the inventor, or the instrument for the possessor, or cause for effect or effect for cause, or content for container, or container for content. All follow the metonymic principle of *stand-for* substitutions, corresponding to Aristotle’s species-to-species

⁸³ In an article on “Metonymy,” the writer claims, “Prior to Vico (1744), philosophers considered tropes . . . merely decorative ways to enrich writing rather than ‘necessary modes’ with which to express reality,” because “ancient rhetoricians lacked precise definitions for the tropes” (*ERC* 444). Against this misconception, one notices how Aristotle defines and theorizes the tropes as topics of invention for creating shared perspectives (cf. *Rhet* 3.2 and 3.10-11).

⁸⁴ Uses of the verb *metonomazô* occur in Herodotus, *Histories* (1.94, 4.155, 4.189, 5.69), Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War* (1.122-123), and Plato, *Theatetus* (180a).

⁸⁵ “*Denominatio* [metonymy] est, quae ab rebus propinquis et finitimis trahit orationem, qua possit intellegi res, quae non suo vocabulo sit appellata” (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4.32.43).

trope (cf. *Poet* 21, 1457b6-9). Cicero in *Orator* (46 BC) similarly conveys the historical origin of metonymy among the Greeks: “The latter [transfer of words] is called ὑπαλλαγή or ‘hypallage’ by the rhetoricians, because as it were words are exchanged for words; the grammarians call it μετωνυμία or ‘metonymy’ because nouns are transferred. Aristotle, however, classifies them all under metaphor” (27.93-94).⁸⁶ Thus, Greek grammarians and rhetoricians coined the term *metonymia*, recognizing it as an important distinction for and contribution to Aristotle’s theory of metaphor.⁸⁷

A trope, metonymy means “change of name” and refers to “the substitution of one word for another to which it stands in some close relation” (Smyth 680, §3033). Metonymy involves substitution of a concrete figure for an abstraction or an epithet for a proper name; therefore, metonymy can be synonymous with “symbol” or “nickname.” While metaphoric substitution is based on analogy (*A is [like] B*), metonymic substitution is based on contiguity or close, existing association (*A stands-for B*). Metaphor is intensive, creating perspective through analogy; metonymy is extensive, creating perspective through symbol, wherein the symbol stands for what is symbolized. Metonymy is useful for naming that which is abstract by an attribute or related image. For this reason, Burke calls metonymy’s strategy *reduction*, “to convey some incorporeal or intangible state in terms of the corporeal or tangible. E. g., to speak of ‘the heart’ rather than ‘the emotions,’” and he interprets metonymy as everyday “poetic realism” by which

⁸⁶ Cicero, *Orator*: “Hanc ὑπαλλαγήν rhetores, quia quasi summutantur verba pro verbis, μετωνυμίαν grammatici vocant, quod nomina transferuntur. Aristoteles autem translationi et haec ipsa subiungit” (27.93-94).

⁸⁷ Three early theoretical treatments of *metonymia* include the following: Nicanor of Cyrene wrote *Changes of Names* (μετονομασίας) of unknown date but quoted by Athenaeus of Naucratis (7.296d) in the early third century AD (*Biographical Dictionary* 2:1177). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60-7 BC) treats the term in his *Opuscula rhetorica* (5.5.5) when discussing the orations of Demosthenes. Athenaeus of Naucratis in Egypt, a Greek rhetorician and grammarian, discusses metonymy in his major work.

the tangible conveys the intangible (*Grammar of Motives* 506). By metonymy one reads *chair* for the officer sitting in the chair, and *scepter* for sovereignty. Functioning similarly, synecdoche involves a part that stands-for the whole and vice-versa. For instance, “a regiment of foot” represents a regiment of infantry soldiers, and “Who stole my wheels?” inquires about a missing car. Rhetorically, metonymy is pleasing to the mind, the ear, and the memory. Concerning the mind, metonymy shows association of ideas, first by substituting a familiar name for an idea, and second by evoking imagery for the idea, becoming a symbol. Concerning ear and memory, metonymy’s succinct, poetic expressions help people remember even complex ideas, rendering metonymy useful in the arts of invention, style, memory, and delivery.

2.10. καὶ ἔάν τε κοσμεῖν βούλη, ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος τῶν ἐν ταύτῳ γένοι φέρειν τὴν μεταφορὰν, ἔάν τε ψέγειν, ἀπὸ τῶν χειρόνων. λέγω δ’ οἶον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένοι, τὸ φάναι τὸν μὲν πτωχεύοντα εὐχεσθαι τὸν δ’ εὐχόμενον πτωχεύειν, ὅτι ἄμφω αἰτήσεις, τὸ εἰρημένον ἐστὶ ποιεῖν· ὡς καὶ Ἰφικράτης Καλλίαν μητραγύρτην ἀλλ’ οὐ δαδούχον· ὁ δὲ ἔφη ἀμύητον αὐτὸν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μητραγύρτην αὐτὸν καλεῖν, ἀλλὰ δαδούχον· ἄμφω γὰρ περὶ θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τίμιον τὸ δὲ ἄτιμον. καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δ’ αὐτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν· ταῦτα δ’ ἄμφω μεταφορὰ, ἡ μὲν ῥυπαινόντων ἡ δὲ τούναντίον. καὶ οἱ μὲν λησταὶ αὐτοὺς ποριστάς καλοῦσι νῦν· διὸ ἔξεστι λέγειν τὸν ἀδικήσαντα μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν, τὸν δ’ ἀμαρτάνοντα ἀδικῆσαι, καὶ τὸν κλέψαντα καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ πορθῆσαι. τὸ δὲ ὡς ὁ Τήλεφος Εὐριπίδου φησὶν, “κώπης ἀνάσσων κάποβάς εἰς Μυσίαν” ἀπρεπές, ὅτι μείζον τὸ ἀνάσσειν ἢ κατ’ ἀξίαν· οὐ κέκλεπται οὖν.

2.10. And if you wish to adorn, borrow the metaphor from something better in the same genus, if to denigrate, from something worse. I mean, for example, since they are opposites in the same genus, saying of a person who begs that he “prays” or that a person praying “begs,” because both are forms of asking, is composing in the way described; as also when Iphicrates called Callias a “begging priest” rather than a “torchbearer” and the latter replied that Iphicrates was not initiated into the Mysteries or he would not have called him a begging priest but a torchbearer; for both are religious epithets, but one is honorable, one dishonorable. Then there are the “parasites of Dionysius,” but the persons in question call themselves “artists.” These are both metaphors, the former one that sullies the profession, the latter the contrary. Pirates now call themselves “businessmen.” Thus, one can say that a criminal “has made a mistake” or that someone making a mistake “has committed a crime” or that a thief both took and “plundered.” A phrase like that of Euripides’ *Telephus*, “lording the oar and landed in Mysia,” is inappropriate [in prose], since *lording* is too elevated; there is no “theft” [if the metaphor is too flagrant].

1405a 14-15. κοσμεῖν [*kosmein*] (to adorn): Aristotle provides a time-tested method for how “to adorn” and how “to denigrate” (ψέγειν [*psegein*]) by choosing an epithet or metaphor from “better” or “worse” conceptual domains, respectively. Since these terms are not synonyms but “opposites in the same genus,” this section focuses on the third category of metaphor, from “species to species,” specifically metonymy and epithet. The way metaphor shapes language concerns far more than ornament or choosing stylistic levels of diction; rather, all words convey figurative images having connotations from various conceptual domains and cultural narratives, implying that language is never structural neutral and that adornment or denigration are part of any general theory of language. As Aristotle explains in 3.10-11, the rhetorical vector of metaphor serves to establish a shared view of reality.⁸⁸ To explain and support this proposition, Aristotle provides six examples: five “appropriate” examples from Athenian life and theater and one “inappropriate” example.

1405a 15. ταὐτῷ γένει [*tautô genei*] (same genus): Allusion to his formal categories of metaphor in *Poetics* 21, wherein terms are transferred within a genus, that is from species to species, referring to the third category of metaphor. In the examples, by suggesting that a speaker “borrow the metaphor from . . . the same genus,” Aristotle means a person-to-person transfer, that is, calling a person by another person’s (or fictional person’s) name, office, or action. The example metaphors create elevation (“torchbearer”) and denigration (“begging priest”) by transferring one person’s office to another by analogy within the same genus.

1405a 31. οὐ κέκλεπται [*ou kekleptai*] (no “theft”): The best art is concealed art. As at 3.2.5, “theft” refers to concealing artful rhetoric by using ordinary diction. The last example of

⁸⁸ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca share and build upon Aristotle’s rhetorical theory of metaphor, exploring its forms and functions in “establishing the structure of reality” (*New Rhetoric* 371-410, §§82-87).

ornateness (*kosmos*), “lording the oar,” excerpted from a lost play by Euripides, *Telephus* (ca. 438), is appropriate for poetry, but inappropriate in prose “since *lording* is too elevated,” too royal, too pompous of an image for a common boat oar. In civic discourse, this metaphor is inappropriate for two reasons: first, “lording” (ruling, swaying one’s sovereignty) is not in “the same genus” as an oar, so the imagistic jump between conceptual domains is unrealistic for an audience; second, “since *lording* is too elevated” and thus unrealistic, an audience detects the rhetor’s premeditated “theft” of their attention and belief through “art,” or at least the audience tends to distrust the rhetor’s good sense and good will. When a rhetor’s metaphors depart from “the same genus” in an inappropriate manner, all concealment of artistic preparation is lifted; then the audience senses dishonesty, fatal to persuasion.

2.11. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς συλλαβαῖς ἀμαρτία, εἰ μὴ ἡδείας ἢ σημεία φωνῆς, οἷον Διονύσιος προσαγορεύει ὁ χαλκοῦς ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγείοις κραυγὴν Καλλιόπης τὴν ποίησιν, ὅτι ἄμφω φωναί· φαύλη δὲ ἡ μεταφορὰ ταῖς ἀσήμοις φωναῖς.

2.11. There is a fault in the syllables if the indications of sound are unpleasant; for example, Dionysius the Brazen in his *Elegies* calls poetry “Calliope’s screech” because both are sounds; but the metaphor is bad because it implies meaningless sounds.

1405a 31. συλλαβαῖς [*syllabais*] (syllables): The syllables here indicate units of sound (φωνῆς [*phônês*]), such as consonant plus vowel, that accompany spoken language. Aristotle thinks that metaphors must have an appropriate accompanying sound to advance a metaphor’s appeal. His assertion carries certain assumptions about sound-meaning relationships, often called imitative form, which describes the common linguistic phenomena that sound mirrors meaning. Aristotle here assumes that all people think the same way about sounds, especially in an oral culture in which language is the temporal experience of sound. Describing the influence of oral psychodynamics, Walter J. Ong suggests that “restriction of words to sound determines not only modes of expression but also thought processes. You know what you can recall” (33).

Specifically, “verbomotor” cultures rely on mnemonics and formulas for recall; privilege aggregative rather than analytic knowledge; depend on participatory, communal adjudication; tend toward agonistic tones; and depend significantly more on effective use of words, whereby sounded words signify power and action (31-76). Since classical Greece was transforming itself from an oral to a literate culture, the characteristics of oral psychodynamics help explain Aristotle’s close attention to sound even in his treatment of metaphoric visualization (3.10-11). What American poet Richard Wilber asserts about rhyme applies to sounds: “Good rhyme is not ornament, but emphasis.” In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle discerns sound aesthetically in order to consider it rhetorically. How does the tone and quality of sound affect meaning, pleasure, and audience reception? These considerations Aristotle addresses since sound contributes aesthetic and rhetorical qualities to an address to create meaning, emotional experience, and perceptions of an oration’s quality.

1405a 32. μὴ ἡδέϊας [*mê hêdeias*] (unpleasant): Two qualities of sound are indicated, one that is “unpleasant” and another that is “bad” or “foul” (φάυλη [*phaulê*]). The “unpleasant” adjective refers to an audience’s subjective sensibilities, and Aristotle assumes that everyone has similar sensibilities about sound. The “foul” adjective refers more objectively to a metaphor’s meaning, which an audience may consider both unsound and unpleasant. The two adjectives are distinct but united in an audience’s experience of “unpleasant” sound and “foul” sense, which reinforce each other as imitative forms. The drumming of syllables creates signals (*semeia*) of sound that affects response; phonetic-semantic (or graphic-semantic) relationships are part of the experience of language so that audiences intuitively and emotionally interpret the aesthetics of sound. This sound-sense relationship powerfully works in language, being a force that skillful orators and writers seek to unite to their advantage, providing pleasure and emphasis. The

relationship between the music of the sound and the meaning of the sense, as experienced by the auditor, testifies that the rhetorical appeals of *pathos* and *logos* are so interwoven that the effects of the one cannot be separated from the other.

1405a 32. ἡ σημεῖα φωνῆς [*hê sêmeia phônês*] (the indications of sound): “Signs of sounds” is a literal gloss, and the question arises about the meaning of *semeia*. The passage seems to indicate orality, but “signs of sound” could equally refer to writing (cf. 3.12). Writing is the meaning Grimaldi suggests: “*written* syllables which point to a certain kind of sound as signate. If this is so, one can see a basic sign-signate relationship . . . [from which] a pleasant or unpleasant sound would appear to be mostly a matter of taste” (“Semeion” 394). Taste concerns private preference, but since Aristotle assumes that people have similar sensibilities about sound, subjectivity does not result in relativism, but degrees of preference wherein pleasant and unpleasant are meaningful categories according to cultural sensibilities to sound.

2.12. ἔτι δὲ οὐ πόρρωθεν δεῖ ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν μεταφέρειν <ἐπὶ> τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως, ὃ λεχθὲν δῆλον ἔστιν ὅτι συγγενές, οἷον ἐν τῷ [1405b] αἰνίγματι τῷ εὐδοκιμοῦντι “ἄνδρ’ εἶδον πυρὶ χαλκὸν ἐπ’ ἀνέρι κολλήσαντα.” ἀνώνυμον γὰρ τὸ πάθος, ἔστι δ’ ἄμφω πρόσθεσις τις· κόλλησιν τοίνυν εἶπε τὴν τῆς σικύας προσβολήν. καὶ ὅλως ἐκ τῶν εὐ ἠνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν ἐπιεικέις· μεταφοραὶ γὰρ αἰνίττονται, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι εὐ μετενήνεκται.

2.12. Further, metaphor should be used in naming something that does not have a proper name of its own and [it should] not be far-fetched but taken from things that are related and of similar species, so that it is clear the term is related; for example, [1405b] in the popular riddle [*ainigma*], “I saw a man gluing bronze on another with fire,” the process has no [technical] name, but both are a kind of application; the application of the cupping instrument is thus called “gluing.” From good riddling it is generally possible to derive appropriate metaphors; for metaphors are made like riddles; thus, clearly, [a metaphor from a good riddle] is an apt transference of words.

1405a 36-37. μεταφέρειν <ἐπὶ> τὰ ἀνώνυμα ὠνομασμένως [*metapherein epi ta anônyma ônomasmenôs*] (naming [by using metaphor] something that does not have a proper name of its own): Name-giving is another appropriate use of metaphor, for instances exist in

which recourse to metaphor is the only semiotic option, foreshadowing the cognitive function of metaphor at 3.11 (cf. Kirby 542). Good metaphoric names have two characteristics here. First, relation: the name should be “related and of similar species” (τῶν συγγενῶν καὶ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν [*tôn syngenôn kai tôn homoeidôn*]) whether in regard to natural or logical distinctions, so that the name (signifier) corresponds in some manner or by some association with the thing named (signified). Second, invention: what is an appropriate way to coin names? Aristotle suggests riddles because riddles, connoted by the Greek term ἀνίγμα (*ainigma*, cf. English *enigma*), reveal something of the hidden mystery of things, either regarding function, form, or essence. In the name-creating process, looking to popular riddles for apt metaphors is everyday philosophy.

1405b 4. ἐκ τῶν εὖ ἠνιγμένων ἔστι μεταφορὰς λαβεῖν [*ek tôn eu ênigmenôn esti metaphoras labein*] (from good riddling . . . derive appropriate metaphors): After giving an example, Aristotle provides an enthymeme in which he asserts the analogy that metaphors are like riddles (enigmas) because both involve transference of meaning. Therefore, good riddles involve metaphors that are often appropriate for coining names. Concerning this process of naming by metaphor, Kennedy notes, “This is known as *katachrêsis* or *abusio*, but to regard it as metaphor is sometimes thought inconsistent with a rigorous substitution theory” (201 n26). Aristotle views catachresis as a metaphor with a lack, wherein the phoros stands in for a missing theme, thus being a variation of metaphor from analogy (cf. 3.2.6, 1404b32 for discussion of catachresis). A source of appropriate metaphors is good riddles. What Aristotle writes about riddles equally applies to other varieties of metaphor, to which one may look for a particularly apt transference for giving names to things hitherto nameless. Arising from the imaginary, metaphoric faculty comes five major kinds of metaphor: myth, allegory, parable, proverb, and

enigma; in addition are four minor kinds of metaphor: euphemism, epithet, pet-name, and nickname (Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* 22). The major classes of metaphor constantly occur in Greek literature, some even constituting genres of Greek style. While Aristotle singles out riddles (enigmas), one may find latent metaphors among the major and minor classes of metaphor from which to create appropriate new names.

2.13. καὶ ἀπὸ καλῶν· κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος τὸ μὲν, ὡς περ Λικύμνιος λέγει, ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῶ σημαينوμένῳ, καὶ αἰσχος δὲ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ τρίτον ὃ λύει τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔφη Βρύσων οὐθένα αἰσχρολογεῖν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει τόδε ἀντὶ τοῦδε εἰπεῖν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ ψεῦδος· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριώτερον καὶ ὡμοιωμένον μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον, τῶ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων. ἔτι οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχον σημαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλου ἄλλο κάλλιον καὶ αἰσχίον θετέον· ἄμφω μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν σημαίνουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αἰσχρὸν· ἢ ταῦτα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τὰς δὲ μεταφορὰς ἐντεῦθεν οἰστέον, ἀπὸ καλῶν ἢ τῆ φωνῆ ἢ τῆ δυνάμει ἢ τῆ ὄψει ἢ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει. διαφέρει δ' εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος.

2.13. And the source of the metaphor should be something beautiful; verbal beauty, as Licymnius says, is in the sound or in the sense, and ugliness the same; and thirdly there is what refutes the sophistic argument: for it is not as Bryson said that nothing is in itself ugly, since it signifies the same thing if one word is used rather than another; for this is false; one word is more proper than another and more like the object signified and more adapted to making the thing appear “before the eyes.” Moreover, one word does not signify in the same way as another, so in this sense also we should posit one as more beautiful or uglier than another; for both signify the beautiful or the ugly, but not solely as beauty or ugliness. Or if they do, [it is] only in degree. These are the sources from which metaphors should be taken: from the beautiful either in sound or in meaning or in visualization or in some other form of sense perception. It makes a difference whether the dawn is called “rosy-fingered” or “purple-fingered” or worse still, “red-fingered.”

1405b 6-7. κάλλος δὲ ὀνόματος [*kallos de onomatos*] (verbal beauty): Aristotle advises that metaphors should derive from beautiful sources because “one word is more proper than another,” more like it, more suited to it. Applying that most important principle of prose style—*prepon*, propriety—concerns sensitivity for verbal and visual aesthetics, as exemplified by Homer when he chooses the term “rosy-fingered” (*rhodo-daktulos*) over other colors for describing the dawn. The question remains, how is beauty (or its opposite) conferred upon language? Aristotle outlines an answer to this practical aesthetic question.

1405b 7-8. ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις ἢ τῶ σημαينوμένῳ [*en tois psophois ê tô sêmainomenô*] (in the sound or in the sense): Aristotle recognizes three sources of verbal beauty (or ugliness): sound, sense, and imagery (visualization). For sound and sense, he refers to the late fifth-century rhetorician and dithyrambic poet Licymnius of Chios in his treatise on “creating beautiful diction [*poiêsin euepeias*],” according to Plato (*Phaedrus* 267c). While Plato mocks Licymnius and other stylists, Aristotle approves of him, recognizing important aesthetic principles in his theory of style. The phrase “before the eyes” (*pro ommatôn*), however, is Aristotle’s own contribution for describing the visual nature of language, a concept he features at 3.10-11. Sarah J. Newman has written about this concept: “Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Bringing-Before-the Eyes,’” in which she shows how perception parallels the metaphorical process and how visualization leads an audience to insight, for in *De Anima* Aristotle asserts, “the soul never thinks without an image” (3.7, 431a16). From an image, the intellect creates a symbol so that imagery is perceived as a meaningful metaphor. Imagery as metaphor is necessary for perceptive cognition; for this reason, visualization is meaningful style, especially teaching style.⁸⁹ As meaningful, sensuous forms, sound and imagery are key elements of an effective prose style.

In the earliest post-Aristotelian treatise on style (and its analogue hermeneutics), titled *Dêmetriou peri hermêneias* (*Demetrius On Style*), the author quotes from *Peri lexêôs* (*On Lexis*) by Theophrastus, Aristotle’s star pupil who inherited the leadership of the Peripatetic School at

⁸⁹ Chadwick comments: “In ancient optics the eyes are not merely passive recipients of images transmitted from the objects seen. A ray comes from the eyes” to the object (184n7; cf. Plotinus 4.5.7.24; 5.5.7.24 ff.; Augustine, *Confessions* 10.6.9, who sends “the rays of my eyes”).

the Lyceum in Athens (near the Hilton Hotel today).⁹⁰ In *Demetrius On Style* (173-74), the author paraphrases Aristotle's statements on the three sources of linguistic beauty:

Grace in style also comes from what are called beautiful words. According to the definition of Theophrastus, beauty in a word is that which gives pleasure to the ear or the eye, or has an inherent nobility of thought [*dianoia*]. [174] Pleasant to the eye are expressions such as “rose-coloured” and “flowery meadow,” since images pleasant to see are also beautiful when they are spoken of; and pleasant to the ear are words like “Kallistratos” and “Annoôn,” since the double “l” and the double “n” have a certain resonance.⁹¹

Following Aristotle and Theophrastus, Demetrius focuses on words that have beautiful imagery, pleasant euphony, and noble associations in the meaning (*dianoia*) of words, which lend beauty and grace to speech.

1405b 9. τὸν σοφιστικὸν λόγον [*ton sofistikon logon*] (the sophistic argument):

Engaging in counterargument, Aristotle illustrates the rhetorical process of *dissoi logoi* and, by this process, seeks to refute sophistic subjectivism. In a brief illustration of *dissoi logoi*, meaning “twofold statements” or “contrasting arguments” based in the ability to understand and argue both thesis and antithesis, Aristotle shows how belief about reality is socially constructed by individuals' competing and contrasting arguments, here regarding *nomos*, or cultural norms,

⁹⁰ In 1997, archaeologists reported that “the foundations of buildings brought to light a few meters away from the Athens Hilton Hotel have to be the Lykeion (Lyceum) of Aristotle” (“Aristotle’s Lykeion,” *Anistoriton* 1 [Oct. 1997] A972); cf. Kennedy 6.

⁹¹ *Demetrius On Style*: Ποιεῖ δὲ εὐχαριν τὴν ἑρμηνείαν καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα καλὰ ὀνόματα. ὠρίσατο δ’ αὐτὰ Θεόφραστος οὕτως, κάλλος ὀνοματός ἐστι τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀκοὴν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ δὴ, ἢ τὸ τῆς διανοίας ἐντιμον. πρὸς μὲν ὄψιν ἡδέα τὰ τοιαῦτα, “ροδόχρουν,” “ἀνθοφόρου χλόας.” ὅσα γὰρ ὁράται ἡδέως, ταῦτα καὶ λεγόμενα καλὰ ἐστὶ. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν “Καλλίστρατος, Ἀννοῶν.” ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν λάμβδα σύγκρουσις ἠχῶδές τι ἔχει, καὶ ἢ τῶν νῦ γραμμάτων (173-74).

values, and customs. In “Licymnius *contra* Bryson,” Aristotle moderates and engages a debate against “the sophistic argument” that no standards exist outside of subjective preferences of language, summarized in Bryson’s words: “nothing is in itself ugly.” Kennedy notes: Bryson was a “Sophist and mathematician contemporary with Aristotle. The view here expressed was taken up later by the Stoics” (201 n29; cf. Cicero, *Letters to His Friends* 9.22.1). Aristotle understands the sophistic argument to be subjectivism, as opposed to his own inductive, common-sense realism (*sensus communis*) and Plato’s idealism. Bryson championed the idea that knowledge is individual representation, resulting in subjectivism. Sophists like Bryson would agree with Nietzsche’s motto, “There are no facts, only interpretations,” where facts are regarded subjectively rather than the result of culturally shared knowledge and language. In subjectivism, nothing is regarded as ugly or beautiful since aesthetic standards are ambiguous and elusive. In his counterstatement, Aristotle asserts his common-sense realism, a doctrine based in the methodology of shared rhetorical representations. As a social, epistemic process, Aristotelian representation cannot result in mere subjectivity because persuasion occurs amid a complex of social relationships, including shared standards regarding evidence, language, conviction, and belief.

The art of *dissoi logoi* is the rhetorical method of social construction *par excellence*, an epistemic and stylistic process of juxtaposing contrastive arguments. In Book 1, Aristotle asserts that “one should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a question, just as in the use of syllogisms” in dialectical exercises (1.1.12). This dialectical and sophistic method of inquiry is evident in Aristotle’s favored syntactical style of antithesis and in his favored trope of metaphor. Aristotle’s theory of style functions in the constructive process of *dissoi logoi* by structuring pairs of dissociated statements and rhetorical appeals at the level of syntax and *taxis*. Contrasting

opposite propositions not only creates quick learning but also creates an instrument of inquiry for discovering arguments regarding truth. As Enos has researched, the historical lineage of *dissoi logoi* traces from both Pythagoras and Zeno of Elea to Empedocles, then to Gorgias, and then to the entire classical tradition, including sophistic, Platonic, and Aristotelian rhetoric, particularly evident in practices of antithesis and dialectic (Enos, *Greek Rhetoric 75-77*; cf. *Rhet* 3.9.9 on antithesis).⁹² Grimaldi comments on *dissoi logoi* as an important epistemic methodology: “In many respects this is the method used in the Platonic dialogue to try to determine an issue. In the process the objective ideally sought, as Socrates says in the *Phaedo* 91a-b, is to arrive at the truth, not to win. In fact some believe that Plato’s choice of the dialogue form reflects this aspect of the *dissoi logoi* idea, i.e., its peirastic or probing character” (“How Do We Get” 29). The *topos* of *dissoi logoi* recognizes the dialogical framework of all communication, within which *lexis* and *taxis* must function rhetorically (Sloane, *On the Contrary* 14, 287).⁹³

1405b 16. οὐχ ἢ καλὸν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αἰσχρόν [*ouk hê kalon ê ouk hê aiskron*] (not solely as beauty or ugliness): This sentence makes a distinction between degrees of beauty and ugliness while avoiding subjectivity and idealism. In what seems a passing comment on formal standards, Aristotle critiques the epistemology of the sophist Bryson by the standard of his own *via media* position between sophistic subjectivity and Platonic idealism. The following summarizes the

⁹² *Dissoi Logoi* is also an ancient, anonymous text, one that a pseudo-Aristotle attempts to discredit; see *Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi*, ed. T.M. Robinson (New York: Arno Press, 1979), having text, translation, and commentary; cf. also *ERC* 197, s.v. “*Dissoi Logoi (Dialexeis)*.”

⁹³ *Dissoi logoi* (Latin *argumentum in utramque partem*) names the classical rhetorical exercise of arguing both sides of an issue (cf. Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.45; *De Oratore* 1.263, *Orator* 46). As a conceptual process, *dissoi logoi* is not merely an exercise of self-refutation but an ability and process of invention without which it would be impossible to engage in effective refutation (discussed at 3.17.13-15). In *On the Contrary*, Thomas O. Sloane argues for the reintroduction of *dissoi logoi* in rhetorical education for developing creative ability and empathy necessary for perceiving and challenging multiple perspectives and arguments.

three classical epistemologies to place the argument in context: *Sophistic relativism* holds that phenomena are real; noumenal ideal forms are non-existent or unknown; and reason is deceptive when it tries to perceive beyond phenomena. *Platonic idealism* asserts that noumenal forms are the supreme realities, and reason, which apprehends the forms, knows reality; the senses perceive shadows. *Aristotelian realism* claims that phenomena are real; noumenal forms are also real but not primary since forms are only known through induction from sense perceptions, but known in degree from common experience, thus “common sense” realism (cf. Kreeft 360). For Bryson, Aristotle’s theory of language, based on perceived degrees of correlation between sign and object, is inadequate because language is arbitrary. For Aristotle, Bryson makes the mistake of not recognizing that some words have a “more proper” meaning or “more adapted” rhetorical function, either by nature or by convention. By not specifying his theory of language as either natural or conventional, Aristotle’s mediating position seems inconsistent, as Kennedy notices: “Cf. the difference between *vase, jar, pot, and jug*. Aristotle here seems to imply belief in some natural link between some words and their meaning as discussed in Plato’s *Cratylus*, though elsewhere he regards words as symbols rather than icons” (201 n31). In either case, language is not subjectively arbitrary for Aristotle but meaningful by convention so that stylistic choices can affect meaning and do function as more or less beautiful, ugly, and appropriate in light of culturally shared sensibilities and in view of audience (cf. discussion at 3.1.8, 1404a21).

2.14. καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ἔστι μὲν τὰς ἐπιθέσεις ποιεῖσθαι ἀπὸ φαύλου ἢ αἰσχροῦ, οἷον ὁ μητροφόντης, ἔστι δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος, οἷον ὁ πατρὸς ἀμύντωρ· καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ὅτε μὲν ἐδίδου μισθὸν ὀλίγον αὐτῷ ὁ νικήσας τοῖς ὄρευσιν, οὐκ ἤθελε ποιεῖν, ὡς δυσχεραίνων εἰς ἡμίονους ποιεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἱκανὸν ἔδωκεν, ἐποίησε “χαίρετ’ ἀελλοπόδων θύγατρες ἵππων.” καίτοι καὶ τῶν ὄνων θυγατέρες ἦσαν.

2.14. In the use of epithets the transference is also sometimes from the bad or ugly, for example *mother-slayer*, sometimes from the better, for example *avenger of his father*. When the winner in a mule race offered Simonides a paltry sum [for an ode in honor of his victory], he declined the commission as though annoyed at composing about “half-asses”; but when the

winner paid enough, he wrote, “Hail, daughters of storm-footed mares!” Nevertheless, they *were* daughters of asses.

1405b 21. ἐπιθέτοις [*epithetōis*] (epithets): Word or phrase that (mis-)characterizes a person, place, or action, usually with a nickname, whether the new name accompanies or replaces the proper name. Denoting a change of name, Aristotle rightly categorizes epithet as a species of metaphor, similar to metonymy (cf. discussion at 3.2.9, 1405a10). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca explain: “The epithet results from the visible selection of a quality which is emphasized and which is meant to complete our knowledge of the object. This epithet is used without justification because it is supposed to set forth unquestionable facts; only the choice of facts will seem tendentious” (*New Rhetoric* 126). Slanting is usually the intent and effect of epithets (e.g., William I of England versus William the Conqueror). Slanted language can become a verbal fallacy (a form of begging the question since it describes and evaluates at once) used to create a biased perception. Aristotle provides two sets of examples that illustrate how epithets create slanting, either to elevate or degrade, ennoble and disparage, depending on the choice of the qualifier.

1405b 22. μητροφόντης [*mêtrōphontês*] (*mother-slayer*): In the former section, Aristotle suggests that metaphors should derive from “something beautiful,” but epithets are often used for slanting and slander, deriving “from the bad or ugly.” The first example is “*mother-slayer*” from Euripides, *Orestes* (1587-88), a tragic drama wherein Orestes kills his mother Clytemnestra to avenge the death of his father Agamemnon at her hands. In the tragedy, the moral dilemma hinges on two epithets: Is Orestes a “*mother-slayer*” or “*father’s avenger*”? One epithet condemns matricide; the other justifies the deed.

1405b 27-28. ὄνων θυγατέρες [*onôn thugateres*] (daughters of asses): A second set of epithets is borrowed from a comic source. The miserly poet Simonides of Ceos (556-468), given

the right sum, penned a eulogy in which he gave “half-asses” the epithet of “storm-footed mares.” Epithets play a role in argumentation when one ennobles and another disparages, though both slantings seem equally possible. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca comment: “By calling Orestes a ‘mother slayer’ or the ‘avenger of his father,’ by referring to a mule as a ‘half donkey’ or a ‘daughter of a storm-footed steed,’ the speaker unmistakably chooses a viewpoint which is perceived to be tendentious because one can immediately see how it might be corrected” (*New Rhetoric* 126). Although Aristotle writes that names and epithets “make a difference” (2.13), in the example by Simonides, because the epithet violates propriety, Aristotle is quick to comment that the excessively elevated epithet does not fool anyone, but is useful only for a comic effect and a teaching illustration. Aristotle enjoys humor (irony, mockery, sarcasm) in his examples, illustrating how he combines rhetorical appeals: *logos* (inductive examples), *êthos* (quoting notable or notorious poets), and *pathos* (appealing to audience’s sense of humor) in a way that advances his argument.

2.15. ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκορίζεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ ὁ ὑποκορισμὸς, ὃς ἕλαττον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης σκώπτει ἐν τοῖς Βαβυλωνίοις, ἀντὶ μὲν χρυσοῦ χρυσιδάριον, ἀντὶ δ’ ἱματίου ἱματιδάριον, ἀντὶ δὲ λοιδορίας λοιδορημάτιον, καὶ νοσημάτιον. εὐλαβεῖσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ παρατηρεῖν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ μέτριον.

2.15. The same effect can be achieved by diminution. A diminutive [*hypokorismos*] makes both bad and good less so, as Aristophanes does sarcastically in the *Babylonians* when he substitutes *goldlet* for *gold*, *cloaklet* for *cloak*, *insultlet* for *insult*, and *diseaselet* [for *disease*]. But one should be careful and observe moderation in both [epithets and diminutives].

1405b 28-29. ὑποκορισμὸς [*hypokorismos*] (diminutive): While epithets rename, diminutives modify; by this means of up-grading, down-grading, and endearment they help achieve the same rhetorical effect of making “both bad and good less so.” The Greek term *hypokorismos* refers to more than simple diminutive, but also has broad reference to all endearing, coaxing, and flattering expressions and euphemisms (LSJ 1885). In the examples,

Aristotle illustrates the most distinctive species of diminutives, those that diminish what is good (i.e., “goldlet”) and what is bad (i.e., “insultlet”). The euphemisms by Aristophanes are sarcastic since they are diminutives of diminutives: for χρυσίου [*ksrusiou*] (“little gold”) he substitutes χρυσιδάριον [*ksrusidarion*] (“little goldlet”), and so on for all the examples. The Greek language can ably multiply *diminuendo* with its thirteen varieties of diminution, especially suffixes, to effect exaggeration as easily as English can pile up adjectives.

1405b 33. μέτριον [*metrion*] (moderation): The term means “moderate measure” or “moderation” (LSJ 1122). As a last note concerning epithets and diminutives, Aristotle counsels moderation, and with good reason since these species of metaphor are often employed in misrepresentations. Epithets are suspect of slanting, seen as a verbal fallacy, when not used judiciously, so that immoderate epithets do not have their intended effect but diminish the speaker’s *êthos*. For instance, a contemporary audience of *Orestes* by Euripides would feel the moral dilemma, but would respond skeptically to its slanted epithets prior to being served by a fair and impartial trial. Similarly, the “half-asses” become “storm-footed mares” remains comical because Simonides knowingly violates moderation, notably what Aristotle calls the principle of propriety (*to prepon* in 3.7).

In the section, Aristotle uses the prefix *anti* to mean “in place of” (1405b30), a usage that impinges on Aristotle’s defining metaphor, “Rhetoric is an *anti-strophos* to dialectic” (1.1.1). Since *anti* can mean both “opposite” and “in place of,” scholars have debated the meaning of this prefix for millennia, whether the phrase means comparison or contrast regarding the relationship of rhetoric and dialectic (Kennedy 30n4). Cicero interprets *anti* to mean “counterpart,” in the sense of two “opposite” and sister arts, and the European tradition has largely followed Cicero, including Cope and Kinneavy (Kinneavy, “William Grimaldi” 163). However, with the reception

of the Greek text of the *Rhetoric* from Byzantium in 1508, scholars such as Erasmus and John Rainolds of Oxford discovered a different meaning among Greeks who frequently use *anti* to mean “in place of,” “analogue,” or “similar” (Green, *John Rainolds’s Oxford Lectures* 107). Thus, following Greek tradition and usage, a growing minority of scholars from Erasmus to Grimaldi consider rhetoric to be an analogue to dialectic, being “correlative” and having “general correlation” and similarity as a method of reasoned inquiry into all branches of knowledge (Grimaldi 1:1-2, 54a1; *Studies* 16-17). By this interpretation, Aristotelian rhetoric is seen as a methodology of discourse that is parallel or analogous with the more formal methods of dialectic; in addition to logical validity, however, rhetoric is an art of audience that seeks to discover not merely valid demonstrations but strong and convincing arguments, striking and clear style, and structured but responsive arrangement as judged by the audience. According to Grimaldi, “Dialectic, for example, considers the same general kind of subject for the purpose of rational investigation and speculative discussion. Rhetoric, its counterpart for Aristotle, approaches the subject under the formality of communication, that is to say with the intention of presenting the matter to an other in such a way as to make accessible to the other the possibility of reasonable judgment” (*Studies* 17). As an art of inquiry and communication, Aristotelian rhetoric forms a methodology applicable to all functions of language generally, including invention, style, and arrangement.

CHAPTER 3

LEXIS: FRIGIDITY

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 3.1. Four faults (*frigidities*) of prose style (1405b 34–1405b 35)

DEVELOPMENT

- 3.1. First fault: ponderously poetic compounds (1405b 35–1406a 6)
 3.2. Second fault: unfamiliar words (1406a 6–1406a 10)
 3.3. Third fault: immoderate epithets (1406a10–1406b 4)
 3.4. Fourth fault: farfetched metaphors (1406b 4–1406b 19)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

3.1. τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἔν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οἷον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορυφῆς γῆς καὶ ἄκτῆν δὲ στενόπορον, καὶ ὡς Γοργίας ὠνόμαζε πτωχομουσοκόλοκας, [1406a] ἐπιορκήσαντας καὶ καταευορκήσαντας, καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας μένους μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν πληρουμένην, πυρίχρων δὲ τὴν ὄψιν γινομένην, καὶ τελεσφόρον ὥθη τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτῶν γενήσεσθαι, καὶ τελεσφόρον τὴν πειθῶ τῶν λόγων κατέστησεν, καὶ κυανόχρων τὸ τῆς θαλάττης ἔδαφος· πάντα ταῦτα γὰρ ποιητικὰ διὰ τὴν δίπλωσιν φαίνεται.

3.1. Frigidities [*ta psychra*] in *lexis* come about in four ways: [first] in double words, as in Lycophron's phrase "the many-faced heaven of the great-summited earth" and "the narrow-passaged shore" and as Gorgias spoke of "beggar-mused flatterers, [1406a] forsworn and right-solemnly sworn" and as in Alcidamas' expression "his soul full of anger and his face becoming fire-colored" and "end-fulfilling deemed he their zeal would be" and "end-fulfilling he made the persuasion of his words," and the foam of the sea was "copper-blue." All these seem poetic because of the doubling.

1405b 34. δὲ [*de*] (but): In contrast to the key "virtues" of style (clarity and propriety), Aristotle introduces four "frigidities" that are four categories of problematic style as determined by audience. The faults may be appropriate for poetry but not for prose style in public discourse. The four faults (ponderously poetic phrases, words, epithets, and metaphors) are violations of the virtues: they obscure clarity and overstep propriety. In addition to lexical concerns, the faults,

since they reveal “poetic calculation,” tend to engender mistrust in an audience concerning a speaker’s *êthos*, which is a serious fault because “*êthos* is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion” (*Rhet* 1.2.4). In 2.1.5, Aristotle elaborates on the importance of *êthos*, naming a triad of character traits that audiences want to see in rhetors, namely, good sense (*phronêsis*), good character (*aretê*), and good will (*eunoia*). Style may support *phronêsis*, but excessive style shows calculation that may undercut the perception of *aretê* and *eunoia*. In the frigidities or faults, Aristotle points out that they are not only bad style but also compromise a speaker’s credibility and thus persuasion. Thus, Aristotle’s comments in chapter 3 are thoroughly rhetorical, generally grounded in audience perceptions and specifically noting how style can be appropriate (*prepon*) or inappropriate (*aprepon*) as determined by audience.

The four faults are neither strict principles nor simply peculiar “peeves” with Aristotle, but the frigidities are four categories of “bad” or problematic style as determined by audience. Aristotle wishes his students to notice and avoid four common categories of inappropriate style. Just after introducing the metaphoric or “exotic style” in chapter 2, Aristotle warns of four excesses that would impede the creation or effectiveness of such a striking prose style. Longinus applies a similar method in teaching style by antithesis in *On Sublimity* (chapters 1-4; cf. Kennedy 202). In a larger context, this chapter further justifies the distinction between poetic and prose styles of composition, a distinction drawn with a dotted line by an audience’s desire for what is clear and appropriate in everyday speech. By suggesting that rhetors avoid the excesses of poetry, which result in frigidities, Aristotle assumes that the best prose style is one composed of natural grace that hides art from an audience (cf. 3.2.4).

1405b 34. ψυχρὰ [*psychra*] (frigidities): The cold term “frigidities” does not describe any quality inherent in language itself but in audience response, or how people *feel* about certain

words and phrases used by a speaker. While “frigidness” refers to psychological response, the causes are faults of style, found in dissonant sound or ugly or ignoble sense (the opposites of pleasant imagery, euphony, and associations described in section 3.2.13). While the phrase “frigid style” connotes physical sensation, the Greek term “*psychra*” is perhaps richer because it denotes psychological feelings and connotes cold, lifeless physical states, including dead meat, lifeless art, and flat, tasteless, ineffective language (LSJ 2028). The terms *psychra* and *psychê* have similar morphologies, suggesting relations of frigid emotions, cold-heartedness, lack of empathy, and that which affects the soul with cold, insipid psychological revulsion (LSJ 2028). By implication, bad taste along with failure to empathize with audience will produce frigid style that causes frigid response. Indeed, taste and success in rhetoric arise from one’s degree of empathy, that is, a rhetor’s ability and desire to think of the good of an audience before self. In his handbook on prose style, Joseph M. Williams expresses this principle in proverbial form: “Above all, write to others as you would have others write to you” (i). A rhetor’s cultural good taste along with the golden rule always work behind the concept of propriety. Since discourse is a social art, learned taste and empathy play the key roles in helping a speaker to adjudicate between what is warmly appropriate and what is frigidly inept.

1405b 35. διπλοῖς ὀνόμασιν [*diplois onomasin*] (double words): These “double words” refer to long compound words, which, as in German, can get excessively long and pompous in Greek. English produces similarly long compounds with hyphenated adjectives between a determiner and noun (“the long-with-compounds rhetor”). As Kennedy notes, “Elaborate compounds were especially characteristic of the tragic style of Aeschylus and are ridiculed in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 830-94” (202n36). Disputing many sophistic practices throughout his treatise, Aristotle draws his “bad” examples from three sophists who use poetic language in

prose: the poet Lycophron, the rhetor Gorgias, and his pupil and successor Alcidas. As Aristotle has previously noted, Gorgias and his school practiced a poetic style in their prose compositions, but Aristotle critiques their highly ornate prose, suggesting that “it is absurd to imitate [poetry]” in prose because no one really speaks that way and even the poets are abandoning their highly ornate style (cf. 3.1.9). Since the distinction between prose and poetry is drawn with a dotted line, Aristotle chooses seven “bad” examples to illustrate his point; however, the last example (“copper-blue” sea foam), for instance, does not seem excessive because each culture has its standards of taste in diction. In this first category of “frigidities,” the principle is to avoid what will “seem poetic” since it reveals artifice and bad taste, which hinders rather than helps one’s message with an audience.

3.2. μία μὲν οὖν αὕτη αἰτία, μία δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ἐέρξην τὸν πέλωρον ἄνδρα, καὶ Σκίρων σίνις ἄνθρωπος, καὶ Ἀλκιδάμας ἄθυρμα τῆ ποιήσει, καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἀτασθαλίαν, καὶ ἀκράτῳ τῆς διανοίας ὀργῇ τεθηγμένον.

3.2. This is one cause of frigidity, and another is the use of glosses, as when Lycophron called Xerxes a “monster man” and Sciron “a sinis man” and Alcidas spoke of “[bringing no such] toys to poetry” and “the wretchedness of his nature” and one who was “whetted with the unmixed anger of his thought.”

1406a 7. γλώτταις [*glôttais*] (glosses): After ponderously poetic compounds, a second kind of fault is strange words, which Aristotle calls “glosses.” This term in non-Attic Greek (outside of Athens) is *glôssa* (γλωῶσσα), from which English gets its term *gloss* (cf. *glossary* and *glossolalia*). Literally, *glôtta* means tongues, referring to foreign dialects and languages. In rhetoric, *glôtta* and *glôssa* refer to strange, foreign-sounding tongues that strike an audience as odd and need extra explanation. According to Kennedy, “Aristotle means anything that sounds strange or might puzzle an audience; cf. 3.10.2” (203n38). The meaning of glosses is the same in *Poetics* 21, wherein nouns are placed in eight categories: “Every word,” Aristotle defines, “is either a standard term [*kyrion*], loan word [*glôtta*], metaphor [*metaphora*], ornament [*kosmos*],

neologism, lengthening, contraction, or modification. By ‘standard term’ [*kyrion*] I mean one used by a community, by ‘loan word’ [*glōtta*] I mean one used by outsiders” (21, 1457b 1-2).⁹⁴

Thus, glosses refers to strange or foreign words that puzzle an audience. Accordingly, Aristotle’s five examples come from poets who use foreign terms in strained metaphors, which by themselves may be appropriate for poetry but not for rhetorical genres.

3.3. τρίτον δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις τὸ ἢ μακροῖς ἢ ἀκαίροις ἢ πυκνοῖς χρῆσθαι· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ποιῆσει πρέπει γάλα λευκὸν εἶπειν, ἐν δὲ λόγῳ τὰ μὲν ἀπρεπέστερα, τὰ δέ, ἂν ἢ κατακορῆ, ἐξελέγχει καὶ ποιεῖ φανερόν ὅτι ποιήσις ἐστίν· ἐπεὶ δεῖ γε χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ (ἐξαλλάττει γὰρ τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν), ἀλλὰ δεῖ στοχαζέσθαι τοῦ μετρίου, ἐπεὶ μείζον ποιεῖ κακὸν τοῦ εἰκῆ λέγειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει τὸ εὖ, ἡ δὲ τὸ κακῶς. διὸ τὰ Ἀλκιδάμαντος ψυχρὰ φαίνεται· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, οὕτω πυκνοῖς καὶ μείζουσι καὶ ἐπιδήλοις, οἷον οὐχ ἰδρώτα ἀλλὰ τὸν ὑγρὸν ἰδρώτα, καὶ οὐκ εἰς Ἴσθμια ἀλλ’ εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἴσθμίων πανήγυριν, καὶ οὐχὶ νόμους ἀλλὰ τοὺς τῶν πόλεων βασιλεῖς νόμους, καὶ οὐ δρόμῳ ἀλλὰ δρομαία τῆ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀρμῆ, καὶ οὐχὶ μουσεῖον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως παραλαβὼν μουσεῖον, καὶ σκυθρωπὸν τὴν φροντίδα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ οὐ χάριτος ἀλλὰ πανδήμου χάριτος δημιουργός, καὶ οἰκονόμος τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ οὐ κλάδοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης κλάδοις ἀπέκρυψεν, καὶ οὐ τὸ σῶμα παρήμπισχεν ἀλλὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος αἰσχύνην, καὶ ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν (τούτο δ’ ἅμα καὶ διπλοῦν καὶ ἐπίθετον, ὥστε ποίημα γίνεται), καὶ οὕτως ἔξεδρον τὴν τῆς μοχθηρίας ὑπερβολήν. διὸ ποιητικῶς λέγοντες τῆ ἀπρεπείᾳ τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμποιοῦσι, καὶ τὸ ἀσαφές διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν· ὅταν γὰρ γινώσκοντι ἐπεμβάλλη, διαλύει τὸ σαφές τῷ ἐπισκοτεῖν· οἱ δ’ ἀνθρωποὶ τοῖς διπλοῖς χρῶνται ὅταν ἀνώνυμον ἢ καὶ ὁ λόγος εὐσύνθετος, οἷον τὸ χρονοτριβεῖν· ἀλλ’ ἂν πολὺ, πάντως ποιητικόν. [1406b] διὸ χρησιμωτάτῃ ἢ διπλῇ λέξις τοῖς διθυραμβοποιοῖς, οὗτοι γὰρ ψοφῶδεις· αἱ δὲ γλῶτται τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς, σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ αὐθαδές, [ἢ μεταφορὰ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις· τούτοις γὰρ νῦν χρῶνται, ὥσπερ εἴρηται.]

3.3. Third is use of epithets that are long or untimely or frequent. In poetry it is appropriate to speak of “white milk,” but in a speech such things are not only rather unsuitable, but if used immoderately they convict [the writer of artificiality] and make it clear that this is “poetry.” Though there is some need to use them (for they change what is ordinary and make the *lexis* unfamiliar), nevertheless one should aim at the mean, for it does less harm than speaking carelessly; carelessness lacks merit, moderation lacks fault. As a result, Alcidas’ phrases seem frigid; for he uses epithets not as seasonings but as the main course, so frequent, extended, and conspicuous are they; for instance, not “sweat” but “wet sweat”; not “to the Isthmian games” but “to the convocation of the Isthmian games”; not “laws” but “the royal laws of cities”; not “in a race” but “in a racing impulse of the soul”; not “museion” but adding “Nature’s museion”; and “sullen-visaged the thought of his soul”; and the artificer not of “favor” but of “pandemic favor,”

⁹⁴ *Poetics* 21: ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑψηρημένον ἢ ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ὧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ὧ ἕτεροι (1457b1-2).

and “steward of the pleasure of the listeners,” and hidden not by “boughs,” but “boughs of the wood,” and not “he covered his body” but “he covered his body’s shame,” and “anti-mimicking was the desire of his soul” (that is at one and the same time both a compound and an epithet, so the result is poetry), and “so extravagant an excess of wickedness.” Thus, by speaking poetically in an inappropriate way [Alcidamas and other sophists] impart absurdity and frigidity, and also lack of clarity because of the verbiage; for when a speaker throws more words at someone who already understands, he destroys the clarity by the darkness. People coin double words when something has no name of its own and the word is easily formed, as is “pastime” [*to khronotribein*]. But if there is much of this, [the diction] becomes completely poetical. [1406b] Thus, *lexis* using double words is most useful to dithyrambic poets, for they are sensitive to sound, but glosses to epic poets, for they are stately and self-assured, [metaphor to iambic poets, for they now use these, as has been said.]⁹⁵

1406a 11. ἐπιθέτοις [*epithetous*] (epithets): After ponderously poetic compounds and obscure words, Aristotle discusses immoderate epithets (literally, what is “added on”), by which Aristotle means overly descriptive adjectives or adjective phrases (Kennedy 203n41). What is wrong with epithets? Aristotle writes that when they are “long [*makros*] or untimely [*akairos*] or frequent [*puknos*],” then epithets violate principles of concision, propriety, and clarity. Specifically, this type of modifier is redundant and periphrastic, which is wordy or crowded; moreover, many epithets in prose show a strained effort to “wax poetic” but usually result in a forced, artificial, immature style while diminishing force and clarity. Occasional epithets can help create an “exotic style,” but as always the key to usage is *prepon*, or to use Aristotle’s metaphor, epithets make good “spice” but bad “meat” for discourse and so should be used sparingly.

1406a 33. τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν [*to geloion kai to phychron*] (absurdity and frigidity): After quoting eleven “inappropriate [*aprepon*]” epithets by the sophist Alcidamas, Aristotle describes the results of such phrases: “absurdity [*geloion*]” and “frigidity [*psychron*],” in addition to “lack of clarity [*asaphes*],” “verbosity [*adoleschian*],” and “darkness [*episkotein*].”

⁹⁵ Later manuscripts add an extra clause, which I place in brackets following Kassel’s text. As Kennedy notes, “this was probably a marginal comment by some later reader, then copied into the text” (204n45). The cross-reference points to 3.1.9.

The first two terms are the strongest and are related in consequence, for language that effects frigidity in an audience's feelings probably results from "ludicrous" usages, where *geloion* has the connotation of laughter, whether laughing *with* or laughing *at* (LSJ 342). The second set of terms also has a cause-effect relationship: for "verbosity" or "chatter" tends to cause darkness in understanding rather than clarity and tends to reveal confusion within the speaker, thus doubly diminishing a speaker's credibility with an audience. While concision is not one of Aristotle's top four "virtues of style," this passage and many others show that an appropriate concern for economy of language is a secondary virtue, a virtue that serves clarity and is ruled by propriety. For Aristotle, the value of rhetorically effective language precedes efficient language, though efficacy depends on efficiency. On the value of concision, a devoted Aristotelian and stylist, Thomas Jefferson, once stated, "The most valuable of all talents is that of never using two words when one will do."

3.4. καὶ ἔτι τέταρτον τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς γίνεται· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταφοραὶ ἀπρεπεῖς, αἱ μὲν διὰ τὸ γελοῖον (χρῶνται γὰρ καὶ οἱ κωμωδοποιοὶ μεταφοραῖς), αἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ σεμνὸν ἄγαν καὶ τραγικόν· ἀσαφεῖς δέ, ἂν πόρρωθεν, οἷον Γοργίας χλωρὰ καὶ ἄναιμα τὰ πράγματα, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα αἰσχροῦς ἔσπειρας κακῶς δὲ ἐθέρισας· ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιτείχισμα τῷ νόμῳ, καὶ τὴν Ὀδύσειαν καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον, καὶ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἄθυρμα τῇ ποιήσει προσφέρων· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπίθανα διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα. τὸ δὲ Γοργίου εἰς τὴν χελιδόνα, ἐπεὶ κατ' αὐτοῦ πετομένη ἀφῆκε τὸ περίπτωμα, ἄριστα τῶν τραγικῶν· εἶπε γὰρ "αἰσχρόν γε ὦ Φιλομήλα." ὄρνιθι μὲν γάρ, εἰ ἐποίησεν, οὐκ αἰσχρόν, παρθένῳ δὲ αἰσχρόν. εὐ οὖν ἐλοιδόρησεν εἰ πῶν ὃ ἦν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὃ ἔστιν.

3.4. The fourth kind of frigidity occurs in metaphors; for there are inappropriate metaphors, some because they are laughable (comic poets, too, use metaphor), some because too lofty and tragic. And they are unclear if far-fetched, for example, Gorgias's phrase about "pale and bloodless doings" or "You have sown shamefully and have reaped badly." These are too poetic. And as Alcidas calls philosophy a "fortress against the laws" and the *Odyssey* "a fair mirror of human life" and "bringing no such toys to poetry." All these are unpersuasive for the reasons given. Yet Gorgias's exclamation to the swallow when she flew down and let go her droppings on him is in the best tragic manner: he said, "Shame on you, Philomela"; for if a bird did it there was no shame, but [it would have been] shameful for a maiden. He thus rebuked the bird well by calling it what it once had been rather than what it now was.

1406b 6. μεταφορὰ ἀπρεπεῖς [*metaphorai aprepeis*] (inappropriate metaphors): After ponderous compounds, unfamiliar words, and immoderate epithets comes the fourth and final fault: farfetched metaphors that violate the principles of clarity and *prepon*. Aristotle names three kinds of inappropriate metaphors: those that are “laughable [*geloion*]” which derive, or should derive, from comic poetry; those that are too lofty or solemn (*semnon*) or too tragic (*tragikon*), which smell of tragic poetry; and those that are “far-fetched [*prosôthen*],” which are simply “unclear [*asapheis*]” to an audience. These three kinds of metaphor are unpersuasive “for the reasons given,” specifically because they violate the virtues of clarity and propriety and thereby the principle of “hiding art,” a principle that Aristotle has earlier summarized (“authors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially but naturally” [3.2.4]).

1406b 10. ποιητικῶς γὰρ ἄγαν [*poiêtikôs gar agan*] (These are too poetic): The problem with the mentioned metaphors is that they are “too poetic,” where *aga* is an intensive particle indicating excessive degree. What is appropriate versus excessive is a community determination, differing in kind and degree from culture to culture and sometimes from audience to audience. What Aristotle calls “too poetic,” therefore, modern speakers often allow. For instance, English speakers have a language steeped in poetic phrases and metaphors that do not strike the contemporary ear as immoderate. By the judgment “too poetic,” Aristotle critiques two sophists (Gorgias and Alcidamas) in three examples, but the two examples from the *Odyssey* are appropriate for an epic poem but not outside of poetry, showing even Homer to be a poor model for rhetorical discourse. Aristotle has two reasons for his judgment: first, poetry displays rather than disguises its art, and second, poetic style in classical culture was not fitting for prose compositions. Today, audiences tend to agree with Aristotle’s primary rationale but disagree with his cultural standard about language because modern language is alive with poetic turns of

phrase. For example, Gorgias's inappropriate, poetic metaphor, "You have sown shamefully and have reaped badly," had become acceptable in the Hellenistic era and has become a stock phrase in English through the influence of poetry on everyday speech; e.g., "For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind" (Hos. 8:7a); "He that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting" (Gal. 6:8). These metaphors (one Hebrew verse, one Hellenistic prose) illustrate the principle of reciprocity better than Latin *lex talionis* and in a style at least as poetic as Gorgianic prose which Aristotle deems "too poetic." On the evolution of prose style in Greek and English, Kennedy comments:

The development of artistic prose in Greek, though influenced by Gorgianic mannerism derived from poetry, was largely a matter of the purification of diction and regularization of syntax into an efficient, elegant tool of expression. The development of artistic prose in French, and to a lesser extent in English, followed an analogous course between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. The great models of Attic prose are Plato, Lysias, Isocrates, and Demosthenes. (198)

In applying Aristotelian rhetoric to contemporary language, rhetors may keep Aristotle's principles for prose style, including categories of virtues and vices, but will wish to scrutinize his particulars, including examples and which values of language comprise virtues and vices. In general, Aristotle's rhetorical principles, though culture-bound, rise to the status of perennial art since they are based in the universal need for audience accommodation.

1406b 17. Φιλομήλα [*Philomêla*] (Philomela): In this last, humorous example (Aristotle apparently enjoyed using humor in his teaching), Gorgias characteristically indulges in verbal irony by giving a nightingale the proper name Philomela, after it had "dropped its mess" on him,

according to the popular myth of Philomela-turned-into-nightingale.⁹⁶ This type of metaphor is personification, being a trope that implies the metaphor of being human or having human traits. Personification is a mode of metaphorical interpretation (a hermeneutic) that may easily lead to Homeric-style mythology, but it also allows people to speak of intelligence and motive in or behind nature. In this sense, personification is appropriate for some subjects and disciplines, but is a style strictly eschewed by science.⁹⁷ In the example, Aristotle commends Gorgias for his humorous wit, making an appropriate example for tragic poetry and for a speech's introduction (*prooimion*), depending on audience. Gorgias's humor marks a transition to chapter 4 on how to create appropriate metaphors.

Throughout chapter 3, Aristotle shows how education is an epideictic occasion by how he appeals to more than reason or common sense about language, engaging in epideictic praise and blame and appealing to character and emotion. Readers find epideictic rhetoric in his "good" and "bad" examples, which are quoted from those with whom he agrees or disagrees; this practice is persuasion by *êthos*. In the chapter on frigidities, why does Aristotle quote only sophists: Gorgias, Lycophron, and Alcidamas? Did Aristotle's friends never write a frigid phrase? In chapter 2 on metaphors and chapter 4 on similes, why does Aristotle quote only those with

⁹⁶ In Greek mythology, the Olympic gods turned Philomela into a bird, but only after her brother-in-law (the king of Thrace, a son of Ares) had raped and imprisoned her. In Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Philomela, while in prison, composes a defiant speech, which in translation begins: "Now that I have no shame, I will proclaim it" (6.545); thus Gorgias puns ironically with his phrase, "For shame, Philomela," referring to a bird. This story has various accounts; the earliest Greek sources are Sophocles, *Tereus* (now lost), and Aristophanes, *The Birds*.

⁹⁷ Natural philosophers seek to avoid personification, lest they commit the "pathetic fallacy" by reading into nature sympathetic human traits, such as intelligent choice, purposeful action, and emotional satisfaction. Darwin serves as an infamous example, who admitted, "It is hard to avoid personifying the word Nature," responding to critics in his third edition of the *Origin of Species* (1861); qtd. in Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species: A Variorum Edition*, Ed. Morse Peck (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania Press, 1959, p. 165).

whom he agrees? By naming and critiquing only well-known sophists, finding their prose style lacking by functional standards, Aristotle reinforces and appeals to a cultural dichotomy based in philosophy and in identity. By this practice, Aristotle assumes an audience of like-minded acquaintances, like his students, an audience not averse to scourging sophists for their relativism, claims to wisdom, and flamboyant style. By showing sophists to be the negative examples, always, Aristotle accomplishes several rhetorical tasks important to his academic community: he differentiates his *êthos* and school from sophistic figures like Isocrates, who was the most prominent student of Gorgias in Athens; he appeals to the *êthos* of his sympathetic audience, such as his students and assistants; and he reinforces a philosophical dichotomy based in the intellectual identity and values of his community, for values are not conclusions but premises in rhetorical syllogisms. Thus appealing to *êthos* in his serious analysis of rhetoric, Aristotle saturates the *Rhetoric* with epideictic praise and blame by naming names. Certainly, this practice is understandable since politics and philosophy have an affective influence on persons' sense of identity and rational faculties, providing (for better or for worse) preferences and prejudices. Aristotle's theory and practice show a holistic faculty psychology in action, illustrating a realistic general theory of language, quite distinct from the post-Enlightenment *zeitgeist* for reducing human affairs to logical models.

What Augustine recognized in the Greco-Roman world applies equally to Aristotle's theory of rhetoric: the nature of the mind is revealed not in its logic but in its sympathies and antipathies (*De Trinitate* 9.16). Aristotle explains this faculty psychology in terms of the tripartite soul: sensation (*aesthesis*), intellect (*nous*), and desire, appetite, or will (*orxis*) (*EN*

6.1.6).⁹⁸ Aristotle defines human beings as a triadic interplay of reason-emotion-volition and, correspondingly, users of informative-affective-directive rhetoric. While his triadic faculty psychology may be analyzed as three independent faculties, the threefold distinction is never thus divided in actual persons and in actual language use. In his *Ethics*, for instance, the highest virtue and action that humans can attain is speculative wisdom (*theoretikê*) because it is “relatively the divinest part of us” (10.7.1). To activate the intellect, however, the will must be moved by the emotions. As Aristotle recognizes, logic is not enough to teach, delight, or move a general audience; logic must be rhetorical by speaking to the whole person: mind, emotions, and will, respectively. Aristotle views practical and applied reason as involving the will activated by the emotions or, strictly, passions that issue in emotional dispositions.⁹⁹

Aristotle explains how his tripartite psychology interacts to produce meaningful action, including implications of stylistic choices as actions, in a passage in his *Ethics*:

Now the cause of action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice [*proairesis*], and the cause of choice is desire and reasoning [*orexis kai logos*] directed to some end. Hence choice necessarily involves both intellect or thought and a certain disposition of character. . . . Thought by itself however moves nothing, but only thought directed to an end, and dealing with action . . . since doing well (welfare) is the End [*eupraxia telos*], and it is at this that desire aims. Hence choice may be

⁹⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics*: τρία δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πράξεως καὶ ἀληθείας, αἴσθησις νοῦς ὄρεξις (6.2.1). In addition, Aristotle considers the rational soul to be bipartite: intellect and will, which pertain to the scientific and calculative faculties, respectively (6.1.5).

⁹⁹ Aristotle makes a formal distinction between feelings and emotions in his analysis of *pathos* in *Rhetoric* II, where short-term surface feelings issue from emotions but may lack the intensity and recognition of deep emotional passions (Grimaldi 2:15, 78a20; *Met* 1022b15-21; *EN* 1105b19 ff.).

called either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect. (6.2.4-5)¹⁰⁰

In this passage on action and choice, emotion is seen as the energy motivating choice and action, including rhetorical action and stylistic choices. Applied to rhetoric, only through emotion can a rhetor move informed audiences to action, directed toward the goal of *eupraxis* or virtuous action. According to William W. Fortenbaugh, virtue for Aristotle is the “perfection of man’s emotional side” because virtuous character reveals the culmination of reason plus emotion resulting in virtuous action (*Aristotle on Emotion* 75). Aristotle recognizes the interactive relationship of emotion, thought, and action, explaining the interaction with reference to his holistic, tripartite faculty psychology.

In Book 2 of the *Rhetoric* (2.1-11), Aristotle applies his faculty psychology, suggesting how *topoi* of *êthos* are necessarily part of the available means of persuasion in public address. As an art and a practice, rhetoric depends on converting *dynamis* to *energeia*, potentiality to action, which is accomplished through moving the emotions. For speaker and audience, action is possible only by the combination of rational and emotional appeals working together according to the doctrine of the golden mean. Pure reason does not produce action, and pure emotion lacks informed, ethical guidance. Therefore, Aristotle’s ethical rhetor must apply reason and emotion together to move an audience to virtuous action. Since Aristotle sometimes uses the word *boulesis* (“rational wish”) for will and other times *orxis* (“appetition” generally, meaning desire or appetite), one should understand the will as not only moved by emotion, but as multifaceted

¹⁰⁰ *EN* 6.2.4-5: πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις (ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα), προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὅ ἔνεκά τινος. διὸ οὐτ’ ἀνευ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας οὐτ’ ἀνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἔξεως ἢ προαίρεσις. . . . διάνοια δ’ αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἔνεκά του καὶ πρακτικῆ. . . ἢ γὰρ εὐπραξία τέλος, ἢ δ’ ὄρεξις τούτου. διὸ ἢ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητικῆ, καὶ [ἢ] τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπου (1139a32–1139b7).

with many high and many low motivations capable of moving people to action (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 151-56).

Aristotle's holistic anthropology translates into a holistic theory of language, what Grimaldi calls a "superb synthesis" in this rhetorical, general theory of language (*Studies* 156). Aristotle neither advocates nor practices a rationalist theory of public discourse (cf. Grimaldi 1:9-10). The psychology of the *Rhetoric* is a subject of sympathies and antipathies with enthymematic reasoning resulting in social justification of belief much more than rational justification of belief. The term *pistis* understood generally as "means of persuasion" (certainly not always rational "proof") accurately describes an audience's perspective. As Aristotle's recognizes, an audience adjudicates by means of undecidability; the interpretive decision is at root a judgment of belief, not a certainty of rational presence.¹⁰¹ Thus, always intentional in language choices (if not being able to predict all effects), Aristotle demonstrates that enthymemes are dialogic, including multiple appeals or *pisteis* (*êthos, pathos, logos*) at the same time, in the same language, and with relatively equal affect since author and audience always already approach language with emotional sympathies (not neutrality) and with undecidability (not indecision) as the ground of decision. Such synthesis of appeals reveals a holistic psychology and epistemology, thus making Aristotelian rhetoric a general theory of language.

¹⁰¹ The notion of "undecidability" emphasizes contingency, indeterminacy, choice-belief (not unbelief) in the process of adjudication through recognition of the possibility of several (more than one) possible interpretations (cf. Derrida, *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice* 50-61[1992]; cf. also Augustine, *Confessions* 12.24.33).

CHAPTER 4

LEXIS: SIMILE

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 4.1. Definition of simile or *eikôn* (1406b 20–1406b 24)

DEVELOPMENT

- 4.2. Usefulness of similes (1406b 24–1406b 26)
 4.3. Examples of similes (1406b 26–1407a 14)

TRANSITION

- 4.4. Propriety of similes (1407a 14–1407a 18)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

4.1. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν μεταφορά· διαφέρει γὰρ μικρόν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπῃ [τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα] “ὡς δὲ λέων ἐπόρουσεν,” εἰκὼν ἔστιν, ὅταν δὲ “λέων ἐπόρουσε,” μεταφορά· διὰ τὸ γὰρ ἄμφω ἀνδρείους εἶναι, προσηγόρευσε μετενέγκας λέοντα τὸν Ἀχιλλεῖα.

4.1. A simile is also a metaphor; for there is little difference: when the poet says, “He rushed as a lion,” it is a simile, but “The lion rushed” [with “lion” referring to a man] would be a metaphor; for since both are brave, he used a metaphor [i.e., a simile] and spoke of Achilles as a lion.

1406b 20. εἰκὼν μεταφορά [*eikôn metaphora*] (a simile is a metaphor): After discussing appropriate and inappropriate metaphors in chapters 2-3, in chapter 4 Aristotle treats similes, which he considers a species of metaphor. The chapter’s first clause, in fact, is a metaphor and illustrates metaphorical definition: “simile is metaphor.” The term simile (*eikôn*) means “similitude,” “likeness,” and “image” (cf. English *icon*). Aristotle illustrates by Homeric simile, “Achilles as a lion.” Kennedy comments: “The simile of Achilles and the lion occurs in *Iliad* 20.164. ‘The lion rushed,’ meaning Achilles, does not occur in the Homeric poems; this, Aristotle says *would be*. Early Greek literature makes rather little use of metaphor, except for

personification of abstract forces, but much of simile; see Stanford 1936 [*Greek Metaphor*]” (205n49). Metaphoric personification was the hermeneutic responsible for much of Greek mythology. In his formal definitions in *Poetics* 21, Aristotle considers metaphor to be the genus and simile the species (*Poet* 21, 1457b6-9). Here, however, Aristotle provides a concrete, functional definition of metaphor and simile, nearly equating the two and indicating that they differ only in grammatical form, simile adding a preposition. Accordingly, similes are explicit comparisons while metaphors are implicit comparisons or explicit identifications, differing slightly in form since metaphors have the formal virtue of being more concise. Stanford observes, “the Aristotelian concept of Neatness—ἀστειότης [*asteiotês*]—a pleasing quality of small and compact things,” moves Aristotle to prefer metaphor over simile in a purely formal sense, as he expresses in 3.10.3 (*Greek Metaphor* 40). Although the term *eikôn* does not appear in *Poetics* (wherein he uses *analogos* instead), *eikôn* is frequent in the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle seems to prefer *eikôn* as a term for prose style and *parabolê* (παράβολή) as a term for example by illustration, where *parabolê* means “throwing beside” for narrated comparisons.

In Book 2, Aristotle discusses *parabolê* as simile and as argumentation. Discussing the inductive example, Aristotle writes, “There are two species of paradigms [*paradeigma*],” consisting, first, of narrations of historical facts and, second, of invented comparisons (*parabolê*) or recorded fables, such as those by Aesop (2.20.2). On this passage, Grimaldi describes *parabolê* as argument by analogy: “Ordinarily the comparison is invented by the speaker (writer), and its effectiveness depends upon his acuteness of mind in seeing analogies suitable to his argument” (2:251, s.v. παράβολή; cf. 3.19.5). Aristotle understands *parabolê* and, by implication, the shorter simile to be basic tools of inductive argumentation, which he calls “common modes of persuasion” (*koinôn pisteôn*) useful in all rhetorical discourse (2.20.1,

1393a23; cf. Grimaldi 2:249). Argument from analogy is also a common topic (Topic 4a at 2.23.5 and Topic 16 at 2.23.17), indicating that similes and metaphors from analogy participate in the deductive mode of logical inference.

Aristotle accurately defines simile to be an explicit comparison, but disagreement tends to exist between poets and rhetoricians regarding the Aristotelian definition of metaphor as a shortened simile. The rhetorical tradition largely follows Aristotle on metaphor, from Demetrius Phalereus (*ca.* 345-280) to Cicero and Quintilian unto nineteenth-century and contemporary scholars. For instance, Cope agrees with Aristotle: “A simile is in fact an expanded metaphor; as a metaphor is a contracted simile” (Cope, *Introd.* 290; cf. 3:48). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca concur: “In the context of argumentation, at least, we cannot better describe a metaphor than by conceiving it as a condensed analogy,” also predicting that Aristotle’s analogical metaphor “will become acceptable once more, we believe, inasmuch as the theory of analogy is developed more deeply” (*New Rhetoric* 399). However, literary critics such as I.A. Richards and W.B. Stanford reject the comparison theory in favor of the synthetic theory of metaphor. Stanford, for instance, asserts that Aristotle “clearly did not intend his remarks on metaphor in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* to be taken as final and complete. On the contrary, they were merely philosophical and general remarks on the contents of his lost *Συναγωγὴ Τεχνῶν* [*Synagôgê Technôn*]” (*Greek Metaphor* 5; cf. Richards, *Philosophy of Rhetoric* 93 ff.).

The distinction between metaphor and simile is a matter of degree given the rich variety of particular instances. Simile is a figure of thought, a “*schema*” or figure: an explicit *comparison* between two different items; it is an analogy facilitating analogical thinking, ruled

by ratio, for example, a map.¹⁰² Metaphor is a figure of language, a “*tropos*” or trope: a synthetic *identification* (not merely comparison, though it creates comparison) between a “literal” subject (the *theme*) and a figurative subject (the *phoros*), showing some synthesis, association of ideas, and connecting points for comparison and contrast. In *Greek Metaphor*, Stanford distinguishes figures from tropes, describing the difference as similar to that between prose and poetry:

Simile, like prose, is analytic, metaphor, like poetry, is synthetic; simile is extensive, metaphor intensive; simile is logical and judicious, metaphor illogical and dogmatic; simile reasons, metaphor apprehends by intuition . . . continue the antitheses and it will appear quite a fair analogy that simile is to metaphor as prose is to poetry. Thus while the lower types of each can be almost indistinguishable from each other, the purest products are of entirely different natures. Simile aims at explicitness and definition; it is in fact a triumph of the νοῦς πάντων βασιλεύς [noble mind]. Metaphor defies reason and yet prevails—an incarnation of the eternal Λογός. Like poet and scientist they eternally disagree about methods and eternally agree about ultimate realities. (29)

Though simile and metaphor may resemble each other in grammatical form, for instance in Aristotle’s comparison of Achilles and a lion (*Iliad* 20.164), similitude and identification are often, but not always, two different realities and even two different hermeneutics based in the respective practices of analysis and synthesis.

¹⁰² *Schema theory* in educational psychology outlines how dominant similes help people organize knowledge, frame thought, and create advance organization for communication.

In the category of metaphor are four master tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.¹⁰³ In his *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, Aristotle treats each species of trope (irony is the focus of *Rhet* 3.11.6-15). The four tropes are metaphorical in the sense that they turn or transfer meaning from one contextual domain to another, according to the four formal categories of metaphor (*Poet* 21, 1457b7-9). Aristotle does not use the terminology of tropes and schemes in a technical sense because it was not yet developed; it was the Stoics in the second century BC who developed the technical theory of tropes (*schêmata lexeôs*, figures of style) and schemes (*schêmata dianoiias*, figures of thought), which became so significant for later rhetoricians (Kennedy 308).

Although one may not consider logical categories for metaphor, people frequently do for synecdoche since it describes what Aristotle calls species-to-genus and genus-to-species metaphors, involving substitutions of single words. Burke elaborates on Aristotle's functional definition of synecdoche: "part for the whole, whole for the part, container for the contained, sign for the thing signified, material for the thing made (which brings us nearer to metonymy), cause for effect, effect for cause, genus for species, species for genus, etc." (507-08). Metonymy also follows Aristotle's logical categories when one considers the functional definition of converting an abstraction to a particular, which an audience then reverses, receiving the particular symbol and converting it back to its abstraction. By metonymy's reduction (as species-to-species metaphor), one speaks of "chair" for the person sitting in the chair and "house of" for dynasty. Personification, likewise, since it so frequently characterizes Nature with human-like

¹⁰³ Kenneth Burke treats metaphor as perspective, metonymy as reduction, synecdoche as representation, and irony as dialectic (*Grammar of Motives* 503-17). Burke does not discuss personification or anthropomorphism, both of which derive from the classical trope of *prosôpopoiia*, meaning "to make into a person" (from *prosôpon* for face or person, and *poiein* for make). The two modern terms create a further distinction among species of metaphor.

motives, transfers meaning “from genus” (e.g., natural theology or natural selection to personify “Nature” by giving her intelligent, purposeful actions). In addition, as Aristotle suggests, the most appropriate metaphors are from “the same genus,” such as from person to person or within the same species (cf. discussion at 3.2.10).

In the category of simile are five master schemes or figures of thought: simile, parallelism, antithesis, distribution, and division or *taxis*. These figures work according to the principle of analogy (*Poet* 21, 1457b8-9). Analogy may be found in any contextual domain or sphere of life, but historically the most fruitful and functional are natural analogies. What Aristotle writes below also applies to simile: “Metaphor from analogy should always have a correspondence between the two species of the same genus” (3.4.4) for it to seem analogical (*analogos*) and appropriate. While mixing of categories exists among tropes and schemes, depending on the particular system of style, what Stanford reveals is accurate: tropes are essential for creating synthetic, poetic meaning, and figures are tools for the analytic processes of prose composition (*Greek Metaphor* 5). Tropes and schemes function as key intellectual tool for arranging and composing within the arts and sciences (cf. *ERC* 269-71, s.v. “Figures of Speech”).

4.2. χρήσιμον δὲ ἢ εἰκῶν καὶ ἐν λόγῳ, ὀλιγάκις δὲ ποιητικὸν γάρ. οἷστέαί δὲ ὥσπερ αἱ μεταφοραὶ· μεταφοραὶ γάρ εἰσι διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἰρημένῳ.

4.2. The simile is useful also in speech, but only on a few occasions; for it is poetic. [Similes] should be brought in like metaphors; for they *are* metaphors, differing in the form of expression.

1406b 24. χρήσιμον [*chrêsimon*] (useful): Placed first for emphasis, Aristotle asserts that similes are “useful,” “serviceable with advantage” (LSJ 2006) in rhetorical style and should be used appropriately just like metaphors. Typical of Aristotle’s teaching style, Aristotle employs simile to describe simile (viz., “similes should be used *like* metaphors”) and employs metaphor

for definition (viz., “similes *are* metaphors”). Kennedy comments: “Aristotle views the simile as a characteristic poetic device, seen especially in the extended similes of epic poetry, [but] simile is not discussed in the *Poetics*. In this chapter of the *Rhetoric*, it is treated as an expanded form of metaphor: a metaphor, that is, with an explicit comparison, whether provided by a verb, adjective, or adverb” (205). Figures of thought overlap significantly with topics of invention because similes and metaphors from analogy not only express existing ideas but also help generate new thought through analogical thinking. According to Williams, stylistic patterns like simile “encourage you to think in ways that you might not have otherwise. In that sense, they don’t just frame your thinking; they generate it” (*Style* 165). Likewise, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca claim, “Analogies are important in invention and argumentation fundamentally because they facilitate the development and extension of thought. With the phoros as starting point, they make it possible to give the theme a structure and to give it a conceptual setting” (385). This inventional aspect of style Aristotle recognizes as a topical relationship, for he lists multiple common topics based on analogy (topic 4, 4a, 16, and 26; cf. *Rhet* 2.23). In this regard, style and thought (*lexis-dianoia*) are inseparable, for which reason the organic theory of style is first attributed to Aristotle (Butler, *Out of Style* 3).

In argumentation, metaphor from analogy, including simile, helps to create a shared view of reality. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “It is not surprising that metaphor, with its fusion of spheres and transcendence of traditional classifications, should be, par excellence, the tool of poetic and philosophic creation” (403-04). In the sphere of conduct and practice, “Argument can be based either on the rule of justice or on a model that one will be asked to follow,” wherein a model (or anti-model) is a heuristic based in metaphor and frequently in the excellence of an exemplary person (*aretê* of *êthos*), either in terms of virtue, skill, wisdom, or

practice (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 363). In effect, the concrete phoros of a model or example becomes “the starting point for reconstructing the behavior,” along with perceptions and attitude, based in the abstract theme of a metaphor from analogy or simile (381). Just like metaphor from analogy, figures based in simile are useful (*chrêsimon*) for creating new understandings of experience. However, the ancient Greeks viewed simile as poetic since they were accustomed to Homeric similes; for considerations of audience and formal neatness, Aristotle prefers metaphor, though his is a cultural and formal preference.

4.3. εἰσὶ δ' εἰκόνες οἷον ἦν Ἀνδροτίων εἰς Ἰδριέα, ὅτι ὅμοιος τοῖς ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν κυνιδίοις· ἐκεῖνά τε γὰρ προσπίπτοντα δάκνειν, καὶ Ἰδριέα λυθέντα ἐκ τῶν δεσμῶν εἶναι χαλεπόν. καὶ ὡς Θεοδάμας εἶκαζεν Ἀρχίδαμον Εὐξένω γεωμετρῆν οὐκ ἐπισταμένω καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογόν· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ὁ Εὐξένος Ἀρχίδαμος γεωμετρικός. καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τῇ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι οἱ τοὺς τεθνεώτας σκυλεύοντες εἰκόασι τοῖς κυνιδίοις ἅ τοὺς λίθους δάκνει τοῦ βάλλοντος οὐχ ἀπτόμενα. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιος ναυκλήρῳ ἰσχυρῷ μὲν ὑποκώφῳ δέ. καὶ ἡ εἰς τὰ μέτρα τῶν ποιητῶν, ὅτι εἴοικε τοῖς ἄνευ κάλλους ὠραίοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπανθήσαντες, τὰ δὲ διαλυθέντα [1407a] οὐχ ὅμοια φαίνεται. καὶ ἡ Περικλέους εἰς Σαμίους, εἰκέναι αὐτοὺς τοῖς παιδίοις ἅ τὸν ψωμὸν δέχεται μὲν, κλαίοντα δέ. καὶ εἰς Βοιωτοὺς, ὅτι ὅμοιοι τοῖς πρίνοις· τοὺς τε γὰρ πρίνους ὑφ' αὐτῶν κατακόπτεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πρὸς ἀλλήλους μαχομένους. καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι ὅμοιός ἐστι τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ναυτιώσιν. καὶ ὡς Δημοκράτης εἶκασε τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἰ τὸ ψώμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία παραλείφουσιν. καὶ ὡς Ἀντισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἶκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας γὰρ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν· ὥστε ὅσα ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον ὅτι αὐταὶ καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἰ εἰκόνες μεταφοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι.

4.3. Examples of similes are what Androtion said to Idreus, that he was “like puppies that have been chained”; for they jump to bite, and Idreus, freed from prison, was vicious. And the way Theodamus likened Archidamus to “a Euxenus that does not know geometry”; this is from analogy, for Euxenus will then be an Archidamus who knows geometry. And the one in the *Republic* of Plato, that those who strip the dead [on the battlefield] are like curs that snap at stones but do not bite the throwers; and the one applied to the citizen body, that it is like a ship’s captain who is strong but deaf; and the one about the verses of poets, that they are like youths without beauty (for when the latter have lost the bloom of youth and the former their meter, [1407a] they do not seem the same). And Pericles’ simile for the Samians, that they are like children who accept the candy but keep crying, and his remark about the Boeotians, that they are like oaks (for oaks are felled by oaks, and the Boeotians by fighting each other). And Demosthenes’ [simile] about the citizen body, that it is like those sick on board a ship. And the way Democritus likened orators to nannies who, after swallowing the pabulum, moisten the baby’s lips with their spit. And the way Antisthenes compared skinny Cephisodotus to incense, because “He gives pleasure by wasting away.” All these can be spoken both as similes and as

metaphors, so whichever are liked when spoken as metaphors clearly will make similes too, and similes are metaphors needing an explanatory word.

1406b 26-27. εἰκόνες [*eikones*] (similes): Ten example similes derive from seven famed Athenian orators and writers, thus illustrating appropriate usage of similes in prose style. While Aristotle associates simile with poetry, notably Homeric simile, the ten illustrations here come not from poetry but from prose, demonstrating that simile is useful, common, and appropriate for rhetorical style. The examples treat themes of ethics and politics, several of which are critical of sophists and of strife in Athenian democracy. Showing a preference for reading and the written style (*lexis graphikê*), Aristotle chooses his ten examples from prose literature: one from Androtion, one from Theodamus, three from Plato, two from Pericles, one from Demosthenes, one from Democritus, and one from Antisthenes. The identity of each speaker can be found in a good encyclopedia or biographical dictionary, such as the *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* (hereafter *Biographical Dictionary*), from which come much of the following character sketches.

1406b 27. Ανδροτίων [*Androtiôn*] (Androtian): An Athenian politician and orator who was a pupil of Isocrates and known for his fervent eloquence. The simile is from a speech by Androtian against prince (later king) Idrieus of Caria, published in 346 (*Biographical Dictionary* 1:177), but today Androtian is “best known from Demosthenes’ speech against him in 346” (Kennedy 205n50).

1406b 30. Θεοδάμωσ [*Theodamas*] (Theodamas): Nothing is known of Theodamas nor of the two characters to whom he refers in his simile, but Cope suggests that the simile was a “standing joke at Athens” since the proportionate analogy implies that the two characters are *equally worthless*, except that one knows *analogos*: “geometry,” and how to apply it to create

“analogy” like the one quoted by Aristotle (3:50). Kennedy agrees: the two characters “are equally stupid, except that Euxenus knows some geometry” (205n51).

1406b 32. Πολιτεία τῆ Πλάτωνος [*Politeia tē Platōnos*] (*Republic* of Plato): Plato (*ca.* 427-347) was Aristotle’s teacher, whom the pupil quotes from memory, for the three quotations differ slightly from the extant text of the *Republic* (5.469e, 6.488a, and 10.601b, respectively), and whom Aristotle expects his audience to be familiar, for he feels no need to explain the well-known similes. These three quotations are Aristotle’s only stylistic illustrations drawn from Plato’s philosophical dialogues, despite Plato’s obvious attention to stylistic refinement. The first simile likens post-battle scavengers, who strip the dead, to cowardly dogs; the second likens democracy to an untrained and unruly ship crew; and the third likens poetic verse to youth: for many youth are so superficial that if one were to remove or ignore surface beauty, of either youth or poetic meter, then they would have no words worthy of attention. Aristotle seems to regard Plato’s similes as successful rhetorical imagery.¹⁰⁴

1407a 1. Περικλέους [*Perikleous*] (Pericles’): Pericles the elected general (*stratēgos*) and statesman (*ca.* 495-429), after studying under Protagoras, Zeno of Elea, and Anaxagoras for a time, led Athens to its zenith in democracy, culture, and empire (*OCD* 1139, s.v. “Pericles”). A forceful and eloquent orator, “Pericles was the first who committed a speech to writing before delivery” (*Biographical Dictionary* 3:192). Aristotle refers to two celebrated similes. In the first simile, Pericles compares Samians to children who, while receiving desired candy, keep crying; specifically, the Samians grumbled and complained after Athens liberated Samos from the Persians and gave them a democracy, a story recounted by Thucydides in *History of the Peloponnesian War* (1.115-117). In the second simile, Pericles compares the Boeotians to oak

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Halliwell, “Style and Sense” (pp. 68-69) for discussion of how Plato’s paradoxical attitude toward style and language may have affected Aristotle.

trees because just as “oaks are felled by oaks” from thrashing together in storms, so Boeotia and the Boeotian League at Thebes fell by its own internal strife; even in modern English, “Boeotia” indicates a certain proverbial stupidity, strife, and disunity (*OCD* 246, s.v. “Boeotia and Boeotian Confederacy”).

1407a 5. Δημοσθένης [*Dêmosthenês*] (Demosthenes’): This is “not Demosthenes the famous orator, whom Aristotle seems to avoid quoting, presumably because of his hostility to Macedon; perhaps the fifth-century general of the same name,” according to common consent (Kennedy 206n54; Cope 3:52). Demosthenes the Athenian general (died 413) played a prominent role in the Peloponnesian War as narrated by Thucydides (*Biographical Dictionary* 1:979). The picturesque simile attributed to him, comparing citizens (*dêmos* in Athenian democracy) to those “sick on board ship,” criticizes the citizenry for their political malcontent, who are always petulant with the present and longing for change. This is the second illustration in this section criticizing democracy for its internal strife. Here one sees Aristotle engaging indirectly in praise and blame based on political preferences since he blames for “bad” speech those with whom he disagrees, including sophists in 3.3 and Demosthenes the orator in 2.24.8, while good examples are from those with whom he politically agrees.

1407a 7. Δημοκράτης [*Dêmokratês*] (Democrates): The simile, comparing orators-lawyers and nannies, suggests that nannies who swallow “the pabulum” (a moistened morsel softened by mouth for the baby) and then with deceit “moisten the baby’s lips with their spit” (which nannies used in the process) are like lawyers who “swallow” all profits and then besmear an audience with their flattery (Cope 3:52). Little is known of the author Democrates, except that he was an Attic orator of the time of Demosthenes (*Biographical Dictionary* 1:974).

1407a 9. Ἀντισθένης [*Antisthenês*] (Antisthenes): The last simile (“Cephisodotus the skinny” is like “incense, because ‘He gives pleasure by wasting away’”) is caustic and sarcastic and seems to make multiple points of comparison. The simile implies proverbial wisdom (“when the wicked perish, there is shouting [of joy],” Prov. 11:10b), for Cephisodotus was not only a skinny Athenian general but also an eloquent advocate of disastrous policies that cost him his command and nearly his life (*Biographical Dictionary* 1:669; Aristotle names him twice, here and at 3.10.7). Antisthenes was a colorful figure and speaker: first a student of Gorgias, then a disciple of Socrates, and finally the founder of the Cynic school (1:207). As told by Diogenes Laërtius, “He used to advise the Athenians to pass a vote that asses were horses; and, as they thought that irrational, he said, ‘Why, those whom you make generals have never learnt to be really generals, they have only been voted such,’” a saying showing his caustic similes that also made for him foolish friends and wise enemies (*Lives* 6.4).

1407a 13. λόγου δεόμενοι [*logou deomenai*] (needing an explanatory word): “Similes are metaphors” needing an extra word, the particle of comparison, such as ὡσπερ [*hôsper*] (as, similar), ὡς [*hôs*] (as), or ὅμοιος [*homoios*] (same as, like, similar). Aristotle emphasizes that the extra word offers an explanation in that the particle makes the comparison explicit to an audience rather than implicit as with metaphor. This section’s concluding comment serves clarity and propriety: some contexts and some metaphors may need a simile’s comparative particle precisely because the extra word highlights a metaphor as derived from analogy. Kennedy comments: “When the metaphor would be obscure or too violent, it ‘needs’ to be recast as a simile” (206n55). Although Aristotle prefers the conciseness of metaphors, sometimes a metaphor calls for explanation, which the particle of comparison accomplishes.

4.4. αἰεὶ δὲ δεῖ τὴν μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ἀνταποδιδόναι καὶ ἐπὶ θάτερα [καὶ ἐπι] τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οἶον εἰ ἡ φιάλη ἀσπίς Διονύσου, καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀρμόττει λέγεσθαι φιάλην Ἄρεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος συντίθεται ἐκ τούτων.

4.4. Metaphor from analogy should always have a correspondence between the two species of the same genus: thus, if the wine cup is the “shield” of Dionysus, the shield can fittingly be called the “cup” of Ares. Speech, then, is composed from these things.

1407a 14. μεταφορὰν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον [*metaphoran tēn ek analogon*] (metaphor from analogy): Referring to the fourth formal category of proportional metaphor (*Poet* 21, 1457b8-9), Aristotle provides a principle and an example, as usual, for creating metaphors from analogy for an appropriate prose style. The principle is some observable “correspondence” (*antapodidōmi*: “answer to,” “balance,” [LSJ 150]) because analogy—from which metaphors may be seen and thus created—is ruled by ratio, as has been discussed (3.4.1). The example comes from the musician and lyric poet Timotheus, whose bold metaphor was oft quoted in ancient Greek society; Aristotle quotes it three times (*Rhet* 3.4.4, 3.11.11, and *Poet* 21.12) to illustrate a suitable metaphor from analogy (*Biographical Dictionary* 3:1149). The example metaphor comes in the form of a *chiasmus* (χῆασμός), an inverted parallel structure arranging phrases as a-b-b-a. *Chiasmus* is a poetic and rhetorical figure of thought (an implied simile) that highlights balanced ideas in balanced form; in this example, since a wine cup is commonly called a “shield” in one context, then likewise a shield can be called a “wine cup” in a new, analogous context. In application, when a rhetor finds an attractive metaphor, especially one familiar to an audience, the rhetor can extend it to create a new metaphor, as Timotheus has done; the new metaphor may have comparative or contrastive meaning to the originating trope (cf. 3.11.11).

What Aristotle discusses here about creating metaphors is, in fact, a common topic (*topos*) of invention, similar to strategies of inference discussed in 2.23 (cf. Grimaldi 2:291-93, 97a7:1). Although Aristotle classifies metaphor as part of *lexis* in Book 3, he does recognize that

metaphor crosses his formal categories since he stresses the cognitive functions of metaphor in chapter 10: “Metaphor most brings about learning” because it participates in the common topics of comparison and association (*Rhet* 2.23, specifically topics 4, 4a, 16, and 26; cf. 3.10.2). Thus, Aristotle demonstrates that metaphor is not merely a stylistic trope, but also a topic of invention possessing logical inference. Metaphor belongs to the heuristic pathway for generating and framing thought (*dianoia*), making the count twenty-nine *koinoi topoi* for discovering the possible means of suasion. Aristotle seems to assume and acknowledge the relationship between thought and style (cf. 2.26.5, 1403a). Given the central place of heuristics in his theory of rhetoric, Aristotle never dissociates style-thought (*lexis-dianoia*) or style-logic (*lexis-logikê*). Although separated for analysis and arrangement, style-thought is always viewed together in an organic relationship within the activity of rhetorical invention and practice.

1407a 18. τούτων [*toutôn*] (these things): Summarizing Book 3 thus far, Aristotle refers to chapters 2-4, to principles of diction for creating clear, meaningful, and appropriate prose: “that is, from the different kinds of words discussed earlier: *kyria*, glosses, compounds, coined words, and metaphors, including epithets and similes” (Kennedy 206n57). In the sentence, λόγος (*logos*) could refer to two related meanings: “speech” as prose (distinct from poetry) or “the speech” as the composition, for Aristotle uses *logos* to mean both aspects of rhetorical style. After discussing word choice (*eklogê*) in chapters 2-4, Aristotle transitions to the process of composition, or putting words into sentences (*synthesis*: “putting together”) in chapters 5-12.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Organizing concepts *eklogê* and *synthesis* are discussed at 3.2.1 and in the Glossary.

CHAPTER 5

LEXIS: CORRECTNESS

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 5.1. Grammatical correctness (1407a 19–1407a 20)

DEVELOPMENT

- 5.2. Correct conjunctions (1407a 20–1407a 30)
- 5.3. Specific nouns (1407a 30–1407a 31)
- 5.4. Specific predicates (1407a 31–1407b 6)
- 5.5. Grammatical agreement (1407b 6–1407b 9)
- 5.6. Grammatical number and punctuation (1407b 9–1407b 18)
- 5.7. Coherence and cohesion (1407b 18–1407b 25)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

5.1. ἔστι δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς λέξεως τὸ ἑλληνίζειν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐν πέντε,

5.1. The first principle [*arkhê*] of *lexis* is to speak [good] Greek [*to hellenizein*]. This is done in five ways.

1407a 19. ἀρχὴ [*archê*] (first principle): Refers to the beginning or starting point, such as the “first principle” of knowledge in an art, like the art of *lexis*. Specifically, Aristotle refers to *synthesis*: composing words into clauses and phrases, with grammar being the first formal principle of *synthesis*. From *archê* English derives its term and prefix *arch*, as in architecture and archangel. After treating diction in chapters 3.2-4, Aristotle begins eight chapters (3.5-12) on *synthesis*. If order of arrangement suggests importance, then one may suppose that clear and correct usage is a primary consideration in rhetorical success.

This first chapter on *synthesis* comes with no introductory or concluding transitions, causing some commentators like Kennedy to suppose that it is an undeveloped early chapter on the subjects of purity and clarity of language (Kennedy 206). This supposition is not a surprise since Greek grammar was not as yet a developed formal art in the fourth century, though grammar was a commonplace in classical Greek education, including Plato's Academy: "students could not master philosophy unless they had first completed a basic curriculum, called *enkuklios paideia* ('rounded education,' whence the term 'encyclopedia'). The subjects covered were grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, harmony [music-poetry], and astronomy. The Romans imitated this curriculum, referring to the subjects studied as the *artes liberales*, 'the liberal arts'" (Mulroy 33; cf. Stobaeus 2.31.27 ff.; Diogenes Laërtes, *Lives* 4.10; and Seneca, *Epistles* 88.23). In the fifth century, Protagoras made an early commentary on grammar, including parts of speech, verbal moods, and gender of word endings (cf. *Rhet* 3.5.5), but "the first appearance of *grammatikê* to designate a specific verbal *technê* was in Plato in the fourth century (*Cratylus* 431e11; *Sophist* 253a12)" (Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* 162). In the second century, Dionysius Thrax (170-90 BC) of Alexandria wrote the first extant grammar in Greek, *Art of Grammar* (*Téchnê grammatikê*), while a celebrated teacher at Rhodes, a Dodecanese Island near Asia Minor. Since Dionysius was concerned primarily with pedagogy (teaching correct Attic Greek to Hellenized speakers of Koinê Greek), he developed the eight parts of speech, which today are still a centerpiece of formal grammar instruction, but he did not treat style or stylistic grammar (Mulroy 37-38). Rather than formal grammar, Aristotle's interest is rhetorical or stylistic grammar, including clarity, precision, agreement, and correctness. The

purpose for discussing correctness derives from the fact that form and function are inseparable in rhetoric.¹⁰⁶

1407a 19. τὸ ἑλληνίζειν [*to hellênizein*] (to speak [good] Greek): The phrase refers to “pure and proper Greek,” the equivalent of correctness or good grammar. The Greek infinitive (with article for specificity) refers to using correctly the Hellenic language; “speak or write pure or correct Greek,” as opposed to barbarism (LSJ 536). Referring to good usage generally, the term specifically means pure and proper usage, grammatical correctness, and applying culturally accepted idioms and conventions of language. Although most translators suitably title chapter 5 “Grammatical Correctness,” Aristotle never uses the word “grammar” (*grammatikê*) because this classical term narrowly denotes “that which is drawn,” “writing,” and “letters” (LSJ 358), while the root of rhetoric, *rhê*, refers to speech (Kennedy 37). In his *Art of Grammar*, Dionysius Thrax explains that letters (γράμματα) received their name because they are formed of lines and scratches; for the ancients, to write (γράψαι) meant to scratch (ξύσαι) marks on tablets (5). When Aristotle uses the *gramma* root, as in “*to gegrammenon*” (τὸ γεγραμμένον, “what is written” in 3.5.6), the word always denotes the practice and art of the scribe, not formal grammar outlining a language’s system of syntax and inflections in conventional usage. Other terms in this chapter, such as “connectives” (§2), “natural sequence” (§2), “require” (§2), “correct agreement” (§5), “punctuate” (§6), and “correspondence” (§7), all designate what would be called “grammar,” so the correct equivalent of Aristotle’s phrase is “good grammar.”

¹⁰⁶ Ferdinand de Saussure observes that grammar, including the eight parts of speech, “is not an undeniable linguistic reality,” but one imposed on language from the discipline of logic: “to say, for example, that the parts of speech are the constituents of language simply because they correspond to categories of logic—is to forget that there are no linguistic facts apart from the phonic substance cut into significant elements” (*Course in General Linguistics* 110; cf. Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* 23). Thus, it could be that Aristotle did not seek to develop grammar as a subset of logic or rhetoric because he recognized the complexity of language and that grammar would be an imposition on the inherently rhetorical usages of language.

1407a 20. πέντε [*pente*] (five): Per his usual orderly process, Aristotle provides an advance organizer for his chapter: five principles for correct language usage, though in fact he discusses seven principles, adding two more in 3.5.7. These seven principles are far from exhaustive, but the point of the chapter is not coverage but emphasis, signaling that good grammar has utilitarian value for forming sentences for rhetorical success. The particular seven principles reveals something of Aristotle's perspective on sentences: he views sentences as the union of subject and predicate (the defining parts of a sentence, proposition, or thought) together with grammatical agreement, correspondence, coherence, and cohesion (cf. 3.2.2 and 3.2.5).

5.2. πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, ἂν ἀποδιδῶ τις ὡς πεφύκασι πρότεροι καὶ ὕστεροι γίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἐνιοὶ ἀπαιτοῦσιν, ὡς περὶ ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ μὲν ἀπαιτεῖ τὸν δὲ καὶ τὸν ὁ δέ. δεῖ δὲ ἕως μέμνηται ἀνταποδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις, καὶ μῆτε μακρὰν ἀπαρτᾶν μῆτε σύνδεσμον πρὸ συνδέσμου ἀποδιδόναι τοῦ ἀναγκαίου· ὀλιγαχοῦ γὰρ ἀρμόττει. “ἐγὼ δ’, ἐπεὶ μοι εἶπεν (ἦλθε γὰρ Κλέων δεόμενός τε καὶ ἀξιῶν) ἐπορευόμην παραλαβὼν αὐτούς.” ἐν τούτοις γὰρ πολλοὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἀποδοθησομένου συνδέσμου προεμβέβληνται σύνδεσμοι. ἐὰν δὲ πολὺ τὸ μεταξύ γένηται [τοῦ ἐπορευόμην], ἀσαφές.

5.2. First is in the [correct] use of connective particles, when a speaker preserves the natural response between those that are prior and those that are posterior to each other, as some require. Thus, *ho men* [“He on the one hand . . .”] and *ho ego* [“I on the one hand . . .”] require [in a subsequent clause] *de* [“on the other hand . . .”] and *ho de* [“he on the other hand . . .”] respectively. The correlatives should occur while the first expression is still in the mind and not be widely separated, nor should another connective be substituted for the one needed; for it is rarely appropriate: “But I, when he spoke to me (for there came Cleon both begging and demanding), went, taking them along.” In these words many connectives are thrown in, in place of what is expected; and if the interval is long, the result is unclear.

1407a 20. συνδέσμοις [*syndesmois*] (connectives): Under the category of connectives, Aristotle refers to principles of cohesion and balance among clauses in the form of conjunctions (coordinating conjunctions, correlative conjunctions, subordinating conjunctions, and conjunctive adverbs). Although his comments focus on correlative conjunctions, his sentences include several types of connectives and conjunctions. In the two examples, he focuses first on balancing correlative clauses and second on clear and cohesive subordination. Then and now,

connectives are a significant part of basic grammar (and punctuation). In discussing correctness, Aristotle emphasizes that grammatical form affects rhetorical function and that grammatical choices affect rhetorical ends.

1407a 21. πεφύκασι [*pephykasi*] (natural order): The modifier “natural” is derived from *physis* referring to “natural order,” or what is expected according to grammatical, customary usage (cf. 3.19.2-5 for frequent use of the term). The modifier is an adverb, literally “naturally,” opposite of artificiality, and refers to the orderly sequence or relation between connective particles, as when a first particle grammatically requires a second. When Aristotle applies *physis* to language, he is describing the logical, expected, grammatical sequence of language, what people consider proper usage. In the examples, Aristotle focuses on particles that create expectation that must be fulfilled correctly, such as following “first” with its correlative “second,” as usage and audiences expect. In this sense, correctness serves not only clarity but also a rhetor’s credibility.

1407a 22-23. ὁ μὲν καὶ ὁ ἐγὼ . . . δέ καὶ ὁ δέ [*ho men kai ho egô . . . de kai ho de*] (*ho men* and *ho ego* require [in a subsequent clause] *de* and *ho de*): A literal translation of these correlative connectives would be “indeed . . . but” and “I indeed . . . but,” where the first connective signals a second to follow. A dynamic equivalent in English comes in the form of subordinating conjunctions (e.g., “since this . . . then that”), where a first conjunction signals that a second conjunction and clause will closely follow. Aristotle typically illustrates the principle in explanatory sentences. Thus, describing and illustrating this kind of subordinating conjunction, he writes, “If the interval [between connectives] is long, then the result is unclear,” because an audience, having limited attention, appreciates clear and concise sentences that express complicated cause-effect or if-then relationships. Aristotle’s advice to speakers and writers is

quite simple: “speak clearly and concisely” and “what is good for the reader is good for the writer” (Enos, “Classical Rhetoric”).

5.3. ἔν μὲν δὴ τὸ εὖ ἐν τοῖς συνδέσμοις, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τοῖς ἰδίοις ὀνόμασι λέγειν καὶ μὴ τοῖς περιέχουσιν.

5.3. On the one hand, then, one merit is found in the use of connectives, a second, on the other hand, in calling things by their specific names and not by circumlocutions.

1407a 30. εὖ [*eu*] (merit): While not calling “pure and proper Greek,” or grammatical correctness, a “virtue” (*aretê*) of style as he does for clarity, propriety, and ornateness (3.2.1), Aristotle seems to infer as much by the short but significant prefix “*eu*,” serving as a strong modifier denoting “good,” “right,” “well done,” “morally well,” and sometimes “perfection, the ideal” in artistic endeavors (LSJ 704). Aristotle frequently adds the adjectival prefix *eu-* to his rhetorical and ethical terms to emphasize a qualitative principle. In the *Rhetoric*, examples are *eukairos* (translated as “opportune” in 3.7.8, but a key term in Isocrates’s rhetorical *paideia*), *eurhythmic* (translated as “rhythmical” in 3.8.7), and *eudaimonia* (translated as “happiness” in 1.5.3, but more literally meaning “good spirited” or “thriving life”). The latter term is a key component of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, related to *eupraxia* and *aretê*, as he states: “Let happiness [*eudaimonia*] be [defined as] right action [*eupraxia*] combined with excellence [*aretê*]” (*Rhet* 1.5.3, my translation).¹⁰⁷ What Aristotle makes explicit in his *Ethics* he leaves implicit in the

¹⁰⁷ *Rhetoric* 1.5.3: ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς (1360b14). Gayle proposes the following translation: “Let ‘blessedness of the deities’ be ‘blessed practice’ combined with virtue.” This rendering of *eudaimonia* derives from its two terms: *eu* and *daimonia*. The Greek word for happiness is a recognition of blessing (*eu*) from the deities. The term was appropriated by Thomas Jefferson, who translates it as “the pursuit of Happiness,” because in its Aristotelian sense, pursuing excellence satisfies people and society. In the nineteenth century, the concept was transliterated as “eudemonism,” denoting “a theory that the highest ethical goal is happiness and personal well-being” (*Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary*). While virtue (*aretê*) denotes a habit of moral excellence, *eupraxia* means well-doing, showing excellence in one’s deeds. Since the two “*eu*” concepts are related, the virtue-praxis harmony becomes a chief principle for interpreting Aristotelian ethics and rhetoric.

Rhetoric, for Aristotle marshals the potency of rhetoric for the promotion of “*eupraxia* combined with *aretê*” in human endeavors and arts. How Aristotle applies qualitative terms to rhetorical style reveals his view of style as both productive art (like poetry and fine arts) and practical art (like ethics and politics) in ways that emphasize language as rhetorical *action*.¹⁰⁸

1407a 30. συνδέσμοις [*syndesmois*] (connectives): Aristotle typically illustrates the forms he describes, and here is an illustration of correct connectives (“On the one hand . . . on the other hand,” “one . . . a second,”), which is certainly the reason for the repetitive first clause, repeating the principle in 3.5.2 before stating the principle of 3.5.3.

1407a 31. ἰδίους ὀνόμασι [*idiois onomasi*] (specific names): The term ὄνομα (*onoma*) denotes “name or noun,” from which English receives these terms. The principle is to prefer specific words, to call things by proper nouns or precise names, rather than imprecise circumlocutions or generic names. In chapter 6, Aristotle makes an exception to the “specific name” principle when one deliberately desires expansiveness (*onkos*) or periphrastic expressions. Otherwise, precise language is the characteristic Aristotelian virtue.

5.4. τρίτον, μὴ ἀμφιβόλοις· τοῦτα δέ, ἂν μὴ τὰναντία προαιρηῆται. ὅπερ ποιούσιν ὅταν μηθὲν μὲν ἔχωσι λέγειν, προσποιῶνται δέ τι λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἐν ποιήσει λέγουσι ταῦτα, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· φενακίζει γὰρ τὸ κύκλω πολὺ ὄν, καὶ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκροαταὶ ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ παρὰ τοῖς μάντεσιν· ὅταν γὰρ λέγωσιν ἀμφίβολα, συμπαρανεύουσιν.

Κροῖσος Ἄλυν διαβάς μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καταλύσει.[1407b] καὶ διὰ τὸ ὅλως ἔλαττον εἶναι ἀμάρτημα, διὰ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν οἱ μάντεις· τύχοι γὰρ ἂν τις μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἀρτιασμοῖς ἄρτια ἢ περισσὰ εἰπῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πόσα ἔχει,

¹⁰⁸ Kenneth Burke, in his theory of “language as symbolic action,” acknowledges his debt to Aristotle: “Aristotle was probably the greatest schoolmaster that ever lived and ever will live. And I feel most at peace with myself when I am on his side” (“Colloquy” 64). In *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950), Burke calls the Aristotelian lineage “the sound traditional approach” (xiv), which he interprets and builds on. In 1959, Laura Virginia Holland suggested, “Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theory is grounded in the doctrines of Aristotle. There is nothing in Burke’s rhetorical theory which is not implicit in Aristotle” (108). Since the 1980s, several rhetoricians have compared and contrasted the theories of Burke and Aristotle, including Richard Young (1981), William L. Benoit (1983), Lewis B. Hershey (1986), and Stan A. Lindsay (1998). Burke may be the interpreter of Aristotle for twentieth-century postmodernity.

καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἔσται ἢ τὸ πότε, διὸ οἱ χρησμολόγοι οὐ προσορίζονται <τὸ> πότε. ἅπαντα δὴ ταῦτα ὅμοια· ὥστ' ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτου τινὸς ἔνεκα, φευκτέον.

5.4. Third is not to use amphibolies—unless the opposite effect [obscurity] is being sought. People do this when they have nothing to say but are pretending to say something. Such are those [philosophers] who speak in poetry, Empedocles, for example. When there is much going around in a circle, it cheats the listeners and they feel the way many do about oracles: whenever the latter speak amphibolies most people nod in assent: “Croesus, by crossing the Halys [river], will destroy a great kingdom.” [1407b] Since there is generally less chance of a mistake, oracles speak of any matter in generalities. In the game knucklebones one can win more often by calling odd or even than by specifying a particular number of counters, and the same is true about *what* will happen in contrast to *when* it will happen, which is why soothsayers do not specify the time. All these things are alike, so they should be avoided except for the reason mentioned.

1407a 32. μὴ ἀμφιβόλοισ [mê amphibolois] (not amphibolies): Similar to “specific names,” the third principle is to avoid “generalities” and specifically the vice of “amphibolies,” referring to ambiguous words and structures (such as misplaced and squinting modifiers) that can create the fallacy of equivocation and in speech can create humorous “howlers.” Kennedy comments: “An amphiboly (lit. what ‘shoots both ways’) [in dialectic] is an equivocation based on a word or phrase with an ambiguous meaning, often creating a fallacious argument” (207n61; cf. 3.18.5). For Aristotle, amphiboly is to rhetoric what equivocation is to dialectic; amphiboly is the formal cause of equivocation so the two terms are often used synonymously.¹⁰⁹ Since Aristotle elaborates, adding four examples from various spheres of life (i.e., pretend poets, oracles, gamblers, and soothsayers), one surmises that amphibolies are a particular frustration for

¹⁰⁹ The terms derive from Aristotle’s “four causes” (*Physics* 2). The four causes provide answers to four questions one may ask about causality. For example, an argument: What material is it made from? Discovered thoughts (material cause). What is its form or essence? An arrangement of six parts centered in demonstration (formal cause). What produced it? A person trained in the art of rhetoric (efficient or artistic cause). For what purpose and end? To persuade (or discover the means to persuade) an audience of what is good, just, or advantageous, leading to happiness (final cause or *telos*). Aristotle’s theory of four causes is a logical method of inquiry and an explanatory model for causation. In natural processes, the final cause is mature development or fulfillment (*entelecheia*). Final cause is Aristotle’s “central methodological focus in all inquiry,” his “working tool,” and “his own special contribution to the theory of explanation” (Edel 65).

Aristotle, who prefers that speakers use specific, distinct words. He does recognize, however, that rhetors occasionally seek to speak obscurely rather than clearly and precisely.

1407a 37. μάντεσιν [*mantesin*] (oracles): In a word play, the term for “oracle” (*mantis*) connotes “obscure expression” (LSJ 1079).¹¹⁰ In this example, Aristotle mentions “a famous ambiguous response by the Delphic oracle to Croesus, king of Lydia. He interpreted it as encouragement, but the kingdom destroyed was his own” (Kennedy 208n62). Beyond the bare amphiboly, this is also an example of how Plato and Aristotle subjected religious revelation to the test of reason and found it wanting. Worse, he declares, “it cheats the listeners” by violating a principle of communication: avoiding ambiguity and seeking clarity in specific names.

5.5. τέταρτον, ὡς Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὀνομάτων διήρει, ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκευή· δεῖ γὰρ ἀποδιδόναι καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθῶς· “ἡ δ’ ἐλθοῦσα καὶ διαλεχθεῖσα ᾤχετο.”

5.5. The fourth [rule is to observe] Protagoras’ classification of the gender of nouns: masculine, feminine, and neuter. There should be correct grammatical agreement: “Having come and having spoken, she departed.”

1407b 7. γένη [*genê*] (classification): What Protagoras has classified (put in *geneá* or genus) is not grammatical gender but natural gender of nouns based on gender-based word endings.¹¹¹ Due to the term’s etymology, *genê* creates an amphiboly, meaning both “class” and “gender” (LSJ 342), but the correct reading here is “class” (rather than Kennedy’s attempt at both: “classification of the gender”), though the classification is based on natural gender.

Protagoras is the first Greek of record to comment on the gender of words, whereby his three classes of nouns are not “masculine, feminine, and neuter” (Kennedy), but “male, female, and

¹¹⁰ From the root *mantis* (oracle, prophecy, divination) comes the insect genus of mantis, within which is the praying mantis (LSJ 1080).

¹¹¹ *Poet* 1465b15 and *Soph El* 173b17 refer to Protagoras’s treatment of gender of words; cf. Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* 23, 97, 162; cf. also Cope (*Intro.* 293n2) and his article on Protagoras in *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology* 7.3 (1860): 48-50.

inanimate” (*arrena kai thêlea kai skeuê*) (Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* 97; Cope, *Intro.* 293n2). The example regards two past-perfect participles, both with feminine suffix, that are introduced by a single feminine article (ἡ [*hê*]), showing grammatical agreement of gender. The general principle of “correct grammatical agreement” applies also to number (i.e., avoiding mid-sentence switches in number, especially between pronouns and their antecedents), which is a topic of the next section.

1407b 8. ἀποδιδόναι . . . ὀρθῶς [*apodidonai . . . orthôs*] (correct grammatical agreement): Modifying the noun “agreement” (*apodidonai*) is the adjective “correct” or “right” (*orthôs*), explaining the major principle of this chapter: correct grammatical agreement for the sake of purity of language and clarity for audience. From the root *orthôs* comes orthodoxy (correct opinion or belief), but here *orthôs* pertains to correct grammar.

5.6. πέμπτον, ἐν τῷ τὰ πολλὰ [καὶ ὀλίγα] καὶ ἐν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν· “οἱ δ’ ἐλθόντες ἔτυπτόν με.” ὅλως δὲ δεῖ εὐανάγνωστον εἶναι τὸ γεγραμμένον καὶ εὐφραστον· ἔστιν δὲ τὸ αὐτό. ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν, οὐδ’ ἂν μὴ ῥάδιον διαστίξαι, ὥσπερ τὰ Ἡρακλείτου. τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται, τῷ ὑστερον ἢ τῷ πρότερον, οἷον ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῇ τοῦ συγγράμματος· φησὶ γὰρ “τοῦ λόγου τοῦδ’ ἐόντος αἰεὶ ἀξύνετοι ἄνθρωποι γίνονται.” ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ αἰεὶ, πρὸς ποτέρῳ [διαστίξαι].

5.6. Fifth is the correct naming of plural and singular: “Having come, they beat me.” What is written should generally be easy to read and easy to speak—which is the same thing. Use of many connectives does not have this quality, nor do phrases not easily punctuated, for example, the writings of Heraclitus. To punctuate the writings of Heraclitus is a difficult task because it is unclear what goes with what, whether with what follows or with what precedes. For example, in the beginning of his treatise he says, “Of this Logos that exists always ignorant are men.” It is unclear whether “always” goes with what proceeds [or what follows].

1407b 10. ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζειν [*orthôs onomazein*] (correct naming): A further application of the fourth principle (correct grammatical agreement) is this fifth principle: Specifying correctly the number of nouns (singular, dual, or plural) and observing consistently the agreement of adjective with noun or pronoun, pronoun with antecedent, and subject with verb in

number. The example consists of a masculine-plural, past-perfect participle (“having come”) modifying a masculine-plural subject (“they”), thus illustrating grammatical agreement of gender and number.

1407b 11-12. εὐανάγνωστον . . . καὶ εὐφραστόν [*euanagnôston . . . kai euphraston*] (easy to read and easy to speak): Typical of his day, Aristotle writes that reading and speaking are “the same thing” because people read books aloud for an audience to hear, closely linking orality and literacy. Untypical of his day, Aristotle collected books and privately read them aloud, giving Plato reason to nickname him “the Reader” (Edel 20). He earned this epithet for two reasons: First, in schools like the Academy, reading was reserved for “readers,” usually servants who read aloud for a class to hear, so Aristotle broke custom and probably believed that it was as good to read a drama as to see it performed. Second, he began a library (books, maps, constitutions, and animals) (cf. *Rhet* 3.9.2 and 3.12.2). The historian Strabo (*ca.* 64 BC–AD 24) declares: “Aristotle bequeathed his own library (*bibliothêkê*) to Theophrastus, to whom he also left his school; and he is the first man, so far as I know, to have collected books and to have taught the kings in Egypt [of the Ptolemaic dynasty] how to arrange a library” by example of his research library at the Lyceum (*Geography* 13.1.54).¹¹² Aristotle was likely the first to understand the power of books, giving him insight into and preference for a written, literary style, and he is remembered for his “odd” practice of collecting and reading all sorts of books.

1407b 11-12. τὸ γεγραμμένον [*to gegrammenon*] (what is written): The *gramma* root, as explained above, refers specifically to “that which is drawn,” “writing,” and “letters” (LSJ 358). In this section, Aristotle switches focus to writing and what contributes to the written style

¹¹² Strabo, *Geography*: ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ὡπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν (13.1.54, 608-09).

(λέξις γραφική [*lexis graphikê*]), a style suited for literary compositions meant to be read, discussed further in chapter 12 (cf. 3.12.2).

1407b 12-13. πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι [*polloi syndesmoi*] (many connectives): Derived from this phrase is the stylistic term *polysyndeton* referring to the use of “many conjunctions” in order to slow tempo, rhythm, and discernment of difference since “connectives make many things seem one” (3.12.4). *Polysyndeton* (especially repetition of *kai* [*and*]) lends the appearance of equality among diverse elements because the practice erases stops between items in a series. For these reasons, later rhetoricians regarded *polysyndeton* as “a figure of speech involving a surfeit of conjunctions: i.e., A and B and C, etc., rather than A, B, C, etc.” (Kennedy 208n64).

Asyndeton is the absence of conjunctions, indicative of the debating style of rhetoric, *lexis agônistikê* (discussed at 3.12). *Polysyndeton* is indicative of an older oral paratactic style and an older written style that uses coordinating conjunctions exclusively. According to Aristotle, *polysyndeton* is not conducive to the written style (*lexis graphikê*), which accordingly should employ subordination and concision (with punctuation), or what is conducive to a hypotactic style (cf. 3.12). Aristotle specifically discusses syntax in chapter 9 (cf. 3.9.1, 1409a24).

1407b 13. διαστήξαι [*diastixai*] (to punctuate): Generally “distinction, separation” as by a mark, the term *diastolê* in grammar came to mean “comma” and by extension all punctuation (LSJ 413). Kennedy comments: “Classical Greek was generally written without punctuation and even without spacing between the words; it thus had to be ‘punctuated’ by the reader” (208n65). A reader of classical texts, then, should be able to distinguish easily beginnings from endings, and thus “punctuate” phrases and clauses.

1407b 14. Ἡρακλείτου [*Hêrakleitou*] (Heraclitus): The “writings of Heraclitus” on the *Logos* in the sixth century provide a prominent example of ambiguous use of language that

exacerbates his ambiguous philosophy. Aristotle quotes the first line from his treatise on the *Logos*, pointing out the squinting modifier caused by the confusing placement of the adverb “always.”¹¹³ The example is not a matter of punctuation in the modern sense, but of syntax and of writing clear sentences by locating modifiers next to the terms which they modify. Aristotle names Heraclitus because his writings and philosophy are notoriously irresolvable, creating more riddles than answers and earning him the epithet “the riddler” (*ainiktês*) (Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives* 9.6). Aristotle is not only critiquing the philosopher’s grammar but also his logic and esoteric philosophy: “Aristotle charged Heraclitus with denial of the Principle of Non-Contradiction because he asserts that certain opposites (the way up and the way down, day and night, etc.) are ‘one’” (*OCD* 687, s.v. “Heraclitus”). Critiquing this pre-Socratic philosopher, Aristotle warns that rhetorical style cannot afford such grammatical and logical riddles. The example of Heraclitus underscores that clarity results from good grammar and careful thinking and that clarity is judged by audience, implying the maxim: “What is good for the reader is good for the writer, for if the reader guesses wrong, the writer loses” (Enos, “Classical Rhetoric”).

1407b 15. ἄδηλον [*adêlon*] (unclear): The first function of language, the prerequisite and culmination of style, is to be clear (*saphê*) and to “make meaning manifest” (*dêlos*) (cf. 3.2.1). For its opposite, Aristotle negates this key term by alpha privative (*adêlos*) to describe the failure

¹¹³ In the sixth century, Heraclitus of Ephesus began using the term *logos* in a metaphysical sense. In the treatise from which Aristotle quotes, Heraclitus asserts that the *logos* “orders all things” that people “encounter every day.” Ironically, Heraclitus emphasizes *logos* as a linguistic concept, as the order inherent in language. In the third century BC, Stoics borrowed the term, identifying it with the divine mind and natural law. In the first-century, the Jewish Hellenistic philosopher Philo Judaeus alleged that *logos* is the mediating principle between God and the world, understood as God’s Law (*Deca-logos*) derived from divine wisdom. In the New Testament, the apostle John personifies the *logos*, who became incarnate in the person Jesus of Nazareth (John 1.1-3, 14), thus unifying and personalizing Greek and Jewish accounts. Hellenistic and medieval theologians considered *logos* in Neoplatonic terms (Birdsall 693).

of signification as that which is “invisible,” “inscrutable,” “unintelligible,” reduced “to nothing” (LSJ 21). The strong term signifies failure to communicate, in this example, in writing.¹¹⁴

5.7. ἔτι τάδε ποιεῖ σολοικίζειν, τὸ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ἐὰν [μὴ] ἐπιζευγνύης, ἀμφοῖν ὃ ἀρμόττει· οἷον εἰ ψόφον καὶ χρώμα, τὸ μὲν ἰδὼν οὐ κοινόν, τὸ δ' αἰσθόμενος κοινόν· ἀσαφὴ δὲ ἂν μὴ προθεῖς εἴπῃς, μέλλων πολλὰ μεταξὺ ἐμβάλλειν, οἷον “ἐμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς ἐκείνω τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε πορεύεσθαι,” ἀλλὰ μὴ “ἐμελλον γὰρ διαλεχθεῖς πορεύεσθαι, εἶτα τάδε καὶ τάδε καὶ ὧδε δὲ ἐγένετο.”

5.7. Further, the lack of correspondence creates a solecism if you do not join words with what fits both; for example, if you are speaking of sound and color, seeing is not common to them, but perceiving is. And it is unclear if you do not first set forth what you are talking about when you are going to throw in much in the middle; for example, “I intended, after talking with that man about this and that and in this way, to go,” instead of “I intended, after talking with that man, to go” and then “This and that transpired and in this way.”

1407b 18-19. σολοικίζειν [*soloikizein*] (solecism): In the chapter’s last section, two additional principles pertain to coherence and cohesion: avoiding solecisms and interrupted syntax. Thus, sixth, the principle of coherence is to avoid solecisms: mistakes in usage resulting from an ungrammatical composition of words in a sentence. “Solecism” is considered a blunder in syntax, while in later rhetorical theory it was contrasted with “barbarism,” meaning a mistake

¹¹⁴ Cope observes irony but seems to misunderstand what he is reading: “No reader of Aristotle, who has suffered from his inattention to this very same essential of perspicuous writing, can fail to be amused with the naïveté and happy unconsciousness which he here shows in laying down a rule for others which he is constantly violating himself; and to such an extent, as to be a source of much obscurity in his writings; and in criticizing others for a fault of which he is perpetually guilty: it is indeed a grave case of Satan rebuking sin” (*Introd.* 294n1). Indeed, but does Cope understand that he is reading, in all probability, Aristotle’s lecture notes? For in addition to his esoteric academic notes, written in a dense and difficult style, Aristotle wrote many exoteric works. Diogenes Laërtius lists over two-hundred works by Aristotle, while we retain thirty-one of them. On these popular works, Cicero reports of “the suave style of Aristotle” and calls his writings, in comparison to Plato’s, “silver” and “a river of gold” (“*flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles*”) (*Academica* 38.119; cf. *Topica* 1.3, *De Oratore*. 1.2.49). We may surmise that Aristotle’s popular, exoteric writings were clear, urbane, informative, insightful, and pleasurable, in sum, an expression of his rhetorical theory and love of writing.

in inflection or the form of one word (Kennedy 208n66).¹¹⁵ Based on extant literature of classical comedy and history, the terms *solecism* and *barbarism* both originated in the fifth century and seem to have become grammatical designations by the fourth century when Aristotle was writing (LSJ 306, 1621; cf. Herodotus 2.57, 4.117; Thucydides 1.1.3). The sample solecism appears to be created by Aristotle since he attaches no name or social significance and since the phrases are the most general possible, rendering it merely a talking point on syntax. In the sample, Aristotle focuses on illogical syntax, in which a verb ought to correspond with both terms of a compound object. Speakers and writers create coherence (and avoid solecism) by choosing a verb that “fits” the complete object in the predicate.

1407b 22. πολλὰ μετὰξυ [*polla metaxu*] (much in the middle): The principle of cohesion, seventh, is to avoid interrupted syntax, described by Aristotle as “much in the middle.” The example sentence illustrates a gross interruption between a verb and its object, in which seven words in the Greek (thirteen in English) separate verb from object so that an audience forgets how the two relate to each other. Instead, Aristotle suggests a tighter subject-verb-object syntax, in which new and complex information comes after the object, at the end of a sentence, or in a new clause. Though he does not elaborate, Aristotle has begun a discussion on how to create cohesive sentences. In chapter 5, Aristotle provides seven principles for how to create grammatical correctness, ensure clarity, and avoid blunders which may tarnish a rhetor’s *êthos* as

¹¹⁵ Gayle comments on the origins of *barbarism* and *solecism*, elucidating the prejudice in the Athenian maintenance of grammatical correctness: “Barbarians were non-Greeks mocked by the Athenians for sounding foreign and funny, as if in their mother tongues they were saying ‘bar bar bar bar bar.’ And the ‘Soloî’ [Σολοί] were the people living in Soli, a Greek colonial city, on Cyprus. To the Athenians, their speech sounded strange, not because of the bar-bar-ous sounds they made but because of their peculiar, non-standard Greek grammar” (Gayle). Thucydides regularly speaks of two people groups, Hellenes and *barbaroi*, distinguished by language, commenting that Homer “does not even use the term foreigners [*barbaroi*]” in contradistinction from Hellenes, who are united by a common language (1.1.3).

well as clear communication. Correctness, Aristotle implies, is not its own end, but it serves the more basic principles of successful communication, such as concision, cohesion, coherence, clarity, and propriety.

CHAPTER 6

LEXIS: EXPANSION AND CONCISION

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 6.1. Expansion (*onkos*) and concision (*syntomia*) (1407b 26–1407b 29)

DEVELOPMENT

- 6.2. Expansion by definitions (1407b 29–1407b 31)
 6.3. Expansion by metaphor and epithets (1407b 31–1407b 32)
 6.4. Expansion by plurality (1407b 32–1407b 35)
 6.5. Expansion by articles (1407b 35–1407b 37)
 6.6. Expansion by conjunctions (1407b 37–1408a 1)
 6.7. Expansion by privatives (1408a 1–1408a 9)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

6.1. εἰς ὄγκον δὲ τῆς λέξεως συμβάλλεται τάδε, τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ἀντ' ὀνόματος, οἷον μὴ κύκλον, ἀλλ' ἐπίπεδον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον. εἰς δὲ συντομίαν τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου ὄνομα.

6.1. The following things contribute to expansiveness [*onkos*] in *lexis*: to use a definition instead of a word; for example, not *circle* but “a plane figure equidistant from the center.” For conciseness [*syntomia*], [one should make use of] the opposite: the word for the definition.

1407b 26. ὄγκον [*onkon*] (expansiveness): Refers to expansion (increase in words) and amplification (increase in dignity). Always setting forth the “available means,” in chapter 6 Aristotle suggests six ways to add expansiveness or its opposite concision (*syntomia*) to a speech or written work. Kennedy explains the metaphor: “*Onkos* literally means ‘bulk, mass, swelling’; here it implies ‘elevation, dignity,’ though in later writers it is often a pejorative term for swollen style. As Aristotle implies in section 7, *onkos* can be regarded as a stylistic form of *auxêsis*,

amplification, of which some inventional aspects were discussed in 2.18.4, 2.19.26, and 2.26” (209). In this concise chapter, Aristotle discusses six techniques of expansion and concision since one is the inverse of the other.

1407b 27. λόγῳ [logô] (definition): *Logos* has broad semantic range, but in rhetoric the term always means more than a single word, such as a statement, including proposition and definition. For purposes of expansion, Aristotle advises substituting a statement (*logos*) for a word (*onoma*), in the example, a “circle.” Rhetors may extend the principle by noting the contrast between *onoma* (single noun or adjective) and *logos*, meaning a phrase, complex term, noun-phrase, or statement (LSJ 1059). Likewise, in *Art of Grammar*, Dionysius Thrax uses *logos* to refer to the sentence as distinct from the word (*lexis*) or the noun (*onoma*) (8). Aristotle suggests that one may substitute a noun-phrase, such as a definitional phrase, for a single word to achieve expansion, or do the opposite for concision. Instead of substitution, rhetors may achieve similar expansion by adding an appositive phrase, defining in a phrase an adjacent noun to expand the clause.

6.2. καὶ εἰ ἀναισχρὸν ἢ ἀπρεπές· εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἢ ἀναισχρὸν, τὸ ὄνομα λέγειν, εἰ δ' ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, τὸν λόγον.

6.2. And if something is shameful or inappropriate, if the shame is in the definition, use the word, and if the word, use the definition.

1407b 29. αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀπρεπές [*aischron ê aprepes*] (shameful or inappropriate): This section suggests a practical application of the previous principle on expansion, that one may avoid what is unseemly by simply switching a word for a phrase or vice versa. In Greek as in English, “the shameful” refers to subject-matter (*logos*) while “the inappropriate” (*aprepon*) reflects on the speaker’s *êthos*, so two types of blunders may be averted by this principle.

6.3. καὶ μεταφορᾶ δηλοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, εὐλαβούμενον τὸ ποιητικόν.

6.3. And make something clear by metaphor and epithets, while guarding against the poetic.

1407b 31. μεταφορᾶ δηλοῦν [*metaphora dêloun*] (make clear by metaphor): Metaphor provides a means to transform a difficult, abstract term with a clear, concrete phrase that also offers easy learning with pleasure, such as the personified concept “blind justice.” Metaphor achieves clarity through figural visualization. This brief reference to metaphor as clarity is expanded in chapters 2, 10, and 11, where metaphor creates urbane style and visualization. In chapter 2, Aristotle introduces the rhetorical functions of metaphor, emphasizing that “metaphor especially has clarity [*saphes*] and sweetness [*hêdu*] and strangeness [*xenikon*]” (3.2.8). In this passage, Aristotle uses the verb *dêloun*, referring to visual signification, to “make visible or manifest, show, exhibit” so that meaning is made clear to the mind (LSJ 385). Thus, a literal translation of the current phrase is “visualize by metaphor.” The idea of visualization (“bringing before the eyes”) is treated in chapters 10 and 11, but here foreshadows that discussion by suggesting that metaphor and epithet not only present nouns (substantives) before the eyes of an audience but also provide expansion since metaphor consists of a phrase.

6.4. καὶ τὸ <έν> πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὅπερ οἱ ποιητὰὶ ποιούσιν· ἐνὸς ὄντος λιμένος ὅμως λέγουσι “λιμένας εἰς Ἀχαιικούς” καὶ “δέλτου μὲν αἶδε πολύθυροι διαπτυχαί.”

6.4. And make the singular plural, as poets do: though there is a single harbor, they say “to Achaean harbors,” and “the tablet’s many-leaved folds.”

1407b 32. τὸ <έν> πολλὰ ποιεῖν [*to <hen> polla poiein*] (make the singular plural): Literally, “to make the one many” as a means to expansion.¹¹⁶ As the two examples indicate, plurality not only lengthens a sentence but also amplifies the sound and sense of dignity. The first example is found in Euripides and Sophocles, who often speak of a single harbor (*limenos*) as “harbors” (*limenas*), though no particular passage matches “Achaean harbors” (Cope 3:66;

¹¹⁶ Kassel has added angle brackets to signify *supplenda* added for clarity, in this case adding to the article (*to*) the implied word *hen* (έν), meaning one, single, or singular.

Spengel 1:274). The second example refers to a writing tablet (*deltos*), often wax-coated and “made up of only two pieces of thin wood, joined together loosely” (Kennedy 209n67).

Normally, this kind of writing tablet has one fold, so “many-leaved folds” is descriptive of a long letter and, as Aristotle suggests, plural for the sake of expanded emphasis (LSJ 377). The phrase comes from Euripides in his romance *Iphigeneia in Tauris*, when Iphigeneia is about to send her long letter to Orestes at Argos (line 727). For Euripides, the plural phrase signals expanded amplification, drawing attention less to length and more to the fate associated with the letter, showing the communiqué to be an important part of the *dramatis personæ*.

6.5. καὶ μὴ ἐπιζευγνύναι, ἀλλ’ ἑκατέρω ἑκάτερον, “τῆς γυναικὸς τῆς ἡμετέρας.” ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, τούναντίον “τῆς ἡμετέρας γυναικός.”

6.5. And do not join [words with a single definite article] but use one with each: *tês gynaikos tês hêmeteras*; but for conciseness the opposite: *tês hêmeteras gynaikos*.

1407b 35. ἐπιζευγνύναι [*epizeugnunai*] (join): The root word *zeugma* means “yoke together,” and the intensifying prefix *epi* adds the sense of “join at the top” (LSJ 633).¹¹⁷ As a means of expansion, *epizeugma* involves adding an article before each noun in a series, as in Aristotle’s example: “this wife of ours” (expansion) versus “our wife” (concision). The example in translation becomes a periphrastic construction that seems to commend wordy forms, but the *epizeugma* principle applies strictly to serial nouns and phrases in parallel forms in which one can simply add or remove the article before each serial item, thus creating respectively an expanded or a contracted style of prose.

¹¹⁷ *Zeugma* is remarkably common in ancient and classical literatures. A figure of thought (implied simile), *zeugma*’s structures “yoke” together coordinate clauses. In function, a common word (usually a verb) is stated in one clause and excerpted but implied in other clauses; e.g., “Art imitates nature just as a son his father, a novice his master, and science philosophy”; “Excellent speech becometh not a fool: / Much less do lying lips a prince” (Prov. 17:7). Aristotle frequently uses *zeugma* as a figure of concision that amplifies parallel ideas by contracting parallel forms.

6.6. καὶ μετὰ συνδέσμου λέγειν· ἐὰν δὲ συντόμως, ἄνευ μὲν συνδέσμου, μὴ ἀσύνδετα δέ, οἶον [1408a] πορευθεὶς καὶ διαλεχθεὶς, πορευθεὶς διελέχθην.

6.6. And speak [expansively] with a conjunction, but if concisely, without a conjunction, yet not without grammatical connection; for example, [1408a] “having gone and having conversed” compared with “having gone, I conversed.”

1407b 37. συνδέσμου [*syndesmou*] (conjunction): Use of a conjunction (*syndeton*) or many conjunctions (*polysyndeton*) aids expansion in prose, while its opposite *asyndeton* adds concision. Concerning concision (*syntomos*), Aristotle repeats his qualification for maintaining “grammatical connection” (as in the similar discussion at 3.5.6) because style always regards balancing conflicting principles, in this case cutting conjunctions (*syndesmos*) while not losing connectives (*asyndetos*, same word but with alpha privative) to maintain grammatical sense. The example compares two phrases, the first with a conjunction between past-perfect participles and the second without a conjunction. The principle is that conjunctions often add expanded dignity to prose, while concise rigor is achieved without them.

6.7. καὶ τὸ Ἐπιμαχίου χρήσιμον, ἐξ ὧν μὴ ἔχει λέγειν, ὁ ἐκεῖνος ποιεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ Τευμησοῦ, “ἔστι τις ἠνεμόεις ὀλίγος λόφος.” αὐξεται γὰρ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὅπως οὐκ ἔχει, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἱ ποιηταὶ φέρουσι, τὸ ἄχορδον καὶ τὸ ἄλυρον μέλος· ἐκ τῶν στερήσεων γὰρ ἐπιφέρουσιν· εὐδοκιμῆ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς μεταφοραῖς λεγόμενον ταῖς ἀνάλογον, οἶον τὸ φάναι τὴν σάλπιγγα εἶναι μέλος ἄλυρον.

6.7. Antimachus’ technique of describing something on the basis of properties it does not have is also useful; he applies it to Teumessos [in the passage beginning], “There is a windy *little* hill. . . .” Amplification of this sort can go on indefinitely. What it is not can be said of things good and bad, whichever is useful. This is the source of words the poets introduce such as *stringless* or *lyreless* music, for they apply privatives. This is popular when expressed in metaphors by analogy; for example, the trumpet is “lyreless music.”

1408a 1-2. Ἐπιμαχίου χρήσιμον [*Antimachou chrêsimon*] (Antimachus’ technique):

Ascribed to the poet Antimachus is a style of using “privatives” (*sterêseôn*), meaning *negation* or *privation* (LSJ 1640). The examples, such as *stringless* (*achordon*) and *lyreless* (*aluron*), show apophatic negation (*apophasis*), the method of negating by using a negative particle, usually the

alpha privative, for “describing something on the basis of properties it does not have.” What Aristotle describes is apophatic of negation for the purpose of extending passages and even language, for the style is “useful” in a general, rhetorical sense and is “the source of words the poets introduce.” In tone of understatement, Aristotle describes by illustration: “Amplification of this sort can go on indefinitely [*apeiron*],” where the Greek term means “infinitively.” Aristotle knows more than he shows since not only passages but also theoretical lexicons and disciplines are developed by means of *apophasis*. Aristotle identifies apophatic negation as a rhetorical stylistic-intentional technique useful for extending passages, language, perspectives, and whole disciplines, including Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics.

The apophatic style is attributed to the poet Antimachus of Claros (*ca.* 400 BC), who was a poet of long elegies (*Lyde* his most celebrated) and longer epics (*Thebäis* his immense epic), whom Plato as a young man knew and admired for his learning and astuteness; Antimachus was the forerunner of the Alexandrine school, writing not for popular audiences but for a set of worthy, patient readers (*Biographical Dictionary* 1:190-91; *OCD* 106, s.v. “Antimachus”). By naming Antimachus, Aristotle appeals to an intellectual character and shows his proclivity for a learned, written style. What he describes is not a language system of negative differentiations (the basis of structuralism and post-structuralism), but the use of negation for purposes of extension.

The example “windy little hill” passage comes from the epic *Thebäis* by Antimachus. Though only fragments of the epic poem exist, many particulars are related through such writers as Strabo, Cicero, and Aeschylus in his drama *Seven against Thebes*, third in the Oedipus-themed trilogy (467 BC). One book in the epic details the mythic expedition known as “seven against Thebes,” wherein seven heroes approach the village of Teumessos in the plain of “seven-

gated Thebes” during the Mycenaean Bronze Age. According to Strabo, “Antimachus has adorned with praise in many verses [the village of Teumessos], although he enumerates all the virtues which do *not* belong to it, as, for instance, ‘there is a windy little hill’; but the verses are well known” (*Geography* 9.2.24). From this “well known” passage, Aristotle illustrates extension, but Antimachus uses the language of negation to amplify and foreshadow irony, in this case that the heroic expedition is approaching a curse-fated tragedy. The example is saturated with irony: verbal irony in privative terms, dramatic irony in historical perspective, and cosmic irony in Oedipus’s curse. As a trope of reversal, irony has the basic formula “‘what goes forth as A returns as non-A’” (Burke, *Grammar of Motives* 517). This, then, is what Antimachus developed: the style of negation signifies irony. According to Aristotle, negation is rhetorical amplification, a useful apophatic technique for extending discourse, marking irony, and describing or defining something by what it *is not*, by its lack (cf. 3.11.6-15).

The poetic style of Antimachus seems to have inspired Aristotle, giving him an important rhetorical technique of diction and invention that he applies to his theoretical discourses, including metaphysics, ethics, and biology.¹¹⁸ In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle coins the term *theologikê* (theology, theological study) and develops the new discipline with apophatic terms: unmoved or immutable (*akinêtos*), inseparable (*akinêtôs*), eternal (*aidios*), and infinite (*apeira*) (*Met* 1026a19 ff.; cf. *Met* 1022b20 ff.). In this tradition, Thomas Aquinas continues the apophatic style (known as Thomist *via negativa*) for Christian theology. Kennedy notes the

¹¹⁸ Aristotle is both famous and infamous for using apophatic style in his biology, for he misuses apophatic techniques to define difference in terms of plentitude and lack: he defines women, children, slaves, and animals by their lack of natural *logikê* and learned virtue; and he often defines domestic and political relationships by their lack of equality and reciprocity (cf. *Generation of Animals* 4.5; *Politics* 1). Aristotle’s inherent standard is the ideal Hellenic person, conceived to be much like himself. Thus, what Aristotle calls a logical fallacy in *Prior Analytics* (1.31, 46a33-35), by which he critiques Plato’s binary oppositions, Aristotle ends up practicing through his proclivity for, and misuse of, apophatic definition.

comparison: “Christian amplification of the glory of God or Christ: ‘without beginning or end, ineffable, unbegotten, etc.’” (210n70). Similarly in his *Ethics*, Aristotle coins the term *êthikê* (ethical-character, moral philosophy) and discusses the new discipline with reference to the mean between extremes, naming vices like intemperance (*akolasia*) and injustice (*adikia*) with apophatic diction (*EN* 2.1.1, 1103a15; cf. *Rhet* 3.7.6 and 3.16.8).¹¹⁹ In this tradition of virtue ethics, John Milton extends apophatic diction, for over a thousand coinages are attributed to Milton in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, many of which have negative form: unbesought, undelighted, inabstinence, disespouse (Ong 296; Flannagan 316). Thus, apophatic diction tends to signify irony in drama, finitude in theology, and limits in ethics within a community’s sense of obligation. In each kind of rhetoric, “Antimachus’ technique” of using privatives (*sterêseôn*) not only extends passages, but also extends rhetorical invention, enlarges the lexicon, and makes or marks a style of language that signifies human boundaries and cosmic enigmas for speaker and audience alike. In addition, it may not be insignificant that Aristotle introduces apophatic terms to metaphysics, ethics, and indeed rhetoric by assuming a disinterested, impartial tone. The influence of Antimachus on Aristotle’s rhetorical style is one example supporting the thesis that “poetic and rhetoric had been sister-arts in Athens since the late fifth century” and that the art of rhetoric “*derives originally from the poetic tradition*” in antiquity (Else 111; Walker viii; cf. discussion at 3.1.10, 1404a39).

¹¹⁹ Schiappa and Walker ascribe several coinages to Plato and Aristotle, who use the suffix *-ikê* to indicate and formalize an “art of” something, creating abstract nouns from concrete terms. Plato’s neologisms include *rhêtorikê*, the art of the *rhetor*, first appearing in Plato’s *Gorgias* 448d (ca. 387-385 BC), and *dialektikê*, the art of philosophical conversation, *dialexis*, where the root *lexis* may indicate the particular style of two-way discourse (LSJ 401). Aristotle’s neologisms include *logikê*, *theologikê*, *êthikê*, and perhaps others (Schiappa, “Did Plato Coin *Rhêtorikê*?”; Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* 34-41). In the development of *rhêtorikê*, Plato conducts his “famous attack on the name and notion of an ‘art of rhetoric,’ *technê rhêtorikê*,” which is countered by “Aristotle’s subsequent effort to recuperate *technê rhêtorikê* as a philosophically respectable discipline” (Walker 34).

1408a 7. στερήσεων [*sterêseôn*] (privatives): Refers to “negation, privation” (LSJ 1640), which is one of four methods of opposition in Aristotle’s logic. In *Categories* 10, Aristotle writes, “Things are said to be opposed in four senses: (i) as correlatives to one another, (ii) as contraries to one another, (iii) as privatives to positives, (iv) as affirmatives to negatives” (11b17-19).¹²⁰ For poets and all those who work with language, privatives are a rich source of neologisms for extending a language’s vocabulary. The opposite is also true, for rhetors not only affix negative prefixes but also the prefix “pro-” to mark culturally significant terms. A discussion of privatives and apophatic style easily leads to thinking about binary oppositions, thesis and antithesis, and expressing definitions by oppositional comparison, but Aristotle reserves that discussion for chapter 9 (cf. 3.9.9).

1408a 8. μεταφορᾶς . . . ἀνάλογον [*metaphorais . . . analogon*] (metaphor by analogy): This source or method for creating metaphors derives from the fourth of his fourfold logical category of metaphor (*Poet* 21, 1457b6-9). Negation is a variation of this inventional method, for in the example “the trumpet is ‘lyreless music’” the analogical definition (i.e., trumpet to lyre) includes negation (lyreless [*aluron*]), showing a thing to be similar in genus but different or opposite in species. When expressing privatives, Aristotle writes that proportional metaphors are popular because metaphors make concrete, allowing an audience to visualize and evaluate the implicit analogy, creating quick learning that is also pleasant.

¹²⁰ *Categories* 10: Λέγεται δὲ ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικείμενον τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρὸς τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στερήσις καὶ ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις (11b17-19).

CHAPTER 7

LEXIS: PROPRIETY

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 7.1. Creating propriety with *pathos* and *êthos* (1408a 10–1408a 11)

DEVELOPMENT

- 7.2-5. Propriety by managing *pathos*, emotion (1408a 11–1408a 25)
 7.6-7. Propriety by managing *êthos*, character (1408a 25–1408a 36)
 7.8. Propriety by managing *kairos*, timing (1408a 36–1408b 1)
 7.9-11. Propriety by managing *hyperbolê*, excess (1408b 1–1408b 20)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

7.1. τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἔξει ἡ λέξις, εἰάν ᾗ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἠθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον.

7.1. The *lexis* will be appropriate if it expresses emotion and character and is proportional to the subject-matter.

1408a 10. πρέπον [*prepon*] (appropriate): Propriety. What he introduced in chapter 2, here Aristotle explains more fully, namely, that an appropriate style (*lexis*) is proportional to the full subject-matter of the discourse. Therefore, style must regard principles for how to manage choices of diction, sound, rhythm, and syntax according to the three rhetorical appeals. By the term *prepon* in the current chapter, Aristotle advises against an overly rigorous, rational style void of *pathêtikê* and *êthikê* (emotion and moral character) because by itself rational rigor is inappropriate and uncharacteristic for a general audience, which responds better to a natural, customary mixture of the three rhetorical appeals (cf. “mixed style” at 3.17.6-8). Grimaldi comments: “the separation of thought and emotion seemed unnatural to the Greeks,” and even intellectual inquiry arises from the “desire to understand” (2:13, 78a20). Argumentation without

emotion is nonexistent; even calculating disinterestedness is a rhetorically significant emotion; for this reason, Aristotle suggests, “do not speak from calculation” in judicial settings because it signifies prudence which audiences suspect of self-advantage (3.16.9). For rhetorical purposes, Aristotle advises that *pathêtikê* and *êthikê* ought to be winsomely evident, having a due proportion (*analogos*) to the factual subject-matter (*pragmata*) of the discourse.

In the rationalist tradition of interpretation, this chapter has suffered more than others because style is too often and too readily reduced to “ornament” added onto logical argumentation, thus privileging *logos* in a Platonic opposition between the three rhetorical appeals. A prominent example of this misinterpretation is Cope, who tends to reduce Book 3 to this one chapter when he comments: “This *proportion* [of *pathêtikê* and *êthikê*] consists in a style of composition,” a style that is presumably optional and external to the real, rational argument (3:71; *Introd.* 301).¹²¹ The distinction between rhetorical appeals is an analytical necessity, but that distinction neither negates the equality of the *pisteis* for general discourse nor provides a basis for attributing to Aristotle the Platonic view of rhetoric (cf. discussion at 3.1.2).¹²² While Aristotle constructs rhetorical theory from logical forms that are highly flexible, he also insists that the subject-matter consists of three appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, and *pragma*) and advises that

¹²¹ In his *Introduction*, commenting on Book 3, chapter 7, Cope makes the specific “rule” on style: “we must have regard, namely, to fitness of time and place in the use of every *τοπός* and every ornament of style” (301) as if to distinguish and to disregard the place of style or “ornament” in argumentation.

¹²² Extending Cope’s mistake, I.A. Richards distinguishes sharply between “the *scientific* use of language” and “the *emotive* use of language,” as he explains: “The distinction once clearly grasped is simple. We may either use words for the sake of the references they promote, or we may use them for the sake of the attitudes and emotions which ensue” (267). In response to Richards, Stanley Fish provides the kind of reply that separates Plato’s and Aristotle’s theories of language: “But may we? Isn’t it the case, rather, that in any linguistic experience we are internalizing attitudes and emotions, even if the attitude is the pretension of no attitude and the emotion is a passionate coldness?” (53).

rhetorical style should manifest the full character of the full subject-matter. Aristotle creates a holistic theory of style based on his analysis of language and audience so that, in effect, Aristotle advances a subject-style ratio.

The question at issue is the nature of language, whether language is conceived as founded on logic rather than on rhetoric (cf. Garver xiii). If language is founded on logic, as Plato's rationalism implies, then language becomes a species and imperfect mimesis or expression of universal logic; then style becomes ornamentation that is added onto essential logic; then subjects and audiences are devalued before the standard of logical demonstration and self-evident truths. However, if language is founded on rhetoric, as Aristotle suggests by asserting the equality of the three rhetorical appeals, then rhetoric becomes a general theory of language and discourse; then style becomes consubstantive with subject-matter, expressive of an inherent synthesis of *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*; then rhetors make meaningful choices in the art of audience-centered communication. Given the rationalist and the rhetorical theories of knowledge and language, one can infer the high value Aristotle places on propriety at the center of his art of rhetorical style.

By discussing propriety, therefore, Aristotle does not imply that language is somehow void of *pathêtikê* and *êthikê* so that these qualities are mere external ornaments to be added onto a logical treatment of subject-matter. Rather, the qualities—more accurately, the effects—of *pathêtikê* and *êthikê* are always already attendant with language so that a speaker or writer may manage them (not add them) in a way and to a certain degree that advances appropriately the purpose of the discourse. In this chapter, Aristotle emphasizes that language expresses the whole person and likewise “must speak to the *whole* person, the composite of intellect, feelings, emotions, and character” (Grimaldi 1:350). Since language exhibits the natural synthesis of

êthos, *pathos*, and *logos*, mirroring the synthesis of human experience, Aristotle suggests that a rhetor should manage appropriately *pathêtikê* and *êthikê* so that one's style advances and does not hinder the purpose and the message.

1408a 10. ἕξει [*hexei*] (untranslated): *Lexis* is a *hexis*.¹²³ While “*hexis*” can mean “have” (derived from the transitive usage of ἔχω [*echô*]), Aristotle has developed this verb, in its intransitive usage, into a rich term meaning “acquired habit of mind” (LSJ 595). In *Nicomachean Ethics* (2.1), Aristotle asserts that ethical virtue is produced by creating good habits of character and mind (*hexis*) acquired through continued practice (*praxis*). Since style is compared to ethics in its terms of virtues and vices, propriety and proportion, and since rhetoric is an art learned by training and practice, it follows that Aristotle views *lexis* as *hexis*, being an acquired habit of character and mind. Suggesting an ancient association between ethics and rhetoric, Aristotle provides a lesson in etymology: “habit (*ethos*) derives from *êthos*” (*EN* 2.1.1).¹²⁴ Since the ability to manage propriety in style is so necessary to rhetorical success, Aristotle considers style to be a *hexis*, an ability matured by practiced habit of considering propriety in regard to the subject-matter and to various kinds of audiences (cf. 3.7.6-7 wherein are four usages of *hexis*).

7.2. τὸ δ' ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν εἴτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγεται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπὶ κόσμος· εἰ δὲ μή, κωμωδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἴπειεν ἄν “πότνια συκῆ.”

7.2. Proportion exists if there is neither discussion of weighty matters [*euonkôn*] in a casual way nor shoddy things solemnly and if ornament is not attached to a shoddy word. Otherwise, the result seems comedy, like the [tragic] poetry Cleophon composes. Some of what he used to say is like calling a fig “Madame.”

¹²³ Kennedy does not translate the verb *hexei*, perhaps following the similar rendering by Roberts, but Freese translates the verb as “will be obtained” (i.e., “will be had”), suggesting that he takes the verb in its transitive sense, which is a possibility (cf. LSJ 595).

¹²⁴ *EN* 2.1.1: “whereas moral or ethical virtue is the product of habit (*ethos*), and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation in form, from that word.” ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους (1103a17-19).

1408a 12. ἀνάλογόν [*analogon*] (proportion): Derived from *analogia*, meaning “geometry,” “mathematical proportion,” “analogy,” and “correspondence” depending on context, this key term concerns a proportionate ratio of style to subject-matter (LSJ 111). In meaning, the term has connections with equity and justice. When Weaver interprets the principle, he writes, “Simple realism operates on a principle of equation or correspondence; one thing must match another, or, representation must tally with the thing represented, like items in a tradesman’s account” (*Ethics of Rhetoric* 14). Applying the principle, what Aristotle commends is a subject-style ratio so that weighty matters (having “good *onkos*”) have a solemn style, casual matters a casual style, and fair matters a middle style. Likewise, the subject-style ratio applies to diction so that ornament (*kosmos*) graces those words able to carry their new beauty and dignity in their sense and sound. Whenever someone violates this subject-style ratio, “the result seems comedy [*kômôdia*]” and perhaps laughable. An instance of such comedy, according to Aristotle’s rhetorical criticism, is found in the tragic poetry of Cleophon, who wrote phrases as “august fig” or “Madame fig,” neglecting in diction the principle of simple realism in the subject-style ratio.

7.3. παθητικὴ δέ, ἐὰν μὲν ἦ ὕβρις, ὀργιζομένου λέξις, ἐὰν δὲ ἀσεβῆ καὶ αἰσχρὰ, δυσχεραίνοντος καὶ εὐλαβομένου καὶ λέγειν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐπαινετὰ, ἀγαμένως, ἐὰν δὲ ἔλεινά, ταπεινῶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ὁμοίως.

7.3. Emotion is expressed if the style, in the case of insolence [*hybris*], is that of an angry man; in the case of impious and shameful things if it is that of one who is indignant and reluctant even to say the words; in the case of admirable things, [if they are spoken] in a submissive manner; and similarly in other cases.

1408a 16. παθητικὴ [*pathêtikê*] (emotion): Regarding *pathos*, this section applies the subject-style ratio to expressing emotion. The implied question is, “How much emotion is appropriate?” In answer, rhetors may express as much emotion as allows the rhetorical situation, consisting of speaker, subject, and audience, or writer, text, and reader, and their respective

contexts. What sets the emotional parameters is the principle of proportion between speaker's style and subject. Since contexts are boundless and impossible to quantify or control, Aristotle provides three extreme examples and asks his students to make applications "similarly in other cases." First, an "angry-man style [*orgizomenou lexis*]" is appropriate for addressing and expressing insolence (*hybris* or pride); second, an "indignant style" is appropriate for addressing impious and shameful subjects; third, a submissive, lowly, compassionate style (*tapeinê*) is appropriate for addressing "piteous" subjects or subjects that move one to pity. What Kennedy glosses as "admirable" (perhaps following Freese, "with admiration," or Roberts, "exultation") is better and more fittingly translated as "piteous" subjects that call for a lowly, compassionate style (cf. *Poet* 1456b).¹²⁵ According to his subject-style ratio, Aristotle suggests that one would be wise to choose an emotional style that is conducive to the subject-matter. The principle of proportion applies to emotion, certainly, but it reveals much more; for emotional, empathetic style shows an audience that one has good sense (*phronêsis*), good character (*aretê*), and good will (*eunoia*), thus revealing a holistic synthesis in the rhetorical appeals (2.1.5). For an attentive audience, the subject-style ratio also means that the rhetorical appeals are equal, as Aristotle suggests in what follows and throughout the chapter.

7.4. πιθανοί δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· παραλογίζεται τε γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς λέγοντος, ὅτι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις οὕτως ἔχουσιν, ὥστ' οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα οὕτως ἔχειν,

¹²⁵ Somehow, Kennedy translates ἐλεεινὰ (*eleeina*) as "admirable" subjects, but the term is best understood as involving pity, such as "moving pity, piteous" (LSJ 531). Making better sense in the context, "piteous" subjects appropriately call for a "submissive" or "lowly" (*tapeinê*) style. This sense accords with Aristotle's subject-style ratio. Related to the term *eleeina* is the classical and biblical concept of ἔλεος (*eleos*), translated "pity, mercy, or compassion" in the Septuagint and in the New Testament. Thus, *eleeina* strongly commends a style of submissive lowliness as Aristotle appropriately suggests.

7.4. The proper *lexis* also makes the matter credible: the mind [of listeners] draws a false inference of the truth of what a speaker says because they feel the same about such things, so they think the facts to be so, even if they are not as the speaker represents them.

1408a 20. ἡ οἰκεία λέξις [*hê oikeia lexis*] (The proper *lexis*): A synonym of *prepon*, the term *oikeia* means “house” or “household” and by implication signifies what is “familiar,” “proper,” and “fitting” for household conduct (LSJ 1202). What is the role and result of a “fitting style”? Placed first for emphasis, *pithanos* is the result, meaning “credibility” or “persuasion,” which is the object of rhetorical discourse, suggesting again the momentous role assigned to style, as proposed at the start of Book 3: “for it is not enough to have a supply of things to say, but it is also necessary to say it in the right way” (3.1.2; cf. 3.10.2 and 3.11.7). In sum, Aristotle suggests that a fitting style so commends the subject that the audience gives the speaker or writer the benefit of doubt, at least, and at most its belief (*pistis*), or persuasion. The passage is stated negatively to emphasize how strongly style commends its subject-matter, so that even when an audience “draws a false inference,” it does so not with an incredulous attitude (*pathêtikê*), detrimental to one’s message, but rather with a credible attitude toward the argument. Since rhetoric, like language itself, is amoral, Aristotle does not pursue the ethical implications of how style influences persuasion, but elsewhere he condemns deception (cf. 2.24.1-11 and 3.15.10), assumes an ideal rhetor who is highly virtuous and wise (*phronêsis*) (1.7.21), and in the next section warns against an excessively emotional style.

7.5. καὶ συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μὴ ἐν λέγει.
διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες.

7.5. And the hearer suffers along with the pathetic speaker, even if what he says amounts to nothing. As a result, many overwhelm their hearers by making noise.

1408a 23. συνομοπαθεῖ [*synomopatheî*] (suffers along with): In this last section on managing *pathos*, Aristotle proposes the principle: pathetic speakers cause their audience “to be

similarly affected with” their own *pathos* (LSJ 1722). “Pathetic speakers” are excessive and thus manipulative, who rouse their own emotions in order to affect their audience. For emphasis of style and illustration, Aristotle reverses his syntax (foregrounding the verb), suggests the short-lived effect of *pathos*, and marks the detrimental effect (“overwhelm their hearers”) both as an observation and as a warning to speakers who stress emotion over information. Aristotle is obviously criticizing sophistic practice and culture, thus using sophistry as the “bad” example of what not to do since “many” misuse emotion by ignoring the subject-style ratio that ought to bring an appropriate balance of emotion and information. In the next sections on managing *êthos* (3.7.6-7), when an audience observes an appropriate balance of style, the audience learns “proof from signs [*sêmeion deixis*]” about the character of the speaker, suggesting the interaction among the three rhetorical appeals.

7.6. καὶ ἠθικὴ δὲ αὕτη ἢ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις, ὅτε ἀκολουθεῖ ἢ ἀρμόττουσα ἐκάστῳ γένει καὶ ἔξει. λέγω δὲ γένος μὲν καθ’ ἡλικίαν, οἷον παῖς ἢ ἀνὴρ ἢ γέρον, καὶ γυνὴ ἢ ἀνὴρ, καὶ Λάκων ἢ Θετταλός, ἔξεις δέ, καθ’ ἃς ποῖός τις τῷ βίῳ·

7.6. Proof from signs is expressive of character, because there is an appropriate style for each genus and moral state. By *genus* I mean things like age (boy, man, old man; or woman and man or Spartan and Thessalian) and by *moral state* [*hexis*] the principles by which someone is the kind of person he is in life.

1408a 26. ἠθικὴ [*êthikê*] (character): The term is placed in first position to mark the transition to the topic of managing *êthos*. A coinage of Aristotle, *êthikê* refers to ethical-character (cf. *EN* 2.1.1, 1103a15; *Rhet* 3.6.7 and 3.16.8). As ethical-character, *êthikê* has primary reference to moral disposition, formed by habits and virtues, as the significant aspect of a person’s *êthos* that shapes cultural identity in its aspects of age, gender, and social status (cf. Grimaldi 2:186). In its originary meaning, *êthos* is given shape from *nomos*, referring to law in the sense of social mores and customs: “that which concerns a free comportment and attitude, the shaping of the historical Being [*das Sein*] of humanity, *êthos*,” and as opposed to *physis*, referring to “what is”

and later narrowed to the physical or natural (Heidegger, *Introduction* 17-18). Thus, *êthos* as “character” is rightly understood in the context of cultural studies; for this reason, Aristotle refers to three social categories, including age (boy, man, old man), gender (woman and man), and cultural identity (Spartan and Thessalian), categories that allude to the topics of *êthos* in Book 2 (2.12-17). In addition, people are differentiated by “moral state [*hexis*],” expressed in persons’ particular styles of discourse.

Aristotle uses the supple term *êthos* in three ways to refer to the three classes of characters in compositions. According to the grammatical heuristic, characters appear as first-, second-, and third-person representations: speaker’s self-characterization, audience’s collective characterization, and speaker’s narrative characterization of others, respectively. This threefold focus on *êthos* highlights rhetoric’s status as *studia humanitatis*, its priority for people, its concern for audience, and its attention to cultural and ethical-character (cf. 3.11.10). When subjected to rhetoric as an art of audience-centered communication, the methodological arts, such as Aristotle’s logical *Organon* (“tools”), become “practical arts” for accomplishing human ends (Kennedy 16).¹²⁶

Êthos of speaker: In a first-person sense, *êthos* refers to the speaker’s or narrator’s presentation of his or her own character, that is, dramatic self-characterization. In turn, the Greek

¹²⁶ Kennedy paraphrases Aristotle’s classification of language arts: “Aristotelian scholars of late antiquity and the Middle Ages regarded rhetoric as one of these methods or tools [*organa*, applicable to all study but with no distinct subject matter], largely on the basis of . . . *Rhetoric* 1.1. Modern scholars have tended to attribute to Aristotle the view that rhetoric is a productive art, like poetics. What he actually says in 1.2.7, however, is that rhetoric is a mixture. It is partly a method (like dialectic) with no special subject of its own but partly a practical art derived from ethics and politics on the basis of its conventional uses. In *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2.4-6 he calls rhetoric a part of the architectonic subject of politics. . . . In reading the *Rhetoric* we perceive a gradual shift of focus, moving from the use of rhetoric as a tool (like dialectic) in 1.1 to its theoretical aspects in 1.2, its political and ethical content in the rest of Books 1 and 2, and its productive aspects in Book 3” (16).

understanding of *charaktêr* (χαρακτήρ) is not individualistic but is interpreted as “type” and “shared with others,” as given shape according to the variables of age, gender, cultural identity, and moral disposition (*hexis*) (LSJ 1977). Given constraints of time and purpose, a speaker’s presentation of *êthos* is always a constructed or managed type. As mentioned above, Aristotle suggests that rhetors should adapt *êthos* to that of audience. In general, an audience looks for a triad of character traits in a speaker to whom it may willingly give attention and credence.

Aristotle writes, “There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive; for there are three things we trust other than logical demonstration. These are practical wisdom [*phronêsis*] and virtue [*aretê*] and good will [*eunoia*]” (2.1.5). *Phronêsis* and *aretê* are aspects of *êthos*, but *eunoia* is expressed by means of *êthos* and *pathos* (Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle’s Accounts” 162).

While Aristotle pragmatically advises attention to self-characterization, he never speaks of a division between presented and actual character, but frequently asserts that the best portrayals are the most natural. Following Aristotle’s principles, Cicero claims that the initial portion of a speech (its exordium or introduction) is the place to establish one’s *êthos* and credibility with the audience (cf. 3.14). Concerning limitations, Kennedy remarks, “Aristotle’s theory of *êthos* is striking, but he limits it to the effect of character as conveyed by the words of a speaker and he fails to recognize the great role of the authority of a speaker as already perceived by an audience” (22). Aristotle often emphasizes a speaker’s characteristic style (diction, ethics, emotion, logic, evidence) so much that he misses other persuasive aspects of *êthos*, including dressed appearance, social reputation or “name,” what Foucault calls the “author function,” and other factors such as setting and context that a speaker can use to advantage (cf. Grimaldi 2:183-89, concerning *êthos*).

Êthos of audience: In a second-person sense, *êthos* refers to an audience's collective character, with which a speaker must be acquainted in order to create strong, appealing arguments, to adopt an appropriate tone, and to adjust his or her statements to the opinions and inclinations of the audience. *Êthos*, particularly of audience, is what distinguishes rhetoric from logic because as soon as audience becomes a consideration (which it always is), it is not enough to make valid arguments, but one must make arguments that are strong, appealing, and persuasive—all adjectives judged by audiences. Thus, *êthos* calls for audience-centered communication. In Book 2, Aristotle surveys a classification of audiences and provides topics of invention useful for adapting the speaker's *êthos*—expression, style, and arguments—to the audience's *êthos* (cf. 2.12-17).

Êthos of others: In a third-person sense, *êthos* refers to narrative characterization, specifically how a rhetor characterizes others in narrative portions of compositions. Narrative characterization is discussed in the section on narration at 3.16, but dramatic characterization is the province of poetics. In *Poetics* 15, Aristotle discusses four aims of narrative characterization: characters should be presented as being as good, as appropriate, as realistic, and as consistent as possible for the situation. In rhetorical genres, mischaracterization can produce ethical fallacies (e.g., *ad hominem*, in-crowd appeal, guilt by association, false authority, and straw-man fallacies) that can certainly affect a rhetor's credibility with an informed audience (and an easy ruse for uninformed audiences; cf. 3.15.4 for discussion of *ad hominem* arguments). This is one reason, given an informed audience, that an ethical rhetor has a supposed advantage over an unethical practitioner, as Aristotle suggests that the odds of persuasion are in the merit of the cause and with an ideal, ethical rhetor (cf. 1.7.21).

In “Aristotle’s Accounts of Persuasion through Character,” Fortenbaugh discusses how *êthos* “provides the grounds for trusting the orator and does not undermine the impartiality of the audience” (147). Making a distinction of two accounts of *êthos* in the *Rhetoric*, Fortenbaugh suggests that rhetorical situation is the determining factor in representations of *êthos*, as seen in the differing emphases in Books 1-2. In 1.1-2, the focus is judicial rhetoric wherein *aretê* is the most important characteristic of *êthos*, given small courtroom audiences; in 2.1, the focus is deliberative rhetoric wherein the full triad of character traits (*phronêsis*, *arête*, *eunoia*) is significant in view of large, political assemblies (157). How a speaker manages *êthos* is a situational determination.

1408a 26. ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις [*ek tôn sêmeiôn deixis*] (proof from signs): From the term *sêmeion* (sign, probable sign, indication) comes the modern study of semiotics, but practicing signs is a perennial part of everyday interpretation and inquiry. Aristotle writes that certain signs not only express ethical-character (*êthikê*) but also provide proof of such character for an audience; since signs can be chosen to a certain degree, *êthos* can be managed. For this line, the apparatus is full of conjectures from a possible lacuna after *deixis*, a term meaning “proof” and only occurring here in the *Rhetoric*. The question is whether the term following *sêmeiôn* is *deixis* or *lexis* and, hence, the nature of the signs. Editors include the phrase with *deixis*, and most translators render it as “proof” after its logical meaning in *Prior Analytics* (40b25 ff.; Grimaldi, “Semeion” 394). Cope provides the most common interpretation of *sêmeiôn* to mean “language, tone, and action” (3:75). In this sense, *deixis* is more dramatic than logical, indicating inferences from what is shown or explained by visual and verbal cues (LSJ 373). Grimaldi provides two readings, summarizing the meaning of each: “the way of proving from σημεῖα expresses character in so far as the proof from signs [or “in that the language”] is

appropriate to and follows from each class and each type of person” (“Semeion” 394). In either case, *sêmeiôn* refers to “instrumental, natural signs” in which “the sign points to the signate” or vice-versa (395). Thus, proof from signs derives from visual and verbal cues that reveal *êthos*, “the kind of person” one is in life, alluding to Aristotle’s basic categories: classed by three age groups (youth, aged, and prime), which are shaped by four variables: birth, wealth, power, and fortune (cf. 2.12-17). “Kind of person” may generally refer to the speaker’s “situatedness,” from which derive a person’s particular values, interests, and premises.¹²⁷ Since premises, motivations, and values arise from and express an author’s *êthos*, Aristotle seems to acknowledge that some audiences, for better or for worse, find *êthos* to be more significant than *logos* because *logos* appeals to ends that are determined by *êthos*. The phrase “proof from signs” suggests the importance of *êthos* and, thus, character management (cf. 3.16.9).

1408a 27. γένος [*genos*] (genus): An appropriate word because *genos* refers to familial or situational classification (race, tribe, family, generation) as well as to logical classification (genus as opposed to species), so Aristotle captures both senses in seeking to classify types of audiences (LSJ 344). Alluding to 2.12-17, Aristotle sets out a simple yet rather comprehensive classification of character types that may make up an audience, based on age groups (youth, prime, old age), which are affected by four variables (birth, wealth, power, and fortune). In the present passage about *êthos* of speaker, Aristotle supplements his threefold category, distinguishing three further factors of identity: gender (man or woman), cultural place (e.g., Spartan or Thessalian), and moral disposition (“moral state [*hexis*]”), alluding to terminology in

¹²⁷ “Situatedness” is a neologism translating the insights of Heidegger’s *Dasein* and Derrida’s *différance*. All three terms (English, German, French) emphasize human finitude: existence in culture resulting from *be-ing* in a particular time and place. The terms express well Aristotle’s broad insights about *êthos* constituted by situatedness and expressing (determining) persons’ particular values, views, and vocabulary.

Nicomachean Ethics 2.1. Aristotle extends his categories of character types not for understanding audience, which is always in view, but for discussing self-characterization, how to manage “proof from signs” expressive of ethical-character, the application of which is the focus of the next section.

7.7. οὐ γὰρ καθ' ἅπασαν ἕξιιν οἱ βίοι ποιοῖ τινες. ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεία λέγῃ τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσῃ τὸ ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' αὐτῶς ὡσαύτως ἂν ἄγροικος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν. πάσχουσι δέ τι οἱ ἄκροαταὶ καὶ ᾧ κατακόρως χρώνται οἱ λογογράφοι, “τίς δ' οὐκ οἶδεν;” “ἅπαντες ἴσασιν.” ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ ὁ ἀκούων ἀισχυνόμενος, ὅπως μετέχῃ οὐπὲρ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες.

7.7. For lives do not have the same character in accordance with [each and] every moral state. If, then, a person speaks words appropriate to his moral state, he will create a sense of character. A rustic and an educated person would not say the same thing nor [say it] in the same way. Listeners react also to expressions speechwriters use to excess: “Who does not know?” “Everybody knows. . . .” The listener agrees out of embarrassment in order to share in the feelings of all others.

1408a 30. ἕξιιν [*hexin*] (moral state): *Hexis* refers to acquired habits of morals and mind and contributes to a person’s *êthos*, or ethical-character. For emphasis, Aristotle writes *hexis* twice in this section and five times in chapter 7. *Hexis* is a common Greek term but theorized by Aristotle in his virtue ethics: *hexis* is an “acquired moral principle that has become a permanent habit of character” (*EN* 2.1), or again, a “habit of right action, formed by acting rightly” (Rackham 71; cf. Grimaldi 2:186-87). A less technical synonym for “habit” is *ethos*, and Aristotle is fond of the etymological association between *ethos* and *êthos*, as he writes: “moral or ethical virtue [*êthikê*] is the product of habit (*ethos*), and has indeed derived from that word” (*EN* 2.1.1). The terms’ etymologies display a conceptual relationship that Aristotle asserts as a principle for managing *êthos* in terms of *hexis*, or moral disposition.

1408a 31. οἰκεία [*oikeia*] (appropriate): This term is the application of *hexis*. The implied question is, “How does a speaker manage or express character?” In answer, Aristotle asserts, when “a person speaks words appropriate to his moral state, he will create a sense of character.”

The key idea for rhetorical practice is appropriateness (*oikeia*, a synonym for *prepon*). The answer is a repeat from section 3.7.4 on managing *pathos*, where Aristotle speaks of “the proper style” (*hê oikeia lexis*), that is, “fitting” conduct. Thus, similar to the subject-style ratio for managing *pathos*, Aristotle here suggests a life-style ratio for managing *êthos*, expressing character in a fitting manner. Given Aristotle’s paraphrase of *hexis* in the previous section, “principles by which someone is the kind of person he is in life [*bios*]” (3.7.6), what Aristotle asserts by the principle of propriety may be summarized as a life-style ratio. Two examples illustrate such as a *life-style ratio* for managing *êthos*: one appropriate, contrasting “rustic” and “educated” expressions of character; and one excessive, giving warning about the overused set expressions of professional speechwriters (logographers like Lysias). Aristotle suggests that speakers and audiences expect education to shape *êthos* in so far as education is a cultural occasion promoting a society’s intellectual and moral values.

7.8. τὸ δ' εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι [1408b] κοινὸν ἀπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν.

7.8. Opportune or inopportune usage is a factor [1408b] common to all species [of rhetoric].

1408a 36. εὐκαίρως [*eukairôs*] (opportune): *Eukairos* is a key term that involves two processes: reading and replying to the situation well. For Aristotle, *eukairos* is the decisive topic regarding the rhetorical situation, though the term occurs only twice in the *Rhetoric*, both in Book 3 (cf. 3.18.1, 1418b39), while the related term *kairos* is employed throughout the *Rhetoric*. *Eukairos* is derived from *kairos*, meaning the “exact or critical time, season, opportunity,” suggesting the right word at the right time for the situation (LSJ 859). *Eukairos* is glossed as “opportune” by Kennedy and Freese, but the term’s dynamic sense is translated better by phrases: “right timing and due measure” (Kinneavy and Eskin 432); “the right moment of opportunity which requires proactivity to achieve success” (Freier 3); “subject-situational

correlation” (J.E. Smith 5); “the situational forces that induce, constrain, and influence discourse” (Enos, *Roman Rhetoric* 16); and “a season when something appropriately happens that cannot happen just ‘any time,’” moreover, “time that marks an opportunity which may not recur” (J.E. Smith 4).¹²⁸ Contrasting *kronos* (quantitative time, chronology) and *kairos* (qualitative time, opportunity), Mark R. Freier observes the significance of the concept: “It is not an understatement to say that *kairos* moments alter destiny. To miscalculate *kronos* is inconvenient. To miscalculate *kairos* is lamentable” (3). The concept of *kairos* advises attention to the situational context, what is sometimes called “being in the moment,” in order to notice opportune instants for altering argument and style in due measure, which, as Aristotle asserts, is a vital factor for all rhetoric.

Kairos, however, is associated with sophists and specifically Isocrates (Aristotle’s rival in rhetorical instruction) and the idea of “relative situation.” It may be for these reasons that Aristotle alters the term as he appropriates a concept from Isocrates, adding a qualitative *eu-* prefix to distinguish his term. Although Aristotle challenges Isocrates elsewhere, here he seems to give approval with qualitative modification.¹²⁹ Aristotle uses *eukairos* in his own semantic context that includes his proportional concepts of *prepon* and *analogia* so that Aristotle’s version of *kairos* implies the golden mean or the right measure (Kinneavy and Eskin 441; cf. *EN* 2.6).

¹²⁸ According to Kinneavy and Eskin’s study, “Baumlin (1984) related *kairos* to decorum or fitness. He claimed that George Puttenham and Francis Bacon employed *kairos* in their definitions of decorum. He quoted Bacon as declaring the following: ‘decency [decorum] . . . is time and season’ (cited in Baumlin, 1984, p. 177). Moutsopoulos (1985) agreed with others who argued that *kairos* adds a dynamism and a value dimension to temporality (p. 223). All of these situational leanings can be seen in Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric” (434).

¹²⁹ Isocrates is a prevalent source and figure in the *Rhetoric*, for “Aristotle quotes or refers to Isocrates some thirty-nine times in the *Rhetoric*, but rarely elsewhere” (Kennedy 6n11). Most quotations occur in contexts of style and arrangement, including emotional style in 3.7.11. In *Panathenaisus* (§16), perhaps referring to Aristotle, Isocrates complains of teachers who “use my discourses as models . . . but are always saying disparaging things about me.”

Theorized earlier by Isocrates as a key component in his rhetorical *paideia*, *kairos* has close links to considerations of audience, decorum, and the principle of apt speech. *Kairos*—the right appeal for the moment, the right argument for the audience, the right tone and style for the subject—is a vital consideration for all genres of rhetoric, discussed in Book 1: judicial rhetoric (concerning past facts and liability), deliberative rhetoric (concerning future policies and choices), and epideictic rhetoric (concerning present honor and dishonor of persons and actions). Kinneavy and Eskin in “*Kairos* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” assert that, although *kairos* is a neglected concept, “Aristotle’s use of *kairos* in the ‘act’ of rhetoric is illustrated throughout his art” (442).¹³⁰ While validity is the standard in logic, *eukairos* is a key measurement in Aristotle’s rhetoric for discovering when and how to apply what is appropriate (*prepon*) for the situation. Moreover, *eukairos* is a common topic of style for the three species of rhetoric, a common topic for discovering, creating, and managing all the previous principles of style. The placement of *eukairos*, concluding the deliberations on expressing *pathos* and *êthos* and just prior to deliberations on managing excessive style, suggests that *kairos* is a summary concept. Just as much as Aristotle’s subject-style ratio for *pathos* and life-style ratio for *êthos*, rhetors should consider the emphasis on *kairos* by Isocrates and Aristotle to indicate a decisive topic in light of the rhetorical situation.

7.9. ἄκος δ' ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ θρυλούμενον· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν αὐτῶ
προσεπιπλήττειν· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ἐπεὶ οὐ λανθάνει γε ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν λέγοντα.

¹³⁰ Kinneavy and Eskin explain: “Traditional underrepresentation in the concordances—the most common used by scholars, Bonitz and Bekker’s (*Aristoteles*, 1961), only lists three references to *kairos* in the *Rhetoric*—was abated somewhat with the advent of Wartelle’s (1982) *Lexique de la “Rhétorique” d’Aristote*, which revealed 13 references. But it is through PERSEUS, a computer program which can find the root of the word as well as the word itself, that scholars are now able to search the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* version of the *Rhetoric* and find a total of 16 references” (433).

7.9. There is a commonly used defense for every hyperbole: the speaker should preempt criticism; for something seems true when the speaker does not conceal what he is doing.

7.9. There is a repeatedly used remedy for every excess [*hyperbole*, an exaggeration of style]: the speaker should pronounce censure [on himself beforehand]; for [the excess] seems sound when the speaker does not hide [but appears aware of] what he is doing. (My translation following the Latin MSS and included here for the sake of comparison.)

1408b 2. προσεπιπλήττειν [*prosepiplêttein*] (preempt): In this verb, the two manuscript families differ by one letter (a sigma), allowing different translations: “preempt” criticism versus “pronounce” censure. The difference in the similar verbs affects the implied object and the implied timing: censure others or censure self?, before or after (anticipated) disapproval? All extant Greek MSS, based on MS A (codex Parisinus 1741), read as Kennedy’s translation above: “the speaker should preempt criticism [from the audience before it occurs]”; but the two Medieval Latin translations, based on reconstructed MS β, read without the sigma and seem to make better sense: “the speaker should pronounce censure [on himself before disapproval from the audience].” Literalists adhering to the Greek MSS are Bekker, Spengel, and Kennedy. Following the Latin MSS are most others, including Stephens, Cope, Roberts, and Freese. The Greek manuscripts render Kennedy’s wooden translation of “preempt,” who also adds a note on the implied timing: “The better [Greek] manuscripts give *should add a censure*; but ancient rhetoricians (e.g., Quintilian 8.3.37) advised anticipation (“You may not want to believe what I am going to say, but. . .”); some scribe may have wrongly inserted the single letter that makes the difference in meaning” (236n82). While Kennedy addresses the question of timing, the more pressing question is, “Who is the object of the verb?” The Latin emendation renders the verb’s action as reflexive. This sense is well explained by Quintilian who paraphrases Aristotle’s argument and text. In a passage on the merits and faults of style, Quintilian comments:

If we ever think, moreover, that we are coining a word too venturously, we may defend it with some apologetical phrase, as “that I may so express myself; if I may be allowed so to speak; in some way; permit me to use the word”; a mode of excuse that may be serviceable when we use expressions which are too daringly metaphorical, and which can hardly be hazarded with safety; for it will thus be evident, from our very caution, that our judgment is not at fault. In regard to this point there is a very elegant Greek saying, in which we are directed προεπιπλήσσειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ (*proepiplêssein te hyperbolê*), “to be the first to blame our own hyperbole.” (*Institutes of Oratory* 8.3.37)¹³¹

Quintilian interprets Aristotle’s principle well, applying the working and sense of MS β, in that a speaker may “preempt criticism” by politely “pronouncing censure” on himself or acknowledging premeditated excess. Kassel’s editorial remarks suggest that Quintilian quotes from Theophrastus, who has paraphrased Aristotle, his teacher, on this point. In any event, the Latin manuscripts, along with Quintilian, provide a meaningful, specific, “common-sense view” (Cope 3:78) of the text within its context, which may be translated with perfect sense (as I have done above beneath Kennedy’s translation) to supplement and comment on the received text.

7.10. ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρῆσασθαι· οὕτω γὰρ κέκλεπται [ὁ ἀκροατής]. λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ [καὶ τοῖς] ἀρμόττουσιν· εἰ δὲ μή, φανερόν γίγνεται [ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν]. ἐὰν δὲ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ μή, λανθάνει ποιῶν τὸ αὐτό. ἐὰν <δ> οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγεται, ἀπίθανον γίγνεται.

7.10. Further, do not use all analogous effects [of sound and sense] together; for thus the hearer is tricked. I mean, for example, if the words are harsh, do not deliver them with a harsh voice and

¹³¹ Quintilian’s *Latinitas*: Sed si quid periculosius finxisse videbimur, quibusdam remediis praemunendum est: “ut ita dicam,” “si licet dicere,” “quodam modo,” “permittite mihi sic uti.” Quod idem etiam in iis quae licentius tralata erunt proderit, nihilque non tuto dici potest in quo non fari iudicium nostrum sollicitudine ipsa manifestum erit. Qua de re Graecum illud elegantissimum est, quo praecipitur προεπιπλήσσειν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ (8.3.37).

countenance. Otherwise, what you are doing is evident. But if sometimes one feature is present, sometimes not, you accomplish the same thing without being noticed. But if, as a result, gentle things are said harshly and harsh things gently, the result is unpersuasive.

1408b 4. ἔτι [*eti*] (Further): The term signals continuity of principle, for both sections (3.7.9 and 3.7.10) concern how to manage excessive style. While the former section addresses how to preempt incredulous responses to excess, this section focuses on how to avoid (appearances of) excess in the first place, especially excessive design and polish.

1408b 6. σκληρὰ [*sklêpa*] (harsh): This adjective, meaning “hard, harsh, austere, rough” (LSJ 1612), is repeated four times to illustrate the principle of propriety, or “analogous effects [of sound and sense].” In framing the mean, Aristotle suggests what a speaker should not do: on the one hand, a speaker should not deliver harsh words with a harsh voice and harsh countenance (literally “face”), but on the other hand, neither should one deliver “harsh things [too] gently.” Rather, what is normal is often more believable, following the golden mean between extremes, which takes into account the subject-style ratio.

Illustrating enthymematic form and process, Aristotle provides his proposition, reason, example, and explanation for why rhetors ought to avoid artistic perfection, avoiding too much proportional polish.¹³² Otherwise, an audience notices the highly rehearsed design and becomes suspicious of control *over* them since the speech does not imitate or proximate normal social discourse. Forbes I. Hill summarizes this principle: “Style will be appropriate if it conveys the states of feeling (*pathe*), depicts characters (*ethe*), and is proportionate to the subject matter. But if a speaker goes too far, making his discourse appropriate in all these ways, the audience will

¹³² “Enthymematic process” is Cooper’s term for understanding the enthymeme not only as a rhetorical syllogism in form but also a process of deductive reasoning and argumentation (Introduction xxvii). As exemplified by Aristotle, the enthymematic process often proceeds from a conclusion (thesis) to reasons and examples that support the statement (analysis) to a summary statement (synthesis), thus Aristotle’s mode of development: thesis, analysis, synthesis (cf. 3.13).

distrust him: hence if his words are extremely harsh, either his voice or his features should be only moderately harsh” (“Aristotle’s Rhetorical Theory” 117). As the subject-style ratio (proportionate display of *êthos* and *pathos*) guides everyday, spontaneous discourse, so prepared discourse ought to resemble (not radically deviate from) norms of prose style. Throughout this chapter, Aristotle emphasizes that the best rhetorical art is striking but not conspicuous, emphatic but not flamboyant, and always clear.

7.11. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλᾶ καὶ τὰ ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμεκας ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν. καὶ ὅταν ἔχη ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιήσῃ ἐνθουσιάσαι ἢ ἐπαίνοισι ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει, “φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην,” καὶ “οἵτινες ἔτλησαν.” φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλὸν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἤρμοσεν ἐνθεον γὰρ ἢ ποίησις. ἢ δὲ οὕτως δεῖ, ἢ μετ’ εἰρωνείας, ὥσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίησε καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρω.

7.11. Double words and frequent epithets and especially unfamiliar words suit one speaking passionately; for it is excusable that an angry person calls a wrong “heaven-high” or “monstrous.” And [this can be done] when a speaker holds the audience in his control and causes them to be stirred either by praise or blame or hate or love, as Isocrates does at the end of the *Panegyricus*: “[How great the] fame and name . . .” and [earlier] “who endured . . . [to see the city made desolate?]”. Those who are impassioned mouth such utterances, and audiences clearly accept them because they are in a similar mood. That is why [this emotional style] is suited also to poetry; for poetry is inspired. It should either be used as described or in mockery [*eirōneia*], as Gorgias did and as in the *Phaedrus*.

1408b 12. λέγοντι παθητικῶς [*legonti pathêtikôs*] (speaking passionately): Earlier at 3.2.5, Aristotle deferred his discussion of “appropriate excess,” writing, “one should use glosses and double words and coinages rarely and in a limited number of situations. (We shall later explain where . . .),” and here at 3.7.11 he follows up on managing these excesses in prose style. The implied question is, “When is the emotional style of speaking, and its accompanying diction, appropriate, especially since people hear it so often?” The answer is in the subject-style ratio, and Aristotle names three occasions: first, for amplification in epideictic rhetoric, when a speaker wishes to stir an audience in praise or blame (cf. 1.9); second, for amplification when a speaker

him- or herself is impassioned with joy or anger; and third, for amplification in the cause of *eirōneia* (mockery). For an example of the first case, Aristotle commends Isocrates in his *Panegyricus* (§§186 and 96); for the third case, he refers to Gorgias in the earlier example when he mocks the swallow (3.3.4) and Plato's *Phaedrus*, alluding to Socratic irony (cf. 231d and 241e, discussed below).

1408b 19. ἐνθεον γὰρ ἡ ποίησις [*entheon gar hê poiêsis*] (for poetry is inspired): The term “inspired” (*entheos*) has emotional connotations, meaning not only “full of the god” but also “possessed” and “divine frenzy,” similar to the term’s English cognate *enthusiasm* (LSJ 566). In ancient Greek culture, poetry was religious, educational, entertaining, and passionate, performed in the passionate style by rhapsodes, thus creating an extraordinary emotional distinction between poetic and rhetorical styles. For this reason, the emotional style is suitable and expected for poetry but only on occasion for rhetorical discourse.

1408b 20. ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ [*en tō Phaidrō*] (in the *Phaedrus*): This reference is the only mention of Plato's *Phaedrus*, though Aristotle quotes three lines from Plato's *Republic* (*Politeia*) at 3.4.3. The *Phaedrus* reference alludes to Socrates' mockery of passionate *erôs* in preference for friendly *philia*, often called platonic love, or *amor platonicus*. For instance, Socrates states that erotic lovers are insane (231e), similar to being “possessed [*enthousiasô*] of the nymphs” (241e). In mockery (*eirōneia*), Socrates speaks in hexameters to emphasize the relationship between passionate and poetic styles. Aristotle refers to such passages for their example of Socratic irony as well as referring to Gorgias's mockery of the swallow, cited at 3.3.4. The three examples in this concluding section refer to various ways for managing high emotions in rhetoric, related to middle and grand styles, and doing so according to the examples of Isocratean epideictic, Socratic irony, and Gorgianic humor.

CHAPTER 8

LEXIS: RHYTHM

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

8.1-3. Prose rhythm (1408b 21–1408b 32)

DEVELOPMENT

8.4-5. Paeanic rhythm (1408b 32–1409a 11)

8.6. Stressed rhythm (1409a 11–1409a 21)

TRANSITION

8.7. Well rhythmmed (1409a 21–1409a 23)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

8.1. τὸ δὲ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως δεῖ μήτε ἔμμετρον εἶναι μήτε ἄρρυθμον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπίθανον (πεπλάσθαι γὰρ δοκεῖ) καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐξίστησιν· προσέχειν γὰρ ποιεῖ τῶ ὁμοίῳ, πότε πάλιν ἦξει. ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν κηρύκων προλαμβάνουσι τὰ παιδιά τὸ “τίνα αἰρεῖται ἐπίτροπον ὁ ἀπελευθερούμενος; Κλέωνα.”

8.1. The form of the language should be neither metrical nor unrhythmical. The former is unpersuasive (for it seems to have been consciously shaped) and at the same time also diverts attention; for it causes [the listener] to pay attention to when the same foot will come again—as when children anticipate the call of heralds (in the law courts): “Whom does the freedman choose as his sponsor?” [The children call out] “Cleon!”

1408b 21. σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως [*schêma tês lexeôs*] (form of the language): Aristotle begins a discussion of prose rhythm under the heading of form (*schêma*). Schemes are “figures of style,” here meaning rhythmic form or pattern of language, but elsewhere the phrase refers to antithesis (2.24.2, 1401a7), grammatical form (*Soph El 4*, 166b10-19), and types or forms of expression (*Poet 19*, 1456b9). In the Hellenistic era, the phrase came to designate two categories of stylistic figures based on simile and analogy, recognizing in *schêma* some inventional qualities that help rhetors generate ideas. Whereas Gorgias had been the exemplar, the Stoics in

their researches on grammar clarified two categories of *schêmata* (*figurae* in Latin), specifying *schêmata lexeôs* and *schêmata dianoia*, or “figures of style” and “figures of thought” in English, also called (adding confusion) “figures” and “schemes,” respectively (Pernot 61; Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 34). Building on Gorgianic style and Aristotle’s terms, rhetoricians in the Hellenistic era developed *schêma* into two grand categories that have largely shaped traditional categories of style.

1408b 21-22. μήτε ἔμμετρον . . . μήτε ἄρρυθμον [*mête emmetron . . . mête arrythmon*] (neither metrical nor unrhythmic): Choosing the mean between extremes, Aristotle argues against meter and for subtle rhythm as suitable for prose. The thesis of chapter 8 is that prose needs a certain kind of rhythm, identified in 3.8.4 as the paean. Before he discusses this thesis, however, Aristotle surveys the options and refutes two arguments in order to reject the extremes, specifically, the lack of rhythm (3.8.2) and the abundance of meter (3.8.1).

In this first section, Aristotle makes a counterargument against meter since, as mentioned in 3.1.9, Gorgias had introduced meter into prose style, a poetic quality that Aristotle rejects as being detrimental to rhetoric. Meter, he argues, is worse than being simply unpersuasive (*apeithô*) because meter not only reveals stylistic artifice, but worse still, meter diverts the audience’s attention away from meaning to an anticipation of the recurring metrical foot. Aristotle provides a demeaning example of this diversion, where meter in prose turns a legal assembly into a childish spectacle, wherein the audience turns its attention from the sense of a serious discourse to the playful meter: “‘Whom does the freedman choose as his sponsor?’ [The children call out] ‘Cleon!’” This humor consists in the formality, not of the judicial proceeding but of the metrical sound which attracts the assembly’s attention; the children play along by answering the expectation created by poetic meter, “when the same foot will come again.” The

example belittles those who promulgate Gorgianic meter, namely sophists. The point is, meter is “consciously shaped,” being a blatant imitation of poetry, not of civic discourse, so it tends to cause two effects that are detrimental to rhetorical discourse. While Aristotle argues against prose meter, he recommends a certain type of prose-rhythm. By necessity, language has form; it is just a matter of creating pleasing, functional forms that imitate to a certain degree normal social discourse in the subtle cadence of prose-rhythm (*kuntsprosa* in later German).

For Aristotle, the distinction between rhythm and meter is the difference between prose and poetry. Rhythm, on the one hand, is “any regular recurring motion” (LSJ 1576), referring to lengths of time, which is a matter of creating cadence as is commonly done to create parallelism and balance. Meter, on the other hand, requires the times (the ordering of syllables) to be in a certain recurrent order. While poetic meter poses the problem of calling attention to itself, the lack of any rhythm gives the overall perception of disorganization. The solution is in finding a certain kind of “natural” prose-rhythm that is neither obvious nor unpleasant (cf. 3.1.4, 1403b31, for further discussion on the distinction between rhythm and meter).

8.2. τὸ δὲ ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον, δεῖ δὲ πεπεράνθαι μὲν, μὴ μέτρῳ δέ· ἀηδὲς γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἀπειρον. περαίνεται δὲ ἀριθμῶ πάντα· ὁ δὲ τοῦ σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμὸς ἐστίν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμητὰ.

8.2. But what is unrhythmical is unlimited, and there should be a limit, but not by use of meter; for the unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. And all things are limited by number. In the case of the form of language, number is rhythm, of which meters are segments.

1408b 26. ἄρρυθμον ἀπέραντον [*arrythmon aperanton*] (unrhythmical is unlimited):

The idea of non-limit in this phrase (terms negated by alpha privatives) suggests that the unordered, non-restrictive, infinitive, and disunited are “unpleasant [*apeiron*]” and “unknowable [*agnōston*],” as opposed to ordered, restrictive, finite, and unified forms in language. This principle of epistemological-aesthetics derives from Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics, as

Kennedy notes, “a basic Aristotelian principle in metaphysics, physics, and other sciences; cf. *Metaphysics* 3.4.999a27” (212n78; also cf. *Rhet* 3.9.2 and 3.14.6; cf. Cope 3:84-85).

1408b 28. περαίνεταί δὲ ἀριθμῶ πάντα [*perainetai de arithmō panta*] (All things are limited by number): Number (*arithmō*) is the principle in this section serving an insightful argument about “the form of language” and how the appropriate application of number to prose results in a certain type of rhythm. In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle inquires about the principle of limit and number: “If nothing exists apart from individual things, and these are infinite in number, how is it possible to obtain knowledge of the numerically infinite? For we acquire our knowledge of all things only in so far as they contain something universal, some one and identical characteristic” (3.4, 999a25-30).¹³³ “Of the numerically infinite,” a rhetor introduces a due proportion of number or meter (*metrion*) to create order, harmony, measure, and symmetry (cf. Cope 3:85). A rhetor has several options for creating order and limit, including meter, rhythm, definite articles, and finite verbs, but Aristotle advises against using meter and for using rhythm to create a mean. In *Orator*, Cicero summarizes and elucidates Aristotle’s views on harmony and the numerous style:

It is owing entirely to the different arrangement of our feet [meter] that a sentence assumes either the easy air of prose, or the uniformity of verse. Call it, therefore, by what name you please (*Composition, Perfection, or Number*) it is a necessary restraint upon our language; not only (as *Aristotle* and *Theophrastus* have observed) to prevent our sentences (which should be limited neither by the breath

¹³³ *Metaphysics* 3.4: ἔστι δ’ ἐχομένη τε τούτων ἀπορία καὶ πασῶν χαλεπωτάτη καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτη θεωρῆσαι, περὶ ἧς ὁ λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἔστι τι παρὰ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστα ἀπειρα, τῶν δ’ ἀπείρων πῶς ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν ἐπιστήμην; ἢ γὰρ ἐν τι καὶ ταυτόν, καὶ ἢ καθόλου τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτη πάντα γνωρίζομεν (999a 25-30).

of the speaker, nor the pointing of a transcriber, but by the sole restraint of number) from running on without intermission like a babbling current of water; but chiefly, because our language, when properly measured, has a much greater effect than when it is loose and unconfined. (*Orator* 68.227-28)¹³⁴

The principle is rhetorical: measured rhythm has “a much greater effect” for creating clear, limited segments of prose that also have an easy grace in the service of communication. The numerical style resulting in rhythm should be applied appropriately, “up to a point” as suggested in the next section.

8.3. διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μὴ· ποίημα γὰρ ἔσται. ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται, ἔαν μέχρι τοῦ ἤ.

8.3. Thus, speech should have rhythm but not meter; for the latter will be a poem. The rhythm should not be exact. This will be achieved if it is [regular] only up to a point.

1408b 31. ῥυθμὸν δὲ μὴ ἀκριβῶς [*rhythmon de mê akribôs*] (The rhythm should not be exact): While a certain kind of rhythm is desirable, Aristotle advises moderation: rhythm should neither be exact nor consistently regular. An orator, then, should develop an ear for rhythm because pleasantly phrased sounds make language more agreeable, memorable, and emphatic. The object is to be pleasing rather than being a perfectionist when creating rhythm. Such rhythmic moderation in prose was a common practice in Aristotle’s day:

¹³⁴ *Orator ad. M. Brutum* in an extended passage reads: “Nihil enim est aliud, Brute, quod quidem tu minime omnium ignoras, pulchre et oratorie dicere nisi optimis sententiis verbisque lectissimis dicere. Et nec sententia ulla est quae fructum oratori ferat, nisi apte eita atque absolute, nec verborum lumen apparet nisi diligenter conlocatorum, et horum utrumque numerus inlustrat; numerus autem—saepe enim hoc testandum est—non modo non poetice vinctus verum etiam fugiens illum eique omnium dissimillimus; non quin idem sint numeri non modo oratorum et poetarum verum omnino loquentium, denique etiam sonantium omnium quae metiri auribus possumus, sed ordo pedum facit, ut id quod pronuntiatur aut orationis aut poematis simile videatur. [228] Hanc igitur, sive compositionem sive perfectionem sive numerum vocari placet, [et] adhibere necesse est, si ornate velis dicere, non solum, quod ait Aristoteles et Theophrastus, ne infinite feratur ut flumen oratio . . .” (*Orator* 68.227-28).

A sense of rhythm begins to be evident in some Greek prose of the late fifth century, but real feeling for it is first seen in the writings of Plato, Isocrates, and Demosthenes in the fourth. Demosthenes in particular (though ignored by Aristotle) avoids a succession of short syllables. The reader needs to keep in mind that Greek (and Latin in the classical period) rhythm was quantitative, based not on stress but on long and short syllables. With a few exceptions, a syllable was regarded as “long” if it contained a long vowel (e.g., eta or omega), a diphthong, or a short vowel followed by two or more consonants. (Kennedy 212)

Since rhythm in due proportion is pleasant and common in prose, the next object is to describe what kind of rhythm works best for prose compositions, an object that Aristotle pursues in the next section by describing four kinds of rhythm and suggesting one as the most stylistic.

8.4. τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἠρωῶς σεμνῆς καὶ <οὐ> λεκτικὸς καὶ ἀρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ' ἰαμβος αὐτῆ ἔστιν ἢ λέξις ἢ τῶν πολλῶν· διὸ μάλιστα πάντες τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες· δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστήσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος· δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ [1409a] τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ τροχερὸς ῥυθμὸς τὰ τετράμετρα. Λεῖπεται δὲ παιάν, ᾧ ἐχρῶντο μὲν ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξάμενοι, οὐκ εἶχον δὲ λέγειν τίς ἦν. ἔστι δὲ τρίτος ὁ παιάν, καὶ ἐχόμενος τῶν εἰρημένων· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύο ἔστιν, ἐκείνων δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐν πρὸς ἓν, ὁ δὲ δύο πρὸς ἓν. ἔχεται δὲ τῶν λόγων τούτων ὁ ἡμιόλιος· οὗτος δ' ἔστιν ὁ παιάν.

8.4. Of rhythms, the heroic [dactylic hexameter] is dignified and not conversational and needs musical intonation; the iambic by itself is the language of the many; thus, all people most often speak in iambs. But [oratory] should be dignified and moving. The trochaic meter is rather too much of a comic dance, as is clear from trochaic tetrameters; [1409a] for they are a tripping rhythm. What remains is the paean; it came into use beginning with Thrasymachus, though at the time people did not recognize what it was. The paean is a third kind of rhythm, related to those under discussion; for it has the ratio of three to two [three short syllables and one long, the latter equal in time to two beats], whereas the others are one to one [the heroic, with one long syllable and two shorts] or two to one [iambic and trochaic, a long and a short or a short and a long, respectively]. And one-and-a-half [the proportion of three to two] is the mean ratio and this is what a paean is.

1408b 32. Τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν [*tôn de rhythmôn*] (Of [the] rhythms): Four rhythms receive attention, and Aristotle associates each with extant genres and certain audiences. The dactylic is

too heroic, suited for tragic and epic poetry that needs to be chanted; the iambic is too common, suited for *hoi polloi*; the trochaic is too lighthearted, suited for comedy and dance. These three rhythms are also metrical and too closely associated with poetry. Forbes I. Hill summarizes the argument as follows:

The language of discourse must be rhythmical but not metrical. Dactylic, spondaic, and trochaic rhythms are too clearly metrical: iambic, the rhythm of conversation, too undistinguished. The foot that one needs is one with an uneven ratio: this is the paeon, consisting of either one long foot and three short ones (/ U U U) or three short feet and one long one (U U U /); the latter is particularly useful for making a cadence at the end of a period. (“Aristotle’s Rhetorical Theory” 118)

“What remains,” writes Aristotle, “is the paeon [*paian*],” first applied to prose by the sophist and rhetorician Thrasymachus of Chalcidon (*OCD* 1260, s.v. “Prose-rhythm, Greek”). To select what is, in effect, the leftover rhythm may seem like an inadequate method for developing an appropriate prose-rhythm, but the paeon is chosen because it accords perfectly with two principles of Aristotelian rhetoric, the golden mean and the exotic style (cf. 3.2.2, 1404b9).

1409a 3. τρίτος ὁ παῖον [*tritos ho paian*] (The paeon is a third kind of rhythm):

Between the overly dignified and the lighthearted, between the metrical and the common is the paeon, which suits Aristotle’s principles previously expressed: “Excellence of style [*lexeôs aretê*] is being clear without being common [*tapeinê*]” (*Poet* 22, 1458a17). The paeon is third not only according to its style (effect) but also according to its ratio of three-to-two feet (cause), which has the benefit of being highly flexible, reversible, and useful for creating cadence and stress either at the start or at the end of statements (discussed in the following sections). With these

formal and functional benefits, it is no wonder that the paeon becomes a stylistic pattern for creating an appropriate prose-rhythm.

8.5. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα ἀφετέοι, καὶ διότι μετρικοί· ὁ δὲ παιὰν ληπτέος· ἀπὸ μόνου γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι μέτρον τῶν ῥηθέντων ῥυθμῶν, ὥστε μάλιστα λανθάνειν. νῦν μὲν οὖν χρώνται τῷ ἐνὶ παιᾶνι καὶ ἀρχόμενοι <καὶ τελευτῶς τες>, δεῖ δὲ διαφέρειν τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς.

8.5. The other rhythms should be avoided for the reasons given and because they are [poetic] meters; and the paeon should be adopted; for it alone of the rhythms mentioned is not a meter, and thus its presence most escapes notice. As it is, only one paeon is in use, both for beginning and ending, but it is necessary to distinguish the opening from the closing.

1409a 9. μάλιστα λανθάνειν [*malista lanthanein*] (most escapes notice): The paeon commends itself and “should be adopted” for two reasons. First, it is not a conspicuous poetic meter; and second, it is rhythmical but inconspicuous (“its presence especially escapes notice,” or “is greatly hidden”) since rhetorical art is a hidden art that is best when it conforms to norms of social discourse. Kennedy, however, contests Aristotle’s assertion that the paeon was not used in poetry and was novel in prose:

Despite what he says, the paeon was sometimes used in lyric poetry; the examples of paeans he cites are all from poetry, probably from poems by Simonides of Ceos. Conversely, the paeon is very rare in prose. Most serious is his failure to consider the cretic (long-short-long), which has the same proportions as the paeon and is the commonest prose rhythm in Greek and Latin literary prose and oratory. Indeed, a paeon can be regarded as a cretic with one of the long syllables resolved into two shorts. Finally, a short syllable at the end of a verse was regarded as lengthened by its position, and later rhetoricians extended this rule to prose rhythm; cf. Cicero, *Orator* 217 and Quintilian’s comment in 9.4.93. (213-14)

Nevertheless, being similar to the cretic or one of its species, the paeon has the moderate, rhythmical, non-metrical qualities that commend it to prose compositionists, and it is a flexible form that may be altered to provide stress and emphasis at the opening and closing of statements.

8.6. ἔστι δὲ παιᾶνος δύο εἶδη ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐν ἀρχῇ ἀρμόττει, ὥσπερ καὶ χρωῶνται· οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν οὗ ἄρχει μὲν ἡ μακρά, τελευτῶσι δὲ τρεῖς βραχεῖαι, “Δαλογενῆς εἶτε Λυκίαν” καὶ “Χρυσεοκόμα Ἑκατε παῖ Διός.” ἕτερος δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας, οὗ βραχεῖαι ἄρχουσι τρεῖς, ἡ δὲ μακρὰ τελευτᾷ· “μετὰ δὲ γὰν ὕδατά τ' ὠκεανὸν ἠφάνισε νύξ.” οὗτος δὲ τελευτὴν ποιεῖ· ἡ γὰρ βραχεῖα διὰ τὸ ἀτελὴς εἶναι ποιεῖ κολοβόν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῇ μακρᾷ ἀποκόπτεσθαι καὶ δήλην εἶναι τὴν τελευτὴν, μὴ διὰ τὸν γραφέα, μηδὲ διὰ τὴν παραγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ῥυθμόν.

8.6. There are two species of paeon opposite to each other, of which one [called a first paeon] is suitable for an opening, as it is now used. This is the one that begins with a long syllable and ends with three shorts: *Dâlōgēnēs / eite Lukian* and *khrysēōkōma Hekate / pai Dios*; the other [called a fourth paeon] is the opposite, where three shorts begin and a long ends: *mētā dē gān / hūdātā ōkēōnōn ēphānīsē nūx*. This makes an ending, for a short syllable [at the end] makes the expression seem cut short. It should instead be cut off with a long syllable and be a clear termination, not through the action of a scribe or the presence of a marginal mark but through the rhythm.

1409a 11. παιᾶνος δύο εἶδη [*paianos duo eidē*] (two species of paeon): The paeon commends itself because its two kinds help rhetors provide rhythmic emphasis where stress normally and naturally occurs, at the opening and closing of statements, as the examples in this section illustrate. The *first paeon*, having a two-to-three rhythm, consists of a long syllable followed by three short syllables; the *fourth paeon*, having a two-to-two pattern, has three short syllables followed by a long syllable. Where the long syllable occurs, the rhythm and sound provide stress (what Aristotle calls “a clear termination”), which speakers can manage for placing emphasis. The point is that rhetors can create a pleasing rhythm and manage it for sound and stress, placing stress at the opening and closing of clauses or phrases. Since stress quite naturally occurs in these positions, the paeon not only allows for normal speech rhythm but also highlights the emphatic locations of statements. Since beginnings and endings are the positions

of stress, rhetors should recognize and use them to their advantage for the sake of emphasis, for rhetoric is an art of emphasis.

1409a 19. παραγραφήν [*paragraphên*] (marginal mark): *Paragraphê* means “mark alongside” or “by-writing,” indicating the mark (such as ¶) that a scribe would insert in the margin of a text to signal an end or transition in order to structure meaning for readers. Kennedy comments: “Though written punctuation was undeveloped in Aristotle’s time, a mark was often made in the margin to indicate the change of a speaker in a play or dialogue” (213n81). The *paragraphê* was the first mark of punctuation, indicating that paragraphing was “the most fundamental way of composing written discourse in Greece” (Enos, “Emergence” 224). Aristotle contends that such marginal marks are unnecessary if the rhythmical stress, when read aloud, signals “a clear termination” so that transitions are an organic part of the sounds of the speech. According to Enos, a paragraph signals a coherent rhetorical unit or pericope: “By ‘paragraphs’ we mean large, macroscopic units whose division and arrangement reveal patterns of composing discourse and, indirectly, structuring thought for the purposes of communication. The paragraph, both for oral and written rhetoric, reveals not only some of the earliest efforts to structure meaning for others but also an epistemic shift from oral to written composition processes” (“Emergence” 224).¹³⁵ For Aristotle, a rhetorical unit often consists of a developed enthymeme or a comparison of antithetical arguments, usually developed according to thesis, analysis, and synthesis, as his discussions and sections in the *Rhetoric* illustrate.

8.7. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὐρύθμον δεῖ εἶναι τὴν λέξιν καὶ μὴ ἄρρυθμον, καὶ τίνες εὐρύθμον ποιῶσι ῥυθμοὶ καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, εἴρηται.

¹³⁵ Cf. Kennedy’s discussion of *rhetorical unit*, which must have beginning, middle, and end, and which corresponds to the *pericope* in form criticism (*New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism* 33; Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1984).

8.7. That *lexis* should, therefore, be rhythmical and not unrhythmical and what rhythms make it well rhythmical and what they are like has been said.

1409a 21. εὐρυθμον [*eurythmon*] (rhythmical): In a short concluding section, Aristotle introduces the word *eurythmon* with his characteristic *eu*-prefix, meaning qualitative “well rhythmical” according to principles of propriety and the mean. Greek *eurythmon* is the source for English *eurhythmy* and *eurhythmic*, meaning harmony of movement or words with rhythm. In artistic endeavors, the adjectival *eu*- denotes “right,” “well done,” and “perfection, [or] the ideal” (LSJ 704). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle uses the *eu*-prefix to modify standard terms and practices, such as *eukairos* in 3.7.8 and *eudaimonia* in 1.5.3 (cf. 3.5.3, 1407a30, for discussion of the *eu*-prefix). What Aristotle emphasizes throughout chapter 8, he condenses in the *eu*-prefix: specifically, the notion “art for art’s sake” (*ars gratia artis*) is a misnomer because style is always rhetorical, wherein aesthetic choices like rhythm are effective only when considered in light of purpose and audience, or the same, according to cultural expectations.

CHAPTER 9

LEXIS: SYNTAX

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 9.1. Periodic and cumulative syntax (1409a 24–1409a 27)

DEVELOPMENT

- 9.2. Cumulative (running) syntax (1409a 27–1409a 34)
- 9.3-4. Periodic (structured) syntax (1409a 34–1409b 13)
- 9.5-6. Periods of one *côlon* and several *côla* (1409b 13–1409b 32)
- 9.7-8. Periods of comparison and contrast (1409b 32–1410a 22)
- 9.9-10. Periods of antithesis and parallelism (1410a 22–1410b 5)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

9.1. τὴν δὲ λέξιν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ εἰρομένην καὶ τῶ συνδέσμῳ μίαν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν τοῖς διθυράμβοις ἀναβολαί, ἢ κατεστραμμένην καὶ ὁμοίαν ταῖς τῶν ἀρχαίων ποιητῶν ἀντιστροφῶν.

9.1. The *lexis* [of formal speech and artistic prose] is necessarily either *strung-on* [*eiromenê*] and given unity by connection, like the preludes in dithyrambs, or *turned-down* [*katestrammenê*] and like the antistrophes of the ancient poets.

1409a 24. λέξιν [*lexin*] (*lexis*): Referencing *lexis* as syntax in chapter 9, Aristotle equates *lexis* with *taxis* at the levels of thought, clause, and paragraph, discussing how rhetors join together clauses and other units of meaning. In this sense, chapter 9 illustrates the interactive union of *lexis-dianoia*, style and thought. What classical (sophistic) rhetors practiced as a formal art of periods, Aristotle reconceptualizes to show that stylistic art is epistemic and argumentative, inseparable from methods of invention. As is his practice, Aristotle begins with a survey of syntax, then focuses on grammatical forms that effect the greatest rhetorical function, and finally

concludes with a discussion of his preferred style of syntax, specifically periods of comparison and contrast, antithesis and parallelism, because these forms create the most learning.¹³⁶

Often attributed to Aristotle, the theory of organic unity regards structural relations within a composition, while the metaphor emphasizes how syntax and arrangement combine thought, genre, and method in a way that is interactive, inseparable, and inevitable (Butler 3, 25; Kinneavy, *Theory of Discourse* 345, 358). In general, Grimaldi asserts, “Aristotle’s view of discourse is organic, not separatist,” pertaining to the interactivity of all elements of rhetoric, including the *lexis-dianoia* fusion (*Studies* 156). In nature, form (*eidos* or *morphê*) and matter (*hylê*) are never separable; moreover, form comprises essential nature, “the essence of each thing and its primary substance” (*Met* 1032b2). Viewing language as partly natural, Aristotle finds that form and thought are inseparable, for form is of the essence of thought. From this perspective, separatist theories of style, based in formulaic or mechanistic metaphors of discrete elements, make the mistake of reducing form to matter, sometimes called a fallacy of reductionism (Abrams 156 ff.; Kreef 112).¹³⁷ Against rationalist dualisms and sophistic formulas, Aristotle advances a thoroughly rhetorical theory of thought and style, even showing how forms of language are basic to human thought and in some sense structure and generate thought. The metaphor of organicism implies three ideas: *economy*, all parts of a composition are necessary to the completed whole; *simplicity*, all parts are necessary to complement each other; and *function*,

¹³⁶ Similar to Aristotle, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss syntax as being epistemic: “modalities of thought underlying variable grammatical forms” (*New Rhetoric* 154).

¹³⁷ Richard Ohmann represents the dualistic theory of style, arguing that style (or form) is separable from content (or meaning). Ohmann asks a central question: “If style does not have to do with *ways* of saying *something* . . . is there anything at all which is worth naming ‘style?’” (Ohmann [1959] “Prolegomena” 2; cf. Butler 2). Butler discusses the history of the content/form or substance/style dichotomy from sophists and Plato to Ohmann in contrast to Aristotle’s organic theory of style (*Out of Style* 2-7 and 25 ff.). Kreeft comments that dualism results in reductionism, “the most pervasive metaphysical fallacy of modern thought” (112).

all parts are pervaded by a single purpose and energy in order to address the rhetorical situation (Abrams 171 ff.). By applying Aristotle's theory of style, a rhetor would create a unified composition wherein thought, sentences, and arrangement work together in view of the situation and with a focused purpose.

Aristotle's two general categories of syntax, via linear metaphors, *eiromenê* (*strung-on*) and *katestrammenê* (*turned-down*), refer approximately to two sets of traditional terms: parataxis and hypotaxis, and cumulative and periodic sentences, respectively. First, parataxis refers to the coordination or juxtaposition of main clauses, strung-together like beads on a string, implying that coordinated clauses are of equal importance. Parataxis has two subcategories: (a) asyndetic parataxis, or *asyndeton*, meaning "without connectives" (e.g., "I came, I saw, I conquered."); and (b) syndetic parataxis, or *polysyndeton*, meaning "many connectives" (e.g., "I came and I saw and I conquered."). Based in paratactic syntax is the cumulative-sentence style: *lexis eiromenê*, or strung-on style.

Second, hypotaxis refers to the subordination of certain clauses and phrases, signaling that subordinated elements are of less importance than the main clause, but also that the ideas are tightly structured with some answering relationship to one another moving toward a definite end. Subordination is accomplished by subordinating conjunctions, relative pronouns, participle phrases, and various modifying phrasing, all of which create expectation and emphasis of the main clause (e.g., "When I came, I saw; when I saw, I conquered" or "Arriving and seeing, I conquered"). Based in hypotactic syntax is the periodic-sentence style: *lexis katestrammenê* (*turned-down style*) refers to specific kinds of periodic sentences having structured, cohesive relationships among units of meaning. From structured styles are composed complex periodic sentences characteristic of Gorgias, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Cicero; thus, the classical

periodic style is characterized by long, highly subordinated sentences and by such devices as parallelism, couplets, balanced clauses, symmetrical phrases, and use of absolute participles—a style popular in each *renaissance* of classical rhetoric. However, Aristotle prefers structured styles not for their show of length or complexity but for their communicative teaching functions.

1409a 24. εἰρομένην [*eiromenên*] (strung-on): As a style of syntax, the metaphor *eiromenê* means “running,” as with coordinating conjunctions and connectives, or “strung together” as multiple pearls on a necklace. This syntactical style refers to *cumulative* (also *running* or *loose*) sentence structure, based in paratactic syntax (e.g., “In the beginning was the Word, *and* the Word was with God, *and* the Word was God” [John 1:1, emphasis added]). For Aristotle, the term *eiromenê* probably implies short phrases and clauses, such as in polysyndeton in the example, from which longer periods are composed (cf. Kennedy 214n82). Aristotle contrasts *lexis eiromenê*, based in parataxis, with hypotaxis in the periodic-sentence style, described in the next section.

1409a 26. κατεστραμμένην [*katestrammenên*] (turned-down): Aristotle’s preferred style of syntax, *lexis katestrammenê* means “turned-under” or “circular” style and is analogous to the choral term “antistrophe,” meaning “turning-back,” as a second strophe answers a first strophe (cf. “Rhetoric is an *antistrophos* to dialectic” at 1.1.1). By implication, the turned or circular style of syntax refers to a complete, cohesive, and compact expression as opposed to a *loose* rendering. This cohesive or circular style comes in the period (*periodos*), described further at 3.9.3. In contrast to the loose, running style, Aristotle prefers the cohesive periodic style because it shows completeness of thought and rhythm, including structures that have comparison and contrast, antithesis and parallelism. Thus, an apt paraphrase of *lexis katestrammenê* is “structured style” of sentence (Hill 118). The example of “antistrophes” from poetry and music (in 3.9.1 and

3.9.6) specifically refers to antithesis, symmetry, and comparison and contrast of ideas. Since Aristotle likes to model what he describes, one may notice that his descriptive sentence is an illustration; in 3.9.1 is a compact, circular sentence showing either-or antithesis in balanced clauses, which are topics of style elaborated throughout 3.9.7-10.

Based in Aristotle's two general categories of stylistic syntax, much could be added: concerning parataxis and hypotaxis, the former represents the residue of orality, the latter the development of literary (Ong, *Orality and Literacy* 28); the former "fragmentation of rhetoric," the latter "integration of rhetoric" (Vickers 254); the one an ancient, native style of speech, the latter considered both analytical, reasoned prose and fashionably elegant literature because it shows coherence and classical style. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca elaborate on the rhetoric of the two types of syntax:

The hypotactic construction is the argumentative construction par excellence. Auerbach considers it to be characteristic of Greco-Roman literature in contradistinction to the paratactic construction favored in Hebrew culture [*Mimesis* 92 ff.]. Hypotaxis creates frameworks, constitutes the adoption of a position. It controls the reader, forces him to see particular relationships, restricts the interpretations he may consider, and takes its inspiration from well-constructed legal reasoning. Parataxis leaves greater freedom, and does not appear to wish to impose a particular viewpoint. (*New Rhetoric* 158)

For its rhetorical function of creating shared perspectives, Aristotle prefers the "circular," hypotactic style created with subordinated, balanced, contrastive syntax since it better provides clarity of ideas, pleasant learning, literary style, and coherence and completion. All of these ideas are mentioned and integrated in the following sections.

9.2. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστὶ [[Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἢ δ' ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις]]: ταύτη γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἅπαντες, νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρωῶνται. λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην, ἡ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὐτήν, ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῆ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδῆς διὰ τὸ ἀπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν. διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτήρσιν ἐκπνεύουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρασ οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον.

9.2. The strung-on style is the ancient one [[“Of Herodotus of Thuri is this historical investigation”]]; for in the past all used it, but now not many do. I call that strung-on which has no end in itself unless the thing being said has been completed. It is unpleasant because it is unlimited; for all wish to foresee the end. Thus, as they complete the course [runners] pant and are exhausted; for they do not tire before the goal is in sight.

1409a 27. ἡ ἀρχαία [*hê archaia*] (the ancient one): Of the two styles of syntax, the “strung-on” style based in parataxis is the ancient style, representing the residue of an oral tradition as distinct from the developing literate style based in hypotaxis, as Walter J. Ong has observed in *Orality and Literacy* (28). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that parataxis can “by its very lack of precision, assume a mysterious, magical character: in this way moreover it can sometimes produce a highly dramatic effect” (*New Rhetoric* 157; cf. Auerbach, *Mimesis* 92). Moreover, the common practice of enumeration, in many of its occurrences, exemplifies the practice and effect of parataxis (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric* 157).

Aristotle represents a transition from the older oral style to the newer literate style, building “the first large library” at his Lyceum, also known as a prolific reader and writer, and nicknamed “The Reader,” a countercultural term of jest “designat[ing] the servant who read aloud to a group” (Edel 17, 20; cf. *Rhet* 3.5.6 and 3.12.2). What Eric A. Havelock asserts in *Preface to Plato* equally applies to Aristotle: He was a literate mind in an oral culture (41). The clear difference, however, is that Plato writes orality but Aristotle writes compositions; Plato’s Socratic dialogues imitate oral conversations (i.e., phonetic writing), but Aristotle writes compositions in the literate mode about the rhetorical art of composition. For these reasons, one may notice that Aristotle shows a preference for “pleasant” hypotactic styles, such as *lexis*

graphikê, the written style suited for literary compositions, as distinct from “unpleasant” paratactic styles, such as *lexis hypokritikê* suited for oral delivery and acting, and *lexis agônistikê* suited for oral debate, though Aristotle recognizes a relative scale between the styles (cf. 3.12).

1409a 27-28. Ἡροδότου Θουρίου [*Hrodotou Thouriou*] (Of Herodotus of Thurii): Kassel double-brackets this quotation as a late addition by Aristotle to his manuscript, but it should neither be considered late, nor “a misquotation of the opening of Herodotus’ *Histories*” according to Kennedy, who subordinates the quotation to a footnote (214n83). The question scholars ask is, why does Aristotle call Herodotus of Halicarnassus by the title Herodotus of Thurii? The easy answer is that Aristotle is simply mistaken, but this impugns Aristotle’s reputation for accuracy about the history of his culture. The convenient answer is to question the manuscript, the route taken by Kassel and Kennedy. However, one may interpret the quotation as an accurate rendering, wherein Aristotle correctly substituted “Thurii” for “Halicarnassus” because Herodotus called himself “Herodotus of Thurii” rather than by his birthplace (Halicarnassus, present-day Bodrum) since he was an honored citizen, and probably a founding citizen, of the Panhellenic city of Thurii in southern Italy, a colony of *magna Graeca* founded by Athens in the year 444. According to historians, Herodotus was closely associated with Thurii in his later life: “The *Suda*, mentions Herodotus’ tomb on the market of Thurii (*Suda* H536); this was a high honor, only attributed to the (often legendary) founders of new cities” (Lendering; cf. Cope 3:92-93). Thus, Aristotle honors Herodotus, accurately represents the “Father of History,” and most importantly includes the opening sentence from his *Histories* as an illustration of the “strung-on” style since Herodotus regularly wrote in paratactic syntax.

9.3. ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη τῆς λέξεώς ἐστιν ἥδε, κατεστραμμένη δὲ ἡ ἐν περιόδοις· λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος [1409b] εὐσύνοπτον. ἥδεια δ’ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής, ἥδεια μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν τῷ ἀπεράντῳ, καὶ ὅτι αἰεὶ τί οἴεται ἔχειν ὁ ἀκροατῆς τῷ ἀεὶ πεπεράνθαι τι αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ

μηδὲν προνοεῖν εἶναι μηδὲ ἀνύειν ἀηδὲς. εὐμαθῆς δὲ, ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος. τοῦτο δὲ, ὅτι ἀριθμὸν ἔχει ἢ ἐν περιόδοις λέξις, ὃ πάντων εὐμνημονευτότατον. διὸ καὶ τὰ μέτρα πάντες μνημονεύουσι μᾶλλον τῶν χύδην· ἀριθμὸν γὰρ ἔχει ᾧ μετρεῖται.

9.3. This, then, is the strung-on style of composition [*lexis*], but the turned-down style is that in periods. I call a *period* an expression [*lexis*] having a beginning and an end in itself and a magnitude easily taken in at a glance. [1409b] Such a style is pleasant and easily understood, pleasant because opposed to the unlimited and because the hearer always thinks he has hold of something, in that it is always limited by itself, whereas to have nothing to foresee or attain is unpleasant. And it is easily understood because easily retained in the mind. This is because utterance in periods has number, which is the most easily retained thing. Thus, all people remember verse better than prose; for it has number by which it is measured.

1409a 35. [*periodos*] (period): Derived from *peri* (around) and *hodos* (road), the term *periodos* is one of Aristotle's visual metaphors, suggesting a circular motion or completeness of thought and rhythm ("a beginning and an end in itself") (Kennedy 214; cf. discussion of *hodos* metaphor at 3.1.2). *Lexis katestrammenê*, the structured style, is a feature of periods. A period is a syntactical unit that comes in two varieties: divided into multiple *côla* or a simple one *côlon*, wherein a colon is equivalent to a phrase or a clause (cf. Hill 118). Periodic structured sentences have comparison and contrast, parallelism and antithesis. While Aristotle is commonly credited with originating the technical use of *periodos* as a grammatical-stylistic term, "the Byzantine encyclopedia *Suda* attributes it to Thrasymachus" (Kennedy 214). A period is commonly thought of as a clause or statement, and sometimes a line of verse or a complete phrase, identified as a rhythmical unit that has limit and magnitude (cf. discussion of rhythm at 3.8.6). As a developing grammatical-stylistic notion in the fourth century, the period has some definite and some associative features, explained well by Kennedy:

The most conspicuous features of a period as Aristotle understands it, and of its subdivision called a *kôlon*, seem to be some syntactical completion (at least a complete phrase), unitary thought, and length that is a mean between "too short" and "too long" in order for the hearer to grasp the thought easily. Aristotle does

not use the word *periodos* to mean one of the long, complex [highly subordinated] sentences of Isocrates (favored later by Cicero and many early modern English writers). He quotes *parts* of Isocrates' complex sentences as examples of periods, but does not analyze the sentences as a whole. Apparently he viewed a long Isocratean sentence as made up of several periods. (214)

As Aristotle uses the term, period refers to syntactical completion, or structured coherence. Structured periods are the preferred style of syntax because they foster easy and, thus, pleasurable learning, which are two related themes in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric.

1409b 1. ἡδῆϊα [*hêdeia*] (pleasant): First, structured periods are pleasant because they help organize and satisfy audience expectations of coherence and of learning (“the hearer always thinks he has hold of something”) and, as pointed out in the next chapter, “To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people” (3.10.2). Thus, well-structured sentences are an important part of rhetorical, audience-centered communication because such sentences aid learning, and learning is pleasant, and learning easily is most pleasant (cf. English adjective “hedonic”).

1409b 4. εὐμαθῆς [*eumathês*] (easily understood): Second, structured periods promote easy learning. The emphasis here is on the *eu*-prefix, learning *well* or *easily*, and the pleasure an audience receives from learning *easily*. Kennedy notes, “As in the case of enthymemes (2.22.3), demands on a popular audience should not be great” (218n97). Well-structured sentences help create easy learning, especially for a general audience, by composing similar ideas in similar forms in close proximity through use of parallelism and antithesis because these forms highlight comparison and contrast. Illustrating this principle in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle often draws comparisons and contrasts between rhetoric and dialectic and between prose and poetry, using a prose structures that are as much a matter of teaching style as of definition. In this sense, *lexis*

and *topoi* are bound together and interactive because *lexis* and *topoi* share formal properties in similar enthymematic forms. Examples include the “structured style” (*lexis katestrammenê*) of the twenty-eight common topics in Book 2, chapter 23. For instance, the first topic of invention is “from opposites” (antithesis), the second topic “from [different] grammatical form of the same word” (comparison and contrast in style), and the third topic “from correlatives” (parallelism in style) (2.23.1-3). The correlations could continue for each of the twenty-eight common topics, showing that topics of rhetorical invention in Books 1-2 cannot be separated from topics of rhetorical style in Book 3. According to Grimaldi, Aristotle’s *koinoi topoi* come in three logical patterns: cause-effect, more-less, and some form of relation (*Studies* 134). These formal patterns of invention always come in syntactical patterns useful in communication. Sharing formal patterns means that invention and style coexist not simply in a cause-effect relationship, but mutually support the creation of each other. Since much confusion exists about the relationship of style to thinking and the composing process, some rhetoricians have suggested that “we might as well abandon the word [style] since it carries with it so many binary hostages (style *and* _____)” (Fish 65). Hostages include “style *and* substance” or “style *and* invention,” the kind of binaries that are separated (and then hierarchically arranged) for analysis or for distinction. In Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, however, style and invention are integrated; though separated for analysis and discussion, Aristotle recognizes that style and substance, like form and matter in nature, are always united and interactive in rhetorical invention and practice.

Correlating the style and invention as *lexis-dianoia* has three important results. First, the correlation shows the interactivity among the arts of rhetoric (invention, style, and arrangement), suggesting that Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* is not a separate treatise later “tacked on,” but an integral part of Aristotle’s unified rhetorical theory. Even if Book 3 could stand by itself, and even if it

did at one point, yet as Grimaldi asserts, the third book “makes sense only in terms of what has preceded it” (*Studies* 57-58).¹³⁸ Second, the *lexis-dianoia* correlation shows how common topics, as formal modes of inference, are not pre-linguistic or pre-style but involve structures of language integrating grammatical-stylistic forms in the process of creating meaning and clarity for author and audience. Third, the *lexis-dianoia* correlation shows that rhetoric is a general, integrated theory of the forms and functions of language. Invention and style are two sides of the same coin: one focusing on how an author learns and the other on how an audience learns. The rhetorical mint creates both, which are two foci or modes of the same composing process. Martha Kolln addresses the issue: “Understanding rhetorical grammar, then, means understanding the grammatical choices available to you when you write and the rhetorical effects those choices will have on your reader” (3). In his *Studies* (15 ff.), Grimaldi has introduced propositions about the integration and interactivity of style and invention, also outlined in the preface to this commentary.

The theme of interactivity in Aristotelian rhetoric derives from the principle that the three rhetorical appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, *logos*) are equal since they are thoroughly interconnected in human thought. The response of pleasure from quick, visual learning, for instance, cannot be completely abstracted from other ways of learning within the core unity of appeals. In audience-centered communication, it is not enough—and simply impossible—to appeal to “pure” reason without also affecting an audience’s emotions and its adjudication of ethical-character. Style cannot be limited to *logos*, neither to *êthos*, nor merely to *pathos*. As Aristotle theorizes,

¹³⁸ Diogenes Laërtius lists Aristotle’s writings (over two-hundred works) wherein an *Art of Rhetoric* in two books (*Technês rhêtorikês a’ b’*) precedes a separate treatise titled *Technê a’* that is assumed to be *On Style* (*Lives* 5.24). Thus, a common view is that Andronicus in Rome, the first-century editor of Aristotle’s works, compiled the three books into the *Art of Rhetoric* as it has existed in subsequent history (Kennedy, “Reworking Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” 181).

rhetorical style is a matter of recognizing and managing the interaction of the three rhetorical appeals. Only by recognizing a holistic anthropology will rhetors create a delightful style of instruction that appeals to the whole person, including intellect, emotions, feelings, and value-laden identity (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 151-56). This theme of interactivity has many results and subthemes, including the focus on creating “pleasurable learning” and “easy learning,” forming the basis for the discussion of metaphor and visualization in chapters 10 and 11.

9.4. δει δὲ τὴν περίοδον καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι, καὶ μὴ διακόπτεσθαι ὥσπερ τὰ [Σοφοκλέους] ἰαμβεῖα,
 Καλυδῶν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπίας χθονός.
 τούναντίον γὰρ ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν τῷ διαιρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου τὴν Καλυδῶνα εἶναι τῆς Πελοποννήσου.

9.4. But a period should also be complete in thought and not cut off, as it is in iambic lines:
 Calydon [is] this land, of Pelops' soil . . .
 Because of the line division it is possible to misunderstand the meaning, as though in this quotation Calydon were in the Peloponnesus.

1409b 8. διανοίᾳ τετελειῶσθαι [*dianoia teteleiôsthai*] (complete in thought): A feature of the well-structured period is its completeness since periods can express complete, full, successful thoughts. Aristotle contrasts this feature of prose with poetry, which with its verses, or iambic line divisions, may interrupt or “cut off [*diakoptesthai*]” the thought. When this occurs, misunderstanding results since communication has failed its intended purpose. The value of expressing a complete thought in a period is not tangential to style but is seen as a central matter of clarity, the prerequisite and culmination of style; for “if [language] does not make clear it will not perform its function” (3.2.1). Expressing a complete thought is an application of the primary virtue of style at the sentence level.

1409b 9. [Σοφοκλέους] [*Sophokleous*] (Sophocles): Kassel places the poet's name in brackets, and Kennedy relegates it to a footnote, because it is a misattribution of the poetic line to Sophocles since the quotation is the first line of *Meleager* by Euripides, known only from

fragments (cf. Euripides, *Fragments* in the Loeb Classical Library). In quoting this line of verse, Aristotle illustrates that a complete period can be, and often is, an incomplete thought, a practice that may be acceptable in poetry but not recommended in prose. Kennedy comments: “Aristotle here equates a period with a line of verse; the line is metrically complete but incomplete in thought. The next line, however, continued without grammatical break, making the geography clear: ‘Alas, across the straits facing pleasant plains, woe, woe!’ Cf. Demetrius, *On Style* 58,” wherein he quotes the same two lines of verse, criticizing it for “indiscriminate” thought (215n85). In this created contrast between poetry and prose, Aristotle emphasizes the idea that prose style should express complete thoughts, as determined by audience and grammatical conventions. In rhetorical situations the audience consists of judges, while in poetry the audience assumes the role of spectators, as discussed in Book 1: “Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either a spectator [*theoros*] or a judge [*kritês*]” (1.3.2). When an audience consists of judges or critics, adjudicating a speech concerning past facts, future policies, or present virtues and vices, then the rhetor is more concerned with how style helps in communicating ideas well, namely, in a clear, coherent, and cohesive style that helps gain the appropriate response, such as understanding plus pleasure.¹³⁹

9.5. περίοδος δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν κώλοις, ἢ δ' ἀφελῆς. ἔστι δ' ἐν κώλοις μὲν λέξις ἢ τετελειωμένη τε καὶ διηρημένη καὶ εὐανάπνευστος, μὴ ἐν τῇ διαίρεσει [ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περίοδος], ἀλλ' ὅλη. κῶλον δ' ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον μῶριον ταύτης. ἀφελῆ δὲ λέγω τὴν μονόκωλον.

9.5. A period is either divided into cola or simple. *Lexis* in cola is completed and divided and easily uttered by the breath, not in its division but in the whole. A colon is one of the two parts of a period. I call a period simple when it has only one colon.

¹³⁹ In reader-response theory, appropriate response is the focus and function of style: “a stylistic fact is a fact of response,” indicating that style is inherently rhetorical (Fish 65).

1409b 13. περίοδος [*periodos*] (period): Defining formal features, Aristotle observes that a period comes in two species: divided (*men*) or simple (*aphelê*), wherein a divided period consists of two or more *côla* and a simple period of one *côlon*. The term *côlon* means a “limb” of the body, and by metaphor is the standard word for “clause of a περίοδος” (LSJ 1016). A *côlon*, in turn, is equivalent to a single clause or phrase that has grammatical independence, similar to a simple sentence. Accordingly, *aphelê* (ἀφελής) here means “simple, simplicity,” “not intricate or involved” (LSJ 287). On the other hand, *men* (μέν) means more than just “divided,” but as a correlative particle, *men* indicates completeness and coherence of structure brought about by “an answering clause” that is to follow (LSJ 1101). While “divided” translates the formal sense, a better and functional translation is “structured” because *men* suggests grammatical-stylistic structures that in their divided form have “answering” functions, wherein one *côlon* answers to the previous one to create a complete, coherent thought (Hill 118). For this reason, Aristotle notes that his preferred style of syntax (*lexis katestrammenê*, the “turned-down style”) occurs only in periods, periods of specific forms that show specific functions: comparison and contrast, parallelism and antithesis. After discussing periodic form further (3.9.6), Aristotle outlines specific periodic functions for expressing complete thoughts (3.9.7-10).

9.6. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ κῶλα καὶ τὰς περιόδους μήτε μούρους εἶναι μήτε μακράς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν προσπταίνειν πολλάκις ποιεῖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ, ὅταν ἔτι ὀρμῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πόρρω καὶ τὸ μέτρον, οὐ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὄρον, ἀντισπασθῆ παυσαμένου, οἷον πρόσπταειν γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρατος. [ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας.] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ περίοδοι αἱ μακραὶ οὖσαι λόγος γίνεται καὶ ἀναβολῆ ὁμοίον (ὥστε γίγνεται ὁ ἔσκωψεν Δημόκριτος ὁ Χίος εἰς Μελανιπίδην ποιήσαντα ἀντὶ τῶν ἀντιστρόφων ἀναβολάς,
οἱ τ' αὐτῷ κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλῳ κακὰ τεύχων,
ἢ δὲ μακρὰ ἀναβολῆ τῷ ποιήσαντι κακίστη·
ἀρμόττει γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ εἰς τοὺς μακροκώλους λέγειν), αἱ τε λίαν βραχύκωλοι οὐ περίοδος γίνεται· προπετῆ οὖν ἄγει τὸν ἀκροατὴν.

9.6. The cola and the periods should be neither stubby nor long. A short one often causes the hearer a bump; for when [his mind] is rushing toward what is to come and its measure, of which he has his own definition, he is pulled up short by the speaker's pausing and trips, as it were, at the abrupt close. Long ones cause him to be left behind, as do those racers who go wide at the turning point; for they, too, lose contact with their fellows. Similarly, long periods turn into a *logos* and are like a prelude. This is the source of the parody [of Hesiod, *Works and Days* 265-266] by Democritus of Chios, attacking Melanippides on the ground that he was composing preludes rather than antistrophes:

A man does wrong to himself when he does it to another,
 And a long prelude is the worst thing for a composer.
 Much the same applies to those who speak long cola, while those that are too short do not constitute a period. Thus, they drag the hearer headlong.

1409b 18. μήτε μουρούς . . . μήτε μακράς [*mête myourous . . . mête makras*] (neither stubby nor long): Concerning length for *côla* and periods, Aristotle suggests the mean, that they should be appropriate or just right, neither stubby nor too lengthy. After stating advice in a proposition, Aristotle explains his suggestion in the remainder of the section using the language of reader-response and metaphors of walking and running along a path to illustrate the negligible effects of excessive length or concision. The term for “stubby,” *muourous*, literally means “mouse-tailed” and by implication “tapering” and “too short” (LSJ 1153). In the context, the term is a visual pejorative used for emphasis, similar to the four subsequent reasons for avoiding very short clauses; these effects include “bump, stumble,” “pulled up short,” “pausing and trips,” and “abrupt close” experienced by an audience. The term for “long,” *makras*, refers to time, suggesting a speaker who is long winded and verbose, using elaborate, long, complex sentences (LSJ 1074). Such a rhetor is characterized as “drag[ging] the hearer headlong,” and the hearer feels “left behind” or “[out of] contact,” using spatial images for temporal effects. The implication is that overly long, complex periods create inattention and misunderstanding. In Aristotle's metaphor, rhetoric is a journey of invention in the discovery of expression in view of audience, so the able rhetor neither lets the audience “stumble” nor “lose contact.” What Aristotle implies is that an audience's experience with language should serve as evidence in the

study of rhetorical style, today studied as affective stylistics and reader-response criticism. Inserting humor at last, Aristotle quotes from Hesiod's *Works and Days*, where Democritus mocks a long-winded poet for "composing preludes rather than antistrophes [stanzas]," also noting, "a long prelude is the worst thing for a composer" (266), invoking the perennial principle that what is good for the audience is good for the author.

1409b 21. ὄρον [*horon*] (definition): Aristotle's definition of "definition" is the metaphor "boundary stone" (*horos*), commonly used as a landmark for demarking regions and property; metaphorically meaning "standard, measure," and used by Aristotle for "term" and "definition" in his logic (LSJ 1255; cf. *Top* 101b39, 139a24). "Boundary stone" has similar imagery as "definition," indicating a de-limitation of geography. Especially in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle considers metaphor to provide positive definition as opposed to negative definition by dichotomy, a common Platonic method that Aristotle criticizes, calling dichotomy a "weak syllogism," referring to the fallacy of tautology, or begging the question (*APr* 1.31, 46a33-35; cf. discussion at 3.1.2).¹⁴⁰ In the *Rhetoric*, *horos* occurs three times (1.10.19, 2.8.2, and 3.9.6). The first usage concerns rhetorical style of definition: "Definitions [*horous*] should be thought sufficient in each case if they are neither unclear [*asapheis*] nor inexact [*akribeis*]" (1.10.19, 1369b31). Aristotle creates clarity by means of metaphoric visualization. Discussing the vivid, spatial, dominant metaphors basic to Aristotle's thought and language, Kennedy elaborates on how metaphor, specifically *horos* and *methodos*, "combines the visual with the teleological, as it were 'along the road of life to a predetermined goal,' observing the 'places [*topoi*],' and 'boundary stones [*horous*]' along the way: Aristotle is a 'peripatetic,' or 'walker'" ("Reworking

¹⁴⁰ In Plato's *Phaedrus*, for instance, Socrates creates the following philosophical pairs, defining each by dichotomy: philosophy/rhetoric, reality/appearance, knowledge/opinion, reason/sense, soul/body, being/becoming, unity/plurality, transcendental/empirical, divine/human (cf. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric* 421).

Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" 171; cf. discussion of the *hodos* conceit at 3.1.2). Similarly at 3.9.6, *horos* participates in the metaphor of walking, comparing syntactical flow with "rushing toward" an audience's particular *horos* of what is appropriate in terms of flow, rhythm, and length of *côla* in the situation.¹⁴¹

9.7. τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ μὲν διηρημένη ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διηρημένη μὲν οἷον "πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων," ἀντικειμένη δέ, ἐν ἧ ἑκατέρω τῶ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταὐτὸ [1410a] ἐπέζευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἷον "ἀμφοτέρους δ' ὤνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείω τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δ' ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον." ἐναντία ὑπομονὴ ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανὸν πλείον. "ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις" ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται. καὶ ἔτι "συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν." "εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον." "πλευσαι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζευξας, τὸν δ' Ἄθω διορύξας." "καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι." "οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ' αἰσχροῶς ἐσώθησαν." καὶ "ἰδίᾳ μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμαχῶν περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας." "ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν." καὶ ὁ εἰς Πειθολαόν τις εἶπεν καὶ Λυκόφρονα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, "οὔτοι δ' ὑμᾶς οἴκοι μὲν ὄντες ἐπώλουν, ἐλθόντες δ' ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐώνηται." ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα ποιεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον.

9.7. *Lexis* in *cola* is either divided or contrasted. It is divided in this example: "Often have I admired those organizing panegyric festivals / and those instituting athletic contests." It is contrasted when in each colon opposite lies with opposite or the same [1410a] is yoked with its opposites, for example, "They helped both, / both those who stayed / and those who followed; to the latter they provided more than they had at home / and for the former they left enough behind." *Staying* and *following* are opposites, as are *enough* and *more*. [Another example is] "And so both to those needing money / and those wishing to enjoy it"; here *enjoy* is opposed to acquisition. And again, "It happens often in these circumstances that the wise fail / and the foolish succeed" [and] "Straightway they were thought worthy of meeds of valor / and not much later they took command of the sea" [and] "To sail through the land / and to march through the sea, / yoking the Hellespont / and digging through Athos" [and] "And though citizens by nature, / by law deprived of their city" [and] "some of them miserably perished, / and others were shamefully saved." And [another is] "Privately to use barbarian servants, / and collectively to overlook the many who were enslaved," [and] ". . . either while living to hold it / or when dead to lose it." And what someone said to Peitholaus and Lycophron in the law court: "When these

¹⁴¹ Based in neurolinguistic research regarding the three learning styles, Kennedy speculates that Aristotle was a visualizer, Plato tactile-emotional, and Socrates auditory according to their respective communicative styles ("Reworking Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" 171-72).

men were at home, they sold you, but coming to you now they have bought you.” All these examples do what has been said.

1409b 32-33. διηρημένη . . . δὲ ἀντικειμένη [*diêrêmenê . . . de antikeimenê*] (divided or contrasted): After explaining various syntactical styles in previous sections, Aristotle finally arrives at his favored syntax: the structured period, either with divided *côla* or contrasted *côla*. Of the eleven quotations, one illustrates the divided style and ten show the contrasted style, so it is evident which is Aristotle’s favorite style of sentence: the style that shows antithesis. In his translation, Kennedy adds slashes to aid in identifying the *côla*, which are equivalent to clauses or phrases, often participle phrases and phrases with a verb implied from its neighboring clause, a structure called a *zeugma*, as in the first and fourth examples. The eleven illustrations are likely chosen carefully since they serve as supporting evidence and examples for Aristotle’s syntactical style of choice, previously described as useful for creating structured sentences that both please and teach. Aristotle pays honor to his rival Isocrates because all the examples are written by him; however, the examples are probably less a complement than a convenience since the illustrations would have been familiar to contemporary audiences. Kennedy comments: “These quotations are all from Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* (sections 1, 35, 41, 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, and 186, respectively), but apparently from memory, since they are not very accurate. The most famous is the reference to Xerxes’ invasion of Greece in 480 BC, when he built a bridge of rafts across the Hellespont and dug a canal for his ships through the isthmus of Athos” (216n88). Aristotle may have altered the quotations slightly to improve them for teaching illustrations, emphasizing the contrasted terms. The lines by Isocrates serve as ready illustrations of contrasted *côla*, also known as antithetical style, discussed further in the remainder of the chapter.

9.8. ἡδεῖα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, ὅτι τὰναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ’ ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῶ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν.

9.8. Such a style is pleasing because opposites are most knowable and more knowable when put beside each other and because they are like a syllogism, for refutation [*elenkos*] is a bringing together of contraries.

1410a 20. τὰναντία [*tanantia*] (opposites): The characteristic of the contrastive style is that it juxtaposes opposite ideas, often in parallel form, as thesis and antithesis in contrastive clauses or phrases. In Greek, the contrastive morpheme is *anti* and occurs twice in this short section: in the suffix *tan-anti* (opposite) and in the prefix *anti-keimai* (to be opposed). Aristotle emphasizes that the contrastive style is pleasing (*hêdeia* occurs at the head of the section for emphasis) because contrastive form allows for ready recognition, facilitating quick learning that audiences find insightful and thus pleasing.

The significance of binary opposition has become more prominent with the advent of structuralism in linguistics and post-structuralism in literary and cultural studies, recognizing that language is not positive naming (nomenclature) but negative, differential relations. In a summary statement, Saussure emphasizes, “[I]n language there are only differences *without positive terms*” (*Course in General Linguistics* 120, emphasis in original). Each term in a language is structuralized by language; meaning is made in contextual, associative relations such as terms in opposition (nature/culture, inside/outside, thesis/antithesis, etc.). Thus, Saussure’s linguistic insight supports Aristotle’s rhetorical heuristic, that opposites are “most knowable.”¹⁴²

Concerning argumentation, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that “negative thought only comes into play if one’s concern is with persons, that is, if one is arguing” (*New Rhetoric* 155). As an instance of this general principle, the syntactical form of antithesis is not mere description of what *is*, but what *ought to be*, expressed in counter-statements of thesis

¹⁴² For definition, Aristotle prefers metaphor over opposition; the latter he regards as a “weak syllogism,” or the fallacy (cf. *APr* 1.31, 46a33-35, and cf. discussion at 1.2, 1403b15).

contra antithesis, as Aristotle regularly places antithesis in the context of refutation (cf. discussion of refutation at 3.17.13-15). Regarding *ought*, antithesis implies a dialogic context, some ethical objection to a prior, opposing statement, an objection that is also perspectival and political; cf. 1.2.7, “rhetoric is like some offshoot [*paraphues*] of dialectic and ethical studies (which is rightly called politics).”

1410a 21. συλλογισμῶ [*syllogismô*] (syllogism): In an example familiar to his students of dialectic, Aristotle compares the contrastive style to the refutative syllogism and, by similarity, to the refutative enthymeme, but he regards the enthymeme to be stylistically superior for its concision, clarity, and flexible form. In his discussion of common topics in Book 2, for instance, Aristotle writes, “Refutative enthymemes are better liked [by audiences] than demonstrative ones because the refutative enthymeme is a bringing together of opposites in brief form, and when these are set side by side they are clearer to the hearer” (2.23.30; cf. 3.17.13). Between these general observations about style and enthymemes, neither the sense nor the sentence differs, but they are exactly comparable. Since common topics concern enthymematic *forms* of argument and inference, they cannot be separated from grammatical-stylistic forms. On the coherence of enthymematic and stylistic form, Grimaldi comments, “A[ristotle] gives us a brief observation not so much on demonstrative-refutative enthymemes as on the essential character of enthymeme as he understands it: an inference marked by such brevity and clarity of statement that the auditors readily apprehend it as it is delivered, and, if not, comprehend it as soon as it is completely expressed” (2:335, 00b27-30). By this comment on “the essential character of enthymeme,” one perceives that the enthymeme is essentially a stylistic form, centered on audience for creating understanding. Herein lies the coherence of Aristotelian

rhetoric and the cohesion of its three books: stylistic-enthymematic forms serve rhetorical functions by creating readily apprehended meaning.

1410a 22. ἔλεγχος [*elenkos*] (refutation): Term refers to the process of refutation in judicial settings but also in the marketplace as practiced by Socrates. *Elenkos* (often spelled *elenchus*) is the technique of the Socratic Method, describing logical cross-examination of a thesis by way of disproof and reproof with an (often implied) antithesis. In setting forth a supporting reason in his enthymeme, Aristotle summarizes the process with a clear proposition: “*elenkos* is a bringing together of contraries [*antikeimai*],” meaning that *elenkos* starts by comparing thesis with antithesis, proceeds by supplying reasons and evidence for or against each, and concludes by asking an audience adjudicate the truth or justice of the issue. Without the process of comparing opposing theses, there is no case, no contrast, no exigency, and no argumentation. *Elenkos* issues from the formal arrangement of thesis and antithesis, made most clear in contrastive-sentence styles. Discussing refutative enthymemes in 3.17.13, Aristotle observes that antithesis is “better liked” by audiences because antithesis is more clearly syllogistic, wherein the contrastive-sentence style creates easy and thus pleasant learning. This proposition also serves as a transition to the last and climatic topic on style: antithesis.

9.9. ἀντίθεσις μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐστίν, παρίσῳσις δὲ εἴαν ἴσα τὰ κῶλα, παρομοίωσις δὲ εἴαν ὅμοια τὰ ἔσχατα ἔχη ἐκάτερον τὸ κῶλον. ἀνάγκη δὲ ἢ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἢ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς ἔχειν. καὶ ἀρχῇ μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἢ δὲ τελευτῇ τὰς ἐσχάτας συλλαβὰς ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος πτώσις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα. ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, “ἀργὸν γὰρ ἔλαβεν ἀργὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ,” “δωρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέλοντο παρὰ ρρητοὶ τ’ ἐπέεσσιν.” ἐπὶ τελευτῆς δὲ “ὠρήθης ἂν αὐτὸν <οὐ> παιδίον τετοκένας, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν παιδίον γεγονέναι,” “ἐν πλείσταις δὲ φροντίσι καὶ ἐν ἐλαχίσταις ἐλπίσιν.” πτώσεις δὲ ταύτου “ἀξιος δὲ σταθῆναι χαλκοῦς, οὐκ ἄξιος ὢν χαλκοῦ;” ταῦτο δ’ ὄνομα “σὺ δ’ αὐτὸν καὶ ζῶντα ἔλεγες κακῶς καὶ νῦν γράφεις κακῶς.” ἀπὸ συλλαβῆς δὲ “τί ἂν ἔπαθες δεινόν, εἰ ἄνδρ’ εἶδες ἀργόν;” ἐστὶ δὲ ἅμα πάντα ἔχειν ταῦτό, [1410b] καὶ ἀντίθεσιν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ πάρισον καὶ ὁμοιοτέλετον. αἱ δ’ ἀρχαὶ τῶν περιόδων σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Θεοδοκτείοις ἐξηρίθμηνται.

9.9. Antithesis, then, is one thing, as is *parisôsis* if the cola are equal [in the number of syllables] and *paromoiôsis* if each colon has similar extremities. This must occur either at the beginning or at the end [of the colon]. At the beginning it always takes the form of [similar] complete words, but at the end it may consist of [the same] final syllables or [the same] grammatical form or the same word. At the beginning are found such things as “*Agron gar elaben argon par autou*” and “*Dôrêtoi t’ epelontos pararrêtoi t’ epeassin*,”¹⁴³ at an end “*ôîêthês an auton ou paidion tetokenai, all’ auton paidion gegonenai*,”¹⁴⁴ or “*en pleistais de phrontisi kai en elakhistais elpisin*,”¹⁴⁵ and inflexion of the same word: “*axios de stathênai khalkous, ouk axios ôn khalkou?*”¹⁴⁶ and recurrence of the same word: “You spoke of him in life meanly and now you write of him meanly.” [One also finds] use of the same [concluding] syllable: “What would you have suffered so striking if you had seen the man shirking?” It is possible for one example to have all these features—[1410b] for the same [colon] to be an antithesis, parison, and homoeoteleuton. The beginnings of periods have mostly been enumerated in the *Theodectea*.¹⁴⁷

1410a 22. ἀντίθεσις [*antithesis*] (antithesis): Antithesis is the climax of chapter 9 and Aristotle’s periodic syntax of choice, wherein opposite concepts are juxtaposed to highlight and evaluate contrast. Antithesis is both the turned-down style and the contrastive style, as distinct from the divided style. However, this is the first usage of the key term *antithesis* for describing the contrastive style of syntax, though synonyms and examples occur throughout chapter 9.¹⁴⁸ The present usage of *antithesis* refers not to the present section but to what has preceded in

¹⁴³ “‘Land they took, unworked, from him,’ probably from a lost comedy. ‘Ready for gifts they were and ready for persuasion by words,’ from *Iliad* 9.526” (Kennedy 217n91).

¹⁴⁴ “‘You would have thought him not to have begotten a child, but himself to have become one,’ source unknown” (Kennedy 217n92).

¹⁴⁵ “‘In greatest cases and in smallest hopes,’ source unknown” (Kennedy 217n93).

¹⁴⁶ “‘Worthy of being set up in bronze but not worth a coin of bronze,’ source unknown” (Kennedy 217n94).

¹⁴⁷ Kassel’s and Kennedy’s enumerations differ regarding the placement of the *Theodectea* sentence (1410b1-2): Kassel makes it the conclusion of 3.9.9, while Kennedy makes it the introduction of 3.9.10. Since the sentence serves as a reference to additional examples of the structured syntactical style, including antithesis and parallelism, I concur with Kassel and have placed Kennedy’s translated sentence at the end of 3.9.9 to maintain consistency.

¹⁴⁸ *Antithesis* occurs only in Book 3 with five instances (1410a22, 1410b1, 36; 1411b1; 1412b31) and one instance of *pseudeis antitheseis* (1410b3). Other expressions for contrasting opposite ideas occur throughout the *Rhetoric*, notably as the first common topic at 2.23.1.

sections 3.9.7-8. Aristotle emphasizes the term by syntactically foregrounding it in first position, but it is part of a summary statement and a transition to the subject of parallelism. Although Aristotle is characteristically careful in choosing terms, Kennedy mentions two reasons for the term's absence until now: "For his students and readers it was hardly a technical term, since its meaning was clear from its two roots, as in *op-position*. Antithesis was one of the characteristics of the prose style of Gorgias, and without mentioning him Aristotle proceeds to discuss other examples of what have come to be known as the 'Gorgianic figures'" (217). The association of antithesis with the famed sophist Gorgias may be why Aristotle has hesitated to introduce the term until after he had thoroughly theorized it in relation to other syntactical styles. Often defined as a figure of style, antithesis for Aristotle is conceptual, not merely ornamental, because the formal features of antithesis include improved recognition and discernment, and when composed as an enthymeme, antithesis has inferential, syllogistic qualities. Aristotle recommends antithesis for at least five reasons: it expresses completeness of thought, creates quick learning, creates clear parallel forms, functions like an enthymeme, and functions as a topic of invention. In sum, antithesis creates improved comprehension and, therefore, stylistic clarity. In the remainder of section 9, Aristotle discusses two types of parallelism, also associated with Gorgias, which may be used with the two types of periodic sentences, the divided and the contrasted style, referring respectively to sentences structured for comparison and contrast.

1410a 23-24. *παρίσῳσις . . . παρομοίῳσις* [*parisôsis . . . paromoiôsis*] (*parisôsis . . . paromoiôsis*): The terms refer to two types of parallelism: structural and phonic parallelism. *Parisôsis* ("almost equal") is a structural figure of parallelism: "approximate equality of clauses as measured by syllables," often regarded as synonymous with *isocôlon*, indicating equal number of syllables (Smyth 681, §3038). *Paromoiôsis* ("assimilation") is a phonic figure of parallelism,

indicating “parallelism of sound between the words of two clauses either approximately or exactly equal in size. This similarity in sound may appear at the beginning, at the end (*homoioleuton*), in the interior, or it may pervade the whole” (Smyth 681, §3039). Aristotle provides guidelines for how to create structural and phonic parallelism followed by seven examples that impressively illustrate parallelism of sound and structure in the same sentences, for he states as a conclusion, “It is possible for one example to have all these features—for the same [*côlon*] to be an antithesis, *parison* [another name for *parisôsis*], and *homoeoteleuton* [*paromoiôsis* at the end of *côla*]” (1410a36; cf. Kennedy 217n95). By combining parallelism of sound and syntax in the same illustrations, appealing to ears and eyes, Aristotle has in view oral and literate forms of rhetoric and their interrelationships. The illustrations reveal Aristotle’s holistic approach to the art, for the dual emphasis shows attention to the interrelationship of orality and literacy during a transitional era when classical Greece was developing general literacy and becoming a culture of “secondary” orality (cf. orality and literacy at 3.11-12).¹⁴⁹

1410b 1. ὁμοιοτέλευτον [*homoioleuton*] (homoeoteleuton): Meaning “same ending,” this phonic figure of parallelism has similar sounds occurring at the end of *côla*, thus combining parallel sounds and structures. Smyth defines *homoioleuton* as “end-rhyme in clauses or verses,” noting that the figure “is most marked in *paromoiôsis*” (678, §3026). Aristotle indicates that *homoioleuton* is a popular species of *paromoiôsis*, where the end-rhyme is useful in oral

¹⁴⁹ “Secondary” orality refers to mediated orality, or oral communication in literate cultures wherein speech and writing, sound and sight, are synthesized. The phenomenon of what happens when oral cultures develop literacy, or when literature cultures become more oral or audio-visual, Kennedy names using the Italian neologism *letteraturizzazione* (coined by Vasile Florescu, *Retorica* 3), a term describing the interrelationship between orality and literacy and their mutual effects on each other in terms of borrowed concepts, genres, and terms (*Classical Rhetoric* 3-5). Orality and literacy are discussed further at 3.11-12.

and literate modes of communication. *Homoiooteleuton* is what modern audiences normally consider to be rhyme.

As employed by Gorgias and his school, figures of phonic and structural parallelism are not as much ornament as emphasis of a central antithesis. Contemporary rhetoricians find that “figures such as isokola, homoeoteleuton, and parisosis, in balancing phrases and clauses, serve to elaborate and underscore the central antitheses of the text, and to provide each with ‘a stricter conceptual unity of its own, allowing its constituents to appear more clearly’” (Consigny 44, ref. Untersteiner, *The Sophists* 200). In Gorgias’s practice and Aristotle’s theory, antithesis does not merely frame thought but helps create it; antithesis is epistemic, serving as a methodological instrument of inquiry. Aristotle identifies antithesis as a form that helps create learning for author and audience alike because contrasted statements “are like a syllogism” (3.9.8). For this reason, antithesis is the first common topic for creating enthymemes (2.23.1). According to Enos, Gorgianic “rhetoric stressed an antithesis which went beyond the stylistic form that earned him distinction to reveal and direct a philosophical method of inquiry” (“Epistemology of Gorgias’ Rhetoric” 45). Similarly, Aristotle focuses on figures of parallelism not merely for their aesthetic forms but primarily for their stylistic functions of creating and emphasizing a central antithesis. Focus on function is the characteristic feature of Aristotle’s theory of style, aptly summarized in the climax of chapter 10: “thus aim at three things: metaphor, antithesis, and *energeia*” because these figures do the most rhetorical work, functioning as tropes and topics (3.10.6).

1410b 2. ἐν τοῖς Θεοδεκτείοις [*en tois theodekteiois*] (in the *Theodectea*): Aristotle concludes the section by referring readers to his *Theodectea* where he has “enumerated” more examples of parallelism of sound and syntax (see discussion at 1410b2 below concerning the

Theodectea). In the translation, the examples of *paromoiôsis* remain in transliterated Greek because it is the sound and not the sense that matters.

1410a 24. ἔσχατα [*eschata*] (extremities): A general term meaning “farthest” or “the last extremity” (also root of *eschaton* and *eschatology* in ecclesiastical Latin and English), in the context of *côlon* (meaning “limb” of the body), the term refers to extremities (beginnings and endings) of clauses or phrases (LSJ 699). While *parisôsis* is structural parallelism created by balanced clauses or similar number of syllables, *paromoiôsis* is phonic parallelism created by similar sounds at the beginning or ending of *côla*. Rhyming sound effects come in three categories, labeled according to three Latinate terms: (a) alliteration (repetition of an initial sound): “The nattering nabobs of negativism” (Spiro Agnew); (b) assonance (repetition of vowel sounds): “Hear the mellow wedding bells” (Poe); and (c) consonance (repetition of consonant sounds): “He struck a streak of bad luck” (Bret Harte). In classical Greek, poets and rhetors structure sound effects according to syntax, or parallel placement in phrases and clauses, thus the term phonic parallelism. Aristotle explains the two types of phonic parallelism and how poets and rhetors create them in three ways: First, “At the beginning [of *côla*] it always takes the form of [similar] complete words,” illustrated by two end rhymes: *agron* (agrarian land) with *argon* (unworked), and then *dôrêtoi* (gifts) with *pararrêtoi* (persuasive words or persuadable persons), quoted respectively from a lost comedy and the *Iliad* (9.526). Second, “at the end [of *côla*] it [phonic parallelism] may consist of [the same] final syllables or [the same] grammatical form,” illustrated respectively by two end-syllable rhymes: *tetokenai* (begotten) with *gegonenai* (become), and then *phrontisi* (cases) with *elpisin* (hopes), both quotations from unknown sources. Third, phonic parallelism at the end of *côla* may be made from “[similar or same inflection of] the same word,” illustrated respectively by three end rhymes: *khalkous* (bronze)

with *khalkou* (bronze), then repetition of the adverb *kakôs* (meanly), and finally repetition “of the same [concluding] syllable” in *deinon* (striking) and *argon* (shirking), wherein quotations are from unknown sources. Thus, the “extremities” of *côla*, both beginnings and endings, are the places for creating phonic parallelism, which in turn help audiences to notice similar (or contrasted) ideas by their similar forms and sounds.

1410b 2. Θεοδεκτεΐοις [*Theodekteiois*] (*Theodectea*): The *Theodectea* is certainly Aristotle’s own lost handbook recording the rhetoric of (or for) Theodectes (*ca.* 375-334), whom he repeatedly quotes in Book 2 when discussing common topics (2.23). Theodectes was educated in the school of Isocrates, but later he became associated with Plato’s Academy and became a pupil and friend of Aristotle, perhaps even his associate instructor of rhetoric; at the end of his short life, Theodectes was a distinguished rhetorician and tragic poet, so much so that Alexander the Great honored his statue by crowning it with garlands (*Biographical Dictionary* 3:1035). Based on Theodectes’s ties to Alexander through Aristotle, Michel Patillon advances the thesis that the *Theodectea* should be equated with the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, chapters 1-28; in which case, the reference would most likely point to numerous examples of “two fold statements” in chapter 24 of that work (1435a6-30), statements structured as antithesis and parallelism according to the figures of *parisôsis* and *paromoiôsis* (Patillon 104-5; cf. Kennedy 217n96; but *contra* Cope, *Intro.* 58).¹⁵⁰ In addition, the *Theodectea* probably contributed to Aristotle’s

¹⁵⁰ *Rhetoric to Alexander* is a late fourth-century handbook of uncertain authorship, but traditionally attributed to Aristotle, including the Berlin edition of Aristotle’s works (1831-70). The treatise has come to be ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (*ca.* 380-320), a rhetorician and historian contemporary with Aristotle, Theodectes, and Theophrastus, based on a passage in Quintilian (3.4.9). See introduction to the treatise by H. Rackham (pp. 258 ff.), Kennedy 269-75, and *ERC* 602-3. Although its authorship is uncertain, its dating seems accurate. Vlastos remarks: “Its linguistic and political ambience is that of fourth-century Athens, echoing Isocrates’ *Techne Rhetorike*. Eight fragments of the treatise turn up in a papyrus dated by its editors in the first half of the third century” (84n15).

Synagôgê technôn (ca. 360-355), his compilation of rhetorical handbooks from the earliest theorists of the art, from Tisias to Isocrates, supplemented with his own views on rhetoric (Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* 5; Kennedy 5, 297 ff.; Erickson, “Lost Rhetorics” 6). According to both accounts, the *Theodectea* was an earlier rhetorical treatise compiled by Aristotle, based on Theodectes’s rhetoric, and served as one of his early sources for the *Rhetoric*, providing numerous illustrations for a style of syntax that had attracted the attention of Aristotle and Theodectes for several decades.¹⁵¹ Beyond inductive examples, in the realm of *êthos*, it is probable that the naming of the *Theodectea* is a tribute to Theodectes (analogous to “Nicomachean” *Ethics*), serving as a memorial to his life and rhetoric, like garlands on his statue.

9.10. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις, οἷον καὶ Ἐπίχαρμος ἐποίει,
τόκα μὲν ἐν τήνων ἐγῶν ἦν, τόκα δὲ παρὰ τήνοισ ἐγῶ.

9.10. There are also false antitheses, for example, the one [the comic poet] Epicharmus wrote, “Sometimes I was in their house, sometimes I was with them.”

1410b 3. ψευδεῖς ἀντιθέσεις [*pseudeis antitheseis*] (false antitheses): As a final note on the forms of parallelism and antithesis, Aristotle refers to false antithesis, that is, *côla* presented as antithesis but that are in fact synonymous. Using similar concluding comments, Aristotle

¹⁵¹ Concerning the relationship between Aristotle and his *Theodectea*, Valerius Maximus (8.14. ext. 3) tells a curious story: “Aristotle allowed Theodectes to claim authorship of one of his own works, then became jealous of the fame and inserted a reference in his writings to show he had written it” (Kennedy 305n21). Cope comments regarding Aristotle’s practice with quotations and references: “Aristotle must be referring to a work of his own: for his practice is, almost or altogether without exception, never to quote another’s work *as an authority*, or as containing something necessary to the elucidation of the subject in hand, which he might himself have supplied, merely for the purpose of saving trouble. He refers to authors who have treated of the same matters as he is at the time engaged upon in order to criticise them, and to supply their defects, or to represent his own opinions and doctrines in favourable contrast. The references to Isocrates’ speeches and others in the *Rhetoric* which we have previously noticed are of quite a different kind: they are *illustrations*, which Aristotle, departing from the usual practice of writers of arts of Rhetoric—exemplified in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*—preferred to draw from the known and accredited writings and speeches of others, rather than to make them for himself. I am for my part so fully persuaded of this that I shall take it for granted that Aristotle in speaking here of the *Theodectea* means to refer to a work of his own” (*Introd.* 56).

follows his discussion of common topics with that of fallacious enthymemes (cf. *Rhet* 2.24.). In both sections (2.24.1-11 and 3.9.10), the false is presented not so rhetors may deceive, but so they may recognize, reveal, and refute error. Grimaldi remarks, translating *Sophistic Refutations*, “‘It is the task of one who has knowledge about a thing to speak the truth about what he knows, and to be able to expose the individual who makes false statements,’ 165a 24-27 (cf. 174b 19-23). This sums up accurately the tenor of all A[ristotle]’s writings: namely, the effort to apprehend and communicate, as far as possible, that which is” (2:337, 00b35-38). In 2.24, Aristotle points out fallacious enthymemes are often formed by false or “verbal” (as opposed to logical) antithesis, including non-sequitor fallacies and homonyms (2.24.2, fallacious topic 1). What Aristotle observes of homonyms applies equally to other devices: “The kinds of words useful to a sophist are homonyms (by means of these he does his dirty work)” (3.2.7). False antithesis is like homonym at the syntactical level; homonym confuses by having the same sound, but false antithesis confuses by apparent contrast. In his one example, Aristotle emphasizes that false antithesis creates verbal irony by its playful deception, quoting a line from the early comic poet Epicharmus: “Sometimes I was in their house, sometimes I was with them” (Fragm. 147, Kaibel). Concerning Epicharmus of Kos, later of Sicily (ca. 540-450), Aristotle mentions him twice in *Poetics* 4-5 (1448a33 and 1449b1), naming him one of the early “comedians” and an originator of comic plot (cf. *Biographical Dictionary* 2:29-30). Demetrius quotes the same line, commenting on false antithesis:

There are some clauses [*côla*] which are not really antithetical but suggest an antithesis because of the antithetical form in which they are written, like the playful joke in the poet Epicharmus, “at one time I was among them, at another time with them.” The same idea is repeated, and there is no contrast. But the

stylistic manner, with its imitation of an antithesis, suggests an intent to deceive. Epicharmus probably used the antithesis to raise a laugh, and also to mock the rhetoricians. (*On Style* 24)

Drawing his theory and example from Aristotle, Demetrius reveals Aristotle's influence on the Hellenistic rhetorical tradition. As a stylistic form, false antithesis is certainly a means to false reasoning, but in the way of wordplay and verbal jousting, wherein the deception is intended to be perceived, false antithesis creates verbal irony, which becomes a feature of urbane, well-liked expressions (cf. discussion of *ta asteia* and verbal irony at 3.11.6-15).

CHAPTER 10

LEXIS: URBANITY AND METAPHOR

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 10.1. Metaphor creates urbane style (1410b 6–1410b 9)

DEVELOPMENT

- 10.2-3. Metaphor and pleasant learning (1410b 10–1410b 19)
- 10.4. Metaphor and quick learning (1410b 20–1410b 26)
- 10.5. Metaphor and antithesis (1410b 27–1410b 31)
- 10.6. Metaphor and visualization (1410b 31–1410b 36)
- 10.7. Examples of metaphor (1410b 36–1411b 23)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

10.1. ἔπει δὲ διώρισται περὶ τούτων, πόθεν λέγεται τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα λεκτέον. ποιεῖν μὲν οὖν ἔστι τοῦ εὐφυοῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου, δεῖξαι δὲ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης. εἴπωμεν οὖν καὶ διαριθμησώμεθα· ἀρχὴ δ' ἔστω ἡμῖν αὕτη.

10.1. Since these things have been defined, there is need to say what are the sources of urbanities [*asteia*] and well-liked expressions [*eudokimounta*]. Now it is possible to create them by natural talent or by practice, but to show what they are belongs to this study. Let us say, then, what they are and let us enumerate them thoroughly, and let the following be our first principle [*arkhê*].

1410b 6. διώρισται [*diôristai*] (have been defined): This past-perfect participle signals the beginning of the climax of Aristotle's treatise on rhetorical style, the climax of chapters 1-12. Since a past participle begins the chapter, the question is, what are "these things" (*toutôn*) that have been defined or discussed? The main clause answers: "urbanities [*asteia*] and well-liked expressions [*eudokimounta*]," being metaphors (characteristic of rhetoric) and a summation (climax of rhetoric) of the principles of *lexis*, which have been "determined, defined" in prior

chapters. Chapter 10 examines principles or sources (*pothen*) for how to create urbane, well-liked expressions. According to Hill, “Some of the elements previously listed when used together make for urbanity of style” (118). This chapter marks a transition from earlier chapters focused on defining the elements and virtues of prose style (3.1-9) to the culminating chapters (3.10-12) focused on how to create a successful style. This transition is seen in Aristotle’s procedure, that “he makes a new start, which marks off this section from the foregoing, and prefaces his treatment with the ‘basic premise of his aesthetic theory’” as recounted in 3.10.2 (Schenkeveld 1). In this sense, the past-perfect participle “have been defined” signals a transition to the climax of Aristotle’s treatment of style.

1410b 6. πότεν [*pothen*] (sources): The term *pothen* means “from where,” “whence,” and by metaphor refers to a methodology of finding “sources,” “places” or “causes” from where one derives well-liked expressions (LSJ 1427). As Williams has observed, most language about style concerns not causes but effects: “words [like *unclear* and *dense*] don’t refer to anything *in* those sentences; they describe how those sentences make us *feel*” (*Style* 34). Describing effects may be sufficient for readers, but not for rhetors. The rhetorical art is a study of causation: identifying the causes and sources of effective style. One value of Aristotle’s study of style is that he approaches style rhetorically, discussing not only elements but also the causes of the effects. *Methodos*, in the following *côlon* (1410a8), underscores Aristotle’s topical methodology, wherein he teaches the sources for how to create good style: “to show the method.” Thus, the term *pothen* refers to topics (*topoi*) that help one identify where to discover and how to create such rhetorical resources as metaphors, similes, figures, proverbs, hyperboles, rhythm, and periodic syntax. Topical sources for creating *ta asteia* are the stated focus of chapters 10-11.

1410b 7. τὰ ἀστεῖα καὶ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα [*ta asteia kai ta eudokimounta*] (urbanities and well-liked expressions): This twofold category summarizes Aristotle’s suggested prose style so that all of his stylistic virtues, forms, and figures will fall under these two principles, or rather, all prior stylistic elements will help create urbanities and well-liked expressions. Aristotle uses the first term, *ta asteia*, only in *Rhetoric* III, a term explained as follows:

Astu means “town,” usually in the physical rather than the political sense, the latter being *polis*. In contrast to the country, towns often cultivate some degree of sophistication; thus, *asteia*, “things of the town,” came to mean good taste, wit, and elegant speech (see Schenkeveld 1994). Latin *urbanitas* (from *urbs*, “city”), and thus English “urbanity,” have similar meanings; cf. also “polite” from Greek *polis* (city state) and “civil” from Latin *civis* (citizen). (Kennedy 218)

Asteia is variously translated as expressions that are “urbane” (Kennedy, Gillies), “lively” (Cooper, Roberts), “smart” (Freese, Jebb), “polite” (Taylor), and “graceful” (Hobbes). Rendering *asteia* as “urbanity,” Kennedy and Gillies transliterate Latin *urbanitas*, the cultured quality of the *urbanus homo*, the refined, educated Roman gentleman. Defining *urbanitas* as “sophistication and refinement,” Edwin S. Ramage traces its sources in Athenian culture and literature, specifically characterized in Thucydides’s Pericles and Plato’s Socrates:

By the time of the Peloponnesian War, she [Athens] had become “the city” as opposed to the countryside, other Greek centers, and even the Piraeus, so that what was located in Athens or what was happening there was designated ἀστικόν, the city’s refinement was embraced by the adjective ἀστεῖον, and the Athenian who exhibited this urbanity was an ἀστεῖος ἀνὴρ or an urbane man. A search for a sophisticated Athenian of the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C.

leads straight to the Dialogues of Plato, for here Socrates has taken on most of the characteristics of the gentleman of the time. Plato has him reveal his urbanity in the way he thinks and speaks; restraint, tact, and consideration are his bywords.

(Ramage, *Urbanitas* 10)

Plato's Socrates and Thucydides's Pericles are Athenian gentlemen, displaying modesty and generosity, decorum and refinement, education and wit, daring with restraint, and feelings of consideration for fellow citizens along with smoothness, sweetness, and cleverness of utterance (Ramage 11). The *êthos* of Socrates (certainly a reflection of Plato's own urbanity) plays an inestimable role in the rhetorical success of Plato's dialogues and philosophy. From this perspective, Plato's *Republic* (Πολιτεία, *Politeia*) and Aristotle's *Politics* (Πολιτικά, *Politika*) both evince an interest in the *polis* as a distinct place and situation that cultivates urbanity. The theme of both works is urbanity.

While *ta asteia* is a personal and cultural quality, the second term, *ta eudokimounta* (well-liked expressions) emphasizes the effect of *asteia*, rather than designating a different category. *Eudokimounta* (derived from the verb *eudokeô* with *eudokimein*) refers to "highly esteemed" and "successful" expressions that give "pleasure, content[ment]" and with which an audience gives "consent, agree[ment] to" and "approval" (LSJ 710). The term refers to the two-way action of the rhetorical relationship between sender and receiver that is best mediated by these urbane, well-liked expressions, creating knowledge, pleasure, consent, and success. Used together, *ta asteia* and *eudokimounta* may be thought of as "brilliant" expressions in all senses of the term: vivid, thoughtful, well-phrased in themselves, and insightful, pleasant, and successful regarding audience response.

Ta asteia is a single category, but a significant subcategory is verbal irony, usually glossed as “witty expressions,” discussed at the end of chapter 11 (3.11.6-15). These ironical urbanities, often in the form of puns, feature an “added surprise” (literally “added deception”) having some concealed truth or insight that when perceived strikes an audience “contrary to expectation,” whether the irony is humorous, sarcastic, or riddling (Kennedy 223n128). Some commentators have interpreted the subcategory as characterizing the whole category, also unduly extending the notion of “well-liked expressions” to justify the notion of *asteia* as “pleasantries” or “witticisms” in exclusion of a wider and richer semantic range. A leader in this trend is Cope, who wrongly typifies *asteia* as “lively, pointed, sprightly, witty, facetious, clever sayings” (3:107), and again as “lively pleasantries” and “witticisms” (*Intro.* 321). Even Forbes I. Hill and Umberto Eco succumb to this synecdoche, translating *asteia* as mere “witticisms” (Hill, “Aristotle’s Rhetorical Theory” 118; Eco 96; cf. Janko 184). While *ta asteia* include the idea of witty, this limited interpretation mistakes a part for the whole. In his descriptions and examples of *ta asteia*, Aristotle never limits the term to what is witty: none of the twenty-six example metaphors in 3.10.7, nor any other examples before 3.11.6, have to do with jokes, puns, or pleasantries. Rather, in chapter 10, all of the metaphors exemplify *ta asteia* by linking together notions and thus offering new insights, which in turn create quick and pleasant learning that facilitates shared understandings (3.11.5, cf. Schenkeveld 6). Included in the category of *asteia*, Aristotle distinguishes several subcategories, including metaphor, antithesis, *energeia*, and various figures that create verbal irony (3.11.6-15).

As a key term and chief category for Aristotle’s theory of style, *ta asteia* have six significant requirements:

- These expressions create “quick learning” and are, therefore, pleasing (3.10.2-4).

- They consist in enthymemes, advancing an argument (3.10.4).
- They are neither superficial nor obscure, but interesting and well-phrased (3.10.4).
- They often compose the favorite form of antithesis (3.10.5).
- They feature the best kinds of metaphors, being both clear and exotic (3.10.6; 3.2.8).
- They make an impression by their vividness and animation (3.10.6; 3.11.2-5).

These six requirements, though defined and discussed in prior chapters, form the outline for chapter 10 and their further elaboration in chapter 11 (Schenkeveld 1). Specifically, two requirements concern logical form (enthymeme, antithesis), and three focus on effects (learning, interest, vividness), while metaphor is capable of combining these forms and functions, making metaphor the chapter's motif. *Ta asteia* (urbane, well-liked expressions), therefore, is not only the chief category but also the critical principle for evaluating success of style and specifically metaphor in Aristotelian rhetoric.

Since *ta asteia* is the genus or major category for chapters 10-11, why do interpreters title the chapters after "tropes and figures" or after "metaphor"? As Schenkeveld writes in his chapter, "*Ta asteia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: The Disappearance of a Category," the category is unique to these two chapters, it is not found anywhere else in the *Rhetoric*, and it is mostly lost from later rhetorical tradition.¹⁵² While *ta asteia* is the topical category, the subtopics of tropes

¹⁵² Dirk M. Schenkeveld, in "*Ta asteia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: The Disappearance of a Category," chapter one in *Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle* (1994), explains his subtitle: "[D]espite all of these favourable characteristics, the *asteia* get no mention in the summation at the end of the whole part on *lexis* at 1414a18-29 [3.12.6], nor does Aristotle ever refer or allude to them in the rest of the *Rhetoric* or elsewhere. From this point of view, the whole section on *asteia* looks like an isolated part in the discussion of *lexis*. It is also remarkable that as a category the *asteia* disappear almost totally from later rhetoric. . . . On the whole, scholars merely mention this Aristotelian group as being discussed in the *Rhetoric*, or they see it as some precursor of the later categories of tropes and/or figures" (2). Kennedy being an exception, most commentators have substituted tropes and figures for *ta asteia* as the chief category for interpreting the culminating chapters on Aristotle's theory of style.

and figures largely assume and assimilate the six requirements of *ta asteia*. In the subcategory of tropes and figures, metaphor is by far the most important in chapters 10-11, thus warranting interpreters to make a recognized, metonymic transference of category.

1410b 8. τοῦ εὐφυοῦς ἢ τοῦ γεγυμνασμένου [*tou euphyous hê tou gegymnasménou*] (by natural talent or by practice): One develops an art by talent, training, and practice, to invoke Isocrates's pedagogical principle.¹⁵³ Between talent (*euphyês*, or natural aptitude) and practice (*gymnasma*, or exercise) comes training or education (*paideia*) for learning a *technê* with its artistic methodology, indicated by *methodos*.¹⁵⁴ Education involves learning the principles, methods, and topics for how to analyze and create, which is the object of Aristotle's treatise.

1410b 9. ἀρχὴ [*archê*] (first principle): The term refers to “beginning, first,” and “elementary principles” as well as “foundations” or natural “sources” of principles of knowledge that comprise an art (*technê*) (LSJ 252). As a transition, Aristotle begins again with first principles, without which one cannot claim to know an art or to practice it well. These first principles are stated in the following section.

10.2. τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἢδὲ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα. αἱ μὲν οὖν γλώτται ἀγνώτες, τὰ δὲ κύρια ἴσμεν· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα· ὅταν γὰρ εἶπη τὸ γῆρας καλάμην, ἐποίησε μάθησιν καὶ γνῶσιν διὰ τοῦ γένους· ἄμφω γὰρ ἀπηθηκότα.

¹⁵³ Describing his *paideia* for *philosophia* (his name for rhetoric) in *Antidosis*, Isocrates explains to his pupils, “I say to them that if they are to excel in oratory or in managing affairs or in any line of work, they must, first of all, have a natural aptitude [*phykenai kalôs*] for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training [*paideia*] and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, they must become versed and practiced [*gymnasia*] in the use and application of their art; for only on these conditions can they become fully competent and pre-eminent in any line of endeavor” (187; cf. *Against the Sophists* 14-15).

¹⁵⁴ The metaphor behind *gymnasma* (exercise) is *gymnos*, meaning “naked, unclad,” referring to the originary context of physical exercise in the male-only *gymnasma* (LSJ 362).

10.2. To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people, and words signify something, so whatever words create knowledge in us are pleasurable. Now glosses are unintelligible, but we know words in their prevailing meaning [*kyria*]. Metaphor most brings about learning; for when he calls old age “stubble,” he creates understanding and knowledge through the genus, since old age and stubble are [species of the genus of] things that have lost their bloom.

1410b 10. μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἤδὲ φύσει [*manthanein rhadiôs hêdu physei*] (to learn easily is naturally pleasant): This proposition, a first principle (*archê*) in the art of rhetoric, derives from and is comparable to the first sentence of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁵⁵ The clause forms the major or general premise of a syllogism, continuing with its minor premise and its conclusion:

- Major premise: “To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people.”
- Minor premise: “words signify something” (i.e., create learning and knowledge).
- Conclusion: “so whatever words create knowledge in us are pleasurable.”

The relaxed syllogism summarizes the human perspective of the relationship between knowledge and pleasure. Language is mediator of knowledge and pleasure (words, *onomata*, being the middle term in the syllogism) so that language serves to transform and translate (linguistic) knowledge into pleasurable learning. Aristotle’s conclusion repeats his principle that introduces Book 3: “for it is not enough to have a supply of things to say, but it is also necessary to say it in the right way” (3.1.2; cf. 3.11.7). The emphasis on the “right way” and the linguistic mediation of knowledge set up the discussion for *ta asteia*, specifically metaphor, as the best means and proper mediator for rhetorical discourse since metaphor actualizes knowledge, animating inanimate information.

¹⁵⁵ Aristotle begins his *Metaphysics* focusing on the trio of knowledge, pleasure, and sight: “All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions” (980a). The primacy of the sense of sight for learning becomes important when Aristotle discusses metaphor as psychological visualization.

The general premise about pleasant learning is an allusion to the first sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: "All humans by nature desire to know" (980a). What Aristotle emphasizes is the pleasure coming from learning easily (cf. *Rhet* 3.10.4). Kennedy notes: "As in the case of enthymemes (2.22.3), demands on a popular audience should not be great" (218n97). In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle stresses the superiority of the sense of sight, which he then applies to rhetoric by emphasizing how metaphor creates psychological visualization. "Sight, visualization, and a sense of the existence of phenomena in physical space are very common motifs in his work," observes Kennedy ("Reworking Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" 170). Visual motifs are evidenced in Aristotle's visual-spatial metaphors and his insight about how psychological visualization creates quick learning leading to shared perspectives of reality. According to Hill, "The general principle is: those devices that impart new knowledge quickly give the most pleasure" (118).

1410b 13. μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ τοῦτο μάλιστα [*metaphora poiei touto malista*] (metaphor most brings about learning): Stressing the cognitive function of metaphor, Aristotle suggests that metaphor is not merely a pedagogical ornament but primarily an "elliptical syllogism" (Derrida, "White Mythology" 239n43).¹⁵⁶ "Metaphor creates this most" is a literal gloss of the phrase, where the term "learning" is inferred from a prior *côla*, "words create knowledge [*mathêsin*]" (1410b12), and also in the next *côlon*: "[Homer] creates understanding [*mathêsin*] and knowledge [*gnôsin*]" by means of metaphor (1410b14). *Mathêsin* refers to "the act of learning,

¹⁵⁶ Derrida's phrase "elliptical syllogism of *mimêsis*" derives from his study of Aristotle's metaphorology in "La Mythologie Blanche" (1971; trans. "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," 1974). Grimaldi makes a similar observation (cf. 1:264, 71b9, s.v. ἀλλὰ συλλογισμός). Since enthymeme is a "rhetorical syllogism" (1.2.8), metaphor can be a "stylistic syllogism" because proportional metaphor creates logical inference as much as the syllogism and enthymeme (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 98 with 134, discussed below).

getting of knowledge” (LSJ 1072).¹⁵⁷ Thus, an accurate rendering would be, “above all, metaphor creates learning,” focusing on metaphor’s pedagogical and cognitive functions for facilitating shared knowledge. *Topics* has a similar proposition: “For metaphor creates knowledge [*metaphora poiei pôs gnôrimon*] of what is signified based on similarity [*homoiotêta*], for all those who use metaphors do so on account of some similarity carried over [*homoiotêta metaphorousin*]” (*Top* 6.2, 140a9-12; cf. *Rhet* 3.11.5).¹⁵⁸ The phrase “on account of some similarity” supplies the implied warrant or unstated premise (because clause) in all metaphors. Once a rhetor expresses a metaphor, the similarities between theme (i.e., “old age”) and phoros (i.e., “stubble”) become apparent so that the rhetor need not explain the reasons that warrant the metaphor because the metaphor invites the audience to participate by quickly visualizing the similarities that logically support the metaphor, making the new perspective reasonable and acceptable (cf. 1410b14 below for analysis of Homer’s metaphor). By this participatory process, metaphor appeals to inference in the auditor’s imagination so that metaphor is found to be an elliptical, stylistic syllogism. Moreover, metaphor creates not only new knowledge but also pleasure in learning by facilitating logical inference through analogy and *mimêsis*. Proportional metaphor provides a method of reasoning through inferential relationships specifically suited for creating a shared perspective of reality between rhetor and audience. If the enthymeme is a “rhetorical syllogism” (1.2.8), then the metaphor is a “stylistic syllogism” because all three forms (syllogism, enthymeme, metaphor) are distinguished not by

¹⁵⁷ *Mathêsin* belongs to a rich set of terms: *mathêma* means *lesson, learning, knowledge, education* as well as *mathematics*; *mathêteuô* refers to a *learner, student, disciple, or pupil*, frequently in Attic Greek referring to pupils of philosophers and rhetoricians (LSJ 1072).

¹⁵⁸ *Topics* 6.2: ἡ μὲν γὰρ μεταφορὰ ποιεῖ πως γνῶριμον τὸ σημαίνόμενον διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητά πάντες γὰρ οἱ μεταφέροντες κατὰ τινα ὁμοιότητα μεταφέρουσιν (140a9-12). My translation is adapted from that of E.W. Forester. For perception of likeness, cf. *Topics* 1.18.

their subject-matter (*pragma*) but by their inferential structures, permitting new conclusions (cf. 1.1.11). Aristotle has theorized three inferential forms: logical syllogism, rhetorical enthymeme, and stylistic metaphor. While the enthymeme is the “master structural idea” in Books 1-2 of the *Rhetoric*, in Book 3 the master *tropos* is also and primarily a *topos*, equally as capable as the rhetorical syllogism of creating new knowledge, but distinct in its visual figuration for creating new and surprising learning.

According to Grimaldi, “rapid insight,” which auditors find pleasurable, is achieved in three ways: by enthymeme with respect to thought, by antithesis with respect to syntax, and by metaphor with respect to language or style (*Studies* 98). All three forms create thought since all three participate in enthymematic form that generates the formal relationships necessary for inference, facilitating understanding. Like the enthymeme, metaphorical form is elliptical, which is a pleasure-producing function of “the syllogism hidden in metaphor” (Derrida, “White Mythology” 239). According to Derrida’s explication of Aristotle’s metaphorology, “The pleasure, here, comes from a syllogism—to be completed” (239n43). Aristotle explains the learning process in regards to *mimêsis*: “for the pleasure [of art] does not consist in the object portrayed; rather, there is a [pleasurable] reasoning [*syllogismos*] [in the mind of the spectator] that ‘this’ is ‘that,’ so one learns [*manthanein*] what is involved [in artistic representation]” (*Rhet* 1.11.23, 1371b9-10).¹⁵⁹ A parallel passage is found in *Poetics* 4: “This [pleasure] is why people enjoy looking at images [*eikonas*], because through contemplating [*theôrountas*] them it comes about that they understand and infer [*manthanein kai syllogizesthai*] what each element means”

¹⁵⁹ *Rhet* 1.11.23: οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκείνο, ὥστε μαυθάνειν τι συμβαίνει (1371b9-10).

(1448b14-16).¹⁶⁰ Kennedy notes: “As seen throughout the *Poetics*, Aristotle’s aesthetics are cognitive. The spectator comes to understand cause and effect and the relation of universals to particulars” (91n208). Grimaldi comments on these passages: “A. is talking about the flash of insight which infers new knowledge from something given, and the pleasure which comes from the illumination. His use of συλλογισμός here, and of συλλογίζεσθαι at *Poet.* 1448b16, and his explanation at *I* 10, 10b10-36 [3.10.2] confirms this” (1:264). The idea of “inference,” adds Grimaldi, is “the key to the whole argument” (1:264). Aristotle’s use of *sylogismos* and *sylogizesthai* is significant regarding *mimêsis* since the logical terms explicitly identify the inferential function of metaphorical *mimêsis* that is always implied when Aristotle writes that “metaphor most brings about learning.” When discussing metaphor, Aristotle focuses on *what* creates pleasurable learning, but in his treatment of topics of pleasure (1.11) he explains *how* this is accomplished by “the syllogism hidden in metaphor.”

In Aristotle’s formal categories, metaphor is poetic *mimêsis*: the linguistic-psychological “image” (*eikon*) creates “understanding [and] gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to others too” (*Poet* 4, 1448b12-13). Metaphor is a perceptual and pedagogical enabler working to communicate ideas more easily and more successfully. The reason Aristotle discusses metaphor as a subject of style derives from his theory of *mimêsis* with respect to his reality/representation distinction. Aristotle clearly states that metaphor is cognitive and participates in rhetorical invention as a *topos*, but his theory of *mimêsis* categorizes metaphor as representational knowledge as distinct from what he considers to be philosophical and non-representational knowledge. Derrida elaborates, interpreting Aristotle’s distinction: “[I]t can quickly be seen that the internal articulation [of ideas] is not that of the metaphors themselves,

¹⁶⁰ *Poetics* 4.4: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον (1448b1416).

but that of the ‘philosophical’ ideas, metaphor playing exclusively the role of a pedagogical ornament” (“White Mythology” 221). Aristotle’s is the traditional assumption: philosophy penetrates the realm of being and pure idea (*eidōs*, *idea*), while rhetoric (along with metaphor) belong to the realm of becoming and *mimēsis*, whose proper function is accurate, successful, and even creative inventional representation. Aristotle’s metaphysics affects his metaphorology, for his philosophy assumes epistemological clarity, the absence of linguistic mediation (*Int* 1, 16a), while his theory of rhetorical style features pedagogical translation of knowledge by the mediation of metaphor. The metaphysical reality/representation distinction is explicit in the epistemology of *mimēsis*, or what Derrida explicates as Aristotle’s undifferentiated internal/external articulation, or logocentrism (*Of Grammatology* 11). This formal distinction explains why Aristotle discusses metaphor exclusively in *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* III.

Contemporary theories of “conceptual metaphor” disrupt Aristotle’s theory of metaphorical *mimēsis*. For instance, when George Lakoff and Mark Johnson “revis[e] central assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition” by demonstrating that ideas are metaphorically structured, they are referring to the Aristotelian tradition of stylistic metaphor (*Metaphors We Live By* x, 3). Aristotle is not a contemporary theorist for whom there is nothing outside of metaphor. For Aristotle, metaphor is *mimēsis*, facilitating the making of meaning.

However, Aristotle’s mimetic view of metaphor is founded in his formal categories in *Poetics*, while in *Rhetoric* III are found functional and psychological views of metaphor and style, complicating his neat logic of *mimēsis*. Kirby comments: “While Lakoff is quite emphatic about distinguishing his cognitive model from what he calls the ‘classical theory,’ I think it is possible not only to show some important adumbrations of his model in Aristotle, but also to reconcile the two to a significant extent” (520). The fact that Aristotle discusses metaphor as a

means of learning indicates a model of cognitive metaphor based in his psychology and having affinities with the common topics of invention in Book 2.22-23 (discussed below at 3.11). Aristotle's observations about cognitive metaphor blur the modern thought/style opposition and even his own metaphysics/*mimêsis* distinction, as he seems to recognize but not address. Aristotle seems to retreat from the philosophical implications of cognitive metaphor, signifying that he shows more than he knows when he emphasizes the pedagogical and rhetorical over the philosophical and logical importance of metaphor. Even when one appreciates how metaphor affects epistemology and the logic of language, the insight of new rhetoric does not diminish but explains Aristotle's observations about the cognitive functions of metaphor: "above all, metaphor creates learning."¹⁶¹ For this insight, combining *lexis-logikê*, Aristotle considers metaphor to be "quasi-philosophical" because metaphor is always inferential and often provides positive definition by picturing essences, as it were, since interpretation by metaphors cannot completely dissociate signs from their referents (Kirby 543; Halliwell, "Style and Sense" 68).

Metaphor is the process of translating and visualizing by analogy. For Aristotle, this process is multimodal: inventional, inferential, pedagogical, delightful, and thus persuasive. In the *Rhetoric*, metaphor as trope serves as *topos* for creating understanding and developing a shared view of reality. Giovanni Battista Vico (1668–1744) comments on the multimodality of metaphor, observing that metaphor works as an argument-*sententia*-conceit all in one (Enos, "Classical Rhetoric"). Metaphor is an argument because it is an implied syllogism making a predication and (implied) conclusion based on probability; a *sententia* because it is a well-liked

¹⁶¹ Aristotle would recognize the coherence of classical and contemporary metaphor theory, referencing the value of "reputable opinions" (*endoxa*). In practical philosophy, *endoxa* often serve both ends of investigation, the starting-points and end-points; for instance, Aristotle writes, "for if the difficulties are solved and the reputable opinions [*ta endoxa*] remain, sufficient proof of the matter will have been given" (*EN* 7.1, 1145b6-7, translation by Barnes).

proverb functioning as a respected premise capable of clinching a case; and a conceit that delights an audience with its imagery and logic. Thus, the probable becomes convincing, the argument advances, and the metaphor teaches and delights, or in Aristotle's terms, metaphor creates quick learning, delighting audiences.

1410b 14. εἶπη τὸ γῆρας καλάμην [*eipê to gêras kalamên*] (he calls old age “stubble”): The metaphor is Homer's, spoken by “fair-haired Menelaus” in *The Odyssey* (4.213), identifying old age with a common agricultural sight of left-over stalks after the harvest: “*the stubble* (i.e. *the residue*) of former strength” (LSJ 865). Quoting Homer, Aristotle at once describes and illustrates the syllogistic process inherent in metaphor: “Metaphor most brings about learning; for when [Homer] calls old age ‘stubble,’ he creates understanding [*mathêsin*] and knowledge [*gnôsin*] through the genus, since old age and stubble are [species of the genus of] things that have lost their bloom” (3.10.2). The supporting reason in the enthymeme need hardly be stated because audiences infer the species-to-species similarity and thus transference between theme (“old age”) and phoros (“stubble”) that warrants the metaphor, making it reasonable and thus acceptable. Aristotle explains the formal process by which metaphor creates logical inference and learning: “Old age is [like] stubble” because, first (species wise), old age is to people what stubble is to plants and, second (genus wise), people and plants are comparable in their lifecycles. In the implied syllogism of metaphor, the middle terms regarding the genus drop out, are implied and unstated, leaving the metaphor in the concluding position. The audience participates in the inferential process by visualizing and supplying the implied premises. By identifying signs of harvest with age of humans, Homer creates a metaphor that audiences can easily visualize, warrant, and also extend with the analogical identification of plants and people. Writing about the same time as Homer (*ca.* 720-680 BC), Isaiah creates a similar metaphor that is

common in English idioms: “All flesh is grass / and all the goodness thereof is as the flower of the field. / The grass withereth, the flower fadeth” (40:6-7) With overtones of mortality, the metaphors of both inspired poets create quick, striking, visual learning by implicitly comparing cycles of plant life with the human lifecycle, thus enabling a speaker and audience to share perspectives on life (cf. discussion of formal categories of metaphor at 3.2.6, 1404b32).

10.3. ποιούσι μὲν οὖν καὶ αἱ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰκόνες τὸ αὐτό· διόπερ ἂν εὖ, ἀστεῖον φαίνεται. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ εἰκὼν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορὰ διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἦττον ἡδύ, ὅτι μακροτέρως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὡς τοῦτο ἐκείνο· οὐκ οὖν οὐδὲ ζητεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ.

10.3. Now the similes of the poets also do the same thing; and thus, if they do it well, they seem urbane. (A simile is, as was said earlier, a metaphor differing by what is put first. Thus, it is less pleasing because longer and because it does not say that this *is* that, nor does [the listener’s] mind seek to understand this.)

1410b 16. εἰκόνες [*eikones*] (similes): The term means likeness or similitude, explicit analogy, image (cf. English *icon*). While *eikôn* is the general term for simile (as in Homeric simile), Aristotle restricts its usage in prose because it is a poetical term (usually translated as “image”), reducing its power to persuade in prose. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle uses *parabolê* to refer to an inductive example (*paradeigma*) created by historical narrative in which the extended simile creates an historical argument (2.20.2-4).

Aristotle considers simile to be a metaphor with a preface that is “put first” (*prothesis*), differing in form only by adding the particle of comparison (cf. 3.4.1). Many in all ages have disputed Aristotle’s formal classification of simile, rhetoricians tending to agree with Aristotle’s analogical view of metaphor and literary critics tending to disagree. For instance, literary critic Stanford points out, “Metaphor is primarily a treatment of language, simile is primarily a treatment of thought” (*Greek Metaphor* 30). But rhetoricians Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca assert, “In the context of argumentation, at least, we cannot better describe a metaphor than by

conceiving it as a condensed analogy” (*New Rhetoric* 399). While simile and metaphor are similar in form, in function they can be as distinct as mathematics from literature, where the former reasons, “humans are like machines,” and the latter, “humans are machines.” Metaphor is a trope while simile is a figure of thought, so on the basis of function and meaning they could be classed separately. According to Aristotle’s formal categories, simile is a species in the genus of metaphor. In terms of rhetorical function, simile creates an explicit comparison while metaphor an implicit comparison, in which both formal structures allow one to compare theme with phoros between different conceptual domains.

1410b 18. ἥττον ἤδου [*hêtton hêdu*] (less pleasing): Similes are said to be “less pleasing” for three reasons: First, similes are longer than metaphors, defying Aristotle’s formal preference for neatness (*asteiotês*), or the pleasing quality of small and compact things (Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* 40). Second, in a related sense, “[simile] does not say that this *is* that,” implying that metaphor is definitional and thus philosophical, while simile makes its definitional claims less explicitly. Kennedy notes, “Aristotle, unlike later classical rhetoricians, thus implies that metaphor is a form of predication” (218n100). This implied claim means that metaphor functions as a sort of enthymeme or elliptical syllogism in which supporting reasons are implied by context or imagery. Third is an issue of clarity concerning the implied claim: “[the listener’s] mind [does not] seek to understand this [definitional claim]” because the simile’s form implies the claim while metaphorical form makes the claim more explicit (cf. 3.4 on the topic of similes). For these three reasons, Aristotle prefers the concise explicitness of metaphors, though in chapter 4 he writes that for similar reasons an obscure metaphor may need the particle of comparison, revising a metaphor as a simile in order to enhance clarity (3.4.3, 1407a13). The principle is that

clarity is a necessary prerequisite for both style and quick learning, so whether understanding is best accomplished by simile or metaphor is a matter of anticipating audience response.

10.4. ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα ταῦτ' εἶναι ἀστεῖα, ὅσα ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν ταχεῖαν. διὸ οὔτε τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εὐδοκιμεῖ (ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ ἅ μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι), οὔτε ὅσα εἰρημένα ἀγνοούμενα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὅσων ἢ ἅμα λεγομένων ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καὶ εἰ μὴ πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν, ἢ μικρὸν ὑστερίζει ἢ διάνοια· γίγνεται γὰρ οἶον μάθησις, ἐκείνων δὲ οὐδετέρων.

10.4. Those things are necessarily urbane, both in composition and in enthymemes, which create quick learning in our minds. This is why superficial enthymemes are not popular (by *superficial* I mean those that are altogether clear and which there is no need to ponder), nor those which, when stated, are unintelligible, but those [are well-liked] of which there is either immediate understanding when they are spoken, even if that was not previously existing, or the thought follows soon after; for [then] some kind of learning takes place, but in neither of the other cases.

1410b 20. δὴ καὶ λέξιν καὶ ἐνθυμήματα [*dê kai lexin kai enthymêmata*] (both in composition and in enthymemes): Translators variously render the phrase as “*lexis* and enthymemes” (Kennedy 1991), “style and enthymemes” (Freese) “style and reasoning” (Cooper), “speech and reasoning” (Roberts). The generalized translations of “*lexis*” or “style” affect the treatise and are preferable because Aristotle writes neither “composition” (*synthesis*) nor “speech” (*logos*), even though composition is a subcategory of *lexis* referring to the arrangement of words into *côla* that compose enthymemes and speeches. In addition, Aristotle does not write “or” between terms (“*lexis* or enthymemes”) but *dê/kai*, “both/and,” signaling a generalized reference that applies to both style and enthymemes. As a result, the phrase complicates a formal thought-style distinction established by the arrangement of the treatise, for the whole of the *Rhetoric* may be included in the phrase “*lexis* and enthymemes.” As a result, the stylistic principles of *ta asteia* apply to the whole art of rhetoric. Similarly, the psychological principle about the pleasure of “quick learning in our minds” applies to all interested audiences. As in previous sections, Aristotle implies that urbanity and metaphor cross categories and

interact with thought (*lexis-dianoia*) because metaphor is an implicit syllogism and often the height of urbane style.

1410b 22. τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων [*ta epipolaia tôn enthymêmatôn*] (superficial enthymemes): Between sound and sham enthymemes are superficial enthymemes that are simply “shallow, slight, commonplace” (LSJ 652), and hence “obvious arguments” (Roberts) that are “not popular” (LSJ 710). By superficial, Aristotle means “no need to ponder,” such as implied premises or results, because they are obvious, requiring no mental effort; as a result, no learning takes place, and they may even sedate an audience. Urbane enthymemes must be interesting and thought-provoking, stimulating for the audience to “some kind of learning.”

1410b 24. ἀγνοούμενα [*agnooumena*] (unintelligible): Next to superficial enthymemes are obscure enthymemes, “those which, when stated, are unintelligible,” because of a lack of clear expression. The result is the same as superficial enthymemes: no learning takes place. In contrast, well-liked expressions that are urbane (*asteia*) and fulfill the principle of quick learning consist of insightful, thought-provoking, well-phrased enthymemes that create “immediate understanding” so that “some kind of learning takes place.”

10.5. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἔὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται, οἷον “καὶ τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίους πόλεμον.” ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ.

10.5. In terms of the thought of what is said, such kinds of enthymemes are well-liked; in terms of the composition [an expression is urbane] on the one hand because of the figure, if it is spoken with some contrast (for example, “regarding the *peace* shared by others as a *war* against their own interests,” where peace is opposed to war).

1410b 27. διάνοιαν [*dianoian*] (thought): Having discussed *ta asteia* in the prior section in terms of thought or enthymemes, in this section Aristotle outlines how to create urbanity in terms of *lexis*, specifically composing antithesis as an example of shaped language (*schêmata*).

In the following section, Aristotle emphasizes how to create urbanity by metaphor in terms of visualization (3.10.6).

1410b 28. σχήματι [*schêmati*] (figure): *Schêmata* becomes in Latin rhetoric the term for figure of style. The distinction between *schêmata* and *figurae* concerns usage: *Schêmata* literally refer to “shaped language,” specifically well-shaped syntax, including antithesis, simile, and metaphor, but in the term’s development has come to mean tropes, or figures of style. *Figurae* literally refer to various “forms,” including well-formed syntax and linguistic images, but the term has developed to mean figures of thought (cf. 3.4.1). In Aristotle’s usage, *schêmata* is a category of ornateness (*kosmos*), referring to orderly, pleasing language, also having several subcategories, including figures of thought and of style (cf. 3.2.1).

1410b 29. ἀντικειμένως [*antikeimenôs*] (contrast): Meaning contrast, opposition, and even antithesis, the term is a key principle serving as the single example in this section of “shaped language,” *schêmata*. The example contrast (*antikeitai*), “peace is opposed to war,” is a paraphrase from *Philippus* 73, by Isocrates.¹⁶²

10.6. τοῖς δ' ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχη μεταφοράν, καὶ ταύτην μὴτ' ἀλλοτρίαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μὴτ' ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν· ὄραν γὰρ δεῖ [τὰ] πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

10.6. Or on the other hand because of the words, if they have metaphor—and metaphor that is not strange (for that would be difficult to perceive) nor superficial (for that causes nothing to be experienced). Furthermore, [urbanity is achieved] by means of bringing-before-the-eyes [*pro ommatôn poiein*, “visualization”]; for things should be seen as being done rather than as going to be done. [To achieve urbanity in style] one should thus aim at three things: metaphor, antithesis, actualization [*energeia*].

1410b 31. ὀνόμασιν [*onomasin*] (words): At the level of diction or word choice (*onoma*), urbanity is created by the best kinds of metaphors. Well-worded metaphors are neither “strangely

¹⁶² Kennedy notes, “*Philippus* was completed in 346 B.C., and quotations from it here and elsewhere [at 3.11.2 and 3.11.8] are the latest historical references in Book 3” (219n101).

alien” (*allogrios*) nor “superficially obvious” (*epipolaios*), but are created by visualization and animation, that is, by transforming a thought into an animated figure and presenting it before the audience’s eyes in order to create quick, thought-provoking comprehension of the message. Although Aristotle writes that metaphors should not be too *allogrios* (other, strange), according to *Poetics* 21.7 every metaphor is *allogrios* (alien) since metaphor involves a transference of language from one conceptual domain to another (Kennedy 219n102).

1410b 33-34. πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν [*pro ommatôn poiein*] (bringing-before-the-eyes): Creating metaphors involves the dynamic process of psychological and linguistic “visualization,” wherein rhetors seek to create vivid figures or word-pictures in order to transform the internal vision and hence comprehension, bringing an audience to insight. In his psychology, Aristotle concludes that thinking is inherently visual: “the soul never thinks without an image” (*An* 3.7, 431a15-19). From images, the intellect constructs linguistic symbols that are used in meaningful ways, such as metaphors to create a shared perspective. In this sense, metaphoric visualization is a psychological-symbolic process necessary for communication and learning. Aristotle applies this insight to metaphor through two terms: visualization (*pro ommatôn poiein*) and actualization or animation (*energeia*). As he elaborates in the next chapter, metaphor is a kind of actualization (*energeia*) as found in Homer’s practice, “making the lifeless living through the metaphor” (3.11.2, 1411b31). The best metaphors, then, not only help an audience to visualize and understand but also to animate the insight, adding dynamism or liveliness, which is a Homeric hallmark that Aristotle applies to his theory of style (3.11.2). Urbane metaphors allow audiences not only visualize the message but also visualize it in action, in its results and applications, so that an audience continues to ponder the insights gained from the metaphor.

In “Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Bringing-Before-the-Eyes,’” Sara Newman examines the visualization-metaphor relationship in its visual, symbolic, and stylistic processes. Aristotle’s insight is that perception parallels metaphorical processes. Visualization is seen as a key concept in the *topos* of metaphor, suggesting how and why rhetors create metaphors that lead audiences to insight. Discussing Aristotle’s psychology and metaphorology, Newman makes several observations: “the thinking soul relies on images” (22), “metaphors originate in perceptions” (9), perception relies on “comparison/contrast, resolution to a mean, and pleasure” (22), metaphors enable natural “quick learning” (8, 20), and “visualization is immediacy” in comprehension (9). For Aristotle, an image is a symbol that enables cognition by insight. Accordingly, “Aristotle characterizes ‘bringing-before-the-eyes’ as a perceptive capacity” (5). In Aristotelian rhetoric, figuration is cognition so that metaphor-creation is a necessary craft of communication.

1410b 34. *πραττόμενα* [*prattomena*] (being done): Derived from *prattô*, this verbal suggests the benefits of seeing “experience” in the “present,” thus recommending the present tense (LSJ 1460). A stylistic application of “bringing-before-the-eyes” is using the present tense, showing past or future action as “being done” in the present. This is not only a matter of word choice but more importantly a matter of perspective. Aristotle suggests showing future actions in the present, but it is more common to show past action in the “historic” present tense and past literary action in the “literary” present tense, which in fact is a stylistic convention (Kennedy 219n103). Concerning benefits, the present tense creates a greater sense of “presence,” including immediacy, visualization, animation before the eyes, and even intimacy, especially in the media of writing to overcome the distance of time and space between author and audience. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that not only does the present tense convey “the feeling of presence,” but also “the present tense expresses the universal, the law, the normal. The present is

the tense of maxims and proverbial sayings” (*New Rhetoric* 160). Moreover, showing activity as presently “being done” is also a form of *energeia*, or vivifying activity. The present tense and showing activity as present are ways to create urbanity.

1410a 35-36. μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας [*metaphoras, antitheseôs, energeias*] (metaphor, antithesis, actualization): By these “three things,” a rhetor will create urbanity. As a functional summary of *ta asteia*, Aristotle names three of six requirements, though these three (metaphor, antithesis, *energeia*) would necessarily include or achieve the other three (quick learning, enthymemes, and interesting, well-phrased expressions). The three figures are interactive because “all cases of imaginative *energeia* are also cases of metaphor, and metaphor and antithesis are easily combined” with each other and other figures (cf. 3.9.7, 3.10.5) (Halliwell, “Style and Sense” 65). Language with metaphor and *energeia* is sensuous and figural, while language with syntactical figures like antithesis provides logical development. In an examination of this summary passage, Fahnestock claims that Aristotle “establishes prototypes for the three subsequent categories of the figures: the tropes, schemes, and figures of thought. By grouping these three, he also identifies the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic sources of figuration, and, unlike his successors, he unites them with a strong view of the functional nature of the figures in rhetorical discourse” (“Aristotle and Theories of Figuration” 166). Integrating the three figures so that all three may occur in the same phrases, Aristotle shows his concern with the epistemic and functional in rhetorical style. In chapter 11, Aristotle focuses on metaphors having visualization and *energeia*, but the next section provides twenty-six example metaphors to illustrate the function of urbane figures. The large number of examples suggests that Aristotle was a collector of fine sentences, especially urbane and well-liked metaphors.

10.7. τῶν δὲ μεταφορῶν τεττάρων οὐσῶν [1411a] εὐδοκιμοῦσι μάλιστα αἱ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ὥσπερ Περικλῆς ἔφη τὴν νεότητά τὴν ἀπολομένην ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὕτως

ἠφανίσθαι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὸ ἕαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἐξέλοι. καὶ Λεπτίνης περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων, οὐκ ἔαν περιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἑτερόφθαλμον γενομένην. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος σπουδάζοντος Χάρητος εὐθύνας δοῦναι <τῶν> περὶ τὸν Ὀλυθιακὸν πόλεμον ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων <αὐτὸν> εἰς πνίγμα τὸν δῆμον ἄγχοντα τὰς εὐθύνας πειράσθαι δοῦναι. καὶ παρακαλῶν ποτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους εἰς Εὐβοίαν ἐπισιτισαμένους ἔφη δεῖν ἐξίεναι τὸ Μιλτιάδου ψήφισμα. καὶ Ἴφικράτης σπείσαμένων Ἀθηναίων πρὸς Ἐπίδουρον καὶ τὴν παραλίαν ἠγανάκτει, φάσκων αὐτοὺς τὰ ἐφόδια τοῦ πολέμου παρηρησθαι. καὶ Πειθόλαος τὴν πάραλον ρόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, Σηστὸν δὲ τηλίαν τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Περικλῆς τὴν Αἰγίναν ἀφελεῖν ἐκέλευσε τὴν λήμνην τοῦ Πειραιέως. καὶ Μοιροκλῆς οὐδὲν ἔφη πονηρότερος εἶναι, ὀνομάσας τινὰ τῶν ἐπικικῶν· ἐκείνον μὲν γὰρ ἐπιτρίτων τόκων πονηρεύεσθαι, αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπιδεκάτων. καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου ἰαμβεῖον ὑπὲρ τῶν θυγατέρων πρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐγχρονίζουσῶν,

ὑπερήμεροί μοι τῶν γάμων αἱ παρθένοι.

καὶ τὸ Πολυεύκτου εἰς ἀποπληκτικὸν τινα Σπυσειππον, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἠσυχίαν ἄγειν ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐν πεντεσυρίγγῳ νόσῳ δεδεμένον. καὶ Κηφισόδοτος τὰς τριήρεις ἐκάλει μύλωνας ποικίλους, ὁ Κύων δὲ τὰ καπηλεῖα τὰ Ἀττικὰ φιδίτια. Αἰσίων δέ, ὅτι εἰς Σικελίαν τὴν πόλιν ἐξέχεαν· τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ “ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.” καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινα μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευε μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσῃσι τὰς συνδρομάς [ἐκκλησίας]. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. καὶ οἷον ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, διότι ἄξιον ἦν ἐπὶ τῷ τάφῳ τῶν ἐν Σαλαμίनि τελευτησάντων κείρασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ὡς συγκαταθαπτομένης τῇ ἀρετῇ αὐτῶν τῆς ἐλευθερίας· εἰ μὲν γὰρ εἶπεν ὅτι ἄξιον δακρῦσαι συγκαταθαπτομένης τῆς ἀρετῆς, μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων, [1411b] τὸ δὲ “τῇ ἀρετῇ τῆς ἐλευθερίας” ἀντίθεσιν τινα ἔχει. καὶ ὡς Ἰφικράτης εἶπεν “ἢ γὰρ ὁδὸς μοι τῶν λόγων διὰ μέσων τῶν Χάρητι πεπραγμένων ἐστίν.” μεταφορὰ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, καὶ τὸ διὰ μέσου πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ. καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσαντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων <καὶ> μεταφορὰ. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου “οὐδὲ τὴν ἰκετηρίαν αἰσχυθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν.” μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων· κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἰκετεύει ἢ εἰκῶν, τὸ ἄψυχον δὲ ἔμψυχον, τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν <ὑπὲρ> τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ “πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες.” τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὖξιν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι. “οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα.” ἄμφω γὰρ ἐστὶν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη. καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τροπαιὸν εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὐτὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου· ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. καὶ ὅτι αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν· ἢ γὰρ εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τε τῆς ἀνάλογον λέγεται καὶ τῷ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν, εἴρηται.

10.7. Of the four kinds of metaphor, [1411a] those by analogy are most admired, as when Pericles said that the young manhood killed in the war vanished from the city as though someone took the spring from the year. And Leptines, speaking about the Lacedaimonians, [said] that he would not allow [the Athenians] to stand by while Greece was deprived of one of its “two eyes.” And when Chares was pressing to submit his financial account in the Olynthian war for approval, Cephisodotus objected, saying he was trying to have his account approved while “strangling the state at the throat.” And once, urging on the Athenians when they had secured supplies for a campaign to Euboea, he said they should march out “by the decree of Miltiades.” And Iphicrates,

when the Athenians had made a truce with Epidaurus and the neighboring coast, complained that they had deprived themselves of “traveling expenses” for the war. And Peitholaus called the Paralus “the bludgeon of the people” and Sestus “the baker’s board of the Peiraeus.” And Pericles demanded the removal of Aegina, “the eyesore of the Piraeus.” And Moerocles said he was no more wicked than___(naming someone of the upper class); for that person was wicked “at thirty-three and a third percent interest,” he himself “at ten.” And Anaxandrides’ iambic line about the daughters who were slow in marrying:

The maidens, I note, are in arrears in their marriages.

And [another example] is the remark of Polyeuctes against the paralytic Speusippus, that he couldn’t keep quiet though “bound by fate in a pillory of disease.” And Cephisodotus used to call warships “colored millstones,” and [Diogenes] the Cynic called fast-food shops “the Attic common mess.” Aesion, moreover, said they had “poured” the city into Sicily; for this is a metaphor, and bringing-before-the-eyes. And [his phrase] “so that Greece cried aloud” is in a certain way metaphor, and a bringing-before-the-eyes. And [so is] the way Cephisodotus demanded that they not hold many syndromas. And Isocrates [provides another example] in regard to “those running together” in festivals. And [consider] what is found in the Funeral Oration, that “it was proper at the tomb” of those dying at Salamis for Greece “to cut the hair in mourning, since freedom was being buried with their valor.” If he had said it was proper to shed tears since their valor was being buried, it would be a metaphor and before-the-eyes, [1411b] but the words “freedom with valor” provide an antithesis. And when Iphicrates said, “My path of words is through the midst of Chares’ actions,” it was a metaphor by analogy, and “through the midst” is before-the-eyes. And to say, “Call dangers to the aid of dangers” is before-the-eyes and metaphor. And [consider] Lycoleon speaking on behalf of Chabrias: “not ashamed of his suppliant attitude in that bronze statue”; it was a metaphor at the time it was spoken, but not at all times, but it was before-the-eyes, for when he was in danger, the statue [seemed to] supplicate, the lifeless for the living, the memorial of his deeds for the city. And [another example is] “in every way practicing lowly thinking”; for “to practice” is to increase something. And [another is] that “God kindled the mind as a light in the soul”; for both make something clear. [Another is] “For we do not settle ways, but postpone them”; both postponement and a peace of this sort are [a species of] delaying. And to say that treaties are a much better “trophy” than those won in wars; for a trophy honors a moment and one success, while treatises apply to the whole war; both are signs of a victory. And [another is] that cities give “great financial account” in the censure of mankind; for a financial account is a legal form of damages. Thus, that urbanities come from metaphor by analogy and by bringing-before-the-eyes has been explained.

1411a 1. κατ’ ἀναλογίαν [*kat’ analogian*] (by analogy): Of the four species of metaphor, Aristotle’s favorite is metaphor from analogy because it most enables the perception and representation of likenesses and, hence, reasoning about *mimêsis* in the world. In *Poetics* 21, Aristotle defines metaphor followed by an outline of his formal categories that reads like a scientific taxonomy: “*Metaphora* is an application [*epiphora*] of a word [*onoma*] that belongs to another/alien thing [*allogrios*]: either from genus to species, species to genus, species to species,

or by analogy [*analogon*]” (1457b6-9, my translation).¹⁶³ As already remarked (3.2.9 and 3.4.1), the first three categories (genus to species, species to genus, and species to species) describe tropes that are generally metaphorical: metonymy, synecdoche, and personification and anthropomorphism; the latter two tropes are a modern distinction, both derived from *prosôpopoia*, meaning “to make into a person” (from *prosôpon* for “face or person” and *poiein* for “to make”). These tropes generally involve substitutions of single words (illustrated in *Poetics* 21, 1457b9-16), while only metaphor from analogy is what modern theorists would regard as metaphor proper, involving some kind of predication, or an implicit comparison between conceptual domains. In *Poetics* 21, Aristotle describes this predication in algebraic form: “I call ‘by analogy’ cases where *b* is to *a* as *d* is to *c*: one will then speak of *d* instead of *b*, or *b* instead of *d*” (*Poet* 1457b16-18).¹⁶⁴ Similarly in *Topics*, Aristotle suggests that “likenesses must be examined in things belonging to different genera—as A is to B, so is C to D,” and also “in the same genus, to see if there is any attribute belonging to them all which is the same” (*Top* 1.17, 108a 7-18). In modern notation of ratio: $A : B :: C : D$, wherein both sides of an analogy are comparable, eliciting comparison and contrast between the two sets of items in different genera. Metaphors from analogy are most “admired,” making these “well-liked” expressions excellent examples of *ta asteia*, fulfilling the six requirements of *ta asteia* (outlined at 3.10.1).

Illustrating metaphor from analogy, Aristotle provides twenty-six example metaphors, making this section the longest in the *Rhetoric*. All examples are from oratory rather than from

¹⁶³ *Poetics* 21: μεταφορὰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον (1457b6-9; cf. *Rhet* 3.2.6 and comments).

¹⁶⁴ *Poetics* 21: τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογον λέγω, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχη τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον πρὸς τὸ τρίτον· ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ τέταρτον ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ τετάρτου τὸ δεύτερον (1457b16-18).

poetry as if to overwhelm his auditors with evidence of the prevalence of metaphor in rhetoric (*contra* the statement by Isocrates in *Evagoras* 9), and because he evidently enjoyed collecting specimens of particularly urbane metaphors. The large number of metaphors probably served Aristotle's teaching practice, such as examples for analysis in class discussion or for models to imitate (classical *imitatio*) in similar forms of metaphor (for instance, cf. Moerocles's metaphor, where Aristotle records the form but not the name in the example). Featuring metaphor in rhetoric, Aristotle culls examples neither from poetry nor from philosophy, for poetry Aristotle considered highly metaphorical but metaphysics beyond metaphor, at least in some instances, according to Aristotle's moderate realism, which itself is a philosophical practice open to rhetorical criticism. Most of the twenty-six metaphors are accompanied with explanations, wherein Aristotle remarks on the class and function for how the metaphor is useful in rhetoric. All of the metaphors are attributed to well-known rhetors, though the last five examples are left anonymous, and some context of their usage is provided along with brief remarks. Four metaphors are by Cephisodotus, two by Pericles, two by Iphicrates, two by Peitholaus, two by Aesion, two by Isocrates, and one each by Leptines, Moerocles, Anaxandrides, Polyeuctes, Lycoleon, and Diogenes the Cynic. The selected examples indicate that oratory is full of effective metaphors (cf. 3.2.6). Aristotle has no need to revert to the poets or philosophers for exemplar metaphors, though he could, but he emphasizes rhetorical metaphors and the metaphorical character of rhetoric.

1411a 3. ὥσπερ εἶ [*hōsper eī*] (as though): The first example by Pericles deserves comment because, of the twenty-six examples, this is the only simile. As a simile (*eikôn*), it includes the preface ὥσπερ (*as* or *like*), distinguishing it from a formally proper metaphor without the comparative particle. Although Aristotle classifies simile as a species of metaphor,

he always makes a distinction, usually preferring metaphor for its more concise form and explicit predication (cf. 3.4.1 and 3.10.3). Like many commentators, Marsh H. McCall explains that for Aristotle the simile (*eikôn*) is a kind of metaphor but that he is more concerned about rhetorical function than exact grammatical form: “he does not dwell on the particular form of his metaphors so long as they achieve the desired stylistic end” (43, cf. 61). The quotation from Pericles is an instance of the comparing the human lifecycle (“young manhood killed in the war”) to the cycle of the seasons (“took the spring from the year”), which is the same kind of metaphor analyzed at length in *Poetics* 21 (cf. discussion at 3.2.1). The celebrated simile by Pericles is also quoted in 1.7.34 as an example of argument from the greater, showing how urbane metaphors from analogy participate as enthymemes, successfully advancing an argumentation (3.10.4).

CHAPTER 11

LEXIS: ENERGEIA AND METAPHOR

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 11.1. Transition to cognitive aspects of metaphor (1411b 24–1411b 25)

DEVELOPMENT

- 11.2-4. Visualization and *energeia* in metaphor (1411b 25–1412a 9)
 11.5. Philosophical aspects of metaphor (1412a 9–1412a 17)
 11.6-7. Irony is a source of urbane metaphors (1412a 17–1412b 10)
 11.8-10. Ironic homonyms are urbane metaphors (1412b 10–1412b 32)
 11.11-13. Ironic similes are urbane metaphors (1412b 32–1413a 14)
 11.14. Ironic proverbs are urbane metaphors (1413a 14–1413a 19)
 11.15. Ironic hyperboles are urbane metaphors (1413a 19–1413b 2)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

11.1. λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιῶσι γίγνεται τοῦτο.

11.1. But it is necessary to say what we mean by bringing-before-the-eyes and what makes this occur.

1411b 24. πρὸ ὀμμάτων [*pro ommatôn*] (before-the-eyes): As a transition to chapter 11, this statement sets the focus on defining visualization (“before-the-eyes”) and exploring the cognitive aspects of metaphor (“what makes this occur”). Kennedy remarks, “The explanation is consistent with [Aristotle’s] cognitive psychology as found in other works, including *Poetics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*: the hearer ‘sees’ something in a different way and takes pleasure in learning” (221-22). Particularly because of chapter 11, what Sara Newman asserts is true: “Aristotle’s theory of metaphor is the Western intellectual tradition’s founding and most

influential statement on this subject” (“Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Bringing-Before-the Eyes’” 1).

Aristotle makes a serious study of style and metaphor in particular wherein he defines metaphor in formal categories, examines its rhetorical functions, and explores the psychological processes. Chapter 11 outlines Aristotle’s cognitive theory of metaphor, elucidating its rhetorical *topos* and its stylistic significance for creating and communicating knowledge.

In Aristotle’s theory of perception, vision parallels visualization, created by the interaction of three agents: psyche (a sensing human), organ (an eye), and object (an outside stimulus having color). By means of these three (soul, eye, object), visualization “is that form [lexical species] of *energeia* that has the potential to actualize the imagistic form within metaphors and thus prompt sensory response in their audiences” (Newman 17). Aristotle’s metaphorology is grounded in visual ability, a psychological-physical “ability to see the available means of persuasion in each particular case” (*Rhet* 1.2, 1255b 25). Such a view of sight and style is consistent with Aristotle’s understanding of psychology and rhetoric, suggesting that Book 3 of his *Rhetoric* is consistent with Aristotle’s unified corpus.

11.2. λέγω δὲ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει. οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορᾶ· ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια, ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ “ἀνθούσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμὴν” ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ “σὲ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄφετον” ἐνέργεια, καὶ “τοῦντεῦθεν οὖν Ἕλληνες ἄξαντες ποσίν.” τὸ ἄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορᾶ· ταχὺ γὰρ λέγει. καὶ ὡς κέχρηται πολλαχοῦ Ὀμηρος, τὸ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔμψυχα ποιεῖν διὰ τῆς μεταφορᾶς.

11.2. I call those things “before-the-eyes” that signify things engaged in activity. For example, to say that a good man is “foursquare” is a metaphor, for both are “complete”; but it does not signify activity [*energeia*]. On the other hand, the phrase “having his prime of life in full bloom” is *energeia*, as is “you, like a free-ranging animal” and “now then the Greeks darting forward on their feet.” *Darting* is actualization and metaphor; for he means “quickly.” And [*energeia*], as Homer often uses it, is making the lifeless living through the metaphor.

1411b 26 and 27-28. σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν [*sêmeinei energeian*] (signify activity): How is visualization “before-the-eyes” best created? Aristotle answers: metaphors having *energeia* best

create visualization. The key term *energeia* (cognate of English *energy*) is usually translated as “activity” (Kennedy), “actuality” (Freese, Ross), “animation” (Hobbes), and by phrases: “realized action (or activity)” (Whatley), “state of activity” (Roberts, Jebb, Cooper). Freese further defines *energeia* as “actualization, vividness, representing things inanimate as animate,” often involving *dynamis*, or dynamism (475). In a summary statement, Aristotle defines *energeia* as motion: “*energeia* is *kinesis*” (3.11.4, 1412a9). *Contra* Kirby, Kassel, Schenkeveld, and Cope, who follows Whatley, *energeia* and “before-the-eyes” and are not synonyms (Kirby 546; Kassel 218; Schenkeveld 4; Cope 3:125). Overlap and interaction certainly exist among “before-the-eyes,” *energeia*, and metaphor. While “bringing-before-the-eyes” creates visualization, which may be static or active, Aristotle adds *energeia* as a modifier to emphasize the distinct effect of motion, animation, and sometimes “personification” (Kennedy 222n17). Bringing-before-the-eyes is visualization, but *energeia* is activation. Metaphors with *energeia* are stylistically superior, not due to form, but due to function because they create quick, pleasant learning. Metaphors “in motion,” vivified by active verbs, actualize an audience’s visual imagination, making a dynamic image and impression with both vividness and animation, as illustrated especially in Homer’s poetry, for *energeia* is Homer’s poetic technique (cf. 3.11.3-4).

Examining this principle further, Richard E. Hughes in “The Contemporaneity of Classical Rhetoric” suggests that the uniqueness and staying-power of Aristotelian rhetoric derives from its generative *vitalism*, which springs from Aristotle’s concern for *entelecheia*, a term Aristotle coined for describing the dynamic relationship among form (*eidos*), action (*energeia*), and purpose (*telos*).¹⁶⁵ Aristotle employs *entelecheia* throughout his corpus with over

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle coined *entelecheia* by combining three Greek roots: *en* (within), *telos* (end, purpose), and *echein* (to have); the *-eia* suffix indicates the natural process of development, describing the dynamic functions of form (*eidê*) (Lindsay 268; Smyth 231-32).

one hundred-thirty usages in at least five different treatises. Burke has appropriated the term with almost equal frequency in his rhetorical theory (e.g., *Grammar of Motives* 27, 249-62).

Entelecheia infuses *energeia*, or natural dynamism, throughout Aristotle's theories. Hughes comments: "His biological studies predisposed him to see reality as the end product of form evolving into its ideally realized material structure. . . . The literal *life-ness* of the arts, and particularly the language arts, is at the heart of Aristotle's rhetoric" (37-38). Because *entelecheia* is his root assumption about earthly reality, Aristotle sees that verities, concepts, and language are never static, but dynamically developing from embryo to reality to maturity or perfection. Applied in his theory of style, Aristotle notices a qualitative difference between visualization that is merely logical, static, and objectified, and that which is pleasing, dynamic, and animated through active subjects and verbs. This liveliness of style is most enjoyable because it is most "natural," normal, and mimetic, reflecting living experiences in nature as theorized in biology as *entelecheia* and in style with the related term *energeia*, or motion. For this reason, Kennedy describes rhetoric as "the energy inherent in communication: the emotional energy that impels the speaker to speak, the physical energy expended in the utterance, the energy level coded in the message, and the energy experienced by the recipient in decoding the message" ("Hoot" 2). The axiom that rhetoric is *energeia*, the energy active in life and language, leads to several hypotheses for a general theory of rhetoric.¹⁶⁶

Havelock and Ong name the *energeia* inherent in oral discourse as "verbomotor," as distinct from reflective "categorical language" characteristic of achieved literacy (Havelock, *Muse Learns to Write* 41; Ong, *Orality and Literacy* 67). In verbomotor language, syntax is

¹⁶⁶ In "A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric" (1992), Kennedy outlines eight "general" or "natural" hypotheses, beginning with "Rhetoric is prior to speech," that apply to human and animal communication (4).

active and dynamic, based in stylistic practices of oral composition and performance. In categorical language, syntax is static, often passive, from overuse of the copula in logical predication as used to describe objectively and analytically. Like Aristotle, Havelock finds in Homer many examples of the style characteristic of verbomotor, or *energeia* (41). While Aristotle is certainly not averse to categorical analysis (he invented it), what he emphasizes in rhetoric is suiting the style to the situation (his thesis in the next chapter, 3.12), for rhetoric is not object-centered, but audience-centered communication. For creating urbane, well-liked expressions, a rhetor must work to adapt the style to the general or particular audience, often reversing syntax and activating verbs to create clarity and pleasure in learning.

Energeia is a key term throughout Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, though the concept is most prominent in his theory of metaphor.¹⁶⁷ *Energeia* appears as a topic of *êthos* (1.5.7) and as a topic of *pathos* (2.2.3) in which *energeia* signifies character and opinions. As a *topos* of *êthos*, the distinction between *dynamis* (potential ability) and *energeia* (manifest activity) enables people to recognize and distinguish between probable signs of character and sure activity that reveals character (cf. Grimaldi 1:112-13). As a *topos* of *pathos*, *energeia* enables similar recognition in regard to repressed and expressed opinions, where "actualization of opinion [*energeia doxês*]" means spoken thought (2.2.3). Internal versus expressed thought are distinguished by the terms *dynamis* and *energeia*, or linguistic potency and rhetorical activity (cf. Grimaldi 2:27). The fact that Aristotle finds *energeia* as an active principle in cognition, recognition, and metaphor suggests that he regards language to be inherently imagistic. Since cognition and expression are highly visual, thought can be seen as structured by language (*contra* Cope's nonlinguistic view of thought; cf. discussion at 3.1.2).

¹⁶⁷*Energeia* occurs nine times in the *Rhetoric*: first in 1.5.7 (1361a24), second in 2.2.3 (1378b10), and then seven times in 3.10-11 (1410b36, 1411b28+, 1412b32).

1411b 27. τετραγώνον [*tetragônon*] (“foursquare”): This term with its accompanying copula (linking verb “is” [*einai*]) illustrates a static metaphor without *energeia*. The lack of *energeia* results not from the noun “foursquare” but from the copula “is,” for *energeia* is activity and is created by showing activity with vivid action verbs, usually in the present tense. The term *tetragônos* is found in a famous poem by Simonides of Ceos: “’Tis difficult for a man to be truly good, foursquare in hands and feet and mind without incurring blame. . . .” (frag. 5; Kennedy 222n1 16). In Plato’s dialogue *Protagoras*, Protagoras quotes the poem by Simonides (339b), while Socrates explicates its meaning: “‘for it is not being but *becoming* good, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, blamelessly built—that is hard truly’” (334a). For Pythagoreans like Simonides, the square symbolized completeness, perfection, virtue, and justice, with which he identified as Aristotle mentions in *Metaphysics* (1, 985b 22–986b 5; cf. Cope 3:125).

1411b 30. ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά [*energeia kai metaphora*] (actualization and metaphor): Three quotations illustrate urbane metaphors having *energeia*, two from Isocrates and from Euripides. All three metaphors show actualization as action being done, using present-tense action verbs or verbals and vivid terms: “*having* his prime of life in full bloom” (Isocrates, *Philippus* 10), “you, like a *free-ranging* animal” (Isocrates, *Philippus* 127), “the Greeks *darting* forward on their feet” (Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis* 80, emphasis added). In addition to the active verbs and verbals, the other terms evoke colorful, moving pictures. The second example is a simile (*eikôn*), identified by the preface *hôsper* (*as* or *like*), but see comments above (3.10.7) along with McCall’s explanation of this passage (41 ff.) concerning Aristotle’s preference for rhetorical function above niceties of form. The quotations from Isocrates are notable because “the latest datable reference in book 3 seems to be to phrases of Isocrates’ *Philippus*, published in 346 B.C.E. (3.11.2 and 8)” (Kennedy, “Reworking Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” 181). As a whole, the

Rhetoric is best dated around the year 335, the year Aristotle returns to Athens and opens his school in the Lyceum, since he mentions the “Common Peace” in 2.23.18, probably the Peace of 336, and other references in Book 2 that date after 340; for this reason, John M. Rist dates the last possible revision of the *Rhetoric* in the year 332 (Rist, *Mind of Aristotle* 86; Kennedy, “Reworking Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” 179).

1411b 31. “Ὅμηρος [*Homêros*] (Homer): The following six examples of *energeia* come from Homer’s *Odyssey* (one in 3.11.2) and *Iliad* (five in 3.11.3-4). Aristotle possibly derives the artistic principle of *energeia* from Homer since rhetoric is the systematization of natural eloquence as well as “an evolving, developing consciousness about the relationship between thought and expression” emerging with notions and examples of gifted eloquence (Enos, *Greek Rhetoric* ix, 9; Vickers 1; cf. Cicero, *De Oratore* 1.32.146). The many examples from Homer suggest that Aristotle enjoys revealing Homer’s art of *energeia* wherein he makes “the lifeless living through metaphor [*ta apsycha empsycha poiein dia tês metaphoras*]” (1411b32) and in which “He makes everything move and live [*kinoumena gar kai zônta poiei panta*]” (1412a9), showing the personifying principle and anthropomorphic capability in *energeia* and metaphor, respectively.

11.3. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ τῷ ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν εὐδοκιμεῖ, οἷον ἐν τοῖσδε, “αὐτίς ἐπὶ δάπεδόνδε κυλίνδετο λάας ἀναιδῆς,” καὶ “ἔπτατ’ οἰστός,” καὶ “ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων,” καὶ “ἐν γαίῃ ἴσταντο [1412a] λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἄσαι,” καὶ “αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα.” ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις διὰ τὸ ἔμψυχα εἶναι ἐνεργούντα φαίνεται· τὸ ἀναισχυντεῖν γὰρ καὶ μαιμᾶν καὶ τᾶλλα ἐνέργεια. ταῦτα δὲ προσῆψε διὰ τῆς κατ’ ἀναλογίαν μεταφορᾶς· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λίθος πρὸς τὸν Σίσυφον, ὁ ἀναισχυντῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀναισχυντούμενον.

11.3. In all his work he gains his fame by creating activity, for example, in the following:
Then to the plain rolled the ruthless stone,
And “the arrow flew” and [also of an arrow] “eager to fly” and [of spears] “They stood in the ground [1412a] longing to take their fill of flesh,” and “The point sped eagerly through his breast.” In all of these something seems living through being actualized; for being “ruthless and “longing” and the other examples constitute *energeia*. He applied these by using metaphor by

analogy; for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is the “shameless” one to the one “shamefully treated.”

1411b 33. ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖν [*energeian poiein*] (creating activity): Homer gains his fame (*eudokimein*), Aristotle explains, by “creating *energeia*” in his works, by animating the inanimate. In all of the examples, Homer chooses concrete subjects and animates them with lively verbs and with personifying adjectives and adverbs. The examples are from *Odyssey* 9.598 and from *Iliad* 13.587, 4.126, 9.574, and 15.541, respectively, but as Kennedy considers, “some of what seems personification in early Greek may have been literally understood by an archaic audience, still sharing something of an animistic worldview” (222n122). Homer’s rhetoric features the art of personifying and animating the inanimate.

11.4. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ταῦτά· “κυρτά, φαληριόωντα· πρὸ μὲν τ’ ἄλλ’, αὐτὰρ ἐπ’ ἄλλα·” κινούμενα γὰρ καὶ ζῶντα ποιεῖ πάντα, ἢ δ’ ἐνέργεια κίνησις.

11.4. He does the same to lifeless things in his much admired similes:

Arched, foam-crested, some in front, but others upon others.

He makes everything move and live, and *energeia* is motion.

1412b 7. ταῖς εὐδοκιμούσαις εἰκόσιν [*tais eudokimousais eikosin*] (much admired similes): In addition to metaphors, Homer creates well-liked similes, perhaps creating the cultural standard for “urbanities and well-liked expressions [*ta asteia kai ta eudokimounta*]” (3.10.1). The quoted line from *Iliad* 13.799 is part of a long, Homeric simile comparing battle to waves of the sea (cf. Kennedy 223n123). What is unique here is that the simile does not personify lifeless things, but the opposite, yet comparing battle to waves of the sea still expresses appropriate movement, energy, and turbulence.

1412a 9. ἐνέργεια κίνησις [*energeia kinêsis*] (*energeia* is motion): In a summary statement, Aristotle equates *energeia* with motion (*kinesis*, the root for “kinetic” energy in English). *Kinêsis* refers to motion of all kinds, including dance, change, shake, and play, which

in turn cause people “to be moved or excited”; it is the opposite of rest (*stasis*) (LSJ 952). Thus, metaphors and similes that make an impression set not only their images “before-the-eyes” (for images could be at rest), but they also activate or vivify the images with *energeia* as Homer does, using concrete subjects, active verbs, and vivid modifiers showing present motion.

11.5. δὲι δὲ μεταφέρειν, καθά περ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ μὴ φανερώων, οἶον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ <τὸ> τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου, ὥσπερ Ἀρχύτας ἔφη ταῦτόν εἶναι διαιτητὴν καὶ βωμόν· ἐπ’ ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ ἀδικούμενον καταφεύγει. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄγκυραν καὶ κρεμάθραν τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι· ἄμφω γὰρ ταῦτό τι, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶ ἄνωθεν καὶ κάτωθεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνωμαλίσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι ταῦτό, ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ καὶ δυνάμεσι τὸ ἴσον.

11.5. As was said earlier, metaphors should be transferred from things that are related but not obviously so, as in philosophy, too, it is characteristic of a well-directed mind to observe the likeness even in things very different. Thus, Archytas [the Pythagorean philosopher] said that an arbiter and an altar were the same; for one who has been wronged flies to both. Or if someone said that an anchor and a rope hung from a hook are the same; for both are the same [shape], but they differ in that one is hung from above and one from below. And to say that [the allotments of land in] cities “have been equalized” is the same thing in widely differing cases: the equality is in the surface of land and the powers [assigned to each citizen].

1412a 11. καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ [*kai en philosophia*] (as in philosophy): The reference to philosophy concerns the necessary ability to observe likenesses (*homoia*) in logical reasoning, including induction, deduction, and definition making. Aristotle adds metaphor to his list of philosophical reasoning processes because metaphor is derived “from analogy” (3.2.9). Like other reasoning processes, metaphor creation depends upon the ability to perceive likenesses among dissimilar things, likenesses that usually do not initially suggest themselves (Kirby 536). Aristotle writes that this perceptive ability “is characteristic of a well-trained mind to observe the likeness even in things very different” (3.11.5). In his logical treatise *Topics*, Aristotle discusses this perceptive ability:

The observation of likeness [*homoiou theōria*] is useful both for inductive arguments [*epaktikous logous*] and for hypothetical deductions [*ex hypotheseōs*]

sylogismous], and also for the assignment of definitions [*apodosin tôn horismôn*]. For inductive reasoning [*epaktikous logous*] it is useful because we maintain that it is by induction of particulars on the basis of likenesses [*homoiôn*] that we infer the universal; for it is not easy to employ inference if we do not know the points of likeness [*ta homoia*]. It is useful for hypothetical deductions because it is an accepted opinion [*endoxon*] that among similars [*tôn homoiôn*] what is true of one is true also of the rest. (*Top* 1.18, 108b7-14)¹⁶⁸

Metaphor originates in observation of likeness, which is a critical cognitive step in the process of reasoning about the world and in the practice of communicating perspectives. In *Topics* Aristotle discusses the process of dialectical reasoning while in the *Rhetoric* he observes that the same process is necessary for the creation of metaphors. The perception of likeness is an ability that applies to rationality, discourse, and arguments, including one's interior dialogue in the process of invention (cf. Grimaldi 2:293, 97a7:1). For these reasons, Paul Ricœur in *The Rule of Metaphor* is interested in exploring the structural hermeneutics of metaphor, particularly its "heuristic power" and its "power to redescribe reality" (216-17). As Aristotle observes, metaphor is a *tropos* ("turn") that is also a *topos*, supplementing the modes of inference (in *Rhet* 2.23). Aristotle adds metaphor to his tools of cognition, his mental places of invention, making the count twenty-nine *koinoi topoi* for seeing the means of persuasion.

¹⁶⁸ *Topics* 1.18: Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρία χρήσιμος πρὸς τε τοὺς ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμούς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὀρισμῶν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐπακτικούς λόγους, διότι τῇ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ καθόλου ἀξιούμεν ἐπάγειν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιόν ἐστιν ἐπάγειν μὴ εἰδότας τὰ ὅμοια. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμούς, διότι ἔνδοξόν ἐστιν, ὡς ποτε ἐφ' ἑνὸς τῶν ὁμοίων ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν (108b7-14; cf. *Poet* 22, 1459a7-8; cf. also *APst* 2.13). My translation follows that of E.W. Forester.

1412a 12. θεωρεῖν [*theôrein*] (to observe): “To see, observe” translates *theôrsai*, “to grasp intellectually the meaning or utility of” (Kennedy 37). The related noun *theôria* is the root of “theory” in English. The verb signifies philosophical contemplation based in the ability “to observe the likeness even in things very different.” Metaphors derive from the ability “to see the likeness,” but this ability also describes the metaphorical process itself. The metaphorical, analogical observation-reasoning process is the fundamental cognitive ability from which other processes of reasoning derive and are interconnected, including those described in *Topics*, such as inference from induction, hypothetical deductions, and assignment of definitions. In addition, if language is largely metaphorical, as Aristotle implies (3.2.6), then many cognitive processes will be metaphorical, indicating that the resources of language play a significant role in the human ability to observe likenesses and to create metaphors.¹⁶⁹ In Book 2, one notices these same terms (*theôrein* and *philosophia*) together: the ability to “see the likenesses, which is rather easy from philosophical studies” (2.20.7). Kennedy interprets the phrase to mean that “the dialectical exercises in the philosophical schools, with their frequent use of the Socratic technique of analogy, train a student to see likenesses” (163n101). Umberto Eco adds that “these likenesses were not only in things but also (perhaps above all) in the ways in which language defines things, the philosopher knew well” (103). The metaphor-creating ability of seeing similarities, Aristotle writes, comes from “natural talent or by practice” (10.1.1), either from “a well-directed mind” (3.11.5) or signifying “natural ability [*euphyias*] because to use metaphor well is to discern similarities [*homoion theôrein*]” (*Poet* 22, 1459a6-8). That this perceptive ability could be “rather easy [*radion*]” applies only to the studious and reflective in the field of philosophy or “literary knowledge” (Jebb) or “literature” (Cope, *Intro.* 256), who are practiced in

¹⁶⁹ Aristotle suggests that metaphor has broad application in language: “for all people carry on their conversations with metaphors” (3.2.6, 1414b31-37; cf. *Poet* 22, 1459a10-14).

language and categorical inquiry. As a general theory of language, rhetoric does double duty for enabling metaphorical perception: philosophical heuristic training for perceiving analogies in the world, but also stylistic training for noticing how language structures and styles perception. In other words, *how* one sees shapes *what* one sees to a significant degree. So interconnected are cognitive-linguistic processes that one may not wholly separate *dianoia* and *lexis*, distinguishing *what* from *how*, even in analysis.

1412a 12. Ἄρχυτας [Archytas] (Archytas): Archytas, the Pythagorean philosopher, provides the first of three examples of seeing similarities among dissimilarities, illustrating the philosophical process of creating metaphors. He states that “an arbiter and an altar were the same,” referring to a lawyer and a priest,” for one who has been wronged flies to both.” The three example metaphors from analogy are insightful because they come from the same genus, as Aristotle briefly explains. The third example metaphor may be a reference to Isocrates, *Philippus* 40 (Kennedy 223n125).

11.6. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα τὰ πλεῖστα διὰ μεταφορᾶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν· μάλλον γὰρ γίνεται δῆλον ὅτι ἔμαθε παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίως ἔχειν, καὶ ἔοικε λέγειν ἢ ψυχῇ “ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ ἥμαρτον.” καὶ τῶν ἀποφθεγμάτων δὲ τὰ ἀστεῖα ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὀφῆσι λέγειν, οἷον τὸ Στησιχόρου, ὅτι οἱ τέττιγες αὐτοῖς χαμόθεν ἄσσονται. καὶ τὰ εὐηιγμένα διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδέα· μάθησις γάρ, καὶ λέγεται μεταφορᾶ. καὶ ὁ λέγει Θεόδωρος, τὸ καινὰ λέγειν. γίγνεται δὲ, ὅταν παράδοξον ἦ, καὶ μὴ, ὡς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, πρὸς τὴν ἔμπροσθεν δόξαν, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς γελοίοις τὰ παραπεποιημένα. ὅπερ δύναται καὶ τὰ παρὰ γράμμα σκώμματα· ἔξαπατᾶ γάρ. καὶ ἐν τοῖς μέτροις· οὐ γὰρ ὡσπερ ὁ ἀκούων ὑπέλαβεν· “ἔστειχε δ’ ἔχων ὑπὸ ποσσὶ χίμεθλα,” ὁ δ’ ὤετο πέδιλα εἶναι. τούτου δ’ ἅμα λεγομένου δεῖ δῆλον εἶναι. τὰ δὲ παρὰ γράμμα ποιεῖ οὐχ ὁ λέγει λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μεταστρέφει ὄνομα, οἷον τὸ Θεοδώρου εἰς Νίκωνα τὸν κιθαρῳδὸν “θράξει σε.” προσποιεῖται γὰρ λέγειν τὸ “Θράττει συ” καὶ ἔξαπατᾶ· ἄλλο γὰρ λέγει. διὸ [1412b] μαθόντι ἡδύ, ἐπεὶ εἰ μὴ ὑπολαμβάνει Θράκα εἶναι, οὐ δόξει ἀστεῖον εἶναι. καὶ τὸ “βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι.”

11.6. Urbanities in most cases come through metaphor and from an added surprise; for it becomes clearer [to the listener] that he learned something different from what he believed, and his mind seems to say, “How true, and I was wrong.” The urbanity of epigrams derives from their not meaning what is [literally] said; for example, that of Stesichorus that “the cicadas will sing to themselves from the ground.” Good riddles are pleasing for the same reason; for there is

learning, and they are spoken in metaphor, as is what Theodorus calls *ta kaina legein*. But this occurs when there is a paradox and not, as he says, in opposition to previous opinion; rather, it is like the bogus word coinages in jests. Jibes involving change of a letter [i.e., puns] also have this effect; for they are deceptive. It occurs too in verses, when they do not end as the listener expected: “He came on, having under his feet—blisters.” The listener expected *sandals*. [To be effective,] the point should be clear as soon as the word is said. Changes of letter [as in a pun] make the speaker mean not what he says but what the word plays on, like the remark of Theodorus to Nikon the harpist, *Thrattei se*. He pretends to say, “It disturbs you” and deceives, for he means something different. [1412b] Thus it is pleasing to the learner, but if the latter does not understand that Nikon was a Thracian it will not seem urbane. And [consider] the remark *Boulei auton persai*.

1412a 18. τὰ ἄσπεῖα [*ta asteia*] (urbanities): The following ten sections (§§6-15) introduce a new source and subcategory of *ta asteia*: verbal irony. Throughout his corpus, Aristotle uses the term irony (*eirōneia*) in its pejorative meaning as “mockery with deceit” (i.e., trickery, sham, lying), but his examples of *ta asteia* feature the modern sense of irony as “mockery without deceit,” such as ironical diction common in puns, sly humor, subtle riddles, and wry, clever expressions. Classical *eirōneia* is considered poetic and pejorative, characterized by the *eirōn*, a witty and resourceful stock character in Greek comedy known for being a trickster, for which reason *eirōneia* means “dissimulation, i.e. ignorance purposely affected” (LSJ 491). Plato first uses the noun *eirōneia* early in the *Republic*, having his opponents characterize Socrates as an *eirōn*, who is merely “shamming [*eirōmeuesthai*]” when he claims not to be able to define justice (337a; cf. *Symposium* 216e).¹⁷⁰ This pejorative characterization of *eirōneia* as trickery, lying, and willful deceit reveals “the Greek suspicion of irony as an abusive and deceptive use of language; anyone who practiced *eironeia* was an *eiron*—a dissembler” (*ERC* 355, s.v. “Irony”). When Aristotle uses *eirōneia*, it gives contemptuous connotations to a person’s character and language (cf. *Rhet* 1379b32; 1408b20; 1419b7; 1420a1; *EN* 1127b22).

¹⁷⁰ On Plato’s use of *eirōneia*, see Gregory Vlastos, “Socratic Irony,” *Classical Quarterly* 37.1 (1987): 79-96; also David D. Possen, “Protagoras and *Republic*: Kierkegaard on Socratic Irony” (pp. 2:87-104) in *Kierkegaard and the Greek World* (Farnham, Eng.: Ashgate, 2010).

However, the modern trope of verbal irony plays a central role in Aristotle's discussion of urbanity, though Aristotle does not have a name for ironical diction. Distinct from deceitful *eirôneia*, verbal irony is "mockery innocent of deceit" in an admirable sense, the sense Cicero gave *ironia* when he transliterated the Greek term and bedecked it with "the height of urbanity, elegance, and good taste" as a habit of stylish discourse (Vlastos 84).¹⁷¹ Quintilian formalized Ciceronian *ironia* as that figure or trope "in which something contrary to what is said is to be understood [*contrarium ei dicitur intelligendum est*]" (9.22.44). In its Latin, urbane, and modern sense, verbal irony occurs when intention is the opposite of expression, creating discrepancies between expectation and fulfillment, appearance and reality, or surface and literal meaning, but always requiring that the rhetor perceive, and desire the hearer to interpret, the concealed meaning that lies beneath the surface statement. In modern rhetoric, Wayne C. Booth classifies verbal irony as "stable irony," wherein authorial intention is the necessary element: "an intentional act of an author, covertly expressed in the text, which is recovered through a stable reconstructive act, resulting in the reader's reconstructing a new local and finite meaning" (*ERC* 357, s.v. "Irony"; Booth, *A Rhetoric of Irony* 1-46).

These characteristics of verbal irony are evident in Aristotle's descriptions of *ta asteia* in 3.11.6-15. Introducing this nameless subcategory, Aristotle writes that urbanities are created from an "added deception," "not meaning what is [literally] said," "riddles," "word plays," and "metaphor" (3.11.6). These descriptions characterize verbal irony, the trope of contrariety as

¹⁷¹ Cicero coined Latin *ironia* as a transliteration of Greek *eirôneia*, but gave his *ironia* admirable connotations with the term "*urbana*" (*De Oratore* 2.67, 269-70; Vlastos 84). In addition, Cicero developed *ironia* into a figure of speech and a habit of urbanity; in turn, Quintilian formalized and distinguished *ironia* by creating two categories, trope and schema, which became verbal and situational irony (*ERC* 355). Through this development, it is possible that Greek *asteia* (urbanities) became a part of Ciceronian and European *ironia* (urbane in focus), for *ironia* is certainly a category of Aristotelian *asteia*.

defined by Quintilian and transferred into English by Samuel Johnson: “A mode of speech in which the meaning is contrary to the words” (Johnson, *Dictionary*, s.v. “Irony”). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle concludes his discussion of urbanity with verbal irony, suggesting significance and perhaps climax of his treatment of style. As a category and source of urbanity, verbal irony adds to the previous six requirements (outlined in 3.10.1) two more: ironic expressions hide an “added surprise” (literally “added deception” [*prosexapatán*]), involving a concealed-to-revealed insight of some truth that strikes an audience “contrary to expectation” (called *paraprosokokia*), whether the irony is humorous, sarcastic, or “pulling one’s leg” (Kennedy 223n128). Since urbanities are well-liked, ironic expressions tend to conceal (and then reveal) witty insights and well-phrased truths rather than feature sarcasm. Irony in eight forms is the focus of the remainder of the chapter: epigrams, riddles, puns, and verses (§6); homonyms (§§7-10); similes (§§11-13); proverbs (§14); and hyperboles (§15). Aristotle observes that these eight well-liked devices are urbane forms of metaphor.

Prior interpreters have overlooked the trope *ironia* in this chapter’s concluding ten sections, perhaps because Greek *eirôneia* denotes the abusive sense of mockery. As a result, commentators have misclassified and misread half of the chapter, suggesting that it treats “other devices of style” (Kennedy 25), “wittiness of style” (Hill 118), “witticisms, things amusing and laughable” (Cope 3:130), “deceptive surprise” and “learning through surprise” (Cooper 212). Rather than disparate witty devices, these results have their cause in verbal irony, which forms and creates the wit, deception, and surprise resulting in well-liked expressions. Verbal irony is the source of these *asteia* as well as a large subcategory for this rhetorical concept.

1412a 18. διὰ μεταφοῶς [*dia metaphoras*] (through metaphor): The fact that Aristotle writes, “*ta asteia* in most cases come through metaphor [*dia metaphoras*] and from the added

deception [*kai ek tou prosexapatan*],” suggests a relationship between metaphor and irony in creating these statements. The conjunction “and [*kai*]” plus the genitive article “the [*tou*]” are significant together because they indicate not two separate sources but a compound source for creating “the most urbane expressions [*ta asteia ta pleista*]” in terms of quantity. This compound source refers to metaphor plus irony or metaphor as irony, suggesting that Aristotle recognizes irony as a trope of substitution. This proposal seems likely because Aristotle unifies ten sections under the trope of irony and writes repeatedly that each device in these sections is a metaphor. One may suggest, therefore, that Aristotle has not four categories of metaphor (outlined in *Poetics* 21) but five categories since he recognizes irony as a fifth kind of metaphor (cf. 3.2.6). If his two species of synecdoche were combined, Aristotle would then have the four classical tropes, titled by Burke as “the four master tropes” (*Grammar of Motives* 503-12).

1412a 18-19. ἐκ τοῦ προσεξαπατᾶν [*ek tou prosexapatan*] (from an added surprise): Literally, “from the added deception,” where the article adds definiteness to the unexpected, surprising supplement in “the deception,” “the concealment” (LSJ 1509). Just after the utterance, the concealed truth is revealed, producing insight, hence surprise, thence pleasant learning so that the auditor’s soul (ψυχὴ [*psychê*]) responds, “How true, and I was wrong [*hôs alêthôs, egô de hêmarton*]” in a moment of agreeable reversal. The essence of verbal irony is the disparity between literal and intended meaning followed by a response of recognition and by a reversal of expectation. Irony defamiliarizes the familiar, preparing an audience to consider new perspectives, attitudes, and opinions. Significantly, Aristotle introduces this new section of *ta asteia* with a virtual formula of verbal irony ($A = -A$), what Burke also defines formulaically, “what goes forth as A returns as non-A,” showing irony to be a trope of reversal (517).

1412a 21. ἀποφθεγμάτων [*apophthegmatôn*] (epigrams): The term refers to a “terse pointed saying, apophthegm” (LSJ 226), appropriated in Early Modern English as *apophthegm* and *apothegm*, meaning “a terse, pointed saying, embodying an important truth in few words; a pithy or sententious maxim,” always involving “the rare talent of compressing a mass of profound thought into an apophthegm” (*OED*), translated in contemporary English as aphorism, proverb, and epigram. “The *asteia* of *apophthegms*,” writes Aristotle, “derives from their not meaning what is [literally] said,” where “not meaning” (*mê phêmi*) negates the idea that what is expressed corresponds with what is believed, supposed, or thought (LSJ 1926). The example comes from the great poet Stesichorus (*ca.* 640-555), who writes that “the cicadas [*tettiges*] will sing to themselves from the ground,” implying that when cicadas (locusts) have no sustenance or refuge in trees, then the land will be devastated. The same aphorism is quoted in 2.21.8 (cf. *Phaedrus* 243a). Demetrius *On Style* (99, 100, 243) also quotes it, rightly calling it an allegory and attributing it to the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse (*ca.* 432-367), for whose son, the tyrant Dionysius II, Plato served as temporary tutor (cf. Plato’s *Seventh Letter*). Demetrius describes the function of this allegorical aphorism:

Allegory [*allêgoria*] is impressive, particularly in threats, for example that of Dionysius, “their cicadas will sing from the ground.” If he had stated openly that he would ravage the land of Locris [Italy], he would have shown more anger but less dignity. As it is, he has shrouded his words, as it were, in allegory [*synkalummati tou logou allêgoria*]. What is implied always strikes more terror, since its meaning is open to different interpretations, whereas what is clear and plain is apt to be despised, like men who are stripped of their clothes. (*On Style* 99-100)

As an allegory, the aphorism is a metaphor, specifically Aristotle's second category of metaphor (species to genus, or particularizing synecdoche), wherein the figure of *locusts singing on the ground* represents a species of the genus «devastation». The example involves verbal irony (“not meaning what is [literally] said” [1412a22]) since the pleasant language and the threatening intent are at odds until the synecdochical figure is understood.¹⁷²

1412a 24. εὖ ἠνιγμένα [*eu ênigmena*] (good riddles): *Ênigmena* is a past participle derived from the verb *ainissomai*, to “speak darkly or in riddles” (LSJ 40, 775). *Ainigma*, riddles or “dark” sayings, are an extended series of metaphors as Aristotle affirms: “they are spoken in metaphor.” He quotes Theodorus of Byzantium (a rhetorician of the late fifth century), who equates *ênigmena* with *ta kaina legein*, “saying new things,” in his early rhetorical handbook.¹⁷³ Aristotle concedes that riddles are “novel expressions,” but disagrees with the reason: “But this occurs when there is a paradox [*paradoxon*] and not, as he says, in opposition to previous opinion [*emprosthen doxan*].” The difference is that *paradoxos* means “contrary to expectation” but not contrary to reason (LSJ 1309). The surprise of paradox occurs suddenly because it is ironic: paradox locates incongruity, not contradiction, between cultural knowledge and reason. Riddles deal in paradoxes that contradict received opinion, yet seem true. The response is, to repeat Aristotle's phrase, “How true, and I was wrong,” thus opening an audience to consider

¹⁷² Greek aphorisms, observes Havelock, are an essential means of knowledge in oral culture: for instance, “the so-called ‘fragments’ of Democritus did not appear to be quotations extracted from otherwise lost works, but on the contrary were intended by their author to serve as self-contained aphorisms,” at a time when knowledge depended on word of mouth and retention on the memory (*The Muse Learns to Write* 1-2).

¹⁷³ In *Sophistical Refutations* (34, 183b), Aristotle credits Theodorus of Byzantium as one of the founders of the art of rhetoric, who, after Tisias and Thrasymachus, advanced the *technê* (cf. 2.23.28; Kennedy 223n127, 294 ff.). Theodorus' handbook on rhetoric would have contributed to Aristotle's anthology of practical handbooks, called *Synagôgê technôn* (cf. 3.1.1). In contrast, Plato refers derisively to Theodorus as “that word-artificer [*logodaidalon*]” (*Phaedrus* 266e).

new and better opinions. In addition, paradox is in the language, resulting from the lack of a distinction, where making a distinction between terms (homonyms) will resolve the paradox and solve the riddle. The act of discerning the distinction creates learning. Aristotle compares riddles to “bogus word coinages” (*parapoiêsis* refers to “making a parody”), just as comic playwrights create parody by imitation with substitutions of words and phrases, thus creating riddles through metaphor. Aristotle does not provide an example, but if asked, he would probably refer to antiquity’s most famous riddle: “What walks on four legs in the morning, on two legs at noon, and three legs in the evening?”¹⁷⁴ In solving the riddle of the Sphinx, one must recognize various metaphors in play, and realize how they mediate and interpret the textual signs.

1412a 29. σκώμματα [*skômmata*] (jibes): “Puns” is the best translation because these jests are created by a change of letter (*gramma*) and *skômmata* is the diminutive of *skômma* (LSJ 1618). Puns are a third kind of irony because they create the same effect (*dynatos*) since they also are “deceptive [*exapata*].” Like the other devices, their effect “derives from their not meaning what is [literally] said” (1412a22). Returning to puns a few lines later (1412a32–1412b2), Aristotle repeats the key principle of verbal irony: they “make the speaker mean not what he says but what the word plays on [*metastrephei*]” (1412a33), where the key term means “turn around” (LSJ 1117). Thus, puns like metaphors are turns of language, which most commonly occur in metonymy or species-to-species substitution.

¹⁷⁴ Asclepiades of Tragilus, a pupil of Isocrates, provides the earliest extant text of the riddle: “There walks on land a creature of two feet, of four feet, and of three feet; it has one voice, but sole among animals that grow on land on in the sea, it can change its nature; nay, when it walks propped on most feet, then is the speed of its limbs less than it has ever been before” (Jacoby, *Fragmente* 12 F 7a; qtd. in Bremmer 46; cf. Kirby 542; Athen. *Deipn.* 456B; *Biographical Dictionary* 1.381). The original Greek consists of five verses in dactylic hexameter. The ancient riddle of the Sphinx is associated with Sophocles’ Oedipus, but he never quotes the riddle, only solves it (*Oedipus Tyrannus* 893-910, *Oedipus Rex* 471 ff.).

1412a 29. μέτροις [*metrois*] (verses): A fourth source of verbal irony are poetic verses that “do not end as the listener expected.” By referring to poetry, Aristotle probably intends to bring to mind a series of common examples, but the practice is not restricted to poetry. Kennedy remarks that this practice, in poetry and in prose, is technically known as *paraprosodokia*, meaning “contrary to expectation” (223n128). In such verses, a writer or speaker creates incongruity between expectation and fulfillment, resulting in surprise; in the best cases, it also results in insight, learning, and pleasure.

1412b 2. “βούλει αὐτὸν πέρσαι” (*Boulei auton persai*): Literally, “you desire to destroy,” relating a pun on the term *persai*, meaning both “destroy” and “Persian women” (Kennedy 224n130). Like all puns, this one results from a homonym and is realized by distinguishing between the word’s meanings in the cultural context. For Greeks, the example was a pleasing pun, having a humorous “added surprise” aimed against political rivals, also appealing to a sense of united identity (*êthos*) among Greeks. For this example and the previous one, Aristotle cautions that puns require cultural knowledge: if the auditor “does not understand,” i.e., that Nikon was a Thracian, or how *persai*, Persian females (or effeminates), played an important part in the Greco-Persian Wars, then “[the pun] will not seem urbane” (1412b1-2). Enthymemes concern particulars, so with the absence of received culture, enthymemes tend to fail, especially puns and other verbal ironies that play upon the disparity between common and intended meaning. The pleasure that comes to an auditor depends upon the ability to distinguish among multiple meanings of a word or phrase and quickly perceive the disparity and the intent.

11.7. δεῖ δὲ ἀμφοτέρω προσηκόντως λεχθῆναι. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι Ἰσοκράτους τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὡς περ Ἰσοκράτους τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὁ οὐκ ἂν ᾤθη τις εἶναι, τοῦτ' εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲν σοφόν· ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ' ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὅ εἰ πεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως.

11.7. It is necessary for both examples to be said in the right way. Similarly also with urbanities, as in saying that the *arkhê* [command] of the sea was not the *arkhê* [beginning] of misfortunes for the Athenians; for they benefited; or as Isocrates says, that the *arkhê* [empire] was the *arkhê* [beginning] of misfortunes; for in both cases someone says what would not be expected and its truth is recognized. To say that an *arkhê* is an *arkhê* is not very clever, but he means the words in different senses; and [in the first example the speaker] does not negate the *arkhê* he has spoken of but uses the word in a different sense.

1412b 3. προσηκόντως λεχθῆναι [*prosêkontôs lesthênai*] (said in the right way):

Referring to the previous “two ways” (*amphotera*), such as the prior examples or sources of irony, Aristotle repeats a principle from the beginning of Book 3: “for it is not enough to have a supply of things to say, but it is also necessary to say it in the right way” (3.1.2; cf. 3.10.2). In the current phrase, the adverb *prosêkontôs* means “suitably, fitly” (LSJ 1512), serving as a synonym for *prepon*, for adjudicating what is *appropriate* for the situation. Given the previous remarks about clarity and audience (3.11.6), in this context “right way” refers to both expression (choosing the best phrasing) and audience (providing enough context) so that the “added surprise” is recognized successfully.

1412b 4-5. ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν [*archê mê archê*] (*archê* not *archê*): This section focuses on the homonym *archê* with its many meanings, including beginning, authority, command, empire, not to mention first principles of an art. Aristotle provides two examples to illustrate how homonyms may create *ta asteia* through similar sound but dissimilar sense. The first example is anonymous: “The *arkhê* [command] of the sea was not the *arkhê* [beginning] of misfortunes for the Athenians,” and the second is similar: “the *arkhê* [empire] was the *arkhê* [beginning] of misfortunes,” from Isocrates, *Philippus* 61 (346) and in *On the Peace* 101 (355) (Kennedy 224n131). As Aristotle explains, each example is both clear (*saphê*) and clever (*sophos*), resulting in surprise and recognition of its truth.

1412b 9. ἀλλ' ἄλλως [*all' allōs*] (different senses): In the present section, this phrase is repeated twice (and a third time in 1412b15) to emphasize the homonym *archê*, and homonymy in general, in creating the surprise in the attractive verbal irony. Aristotle notes that the word is used with “different senses” in each case so that surprise with insight results when one distinguishes the two meanings in the single sound, recognizing the word play. Until this point in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle has not mentioned *homonymia* as a device of *ta asteia*, but he does in the next section alongside of metaphor.

11.8. ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ τούτοις, εἰὰν προσηκόντως τὸ ὄνομα ἐνέγκῃ ὁμωνυμία ἢ μεταφορᾷ, τότε τὸ εὖ. οἶον “Ἀνάσχετος οὐκ ἀνασχετός·” ὁμωνυμίαν ἀπέφησεν, ἀλλὰ προσηκόντως, εἰ ἀπῆδης. καὶ “οὐκ ἂν γένοιο μάλλον ἢ [σε δεῖ] ξένος ξένος,” ἢ οὐ μάλλον ἢ σε δεῖ. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ “οὐ δεῖ τὸν ξένον ξένον αἰεὶ εἶναι.” ἀλλότριον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ Ἀναξανδρίδου τὸ ἐπαινούμενον, “καλὸν γ' ἀποθανεῖν πρὶν θανάτου δρᾶν ἄξιον.” ταῦτό γάρ ἐστι τῶ ἐπιεῖν ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ὄντα ἄξιον ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ ἄξιόν γ' ἀποθανεῖν μὴ θανάτου ἄξιον ὄντα, ἢ μὴ ποιῶντα θανάτου ἄξια.

11.8. In all these cases, if a word is introduced appropriately, either as a homonym or a metaphor, it is well done. For example, “Mr. Baring is unbearable.” The homonym is negated, but appropriately if he is unpleasant. And “You should be no stranger than a stranger,” or no more than you should be. Or again, “It is not necessary for the stranger always to be strange,” for one word [*xenos*] is used in different senses. Similar is the admired line of Anaxandrides: “Good it is to die before doing anything worthy of death.” That is the same as saying someone is worthy of dying when not worthy of dying or worthy of dying when not being worthy of death or not doing anything worthy of death.

1412b . ὁμωνυμία ἢ μεταφορα [*homonymia he metaphora*] (homonym or metaphor):

The two terms are categories which are distinct but not mutually exclusive. In the current usage, they involve the substitution of “a word [*to onoma*]” (noun or adjective), suggesting that Aristotle is referring to his first three categories of metaphor (generalizing synecdoche, particularizing synecdoche, and metonymy) which may create a homonym. Since a homonym refers to one sound with two or more meanings (a word with a double identity), it is certainly possible to create homonymy with a metaphor, and vice-versa. The passage emphasizes word choices and expressions that are made “suitably, fitly [*prosêkontōs*]” (LSJ 1512), in which case it

is well done. Four examples illustrate well-composed homonymy. The first example (“Mr. Baring is unbearable [*Anáschetos ouk anaschetós*]”) is appropriately negated, creating irony and humorous surprise. The last example comes from Aristotle’s contemporary, Anaxandrides the award-winning comic poet, whose homonym is called “praiseworthy [*epainoumenon*].” It reads, “Good it is to die [*apothanein*] before doing anything worthy of death [*thanatou*],” and Aristotle spends a few lines analyzing its admirable homonymous irony (cf. 3.2.7: “The kind of words useful to a sophist are homonyms” [1404b38]).

11.9. τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶδος τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς λέξεως τούτων· ἀλλ’ ὅσῳ ἂν <εν> ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειμένως λεχθῆ, τοσούτῳ εὐδοκιμεί μάλλον. τὸ δ’ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡ μάθησις διὰ μὲν τὸ ἀντικεῖσθαι μάλλον, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ θάττον γίνεται.

11.9. The species of the *lexis* in these examples is the same, but insofar as they are spoken concisely and with a contrast they are better liked. The cause is that knowledge results more from contrast but is quicker in brief form.

1412b 21. ἐλάττονι καὶ ἀντικειμένως [*elattoi kai antikeimenôs*] (concisely and with contrast): Referring to the previous examples of homonymy, Aristotle notes that they are a distinct species (*eidōs*) of *lexis* which are “better liked” because they are concise and include contrast. With the given homonyms, the contrast creates the verbal irony in each case, and their conciseness (often with parallelism) emphasizes the contrast, thus creating a sharper statement with more surprise, learning, and delight. As an example, “Noah saturated the earth with his absence.” The expression is concise, the terms saturate and absence are opposites, and “saturated” is synonymous with “precipitated,” creating irony. In his discussion, Aristotle refers to his favorite form of syntax—antithesis—because “knowledge results more from contrast but is quicker in brief form.” In this sense, the illustrated homonyms fulfill the six requirements of urbanity (outlined in 3.10.1).

11.10. δεῖ δ’ αἰεὶ προσεῖναι ἢ τὸ πρὸς ὃν λέγεται ἢ τὸ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι, εἰ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές καὶ μὴ ἐπιπόλαιον· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα χωρὶς ἔχειν, οἷον “ἀποθνήσκειν δεῖ μὴθὲν

ἀμαρτάνοντα·” ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστεῖον. “τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμῆν τὸν ἄξιον·” ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀστεῖον. ἀλλ’ ἐὰν ἅμα ἄμφω ἔχη· “ἄξιόν γ’ ἀποθανεῖν μὴ ἄξιον ὄντα τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν.” ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν πλείω ἔχη, τοσοῦτῳ ἀστειότερον φαίνεται, οἷον εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μεταφορὰ εἶη καὶ μεταφορὰ τοιαδὶ καὶ ἀντίθεσις καὶ παρίσῳσις, καὶ ἔχοι ἐνέργειαν.

11.10. There should always be application to the person addressed or [an awareness of] what is rightly said, provided what is said is true and not superficial. It is possible to have one quality [e.g., truth] without the other [without teaching something in brief, striking form]; for example, “One should die while still faultless.” But that is not urbane. “A worthy man should marry a worthy woman.” But that is not urbane [either]. But it is [urbane] if both [qualities] are present: “He is worthy to die when not worthy of dying.” The more there is in the thought, the more it seems an instance of urbanity: for example, if the words are a metaphor and a metaphor of a certain sort and [if there is] antithesis and *pariosis* and it has *energeia*.

1412b 24. ὃν λέγεται [*hon legetai*] (person addressed): The person “who is addressed” is a reminder that rhetoric is a human art, for which reason a rhetor must constantly consider audience *ēthos* and response. Emphasizing audience, Aristotle foregrounds the term *aei* (always). In the perennial arts of dialectic and rhetoric, audience is always the key consideration. Aristotle’s emphasis on audience must be seen against Plato’s geometrical thinking and rationalism, including his knowledge-opinion dualism, irrefutable self-evidence, and universal objectivity that is thought to bind all persons. Under rationalism, audience loses its value along with the personal “subject,” who is subjugated under the “object” in the metaphor’s hypostases of abstract truth and validity, by which it is wrongly thought that audiences have no role. Rather, Aristotle asserts as a principle, “There should always be application to the person addressed or [an awareness of] what is rightly said.” With similar language and tone regarding dialogic relations, Bakhtin has observed, “Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness, and so forth), whose responsive understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses” (*Speech Genres* 126). The art of rhetoric seeks to give consideration to the human aspects of knowledge, including dialogic

relations of a situation, subject-object relations, awareness of voice, and determinations of audiences, including specific, general, and implied audiences.

1412b 24. ἡ ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι [*hê orthôs legesthai*] (or what is rightly said): *Orthôs* (“rightly”) is a weighty word often reserved for the pantheon (LSJ 1250), emphasizing the important relationship between audience and expression, *êthos* and *lexis*. Parallelism further emphasizes this relationship, for the present phrase is given in parallel form with the previous one, thus: “[the person] who is addressed or what is rightly addressed.” The parallelism reveals that the phrase is not an either/or proposition, despite the term “or [*hê*],” which is as much a conjunctive as a disjunctive (LSJ 761). Hence, audience and *lexis* are distinct yet interrelated considerations. This relationship is the focus of the passage, showing that an orator’s sense of style and an auditor’s response are related like two sides of a coin, “urbanity” being one face and “well-liked expressions” being the other face (cf. 3.10.1). The other’s perspective shapes one’s own sense of style through empathy and concern for clear, urbane communication. Put differently, the outside audience becomes the inside of the orator. While Book 2 provides much attention to direct audience (2.1-17), implied audience is always present in considerations of style, especially in the ethical connotations of “virtue of style [*lexeôs aretê*]” (3.2.1). Direct and indirect audiences are found in the phrase “rightly said,” for the term *orthôs* includes one’s own tastes and standards, while accommodating one’s *êthos* and words to that of the direct addressee and even to one’s sense of a “higher *superaddressee*,” whether that be “God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science, and so forth” (Bakhtin 126). What “rightly said” means involves a rhetor’s sense of responsibility to these three audiences, comparable to the threefold sense of *êthos* (cf. 3.7.6).

1412b 27-28. τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἄξιον [*tên axian dei gamein ton axion*] (“A worthy man should marry a worthy woman”): The quotation seems to be Aristotle’s own example and is noteworthy because Aristotle implies equality of worth among men and women and praises the union of worthy men and women, where worth (*axia*) refers to moral or social dignity (LSJ 170; cf. Latin *dignitas*). Placing in first position “the worthy woman [*tên axian*],” Aristotle emphasizes her importance to “the worthy man [*ton axion*],” so that he would be at fault or loss if he did not find and marry a socially and morally admirable person. Though not worthy as an urbane expression, the expression yet suggests a perspective of Aristotle that is overlooked, namely, that he ascribes worthiness to men and women alike.¹⁷⁵

1412b 29-30. ὅσῳ δ’ ἂν πλείω ἔχη [*hosô d’ an pleiô echê*] (the more there is in the thought): The phrase serves to emphasize the interrelationship between thought and words; specifically *dianoia* and *onomata* must both be present to create good style. In the prior examples, Aristotle quotes two expressions that are not urbane, but the third is urbane because it combines both qualities of the previous examples to create a pithy, ironical expression: “He is worthy to die when not worthy of dying.” In this sense, “thought” is a matter of *lexis*. This *lexis-dianoia* unity is reinforced by the prior opposition: “true and not superficial [*alêthes kai mê epipolaion*]” (1412b25), where the second term in the opposition is a metaphor meaning “on the surface” and thus “commonplace” or “most obvious” (LSJ 652). Similar to the *lexis-êthos* relationship, *lexis-dianoia* is not an either/or relationship, but intimately related so that “the more there is in the thought” the better will be the style: “the more it seems an instance of urbanity [*asteioteron*].” A failure of style is when one has “one quality [i.e., truth or information] without the other [without teaching something in a brief, striking form]” (1412b26). Meaningful

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Cheryl Glenn: Aristotle “could not seem to see beyond the contemporary and seemingly permanent inferior status of Greek women” (*Rhetoric Retold* 50 [1997]).

sentences are those that convey information in a style that creates quick learning, a style that includes metaphor, antithesis, *parisôsis*, and *energeia* (1412a31-32).

1412b 31-31. μεταφορὰ . . . ἐνέργειαν [*metaphora . . . energeian*] (metaphor . . . *energeia*): In a concluding, summary statement (*epilogos*), Aristotle lists his styles for creating urbanity: “metaphor of a certain sort and antithesis and *parisosis* and *energeia*.” Metaphor refers to one of his four species of tropes; antithesis is his favorite style of syntax for creating quick learning and showcasing irony; *parisosis* creates equal length of *côla* (balanced phrases and clauses) that clearly emphasizes parallelism or antithesis; and *energeia* signifies not only visualization but more particularly animation of metaphoric images. These four sources of style are the most significant, and the greater the proportion of these qualities, the more urbane will the expression appear.

This concluding list announces a transition from verbal irony created with single words, such as puns and homonyms (§§ 6-9), representing Aristotle’s first two categories of metaphor, namely generalizing and particularizing synecdoche. What follows is a discussion of verbal irony created with multiple words, such as simile, proverbs, and hyperbole (§§ 11-15), representing Aristotle’s second two categories of metaphor, namely metonymy and metaphor from analogy. Despite the transition, or perhaps because of it, some have viewed the following sections as an appendix to the discussion of *lexis*, but the following sections are clearly an extension of Aristotle’s analysis of the sources of *ta asteia* with “an added surprise” (3.11.6).

11.11. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω, αἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσαι τρόπον τινὰ μεταφοραί. αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐκ δυοῖν λέγονται, ὥσπερ ἡ ἀνάλογον μεταφορά· οἶον ἡ ἀσπίς φασὲν εἶναι φιάλη Ἄρεως, καὶ [1413a] τόξον φόρμιγγι ἄχορδος. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λέγουσιν οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, τὸ δ’ εἰπεῖν τὸ τόξον φόρμιγγα ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλην ἀπλοῦν.

11.11. As has been said above [3.4], similes, which are well liked in some way, are also metaphors. They always involve two terms, as does metaphor from analogy. For example, we say the shield is the wine cup of Ares and [1413a] his bow is a stringless lyre. Thus, their

meaning is not that of the single word, as would be the case if we said the bow is a lyre or the shield a cup.

1412b 32. εἰκόνες [*eikones*] (similes): *Eikôn* means “similitude,” “likeness,” and “image” (cf. English *icon*), and is the common Greek term for simile. As discussed previously (3.4), Aristotle considers metaphor to be a composite category, wherein proportional metaphor and simile differ only by the comparative particle ὥσπερ (*hôsper*: *as* or *like*). In all other ways, simile and proportional metaphor (*analogon metaphora*) are the same, including the fact that “they [both] always involve two terms.” Accordingly, similes are explicit analogies while metaphors are implicit analogies, differing only in form since metaphors have the formal virtue of being neater and more concise (*asteiotês*) (cf. 3.10.3).

1412b 35. φιάλη Ἄρεως [*phialê Areôs*] (wine cup of Ares): “The shield is the wine cup of Ares” is a quotation from *Poetics* 21, illustrating proportional metaphor. In the passage, Aristotle writes, “I mean, for example, the cup is related to Dionysius as the shield to Ares,” wherein cup and shield are iconographic symbols/metonymies for the wine god and the war god in literature and art (*Poet* 21, 1457b12 [Kennedy’s translation, 276n33]). The purpose for citing the metaphor is twofold: First, it illustrates that proportional metaphors “always involve two terms,” with two sets of corresponding synecdoches, so that substitution of terms is proportionate ($A/B = C/D$): *Dionysius/wine cup = Ares/war shield* leading to *Dionysius/Ares = wine cup/war shield*.¹⁷⁶ Second, Aristotle wishes to show that metaphors from analogy may be expressed as similes, and vice-versa, since in section 13 he returns to the metaphor: “for it is possible to liken [*eikasai*] the shield to the cup of Ares” (1413a5-6). Simile and proportionate metaphor may be treated analogously since they both have two sets of corresponding terms, although they are

¹⁷⁶ For helpful discussions of this metaphor, see Eco, *Semiotics* 94-104; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric* 399-400; and my discussion at 3.2.6, 1404b32.

interpreted differently since the former is a figure of thought, ruled by ratio, and the latter is a figure of language, involving partial identification.

11.12. καὶ εἰκάζουσι δὲ οὕτως, οἶον πιθήκῳ ἀυλητῆν, λύχνῳ ψακαζομένῳ [εἰς] μύωπα· ἄμφω γὰρ συνάγεται.

11.12. People also make similes this way; for example, a flute-player [can be] compared to an ape or a near-sighted man to a lamp sprinkled with water; for both [eyelids and flame] flicker.

1413a 3. εἰκάζουσι [*eikazousi*] (make similes): The verb indicates a heuristic device, a source of invention, based in seeing similarities among dissimilar items (cf. 3.11.5 and *Top* 1.18). This truth is the corollary to that expressed in the next section, namely that people can make metaphors from similes, and vice-versa, since both result from perceiving analogies in the world or likenesses in language itself.

1413a 4. συνάγεται [*synagetai*] (compared): The verb *synagesthai* is the link between the winking of the myopic man and the flickering of the flame, for the verb describes both actions. The verb occurs as the end of the thought for increased anticipation and emphasis. In both examples, the compared pairs are humorous to the point of exemplifying verbal irony. For instance, a flute-player (*pithêkô*) and ape (*aulêtên*) because, when playing, a flute-player takes a crouching stance like an ape, and a near-sighted man (*myôpa*) and a lamp sprinkled with water (*luxnô psakazomenô*) because both eyelids and flame flicker (Kennedy 225n134). These examples suggest that a person with creativity can find likenesses with connecting links in nearly all things, but what is likened becomes emphasized. As Groupe μ comments on the comparison process, “When we consider two objects, no matter how different they might be, it is always possible by running through the pyramid [of a taxonomy] of nested classes to find a limit-class such that the two objects are both counted in together but remain separate in all inferior classes”

(107). Regarding audience response, an interpreter will seek the shortest route by which the two items can reconnect (108).

11.13. τὸ δ' εὖ ἐστὶν ὅταν μεταφορὰ ἢ ἔστι γὰρ εἰκάσαι τὴν ἀσπίδα φιάλῃ Ἄρεως καὶ τὸ ἑρείπιον ῥάκει οἰκίας, καὶ τὸ τὸν Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην εἶναι δεδηγμένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος, ὡς περ εἰκάσει Θρασύμαχος ἰδὼν τὸν Νικήρατον ἠττημένον ὑπὸ Πράτυος ῥαψωδοῦντα, κομῶντα δὲ καὶ αὐχμηρὸν ἔτι. ἐν οἷς μάλιστα τ' ἐκπίπτουσιν οἱ ποιηταί, εἴ μὴ εὖ, καὶ εἴ εὖ, εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. λέγω δ' ὅταν ἀποδιδῶσιν, “ὡς περ σέλινον οὐλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖ,” “ὡς περ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ.” καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντ' εἰκόνες εἰσὶν. αἱ δ' εἰκόνες ὅτι μεταφοραί, εἴρηται πολλάκις.

11.13. This is well done when there is metaphor; for it is possible to liken the shield to the cup of Ares and a ruin to the “rag” of a house and to say that Niceratus is a “Philoctetes bound by Pratys,” a simile made by Thrasymachus after seeing Niceratus defeated by Pratys in a rhapsode contest, still disheveled and dirty [like Philoctetes in Sophocles’ play.] If poets do not do this well, they most fail with the public; and if they do it well, they are popular. I mean when they make terms correspond: “He has legs like stringy parsley” [or] “like Philammon boxing the punching ball.” All such things are similes, and that similes are metaphors has been repeatedly said.

1413a 6. φιάλῃ Ἄρεως [*phialê Areôs*] (cup of Ares): See above: 3.11.11 (1412b 35).

The prior passage begins the discussion on the metaphor from analogy “wine cup of Ares” (cf. *Poet* 21, 1457b12), which the current passage concludes.

1413a 6. Νικήρατον φάναι Φιλοκτήτην [*Nikêraton phanai Philoktêtên*] (Niceratus is a Philoctetes): This simile derives from mythology, comparing participants in a rhapsodic contest to legendary figures in the Trojan War. It appears that Niceratus engaged Pratys in a rhapsodic contest; after Niceratus lost the gala, Thrasymachus saw him with his hair a mess and his face dirty from the intense drama of the rhapsody. Thus, the scene lent itself to a sublime simile: “Niceratus appears as ‘Philoctetes bitten by Pratys’”; for Philoctetes was the legendary Greek archer, having the bow of Heracles, who suffered from a snakebite and then lived wretchedly for a time on the island of Lemnos, a story retold by Sophocles in *Philoctetes* (409 BC) (*OCD* 1165, s.v. “Philoctetes”). The three example apply the principle concerning sources of metaphors:

“from the beautiful [or alternatively the ugly] either in sound or in meaning or in visualization or in some other form of sense perception” (3.2.13, 1405b17-19).

1413a 10. οἱ ποιηταὶ [*hoi poiêtai*] (The poets): The reference to “the poets” serves as emphasis, an argument “from the more and the less” (cf. 2.23.4, topic 4); for if the poets succeed (are applauded) or fail (are hissed) based on their ability to create analogies, then how much more orators when speaking for serious purposes. Two anonymous example similes are obviously from comic poetry: “He has legs like stringy parsley” (so thin are they) and “like Philammon boxing the punching ball” (so rapid are the blows). The Athenian boxer Philammon won at Olympia in the 105th Olympiad (360 BC), so the simile suggests a succession of rapid, powerful blows (Edmonds 3.289). The second simile is successful because of its motion, or *energeia*, while the first because of its comic exaggeration and visualization. The example similes illustrate metaphor from analogy wherein the degree of comparison renders them humorous, hyperbolic, and perhaps ironic (cf. the same examples in 3.11.15).

11.14. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι μεταφοραὶ ἀπ’ εἶδους ἐπ’ εἶδος εἰσὶν· οἷον ἂν τις ὡς ἀγαθὸν πεισόμενος αὐτὸς ἐπαγάγηται, εἶτα βλαβῆ, ὡς ὁ Καρπάθιος φασὶ τὸν λαγῶ· ἄμφω γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον πεπόνθασιν. ὅθεν μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀστεῖα λέγεται καὶ διότι, σχεδὸν εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον.

11.14. Proverbs [*paroimiai*] are metaphors from species to species. For example, if someone brings home something, believing it is a good thing, and then suffers harm, it is “what the Carpathian says of the hare,” for both have experienced what is described. So the sources and cause of *asteia* have been more or less stated.

1413a 14. αἱ παροιμίαι [*hai paroimiai*] (proverbs): The term refers to proverbs, maxims, and figures of comparison (LSJ 1342). Hellenistic Jews use the term to refer to the Proverbs of Solomon (cf. John 10:6; 4 Macc. 18:16). Aristotle proposes that proverbs are, in fact, figures of comparison and, therefore, metaphors based in the metonymic transfer from species to species. The example suggests that proverbs are principles derived from comparing many

experiences. In turn, people use proverbs to express similarity between the principle and their experience. In this way, proverbs are confirmed, solidified, and express cultural knowledge. In the example, the transfer occurs in the species “goods brought home” including imported goods, but an irony occurs because the expected “good” is found to be a bad experience. The Carpathian proverb was a concise expression for this kind of bad experience, which would be common knowledge to Aristotle’s immediate audience, so he does not repeat the proverb. Its exact expression is unknown today, but Kennedy compares it to “the Australian experience with the introduction of rabbits, which were originally thought to be useful but devastated crops” (225n135). Proverbs derive from comparison and function in a culture as metonymies, reducing a host of contiguous experiences to a memorable maxim. In this sense, proverbs are like maxims, having the cultural status of facts.

11.15. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ <αἷ> εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολαὶ μεταφοραί, οἷον εἰς ὑπωπιασμένον “ῥήθητε δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν εἶναι συκαμίνων κάλαθον.” ἔρυθρον γάρ τι τὸ ὑπώπιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ σφόδρα. τὸ δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ καὶ τὸ, ὑπερβολὴ τῆ λέξει διαφέρουσα.
 ὥσπερ Φιλάμμων ζυγομαχῶν τῷ κωρύκῳ· ῥήθης δ’ ἂν αὐτὸν Φιλάμμωνα εἶναι μαχόμενον τῷ κωρύκῳ.
 ὥσπερ σέλινον οὖλα τὰ σκέλη φορεῖν· ῥήθης δ’ ἂν οὐ σκέλη ἀλλὰ σέλινα ἔχειν, οὕτως οὖλα. εἰσὶ δὲ <αἷ> ὑπερβολαὶ μειρακιώδεις· σφοδρότητα γὰρ δηλοῦσιν.
 [[διὸ ὀργιζόμενοι λέγουσι μάλιστα·
 οὐδ’ εἴ μοι τόσα δοίη ὅσα ψάμαθός τε κόνις τε.
 κούρην δ’ οὐ γαμέω Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρείδαο,
 οὐδ’ εἴ χρυσεῖη Ἀφροδίτη κάλλος ἐρίζοι,
 ἔργα δ’ Αθηναίη.]]

[1413b] [χρῶνται δὲ μάλιστα τούτῳ Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες.] διὸ πρεσβυτέρῳ λέγειν ἀπρεπές.

11.15. Well-liked hyperboles are also metaphors; for example, of a man with a black eye, “You would have thought him a basket of mulberries”; for his face is somewhat purple, but there is much exaggeration. And in like this or that there is hyperbole differing in the form of expression: “like Philammon boxing the punching ball” (you would think him to be Philammon fighting a sack), “He has legs like stringy parsley” (you would think him to have parsley for legs, so stringy they are). Hyperboles are adolescent; for they exhibit vehemence. (Therefore those in anger mostly speak them:

Not even if he gave me as much as the sand and the dust. . . .

But I will not marry the daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus,

Not even if she rivals golden Aphrodite in beauty,
And Athene in workmanship.)

[1413b] (The Attic orators especially use this.) Thus, it is inappropriate for an older man to speak [in hyperbole].

1413a 19. εὐδοκιμοῦσαι ὑπερβολὰ [eudokimousai hyperbolai] (well-liked hyperboles):

Hyperbole is a form of proportionate metaphor wherein the degree of proportion is extravagantly exaggerated for vehement or comic effect. Literally, hyperbole means “overthrowing” or “overshooting” the mark, where mark derives from propriety (LSJ 1861). A term coined by Greek rhetoricians, “hyperbole was first used to mean exaggeration by Isocrates in his *Epistulae* and first identified as a figure of speech by Aristotle” in the current passage (*ERC* 334, s.v. “Hyperbole”). In this section, Aristotle discusses first hyperboles that express appropriate humor and then hyperboles that express inappropriate vehemence. Exaggeration has no assignable limit, so Aristotle refers specifically to “well-liked hyperboles,” meaning expressions having found favor in the culture based in extravagant comparisons that create appropriate humor. Such is the first example: “You would have thought him a basket of mulberries” (for his face is somewhat purple). In this instance, hyperbole creates humor, even irony, because the comparison from a completely different genus or context is so surprising. The next examples are repeats of two similes referring to “Philammon boxing” and “legs like stringy parsley” (cf. examples and comments at 3.11.13).

1413a 21. λέξει διαφέρουσα [lexei diapherousa] (form of expression): The phrase

literally means “different styles” (LSJ 417), referring to distinct possible forms of syntax used for metaphors from analogy, including hyperbole. Aristotle’s meaning is found in the examples, where “different styles” concerns either the use of the comparative particle *hōsper* (as or like) for similes or the use of some form of the copula for metaphors. Thus, Aristotle expresses each example twice, first as a simile using the comparative *hōsper* and then as a metaphor using the

copula, either the infinitive “to be” (*einai*) or “to have” (*echein*). From these basic forms, authors have used a wide variety of comparisons and copulas to express various degrees of comparison and commutability between analogous terms.¹⁷⁷

1413a 29. μείρακιώδεις [*meirakiôdeis*] (adolescent): The adjective refers to behavior characteristic of the young, “under twenty one” years (LSJ 1093). The use of hyperbole signifies adolescent behavior because it expresses vehemence: “The young overdo everything,” Kennedy remarks (226n137; cf. 2.12.4). Characteristically, the young indulge in hyperbolic expressions because they hold strongly felt but uncritical opinions, opinions based more in cultural *nomos* than in careful reflections of *phronêsis*. Not only the young, but also angry men use hyperboles, such as Achilles when he felt cheated of his war booty (*Iliad* 9.385 and 388-90).¹⁷⁸ In a concluding comment, Aristotle counsels, “Thus, it is inappropriate [*aprepon*] for an older man to speak [in hyperbole]” (1413b1-2), where the term for elder (*presbyteros*) refers not only to age but also to maturity and esteem.

In chapters 10 and 11, Aristotle emphasizes that metaphor is exotic, defamiliarizes the familiar, and creates quick and thus pleasant learning; simile is second best. Antithesis structures clear contrast for quick learning. Vivid metaphors with active movement, or *energeia*, are the best kind for visualization (before-the-eyes), not due to their form but their function, creating quick, pleasant learning. Other kinds of metaphors with an “added surprise” often feature verbal irony, including epigrams, riddles, puns, and homonyms. Proverbs and hyperboles also function as metaphors, but hyperbole is particularly characteristic of the young.

¹⁷⁷ For a discussion of the different types and grammatical forms of comparison and various copulas authors have used, see Groupe μ, *General Rhetoric* (pp. 114-19).

¹⁷⁸ Kassel adds double brackets (and Kennedy uses parenthesis) to set off this quotation from *Iliad* 9 and the clause “Attic orators especially use this [hyperbole],” since editors speculate that the quotation and adjoining clause are a late addition (cf. Kennedy 226n139 and 244n199).

CHAPTER 12

LEXIS: SITUATION AND MEDIA

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 12.1. Suiting the style to the situation (1413a 3–1413a 8)

DEVELOPMENT

- 12.2. Written, literary style (1413a 8–1413a 21)
- 12.3-4. Oral, agonistic style (1413a 21–1414a 7)
- 12.5. Audience size (1414a 7–1414a18)

TRANSITION

- 12.6. The mean in all things (1414a 18–1414a 29)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

12.1. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λελθῆναι ὅτι ἄλλη ἐκάστῳ γένει ἀρμόττει λέξις. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀγωνιστικὴ, οὐδὲ δημηγορικὴ καὶ δικανικὴ. ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἶδέναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἐλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν ἂν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν.

12.1. One should not forget that a different *lexis* is appropriate for each genus [of rhetoric]. For the written and agonistic styles are not the same; nor are the demegoric [deliberative] and the dicanic [judicial], and it is necessary to know both. [Debate] consists in knowing how to speak good Greek; [writing] avoids the necessity of silence if one wishes to communicate to others [who are not present], which is the condition of those who do not know how to write.

1413b 3. ἐκάστῳ γένει [*hekastô geneî*] (each genus): This phrase begins and ends the chapter, creating an *inclusio* (cf. 1414a29). Aristotle discusses “each genus” of rhetoric (deliberative, judicial, and epideictic) under headings specific to style: (1) *lexis agônistikê*, the oral, agonistic style of rhetoric, and (2) *lexis graphikê*, the written, literary style of rhetoric.

These media of communication have similarities and differences, like the three genera of rhetoric. Aristotle focuses on features of difference, specific (*idia*) to each media, because he has

completed his discussion of common (*koinê*) principles of rhetorical style (cf. 1414a28-29). The three genera of rhetoric are only mentioned at 3.12.5, where again the focus is specific situations, notably the size of audience in “demegoric” rhetoric and before a single judge. Thus, the genera of rhetoric provide background and entry for a discussion of how to adjust previously examined general principles (*koinê*) for specific rhetorical situations (*idia*), particularly for media and audience. In chapter 12, Aristotle focuses on three features of the rhetorical situation:

- Main principle: “suit the style to the situation,” beginning with purpose (genus), media, and audience (§1, 1413b3-4).
- Type of media: written style (*lexis graphikê*) and oral, debating style (*lexis agônistikê*) of rhetoric have special distinctions of style (§§2-4).
- Size of audience: how to adapt style when speaking before the Athenian assembly (an audience of 6,000-plus) versus speaking before a single judge (§5).

The chapter’s focus on *lexis graphikê* compared and contrasted with *lexis agônistikê* suggests that writing (*graphein*) has complicated the three genera. Aristotle recognizes that writing implies a different situation of audience, even though written rhetoric at the time was often read aloud before an audience as an oral performance. Since writing creates a different situation of audience, it has a different style, creating two distinct styles for each genus of rhetoric, thus six styles of rhetoric, with degrees of similarity and difference between them.

1413b 3-4. ἄρμόττει λέξις [*harmottei lexis*] (appropriate style): The chapter begins and ends with the general principle, the thesis: one needs to suit the style to the situation, beginning with purpose (genus or genre), media, and audience. The key term is the verb *harmottô* (Attic for *harmozô*), meaning “fit together,” “adapt, accommodate,” “betrotth” (of marriage), and set “at harmony with itself (of music, from which English derives “harmonize”) (LSJ 243; cf. 1414a25).

The principle of “fit, marry, and harmonize” the style to the situation applies to the three kinds of rhetoric (called both genera and species in Book 1), as well as the media of communication (oral or written), and size of audience.

1413b 6-7. μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν [*mê anagkazesthai katasiôpan*] (avoids the necessity of silence): Literally, writing (*graphein*) “cancels the constraint of keeping silence” (LSJ 100, 911). The ability to write “breaks the silence” and gives one a voice “if one wishes to communicate [*metadouvai*] to others [who are not present]”; however, “those who do not know how to write [*hoi mê epistamenoï graphein*]” must remain silent to audiences who are distant across times and spaces. This focus on literary style of rhetoric is significant because Aristotle lived toward the end of a cultural transition that Havelock has called the “literate revolution in Greece,” a stage of developing literacy, along with rhetorical consciousness, occurring approximately from 430 to 330 BC (*Preface to Plato* 40, 197-98). In view of contrasting descriptions of primary school curriculums recorded by Aristophanes, *Clouds* (423 BC) and Plato, *Protagoras* (ca. 380 BC), Havelock makes “the inference that in Attic schools the introduction of letters at the primary level as a standardized practice had begun by the beginning of the last third of the fifth century. Such a conclusion is consistent with the achievement of general literacy toward the end of the war [Peloponnesian War, 431-404], a condition to which [Aristophanes’] *Frogs* in 405 called attention” (*Preface to Plato* 40; cf. *Protagoras* 325e-326e). The conversion to the grapheme began with the technology of writing and the invention of the Greek alphabet, an invention that has only occurred once (since all subsequent alphabets are adaptations).¹⁷⁹ Literacy turned out to be not only a symbolic system for recording and extending

¹⁷⁹ Havelock comments: “The invention of the Greek alphabet, as opposed to all previous systems, including the Phoenician, constituted an event in the history of human culture, the

expression but much more creating the literary mindset: philosophical abstraction, rhetorical analysis, and literary education and professions like logography (Havelock, *Preface to Plato* 270; Enos, *Greek Rhetoric* 23 ff.). In turn, literacy created a new and distinct style of artistic and civic discourse, *lexis graphikê*. As Kennedy summarizes, “By Aristotle’s time, political orators, including Demosthenes, were publishing written, polished versions of judicial and deliberative speeches they had earlier delivered, seeking a longer lasting influence on the public” (226).

Without these and other written records, Aristotle’s study of the arts of discourse (logic, poetics, and rhetoric) would have been impossible.

12.2. ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἢ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἢ ὑποκριτικωτάτη. ταύτης δὲ δύο εἶδη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἠθικὴ ἢ δὲ παθητικὴ. διὸ καὶ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν δραμάτων διώκουσι, καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους. βαστάζονται δὲ οἱ ἀναγνωστικοί, οἷον Χαιρήμων (ἀκριβῆς γὰρ ὡς περὶ λογογράφος) καὶ Λικύμνιος τῶν διθυραμβοποιῶν. καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι <οἱ λόγοι> οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων [ἢ τῶν λεχθέντων] ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἀρμόττει· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὑποκριτικὰ ἀφηρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τὰ τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ οὐ, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται· ἔστι γὰρ ὑποκριτικὴ.

12.2. Written style is most exact; the agonistic style is very much a matter of delivery. Of the latter there are two species; for one form is ethical, the other emotional. Thus, actors are on the lookout for plays of these sorts, and the poets for these kinds of actors. But [poets] who write for the reading public are [also] much liked, for example, Chaeremon (for he is as precise as a professional prose writer [*logographos*]), and Licymnius among the dithyrambic poets. On comparison, some written works seem thin in debates, while some speeches of [successful] orators seem amateurish when examined in written form. The cause is that [their style] suits debate. Thus, things that are intended for delivery, when delivery is absent, seem simple minded, since they are not fulfilling their purpose; for example, *asyndeta* and constant repetition are rightly criticized in writing but not in speaking, and the orators use them; for they lend themselves to oral delivery,

1413b 8. λέξις γραφικὴ [*lexis graphikê*] (written style): In a contrastive format, Aristotle outlines the features of the written, literary style as distinct from the oral, agonistic style, though

importance of which has not as yet been fully grasped. Its appearance divides all pre-Greek civilizations from those that are post-Greek” (“Preliteracy of the Greeks” 369).

he recognizes a relative scale of similarity and difference between the two styles as adapted to the three kinds of rhetoric. *Lexis graphikê* is suited for literary compositions meant to be read. Aristotle names two distinguished poets who write specifically for the reading public: Chaeremon (mentioned in *Poet* 2, 1447b20) and Licymnius of Chios, a dithyrambic poet writing at the end of the fourth century (*Biographical Dictionary* 2:785). Moreover, “those who write for the reading public,” including a few poets, historians, and philosophers, are “much liked [*bastazesthai*],” meaning extremely popular and ennobled in public opinion (LSJ 310), recognized for their literature and for their style of composition.

Compared to the oral, agonistic style, the written, literary style has three specific requirements: more exact word choices, more concision (less repetition), and more details of argument. The written style is more exacting in diction, information, and sophistication of argument. In the latter sense, writing is viewed not merely as a media of expression but also as a means of cognition.¹⁸⁰ Writing becomes a thinking tool for creating sophisticated arguments that rely on abstraction, formal inference, and details of information which would be improbable without writing and which only a reading audience would be able to give sufficient attention. The terms in this passage (and elsewhere) indicate Aristotle’s preference for the written style since “the Reader” (Plato’s nickname for him) evidently finds the literary style more concise and precise, which accords with his general preference for neatness (*asteiotês*), a pleasing quality of small, compact things, being also the principle he cites for preferring metaphor over simile (Edel 20; Stanford, *Greek Metaphor* 40; cf. *Rhet* 3.5.6, 3.9.2, and 3.10.3). Unlike Plato’s denunciation of rhetoric and writing in the *Phaedrus* (275a-b), Aristotle appreciates writing, keeps a large

¹⁸⁰ Writing as a mode of invention is discussed by Walter Ong in *Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology*, and by Richard Young and Patricia Sullivan in “Why Write? A Reconsideration” (pp. 215-25 in *Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*, edited by Connors, Ede, Lunsford, and Corbett).

library, evinces extensive reading, prefers prose in the written style, and is himself a writer, having composed over two-hundred treatises (cf. Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives* 5.22 ff.).

Once writing and the written style of rhetoric are developed in a culture, primary orality ceases to exist and gives way to post-literate or “secondary” orality. Writing and the written style affect, or infect, all discourse and all thinking, including each of the arts of rhetoric. No longer are “speeches” (*logoi*) simply oral, but only speeches created, crafted, and delivered with the technology of writing, or influenced by writing and the associated written style. Likewise, rhetors may have speeches and dialogues recorded in writing (written down) for delivery to an extended literate audience, who can then read, analyze, and discuss the speech in its visual form. The phenomenon of what happens when oral cultures develop literacy, or when literature cultures become more oral, George Kennedy has named using the Italian neologism *letteraturizzazione* (coined by Vasile Florescu, *Rhetorica* 35), a term describing the interrelationship between orality and literacy and their mutual effects on each other in terms of borrowed concepts, genres, and terms (*Classical Rhetoric* 3-5; *ERC* 386, s.v. “*Letteraturizzazione*”).

1413b 9. ἀγωνιστικὴ [*agônistikê*] (agonistic style): Derived from the noun *agôn* (place of contest, battle, or struggle), *lexis agônistikê* is the high style of speech suited for oral debates before a judicial assembly and amid a deliberative, policy-making body (LSJ 18). Since *agôn* refers to a place of contest or battle, a site proper to Greek men only, the term implies a formal debating situation, wherein are thesis and antithesis, requiring strategies for engaging a critical audience with all three means of persuasion, typically with many appeals of character and emotion. The oral, debating style of rhetoric involves two specific features: repetition and

asyndeta (coordination without conjunctions) suited for performative delivery, discussed in sections 3 and 4, respectively (cf. 3.5.6).¹⁸¹

1413b 10. δύο εἶδη [*duo eidê*] (two species): In *lexis agônistikê* is a distinction creating two species. Since *agônistikê* is largely a matter of delivery (*hypokritikôtatê*), its two species are named after characteristic qualities: ethical style (*lexis êthikê*) and emotional style (*lexis pathêtikê*), respectively referring to appeals to character and emotion. Since these appeals are characteristic of the oral, debating style, Aristotle refers to actors and poets since they are the artists of these appeals (cf. 3.1.3-7). In oral rhetoric, *lexis êthikê* helps create identification and a common cause, while *lexis pathêtikê* makes for force, charisma, and charm, emphasized with repetition and *asyndeta* in order to please and move an audience. Oral debates (*agôsi*) without these stylistic features seem *stenoî*, “thin” and “weak” (LSJ 1638). In contrast, these features of *lexis agônistikê* when examined in written compositions (*logoi graphikôn*) are criticized because they appear “amateurish [*idiôtikos*]” and “simple minded [*euêthê*]” (LSJ 819, 713) since they are entirely outside of the logical and factual subject-matter (*pragmata*).

12.3. ἀνάγκη δὲ μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας, ὅπερ ὡς περ ὁδοποιεῖ τῶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι: “οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ κλέψας ὑμῶν, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἔξαπατήσας, οὗτος ὁ τὸ ἔσχατον προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρήσας.” οἶον καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ ὑποκριτῆς ἐποίει ἐν τῇ Ἀναξανδριδου Γερωντομαχίᾳ, ὅτε λέγοι Ραδάμανθους καὶ Παλαμήδης, καὶ ἐν τῶ προλόγῳ τῶν Εὐσεβῶν τὸ ἐγώ· ἐὰν γὰρ τις τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ ὑποκρίνηται, γίγνεται ὁ τὴν δοκὸν φέρων.

12.3. and it is necessary to speak the same thought in different words; this, as it were, leads the way for the delivery: “He is the one cheating you; he is the one deceiving you; he is the one trying to betray you.” This is the sort of thing Philemon the actor used to do in *Old Man’s Madness* by Anaxandrides when reciting [the passage about] Rhadamanthus and Palamedes and

¹⁸¹ Walter Ong comments: “*Ludus*,” Latinized *agôn*, designated training exercises for war before becoming “the Latin word for school, we have seen means also war games,” so that, by implication, “the agonistic elements in academia are entangled with the dialectic of masculine and feminine” (*Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness* [Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1981], p. 132-33). *Ludus Literarius*, for instance, is usually translated as “grammar school.”

in the “ego” passage of *The Pious Ones*. For if one does not act out these lines, it is a case of “the man carrying a beam.”

1413b 22. μεταβάλλειν τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντας [*metaballein to auto legontas*] (to speak the same thought in different words): A metaphor for style exists in the verbal-infinitive *metaballein*, meaning to “throw, aim, direct, or go” a different direction, “change” direction, “alter” course, and “translate” (LSJ 1109). This infinitive (having the *meta-* prefix like *metaphora* and the *ball* root like *parabolê*) may be accurately translated as “to change course with different words.” In 3.17.17, the infinitive is used in the advice “to change enthymemes into maxims” (1418b33). *Metaballein* works as a cultural model for style: style is *navigation*, navigating a course, with changes of course, changes of tack, involving turns and transfers (i.e., translation). The Hellenic metaphor provides a different orientation to language than the modernist metaphors for style in the dichotomy substance/style or contents/container.¹⁸² The modern metaphor renders style of little consequence or even disposable. However, the Hellenic figure for style is robust and dynamic because it does double duty as a metaphor for style and life, for both involve navigation along a path (*hodos*). From this root metaphor has developed some of the rich language of classical rhetoric, often associating rhetorical style with lifestyle (see comments at 3.1.2). Based in the root metaphor of *hodos*, the terms *metaballein* and *lexis* tend to personalize rhetorical style because it envisions audience as a face-to-face meeting or assembly, whether that meeting is primarily a dialogue or a confrontation.

1413b 22. λέγοντας [*legontas*] (different words): A feature of the oral, debating style (*lexis agônistikê*) is “constant repetition [*to pollakis to auto eipein*]” (as phrased in the previous section), but in “different words.” Though criticized in the literary style, repetition of key ideas

¹⁸² Cf. 3.1.2 for a further discussion of cultural metaphors inherent in the *Rhetoric* and the mistake of reading modern metaphors in a classical text, often resulting in mistranslation.

in different words, or “change of course with different words,” is necessary in an oral, debating style for three reasons: repetition assists an audience’s attention and memory; repetition creates the appearance of sincerity, a matter of *êthos*; and repetition amplifies emphasis and force, a matter of delivery. Aristotle refers to examples from actors because delivery is acting (cf. 3.1.3). When an orator neglects this feature of repetition, “it is the case of ‘the man carrying a beam,’” which is a proverb for anxiety, timidity, and awkwardness: similar to a person walking stiffly to keep a balance beam balanced, rather than the reverse (Kennedy 228n142). After repetition, a second feature of *lexis agônistikê* is *asyndeta*.

12.4. καὶ τὰ ἀσύνδετα ὡσαύτως· “ἦλθον, ἀπήντησα, ἔδεόμην·” ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑποκρίνεσθαι καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐν λέγοντα τῷ αὐτῷ ἦθει καὶ τόνῳ εἶπεῖν. ἔτι ἔχει ἴδιόν τι τὰ ἀσύνδετα· ἐν ἴσῳ γὰρ χρόνῳ πολλὰ δοκεῖ εἰρηῆσθαι· ὁ γὰρ σύνδεσμος ἐν ποιεῖ τὰ πολλὰ, ὥστε ἐὰν ἐξαίρεθῆ, δῆλον ὅτι τούναντίον ἔσται τὸ ἐν πολλὰ. ἔχει οὖν αὐξήσιν· “ἦλθον, διελέχθην, [1414a] ἰκέτευσα” (πολλὰ δοκεῖ), “ὑπερεῖδεν ὅσα εἶπον.” τοῦτο δὲ βούλεται ποιεῖν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐν τῷ “Νιρεὺς αὖ Σύμηθεν, Νιρεὺς Ἀγλαΐης, Νιρεὺς ὃς κάλλιστος.” περὶ οὗ γὰρ πολλὰ λέγεται, ἀνάγκη καὶ πολλάκις εἰρηῆσθαι· εἰ οὖν καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ πολλὰ δοκεῖ, ὥστε ἠὔξηκεν ἅπαξ μνησθεῖς διὰ τὸν παραλογισμὸν, καὶ μνήμην πεποίηκεν, οὐδαμοῦ ὕστερον αὐτοῦ λόγον ποιησάμενος.

12.4. Similarly with *asyndeta*: “I came, I met, I was begging”; for it is necessary to act this out and not to speak it as one talking in the same character and tone. Furthermore, *asyndeta* have a special characteristic; many things seem to be said in an equal space of time; for the connectives make many things seem one, so if they are taken away, clearly the opposite results: one thing will be many. *Asyndeton* thus creates amplification [*auxesis*]: “I came; I spoke; I besought” [1414a] (these things seem many), “he overlooked everything I said.” This is Homer’s intention also in the passage “Nereus, again, from Syme . . . Nereus, son of Aglaïa . . . Nereus who, as the handsomest man . . .”; for a man about whom many things are said must necessarily often be named. [Conversely,] people think that if someone is often named there must also be many things to say; thus [Homer] amplified [the importance of Nereus] (though mentioning him only in this passage) and by this fallacy made him memorable, though no account of him is given anywhere later in the poem.

1413b 29. τὰ ἀσύνδετα [*ta asyndeta*] (*asyndeta*): Literally, “without conjunctions” (i.e., A, B, C, etc. rather than A and B and C, etc.), *asyndeton* refers to the stylistic practice of omitting conjunctions between parallel items to create a rapid tempo with forceful stops between items and because it affects perception: “one thing will be many.” *Asyndeton* gives the

impression that, for instance, a series of reasons are different reasons in a non-exhaustive list that could continue. Thus, Aristotle notes that *asyndeton* creates amplification (*auxêsis*) (cf. 3.6). As an example, “I came; I spoke; I besought” seem many actions compared with “I came and I spoke and I sought,” which flows as one continuous action. The latter is an example of *polysyndeton*, meaning “many conjunctions” (cf. 3.5.6, 1407b12-13). Hellenistic rhetoricians regarded *asyndeton* and *polysyndeton* as figures of style (Kennedy 208n64).

1414a 2. “Ὅμηρος [Homêros] (Homer). In the section’s last example, Homer combines *asyndeton* and repetition by repeating names in the *Iliad* (2.671-73). Aristotle observes that the repetition of a name, especially without conjunctions, causes the named person (or place or idea) to seem important and become memorable, for “people think that if someone is often named there must also [correspondingly] be many things to say [about him].” The many examples from Homer (he is cited eleven times in the *Rhetoric*, five in Book 3) show Aristotle’s high regard for him, often highlighting Homer as a stylist worth imitating in oral and written performance.

12.5. ἡ μὲν οὖν δημηγορικὴ λέξις καὶ παντελῶς ἔοικεν τῇ σκιαγραφίᾳ· ὅσω γὰρ ἂν πλείων ἢ ὁ ὄχλος, πορρωτέρων ἢ θέα, διὸ τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιεργὰ καὶ χεῖρω φαίνεται ἐν ἀμφοτέροις· ἡ δὲ δικὴ ἀκριβεστέρον. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ <ἐν> ἐνὶ κριτῇ· ἐλάχιστον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν ῥητορικῇ· εὐσύνοπτον γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον, καὶ ὁ ἄγων ἀπεστιν, ὥστε καθαρὰ ἡ κρίσις. διὸ οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις εὐδοκιμοῦσι ῥήτορες· ἀλλ’ ὅπου μάλιστα ὑπόκρισεως, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι. τοῦτο δὲ, ὅπου φωνῆς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅπου μεγάλης. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις·

12.5. Now the demegoric style seems altogether like shadow-painting; for the greater the crowd is, the further the distance of view; thus, exactness is wasted work and the worse in both cases. Speaking in the law courts requires more exactness of detail, and that before a single judge even more; for it is least of all a matter of rhetorical techniques; for what pertains to the subject and what is irrelevant is more easily observed [by a single judge], and controversy is gone, so the judgment is clear. As a result, the same orators are not successful in all these kinds of speeches. Where there is most need of performance, the least exactness is present. This occurs where the voice is important and especially a loud voice. The epideictic style is most like writing; for its objective is to be read. And the judicial style second[-most].

1414a 7-8. δημηγορικὴ λέξις [*dêmêgorikê lexis*] (demegoric style): This section examines the relationship between audience size and rhetorical style. Aristotle applies his principle (“suit the style to the situation,”) to two extreme situations of audience: addressing thousands in a democratic assembly and addressing a single judge. The use of the term *dêmêgorikê* refers to orations delivered in the Athenian assembly (*ekklêsia*) or similar situations in which audience size is a determining factor of style (cf. “Messenian assembly” in 3.17.14, 1418b11). *Dêmêgorikê* is a species of deliberative rhetoric, not synonymous with deliberative (cf. 1.3-8). In Book 3, Aristotle never uses his regular word for “deliberative” rhetoric, *sympouleutikon*; instead he uses *dêmêgorikê*, probably because it envisions a more specific rhetorical situation that affects choices of style. Before the *ekklêsia*, according to Aristotle, “exactness [of detail] is wasted work,” while before a single judge dramatic techniques of oral delivery are irrelevant. In this, Aristotle creates a proportion: “the greater the crowd” the more necessary are delivery techniques and the less necessary are details of argument, while the opposite is required before a single judge.

Demegoric and democracy have the same root, *dêmê* or *dêmos*, referring to the 139 *dêmoi* or districts of Attica. From the *dêmoi* came adult-male citizens called to serve in the Athenian assembly that governed the political, legislative, administrative, and financial matters of the *polis*, or city-state. Literally, *dêmos* refers to “the place where the people live,” by association “the people,” and later both “the common people” and “the sovereign people” as in *dêmokratia* (*OCD* 446, 514, s.v. “Demes,” “Ekklêsia”; cf. Grimaldi 1:81, 58b4:2). Demegoric rhetoric, then, refers to orations, composed and delivered by a citizen-*rhêtôr*, addressed to the Athenian assembly meeting in the Pnyx amphitheater before an average audience of 6,000-plus citizens,

regarding matters of deliberation and policy.¹⁸³ The genus of deliberative rhetoric concerns the subject of counsel and advice that may either exhort or dissuade (cf. 1.3, 1458b8-29), while the species of demegoric rhetoric requires an agonistic style, including oratorical delivery, suited for addressing an audience of thousands.

1414a 9-10. τὰ ἀκριβῆ περιέργα [*ta akribê perierga*] (exactness is wasted work): In the context of the Athenian assembly, Aristotle's brief comments are realistic and probably imply a criticism (discussed below). More focused on the size of the assembly than the process of deliberation, Aristotle creates a proportional simile: the demegoric style looks like "shadow-painting [*skiagraphia*]." The simile refers to "outline painting without detail, intended to be seen at a distance and used for background scenery in the theater" (Kennedy 228n145; cf. Plato, *Theaetetus* 208e and *Parmenides* 165c). Speaking before a giant audience is like painting background scenery, for exactness of style is "wasted work" in both cases. As an example of a large audience, *lexis dêmêgorikê* illustrates the extreme degree of *lexis agônistikê*: the style will consist of a general, even simple presentation of argument with minimal details, only the most important evidence; the delivery techniques will include repetition and *asyndeton* and appeals to *êthos* and *pathos*. *Lexis dêmêgorikê* best illustrates *lexis agônistikê*, while speaking before a single judge illustrates *lexis graphikê*, whether delivered by speech or by writing. When Aristotle

¹⁸³ In "Greek Oratorical Settings and the Problem of the Pnyx: Rethinking the Athenian Political Process," Christopher Lyle Johnstone describes the physical contextual constraints for oral style and delivery: "In virtually all Greek *poleis*, though the citizens' assembly (the *ekklêsia*) met initially in the agora, it convened later in an amphitheater of more-or-less formal design and construction" so that "by the fifth century the theater was the scene of the regular political assemblies in almost all Greek cities," being typically large with excellent acoustical properties for projecting the human voice (106-7). The Athenian *ekklêsia*, however, met in a shallow amphitheater named the Pnyx, a small, rocky hill in central Athens, known for its acoustical limitations being "decidedly unfriendly to oratory for a mass audience" (111). Only late in the fourth century, possibly late in Aristotle's lifetime, did the *ekklêsia* move from the Pnyx to the Theater of Dionysus on the southern side of the Acropolis (111).

refers to detail, he never means sacrificing exactness of style (*lexis*), such as careful choice of words and metaphors, but he means detail of evidence and argument (*pragma*), depending on the side of audience and the media of communication (Kennedy 228n146).

Aristotle's metaphor of shadow-painting reveals a realistic but cynical estimation of the Athenian assembly. His tone may be cynical, but it is characteristic of Plato and Aristotle, whose political preference was a tiered society led by philosopher-kings. Aristotle's earlier comments on the "corruption of politics" (3.1.5), as Kennedy notes, "seems to reflect the Platonic view (e.g., *Gorgias* 463a-b) that political oratory under democracy had become a form of flattery and that it offered entertainment to the mob" (195n7). This cultural critique seems to be directed not at deliberative rhetoric but at its actualization in demegoric rhetoric. If one wished to interpret this chapter as a general statement of deliberative style rather than demegoric style, then such a misinterpretation could be criticized on three accounts: First, Aristotle is more concerned with the corporate character of the *ekklêsia*, particularly its large size and preference for delivery, than the actual process of deliberation. Second, Aristotle would then contradict Book 1 where he outlines ethical and political topics (*eidê*) and the many facts and historical details (*stoicheia*) required for successful deliberation (1.4-8). Third, Aristotle would then allow his political preferences to cloud his abilities at description and inference, which is uncharacteristic. The language and political context indicate that Aristotle is not discussing deliberative style generally but demegoric style specifically, as required for a large audience, such as the Athenian assembly.

1414a 10-11. δικὴ ἀκριβέστερον [*dike akribêsteron*] (speaking in the law courts): In judicial (*dikanikê*) rhetoric, orators use a less dramatic style with a more detailed argument. In the second extreme example, that of speaking before a single judge, Aristotle observes that delivery techniques are *periêrgon*: "irrelevant" and "wasted work" (cf. 1414a10). Given an

audience of one, a rhetor will create *lexis graphikê*, including detailed treatment of evidence and argument, being concise, and appealing mostly to *logos* without neglecting the other appeals.

1414a 17. ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις [*epideiktikê lexis*] (epideictic style): Aristotle makes a short, general statement, literally translated: “the epideictic style is the most literary [*graphikôtatê*]” since “its objective [*ergon*] is to be read [*anagnôsis*],” such as an oral reading before a public audience (LSJ 101). The noun *graphikôtatê* refers to a category defined by qualities characteristic of the written, literary style (LSJ 360; cf. 3.12.2). Epideictic focuses on *êthos*, praising the honorable and blaming the shameful, and is usually a part of events that celebrate or eulogize (cf. 1.9). Epideictic seems to “have more in common with literature than with argumentation,” according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, because “in epideictic oratory, every device of literary art is appropriate, for it is a matter of combining all the factors that can promote this communion [centered on particular values] of the audience” (*New Rhetoric* 48, 51). The focus on values, artistry of style, imagination, communion with an audience, and rhetor as educator all suggest that literature and art (mimetic and non-mimetic) are species of epideictic rhetoric, as Aristotle recognizes stylistic similarities. In a relative comparison, Aristotle notes that the judicial style is the second-most in literary qualities because of the smaller audience size and the requirements of greater details than deliberative rhetoric.

In summary, one can outline the agonistic style and the written style according to their respective but relative characteristic features in the following chart:

	<i>Lexis agônistikê</i>	<i>Lexis graphikê</i>
▪ Main media	Oral delivery (<i>hypokrisis</i>)	Written delivery (<i>graphia</i>)
▪ Appeals estimation	<i>Êthos, pathos, logos</i>	<i>Logos, êthos, pathos</i>
▪ Expansion	Repetition, <i>asyndeton</i>	Concision
▪ Argument	General details	Exactness of detail
▪ Audience	Few, many, giant in size	Few or individual
▪ Purpose (genus)	Deliberative	Judicial
		Epidictic
Chart 12.1: Comparison of <i>lexis agônistikê</i> and <i>lexis graphikê</i>		

As Chart 12.1 indicates by dotted lines, the degree of difference between *lexis agônistikê* and *lexis graphikê* is relative to the situation, including purpose, media, and audience. For instance, Aristotle writes that “the epideictic style is the most literary since its objective is to be read,” but the situation may require oral delivery before an audience of thousands, in which case the epideictic oration would require features of the agonistic style. In all cases, one should suit the style to the situation.

12.6. δευτέρα δὲ ἡ δικανικὴ. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι ἠδεῖαν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ, περιέργον· τί γὰρ μᾶλλον ἢ σώφρονα καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη ἦθος ἀρετῆ; τὸ δὲ ἠδεῖαν εἶναι ποιήσει δηλον ὅτι τὰ εἰρημένα, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς ὠρισται ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς λέξεως· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δεῖ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι ἀλλὰ πρέπουσαν; ἂν τε γὰρ ἀδολεσχῆ, οὐ σαφῆς, οὐδὲ ἂν σύντομος. ἀλλὰ δηλον ὅτι τὸ μέσον ἀρμόττει. καὶ τὸ ἠδεῖαν τὰ εἰρημένα ποιήσει, ἂν εὐ μιχθῆ, τὸ εἰωθὸς καὶ ξενικόν, καὶ ὁ ῥυθμός, καὶ τὸ πιθανὸν ἐκ τοῦ πρέποντος. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως εἴρηται, καὶ κοινῆ περὶ ἅπαντων καὶ ἰδίᾳ περὶ ἑκάστον γένος· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τάξεως εἰπεῖν.

12.6. To make a further distinction of style that it should be pleasant and elevated is superfluous. For why that, rather than chaste or liberal or any other virtue of character? Clearly, the things discussed will make the style pleasant if the virtue of *lexis* has been rightly defined. For otherwise, what is the point of being clear and not flat but appropriate? For if it is luxuriant, it is not clear, nor if it is [too] concise. But clearly the mean is suitable. And the things mentioned will make style pleasant if they are well mingled: the conventional and the strange, and rhythm, and persuasiveness from propriety. This concludes the discussion of *lexis*, both in general about all of it and in particular about each genus. It remains to speak about arrangement.

1414a 19. προσδιαίρεισθαι τὴν λέξιν [*prosdiaireisthai tês lexin*] (distinction of style):

This phrase reiterates the purpose of chapter 12: to make some further distinctions of style based on the situation. Beyond the four virtues of style (clarity, propriety, correctness, ornateness; cf. 2.1), the further distinctions include purpose (defined generally by the genera of rhetoric), media of communication (written or oral delivery), and size of audience (ranging from a single judge to thousands). To make further distinctions beyond these basic categories, as the sophists were wont to do, Aristotle calls *periergon*, “superfluous” or “wasted work” (cf. 1414a9).

1414a 19. ἡδεῖαν . . . καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ [*hêdeian . . . kai megaloprepê*] (pleasant and elevated): This proposition, that rhetorical style should be always pleasant and elevated, is attributed to Theodectes by Quintilian (4.2.63; cf. Kennedy 229n148). By quoting Theodectes, Aristotle shows disagreement with the principle, not with the qualities, because he denies the need for “a further distinction of style [*prosdiaireisthai tês lexin*].” If one has defined well “the virtue of *lexis*,” what more is needed but to apply the virtues to the situation? In this sense, the sophist Theodectes serves as a representative foil to distinguish Aristotle’s treatment of style from the elaborate systems of sophists, who were known for multiplying distinctions in their systems of *lexis*; similarly with *taxis*, Aristotle names Theodorus and Licymnius to separate and defend his categories from their “ridiculous divisions” (3.13.3-5; cf. *Phaedrus* 266d-267d). Since Aristotle creates only logical categories having “distinct species [*eidōs*] and difference [*diaphoran*]” (3.14.5, 1414ba5), to make further distinctions beyond those discussed in Book 3 is *periergon*: “superfluous,” “wasted work” (cf. 1414a9). In this statement, Aristotle does not suggest that he lays claim to a comprehensive treatment of style, but it does assert confidence that he has named and discussed all of the basic categories or fundamental features that create

rhetorical style. Therefore, if one assesses the situation and applies the virtues of *lexis* according to “the mean,” then one will create a pleasant style because it is an appropriate style.

1414a 25. τὸ μέσον ἁρμόττει [*to meson harmottei*] (the mean is suitable): *Harmottei* is the key term which commenced the chapter, creating an *inclusio* (cf. 1413b3). The verbal-infinitive is a synonym for *prepon* but emphasizes suiting the style to the situation: to “fit together,” to “set in harmony” (LSJ 243). What creates a suitable fit and harmony in style is choosing the golden mean (LSJ 1107, s.v. *mesos* 3.3; cf. *Rhet* 3.2; *EN* 2.5). One creates a pleasant, suitable style by choosing the mean between competing principles, such as between ordinary (*eiôthos*) and exotic (*xenos*) diction and between sophistic verbosity (*adoleschê*) and cold concision (*syntomos*) in matters of expansion. By choosing the mean, the style will be appropriate and thus pleasant. One reason the mean is pleasant is because it shows restraint, maturity, and control (*sôphrosynê*; cf. discussion at 3.2.1, 1404b 4). Another reason is that the mean a deeply held Greek value and Western quality reputed to have been inscribed onto the wall of the outer-court of Apollo’s temple at Delphi, in the dictum *mêden agan*, “Nothing in excess!”

1414a 29. περὶ τάξεως [*peri taxeôs*] (about arrangement): The parallel phrases *perilexeôs* and *peri taxeôs* signal a transition: the conclusion of “on style,” according to its common (*koinê*) principles and specific (*idia*) purposes, and the beginning of “on arrangement,” the third of the arts of rhetoric. This use of *taxis* is the last usage of the term; *taxis* never occurs in chapters 13-19, but only outside the discussion of arrangement. *Taxis* occurs four times in the *Rhetoric*: first regarding “order [*taxin*]” in good governance (1.8.4, 1366a2); second as “arrangement [*taxeôs*]” of arguments (2.26.5, 1403b2); third as an aorist infinitive verb: “how the parts of a *logos* ought to be arranged [*taxai*]” (3.1.1, 1403b8); and fourth here: *peri taxeôs*

referring to the rhetorical concept and category of organization, arrangement, or Latin *dispositio*. Like *lexis*, the feminine noun *taxis* with its “-sis” suffix (genitive *taxeôds*) designates an abstract action, such as a methodology or a functional art having processes, conditions, and qualities (Smyth 230, 244 [§840a2, §865]). Moreover, *taxis* is a military term with two related meanings regarding formal taxonomy and functional strategy of arrangement. The term has primary associations with military rank and file, such as “*order or disposition of an army*,” “*order of battle*,” and “*rank or line of soldiers*” (LSJ 1756). Thus, *taxis* always has connotations of “strategy [*stratêgia*]” or generalship, from *stratêgos* referring to a commanding general responsible for arranging and employing military resources. While Aristotle uses *taxis* to refer to the formal taxonomy of an argument, *taxis* always has overtones of functional strategy in view of the rhetorical situation.

CHAPTER 13

TAXIS: PARTS OF AN ARGUMENT

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

13.1-2. Two necessary parts of an argument (1414a 30–1414a 36)

DEVELOPMENT

13.3. Unnecessary parts of an argument (1414a 36–1414b 7)

13.4. Four common parts of an argument (1414b 7–1414b 12)

TRANSITION

13.5. Requirements for a category of *taxis* (1414b 12–1414b 18)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

13.1. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ λόγου δύο μέρη· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδείξαι. διὸ εἰπόντα μὴ ἀποδείξαι ἢ ἀποδείξαι μὴ προεἰπόντα ἀδύνατον· ὅ τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύων τι ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ ὁ προλέγων ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀποδείξαι προλέγει.

13.1. There are two parts to a speech; for it is necessary [first] to state the subject with which it is concerned and [then] to demonstrate the argument. It is ineffective after stating something not to demonstrate it and to demonstrate without a first statement; for one demonstrating, demonstrates *something*, and one making a preliminary statement says it first for the sake of demonstrating it.

1414a 30. λόγου [*logou*] (a speech): In the context, *logos* refers to *argument*, *message*, or *composition* as the genus or general category since rhetoric is the art of argumentation. Species of argument include speech, address, essay, treatise, sermon, book, and dialogue on any particular subject whatever. While *logos* has a wide semantic range, in rhetoric *logos* never refers to a single word or vocabulary item, but always an asserted statement, series of statements, or whole speech or composition (LSJ 1057; Else 128; *ERC* 410, s.v. “Logos”).

1414a 30. δύο μέρη [*duo merê*] (two parts): “There are only two parts of an argument [*logos*]: you make a statement and you prove it from the subject-matter [*pragma*]” (my translation). Arrangement refers to the art of the parts: “the art of dividing a discourse into its parts and the inclusion, omission, or ordering of those parts according to the rhetor’s needs and the situation and the constraints of the chosen genre” (*ERC* 32, s.v. “Arrangement”). According to Aristotle, two parts are necessary, the statement (*prothesis*) and the proof (*pistis*) from the subject-matter (*pragma*) (3.13.2). This first section of *taxis* resembles Aristotle’s initial treatment of other subjects, such as invention (1.1) and delivery (3.1), wherein he initially proceeds as an idealistic logician but then develops his discussion as a pragmatic rhetorician considering audience expectations and cultural practices. For invention, style, and arrangement, logic is “necessary,” but “because of the corruption of the audience” (3.1.5), logic needs to assume a popular and pleasing form suited for audience-centered communication. The important difference between logic and rhetoric is audience; for this essential reason, Aristotle frames his theory of rhetoric with logical forms, such as the enthymeme and “two parts” necessary for an argument, but he always develops the initial frame with rhetorical appeals and subject-matter (*pragma*, *êthos*, *pathos*) that are relatively equal, depending on the audience.

1414a 31. πρᾶγμα [*pragma*] (subject): The noun (plural *pragmata*) is abstract in logic and rhetoric, referring to the “factual subject-matter” which is the chief business in argumentation (on this key term, see discussion at 3.1.3, 1403b19). Aristotle makes the fundamental distinction between persuasion *of* the subject (*pisteis en tôn pragmati*) and persuasion *from* the subject (*pisteis exô tôn pragmatôn*), where the latter refers to argumentation with *pragma*, the factual and logical subject-matter (cf. 1.1.3-4). This clear distinction widely influenced later rhetorical tradition: contrary to orators of their day, Cicero and Augustine follow

Aristotle's distinction between argument with *pragma* (persuasion by *sapienter*) leading to informed judgment and argument without *pragma* (persuasion by *eloquenter*) leading to uninformed judgment. For the Aristotelian tradition, this distinction regarding the necessity of *pragma* "is fundamental and essential, without which eloquence is something empty and false" (Sullivan 47). Persuasion *from* the subject is what Aristotle has in view when naming the two things necessary: statement *of* the subject that leads to argument *from* the subject.

Discussing *taxis*, however, Aristotle emphasizes the need for balanced arguments created by employing means outside of the subject-matter since *pragma* refers to only one of three *pisteis*. All three artistic means of persuasion are necessary in successful argumentation because rhetoric is not merely dialectic but a human art wherein persons address persons, who are an integrated "complexus of reason, feelings, emotions, and set attitudes" (Grimaldi 1:9, 54a15:2). In the tradition of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lysias* 19), Grimaldi understands *pragma* to refer to "the logical and factual presentation of the subject-matter" (*Studies* 145). In this sense, the rhetorical appeals have formal and material properties: formally, *logos* refers to the two forms and modes of argument, the deductive enthymeme and the inductive example; materially, *pragma*, *êthos*, and *pathos* refer to the respective substantial elements of factual, ethical, and emotional means of persuasion (cf. Grimaldi 1:9-10, 54a15:2). The three artistic *pisteis* together (*pragma*, *êthos*, and *pathos*) are "the intellectual and psychological forces which come into action in the effort to establish conviction" as presented in the formal modes of deductive and inductive argumentation (Grimaldi, *Studies* 145).

1414a 31. ἀποδείξει [apodeixai] (to demonstrate [the argument]): This verbal-infinitive refers to the logical process of "demonstration" or "argumentation" through the use of syllogisms, enthymemes, examples, facts, and signs. For Aristotle, form and matter—*apodeixis*

and *pragma*—are the heart of argument. Thus, his minimalist *taxis* is “necessary,” or of the essence, in an argument: statement (*prothesis*) of the subject and proof (*pistis*) through facts and demonstration.

13.2. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τὸ δὲ πίστις, ὡς περ ἂν εἴ τις διέλοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρόβλημα τὸ δὲ ἀπόδειξις.

13.2. Of these parts, the first is the statement [*prothesis*], the other the proof [*pistis*], just as if one made the distinction that one part is the problem, the other the demonstration.

1414a 34. πρόθεσις [*prothesis*] (statement): The *prothesis* is the *thesis* statement, usually stated in the introduction of an argument (*logos*); it refers to the proposal, main claim, or purpose (*telos*) that creates focus and unity for a *logos* (LSJ 1480). The *prothesis* is “necessary” in a logical sense: without it neither a disagreement, nor an argument, nor a composition can exist. In a practical sense, compositions always have a thesis, which is either explicit or implicit to the audience and to the writer. For Aristotle’s students of logic and philosophy, the necessity of the thesis would be obvious; for this reason, Aristotle includes *prothesis* as one of the four basic categories of *taxis* (3.13.4), but he also leaves it as implied by not mentioning this term again after chapter 13; instead, he uses less technical synonyms, such as “purpose [*telos*]” (3.14.6, 1415a23). Rather than simply use the root “thesis,” the prefix “pro” indicates that the purpose statement is stated in advance, usually in the introduction.

1414a 35. πίστις [*pistis*] (proof): The key term has a semantic range that is determined by context. In the current usage, *pistis* has a double meaning, functioning as a species-to-genus metaphor (particularizing synecdoche). In logic, *pistis* refers to proof, but in Book 3 (especially chapter 17) this meaning is extended to “category” or “part of speech” wherein one places the “proof” and other “means of persuasion.” The term *pistis* has a range of meaning beyond “proof” in the *Rhetoric* (cf. Grimaldi 1:349-56, and this commentary’s Introduction). The term’s meaning

is context dependent. Grimaldi asserts, “In actual fact the word πίστις [*pistis*] in Aristotle’s text will not sustain the univocal interpretation (i.e., proof, way of proving), which has been imposed upon it” by translators and commentators (*Studies* 69). Rather than simply “proof,” the term has a semantic range of five meanings: (1) persuasion: the state of mind of conviction, belief, or faith which results when a person judges and accepts a proof or demonstration; (2) means to persuasion: the logical instrument of the reasoning process in deduction or induction that will create conviction or belief in an audience; and (3) source of persuasion: the source material or *pragma*—based in *êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*—that will create conviction or belief in an audience; (4) pledge or word of honor that instills belief; and (5) body of a composition, or that part of a speech wherein are proof and demonstration, which is a technical meaning restricted to *taxis* in 3.13-19. Grimaldi defines this technical usage of *pistis* as “that part of a speech wherein one formally demonstrates one’s thesis or proposition” (*Studies* 70). Thus, in this section of the *Rhetoric*, *pistis* designates that part of speech wherein one places the *pisteis*: evidence plus demonstration plus any other means of persuasion. This usage of *pistis* is similar to the term “body” of a composition, referring to category and placement. The test for whether a part of a speech belongs to the “proof” is argument: if a part demonstrates or argues from the subject, then it belongs to the proof, placed in the middle or body of a composition; if it does not demonstrate or argue, it is not part of proof but belongs in the prooimion or epilogue (see below the four basic parts of a *logos*).

1414a 35. πρόβλημα [*problêma*] (problem): Refers to the dialogical nature of discourse and specifically to the problem-solution or question-answer structure, genre, and process of

argumentation in rhetoric, research, and drama (cf. *Poetics* 25 and the peripatetic *Problêmata*).¹⁸⁴ Creating a simile, Aristotle likens argumentation (statement plus proof) to logical “demonstration [*apodeixis*]” (question plus deduction). The simile develops the metaphor with which Aristotle introduces his treatise: “Rhetoric is an *antistrophos* to dialectic” (1.1.1), for both are question-answer or problem-solution genres and methods of inquiry, wherein one begins with a practical or conceptual question (*problêma*), proposes an answer (*prothesis*), and seeks to support it with reasons and evidence by means of deduction and induction (*pistis*). This formal methodology is the same process and genre which many writers and speakers use today; for instance, *A Manual for Writers* arranges the research-writing process according to Aristotle’s basic categories: moving from topic to question, from question to hypothesis, and from hypothesis to proof and support (5-20). Similarly, Aristotle has approached his discussion of *taxis* not merely as a question (how to arrange a speech) but as a problem (in view of current “ridiculous divisions”) in need of a solution (1414a36). By posing his question as a situational problem, that is, by invoking numerous sophists, Aristotle has added interest and significance to his treatise, and he has done so by antithesis, his favorite form of syntax and a method of development. Addressing a problem, Aristotle must not only prove his own thesis as a solution, but also seek to refute the representative sophists’ antitheses by critiquing their terms (categories of genus and species),

¹⁸⁴*Problêma* is a central term in Aristotle’s *Poetics* and in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problêmata* (*Problems*) assembled by Aristotle’s peripatetic school. *Poetics* 25 begins, “On problems and solutions” and then summarizes points from Aristotle’s lost *Homeric Problems* (25, 1460b6; 125nf). Dramatic tragedy, comedy, and epic pursue problems and solutions evident in such terms as recognition, reversal, denouement, and irony. *Poetics* 25 is a handbook for poets on compositional problems, most of which may “be resolved by reference to *lexis*” (1461a9). The treatise *Problêmata* is a collection of nine-hundred problems written in a question-answer format in thirty-eight sections; the treatise was assembled by Theophrastus, Aristotle’s student, friend, and successor at the Lyceum (Fortenbaugh, *Theophrastean Studies* 97, 296).

reasons (*apodeixis*), and evidence or proof (*pragma*). Describing and illustrating, Aristotle shows how arrangement serves problem-solving.¹⁸⁵

13.3. νῦν δὲ διαιροῦσι γελοίως· διήγησις γὰρ τοῦ δικανικοῦ μόνου λόγου ἐστίν, ἐπιδεικτικῶν δὲ καὶ δημηγορικῶν πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι διήγησιν οἷαν λέγουσιν, ἢ τὰ πρὸς τὸν [1414b] ἀντίδικον, ἢ ἐπίλογον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν; προοίμιον δὲ καὶ ἀντιπαραβολὴ καὶ ἐπάνοδος ἐν ταῖς δημηγορίαις τότε γίνεται, ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ, καὶ γὰρ ἡ κατηγορία καὶ ἡ ἀπολογία πολλάκις· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ συμβουλή. ἀλλ' ὁ ἐπίλογος ἔτι οὐδὲ δικανικοῦ παντός, οἷον ἐὰν μικρὸς ὁ λόγος, ἢ τὸ πρᾶγμα εὐμνημόνευτον· συμβαίνει γὰρ τοῦ μήκους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.

13.3. Currently [writers on rhetoric] make ridiculous divisions; for a *diêgêsis* [or narration of the facts] surely belongs only to a judicial speech. How can there be the kind of narration they are talking about in epideictic or deliberative? Or how can there be replies to the [1414b] opponent? Or an epilogue, in demonstrative speeches? *Prooemion* [introduction] and *antiparabolê* [reply by comparison] and *epanodos* [recapitulation] sometimes occur in public speeches when there is debate on two sides of a question [for there is often both accusation and response], but not insofar as there is deliberation. Moreover, an epilogue is not a requirement of every judicial speech—for example, if the speech is short or if the subject is easily remembered; for an epilogue results from shortening [i.e., condensing] the length [of an argument].

1414a 36. διαιροῦσι γελοίως [*diairousi geloiôs*] (ridiculous divisions): The sentence literally reads, “But now, laughable divisions [exist].” The adjective *geloiôs* refers to laughter and by synecdoche of what causes laughter: what is “ludicrous, absurd,” such as practices of arrangement in sophistic handbooks on rhetoric, discussed further in 3.13.5. The noun *diairousi* refers to logical division but connotes exaggeration (LSJ 395). The text’s tone reflects Aristotle’s

¹⁸⁵ If Aristotle were more pedagogically creative, he may have suggested a heuristic metaphor for his structure of an argument, such as a temple: Arguments resemble a temple in structure wherein they have a roof-like thesis statement supported by a colonnade of reasons and evidence. In the building process, argument architects develop a research question (*problêma*), answer the question with a thesis statement (*prothesis*), define key terms, and support their thesis with reasons and evidence. If rhetors address an antithesis, they may refute the opposing argument by critiquing its terms, reasons, and evidence supporting the opposing edifice. In *Prooemia* 1 and 7 of his *Institutes of Oratory*, Quintilian creates an architectural metaphor for arrangement: “But as it is not enough for those who are erecting edifices [*aedificanti*] to collect stones, materials, and other things useful for the architect [*artificium*] unless the hand of the workman be also applied to the disposition and collocation of them [*disponendis eis collocandisque*], so in speaking, however abundant be the quantity of matter, it will form but a confused mass and heap unless similar arrangement bind it together, disposed in regular order [*dispositio in ordinem*], and with its several parts connected one with another” (7).

depreciative attitude toward the “current” state of *taxis* among sophists who consider rhetoric to be synonymous with *lexis* and *taxis*, developing elaborate systems of arrangement. Kennedy comments: “The *Arts*, or handbooks of rhetoric, were organized around discussion of what kind of thing should be said in each of the parts usually found in a judicial speech” (32n15; cf. 1.1.9). In this section, Aristotle specifies the current problem by identifying how parts of speeches are misapplied, creating redundancy or irrelevancy: misapplied *prooemion* (introduction), *diêgêsis* (narration of the facts), *antidikon* (reply to opponent), *antiparabolê* (reply by comparison), *epanodos* (recapitulation), and *epilogos* (conclusion). The list of problems continues in section 3.13.5. Against this situational problem, Aristotle seeks to distinguish himself and his *technê* by suggesting a correction, namely the relative minimalism of arrangement by arguing that *taxis* serve and advance the “subject” (*pragmata*) of the argument. Similarly in *Poetics* 6, Aristotle argues that the soul of tragedy is plot, and plot is the arrangement (*synthesis*) of episodes (1450a3-4; Crider 38).

Aristotle’s treatment of *taxis* participates in a problem-solution genre and process. In constructing an argument for a theory of *taxis*, Aristotle’s strength lies in deduction: examining the goals (*telos*) of each genre of rhetoric and the forms and functions of constituent parts of speeches helping to achieve those goals. His weakness lies in induction: his limited knowledge of political oratory. According to Kennedy, “[Aristotle] seems to have made no effort to construct his theory of rhetoric [particularly *taxis*] by analysis of real speeches. Instead, he relies on constructing arguments based on his understanding of the goals of politics and ethics” (22). In this regard, some have noticed that “when Aristotle gives examples from speeches, he quotes exclusively from epideictic works” (Trevett 371). Given this focus, Aristotle is successful at refuting the sophists’ elaborate systems of arrangement and at creating an approach to *taxis* that

may be called minimalist: thesis and proof that are framed by an introduction and conclusion (3.13.4). Beyond basic categories, however, Aristotle's treatment of *taxis* did not gain popularity because he began rather than completed a useful theory of *stasis*. Kennedy suggests, "His lack of a systematic account of *stasis* is probably one reason why the *Rhetoric* was rather little studied in rhetorical schools of later antiquity" (236; cf. Liu 58-59). However, the main reason the *Rhetoric* was little studied was its esoteric status along with its late recovery (Kennedy 306-11; Poster 219 ff.). Aside from *stasis* theory, Aristotle addresses the problem of misused *taxis* and theorizes the basic categories that are a necessary part of every *logos*.

13.4. ἀναγκάια ἄρα μόρια πρόθεσις καὶ πίστις. ἴδια μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ πλείστα προοίμιον πρόθεσις πίστις ἐπίλογος· τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον τῶν πίστεων ἔστι, καὶ ἡ ἀντιπαραβολὴ αὐξήσις τῶν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μέρος τι τῶν πίστεων· ἀποδείκνυσι γὰρ τι ὁ ποιῶν τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ προοίμιον, οὐδ' ὁ ἐπίλογος, ἀλλ' ἀναμνήσκει.

13.4. The necessary parts, then, are *prothesis* [proposition] and *pistis* [proof]. These are, therefore, the parts that really belong [in every speech]; and at the most, prooemion, proposition, proof, and epilogue. For replies to the opposition belong to the proofs, and reply by comparison is amplification of the same, so it is a part of the proofs. One who does this demonstrates something, but the prooemion does not, nor the epilogue; the latter reminds [the audience of what has been demonstrated].

1414b 7. ἀναγκάια [*anankaia*] (necessary): Placed first for emphasis, *anankê* refers to "necessity in the philosophical sense" or "logical necessity" as developed by Aristotle in his philosophical, scientific, and logical treatises (LSJ 101). The necessary two "parts [*moria*]" are πρόθεσις [*prothesis*]: proposition, thesis, or main claim; and πίστις [*pistis*]: proof in logic and facts. These two parts are necessary, so they belong in every argument. While thesis and proof are necessary, Aristotle frames them with two rhetorical requirements: an introduction and a conclusion.

1414b 8. πλείστα [*pleista*] (at the most): Placed first in the clause for emphasis, *pleistos* means "the greatest number possible," "the most allowed" (LSJ 1414). Thus, between (a) two

“necessary” parts of a *logos* and (b) exaggerated divisions of *taxis* taught by notable sophists, Aristotle proposes a mean: (c) the “at most” category. Aristotle’s golden mean has four parts that outline his treatment of *taxis*: introduction (*prooimion*), thesis (*prothesis*), proof (*pistis*), and conclusion (*epilogos*). Through the course of discussing the four basic parts of a *logos*, Aristotle adds three more sections, but he sees these as strategic extensions or subcategories of the four basic parts of a composition. The following outlines Aristotle’s method of arrangement, based on his four basic parts plus three extensions:

1. *Prooemion*: introduction (§3.14-16)
 - a. *Prooemia* in epideictic, judicial, and deliberative rhetoric (§3.14)
 - b. *Topoi* for countering attack [*diabolê*] in judicial rhetoric (§3.15)
 - c. *Diêgêsis*, or narration of the facts, primarily in judicial rhetoric (§3.16)
2. *Prothesis*: proposition, thesis, or main claim (§3.14)
3. *Pistis*: proof, appeals, and refutation for supporting the argument (§3.17)
 - a. *Erôtêsis*, or interrogation in judicial rhetoric (§3.18)
4. *Epilogos*: conclusion (§3.19)

For comparison, the classical Roman oration, primarily a judicial genre, has six parts: introduction (Greek *prooimion*, Latin *exordium*), narration (*diêgêsis*, *narratio*), outline (*prokataskuê*, *divisio*), proof (*pistis*, *confirmatio*), refutation (*elenkos*, *refutatio*), and conclusion (*epilogos*, *conclusio*); additionally, Cicero allows for an optional digression (*diatribê*, *digressio*) while Aristotle discourages the practice (cf. 3.17.10) (Pernot 221; Crider 48; Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 103-6; Enos, *Literate Mode* 62, 72). In his fourfold system, Aristotle includes all six of the later classical categories but subsumes two parts under other headings: the outline is part of the introduction (3.14.6), and refutation belongs of proof (3.13.4, 1414b9). The placement of the

prothesis is flexible but usually belongs to the introduction, depending on the situation. The *prothesis* is not discussed outside of chapter 13, probably because it is such an obvious feature for Aristotle's students and since its placement is not fixed.

However, the question arises: Why does Aristotle include three additional parts of an argument (*diabolê*, *diêgêsis*, and *erôtêsis*), making seven in total, when he has just asserted that "at most" four parts are necessary? Commentators have answered this question in two ways, providing a traditional answer and an intriguing recent answer, both related to the needs of Aristotle's original audience. First, the traditional answer asserts that Aristotle starts his discussion of *taxis* as an idealistic logician but develops it as a pragmatic rhetorician. Describing this perspective, Kennedy observes that initially "[Aristotle] takes an austere, rather Platonic, view of what, in an ideal society, should be adequate—facts and arguments—and he then turns to consider the actual situation of his time and offers practical advice to his students" (229-30). Aristotle adds parts of a speech to his system of arrangement based on what he perceived as his students' needs and the necessities of practicing rhetoric in Hellenic institutions and genres.

Second, a recent and intriguing answer to the question involves the dangerous cultural situation for Socratic philosophers in Athens in the aftermath of the execution of Socrates. In a prize-winning article entitled "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Against Rhetoric: Unitarian Reading and Esoteric Hermeneutics," Carol Poster reconstructs the probable cultural context that informs the esoteric text, arguing that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* should be read alongside *Sophistical Refutations* because Aristotle sought to teach philosophers the pragmatics (including unscrupulous tactics) of rhetoric for how to argue and prevail before different audiences in social and political venues:

In *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle analyzes the fallacies of the sophists to prepare his students to refute them, but he only provides counterarguments, and

does not discuss ways to construct speeches advancing a particular notion or case. Instead, the *Rhetoric* is provided as a manual for the student trained in dialectic who needs, particularly for purposes of self-defense or defense of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, to sway an ignorant or corrupt audience or to understand the functioning of rhetoric within the badly ordered state. The techniques described are dangerous, potentially harmful to both speaker and audience, and ought not be revealed to the general readership of Aristotle's dialogues, but only taught within the controlled environment of Aristotle's school, as part of an esoteric corpus of Platonic-Aristotelian teaching. (244)¹⁸⁶

Given this practical purpose within sophistic culture, Aristotle extends sections of *taxis* treating self-defense strategies in judicial procedure: “counteracting a prejudicial attack [*diabolê*]” (3.15), “*diêgêsis*, or narration of the facts” (3.16), and “interrogation [*erôtêsis*]” (3.18). These three extended or added sections discuss primarily judicial rhetoric. In the latter section (3.18.2), Aristotle thrice mentions Socrates in his unjust trial, quoting him addressing his jury (cf. Plato, *Apology* 27d). In the chapters treating *taxis*, and particularly the three extended sections, one may interpret Aristotle's rhetorical *apologia* for philosophy in his desire to address an immediate exigency facing the intellectual heirs of Socrates.

13.5. ἔσται οὖν, ἂν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα διαιρη, ὅπερ ἐποίουν οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον, διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις καὶ ἔλεγχος καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχος. δεῖ δὲ εἶδος τι λέγοντα καὶ διαφορὰν ὄνομα τίθεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, γίνεται κενὸν καὶ ληρώδες, οἷον Λικύμνιος ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐπούρωσιν ὀνομάζων καὶ ἀποπλάνησιν καὶ ὄζους.

13.5. If one continues making such divisions as the followers of Theodorus make, there will be another *diêgêsis*, both the *epidiêgêsis* [supplementary narration] and *prodiêgêsis* [preliminary narration] and *elenkos* [refutation] and *epexelenkos* [supplementary refutation], but one should attach a name only when speaking of a distinct species and difference; otherwise, the category

¹⁸⁶ Carnes Lord argues for a similar intention but within a congenial culture: “Aristotle is concerned above all to show rhetoric can become an instrument of political prudence or of a political science which educates to prudence” (“Intention of Aristotle's ‘Rhetoric’” 338).

becomes empty and laughable, like those Licymnius created in his *Art*, [speaking of] “wafting” and “wandering” and “ramifications.”

1414b 13. οἱ περὶ Θεόδωρον [*hoi peri Theodôron*] (the followers of Theodorus):

Mentioning the rhetorical school of Theodorus of Byzantium (a rhetorician of the late fifth century), Aristotle invokes prominent rhetorical practices of arrangement to differentiate and defend his basic system of *taxis* from their “ridiculous divisions” (3.12.6). Theodorus is mentioned four times in the *Rhetoric*, showing Aristotle’s familiarity with his handbook of rhetoric (cf. 2.23.28; 3.2.4; and 3.11.6). What Aristotle objects to is the practice of subdividing basic categories into species (*eidōs*) without any distinguishing features, such as dividing the *diêgêsis* into preliminary and supplementary narration, and the same for the *elenkos*, or refutation. For the same reason, Aristotle mentions the poet Licymnius and his *technê* on rhetoric, critiquing his subdivisions in principle and in name (“wafting,” “wandering,” and “ramifications”), but Licymnius “may have applied these terms to dithyrambs or other poetry rather than to oratory; cf. 3.2.13” (Kennedy 231 n153).

1414b 15. εἶδος . . . διαφορὰν [*eidōs . . . diaphoran*] (distinct species and difference):

The principles for correct definition and for assigning a name (*onoma*) reside in observing “a distinct species [*eidōs*] and difference [*diaphoran*].” According to Grimaldi, “when we classify, any εἶδος can become a γένος as we descend,” meaning that identification of distinct *eidōs* is the prelude to definition by genus (1:74, 58a13). *Eidōs* refers to species or form, by association of observing likenesses and differences of form and function; likewise, *diaphoran* refers to the logical process of observing *differentia*, which legitimates the name of a species (LSJ 418). Condensed in the technical term *eidōs* are processes of seeing and knowing and, by association, knowledge of species. Joseph Novak describes the cognitive relationship between seeing, knowing, and species:

The term *eidōs* (plural: *eide*) is of Greek origin, and it basically means “something that is seen.” The term is a noun that is derived from the verb *eido* which means “to see.” The root of this verb is quite interesting because it originally contained a letter that in later Greek became obsolete, namely, the *digamma* which had the sound of a “w” or a “v.” Thus, we can see this root at work in the Latin verb “video” which also means “to see”. . . . A further interesting linguistic connection exists with the Sanskrit term “veda” which also designates a cognitive activity such as “knowing” or “wisdom.” There is even a link with Old English in a term like “wit,” i.e., “to know.” (“A Sense of Eidos” 1)

By means of wise observation, one recognizes features and differences of species. For Aristotle, as a general principle, one must start with induction: “Now demonstration proceeds from universals [i.e., definitions] and induction from particulars; but it is impossible to gain a view of universals except through induction . . . ; and we cannot employ induction if we lack sense-perception, because it is sense-perception that apprehends particulars” (*APst* 1, 81a40-81b6; cf. *EN* 1139b20 ff.; cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 115-116).¹⁸⁷ In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle writes, “By *eidōs* I mean the essence [*einai*] of each thing and its primary substance [*prôtên ousian*]” (1032b1-2).¹⁸⁸ Aristotle held that definitions refer to essences in concrete items functioning as their formative power. Thus, by the inductive process together with clear principles of definition, one can arrive at a basic taxonomy of arrangement, assigning names where appropriate. The lack

¹⁸⁷ *Posterior Analytics* 1: μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει, ἔστι δ' ἢ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἐπαγωγή ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος, ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς . . . , ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον (81a40-81b6).

¹⁸⁸ *Metaphysics* 7: εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν (1032b1-2).

of careful observation and categories is what Aristotle deplores in “sophistic” systems of *taxis*, a problem he intends to correct according to his formal principles of definition.

CHAPTER 14

TAXIS: INTRODUCTION

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

14.1. The introduction (prooemion) (1414b 19–1414b 29)

DEVELOPMENT

14.2-4. Epideictic introductions (1414b 29–1415a 8)

14.5-10. Judicial introductions (1415a 8–1415b 25)

14.11. Demegoric introductions (1415b 25–1416a 3)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

14.1. τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν ἀυλῆσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ' εἰσὶ, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποιήσεις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοιμίων· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀυληταί, ὅτι ἂν εὖ ἔχωσιν ἀυλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν· ὅτι γὰρ ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι. ὅπερ πάντες ποιῶσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένη. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἐκτοπίσῃ, ἀρμόττει καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι.

14.1. The prooemion is the beginning of a speech, what a prologue is in poetry and a *proaulion* in flute-playing; for all these are beginnings and, as it were, pathmakers for one who is continuing on. Now the *proaulion* is like the prooemion of epideictic speeches; for the flute-players, first playing whatever they play well, lead into the opening note of the theme, and this is the way to write epideictic speeches: after saying whatever one wants, to introduce the theme and join the parts together, as all [epideictic writers] do. An example is the prooemion of Isocrates' *Helen*, where there is nothing in common between the eristics and Helen. At the same time, even if [an epideictic writer] wanders from the subject, it is appropriate for the whole speech not to be uniform.

1414b 19. προοίμιόν [*prooimion*] (prooemion): Refers to the “beginning of a speech [*archê logou*],” signifying the first of the parts of a speech (*logou merê*) and the first section of *taxis*. In epideictic and deliberative rhetoric, arrangement follows a tripartite division:

introduction, proof, and conclusion (Pernot 222). Prooemion is derived from *pro* (front, first)

plus *oimos*, meaning “way, road, path” (LSJ 1206), thus likening introductions to “pathmakers [*hodopoiêsis*] for one who is continuing on” along the same path. Prooemion is one of the many metaphors in classical rhetoric arising from *hodos*, associating language usage with a “journey along life’s way” (LSJ 1199, s.v. ὁδός; cf. discussion at 3.1.2). *Prooimion* has many cognates and derivatives: “Transliterated into the Latin alphabet the word becomes *prooemion* or *proemium*, sometimes shortened in English to *proem*. The Latin term is usually exordium, in which the image is that of a warp set up on a loom for weaving [i.e., a text]. Other analogous words are *prologue*, used primarily of plays, and *preface*, from Latin *praefatio*, ‘what is said first,’ used in the case of prose works other than oratory” (Kennedy 231; cf. *ERC* 33, s.v. “Arrangement”). In addition to discussing the etymological metaphor, Aristotle characteristically explains rhetorical terms by likening them to other arts: the prooemion is like the prologue in poetry (*poiêsei prologos*) and the *proaulion* in aulos-playing or flute music (*aulêsei proaulion*). The latter is the “same as [*homoion*]” prooemia in epideictic rhetoric, likening music-poetics with epideictic. Rhetors often wrote collections of prooemia which they could adapt for a variety of purposes; for instance, the works of Demosthenes includes a collection of prooemia, which scholars first interpreted as fragments but later as a collection of ways to begin a speech (Kennedy 231).

1414b 25. γράφειν [*graphein*] (to write): The presence of the infinitive “to write” indicates that Aristotle recognizes and suggests that a fine practice of composition should precede epideictic orations, whose “style is most like writing” (3.12.5). By Aristotle’s time, rhetoric had largely become secondary orality, that is, post-literate orality or writing given an oral performance: “This is the way to write [*graphein*] epideictic speeches [*epideiktikois*”

logois].” The suggestion is that one can learn to write prose introductions by imitating aural and literary prooemia in music, poetry, and orations.¹⁸⁹

1414b 25. ἐνδοῦναι [*endounai*] (theme): In context, this infinitive means to “give the key-note” of a tune or speech, and thus refers to *theme* (LSJ 560, s.v. *endidōmi* 6). Similarly, the next verb (*synaptō*) is a parallel infinitive, referring to the theme’s function: to “unite” or “join the parts together”; the term also refers to the “proportionate mean [*synēmmenē mesotēs*],” otherwise called the golden mean in ethical theory (LSJ 1698). These two terms refer to the transitional moment in an epideictic proem when the rhetor moves from “saying whatever one wants to give the key-note [theme] and to bring harmony [unity]” to the oration, “as all [epideictic writers] practice,” for example, the oration *Helen* by Isocrates. In the prooimion to *Helen*, “Isocrates attacks philosophers who argue for the sake of argument (eristic) or sophists who speak on trivial subjects. In contrast, he says, Gorgias chose a fine subject in his *Encomium of Helen* but then composed an apology rather than an encomium. This leads into the body of the speech where Isocrates shows how Helen should be celebrated” (Kennedy 232n154). This, then, is the style of an epideictic introduction.

1414b 29. μὴ ὅλον [*mē holon*] (not uniform): As a added observation, Aristotle notes that it is “appropriate [*harmottei*]” for the whole speech not to be completely uniform, which is the particular style of epideictic arrangement, involving digressions from the subject but unified by a theme.

14.2. λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου· οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ “ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες,” ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς δ’ εὖ φρονούσιν οὐθὲν ἄθλον ἐποίησαν.

¹⁸⁹ For a study of the transition from orality to literacy in classical Greece, including its cognitive and cultural effects, see Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, esp. Part Two (197-311).

14.2. The proemia of epideictic speeches are drawn from praise or blame. For example, in his *Olympic Discourse* Gorgias praises those who founded national festivals: “You are worthy of the admiration of many, O men of Greece.” Isocrates, on the other hand, blames them because they honored excellence of the body with gifts, but offered no prize to the wise (*Panegyricus* 1).

1414b 30. ἐξ ἐπαίνου ἢ ψόγου [*ex epainou ê psogou*] (from praise or blame): The preposition “from [*ex*]” suggests that Aristotle is referring to topics of *taxis* regarding praise, blame, justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom (*Rhet* 1.9; cf. Grimaldi 1:191 ff.). In several places, Aristotle uses the plural noun *toutôn*, meaning “sources” (1415a5). What is implied in this chapter is made explicit in the next, where Aristotle begins to use the term *topos* for referring to places or strategies of invention of subject-matter for the localized parts of arrangement. However, *toutôn* (even when called *topoi*) are distinct from formal *koinoi topoi* (twenty-eight in 2.23 plus metaphor) having logical inference while “sources” do not, but are like material *eidê* (specific topics) (cf. *ERC* 724, s.v. “Topics”). The specific or particular topics are useful for discovering propositions about the subject-matter of each species of rhetoric, subject-matter that appeals to *pragma*, *êthos*, and *pathos* (cf. Grimaldi 1:94, 59b25-32). For epideictic introductions, Aristotle names five sources: praise and blame (§2), advice in exhortation and dissuasion (§3), and appeals to the audience (§4) (3.14.4). For examples of praise and blame, Aristotle creates dramatic antithesis: Gorgias in the late fifth century addressed the crowds at Olympia, praising the Greeks for establishing the Olympic games; later, Isocrates addresses the same assembly but blames the Greeks for misplaced values inherent in the Olympic games since the Greeks praise, promote, and finance excellence in athletics but not talents of intellect, composition, and practical wisdom (*eu phronêsis*). The antithesis creates cultural critique with exciting dialogue, enjoyable irony, and even urbanity, combining features of Aristotle’s preferred style of syntax and well-liked expressions (cf. 3.9.8 and 3.11.6). The Olympic example concerns the theme of

Panhellenism, a concern of both Gorgias and Isocrates who address the issue of their culture's primary values.¹⁹⁰

14.3. καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς, οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους οἱ μήτε εὐδοκιμοῦσιν μήτε φαῦλοι, ἀλλ' ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἄδηλοι, ὡσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πριάμου· οὗτος [1415a] γὰρ συμβουλεύει.

14.3. Another [source of epideictic prooemia is] from offering advice: for example, that one should praise the good, and thus the speaker praises Aristeides, or such as are neither famous nor bad but are good while obscure, like Alexander the son of Priam. [In these instances] the speaker [1415a] offers advice.

1414b 35. συμβουλῆς [*symboulês*] (advice): Refers to “*advice or counsel given,*” most often through a process of deliberation (LSJ 1677). A source of epideictic prooemia is “offering advice,” derived from deliberative (*symbouleutikon*) rhetoric, specifically advice or examples of praising the good and condemning the bad. The example figures are Aristeides “the Just” (an early fifth-century statesman) and Alexander son of Priam, suggesting that an epideictic orator could advise that people praise not the rich and famous but the morally good who advance the public good; this advice follows the example of Isocrates in *Panegyricus* 1. Advice of moral suasion or dissuasion, explicitly or implicitly, is the function of all epideictic rhetoric, including most mimetic literature. The example of Paris Alexander (the son of King Priam of Troy in the *Iliad*) is strange in a context about praising one who is “good while obscure” since he is notorious for being the immediate cause of the Trojan War, but Aristotle is probably referring to his early, obscure background on Anatolian Mount Ida before being thrust into history. Kennedy

¹⁹⁰ In *Panegyricus* 1, Isocrates begins his oration by expressing “wonder” (*thaumazô*) at the values of the “national assemblies [*panêgyreis synagagontôn*].” On Gorgias’s *Olympic Oration*, three brief fragments of testimony exist in Sprague, *The Older Sophists* 49-50. Isocrates emphasizes the virtue of *phronêsis*, referring to moral prudence in regard to practical wisdom. Like art (*technê*), *phronêsis* concerns action (*praxis, eu praxis*) but involves reason (*logos*) and contemplation (*theorein*). *Phronêsis* describes the ability (*dynamis*) to deliberate well about the good, seeking truth about what is good and bad for humanity. In this sense, the proverb is true, “Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric* 199).

notes: “The point is that Paris was living alone in the country until chosen as a judge in the beauty contest of the goddesses” (232n157). In Book 2, Aristotle references an epideictic oration entitled *Alexander*, probably by Polycrates, which features moral advice or suasion (2.23.8, 2.24.7; cf. also 2.24.9).

14.4. ἔτι δ' ἐκ τῶν δικανικῶν προοιμίῳν· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν, εἰ περὶ παραδόξου λόγος ἢ περὶ χαλεποῦ ἢ περὶ τεθρυλημένου πολλοῖς, ὥστε συγγνώμην ἔχειν, οἷον Χοιρίλος “νῦν δ' ὅτε πάντα δέδασται.” τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ τούτων, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· δεῖ δὲ ἢ ξένα ἢ οἰκεία εἶναι τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ.

14.4. Another source is borrowed from judicial prooemia, that is, from appeals to the audience, if the speech is about something paradoxical or difficult or already much discussed, in order to obtain pardon [for discussing it], as the verse of Choerilus: “Now, when [all the subjects of poetry] have been treated. . . .” These, then, are the sources of the prooemia of epideictic speeches: from praise, from blame, from exhortation, from dissuasion, from appeal to the audience. The opening note must be either unrelated or related to [the subject of the speech].

1415a 2. τὸν ἀκροατὴν [*ton akroatên*] (the audience): The term is specific to rhetoric: “[the] *hearer*, of persons who come to hear a public speaker” (LSJ 56). “Consider audience” is a perennial principle, for rhetors must contemplate the needs and probable responses of the specific audience they intend to address (*ERC* 43, s.v. “Audience”). Thus, a fifth source for creating epideictic introductions, or parts thereof, comes from “appeals to the audience,” specifically to obtain advance pardon for broaching difficult subjects. This is a practice common in judicial rhetoric where difficult issues are the norm, but it can also be used successfully in epideictic. Aristotle names three kinds of difficult subjects: paradoxical subjects (*paradoxou logos*), requiring making fine distinctions and risking confusion in a general audience; irksome subjects (*chalepou*) that are emotionally grievous and hard to bear; and overly discussed subjects (*tethrulêmenou* past participle from *thrulêô*) referring to what is the “common talk,” “repeat[ed] over and over” (LSJ 807). Given three kinds of thorny subjects, it is always wise to forewarn an

audience, humbly asking for advance pardon for mentioning difficult subjects in order to retain an audience's good-will, receptivity, and attention (cf. 3.14.7) .

1415a 4. Χοιρίλος [*Choirelos*] (Choerilus): Named as an example, perhaps for historical irony, this fifth-century epic poet appealed to the audience when he complained of the limited number of subjects left by poets of his time (Kennedy 232n158). Perhaps this subject was irksome to an audience, which gave the poet reason to appeal for advance pardon. By his appeal, the poet also implies the difficulty of rhetorical invention for poetry.

1415a 5. τούτων [*toutôn*] (sources): This plural noun literally means “whence” or “from there” and refers to “sources” of invention (LSJ 1427), being a near synonym for *topoi*. At the end of chapter 14, Aristotle uses the term “source [*pothen*]” (1415b25), while in chapter 15 he begins to use the term *topos* for referring to places, sources, or strategies of invention. Aristotle largely organizes his treatment of *taxis* according to *topoi*, thus creating a localized system of structure and invention that responds to the needs of each part of an oration or composition (cf. Enos, “Ciceronian *Dispositio*” 109). Distinct from common and material topics, the topics of *taxis* function as responsive heuristics within the divisions of a discourse, enabling a rhetor to suit the composition to each situation. Here “source” summarizes five means of invention for epideictic prooemia: praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, and appeal to the audience. The summary statement marks a transition, for Aristotle has an organized writing practice in his treatises wherein he structures sections or paragraphs according to thesis, analysis, and synthesis.

14.5. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταῦτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν διθυράμβων ὅμοια τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς· “διὰ σὲ καὶ τεὰ δῶρα εἴτε σκῦλλα.”

14.5. As for the prooemia of judicial speeches, one should grasp that they have the same effect as the prologues of plays and the prooemia of epic poems. (Those in dithyrambs are like those in epideictic. For example: “Through you and your gifts and then spoils. . . .”)

1415a 8. δικανικοῦ προοίμια [*dikanikou prooimia*] (prooemia of judicial speeches): The new subject signals a transition to judicial rhetoric, dealing with the strategic functions or effects (*dynatai*) of introductions. Aristotle understands the introduction as having a fourfold purpose: communicate the subject, especially the purpose (*telos*); refute or create an attack (*diabolê*); create good-will (*eunous*) in the audience; and create an attentive (*prosektikos*) audience. The first two functions are intrinsic to the subject (*pragmata*), while the latter two are extrinsic to the subject, which Aristotle names “remedies” (*iatreumata*) for allying possible problems with a antagonistic or apathetic audience (cf. 3.14.8). Later Greek and Latin rhetorical handbooks usually discuss three functions of the introduction: “to make the audience receptive or teachable (Latin *docilis*), well disposed (*benivolus*), and attentive (*attentus*) (Kennedy 234; cf. *Classical Rhetoric* 103).

1415a 9. πρόλογοι [*prologoi*] (prologues): Drawing two similes, Aristotle emphasizes that introductions in judicial rhetoric have the same “effect [*dynatai*]” as prologues in dramatic plays (*dramatikos*) and as prooemia in epic poems (*epopoia*). He qualifies this statement with reference to dithyrambic poetry, whose prooemia are more like that in epideictic rhetoric. As an example he refers to a quotation from the fifth-century dithyrambic poet Timotheus (Kennedy 233n159). An introduction has two basic purposes: it informs the audience of the rhetorical purpose and persuades the audience that it is worthwhile, or significant, including an outline of the argument. The classical oration, primarily a judicial genre, has six parts: introduction, narration, outline, proof, refutation, and conclusion (cf. 3.13.4). In his minimalist *taxis*, Aristotle subsumes in the introduction other parts of a speech, including the outline and possibly the narration and proposition depending on the situation.

14.6. ἐν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἔπεισι δεῖγμά ἐστι τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα προειδῶσι περὶ οὗ [ἧ] ὁ λόγος καὶ μὴ κρέμηται ἢ διάνοια· τὸ γὰρ ἀόριστον πλανᾷ· ὁ δὲ οὖν ὡς περ εἰς τὴν

χείρα τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιεῖ ἐχόμενον ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. διὰ τοῦτο “μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά,” “ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε μουσα,” “ἠγεό μοι λόγον ἄλλον, ὅπως Ἰσσίας ἀπὸ γαίης ἦλθεν εἰς Εὐρώπην πόλεμος μέγας.” καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ <οὔ> τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθύς ὡς περὶ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ, γέ πού [δηλοῖ], ὡς περὶ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς [[εἰμοὶ πατὴρ ἦν Πόλυβος]]. καὶ ἡ κωμωδία ὡσαύτως. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου καὶ ἴδιον τοῦτο, δηλώσαι τί ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος. διόπερ ἂν δηλον ἢ καὶ μικρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα, οὐ χρηστέον προοιμίῳ.

14.6. In [judicial] speeches and in epic there is a sample of the argument in order that [the audience] may know what the speech is about and [their] thought not be left hanging. The unlimited leads astray; he who gives, as it were, the beginning into the hand [of the hearer] allows him, by holding on, to follow the speech. This is the reason for “Sing, Goddess, the wrath . . .” [and] “Speak to me, Muse, of the man . . .” [and]

Bring to me another theme, how from the land of Asia
There came to Europe a great war.

And the tragedians make the subject of the play clear—if not right away as Euripides does, at least somewhere in the prologue, as Sophocles does too: “My father was Polybus. . .” And the comedians similarly.

The most necessary and specific function of the prooemion is this: to make clear what is the purpose for which the speech [is being given]. As a result, if the subject is clear or short, there is no need of a prooemion.

1415a 12. προειδῶσι [*proeidōsi*] (may know): The term refers to “advance organizer,” being a practice of good communicators. The verb means “see beforehand” (LSJ 1467), wherein the root *eidōs* refers to both sight and the form seen (Novak 1), as a result of the rhetor giving the audience a *deigma*: “sample, example” also “plan, sketch” of the argument (LSJ 372). The term *deigma* is related to *paradeigma*, Aristotle’s term for “example” as an inductive argument. The two words together (*pro-eidos* plus *deigma*) create the concept of “initial outline” or “advance organizer,” allowing an audience “to follow the speech [*akolouthein tō logō*]” and “not be left hanging.” An introduction should have an advance organizer to inform the audience not only of the subject but also of its plan, including focus, outline, and proposition. An audience wants to see an end in the beginning. In Plato’s words, quoting a Greek proverb, “The beginning is half of the whole” (*Laws* 6, 753e). In the later history of classical rhetoric, the outline of the argument

became its own part of arrangement. In Aristotle's approach to *taxis*, the introduction includes outline, narration, and proposition.

1415a 14. ἄοριστον [*aoriston*] (unlimited): The opposite of providing an advance organizer is “unlimited” orations, with no end in sight, literally “indeterminate” (LSJ 173). The audience can then foresee neither an end nor a means to an end; without a determinate or delimited method, the speech easily “goes astray.” This indeterminate situation creates uncertainty in an audience, coupled with dwindling confidence in the speaker. In the context of rhythm and syntax, Aristotle uses the same terms: “the unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. And all things are limited by number” (3.8.2). Concerning numerical delimitation, an advance organizer often includes numbers: e.g., “This claim is supported by three clear reasons,” and one proceeds to name the reasons. What applies to syntax also applies to the structure of arguments and communicating that structure in the introduction: “Such a [delimited] style is pleasant and easily understood” (3.9.3), referencing clarity as the first principle of style (cf. 3.10.2).

1415a 14. εἰς τὴν χεῖρα [*eis tēn cheira*] (into the hand): The hand is a metonymy (symbol) for control. What one includes or excludes in an introduction is an issue of clarity and control. In the one hand, if a rhetor omits the proposition and advance organizer from the introduction, the rhetor retains the upper-hand because an audience is unable to judge or critique the rhetor's success until the proposition is stated, perhaps in the conclusion or only gradually revealed. This is often the case in inductive analyses and scientific studies in which analysts wish to show their methodology of invention by their methodology of communication. In the other hand, if a rhetor includes the proposition and advance organizer in the introduction, the rhetor gives the audience the upper-hand since the audience is then able to evaluate the rhetor's success as the argument progresses. This is the case in deductive arguments, reflecting the structure of

the enthymeme, wherein the conclusion/proposition precedes the reasons for it. Aristotle's point is that giving "the beginning into the hand" enables the hearer to understand and "to follow the speech [*akolouthēin tō logō*]" but also to follow it critically. This pleasant, reassuring sense of control is one reason audiences prefer a full introduction, including the proposition and advance organizer. In this sense, arrangement itself is a persuasive force with reference to all three appeals.

1415a 16. "ᾄειδε θεᾶ" [*aeide Thea*] ("Sing, Goddess"): The invocation from Homer's *Iliad* serves as an allusion to an example that models a well-crafted introduction which includes the clarifying elements that give the audience a sense of focus, purpose, and organization. In this section, Aristotle refers to three epic invocations: first the *Iliad*, then the *Odyssey*, and finally the epic on the Persian Wars by Choerilus of Samos. He also refers to two well-known tragic poets: Euripides, who always states clearly his purpose in prooemia, and Sophocles, whose character Oedipus recites a speech stating the purpose in the prooemion (*Oedipus the King* 774; cf. Kennedy 233n161). The references to invocations serve not only to highlight purposeful introductions but also archaic epistemologies, as if to suggest that if the inspired Homer and the poets could create fine introductions, so also those who can invoke at will *topoi* of invention. Homer's "source" was the Muse whom he invokes imperatively to "sing" the *Iliad* and "recite" the *Odyssey*, so that Homer presents himself as a mediating performer rather than an inventive author (Havelock, *The Muse Learns to Write* 20). In place of inspired singing and reciting, Aristotle abstracts the sources and causes of the creative process by the metaphor "seeing" *places* along a pathway, as it were, for finding and choosing the artistic methods of inference, virtues of style, and principles of arrangement. Aristotle's theory of rhetoric is an intellectual "faculty [*dynamis*]" of mind (1.2.1). In terms of education and knowledge of causation, Aristotle's art of

invention supersedes Homer’s Muse for inspiration (*entheos*), and sophistic formulae for imitation, though neither evidently in terms of cultural examples for eloquence (cf. 3.7.11).

1415a 23. τέλος [*telos*] (purpose): The term is synonymous with *prothesis*, the proposition, indicating its usual placement in the introduction of a *logos*. Aristotle emphasizes that the purpose statement is “the most necessary and specific function of the prooemion.” This necessity accords with his emphasis that the *prothesis* is a “necessary” part of a speech (3.13.4). In addition to placement in the introduction, Aristotle emphasizes that the *telos*, or *prothesis*, ought to be “clear [*dêlon*],” repeating the term twice. As already discussed, *dêlos* means making the meaning clear and visible to the auditor’s mind (cf. discussion at 3.2.1, 1404b1). The virtue of clarity is a prerequisite and culmination of style. What is most important in a composition ought to be clearest and carefully placed. For Aristotle, purpose is a part of his three species of rhetoric, which are derived from the roles played by audiences in various civic functions: “By locating purpose in the social action the audience takes, Aristotle’s approach to purpose provides him with a basis not only for classifying rhetoric into his famous three types—deliberative, forensic, and epideictic—but also for deriving characteristic lines of argument appropriate to the persuasion of an audience in a given institutional context” (*ERC* 576, s.v. “Purpose”). Since rhetoric is always situational, the practice of clarifying purpose becomes a negotiation between rhetor and audience, or thinking of and for the audience in a given situation.

14.7. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα εἶδη οἷς χρῶνται, ἰατρεύματα καὶ κοινά. λέγεται δὲ ταῦτα ἕκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου. περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν καὶ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου, ὅσα περὶ διαβολὴν λύσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι. ἔστι δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως· ἀπολογουμένων μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τὰ πρὸς διαβολήν, κατηγοροῦντι δ’ ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ. δι’ ὃ δέ, οὐκ ἄδηλον· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολογούμενον, ὅταν μέλλῃ εἰσάξειν αὐτόν, ἀναγκαῖον ἀνελεῖν τὰ κωλύοντα, ὥστε λυτέον πρῶτον τὴν διαβολήν· τῷ δὲ διαβάλλοντι ἐν τῷ ἐπιλόγῳ διαβλητέον, ἵνα μνημονεύσῃ μάλλον. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἕκ τε τοῦ εὖνουν ποιῆσαι [καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσει] καὶ ἐνίοτε [τὸ] προσεκτικόν [ἢ τοῦναντίον]· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ συμφέρει ποιεῖν προσεκτικόν, διὸ πολλοὶ εἰς γέλωτα πειρῶνται προάγειν. εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν ἅπαντα ἀνάξει, ἔάν τις βούληται, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικῆ φαίνεσθαι· [1415b] προσέχουσι γὰρ μάλλον τούτοις. προσεκτικοὶ δὲ τοῖς μεγάλοις, τοῖς ἰδίοις, τοῖς

θαυμαστοῖς, τοῖς ἡδέσιν· διὸ δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ὡς περὶ τοιούτων ὁ λόγος. ἔαν δὲ μὴ προσεκτικούς, ὅτι μικρόν, ὅτι οὐδὲν πρὸς ἐκείνους, ὅτι λυπηρόν.

14.7. The other kinds that are used are *remedies* [*iatreumata*] and are common [to all species of rhetoric]. These are derived from the speaker and the hearer and the subject and the opponent: from the speaker and the opponent whatever refutes or creates a prejudicious attack [*diabolê*]. But these are not done in the same way. In the defendant's speech replies to attack come first, in the prosecution's [they come] in the epilogue. The reason is not unclear; for the defendant, when he is going to introduce himself, has to remove whatever hinders his case and thus must first counteract the attack. But the attacker ought to put his attack in the epilogue in order that [the audience] may better remember it.

Remarks aimed at the audience derive from an effort to make them well disposed or make them angry and sometimes to make them attentive, or the opposite; for it is not always useful to make them attentive, which is why many speakers try to induce laughter. All sorts of things will lead the audience to receptivity if the speaker wants, including his seeming to be a reasonable person. [1415b] They pay more attention to these people.

And they are attentive to great things, things that concern themselves, marvels, and pleasures. As a result, one should imply that the speech is concerned with such things. If they are not attentive, it is because the subject is unimportant, means nothing to them personally, [or] is distressing.

1415a 25. ἰατρῆματα [*iatreumata*] (*remedies*): A medical term derived from *iama*, literally meaning “remedy, medicine” often for purposes of “soothing, pacification” (LSJ 815). Applied to rhetoric, a “remedy” is a strategy for allaying or countering prejudicial attack (*diabolê*). According to the passage, *remedies* are “other kinds [*alla eidê*]” of sources from which one creates an effective introduction, sources that are “common [*koina*]” to all genres of rhetoric in many situations. After proposing the thesis, Aristotle provides a fourfold advance organizer. *Remedies* are strategies for dealing with antagonistic or apathetic characters, including purposeful attacks or slanted language of an opponent or an audience. As such, *remedies* are outside of the subject (*pragma*), but they belong not only in the introduction but also in the conclusion and throughout a speech, as required by the situation. *Remedies* are derived from four sources, discussed in order: (1) the speaker regarding the need to refute an attack (*diabolê*) or create a counter-attack; (2) the opponent regarding needed information for replying to an attack; (3) the subject regarding placement of attacks and replies; and (4) the audience regarding the

need to create good-will (*eunous*), attention (*prosektikos*), and receptivity (*eumatheia*).

Aristotle's three remedial functions for audience later became a permanent feature of classical rhetoric: to make each listener well-disposed (*benevolus*), attentive (*attentus*), and receptive (*docilis*) to the speaker or writer (Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 103).

1415a 29. πρὸς διαβολήν [*pros diabolên*] (replies to attack): The term *diabolê* means “slander, prejudice,” while the related verb *diaballô*, also occurring in this passage, means “attack.” Concerning these cognates, Kennedy notes that “Aristotle’s discussion does not draw a sharp distinction between attacks that may be justified and those that are slanderous” (233n163; cf. Grimaldi 1:10-11, 54a16:2). The distinction little matters in terms of practice and arrangement since litigants should reply to attacks based on their effect, regardless of their intent. Replies to attack come in different tactical places, depending on one’s role in the judicial setting. Kennedy notes judicial procedure: “As in modern trials, the prosecution spoke first. The prosecutor, however, sometimes begins with an explanation of why he has been moved to bring the case to trial; cf. e.g., Lysias 12.1-3 [*Against Eratosthenes*], Isocrates 17.1-2 [*Trapeziticus*], Aeschines 1.1-2 [*Against Timarchus*], etc.” (234n164). Therefore, as the defendant, one ought to reply first or right away (*prôton*) to counteract the effect of the prosecution’s attack, including a reply or counter-attack in the introduction. As the prosecution, one ought to reply to the defendant’s attack later in the speech, thus including a reply or counter-attack in the epilogue. Aristotle notes one of several reasons for including a reply or counter-attack in the epilogue: “that [the audience] may better remember it.” Other reasons also exist; for instance, having the last word prevents one’s opponent from having any (or ample) opportunity to reply.¹⁹¹

¹⁹¹ Cf. Daniel J. O’Keefe’s discussion of replies to attack messages in *Persuasion: Theory and Research* (Sage Publ., 2002), esp. pp. 220 ff.

1415b 1. προσεκτικοὶ [*prosektikoi*] (attentive): Aristotle enumerates the “means of attention.” Since attention is deemed the most important of the three remedial functions for audience, Aristotle lists eight attention-grabbing devices, plus two more in section 10. First, however, he notes that attention “is not always useful,” and some speakers seek to divert attention by inducing laughter (*gelô*s) (1415a37). The challenge of regaining attention then falls on the following speaker. Since issues of attention are necessary for rhetorical success, Aristotle enumerates ten attention-gaining “sources [*pothen*],” devices, or topics:

- Seeming to be the sort of person who is reasonable, capable, upper or educated class, or morally fair and good (*epieikê*) (LSJ 632; cf. 1.13.13, 1374a26)
- Suggesting how the subject is significant or great (*megalô*is)
- Speaking about what benefits or concerns the hearers themselves (*idio*is)
- Speaking about wonders and marvels (*thaumastô*is)
- Addressing an audience’s particular pleasures (*hêdesin*)
- Showing how the subject is not unimportant (*[mê]* *mikron*)
- Suggesting how the subject affects hearers personally (*ekeinô*us)
- Preventing distress by obtaining advance pardon for broaching distressing (*lypêron*) subjects, such as paradoxical, irksome, and overly discussed subjects (cf. 3.14.4)
- Addressing an audience by name, using nouns of direct address (1415b20)
- Asking for response by using rhetorical questions (1415b21)

These ten devices are not exhaustive, but they touch the most common appeals of *êthos* and *pathos* for making an audience attentive. Well-liked expressions could be added to this list (cf. 3.10-11). Many of these means of attention can be created by framing a subject as a problem, felt

need, or mystery to be solved, thus suggesting its significance or relevance in the introduction (cf. 3.2.3, 1404b11 for discussion on attention).

14.8. δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦ, οὐδὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχη ὡσπερ σῶμα κεφαλὴν.

14.8. But one should not forget that all such things are outside the real argument: they are addressed to a hearer who is morally weak and giving ear to what is extrinsic to the subject, since if he were not such a person, there would be no need of a prooemion except for setting out the headings of the argument in order that the body [of the speech] may have a “head.”

1415b 5. ἔξω τοῦ λόγου [*exê tou logou*] (outside the argument): The means of attention by appeals of *êthos* and *pathos* are said to exist “outside” of the “real argument” (*logos*) since they are “outside the subject [*exê tou pragmatos*].” Aristotle makes a fundamental distinction in rhetoric: persuasion *of* the subject versus persuasion *from* the subject. The former refers to appeals to character and emotion exclusively or primarily. The latter refers to enthymematic forms and processes of reasoning treating the subject itself, which includes various degrees of the three rhetorical appeals but always includes reasoning *from* the factual subject-matter or *pragma* (cf. 1.2.2, 3.1.3, and 3.13.1). According to Aristotle, many “outside” appeals are necessary due to the “moral weakness” of the hearer in attending to serious judicial matters. Otherwise, an orator would not need to massage the ears of the hearer to fulfill civic duty as a hearer and judge. Yet, a morally ideal world would neither need a judiciary. Although he prefers civic discourse that focuses on factual matter, Aristotle reveals his realistic assessment and responsibility to the actual situation by attending to all of the available means of attention in imperfect rhetorical situations.

1415b 6. φαῦλον [*phaulon*] (morally weak): The adjective describing the typical, inattentive hearer is *phaulon*, referring to a person who is “*common*” or “*inferior*” and morally “*careless, thoughtless, indifferent*” (LSJ 1920). The same adjective refers to “*bad*” or “*foul*”

sounding language (*Rhet* 3.2.11, 1405a32). The inattentive, inferior auditor is apathetic and unwilling to listen to needs of others nor duties of justice, unless personal pleasure derives from the effort. The “morally weak” hearer characterizes the audience in 3.1.4-5, which has a similar context: the art of delivery appeals primarily to *pathos* due to the “corruption of the audience [*akroatou mochthêrian*]” (1403b35 and 1404a8). Unlike logic, rhetoric is a realistic, audience-centered art; the rhetor must appraise the audience and act pragmatically to advance a case, choosing from the available means of attention and of persuasion, despite or because of the audience’s weakness of character. Successful rhetors are able to rouse the weak, inattentive auditor by properly employing the means of attention.

1415b 8. σῶμα [*sôma*] (body): The root metaphor “body” creates several derivative terms used in *taxis* for describing the parts and functions of an argument. The use of “body” here is an adjunct for “head” (*kephalê*) and “headings” (*kephalaiôdôs*) to describe respectively the part and functions of an introduction to an argument. Aristotle’s minimal system of arrangement accords with the body metaphor: prooemion (head), proof and other appeals (body), and conclusion (foot) (cf. 3.13.4). In his introduction (1.1.3), Aristotle calls the enthymeme the “body of persuasion [σῶμα τῆς πιστεως]” (1354a15), asserting the centrality of the enthymeme as the mode of proof as opposed to his predecessors who focus merely on that which is “external to the subject [ἐξῶ τοῦ πράγματος]” (1354a15-16), also comparing externals to “dress” (1356a27) (cf. Grimaldi 1:9, 54a15:2 ff.). Aristotle compares the dynamic functions of body and argument since both enable self-defense, but the latter by rhetorical action (1355a39). In terms of syntax, *côla* are “limbs” composing the argument’s body (cf. 3.9). As a root metaphor, “body” works to distinguish parts of *taxis* and syntax and to describe the dynamic functioning of those forms.

14.9. ἔτι τὸ προσεκτικούς ποιεῖν πάντων τῶν μερῶν κοινόν, ἐὰν δέη· πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἀνιάσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρχόμενοι. διὸ γελοῖον ἐν ἀρχῇ τάττειν, ὅτε μάλιστα πάντες προσέχοντες ἀκροῶνται. ὥστε ὅπου ἂν ἦ καιρός, λεκτέον “καί μοι προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν· οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμὸν ἢ ὑμέτερον” καὶ “ἔρῳ γὰρ ὑμῖν οἶον οὐδεπώποτε ἀκηκόατε δεινόν,” ἢ οὕτω θαυμαστόν. τοῦτο δ’ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἔφη Πρόδικος, ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς.

14.9. Furthermore, making the audience attentive is a feature common to all parts of a speech, if there is need of it [at all]; for these remedies are sought everywhere, not just when beginning. Thus, it is ridiculous to amass them at the beginning, when all listeners are most paying attention. As a result, whenever there is an opportunity, one should say [things like] “And give me your attention; for none of this pertains more to me than to you,” and “I shall tell you something strange, the like of which you have never heard,” or “[something] so marvelous.” To do this is, as Prodicus said, “to throw in some of the fifty-drachma lecture when the hearers nod.”

1415b 12. καιρός [*kairos*] (opportunity): In this section, Aristotle resumes his discussion of the means of attention, now focusing *kairos*. Often translated as “opportunity,” this rich term refers to two processes: reading and replying to the situation well. *Kairos* means “right timing and proper measure—directly related to the rhetorical importance of time, place, speaker, and audience” (*ERC* 371, s.v. “*Kairos*”). In effect, *kairos* refers to the art of providing the right message in the right way at the right time, which *remedies* help create.¹⁹² *Remedies* are used to create *kairos* moments in introductions but should not be confined to introductions, for *remedies* are common parts or strategies (*merôn koine*) useful throughout a discourse. *Remedies* for audience inattention can be used when necessary or at the “right times” throughout a speech to increase audience motivation. Aristotle provides three examples of effective ways to make an

¹⁹² The gloss “opportune” (Kennedy and Freese) does not render the dynamism of *kairos*, which is better translated as “fitness in regard to time, place, occasion” (Cope 3:77); “right timing and due measure” (Kinneavy and Eskin 432); “the right moment of opportunity which requires proactivity to achieve success” (Freier 3); “subject-situational correlation” (J. Smith 5); “the situational forces that induce, constrain, and influence discourse” (Enos, *Roman Rhetoric* 16). Contrasting *kronos* (quantitative time, chronology) and *kairos* (qualitative time, opportunity), Freier observes significance: “It is not an understatement to say that *kairos* moments alter destiny. To miscalculate *kronos* is inconvenient. To miscalculate *kairos* is lamentable” (3). Cf. discussion at 3.7.8, 1408a36, for a more complete definition of *kairos*; cf. also Kinneavy and Eskin, “*Kairos* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.”

audience attentive. The first example asks for attention directly and also suggests that the subject affects the hearers personally (*ekeinous*). The next two examples raise expectations of hearing wonders and marvels (*thaumastois*). These examples illustrate two of the eight means of attention previously enumerated (in 3.14.7).

1415b 16. πεντηκονταδράχμου [*pentêkontadrachmou*] (fifty-drachma lecture): A memorable maxim due to its *energeia*, visualization, and humor, illustrating signs of *kairos* and how to create attention. The simile is attributed to Prodicus, a fifth-century sophist, “best known from his role in Plato’s *Protagoras* and his narration of the myth of the ‘The Choice of Heracles’ preserved in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* 2.1.21-34” (Kennedy 235n165). As teachers, sophists had prepared, memorized lectures on rhetoric, which students paid to attend. A drachma was a silver coin in ancient currency, often the daily wage for a skilled worker, today in Athens equivalent approximately to forty Euros (€40) or fifty U.S. dollars (\$50) (*OCD* 356, s.v. “Coinage”). The fifty-drachma lecture was the professor’s best ideas, how the sophist attracted a following and earned a living. Prodicus’s maxim is a “well-liked hyperbole,” but an exaggeration that is realistic and therefore more humorous. The suggestion is that one should tantalize an audience with some of the best lecture “when the hearers nod” asleep during the current lecture. The subordinate clause (“when the hearers nod”) signals opportune timing (*kairos*), while the main clause (the second *côlon* in the Greek syntax) indicates how to regain attention: “throw in some” of the most important information or other means of attention.

14.10. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν οὐχ ἤπερ [ὁ] ἀκροατῆς, δηλον· πάντες γὰρ ἢ διαβάλλουσιν ἢ [φόβους] ἀπολύονται ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις. [[ἄναξ, ἐρῶ μὲν οὐχ ὅπως σπουδῆς ὑπο. τί φοιμιιάζῃ;]] καὶ οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔχοντες ἢ δοκοῦντες· πανταχοῦ γὰρ βέλτιον διατρίβειν ἢ ἐν τῷ πράγματι. διὸ οἱ δούλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν ἀλλὰ τὰ κύκλω, καὶ προοιμιάζονται.

14.10. But it is clear that this is not addressed to the hearer in his proper capacity as hearer; for all [who do it] are attacking others or absolving themselves in their prooemia. “Lord, I shall not

“speak as one in haste. . . .” “Why this proem. . . .” And [those do this] who have or seem to have a bad case [where] it is better to spend words on anything other than the subject. That is why slaves do not answer questions but go round in a circle and “proem-ize.”

1415b 17. ἥπερ [ὁ] ἀκροατής [*hêper ho akroatês*] (proper capacity as hearer): The phrase “proper capacity” derives from *hêper*, a technical term in Aristotle’s logic expressing identity, “to indicate the *precise* or *essential* nature of a thing” (LSJ 1262, s.v. ὅσπερ, ἥπερ 2.5). According to functional identity, “the hearer *qua* hearer” has a proper duty to pay attention while inattention is improper. When a speaker must use *remedies* as means of attention, the speaker addresses a hearer who is derelict of duty, who is not attentive to arguments within the subject (*pragma*) unless outside appeals are added for moving emotions or for “attacking others or absolving themselves in their prooemia.”

1415b 21. τί φροίμιάζῃ; [*ti phroimiazê*] (Why this proem?): Two brief quotations illustrate two additional means of attention: first, addressing an audience directly, using nouns of respectful direct address; second, asking for attention by using rhetorical questions (cf. 3.14.7). The quotations are allusions to *remedies*, referring respectively to Sophocles, *Antigone* 223 and Euripides, *Iphigenia Among the Taurians* 1162; the quotations are double-bracketed by Kassel, signaling a speculated late addition. Although the context concerns diversionary tactics, yet the *remedies* are legitimate means of attention when used well and infrequently. In the first example, Sophocles places in first position the noun of direct address, a common practice for emphasis: “Lord” or “Sir,” followed by an equally respectful clause to begin the speech. When a speaker uses direct address in a respectful manner and infrequently, an audience usually reciprocates with respectful attention. In the second example, Euripides writes a rhetorical question for his orator, a question that asks for audience response since response is the beginning of responsibility of “hearer *qua* hearer.” Euripides through his orator asks, “Why this proem?” which is not a simple

question; in the context, it is a diversion. Contrary to modern opinion, “rhetorical” questions are usually not simple but focus on central issues in order to frame the issue, according to the maxim: “He who asks the question defines the issue.” Rhetorical questions get to the heart of a matter and, therefore, focus audience attention on the stated issue. Rhetorical questions are similar to dialectical questions, except the speaker answers the questions for the audience. If a rhetorical question occurs at the beginning of a speech or composition, the rhetor leads the audience by patient exposition to the desired answer in the conclusion. If the question is posed near the conclusion, the rhetor answers immediately with a flourish.

1415b 22. οἱ πονηρὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα [*hoi ponêron to pragma*] (bad case): The phrase has a strong meaning, such as “worthless subject” or “degenerate argument,” with the adjective *ponêros* having ethical and political connotations (LSJ 1447).¹⁹³ Aristotle suggests that rhetors who have “empty subjects” seek to obfuscate that fact by spending their time arguing *of* the subject rather than *from* the subject. One sign of a weak or apparently weak case is an abundance of *remedies*. Those with bad cases employ the most *remedies* in introductions by continually appealing to an audience’s character and emotions rather than their reasoning process on the subject. Aristotle names this diversionary tactic by the verb “prooem-ize [*prooimiazontai*],” paraphrased as “go round and round in a circle” rather than addressing the issue. “That is why slaves do not answer questions,” he suggests, since questions address and frame the issue.

14.11. πόθεν δ’ εὖνους δεῖ ποιεῖν, εἴρηται, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων. ἐπεὶ δ’ εὖ λέγεται “δὸς μ’ ἐς Φαίηκας φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἢ δ’ ἐλεεινόν,” τούτων δεῖ δύο στοχάζεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς οἴεσθαι δεῖ ποιεῖν συνεπαινεῖσθαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ γένος ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἀμῶς γέ πως· ὁ γὰρ λέγει Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ἀληθές, ὅτι οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν ἀλλὰ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίοις. τὰ δὲ τοῦ δημηγορικοῦ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ δικανικοῦ λόγου ἐστίν, φύσει δὲ ἥκιστα ἔχει· καὶ γὰρ καὶ περὶ οὐ ἴσασι, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα προοιμίου, ἀλλ’ ἢ δι’ αὐτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας, ἢ

¹⁹³ In Hellenistic usage, including Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, *ponêros* has ethical overtones, usually translated as wicked or evil (cf. LXX Deut. 17:2, Matt. 5:11, 13:19), also in modern derivations, such as devious or evil-natured in Modern Greek and “porn” in English.

ἐὰν μὴ ἡλικὸν βούλει ὑπολαμβάνωσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον. διὸ ἢ διαβάλλειν ἢ ἀπολύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ ἢ αὐξῆσαι ἢ μειῶσαι. τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα προοιμίου δεῖται, ἢ κόσμου χάριν, ὡς [1416a] αὐτοκάβδαλα φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὴ ἔχη. τοιοῦτον γὰρ τὸ Γοργίου ἐγκώμιον εἰς Ἡλείους· οὐδὲν γὰρ προεξαγκωνίσας οὐδὲ προανακινήσας εὐθύς ἀρχεται
 “Ἡλις πόλις εὐδαίμων.”

14.11. The sources of creating good will have been mentioned and each of the other similar [states of mind]. But since it is well said,

Grant me to find among the Phaeacians friendship or compassion, these are the two things one should aim at. In epideictic, however, one should make the hearer think he shares the praise, either himself or his family or his way of life or at least something of the sort; for what Socrates says in the funeral oration is true, that it is not difficult to praise Athenians in Athens, but among the Spartans [it is another matter].

The proemia of deliberative rhetoric are copied from those of judicial, but in the nature of the case there is very little need for them. Moreover, they are concerned with what the audience knows, and the subject needs no proemion except because of the speaker or the opponents or if the advice given is not of the significance they suppose, but either more or less. Then it is necessary to attack or absolve and to amplify or minimize. It is for this that a proemion is needed—or for ornament, since [1416a] the speech seems carelessly done if it does not have one. An example of the latter is Gorgias' encomium to the Eleans: without preliminary sparring or warm-up he begins abruptly, “Elis, happy city.”

1415b 25. πόθεν [*pothen*] (sources): The plural noun literally means “whence,” and refers to places, causes, or sources of invention (LSJ 1427). At the head of this section, *pothen* is a summary term referring to all of the aforementioned “sources” from whence one invents *remedies* for creating emotional “good will [*eunous*]” in an audience. The term *pothen* is a functional synonym for *topos*, a term used in chapter 15 for referring to the topical treatment of *taxis* focusing on localized strategies of invention.

Aristotle provides a topical procedure within his six divisions of a composition to help rhetors create structure and localized invention. Similar to his interactive theory of style, Aristotle views an interrelationship between *taxis* and *topoi* so that each part of an address may respond to the needs appropriate to each division. Accordingly, the discussion of *taxis* largely concerns the topical method for localized processes of invention, wherein the respective divisions of a discourse are responsive to the needs of each particular part according to the

situation. A localized process of invention is found among later rhetoricians in the Aristotelian tradition. In the rhetorical theories of Cicero and Quintilian, Enos discovers and emphasizes that “*invention occurs within a domain: that is, arrangement provides a structure, an architecture for the creation of ideas*. Thus, Ciceronian patterns of arrangement, with highly defined and localized schemata, are intended for effective, responsive discourse” (“Ciceronian *Dispositio*” 109).¹⁹⁴ This same architecture of invention is evident in Aristotle’s topical treatment of *taxis* so that within the divisions of a discourse a rhetor may create each part of a composition in way that responds to the particular needs of the situation (cf. discussion at 3.15.2, 1416a6).

1415b 27. φίλον ἐλθεῖν ἢ δ’ ἐλεεινόν [*philon elthein êd eleeinon*] (to find friendship and compassion): Homer’s maxim, “Grant me to find among the Phaeacians friendship or compassion” (*Odyssey* 7.327), serves as an instructive summary on *remedies*, for “these are the two things one should aim at” as the goal of emotional appeals in judicial prooemia. Aristotle defines friendliness, pity, and good will in the category of emotions (2.1.7; cf. 1.1.7.). *Philia* refers to the positive emotion of feeling friendly toward someone, defined as “wanting for someone what one thinks are good things for him” (2.4.1). *Eleeinos* (a derivative of *eleos*, “pity”) means finding, arousing, or receiving *pity* (LSJ 531). Both emotions are important for a defendant in a trial. In the maxim, the aorist infinitive “to find,” “to arrive at” (*elthein*) indicates that the discussion on *remedies* is an applied extension of *topoi* of *pathos* in Book 2, applied to judicial prooemia (cf. *topoi* of *philia* in 2.4 and of *eleos* in 2.8).

1415b 28. συνεπαίνεῖσθαι [*synepaineisthai*] (shares): To indicate the emotional goal of epideictic prooemia, Aristotle uses a verbal-infinitive meaning to “*approve together, give joint assent*” in order to “join in praising” (LSJ 1709). The verbal does not imply giving praise to the

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Cicero, *Oratorical Partitions* 9, 27; *Topics* 6-7, 97-99; Quintilian, *Institutes of Oratory*, prologue 7; Enos, “Heuristic Structures of *Dispositio*” (77-83).

audience, but rather indirect praise by commending what the audience values, such as laudable actions and people, and by employing the audience's particular value-laden language. In epideictic prooemia, emotional appeals support character appeals: by creating shared assent and praise, an orator creates an emotional sense of shared identification, lending the perception that the speaker and audience have the same cultural values and perspectives. This emotional goal affects perceptions of *êthos*, of being likeminded and ideological allies regarding, for instance, race, gender, class, religion, and politics. In turn, common values serve as premises (for values are premises, not conclusions), creating the basis for "reasoning together" about ethical values in all species of rhetoric, but especially epideictic rhetoric.

As he quotes from Homer to exemplify the emotional goal of judicial prooemia, similarly for epideictic prooemia, Aristotle paraphrases a maxim spoken by Socrates in his funeral oration: "It is easy to praise the Athenians among the Athenians, but among the Spartans it is a difficult task" (cf. Plato, *Menexenus* 235d). The maxim asserts the ease of creating emotional approval among one's own community and the challenge of cross-cultural communication. In the dialogue, Plato uses the general infinitive *eu legein* ("speak well of" or "eulogize"), but in his paraphrase, Aristotle employs the more specific infinitive *epainein*, meaning to "approve, applaud, commend" and especially to "complement publically" (LSJ 603). *Epainein* (approve) is the root of *synepaineisthai* (approve together); use of verbal parallelism emphasizes how the Socratic maxim illustrates Aristotle's principle. This instance shows that Aristotle feels free to alter quotations slightly to improve them for his purposes of teaching by emphasizing terms and creating parallelism for the sake of his audience.

1415b 32. δημηγορικῶν [*dêmêgorikou*] (deliberative rhetoric): The term signals a transition, but the discussion of demegoric rhetoric is more an extension than a parallel treatment

because deliberative prooemia “are from [*ek tôn*]” or “copied from” the same sources and principles as judicial prooemia. In addition, the transitional term is not the genus “deliberative [*symbouleutikon*]” rhetoric, but the species “*dêmêgorikê* [demegoric]” rhetoric referring to the Athenian democratic assembly and similar situations in which speakers address issues of policy before large audiences and, therefore, need to suit the style to the size of audience. In Book 3, the term “deliberative [*symbouleutikon*]” is never used but always “demegoric” with its more specific rhetorical situation and characteristic audience of thousands (see discussion at 3.12.5).

1415b 34. περὶ οὗ ἴσασσι [*peri hou isasi*] (concerned with what an audience knows): The phrase summarizes why demegoric prooemia are necessary. According to Aristotle, prooemia are responsive because rhetoric is dialogic, always responding to a rhetorical situation and drawing premises from audience understanding. Aristotle mentions three variables in the situation that require prooemia and, answering these, five possible functions of prooemia, most of which are counter-arguments. As a general heading, prooemia are rhetorical, not logical: prooemia are for the audience and concern “what an audience knows.” The verb in this phrase derives from *eidon*, meaning both “see” and “know,” wherein what one knows comes from sense perception or experience (LSJ 482, s.v. εἶδω). One may translate the purpose of demegoric prooemia as follows: “they are concerned with audience perceptions” based on experience or statements by prior speakers. Prooemia are needed to address audience perceptions as previously formed by “the opponents” or by “the speaker” or by audience experience if “the advice given” does not meet the audience’s expectations as either “more or less” significant. Given these three variables in the rhetorical situations, Aristotle recognizes five possible responses and thus five functions of demegoric prooemia, written in verbal parallelism: “to attack or absolve and to amplify or minimize” and for “ornament” (*kosmos*) (cf. 3.1.2). All but the last are counterarguments. A

speaker may need “to attack” the opposition, refuting the antithesis; or “to absolve” his own character and thesis; or “to amplify” the significance of his argument to fulfill expectations, or amplify the problems of the antithesis; or “to minimize” the problems of his own advice, or minimize the benefits of the antithesis; and “for ornament” to fulfill cultural expectations “since the speech seems carelessly done if it does not have [a prooemion].” In replying to an opponent, a speaker should preface remarks with an introduction “to explain why he rises to speak or what his opponents’ hidden motives are; cf. e.g., Demosthenes 4.1” (Kennedy 235n170). For a negative example taken from epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle cites Gorgias’ encomium to the Eleians that “begins abruptly,” seeming like an athletic contest “without preliminary sparring or warm-up.” Kennedy notes, “The metaphors are from boxing. Epideictic was often thought of as analogous to athletic contests; cf. Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 1” (236n171). The example indicates the dialogical nature of rhetoric: people expect and desire a prooemion in which a speaker explains and replies to the rhetorical situation, however briefly. Introductions serve as “pathmakers” (the etymology of *prooimia*) in the dialogic of civic discourse for responding to audience expectations and the opponent’s attacks in order to prepare the audience to accept one’s policy advice over against the opponent’s counsel.

CHAPTER 15

TAXIS: COUNTERACTING ATTACKS

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

15.1. *Topoi* for counteracting prejudicial attack (*diabolê*) (1416a 4–1416a 6)

DEVELOPMENT

15.2-3. *Topoi* of *stasis* for counteracting attack (1416a 6–1416a 20)

15.4-10. *Topoi* of *êthos* for counteracting attack (1416a 20–1416b 15)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

15.1. περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις ὑπόληψιν δυσχερῆ ἀπολύσαιτο. οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει εἴτε εἰπόντος τινὸς εἴτε μή, ὥστε τοῦτο καθόλου.

15.1. One source of counteracting a prejudicial attack (*diabolê*) is to use arguments to refute an unpleasant suspicion. It makes no difference whether someone has [actually] expressed the suspicion or not, so this is of general applicability.

1416a 4. περὶ δὲ διαβολῆς [*peri de diabolês*] (prejudicial attack): The phrase signals a new focus: “Now, about prejudicial attacks,” or Cooper: “In dealing with prejudice.” Some translators like Kennedy ignore the term *peri*, meaning “on,” “about,” or “concerning,” signaling a shift of focus for a new subject. Chapter 15 consists of an elaboration on judicial prooemia focused on counteracting *diabolê*, translated as “prejudicial attack,” first under the category of counter-argumentation, including *stasis* (§§1-3), and second belonging to the category of *ad hominem* arguments or fallacies of *êthos* (§§4-10). The purpose of the chapter is self-defense, similar to *Sophistical Refutations* but treating fallacies of ethical character, wherein Aristotle discusses ten sources (*to ex hôn*) or topics (*topoi*) for how to counteract attacks. The term *diabolê* means “false accusation, slander, prejudice” primarily against *êthos* (LSJ 390). The related verb *diaballô*, also occurring in the chapter, has a general sense of “attack” or “misrepresent” a

person's argument or character (LSJ 389; cf. Grimaldi 1:10-11, 54a16:2, on *diabolê*).

Concerning these cognates, Kennedy observes that Aristotle does not make an adequate distinction between slanderous attacks and justified attacks (233n163). This inadequate distinction may have two causes. First, Aristotle always assumes a just defendant, perhaps Socratic philosophers or rhetoricians defending themselves against a litigious and sophistic culture—an authorial assumption suggesting an original audience and rhetorical purpose for the esoteric work called “*peri rhêtorikês*” (cf. Poster 244; Kennedy 17; and comments at 3.13.4). If this is the case, then “*peri diabolê*” is a chapter with strategic purpose. Second, justification or intention of prejudicial attacks matters little for a rhetorical treatment of *taxis*, for a speaker must attend to the effects of prejudicial attacks without delay in order to mitigate audience suspicions and address questions raised by the attacks.

1416a 4-5. ἀπολύσαιτο [*apolusaito*] (to refute): The key verb *apoluô* is not related to logical or legal “refutation” (*elenchos*) but is a general, pragmatic term meaning primarily “set loose from,” “release” as if from a trap or trouble, and secondarily in legal contexts “refute in defense” or “refute calumnies” (LSJ 208). Implied by the verb and context is the supplied term “arguments,” taken to be the source of “general applicability [*katholou*]” for counteracting attacks. Thus, the first *topos* of refutation is any good counterargument regarded as reasonable or effective by the audience. In the concluding chapters of Book 2, Aristotle treats refutation, writing that an opponent's enthymemes may be refuted either by counter-enthymeme or by objection (2.25-26; cf. Grimaldi 2:355 ff.; also cf. *ERC* 592, s.v. “*Refutatio*”). What a speaker refutes or clears away is any “injurious suspicion [*hypolêpsin dyscherê*]” in the audience's mind created by the opponent's attacks and calumnies, regardless of whether the suspicion is probable or spoken. When suspicions exist, counterarguments are necessary in introductions to create an

open-minded audience capable of seriously considering one's message. As necessary response, organization becomes a factor in persuasion. As response, invention becomes dialogical in anticipating certain prejudicial attacks and for preparing what is appropriate for each part of the message.

15.2. ἄλλος τόπος ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα ἀπαντᾶν, ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ ὡς οὐ βλαβερὸν, ἢ οὐ τούτω, ἢ ὡς οὐ τηλικούτον ἢ οὐκ ἄδικον ἢ οὐ μέγα ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ἢ οὐκ ἔχον μέγεθος· περὶ γὰρ τοιούτων ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, ὡς περὶ Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ναυσικράτην· ἔφη γὰρ ποιῆσαι ὃ ἔλεγεν καὶ βλάψαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀδικεῖν. ἢ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι ἀδικοῦντα, εἰ βλαβερὸν ἀλλ' οὖν καλόν, εἰ λυπηρόν ἀλλ' ὠφέλιμον ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιούτον.

15.2. Another topic is to make denial in regard to what is at issue: either that it is not true or not harmful or not to this person or not so much as claimed or not unjust, or not very, or not disgraceful or that it is not important. The question at issue [*amphisbêtêsis*] concerns things like this, as in the reply of Iphicrates to Nausicrates; for he admitted that he had done what the other claimed and that it caused harm but not that he had committed a crime. Or one may balance one thing against another when a wrong has been done, [saying that] although it was harmful, it was honorable [or that] though it caused pain, it was advantageous, or something of this sort.

1416a 6. ἄλλος τόπος [*allos topos*] (another topic): The term *topos* introduces Aristotle's topical treatment of *taxis*, distinct from that found in Books 1-2. *Topos* means "place" as along a path (*hodos*), where metaphorically one looks to discover the "available means of persuasion." *Topos* means *place* and *strategy* of invention; one finds the *strategy* at the *place* (cf. Grimaldi 2:291-93, 97a7:1; Kennedy 172). *Topos* also has three distinct functions in Aristotelian heuristics for discovering subject-matter (1.4-15), inferential structures (2.20-23), and localized responses to the particularities of each part of a composition (3.14-19). In Book 1, when Aristotle discusses the three genres of rhetoric, he organizes his treatment as sets of specific topics, or *eidê* (plural *idia*, derived from *eidos*), for discovering specific subject-matter. In Book 2, Aristotle names twenty-eight *koinoi topoi* (common topics) that outline the formal relationships among ideas that "apply to all [species of rhetoric]" (2.22.17). *Koinoi topoi* are inferential forms, similar to dialectical *topoi* discussed in *Topics*, including strategies for defining, classifying, comparing,

and associating antecedent-consequent and cause-effect relationships (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 356; see discussion at 3.2.6, 1404b32, and 3.10-11). In Book 3 on arrangement, Aristotle introduces *topos* of *taxis*, although he only uses the term five times: twice in chapter 15 (1416a6 and 13) and thrice in chapter 19 (1419b18, 24, and 27). Despite the term's infrequent usage, the term's meaning is implied in the term "sources" (used ten times in this chapter), prefaced by the term "*allos*" meaning "another [topic]," and the term *pothen* and its periphrastic synonym *ek tôn*, both meaning "source" from which to draw an argument (cf. discussion of *pothen* at 3.14.11, 1415b25). Distinct from material and common topics, the topics of *taxis* serve as localized methods of invention that are responsive to the particularities of each part of a composition. Aristotle's topical treatment of *taxis* strongly suggests the unity of his theory and treatise (cf. discussion at 3.14.11, 1415b25).

1416a 7. τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα [*ta amphisbêtoumena*] (what is at issue): This term begins a discussion of what has become known as *stasis* theory: a heuristic used in judicial rhetoric for defining the "issue" or "question" in dispute; once the *stasis* is defined, it becomes the basic proposition that a rhetor seeks to demonstrate or to deny (cf. Grimaldi 1:296, 74a11 ff.).¹⁹⁵ The term is used here as a present-plural participle, similar to *staseis*, and at line 9 as a singular noun (*amphisbêtêsis* [1416a9]), having similar legal usage as *stasis*. As an Attic legal term, *amphisbêtêsis* refers to the "*claim*" or "*question*" at issue in a dispute or controversy (LSJ 94; cf. 1.1.8). Similarly, *stasis* in legal usage refers to the "*position* taken up by a litigant (esp. defendant)" (LSJ 1634). As a word for identifying the *stasis*, *amphisbêtêsis* occurs ten times in chapters 15-17 (twice in 3.15.1, once in 3.16.6, and seven times in 3.17.1-2 and 4). As theorized by Hermagoras of Temnos (second century BC) and Hermogenes of Tarsus (second century AD),

¹⁹⁵ On *stasis* theory, cf. esp. ERC 693-96, s.v. "Stasis Theory," and Cope's discussion of "legal issues" in Cope, *Introd.* 397-400.

stasis has four actualizations creating four basic categories: *Being* (*stasis* of fact or conjecture), *Quantity* (*stasis* of definition), *Quality* (*stasis* of quality), and *Place* (*stasis* of jurisdiction) (Dieter 215; Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 99, 121-22; Kennedy, “Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric” 183 ff.). In chapters 15 and 17, Aristotle illustrates all four categories of “what is at issue,” without theorizing categories, so his treatment is regarded as a significant pre-*stasis* theory. His specific yet undeveloped discussion suggests that Aristotle considered the “issue” an application of more fundamental logical categories which needed no further development. The first three categories of *stasis* are definitional: predication of being, genus, and quality, respectively. This trilogy derives from the first three of his ten “categories” (essence, quantity, quality), from which *stasis* theory derives its terms (*Cat* 4, 1b25). The fourth *stasis* of jurisdiction has ties to his fourth and fifth categories, relation and place. Additionally, the functional categories of language rehearse the same, as some have observed: “the parts of speech in language correspond fairly well to the list of [ten] categories,” with nouns expressing *being*, adjectives *quantity*, adjectives and adverbs *quality*, prepositions and conjunctions *place* and relations, etc. (Kreeft 55). Aristotle’s pre-*stasis* theory is more fully discussed at 3.17.1.

1416a 7. οὐκ ἔστιν [*ouk estin*] (not true): A literal rendering of the phrase is “not being.”¹⁹⁶ This is the first of eight example counter-claims illustrating the *topos* of how to make

¹⁹⁶ “Not-being [*ouk estin*]” is a concept developed by the Pre-Socratics and Gorgias. Sextus Empiricus (*Against the Professors* 7.65-87) outlines and renders Gorgias’s account: “In what is entitled *On the Nonexistent or On Nature*, he proposes three successive headings: first and foremost, that nothing exists; second, that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without doubt incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man” (Sprague, *Older Sophists* 42). With sophistical love of paradox and antithesis, Gorgias presents contradictions concerning not-being (*ouden estin*), not-knowing (*akatalêpton*), and language (*logos*), perhaps as a pointed critique of Plato’s notion of pure being (cf. Enos, *Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle* 72-85). While Aristotle recognizes the paradoxes of not-being, skepticism, and representation, Aristotle treats not-being as a matter of conjecture, the first and fundamental *stasis*, which in practical reasoning is a determination of audience.

“denial [*apantan*]” of “what is at issue” to counteract an attack, so each example is prefaced with “not [*ouk*].” Although the first example defines the first category of *stasis*, Aristotle is illustrating rather than developing categories. To show how far Aristotle develops his pre-*stasis* theory, one can compare his examples in this section, adding one from section 8, with the four basic categories of *stasis*:

- *Being*: “not true,” “not this person”
- *Quantity*: “not so much as claimed,” “not very [*mega*]”
- *Quality*: “not harmful,” “not unjust,” “not disgraceful,” “not important [*megethos*]”
- *Place*: “wrong to bring [dramatic] trials into the law courts” (3.15.8)

Several of the example counter-claims are interpretive regarding category since the examples have no context, but later Aristotle names four basic categories: fact, harm, importance, and justice (3.16.4, 6 and 3.17.1; cf. *APst* 2.1). Of these four, fact is *stasis* of being, while the latter three are subdivisions in *stasis* of quality (Kennedy 242n191). Summarizing, Aristotle notes: “The question at issue [*amphisbêtêsis*] concerns things like this” (1416a9), emphasizing his mode of illustrating sources of argument. Since he either names or illustrates the four basic categories and some subcategories, one can conclude that Aristotle has laid a full foundation for what would become known in the Hellenistic era as *stasis* theory.¹⁹⁷

1416a 10. Ἰφικράτης [*Iphikratês*] (Iphicrates): The example is a paraphrase of the Athenian general Iphicrates (mentioned twelve times in the *Rhetoric*), who admitted his deed (*stasis* of being) but denied its crime (*stasis* of quantity). The legal tactic of denying the definition or genus of crime Aristotle considered, whatever the morality, an impressive

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Ray D. Dearin, “The Fourth *Stasis* in Greek Rhetoric.” *Rhetoric and Communication*. Ed. Blankenship and Stelzner. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1976. 3-16.

defensive. According to sources, “Nausicrates (called Naucrates by Roman writers) was a student of Isocrates; see Quintilian 3.6.3” (Kennedy 237n173).

1416a 11. ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι [*antikatallesthai*] (one thing against another): A final method of creating counter-claims, or disputing *stasis* of quality, is by asserting one quality or value over against another: e.g., honor/harm, advantage/pain, etc. When a defendant admits “wrong [*blapsai*],” he or she may assert the intention of the greater good.

15.3. ἄλλος τόπος ὡς ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημα ἢ ἀτύχημα ἢ ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη τρέμειν οὐχ ὡς ὁ διαβάλλων ἔφη, ἵνα δοκῆ γέρων, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης· οὐ γὰρ ἐκόντι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἔτη ὀγδοήκοντα. καὶ ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, ὅτι οὐ βλάψαι ἐβούλετο, ἀλλὰ τόδε, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο ὃ διεβάλλετο, ποιῆσαι, συνέβη δὲ βλαβῆναι· “δίκαιον δὲ μισεῖν, εἰ ὅπως τοῦτο γένηται ἐποίουν.”

15.3. Another topic: that [the act in question] is a mistake or bad luck or a necessity, as Sophocles said he was not trembling for the reason his accuser said—in order to seem old—but out of necessity; for it was not of his own volition that he was eighty years old. And it is possible to offer a different reason: that one did not intend harm but some other objective and not what the accuser alleged, but the accidental result was harmful: “It would be just for you to hate me if I acted in order to bring this about.”

1416a 14. ἀμάρτημα [*hamartêma*] (mistake): The term means “mistake” in judgment, the opposite of “done rightly” (LSJ 77).¹⁹⁸ Two more alpha-privatives follow, moderating intention: “bad luck [*atychêma*]” and situational “necessity [*anagkaion*].” Thus, the third *topos* for counteracting attacks focuses on denying the efficacy of the claimed *stasis* by denying willful or malicious intention. While not denying the deed or effect (*stasis* of being), a defendant may deny the reason, cause, or intention, which changes the definition and certainly the quality of the accusation (*staseis* of quantity and quality).

¹⁹⁸ In the *Poetics* 13, *hamartêma* means tragic flaw: “a mistake in judgment” that shapes the action-idea, plot, and destiny of characters. In the Hellenistic era, *hamartêma* developed the meaning of “sin” (the “result of sinning”), but only later through the influence of Hebraic translational meanings of this word as “sin” in the LXX and Christian literature (LSJ 77).

1416a 17. ἀντικατάλλασσασθαι [*antikatallattesthai*] (offer a different reason): The counterpart to denying an alleged cause or intention is to “*exchange one thing for another*,” referring to a method of minimizing collateral damage (LSJ 156). Aristotle’s advice is to offer a different cause or reason, one that mitigates intention and thus guilt, though not actual damages. In this way, a defendant shows that harm was an unintended accident. For an illustration, Aristotle summarizes how Sophocles answered an accusation by claiming the “necessity” of old age. The example could derive from either the dramatist or the general: “The reference is perhaps to Sophocles the dramatist, when accused by his son of mental incompetence as described in an anonymous biography prefixed to some manuscripts; otherwise the fifth-century B.C. general Sophocles whose trial Aristotle mentions in 1.14.3 and 3.18.6” (Kennedy 237n174).

15.4. ἄλλος, εἰ ἐμπεριείληπται ὁ διαβάλλων, ἢ νῦν ἢ πρότερον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐγγύς.

15.4. Another [topic is recrimination], if the accuser has been involved [in the action or something similar], either now or in the past, either himself or one of those near him.

1416a 20. ὁ διαβάλλων [*ho diaballôn*] (the accuser). By naming the accuser (*diaballôs*), Aristotle begins a series of nine *topoi* focusing on *êthos* as means to defend against attack. This *topos* is the classical *ad hominem* argument known as *tu quoque* (Latin for “You, too”), made famous by Shakespeare: “Et tu, Brute!” (*Julius Caesar* 3.1.77). In vernacular English, it means, “Look who’s talking.” Similar are the rhetorical figures of *antanagôgê* (recrimination) and *antapodidômi* (counter-claim) (LSJ 150), exemplified by Socrates’s comic reply to Phaedrus, “You’re another [*antapodidontes allêlois*]” (Plato, *Phaedrus* 236c). Aristotle is aware of informal fallacies in argumentation because he coined the term: “*Ad hominem* arguments were first recognized by that name by Aristotle in his discussion of refutations in *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*” (Walton 503). Aristotle would expect his students to consult his logical treatises. Accusing the accuser of the same claim, the defendant both diverts attention from the

issue and discredits the accuser's character by revealing inconsistency, bad motive, or untrustworthiness of the original claim. The argument has the following form: A makes claim C; A is also guilty of C; thus, C is dismissed (Kreeft 81). Sometimes a fallacy of *êthos, tu quoque* has invalid and valid uses, depending on whether the counter-claim is merely a diversion or affects the original claim.

15.5. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλοι ἐμπεριλαμβάνονται, οὗς ὁμολογοῦσι μὴ ἐνόχους εἶναι τῇ διαβολῇ, οἶον εἰ ὅτι καθάριος, μοιχός, καὶ ὁ δεῖνα ἄρα.

15.5. Another [is] if there are others with similar characteristics whom [the opponents] agree are not liable to the charge; for example, if a person who is fastidious about his appearance is [to be judged] an adulterer, then so-and-so must be.

1416a 22. ἄλλοι [*alloi*] (others [involved]): By naming “others involved,” Aristotle extends the previous *topos* about the accuser's consistency to the consistency of the principle, or what happens when the judgment is applied to others in the same category. This *topos* works to reveal at least two fallacies in the accuser's claim, namely, the ethical fallacy of guilt by association and the inductive fallacy of hasty generalization, both examples of the *non-sequitur*. Based in Aristotle's example, the accuser's argument takes the following form: A is an adulterer [*moichos*] because A is a sleek person [*katharios*]. The accuser has assumed the major premise, “All sleek people are adulterers.” Thus, a defendant could name other sleek people, “whom [the opponents] agree are not liable to the charge,” to reveal the spuriousness of the association and, therefore, the bogus allegation (cf. *SophEl* 5-6, 167b1-20 and 168b28-169a5, treating refutation and fallacies connected with the consequent).

15.6. ἄλλος, εἰ ἄλλους διέβαλεν ἢ ἄλλος <ἢ> αὐτός, ἢ ἄνευ διαβολῆς ὑπελαμβάνοντο ὡσπερ αὐτὸς νῦν, οἱ πεφήνασιν οὐκ ἐνόχοι.

15.6. Another [is] if the opponent or someone else has attacked others [in the past] or if, without arraignment, others have been under suspicion as the speaker now is and have been shown not guilty.

1416a 25-26. οἱ πεφήνασιν οὐκ ἔνοχοι [*hoi pephênasin ouk enochoi*] ([those] shown not guilty): This *topos* concerns applying the precedent. If others under similar indictment or suspicion have been “shown not liable,” then the defendant may assert the precedent against the charge. That the opponent made a dubious indictment indicates a flawed cause, either a prejudicial or unintentional attack. The counter-measure is similar to admitting the deed (*stasis* of being) but denying the crime (*stasis* of quantity) (cf. 3.15.2).

15.7. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἶ ὅς αὐτὸς ἄπιστος, οἱ τούτου λόγοι ἔσονται πιστοί.

15.7. Another comes from counterattacking the accuser; for it will be strange if his words are believable when he himself is unbelievable.

1416a 26-27. ἀντιδιαβάλλειν τὸν διαβάλλοντα [*antidiaballein ton diaballonta*] (counterattacking the accuser): The *topos* of “counterattacking the attacker” is recommended for consistency’s sake because an audience will think it “strange” (*atopos*, “out of place”) if dissociation occurs between the prosecutor’s *logos* and *êthos*. Therefore, a defendant should not only refute the claim but also accuser’s credibility, asserting bad information or bad motive. As Cooper paraphrases: “meet calumny with calumny; thus: ‘How monstrous to rely on the statement of this man, when you cannot rely upon *him*.’” It seems that a significant insight exists in Aristotle’s *topos* of non-dissociation. This insight is personal context: a *logos* does not exist independently but subsists with a creative *êthos*. Arguments are autobiographical to a considerable extent because they are personal accounts. Arguments are interpretations, not mere demonstrations, as Nietzsche has asserted in his speech denying the objectivity of “brute facts” (“On Truth and Falsity” 180). Since he reasserted subject-object relations, one is better able to recognize the classical sense of interpretation: an argument originates not from an object observed but from a situated subject observing an object amid a rhetorical situation. Aristotle’s

insight in this passage is that *logos* reflects *êthos* because perspective and argument derive from persons who have ethical-character. Any other assumption dissociates *logos* from *êthos*, which simply seems “strange” and “unbelievable” (*apistos*).

15.8. ἄλλος, εἰ γέγονεν κρίσις, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς Ὑγιαίνοντα ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει κατηγοροῦντα ὡς ἀσεβῆς, ὅς γ' ἐποίησε κελεύων ἐπιορκεῖν “ἡ γλῶσσ' ὁμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.” ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖν τὰς ἐκ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ ἀγῶνος κρίσεις εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἄγοντα· ἐκεῖ γὰρ αὐτῶν δεδωκέναι λόγον ἢ δῶσειν, εἰ βούλεται κατηγορεῖν.

15.8. Another if there has been a previous decision, as in Euripides' reply to Hygiainon in an antidosis trial when accused of impiety because he had written a line recommending perjury: “My tongue swore, but my mind was unsworn” (*Hippolytus* 612). He said [Hygiainon] was wrong to bring trials into the law courts that belonged in the Dionysiac contest; for he had given or would give an account of the words there if anyone wanted to bring a complaint.

1416a 32. γέγονεν κρίσις [*gegonen krisis*] (previous decision): The phrase (previously “given decision”) could have two references, either an appeal to precedent or to jurisdiction. The example indicates that the latter meaning is correct, so this *topos* concerns *stasis* of jurisdiction. In the example, Euripides challenged a civic court's jurisdiction regarding artistic license, asserting that the accuser unjustly transferred an alleged artistic “impiety [*asebês*]” from the Dionysiac “contest [*agônos*]” to the judicial “contest [*agonta*],” when the former had jurisdiction over such issues. Kennedy comments: “The trilogy of which the *Hippolytus* was a part had been given first prize by the judges in the dramatic contest of 428 B.C., and Euripides was claiming a charge of impiety should be brought before those judges. This is an example of what comes to be known as *stasis* of transference or jurisdiction, the claim that the charge is brought before the wrong court” (238n175). Thus, the question at issue becomes not the alleged impiety but the relationship between civic courts and dramatic contests.

15.9. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν, ἡλίκον, καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι ἄλλας κρίσεις ποιεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐ πιστεύει τῷ πράγματι. κοινὸς δ' ἀμφὸν ὁ τόπος τὸ σύμβολα λέγειν, [1416b] οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρω ὃ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι οἰκείος τῷ Πριάμῳ· ἡ γὰρ Ἡσιόνη ἀδελφή· ὃ δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ἐχθρὸς τῷ Πριάμῳ, ὃ Τελαμών, καὶ ὅτι οὐ κατεῖπε τῶν κατασκόπων.

15.9. Another is to use [the nature of] slander [*diabolê*] as a basis of attack, considering what a bad thing it is, and this because it alters legal judgments and does not rely on the facts. To speak of *symbola* is a topic common to both sides; [1416b] for example, in the *Teucer* [of Sophocles] Odysseus claims Teucer is a relative of Priam, for his mother Hesione was [Priam's] sister, but Teucer says that his father Telamon was Priam's enemy and that he had not betrayed the spies.

1416a 34. διαβολῆς κατηγορεῖν [*diabolês katêgorein*] (slander as a basis of attack).

Rendered literally: “to charge slander as great” or “to denounce calumny—to show what an evil it is” (Cooper). The *topos* concerns deflection of prejudicial attacks, in which a defendant impugns the attacker for attacking character, for seeking to alter the judgment [*kriseis*], and for diverting attention from the facts [*pragmati*].

1416a 36. σύμβολα λέγειν [*symbola legein*] (to speak of *symbola*): Refers to “probable signs” as distinct from necessary “signs [*sêmeia*],” called a *tekmêrion* (1.2.16-18; cf. *APr* 2.27) and distinct from linguistic “primary signs [*sêmeia prôtôs*]” (*Int* 1, 16a7). *Symbola* are phenomena from which one may speculate deductively about several probable causes of the sign based on natural laws, social customs, and personal motive. As phenomena, *symbola* always refer to an effect of an unobserved cause, a result of a hidden reason, a manifestation of a secret motive derived from personal or social values (cf. 1.2.16 ff.). Thus, *symbola* refer to speculative or probable knowledge derived from signs that may serve as circumstantial evidence. The translation “probable sign” is a synecdoche (substitution of effect for cause) because what is probable is not the sign but knowledge of the cause.

The *topos* from signs is a strategy of argument “common to both sides [*koinos d' amphoin*]” since signs easily create speculations and suspicions that cannot be proved conclusively; therefore, a defendant should be prepared to refute them and offer alternative probabilities in counterargument. Argument from signs is included with *topoi* of *êthos* for countering attack because such arguments often signify family and personal loyalties and thus

motive. Kennedy comments on the usage of *symbola*: “Often physical evidence, but here a probable sign: the assumption of family loyalty as contrasted with evidence from actions. Teucer was accused of treachery to the Greeks” (238n176). The example concerns the sign of family relationship to indicate probable evidence of loyalty. Unlike modern judicial standards, the ancient Greeks accepted signs of probable evidence as admissible and persuasive in court cases. For not criticizing this easily manipulated practice, commentators find fault in Aristotle’s treatment of judicial rhetoric. For instance, Kennedy writes, “Nor does Aristotle take a strong stand against the common Greek preference for circumstantial evidence over the direct evidence of documents and witnesses” (23). These criticisms are valid, but they may be hasty because they are based in limited information derived from rhetorical practice, not cultural critique, and because Aristotle does criticize the “corruption” of the judiciary and “morally weak” judges for overly attending to extrinsic appeals instead of arguments from the subject (3.1.5 and 3.14.8).

15.10. ἄλλος τῷ διαβάλλοντι, τὸ ἐπαινοῦντα μικρὸν μακρῶς ψέξει μέγα συντόμως, ἢ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ προθέντα, ὃ εἰς τὸ πρᾶγμα προφέρει ἐν ψέξει. τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι· τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ βλάπτειν πειρῶνται, μιγνύντες αὐτὰ τῷ κακῷ. κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυομένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται πλείονων ἔνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολυομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον· οἷον ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα προείλετο, τῷ μὲν ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα, τῷ δ’ ὅτι οὐ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μόνον μὴ ἀνταγωνιστεῖν ὡς φαῦλον. καὶ περὶ μὲν διαβολῆς εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

15.10. Another, for the accuser, is to find fault with some big thing briefly after praising some little thing at length or, after setting forth many good things [about the opponent] to find fault with the one thing that bears on the case. Such [speakers] are most artful and most unjust; for they seek to harm by saying good things, mingling them with the bad. [A topic] common to accuser and defendant [occurs] when the same thing can have been done for many reasons; the accuser should attribute an evil motive, pointing to the worse interpretation, the defendant the better [motive]. For example, when Diomedes picked Odysseus [as a companion on an expedition in Iliad 10.242-46] one [speaker] might say that he regarded him as the best man, another, no, [he regarded him] as worthless, chosen because he alone would not be a rival. Let this be enough about prejudicial attack.

1416b 4. ἐπαινοῦντα μικρὸν [*epainounta mikron*] (praising some little thing): This *topos* concerns a subtle *ad hominem* attack against the defendant, a strategy available to the

accuser but which the defendant should be aware. It comes in two forms, paraphrased by Cooper: “to praise at great length some trifling merit [*mikron*] of the accused, and then to put a great slur [*psexai mega*] upon him concisely; or to list a number of his merits [*agatha*], and then condemn him for one bad quality [*hen psexai*] that bears heavily on the case [*pragma*].” The latter attack is more effective in judicial settings while the former pertains to epideictic rhetoric. For instance, in the funeral oration in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*, Antony repeatedly praises Brutus for being an “honorable man” but adds the great slur, “he was ambitious” (Kennedy 238n177).

1416b 6-7. οἱ τεχνικώτατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι [*hoi technikôtatoi kai adikôtatoi*] (most artful and most unjust): These two terms occur only here in the *Rhetoric*, referring to persons identified by their respective technical and moral pursuits. As noted earlier, Aristotle considers rhetoric to be an amoral art (3.7.4, 3.15.10), always assumes an ideal orator who is highly virtuous and wise (*phronêsis*) (1.7.21), and always assumes that his students of rhetoric will pursue the available means of persuasion rather than the means of deception (cf. 2.24.1-11). Aristotle suggests that the art of rhetoric, like a language system itself, is morally neutral but not structurally neutral since rhetoric and language always render an interested perspective (cf. discussion at 3.2.7). When Aristotle condemns the practice of rhetoric, he does not condemn the *technê* but the unjust practitioners themselves, the *adikôtatoi*. Concerning the morality of the *Rhetoric*, controversy abounds on Aristotle’s alleged “moral ambivalence” (Oates 335). Critics’ opinions range across the entire moral spectrum, interpreting Aristotelian rhetoric as inherently immoral, moral, and amoral. A few scholars, such as Whitney J. Oates, claim that Aristotle’s Achilles heel is his empiricist theory of value, resulting in his ambivalent and at times immoral theory where “‘Anything goes,’ if only persuasion emerges” (341). Some take the opposite position, such as Lois Self and Christopher Johnstone, who argue that the *Rhetoric* is intrinsically

moral because it places the odds of persuasion in the merit of the case and cause due to the “association of persuasion and virtue” (Self 131). Other critics, such as Grimaldi, John Herman Randall, and Larry Arnhart, claim that Aristotle’s theory of discourse is as amoral as language itself (Grimaldi, *Studies* 15 ff.). As the current passage attests, Aristotle dissociates art from artist, affirming rhetoric and not hesitating to condemn an immoral rhetor, not for discovering the available means of deception but for using them. Moreover, Aristotle understands his responsibility to pragmatism; since immoral orators exist, an art of rhetoric must teach the deceptive art so that just rhetors may know how to defend themselves and truth in each particular case.

1416b 9. πλειόνων ἕνεκα [*pleionôn heneka*] (for many reasons): The phrase implies the word reasons, motives, or causes. This last *topos* for discovering how to defend against a prejudicial attack applies to both accuser and defendant because the topic involves offering a reason when, from an audience perspective, “many reasons” could be possible and all beyond verification. Since this proof concerns motive, it regards *êthos*, for all psychological motives entail *êthos*. In a realistic appraisal, Aristotle suggests, “the accuser should attribute an evil motive [*kakoêthisteon*], pointing to the worse interpretation, the defendant the better.” The accuser interprets “bad character” (*kakoêtheia*) while the defendant counters by alleging a morally “better” report, character, or motive (LSJ 861). What makes one motive more believable than the other is how the speaker supports the interpretation with strong reasons and evidence, where “strong” is always adjudicated by audience. The example illustration from the *Iliad* (10.242-46) concerns conflicting reports of motive, showing how *diabolê* and defense are not only a part of epic conflicts but also everyday argumentation.

CHAPTER 16

TAXIS: NARRATION OF FACTS

OUTLINE

DEVELOPMENT

16.1-3. Epideictic narrative (1416b 16–1416b 29)

16.4-10. Judicial narrative (1416b 29–1417b 11)

16.11. Demegoric narrative (1417b 11–1417b 20)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

16.1. διήγησις δ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐφεξῆς ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ τὰς πράξεις διελθεῖν ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος· σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον (οὐδὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων) τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς τέχνης· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ἐστὶ δεῖξαι, ἢ ἂν ἢ ἄπιστον, ἢ ὅτι ποιόν, ἢ ὅτι ποσόν, ἢ καὶ ἅπαντα.

16.1. *Diêgêsis* in epideictic speeches is not continuous but part-by-part, for one should go through the actions that constitute the argument [*logos*]. The argument is composed partly from what is non-artistic, since the speaker is in no way the cause of the actions, and partly from art, which is a matter of showing either that the action took place, if it seems unbelievable, or that it was of a certain kind or importance or all these things.

1416b 16. διήγησις [*diêgêsis*] (*diêgêsis*): The term can mean “narrative” and “narration” with some distinctions in usage, but *diêgêsis* (*narratio* in Latin) refers principally to the exposition of facts about the events, circumstances, and context important to the argument (*ERC* 453, s.v. “*Narratio*”). In the present usage, narrative of the facts refers to context or background information, without which an argument would make little or no sense. By synecdoche, the narrative signifies a category, so narrative also refers to the narration, or that part of an argument in which narrative occurs. Kennedy comments: “*Diêgêsis* literally means ‘a leading through’ the facts. It has become usual to distinguish *narration* as a part of a speech from *narrative*, meaning any account of a course of events, but Greek *diêgêsis* (and Latin *narratio*) were sometimes used of both. Conversely, Greek *diêgêma*, ‘narrative,’ was sometimes used of the narration of a

speech, and in the second century AD *katastasis* became the common Greek word for a narration” (238-39).¹⁹⁹

By devoting a chapter to *diêgêsis* for all three species of rhetoric, Aristotle provides insights about narrative that anticipate narrative theory and criticism. For instance, Aristotle treats the same four features of narrative as those Sonja K. Foss outlines defining narrative discourse, including (1) sequence “of at least two events,” (2) “organized by time order” but not necessarily chronological, (3) “some kind of causal or contributing relationship among events,” and (4) centered around a “unified subject” (*Rhetorical Criticism* 307-8). In addition, Foss suggests that what makes narrative a distinct mode of argumentation is that “the narrative creates for both the storyteller and the audience a personal involvement in the narrated world and the act of narrative,” in which “emotional connection” and “moral evaluation” are part of the experience of narrative (308-9). In this sense, it is significant that Aristotle discusses narrative order (§§1-2), causation (§§4, 11), and focus on *stasis* questions (§6) while emphasizing the importance of *êthos* (§§5, 8-9) and *pathos* (§10) for the narrator and audience as part of narrative rationality.

1416b 17. κατὰ μέρος [*kata meros*] (part-by-part): Classical epideictic narrative is organized less for drama and more for memory and emphasis. A speaker leads an audience through the actions “part-by-part [*kata meros*]” or sometimes “continuously [*ephexês*]” (3.16.2), similar to narrating sequences of plot, but limiting the narrative to what supports the *logos*, or

¹⁹⁹ *Diêgêsis* and *katastasis* are distinct indicators of narrative and narrated history, but Hellenistic religious literature suggests that *diêgêsis* remained the common term. *Katastasis* refers to a settled order: “standing firm, settled condition, fixedness,” especially used of political constitutions (LSJ 913). Many Hellenistic writers preferred the more supple *diêgêsis*. Early Christian historians employ *diêgêsis*. Luke uses *diêgêsis* in the phrase “*anataxesthai diêgêsîn* [to set in order a narrative]” about “*pragmatôn* [events]” recounting the life and teachings of Jesus of Nazareth (Luke 1:1). Luke’s usage of *diêgêsis* could refer to the whole Christian narrative, including creation, fall, redemption, and consummation. Likewise, Eusebius uses *diêgêsis* in his *History of the Church* (ca. 323), referring to the Gospel narratives (3.24.7; 3.39.12), suggesting the continued usage of *diêgêsis* for narrative and narration.

intended message. Aristotle distinguishes two common organizational methods for epideictic rhetoric: (§1) topical organization, arranged in point-by-point sequence, often climactically, wherein each point is supported by evidence, such as narrated actions and quoted discourses; and (§2) chronological organization, arranged as a continuous narrative, allowing observation of cause-effect relationships over time, and interspersed with the rhetor's own commentary and interpretation. On these two methods Kennedy comments: "In judicial oratory narrative is largely confined to a continuous statement of the facts of the case and necessary background information. In epideictic, as Aristotle understands it, the speaker may identify the virtues of the person being praised one-by-one and add narrative passages in support of them" (239n179). Aristotle recommends topical over chronological organization for three reasons (in 3.16.2), namely, topical arrangement aids memory, clearly demonstrates, and emphasizes significance.

1416b 17. τὰς πράξεις [*tas praxeis*] (the actions): In epideictic narrative, the facts are personal actions, both deeds and discourse. According to Aristotle, an epideictic rhetor gives a narrative of the actions for two purposes: first to confirm the historical facts and show that "the action took place," and second to interpret the facts in a way that assigns social significance to the actions as being honorable or dishonorable or degrees of both (cf. Cicero, *De inventione* 1.19.27). Foss observes, "Narrative is always involved in the question of whether an action is 'proper or incorrect,' so that narrator invites the audience members to share the moral evaluation being offered," an evaluation that is the thrust of epideictic and narrative argumentation (*Rhetorical Criticism* 309).

1416b 18. ἄτεχνον . . . τέχνης [*atechnon . . . technês*] (non-artistic . . . art[istic]): A narrative has both non-artistic and artistic elements, referring respectively to non-created facts and created arguments. Later rhetoricians call these *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* proofs, respectively

(Kennedy, 38n35). Naming them in this order, Aristotle refers to an inductive method: facts followed by interpretation. The terms are defined in Book 1: “Of the *pisteis* [proofs], some are *atechnic* [*atechnoi*] (non-artistic), some *entechnic* [*entechnoi*] (embodied in the art, artistic) (1.2.2). *Atechnic* or *extrinsic* proofs are preexistent and include witnesses, testimony, contracts, and other evidences not created by the speaker. *Entechnic* proofs (*pisteis entechnoi*) are “whatever can be prepared by method [*methodou*] and by ‘us’; thus one must use the former and invent [*eurein*] the latter” (1.2.2). In other words, the *pisteis entechnoi* are three in number: *pragma*: logical and factual subject-matter; *êthos*: personal element; and *pathos*: emotions and sensibility (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 145). The *entechnic* proofs are subjects that become incorporated in enthymeme and example. In addition, Enos and Lauer provide a corrected and insightful translation of this passage, suggesting that *entechnic* heuristics consist of two categories, which they call subject acts and social acts.²⁰⁰

In a mistranslation, Cope’s terms “direct” and “indirect” proofs (1:29 and 3:197-98) promulgate a modern misconception of classical *atechnic* and *entechnic* proofs, separating facts and reason from ethical and emotional appeals. Cope’s terms recapitulate a rationalist binary of direct/indirect proofs, suggesting a sharp distinction between rhetorical and narrative argumentation. Grimaldi corrects the record: “A[ristotle] always calls the three *entechnic* proofs simply πίστεις [referring to *pragma*, *êthos*, *pathos*] and studies each almost equally in the first

²⁰⁰ Enos and Lauer provide a corrected translation and insightful reading of this passage, noting that *Rhetoric* 1.2.2 (1356a1) is the only passage where Aristotle uses the verb for *heuristic* (εὐρεῖν), being second, aorist infinitive active, meaning artistic proofs that “are invented by us” with completed action; therefore, *pisteis entechnoi* refer to two kinds of heuristics: those “one must use” and those “invented by us [rhetors].” Enos and Lauer argue that the phrasing refers not to the distinction between *atechnic* and *entechnic* proofs but to two categories of *entechnic* proofs, specifically generative common topics (subject heuristics) and proofs generated by the rhetor in social exigencies (social heuristic) so that “Aristotle considers invention a social act” (“Meaning of *Heuristic* in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*” 205-8).

two books” (1:38). For epideictic narrative, the artistic proofs have two stated functions asserting occurrence and interpretation: showing that an action actually occurred “if it seems unbelievable [*apiston*],” and “that it was of a certain kind or importance.” Offering interpretation, artistic proof involves definition and social significance in the cultural context.

16.2. διὰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐφεξῆς δεῖ διηγεῖσθαι πάντα, ὅτι δυσμνημόνευτον τὸ δεικνύναι οὕτως. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀνδρείος, ἐκ δὲ τῶνδε σοφὸς ἢ δίκαιος. καὶ ἀπλούστερος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ἐκείνως δὲ ποικίλος καὶ οὐ λιτός.

16.2. For this reason, sometimes everything should not be narrated continuously, because this kind of demonstration is hard to remember. From some actions a man is shown to be brave, from others wise or just. A speech so arranged is simpler; the other approach is confusing [*poikilos*] and not plain [*litos*].

1416b 23. δεικνύναι [*deiknunai*] (demonstration): Derived from δεῖξις (*deixis*) and related to *deigma* and *paradeigma* (example), the term (and its cognates) refers to the inductive “mode of proof” such as “demonstration” or “exposition” (LSJ 373, 375; cf. Grimaldi 1:12). In the *Rhetoric*, the term for demonstration has non-technical, general usage, unlike the technical *apodeixis*, meaning logical demonstration by syllogism (cf. *Topics* 1). In the context of epideictic narrative, the use of “demonstration” indicates that narrative is just as much an epistemic mode as scientific induction or syllogistic deduction. Narration of experience and facts, especially as a rhetor arranges those facts, seeks to demonstrate probable knowledge in support of a message.

1416b 24. ἀπλούστερος [*haplousteros*] (simpler): Derived from *haploos*, the term means “simple, plain, straightforward” as opposed to compound or mixed (LSJ 190). In Plato’s *Republic*, the term means “simple narrative” without dramatic dialogue as opposed to *mimêsis* with *dramatis personae* (392d). The term summarizes Aristotle’s three reasons for recommending topical arrangement over a single, chronological narrative. Since topical arrangement was customary for epideictic oratory, the three supplied reasons supplement audience expectation (cf. 3.16.1). First, for orator and audience, topical arrangement aids

memory, while continuous narration is “hard to remember [*dysmnêmoneuton*].” Second, topical arrangement emphasizes significance because the orator defines the headings, chooses the evidence, and provides interpretive commentary. Third, topical arrangement clearly demonstrates what is asserted, while continuous narration leaves interpretation to the audience, who would need to decide which actions evidence which virtues or vices. For these three reasons, one notices that clear arrangement is a force in persuasion, not only because it is clear and plain [*litos*], but also because arrangement organizes demonstration to support the rhetor’s interpretation of events.

16.3. δεῖ δὲ τὰς μὲν γνωρίμους ἀναμιμνήσκειν· διὸ οἱ πολλοὶ οὐδὲν δέονται διηγήσεως, οἷον εἰ θέλεις Ἀχιλλεῖα ἐπαινεῖν· ἴσασι γὰρ πάντες τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς δεῖ. ἔαν δὲ Κριτίαν, δεῖ· οὐ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἴσασιν. * * *

16.3. Well-known actions should [only] be recalled, [not described in detail]. Thus, many [epideictic speeches] have no need of narrative, for example, if you wish to praise Achilles; for all know of his actions. But it is necessary to make use of these. On the other hand, if you are praising Critias, you should [narrate his good actions] for not many know of them. . . .

1416b 26. ἀναμιμνήσκειν [*anamimnêskein*] (recalled): The infinitive means to “remind,” “recall to memory” (LSJ 113), thus: It is only necessary to recall familiar actions (*praxeis gnôrimous*) rather than describe them in detail. The emphasis on “reminding the audience” begins a passage about the necessity of narrative as a method of reinforcing public knowledge or even changing cultural memory.²⁰¹ For familiar actions, no narrative is needed, only a brief reference to the specific events, but if a rhetor refers to events, it is necessary “to make use [*chrêsthai*]” of the recalled actions to demonstrate a quality like courage. For unfamiliar actions, narrative is necessary to inform the audience. Aristotle’s two examples are Achilles, referring to familiar actions in the Greek literary imagination, and Critias, referring to unfamiliar events in

²⁰¹ Cf. Lloyd Bitzer, “Rhetoric and Public Knowledge.”

political memory. In both scenarios, narrative is a way to re-present the actions and events that create public knowledge and the cultural imagination.

Concerning Critias and the probable lacuna in the manuscript, Kennedy comments:

“Critias was one of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens in 404 B.C. Something seems to have been lost in the text here; in what follows Aristotle is discussing narrative in judicial speeches. The manuscripts fill the gap by inserting a passage from 1.9.33-37” (239n181; cf. Grimaldi 1:213). Kassel has placed three asterisks at the end of the section to denote the probable lacuna, accounting for the abrupt transition. The probable lacuna does not seem to affect the present passage but the next section, beginning with contrastive “but” indicating missing information in a discussion of judicial narrative.

16.4. νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασὶ δεῖν εἶναι ταχεῖαν. καίτοι ὡσπερ ὁ τῶ μάττοντι ἐρομένῳ πότερον σκληρὰν ἢ μαλακὴν μάξῃ “τί δ’;” ἔφη, “εὐ ἀδύνατον;” καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως· δεῖ γὰρ μὴ μακρῶς διηγείσθαι ὡσπερ οὐδὲ προοιμιάζεσθαι μακρῶς, οὐδὲ τὰς πίστεις λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνταῦθά ἐστὶ τὸ εὐ [ἢ] τὸ ταχὺ ἢ τὸ συντόμως, ἀλλὰ τὸ μετρίως· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅσα δηλώσει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἢ ὅσα ποιήσει ὑπολαβεῖν [1417a] γεγονέναι ἢ βεβλαφέναι ἢ ἡδίκηκεναι, ἢ τηλικαῦτα ἤλικα βούλει· τῶ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ ἐναντία.

16.4. But nowadays they ridiculously say that the narration should be rapid [*taxeia*]. Yet, as the man said to the baker when asked whether he should knead the dough hard or soft, “What? Can’t it be done *right*?” Similarly here, one should not narrate at length, just as one should not [unduly] lengthen prooemia, nor proofs either; for speaking well is not a matter of rapidity or conciseness but of moderation, and that means saying just as much as will make the thing clear or as much as will make [the audience] suppose [1417a] that something has happened or that harm has been done or injustice, or that the facts are as important as you claim.

1416b 30. ταχεῖαν [*tacheian*] (rapid): The adjective modifies time: “rapid” or “quick” (LSJ 1762, s.v. τάχος). Due to a probable lacuna, the passage reads like the middle of a discussion of judicial narrative, with no transition. The unidentified “they” refers to sophistic handbook writers and probably Isocrates and his followers (Kennedy 239n182). By referencing the “rule of brevity,” Aristotle is critiquing the Isocratean school, for Quintilian notes that

Isocrates required the narrative to be clear, brief, and probable (Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 42). Regarding *lexis* and *taxis*, the problem with rules is that they always obscure more important factors like subject and situation. This example serves to show how sophistic and Isocratic schools taught rhetoric as formulae, while Aristotle defines rhetoric as a faculty (*dynamis*) of mind (1.2.1). In the Aristotelian tradition, rhetoric is a faculty, not formulae.

1416b 35. τὸ μετρίως [*to metriôs*] (moderation): Meaning “moderate measure” or “moderation,” the term is synonymous with the central principle of style, *prepon* (LSJ 1122; cf. 3.2.1, 1404b4). *Prepon* and *metriôs* express the “mean” between extremes: what is done well or right (*eu*) in any situation. Similar to Aristotle’s illustration of “what the man said to the baker,” Williams expresses this principle as the “Goldilocks rule: not too much, not too little, but just right” (*Style* 129). Moderation is not a rule but a judgment specific to each particular situation. Thus, as Aristotle writes, “speaking well is not a matter of rapidity or conciseness but of moderation,” saying just enough so as to be clear and to achieve one’s ends.

1417a 2. τῷ δὲ ἐναντίῳ τὰ ἐναντία [*tô de enantiô ta enantia*] (the opposing speaker should do the opposite): According to punctuation in the Greek text (Kassel and Ross editions), this phrase is part of section 4, but Kennedy oddly places it with section 5. Placement and punctuation affect translation: preceded by a colon in section 4, the phrase relates to previous issues of *stasis*; followed by a colon in section 5, it concerns appeals of *êthos*. All translators (Cope, Roberts, Cooper, Freese, etc.) follow the Greek text, placing the phrase with section 4, Kennedy being the exception. Freese translates literally: “The opposite party must do the opposite.” In judicial narrative, the opposing speaker will argue against the three *staseis* just mentioned, specifically that an event has happened (*stasis* of being), or that harm or injustice has occurred (*staseis* of quality), or that the case is important (*stasis* of quality). A defendant will

argue against these kinds of alleged claims. These same four *staseis*, with parallel phrasing, are repeated in 3.16.6 and discussed in detail in 3.17.1 (cf. Dieter “Stasis,” discussed at 3.17.1).

16.5. παραδιηγείσθαι δὲ ὅσα εἰς τὴν σὴν ἀρετὴν φέρει, οἷον “ἐγὼ δ’ ἐνουθέτουν αἰεὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγων, μὴ τὰ τέκνα ἐγκαταλείπειν,” ἢ θατέρου κακίαν· “ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατό μοι ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἦ αὐτός, ἔσται ἄλλα παιδία,” ὃ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους Αἰγυπτίους ἀποκρίνασθαί φησιν ὁ Ἡρόδοτος· ἢ ὅσα ἡδέα τοῖς δικασταῖς.

16.5. [As] the opposing speaker, [you] should do the opposite: seize an opportunity in the narration to mention whatever bears on your own virtue (for example, “By stressing justice, I kept admonishing him not to abandon his children”) or bears on the opponent’s wickedness (“But he answered me that wherever he might be there will be other children,” which is what according to Herodotus the Egyptian rebels replied [when begged by Psammetichus not to desert their wives and children]) or what is pleasing to the judges.

1417a 2. παραδιηγείσθαι [*paradiêgeisthai*] (seize an opportunity): The infinitive means to “relate incidentally or by the way” (LSJ 1308). Since the infinitive is present-tense, middle voice, most translators rightly use the term “incidentally” or “as you go” (Roberts), referring to a deliberate but informal manner of including in the narrative certain details of subject-matter that bear on *êthos*, such as one’s own virtue and an opponent’s malice. In an odd translation, Kennedy changes the mood of the Greek infinitive from middle voice to imperative since he has re-placed the previous phrase to this section. As one narrates the facts of the case, one ought to “relate” incidentally and opportunely whatever represents “your own virtue [*sên aretên*]” or the opponent’s “wickedness [*kakian*].” On the one hand, *aretê* means virtue, moral excellence, and good character (in Aristotle’s ethics developed by habit [*hexis*]), signifying a morally wise and prudent person (*phronimos*). On the other hand, *kakos* refers to moral “badness,” the opposite of *aretê*, signifying an unwise, devious, or wicked person (LSJ 863). In the examples, these moral character traits are all implied, being probable signs (*symbola*) from narrated actions (cf. 3.15.9). The strategy described refers to the accusation party since the following section pertains to the defendant.

16.6. ἀπολογουμένω δὲ ἐλάττων ἢ διήγησις· αἱ γὰρ ἀμφισβητήσεις ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ βλαβερόν εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἄδικον ἢ μὴ τηλικούτον, ὥστε περὶ τὸ ὁμολογούμενον οὐ διατριπτέον, ἐὰν μὴ τι εἰς ἐκεῖνο συντείνῃ, οἷον εἰ πέπρακται, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄδικον.

16.6. The defendant's narration can be shorter; for what is in doubt is whether something happened or whether it was harmful or unjust or not important, so one should not waste time on what is agreed unless something contributes to the defense; for example, if something has been done but not that it was unjust.

1417a 8. ἀμφισβητήσεις [*amphisbêtêseis*] (what is in doubt): The term refers to “what is in question,” used to identify the *stasis* or disputed issue in a case or debate. Aristotle's four *staseis* (fact, harm, justice, and importance) are here prefaced by *mê* (“not”) since the defendant will deny the accusations, so translators often replace “question” with “doubt.” The same four *staseis* occur in section 4 with the same parallel phrasing but without negative *mê* (1417a1-2). Aristotle develops the discussion of his four *staseis* in 3.17.1-2 (cf. 3.15.1). Aristotle advises that “the defendant's narrative can be shorter” because the defendant, in response, will not need to repeat many narrative details unless they are disputed and pertain to the alleged accusation; rather, the defendant should develop the narrative describing details that counter the accusation.

16.7. ἔτι πεπραγμένα δεῖ λέγειν ὅσα μὴ πραττόμενα ἢ οἶκτον ἢ δεινώσιν φέρει. παράδειγμα ὁ Ἀλκίνου ἀπόλογος, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν Πηνελόπην ἐν ἑξήκοντα ἔπεσι πεποίηται. καὶ ὡς Φαῦλλος τὸν κύκλον, καὶ ὅ ἐν τῷ Οἰνεῖ πρόλογος.

16.7. Further, actions should be spoken of in past tenses except for what brings in either pity or indignation when it is dramatized. The account of [what was told to] Alcinous is an example, in that it has been compressed into sixty verses for Penelope, and [other examples] are the way Phaëllus told the epic cycle and the prologue of the *Oeneus*.

1417a 12. πεπραγμένα [*pepragmena*] (actions): The focus of the passage is when to use past tenses and when to switch to present tenses when narrating past actions and events. “Past actions” is signified by *pepragmena*, a past participle derived from *prassô*, referencing not merely “actions” (Kennedy) but past actions: “events as past and gone” (Roberts), “past things” (Freese), or “what has been done” (Kennedy translating the same word at 3.19.2). For actions

and events that happened in the past, one should narrate in the “past tenses [*prattomena*],” a present participle, also derived from *prassô*, which is the basic meaning of “*pass through, pass over*” one’s fortunes and experiences (LSJ 1460). When the past affects present responses and views, specifically emotions (pity or anger), then one should switch to the present tenses since the responses are also present. Tenses in narrative seem an obvious matter of course, so a problem or a contrary principle may have prompted Aristotle to address narrative or dramatic tenses. In chapter 10, for instance, Aristotle advises using the present tense, showing events as “being done” as a source of urbanity. Benefits of the present tense include a greater sense of “presence,” including immediacy, intimacy, visualization, and *energeia* (cf. 3.10.6, 1410b34). In chapter 10, most of his examples derive from Homer’s epics, so it is clear that he is thinking more of literary or epideictic rhetoric. In judicial rhetoric, these qualities can be created in the narrative past tenses, but in a greater degree in present tenses. As rhetoricians have observed, “the past tense stands for the irrefragable fact,” while “the present expresses the universal, the law, the normal” in addition to “the feeling of presence” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *New Rhetoric* 160).

1417a 14. ἐν ἑξήκοντα ἔπεσι [*en hexêkonta epeisi*] (into sixty verses): The example from *Odyssey* 23 illustrates two principles. First, it illustrates compression, what Aristotle emphasizes in the prior section about the defendant’s narrative being concise. That Odysseus tells the tale of his many wanderings to Penelope in sixty verses is the supreme illustration of compressing narrative of past events, probably creating a humorous hyperbole. Second, the example illustrates the use of past tenses in the narration of past actions. Concerning Odysseus’s sixty verses, Kennedy comments: “The story told to Alcinous includes Odysseus’ dramatic narration of his adventures, with much direct discourse, and stretches through *Odyssey* 9-12. In *Odyssey* 23.264-

284 and 310-343 (not quite sixty verses) Odysseus gives Penelope a summary of his adventures” (240n184). Concerning Phaÿllus, nothing is known, but the *Oeneus* is a lost tragedy by

Euripides, which probably included a similar example of highly compressed narrative.

16.8. ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο, ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἐν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιᾶν ταύτην· ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιᾶ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἦθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν (τὸ γὰρ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν), ἀλλ’ οἱ Σωκρατικοὶ [περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν].

16.8. The narration ought to be indicative of character [*êthikê*]. This will be so if we know what makes for character [*êthos*]. One way, certainly, is to make deliberate choice [*proairesis*] clear: what the character is on the basis of what sort of choice [has been made]. And choice is what it is because of the end aimed at. Mathematical works do not have moral character because they do not show deliberate choice (for they do not have purpose), but the Socratic dialogues do (for they speak of such things).

1417a 8. ἠθικὴν [*êthikên*] (character): Narrative of facts (*diêgêsis*) is not merely about facts, per se, but what events and actions signify about ethical-character, and by character motive, and by motive choice (*proairesis*), and by choice blame or blamelessness. Therefore, “narration ought to be indicative of *êthikê*” since ethical-character is relevant to causation and, thus, a reasonable means of persuasion regarding probable knowledge. The term *êthikê* is placed in first position in this section to signify emphasis and the new topic of judicial narration. As previously noted, *êthikê* is a coinage of Aristotle referring to ethical-character (cf. *EN* 2.1.1, 1103a15; *Rhet* 3.6.7, 1408a1-2, and 3.7.6, 1408a26). *Êthikê* is a decisive aspect of narrative rationality, or how narratives create and indicate both cohesion and credence.²⁰² According to

²⁰² In his narrative paradigm, Walter Fisher defines “narrative rationality” suggesting that audiences test narratives against two basic principles called narrative probability (coherence) and narrative fidelity (truthfulness and reliability). Fisher further defines these principles: (1) “Probability, whether a story ‘hangs together,’ is assessed in three ways: by its *argumentative* or *structural coherence*; by its *material coherence*, that is, by comparing and contrasting stories told in other discourses (a story may be internally consistent, but important facts may be omitted, counterarguments ignored, and relevant issues overlooked); and by *characterological coherence*” as determined by “actional tendencies” about how characters act characteristically. (2) “Fidelity, the truthfulness of a story, is assessed by applying what I call ‘the logic of good

Walter Fisher, “*characterological coherence*” is one of three determiners of narrative probability and, thus, persuasion, as well as what separates rhetorical rationality from traditional logic, as

Fisher explains:

Whether a story is believable depends on the reliability of characters, both as narrators and as actors. Determination of one’s character is made by interpretations of the person’s decisions and actions that reflect values. In other words, character may be considered an organized set of actional tendencies. If these tendencies contradict one another, change significantly, or alter in “strange” ways, the result is a questioning of character. Coherence in life and in literature requires that characters behave characteristically. Without this kind of predictability, there is no trust, no community, no rational human order. Applying this consideration of coherence is an inquiry into motivation. Its importance in deciding whether to accept a message cannot be overestimated. Determining a character’s motives is prerequisite to trust, and trust is the foundation of belief.

(*Human Communication as Narration* 47)

What Fisher calls “actional tendencies” Aristotle recognizes as *êthos* and *hexis*, describing habits of mind and morals acquired through *praxis*, creating one’s distinctive and predictable qualities of character (*EN* 2.1). In Aristotle’s account, probability and fidelity are key considerations of narrative persuasion. In the following sections, Aristotle discusses attributes of character that bear on an audience’s adjudication, including “deliberate choice” (§8), arrogance and rudeness (§9), calculation versus moral principle (§9), emotion and, in general, attitude (§10).

reasons,”” formed by analyzing and evaluating arguments with “critical questions that can locate and weigh values. These are questions about *fact, relevance, consequence, consistency*, and *transcendental issues*” (*Human Communication as Narration* 47-48).

1417a 17. προαίρεσιν [*proairesin*] (deliberate choice): *Proairesis* occurs three times in this section, a term that literally means “choosing one thing before another,” referring to premeditation, purpose, and deliberated choice (LSJ 1466). Its opposite is *anankê*, meaning force, constraint, or necessity, often as a result of fate (LSJ 101). As an ethical term, Aristotle defines *proairesis* teleologically, according to what end or purpose (*telos*) a person has chosen.²⁰³ For instance, “mathematical works [*mathêmatikoi logoi*]” do not have *êthos* because they do not have *proairesis*, but “Socratic works [*Sôkratikoî*]” deal with both. *De Anima* has a similar passage: “[the] mind which calculates to an end, that is the practical mind; it differs from the speculative mind by its end [*telos*]” (433a14-15). While scientific speculation is supposedly amoral, without an ethical purpose, practical reason concerns morality because the subject-matter deals with personal, deliberate choice. Grimaldi marks this passage to indicate the difference between the logical syllogism and the rhetorical syllogism, a difference not of structural form but of subject-matter: the former takes its subject-matter from epistemic sources while the latter from ethical sources having *proairesis* and purpose (*Studies* 146). Consequently, rhetorical demonstration concerns more than intellect but the fusion of reason, *êthos*, and *pathos* in its subject-matter. In judicial settings, a case presents itself as a problem or mystery, and the primary factors for solving the mystery are indications and determinations of *proairesis*. For this reason, formally or informally, what judges look for and seek to prove is *proairesis* or purpose, indicating “guilty mind” (*mens rea*), in order to establish liability. Beyond confession and extrinsic proofs, the signs of deliberated choice are evidences by means of narrated actions,

²⁰³ Cf. *Ethics*: “Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking [*proairesis*], seems to aim at some good,” where the good that people seek is “happiness [*eudaimonia*]” (*EN* 1.1; cf. *Rhet* 1.5). *EN* 1.1: πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ (1494a1-2).

presentation of character, and the perceived correlation between actions and character (cf.

3.15.7).

16.9. ἄλλα ἠθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἦθει, οἶον ὅτι ἅμα λέγων ἐβάδιζεν· δηλοῖ γὰρ θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν ἦθους. καὶ μὴ ὡς ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν, ὡς περ οἱ νῦν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως. “ἐγὼ δὲ ἐβουλόμην· καὶ προειλόμην γὰρ τοῦτο· ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ὠνήμην, βέλτιον.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ φρονίμου τὸ δὲ ἀγαθοῦ· φρονίμου μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τὸ ὠφέλιμον διώκειν, ἀγαθοῦ δ' ἐν τῷ τὸ καλόν. ἂν δ' ἄπιστον ἦ, τότε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, ὡς περ Σοφοκλῆς ποιεῖ· παράδειγμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης, ὅτι μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ἐκήδετο ἢ ἀνδρὸς ἢ τέκνων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἂν γενέσθαι ἀπολομένων, μητρὸς δ' ἐν Ἄδου καὶ πατρὸς βεβηκότων οὐκ ἔστ' ἀδελφὸς ὅς τις ἂν βλάστοι ποτέ. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς αἰτίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἀγνοεῖς ἄπιστα λέγων, ἀλλὰ φύσει τοιοῦτος εἶ· ἀπιστοῦσι γὰρ ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἐκόντα πλὴν τὸ συμφέρον.

16.9. Other ethical indications are attributes of each character; for example, that someone walks away while talking; for this makes his arrogance and rudeness of character clear. And do not speak from calculation, as they do nowadays, but from moral principle: “I desired it and I chose this for that reason, but if I did not benefit, it was better so.” The former is characteristic of a prudent man, the latter of a good one; for the quality of a prudent man consists in pursuing his own advantage, that of a good man in pursuing the honorable. If [what you say] seems incredible, then add the cause, as Sophocles does. An example is the passage from the *Antigone*, arguing that there is more obligation to a brother than to husband or children; for the latter can be replaced if they die,

But when mother and father have gone to Hades

There is no brother who can be born again.

If you do not have a reason to give, say that you are not unaware that what you say may seem incredible but [that] you are naturally this sort of [virtuous] person and [that] people never do believe [that] anyone willingly does anything except for some advantage.

1417a 21. ἠθικὰ τὰ ἐπόμενα [*êthika ta hepomena*] (ethical indications): This section treats “character management” since audiences read actions, style, tone, and emotions as signs of ethical-character (*êthikê*). In turn, ethical-character indicates probability or improbability of the alleged actions and of the cohesion and credence of the recounted narrative. The phrase “indications of *êthos*” means indications or signs of character. The participle *hepomena* (derived from *epomai*) means “learn by inquiry,” inferring seeking answers or knowledge through signs and indications (LSJ 691). In its present context, the term is nearly synonymous with *symbola* used in section 10, also commonly translated as indications.

1417a 21-22. ἑκάστῳ ἦθει [*hekastô êthei*] (of each character): The phrase “each kind of character” alludes to the discussion of *êthos* of audience, being topics for adapting the speaker’s *êthos* to the audience’s *êthos*, but here the topics are applied to the speaker’s self-presentation. In Book 2, Aristotle classifies character by three age groups (youth, aged, and prime), which are shaped by four variables: birth, wealth, power, and fortune (2.12-17). The discussion on the kinds of *êthos* has the purpose of “considering what they are like in terms of emotions and habits and age of life and fortune” (2.12.1), noting that people interpret ethical-character based on actions, style, and emotions.

1417a22. θρασύτητα καὶ ἀγροικίαν [*thrasytêta kai agroikian*] (arrogance and rudeness): As an example of “indications of *êthos*,” Aristotle notes how people interpret actions; when “someone walks away while talking,” people interpret the action as “arrogance and rudeness.” The first adjective *thrasytês* occurs twice in the *Rhetoric* (here and in 2.14.1) describing arrogance indicative of rashness and lack of prudent judgment, for arrogance is commonly thought a sign of rash behavior or blind judgment (2.14.1, 1390a31). The second adjective *agroikia* (derived from *agroikos*, country folk) means roughness of character, stereotypical of country dwellers as opposed to the urbanity of the *polis* where people are more likely to have refined judgment and formal education (cf. discussion of urbanity at 3.10.1, 1410b7).

1417a 24. ὡς ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως [*hôs apo proaireseôs*] (from moral principle): In the advice, “Do not speak from calculation [*hôs apo dianoias legein*], as they do nowadays, but from moral principle [*hôs apo proaireseôs*],” Aristotle contrasts signs of two motivations characteristic of two types of character. The first characteristic is calculation, signifying a prudent person (*phronimos*), whose chief motivation is self-advantage (*ôphelimos*); the second is

moral principle (*proairesis*), signifying a good person (*agathos*), who is mainly motivated by what is honorable (*kalos*). The prudent person appears blamable, but the good person appears above reproach. For these cause-effect relations, Aristotle advises being, or appearing to be, a virtuous person who seeks honor in moral principle, yet the irony is that Aristotle advises calculation for advantage. A discussion of rhetorical presentation is necessarily a subject of audience response because audiences only have access to representations. This realism does not imply that Aristotle's discussion of character management is immoral but, in fact, that it is responsible (responding) to the human condition as a rhetorical situation (cf. 3.1.5).

1417a 28. τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν [*tên aitian epilegein*] (add the cause): The ability to add the cause or reason is what creates a reasonable argument and forms an enthymeme, even when the cause concerns ethical and not strictly logical topics (cf. Grimaldi 2:4 ff., and *Studies* 153-56; Kennedy 114). The noun *aitia* means cause, reason, occasion, or motive (LSJ 44). Since the term is the same as that used in Aristotle's "four causes," *aitia* in the current context could refer to the efficient or motive cause (how something happened) and the final cause (why something happened) (cf. *Phys* 2.3, 194b; *Met* 1013a). Extending the discussion of virtuous presentation, Aristotle observes that virtuous behavior may, in fact, "seem incredible" to an audience; for this probable contingency, he advises two responses. First, the speaker should "add the cause," assumed to be an honest account of motive, such as moral principle, value, or loyalty. As an example, Aristotle explains and quotes from Sophocles, *Antigone* 911-12, regarding family loyalty. Second, if the speaker does not have a reason to give, Aristotle provides an easy script ("say that . . ."), asserting the rationale that the speaker is naturally a virtuous person. As already mentioned (cf. 3.1.1 and 3.13.4), the *Rhetoric* was an esoteric work, whose original and only audience was Aristotle's students who were trained in dialectic and moral philosophy,

specifically virtue ethics, so Aristotle seems to assume that, when engaging judicial situations, his students would actually be virtuous but in need of the pragmatic art of rhetoric in order to succeed in a litigious, sophistic culture.

16.10. ἔτι ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγε διηγούμενος καὶ τὰ ἐπόμενα καὶ ἃ ἴσασι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἢ ἑαυτῶ ἢ ἐκείνῳ προσόντα· “ὁ δ’ ὤχετό με ὑποβλέψας.” [1417b] καὶ ὡς περὶ Κρατύλου Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διασίζων, τοῖν χειροῖν διασεύων· πιθανὰ γάρ, διότι σύμβολα γίνονται ταῦτα ἃ ἴσασι ἐκείνων ὧν οὐκ ἴσασι. πλεῖστα δὲ τοιαῦτα λαβεῖν ἐξ Ὁμήρου ἔστιν.

ὡς ἄρ’ ἔφη, γρηῦς δὲ κατέσχετο χερσὶ πρόσωπα· οἱ γὰρ δακρύειν ἀρχόμενοι ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. καὶ εὐθὺς εἴσαγαγε καὶ σεαυτὸν ποῖόν τινα, ἵνα ὡς τοιοῦτον θεωρῶσι, καὶ τὸν ἀντίδικον· λανθάνων δὲ ποίει. ὅτι δὲ ῥάδιον, ὅραν δεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀπαγγελλόντων· περὶ ὧν γὰρ μηθὲν ἴσμεν, ὅμως λαμβάνομεν ὑπόληψιν τινά. πολλαχού δὲ δεῖ διηγείσθαι, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐν ἀρχῇ.

16.10. Further, speak from the emotions, narrating both the results [of emotion] and things the audience knows and what are special characteristics of the speaker or the opponents: “And he went off, scowling at me.” [1417b] And as Aeschines says of Cratylus, that he was hissing and violently shaking his hands; for these things are persuasive since they are indications [*symbola*] that the audience knows of those things they do not know. Many such things are to be found in Homer:

Thus she spoke, and the old nurse covered her face with her hands.

For those who begin to cry place their hands over their eyes. And at the beginning you should introduce yourself—and the opponent—as a person of a certain character so that they will see you as such, but do it inconspicuously. That this is easy can be seen from messengers [in tragedy]; for we know nothing of what they are going to say, but we get some inkling of it [from their attitude]. Narrative should occur in many places and sometimes not at the beginning.

1417a 36. ἐκ τῶν παθητικῶν λέγε [*ek tōn pathêtikōn lege*] (speak from the emotions):

Pathos is a *topos* of narration because emotional state “counts” in interpreting past events according to narratology (cf. Fisher 64; Foss 308). The phrase could mean “speak *from* the emotions” (Kennedy), showing one’s present emotions for the purpose of appearing sincere if expressed in moderation, but context and examples do not support this translation. The better translation is “speak *of* the emotions,” making past emotions a *topos* of narration, both the speaker’s and the opponent’s past emotions. In the context of narration, the *topos* of *pathos* follows immediately after that of *êthos* in sections 8-9. In this usage, speaking “*of* the emotions” makes emotional state a modifier of character that, in turn, indicates probable motive. Aristotle’s

term is *symbola*, meaning “probable signs” or “indicators” of character and motive (a term discussed at 3.15.9). The three example narratives are in past tenses, but the emotions described in each occur as participles: “scowling at me” (Aristotle or anonymous), “hissing and violently shaking his hands” (Aeschines), and “covered her face with her hands” (Homer, *Odyssey* 19.361). Participles are adjectives, modifying the subject, particularly the subject’s emotional state, signifying motive. As a *topos* of narration, therefore, Aristotle advises speaking indirectly of the emotions, using participles or other modifiers to describe emotional state. As Kennedy notes, the Aeschines mentioned is the one called “Socraticus,” who was “a contemporary of Plato, devoted follower of Socrates, and author of dialogues. Cratylus was a follower of Heraclitus and engages in debate with Socrates in Plato’s dialogue *Cratylus*” (241n187).

1417b 7. λαυθάνων [*lanthanôn*] (inconspicuously): The participle means “*escape notice or detection*” or as an adverb “*inconspicuously*” (LSJ 1029), reminiscent of the principle that the best art is concealed (cf. 3.2.5 and 3.2.10). Extending the previous principle, Aristotle advises the speaker to “introduce immediately [*euthus eisagage*]” himself and the opponent as a certain sort of character to give the audience a particular first impression so that the audience can “see [*theôrosi*]” their *êthos*, but this must be done inconspicuously. To illustrate how this sort of first impression is easily achieved and how important it is, Aristotle refers to messengers in tragedy whose stage character indicates attitude and message before they speak their lines.

1417b 9. ἀπαγγελλόντων [*apangellontôn*] (messengers): The term (masculine, plural participle) refers to “messengers” whose role in drama was to recite an explanatory or interpretive narrative (LSJ 173, s.v. ἀπαγγέλλω). The term occurs only here in the *Rhetoric*, used to illustrate the importance of stage character, implying an analogy for how audiences adjudicate poetic and rhetorical character. Aristotle’s comparison of tragic drama with judicial

rhetoric may indicate the classical context of judicial situations, including auditors trained by theater-going to be spectators, whose typical hermeneutic is theatrical, where spectacle of character is an important factor in interpreting past actions (cf. 3.1.5).

1417b 10. πολλοῦ [pollackou] (in many places): As concluding advice on judicial narrative, Aristotle notes that the placement of narrative is dynamic, occurring “in many places” and “for many reasons” according to the situation (LSJ 1435). By this observation, Aristotle critiques the sophists’ static formulas and rigid rules for arrangement, implying that rhetorical arrangement is always determined by the rhetorical situation.

16.11. ἐν δὲ δημηγορίᾳ ἥκιστα διήγησις ἔστιν, ὅτι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων οὐθεὶς διηγείται· ἀλλ’ ἐάν περ διήγησις ἦ, τῶν γενομένων ἔσται, ἵνα ἀναμνησθέντες ἐκείνων βέλτιον βουλευσῶνται περὶ τῶν ὕστερον. [[ἢ διαβάλλοντος, ἢ ἐπαινούντος.]] ἀλλὰ τότε οὐ τὸ τοῦ συμβούλου ποιεῖ ἔργον. ἂν δ’ ἦ ἄπιστον, ὑπισχνεῖσθαι τε καὶ αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς, καὶ διατάττειν οἷς βούλονται, οἷον ἡ Ἰοκάστη ἢ Καρκίνου ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι αἰεὶ ὑπισχνεῖται πυνθανομένου τοῦ ζητοῦντος τὸν υἱόν. καὶ ὁ Αἴμων ὁ Σοφοκλέους.

16.11. Narrative is least common in deliberative oratory, because no one narrates future events, but if there is narrative, it will be of events in the past, in order that by being reminded of those things the audience will take better counsel about what is to come (either criticizing or praising). But then the speaker does not perform the function of an adviser. If something is unbelievable, promise to tell the cause of it immediately and to refer it to whomever they wish, as Iocasta in the *Oedipus* of Carcinus is always promising when someone is trying to find out about her son. And [similarly] Haemon in Sophocles.

1417b 11. δημηγορία [dêmêgoria] (deliberative oratory): The term signals a transition to a brief discussion of demegoric narrative. As previously mentioned, Aristotle never uses the term “deliberative” (*symboleutikon*) in Book 3, but always the species “demegoric” rhetoric since the latter implies a large audience that has implications for a treatment of style and arrangement (cf. discussions at 3.12.1, 3.12.5, and 3.14.11). The discussion of demegoric narrative is brief because it regards deliberations of policy and advice for future actions rather than past actions as judicial rhetoric.

1417b 14. ἀναμνησθέντες [*anamnêsthentes*] (being reminded): Whenever narrative exists in political rhetoric, it consists of historical events used as evidence in demonstration, often by historical analogy (e.g., “being reminded” of events and lessons of the past), to support a policy proposition. When narrating, a political orator is not performing his proper function (*ergon*) as an advisor or counselor (*symbolos*) of policy, but is acting as an historian. Nonetheless, political orators often engage in historical narrative as a mode of demonstration to explain rationale for proposed policies. Due to abuse, analogy from history is often called the politician’s or the historian’s fallacy because it often includes false analogy.²⁰⁴

Aristotle does not discuss the distinction between history and historiography, but he recognizes the rhetorical art of history and representation. This view derives from his account of rhetoric as a general theory of language and of argumentation, also from his acquaintance with rhetoricians who were also historians and poets of historical subjects who gave shape to the history of Greece.²⁰⁵ For instance, Aristotle commends certain epic and tragic poets who make clear their purpose (*telos*) and argument (*logos*) in the introduction (*Rhet* 3.14.5-6). Understanding the literary process, Aristotle would agree that Herodotus is “not only the father of history but also of rhetorical historiography,” recognizing that Herodotus, Thucydides, and other historians provide “an interpretive accounting of events” that promotes a particular perspective (Enos, *Greek Rhetoric* 29 ff.). Comparing poetic and historical genres in *Poetics* 9,

²⁰⁴ Kassel and translators bracket the phrase (“either criticizing or praising”), suggesting that it is probably a late or spurious addition. The phrase seems out of place since actions of epideictic rhetoric do not address the context or situation.

²⁰⁵ On rhetoricians who were also historians or epic or tragic poets in the fourth century, see *OCD*, s. vv. “Anaximenes of Lampsacus,” “Antimachus,” “Choerilus,” and “Theodectes.” On Plato’s rhetoric of representation, see Schiappa, “Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?”; Taylor and Schiappa, “How Accurate is Plato’s Portrayal of Gorgias of Leontini?”; Miller, “Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of *Doxa*.”

Aristotle explains that “poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more to the universal, while history relates particulars” (1451b3-4), noting that particulars receive significance only within a general or narrative perspective.²⁰⁶ To be sure, poetry and history are situated at different ends of the rhetorical spectrum, but both provide an interpretive recounting of events, engaging in rhetorical art to create a shared perspective of history.

1417b 17. αἰτίαν λέγειν εὐθύς [*aitian legein euthus*] (tell the cause immediately): The advice to “tell the cause” is the same as that previously mentioned in treating judicial narrative (cf. 3.16.9, 1417a28). The adverb *euthus*, meaning “immediately” or “right away,” indicates a solution to a contingent problem, namely, the contingency that “something is unbelievable [*apiston*].” The solution to disbelief is to “tell the cause immediately.” The ability to state cause or reason is a rhetorical “ability” (*dynamis*), for enthymematic form consists of a proposition plus a reason (cf. 1.2.1). By using the term “cause” (*aitia*) rather than “reason,” Aristotle refers to personal motivation or historical causality, but probably both. The literary examples indicate that “cause” means motivation, but the previous context suggests that “cause” may mean history. Concerning historical causality, *aitia* would refer to the efficient cause (i.e., how something happened) or the final cause (i.e., why something happened), according to social interpretations of history shared between rhetor and audience. In political narrative, rhetors discuss history regarding rationale for particular policies. Concerning personal motivation, the reference to examples by Carcinus, *Oedipus* and by Sophocles, *Antigone* (683-723) deal with issues of family

²⁰⁶ *Poetics* 9: διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγει (1451b3-4). Aristotle does not use the terms “truth” and “fact” (unlike some translators) but merely “generalities” (*mallon*) and “particulars” (*ekaston*), terms he defines in the follow-up passage (see discussion of poetry and history at *Rhet* 3.1.10).

loyalty. The principle of the passage is that the best arguments consist of enthymematic form, supporting statements with reasons or causes, and stating reasons immediately.

CHAPTER 17

TAXIS: PROOF AND REFUTATION

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

17.1-4. Focus of proof: *stasis* in judicial, epideictic, and demegoric (1417b 21–1417b 38)

DEVELOPMENT

17.5-9. Forms of proof: enthymemes, paradigms, and maxims (1417b 38–1418a 21)

17.10-12. Means of proof: variety of rhetorical appeals (1418a 21–1418b 1)

17.13-15. Refutation in proof (1418b 1–1418b24)

17.16-17. Indirection and maxims in proof (1418b 24–1418b 38)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

17.1. τὰς δὲ πίστεις δεῖ ἀποδεικτικὰς εἶναι· ἀποδεικνύναι δὲ χρή, ἐπεὶ περὶ τεττάρων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις, περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητουμένου φέροντα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· οἶον εἰ ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν ἀμφισβητεῖται ἐν τῇ κρίσει, δεῖ τούτου μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν φέρειν, εἰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔβλαψεν, τούτου· καὶ <εἰ> ὅτι οὐ τοσόνδε ἢ ὅτι δικαίως, ὡσαύτως. καὶ εἰ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τούτο ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις,

17.1. Proofs should be demonstrative [i.e., logically valid]. Since four points may be open to dispute [*amphisbêtêsis*], there is need to provide a demonstration bearing on what is disputed: for example, if the issue disputed in a trial involves a denial that something was done, there is most need to provide a demonstration that it was, and if [the act is admitted but one party alleges] that it did no harm, [the other needs to show] that it did; and if [it is denied] that it was important or [claimed] that it was done justly, similarly. And if the dispute is about whether something has been done [by one of the parties],

1417b 21. δὲ [*de*] ([untranslated]): The conjunction is a transition. Chapter 17 has a clear five-part arrangement: *stasis* or focus of argument (§§1-4), forms of argument (§§5-9), means of argument (§§10-12), refutation (§§13-15), and appropriate means for refutation. Throughout is advice on using a variety of means of argumentation. Although Kennedy calls this a “somewhat rambling chapter” (242), in fact, the discussion is organized according to focus, form, and

function and often addresses the need for variety and balance, seen in terms such as “mixed in” (§6), “interweave” (§11), “both” (§12), “make room” (§15), and in advice for what not to do to avoid monological modes of argumentation (§§6-8). Rather than rambling, it is likely that Aristotle is illustrating what he describes, as is his custom, by writing an organized yet “mixed” style of rhetoric. By applying his advice, Aristotle illustrates how to utilize the virtue of propriety (*prepon*) in the art of arrangement, thus creating an exemplar discussion of proofs in argumentation.

1417b 21. πίστεις [*pisteis*] (proofs): The term has broad usage but connotes one primary meaning in this passage, rational methodology. Adjacent to the term *apodeixis* (logical demonstration), plural *pisteis* refers to two logical instruments of the reasoning process: deductive enthymemes and inductive paradigms (cf. discussion at 3.17.5-8; cf. also *ERC* 564, s.v. “Proof”). Grimaldi observes that “the whole context of c. 17 is concerned with the use of *paradeigmata* and *enthymemes* so that it would seem reasonable to conclude that *pisteis* at 17b21 and 18b23 also refer to these two logical instruments” (*Studies* 72). Although *pisteis* in the broad context of *taxis* could refer to placement, what is often called “the body” or “the argument” of a composition—what Grimaldi defines as “that part of a speech wherein one formally demonstrates one’s thesis or proposition”—yet that technical meaning of *pistis* is limited by the immediate context of *apodeixis* and a discussion of *stasis* (*Studies* 70; cf. 3.13.2). The present usage of plural *pisteis* is Grimaldi’s “second meaning” of the term, referring to the methodological technique of demonstration by using the logical instruments of enthymeme and example (cf. discussion of *pistis* in Introduction; cf. also Grimaldi 1:349 ff.).

1417b 21. ἀποδεικτικὸς [*apodeiktikas*] (demonstrative): In logic, *apodeixis* is a technical term meaning logical demonstration by syllogism, but in the *Rhetoric* it carries a

derivative meaning: “the rational character of discourse” for treating in a valid manner the sources of evidence (*pragma*) as well as *êthos* and *pathos* relevant to the subject of practical reason (Grimaldi, *Studies* 148). Cope only half-agrees with this definition: he denies the general subject-matter of rhetorical demonstration because he mistranslates classical *atechnic* and *entechnic* proofs, creating a rationalist binary of direct/indirect proofs (cf. discussion at 3.16.1); but Cope affirms the general forms and methods of rhetoric (3:198). For instance, Cope denies that *êthos* and *pathos* “have any pretension to the character of ἀποδεικτικαί,” but affirms that demonstrative proofs “must be, so far consistent with sound reasoning and the rules of logic, as will induce those who hear them to *believe* what they seek to establish” (3:198). Similarly Kennedy translates the term as “logically valid” in general (242).

1417b 22. περὶ τεττάρων ἢ ἀμφισβήτησις [*peri tettarôn hê amphisbêtêsis*] (four points open to dispute): Aristotle begins a focused discussion of what is called his “pre-*stasis*” theory for discovering and focusing on the disputed issue in a legal claim (he begins the discussion of *stasis* at 3.15.2). A more literal gloss of the phrase would be: “About the four disputed issues.” The noun *amphisbêtêsis* is an Attic legal term referring to the disputed claim, question, or issue in a controversy (LSJ 94; cf. 1.1.8). In Hellenistic rhetoric, the metaphor *stasis* assumed this meaning and became the prominent term since it also refers to the “*position* taken up by a litigant (esp. defendant)” (LSJ 1634). As a word for identifying the *stasis*, *amphisbêtêsis* occurs ten times in Book 3, seven of which occur in chapter 17 (3.17.1-2 and 4). The four disputed issues which Aristotle names are not exhaustive (he names more at 3.15.2), but these four are his four basic categories of *stasis*:

- *Stasis* of fact or conjecture: “denial that something was done” (*ou gegonen*)
- *Stasis* of harm: “[the act] did no harm” (*ouk eblapsen*)

- *Stasis* of importance: “[the act] was [not] important” (*ou tosonde*)
- *Stasis* of justice: “[the act] was done justly” (*dikaiôs*)

Generally, the *staseis* are progressive, meaning that they imply admission or concession of the previous *stasis*, starting with *stasis* of fact or conjecture (cf. 1.3.6). Kennedy comments:

“Aristotle here again anticipates some categories of later *stasis* theory. His four questions are fact, harm, importance, and justice, of which the last three become subdivisions of *stasis* of quality” (242n191).²⁰⁷ Compared to later developments of *stasis* theory, Aristotle seems to omit the categories of quantity (*stasis* of definition) and place (*stasis* of jurisdiction) and not to recognize the general application of *stasis* outside of judicial rhetoric. Both criticisms are hasty conclusions. Though focusing on *stasis* of quality, he touches on and illustrates the “missing” categories in his previous discussion of the disputed issue in 3.15.2. In addition, *stasis* of harm could be viewed as definitional since it seems to question the proper category of an alleged act, but such questions are speculative without an actual situation. Concerning general application, Aristotle does apply his four *stasis* questions in a parallel manner in his discussion of political rhetoric and deliberative proof (cf. 3.17.4).

Although the rhetorical theory of *stasis* developed within judicial discourse, Hermagoras of Temnos (second century BC) found the metaphor and the four basic categories in Aristotle’s *Physics* for describing the dynamics of argumentation. In “*Stasis*” (1950), Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter investigates the etymology of *stasis* in Aristotle’s science. In *Physics* 5-8, *stasis* is that which disrupts or severs *kinesis*, a movement in response to a stimulus in any sets of circumstances or *peristaseis*, while the opposite of *kinesis* is *stasis*, the point of conflict and

²⁰⁷ In *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle outlines four similar questions: “There are four kinds of questions that we ask, and they correspond to the kinds of things we know. They are: to the question of fact, the question of reason or cause, the question of existence, and the question of essence” (*APst* 2.1, 89b23-25).

change between any both-way movements (Dieter 231). The categories for describing this conflict also derive from Aristotelian sources, specifically his categories applied to motion. Within the category *Being*, Aristotle distinguishes three changes and counter-motions that he calls *Quantity*, *Quality*, and *Place* (Dieter 223-25; Dearin 8). While Hermagoras was the first to present the four-part *stasis* system as a method of invention, later Cicero, Quintilian, Hermogenes of Tarsus and others developed *stasis* into “the technique of determining the question at issue in a trial—whether it was one of fact, law, quality of the act, or jurisdiction of the court,” refining the four levels of *stasis* (Kennedy 236; Dearin 8). For instance, Quintilian following Cicero identifies four *status* or *constitutio* in four questions: conjectural (*is it?*), definitive (*what is it?*), qualitative (*what kind is it?*), and translative (*who should decide the case?*) (*Institutes of Oratory* 3.6). Considering the proportional metaphor of *stasis*, Dieter observes, “The rhetorician is a ‘*physikos*’ in that he . . . studies movement or other forms of change” in an art of cause-effect relations (221). The Aristotelian metaphor and categories form the basis of the heuristic procedure by which rhetors ask questions to discover the point at issue.

17.2. μὴ λανθανέτω [δ'] ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι πονηρόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄγνοια αἰτία, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀμφισβητοῖεν, ὥστ' ἐν τούτῳ χρονιστέον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις οὔ.

17.2. do not forget that it is necessary on this issue alone for one or the other to be a liar; for ignorance is not an excuse, as it might be if the dispute were about justice. So in this case one should use [the topic of the opponent's wickedness], but not in others.

1417b 27-28. ταύτῃ τῇ ἀμφισβητήσει μόνῃ [*tauté tê amphisbêtêsei monê*] (this issue alone): The *stasis* of being or fact is the base conjecture because the *staseis* are progressive so that *staseis* of quantity and quality imply admission or concession of *stasis* of fact. For this reason, this one *stasis* is “necessary” (*anagkaios*) in order to have a case, and where the fact or action itself is disputed, one of the litigants is necessarily a liar or wicked (*ponêros*), not merely

mistaken or ignorant about the alleged action. Kennedy comments: “In *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.10, 1135b30, Aristotle somewhat qualifies this: if a speaker denies an action that he has performed because he has genuinely forgotten it, he is not necessarily wicked. But generally, when one person claims something was done and another denies it, one is lying” (243n192). As a result of this necessity, one of the disputants should use the ethical topic of wickedness, asserting wickedness in the opponent’s character in support of one’s sincere proposition (cf. 3.15.7).

17.3. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικαῖς τὸ πολὺ, ὅτι καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα, ἢ αὐξησις ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ πράγματα δεῖ πιστεύεσθαι· ὀλιγάκις γὰρ καὶ τούτων ἀποδείξεις φέρουσιν, εἴαν ἄπιστα ἢ ἢ εἴαν ἄλλος αἰτίαν ἔχη.

17.3. In epideictic speeches there will be much amplification about what is good and advantageous; for the facts need to be taken on trust, and speakers rarely introduce evidence of them, only if any are incredible or if someone else is held responsible.

1417b 31. καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα [*kala kai ôphelima*] (good and advantageous): The focus of epideictic proof is the “good and advantageous,” just as the *stasis* is the focus of judicial and deliberative proof. The term *kalos* includes ethical and aesthetical qualities, meaning not only “morally good” but not merely “beautiful” (LSJ 870). Due to this association, “the ancient Greeks could not dissociate between the good and the beautiful” (Enos, “Classical Rhetoric”; Kennedy 75n160). Cultures share not only a vocabulary but also views and values about “what is good and advantageous,” with epideictic functioning to create ethical and aesthetic cohesion. Although “facts [*pragmata*]” in epideictic are generally believed (*pisteuô*), assertions are rarely disputed because they are widely shared and acknowledged. Therefore, speakers only introduce evidences (*apodeixeis*) when an assertion of value seems “incredible [*apista*]” or someone’s action needs attestation or documentation. Otherwise, proof is not needed for what is assumed or taken on trust.

17.4. ἐν δὲ τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσκειν ἂν τις, ἢ ὡς ἔσται μὲν ἄκελεύει, ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαια ἢ οὐκ ὠφέλιμα ἢ οὐ τηλικαῦτα. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁρᾶν εἴ τι ψεύδεται ἔκτος τοῦ πράγματος· τεκμήρια γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι ψεύδεται.

17.4. In deliberative speeches one may debate whether the events predicted [by a previous speaker] will occur or admit that they will occur as he demands, but [claim they] will not be just or advantageous or important. One should also look to see if any incidental details are falsified; for these are sure signs [*tekmêria*] that he also falsifies other things more to the point.

1417b 35. ἔσται ἀμφισβητήσκειν [*estai amphisbêtêseien*] (debate whether [will be]): In policy deliberations, what is open to debate are four issues, parallel to the four *staseis* in judicial rhetoric, here classified according to *being* and *quality*. One may debate a policy by denying its predicted results (future *being*), or one may concede the probable future but deny the quality of its touted results. First is *stasis* of fact: “one may debate whether the events predicted will occur” (*estai amphisbêtêseien*). If one concedes the probability of the predicted facts, then second are *staseis* of quality: one may deny that the future results will be just (*dikaia*), advantageous (*ôphelima*), or important (*têlikauta*). These three adjectives are the “ends” (*telos*) of political deliberation (each named in 1.3.5 and discussed in 1.4-8), which later rhetoricians call “final headings” or “headings of purpose” (Kennedy 49n82). By applying the four *stasis* questions to deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle shows a clear recognition of the general application of his “pre-*stasis*” theory for defining the question at issue.

1417b 37. τεκμήρια [*tekmêria*] (sure signs): The term means convincing “sign” serving as demonstrative proof or “necessary sign,” as opposed to direct evidence, on the one hand, and non-necessary *sêmeion* and probable *eikos*, on the other hand (LSJ 1768; Grimaldi, *Studies* 115). In Book 1, Aristotle defines his technical term: “a necessary sign is a *tekmêrion*,” where *necessary* means “[signs] from which a [logically valid] syllogism can be formed; thus, I call this kind of sign a *tekmêrion*” (*Rhet* 1.2.16-17). The plural *tekmêria* occurs three times in the *Rhetoric*, but Grimaldi identifies the current passage as being “a unique instance” of its non-

technical meaning (“Semeion” 393). In its technical meaning in the *Rhetoric* (1.2-3) and *Prior Analytics* (2.27), *tekmêrion* designates a necessary “one-to-one relationship between sign and signate as grounded in the nature of sign-signate” (390). Cope applies this technical meaning to its plural usage in the current passage (3:200). Grimaldi prefers a laxer view: “The reasonable interpretation of τεκμήριον in our passage would be ‘the proofs,’ ‘clear evidence’” (394).

Kennedy agrees: “This hardly meets the standards of *tekmêria* as discussed in 1.2.16,” thus the translation “sure signs” (243n193). In context, Aristotle advises researching the opponent’s argument, starting with “incidental details,” for if these are falsified, they are “sure signs [*tekmêria*]” that more important evidences are also falsified. The use of the strong noun *tekmêria* in this context seems to indicate a cynicism regarding the rigor and ethics in the proceedings of Athenian *dêmêgorikê* (cf. 3.12.5). This section concludes Aristotle’s treatment of the focus or *telos* of proof according to *staseis*; next he begins a discussion of the two forms of argumentation.

17.5. ἔστι δὲ τὰ [1418a] μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτερα, τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἢ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστ’ ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἢ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὐ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξις ἔστι καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ γεγονός ἀνάγκην.

17.5. Paradigms [i.e., proof from examples] are most appropriate to deliberative oratory, enthymemes more suited to judicial; for the former is concerned with the future, so it is necessary to draw examples from the past; the latter is concerned with what are or are not the facts, which are more open to demonstration and a necessary conclusion; for the past has a necessity about it.

1418a 1. παραδείγματα [*paradeigmata*] (paradigms): Aristotle begins a discussion of the two forms of argument and their application to the three species of rhetoric (§§5-9). Grimaldi explains the two forms: “For in rhetoric, *enthymeme* (the process of deduction) and *paradeigma* (the inductive process) are the logical instruments which one is to use in constructing argumentation directed toward *krisis*, or judgment, on the part of another” (*Studies* 71). For

applying the two logical forms, Aristotle asserts the following thesis: Inductive proof from examples is more appropriate for political rhetoric (*dêmêgorik*), while deductive, enthymematic forms are more suitable for judicial rhetoric (*dikanik*). Concerning political rhetoric, Aristotle gives a general reason for the advice: the focus of political rhetoric is the future, so speakers create proofs by citing examples of the past, such as interpretive lessons from history, and by analogy applying them as arguments concerning events in the future.²⁰⁸ Discussing the example in Book 2, Aristotle writes, “Although it is easier to provide illustrations through fables, examples from history are more useful in deliberation; for future events will generally be like those of the past” (2.20.8; cf. 3.16.11; cf. also *ERC* 247, s.v. “Example”).

1418a 2. ἐνθυμήματα [*enthymêmata*] (enthymemes): The enthymeme is a logical form, “the master structural idea” in Aristotelian rhetoric (Grimaldi, *Studies* 145). The deductive enthymeme is a species of syllogism, often formed as an inverted syllogism, consisting of a proposition followed by a reason or two, which are assumed to be shared by the audience and, thus, adaptable to the needs of a general audience and the subject of probable knowledge (Grimaldi 1:21-23; Kennedy xii; *ERC* 223, s.v. “Enthymeme”). In the current passage, Aristotle asserts that the enthymeme is more suited for judicial rhetoric. In enthymematic form, he supports his proposition with two reasons, a minor premise followed by a major premise. First, the focus of judicial rhetoric is the *staseis*; so a speaker will make a proposition about a *stasis* and create proofs with deductive demonstration (*apodeixis*) resulting in a necessary conclusion

²⁰⁸ In 2.20.9, Aristotle discusses “a few cases” in which examples are useful in judicial rhetoric, such as their function as witnesses to supplement enthymemes. Kennedy elaborates: “[I]nduction is useful in deliberative oratory, where the future must be projected on the basis of past experiences. But it can be, and often is, used to create a picture of the character of a litigant in court by drawing a picture of his virtues or vices from past conduct. Aristotle’s point, however, is that it is usually more effective to state the conclusion first and then support it with examples, e.g., “The king plans to invade Greece; for he is securing his position in Egypt [enthymeme]. This is what both Darius and Xerxes did in the past [example]” (164).

(*anagkê*). Second, the remark “the past has necessity [*echei to gegonos anankên*]” is a major premise supporting the first reason. The general observation about the necessity of the past is based on two, often assumed ideas: the particularity of past events and the principle of non-contradiction: “No one can believe that the same thing can (at the same time) be and not be” (*Met* 4, 1005b23-24).²⁰⁹ The two reasons (major and minor premises) support the initial proposition in the enthymeme, called a conclusion in a syllogism. As is his practice, Aristotle describes and illustrates at the same time, discussing the enthymeme with an enthymeme.

What distinguishes an enthymeme from a syllogism is not the form but the sources. In Book 1, Aristotle defines the sources of rhetorical propositions according to three kinds of signs: “*Tekmêria* and probabilities [*eikota*] and signs [*semeia*] are all rhetorical propositions [*protaseis*]. A syllogism is wholly from propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism consisting of propositions expressed [by three kinds of signs]” (1.3.7, 1359a8-10; cf. Grimaldi 1:85; *Studies* 155). While the syllogism is a structure for creating new *necessary* knowledge, the enthymeme is a form used primarily for creating new *probable* knowledge in the human sphere of practical reason wherein deliberate choice (*proairesis*) is always a factor (cf. 1.2.14 and 3.16.8).

17.6. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ἐφεξῆς λέγειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἀλλ’ ἀναμιγνύναι· εἰ δὲ μή, καταβλάπτει ἄλληλα. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ ὅρος·
ὦ φίλ’, ἐπεὶ τόσα εἶπες ὅσ’ ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνὴρ,
ἀλλ’ οὐ τοιαῦτα.

17.6. But the enthymemes should be mixed in and not spoken continuously; otherwise they get in each other’s way. (There is a limit to how much an audience can take, [as in the line] Oh friend, since you have spoken as much as a wise man would as much as, not such things as.)

²⁰⁹ The principle of non-contradiction is often paraphrased as follows: A cannot be both A and non-A at the same time and in the same respect. In *Metaphysics* 4, Aristotle provides three versions of the principle: ontological (1005b19-20), psychological (1005b23-24), and logical (1011b13-14). Socrates states the principle in Plato’s *Republic* 436b.

1418a 6. ἀναμιγνύναι [*anamignunai*] (mixed): The term means “mixture” or “mixed up [ἀνα]” and shows a concern for variety and balance for audience’s sake (LSJ 113). In the following sections (§§6-12), Aristotle discusses how to create a “mixed” style with an appropriate balance between rigorous demonstration and ethical and emotional appeals in enthymemes. Deductive and inductive arguments should not be spoken as a long, continuous chain of argumentation, which only wearies the listener, but should have a mixture among the three rhetorical appeals (*pisteis*) for addressing a general audience. The need for balance Aristotle particularly addresses to his students trained in dialectic who would be prone to over-value logical appeals; the advice comes with tones of warning and appeals to wisdom (cf. 3.17.7). The two reasons annexed to the advice are audience considerations. First, a long chain of argumentation destroys (κατα) the effect because an audience cannot process new information and force of statements as fast as the speaker (cf. 1.2.13). Second, a “limit of quantity” (*posos*) always exists, so a speaker should focus on quality. The quotation from Homer’s *Odyssey* (4.204) illustrates the prudence of preferring quality over quantity of speech.

17.7. καὶ μὴ περὶ πάντων ἐνθυμήματα ζητεῖν· εἰ δὲ μή, ποιήσεις ὅπερ ἔνιοι ποιούσι τῶν φιλοσοφούντων, οἱ συλλογίζονται τὰ γνωριμώτερα καὶ πιστότερα ἢ ἐξ ὧν λέγουσιν.

17.7. And do not seek enthymemes about everything; otherwise you do what some philosophers do; the conclusions of their syllogisms are better known and more plausible than their premises.

1418a 11. ποιούσι τῶν φιλοσοφούντων [*poiouusi tōn phiosophountōn*] (some philosophers): “Certain philosophers” serve as negative examples, who would do better if they considered their audience and knew rhetoric. As a warning against “syllogizing” or “seeking enthymemes about everything,” Aristotle begins an anecdote about certain philosophers who make a mistake when they seek to demonstrate conclusions (*syllogizontai*) when audiences already accept their conclusions as maxims and believable knowledge (*pistotera*) (cf. 2.22.3).

The word “better known” (*gnôrimos*) is similar to “maxim” (*gnômê*), both referring to familiar, well-known, public knowledge. When speaking in public, philosophers need to be rhetoricians, knowing when to simply assert their maxims and build on available common ground (cf. 3.17.9 and 17; cf. Lloyd Bitzer, “Rhetoric and Public Knowledge”).

17.8. καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιῆς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας αἱ ἅμα, καὶ ἢ ἀφανίζουσιν ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν. οὐδ' ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν λόγον, οὐ δεῖ ἐνθύμημά τι ζητεῖν ἅμα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει οὔτε ἦθος οὔτε προαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

17.8. And when you would create pathos, do not speak enthymemes; for the enthymeme either “knocks out” the pathos or is spoken in vain. (Simultaneous movements knock out each other and either fade away or make each other weak.) Nor should you seek an enthymeme when the speech is being “ethical”; for logical demonstration has neither *êthos* nor moral purpose.

1418a12. μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα [*mê lege enthymêma*] (do not speak enthymemes): The advice concerns seeking balance and using a mixed style among emotional, ethical, and logical appeals. The separation of *pathos* and *êthos* from enthymemes needs explanation, for it expresses emphasis rather than definition. Discussing this passage, Grimaldi observes the difficulty: “We have here what appears to be an explicit identification of enthymeme with *apodeixis*; and so the enthymeme is apparently the logical proof of one’s subject-matter [*pragma*]” (*Studies* 148). What needs to be recognized is that this is an isolated passage that, if accepted as definition, is immediately contradicted by the next section on the close relationship between enthymeme and maxim and by Aristotle’s clear statements about the enthymeme being a general, integrative form of rhetorical argumentation (cf. 1.1.11 and 1.2.2-7; cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 150). Kennedy comments on the difficulty: “The rejection of enthymemes as too coolly rational in arousing emotion or portraying character (modified in section 12) is evidence against the view of Grimaldi and others that Aristotle’s discussion of emotions and characters in Book 2 is intended to supply topics for enthymemes” (243n195), but Kennedy also notices the contradiction in 3.17.9:

“Despite what Aristotle has just said [at 3.17.8], this [ethical maxim] seems to qualify as an enthymeme since a reason is given” (244n197). Context is important: isolated statements, such as the current one, should be interpreted in light of a chapter’s themes, developing emphasis, and general theory as developed from the vast majority of evidence. In the present context, with its imperative and emphatic mood, when Aristotle does identify the enthymeme with logical demonstration (*apodeixis*), the purpose is not to define the enthymeme but to emphasize appeals through emotion and character: “Aristotle clearly desires to emphasize proof by *pathos*. He separates it distinctly from logical proof” for emphasis (Grimaldi, *Studies* 149). For Aristotle, the enthymeme is a logical, inferential form that can make use of all three entechnic proofs (*êthos*, *pathos*, *logos*), together or independently, regarding the subject-matter of practical reason. As Grimaldi summarizes, “There is no problem in the identification of enthymeme with *apodeixis*, for Aristotle actually calls the enthymeme the *apodeixis* of rhetoric (*Studies* 149; cf. 1.1.11, 1455a6). One should interpret Aristotle as advising the following: “Do not speak in demonstrative enthymemes alone, for logical demonstration ‘knocks out’ the emotion; rather, the situation requires balanced enthymemes, including appeals to emotion.” What Aristotle emphasizes here and throughout the chapter is a mixed style.

17.9. γνώμας δὲ χρηστῆον καὶ ἐν διηγῆσει καὶ ἐν πίστει· ἠθικὸν γὰρ. “καὶ ἐγὼ δέδωκα, καὶ ταῦτ’ εἰδὼς ὡς οὐ δεῖ πιστεύειν.” ἔὰν δὲ παθητικῶς, “καὶ οὐ μεταμέλει μοι καίπερ ἠδικημένῳ· τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ περίεστι τὸ κέρδος, ἐμοὶ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον.”

17.9. Maxims should be used both in a narration and in a proof; for they are ethical: “I *have* given [the money], though knowing ‘one should not trust.’” Or [they should be used] if the context is emotional: “Though wronged, I have no regret; the profit belongs to him, the justice to me.”

1418a 17. γνώμας [*gnômais*] (maxims): Aristotle commends the maxim (*gnômê*) because it has the cultural status of a fact. The maxim incorporates cultural wisdom, often ethical reasoning, in enthymematic statements that are familiar and acceptable to an audience,

thus creating common ground. From acceptable statements, rhetors make acceptable conclusions. For Aristotle, maxims function as an effective feature of argumentation, often discussed in their relation to enthymemes (cf. 3.17.17), though maxims are closely related to epigrams and proverbs, which are both features of urbane style (cf. 3.11.6 and 14).²¹⁰ A *gnômê* (Latin *sententia*, cf. English “sententious”) is a cultural saying or proverb, literally meaning “thought,” concerning a general truth about choices and actions, often in enthymematic form. In 2.21, Aristotle provides a detailed study of “gnomic sayings [*gnômologias*],” wherein he states that they are general truths with an ethical or practical precept “about things that involve actions [*praxeis*]” (1394a24-25). Maxims are often enthymemes, depending on the presence of a supporting reason or supplement. In the two illustrations, the first is a simple maxim, the second an enthymeme. The situation in the first illustration is of a person who has deposited money with another, apparently disregarding a common maxim (Kennedy 244n196). Aristotle defines maxims according to four formal categories (2.21.3-6). Grimaldi summarizes the four species: “(A) maxim with its reason given (e.g., no man is free, for he is either a slave of money or chance); this kind of maxim is either (1) part of an enthymeme, or, (2) enthymematic, but not part of an enthymeme; (B) maxim without its reason added (e.g., no man is completely happy); this is either (3) well-known gnomic statement and so familiar, or, (4) eminently clear from the mere enunciation” (*Studies* 149-50; cf. Kennedy 165n107). It is immediately noticed that many, if not most, maxims are either enthymemes or enthymematic, as Aristotle attests: “As a result,

²¹⁰ Maxims have a long history in rhetoric, discussed by Kennedy: “Literally, *gnômê* means “thought,” usually an opinion given as a judgment or advice. Pithy, epigrammatic statements have a long history has a feature of rhetoric from classical Greece to the present. Aristotle’s successors, however, (e.g., Quintilian 8.5) treat the gnomic saying as a stylistic device used primarily for ornament, while he regards it as a tool of logical argument. There was an ancient gnomic tradition in Greece, seen in the utterances of sages and the elegiac poetry of Theognis, and quotable lines are a regular feature of Greek tragedy, especially the plays of Euripides. Aristotle cites a number of these [in 2.21]” (164).

since enthymemes are rather like syllogisms about such things [*praxeis*], the conclusions of enthymemes are [either of] the premises (with the [full] syllogism omitted) are maxims” (2.21.2, 1394a27-29). Grimaldi observes: “Premises or conclusions of an enthymeme are often gnomic in character” (*Studies* 150; cf. 149-56 for an extended analysis of maxims). Three observations follow: first, maxims show that *êthos*, *pathos*, and *reason* are the subject-matter of enthymemes; second, “maxims should be used,” Aristotle asserts, since they bring balance and mixture among rhetorical appeals while also creating common ground; third, maxims are extremely useful in rhetoric since rhetorical speakers and writers address humanity’s practical reason in which deliberate choice (*proairesis*) and action (*praxeis*) are the critical factors.²¹¹

17.10. τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι, εἰκότως, διότι περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ἐκεῖ δὲ περὶ τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρήσιος (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἔμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δέ), καὶ ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις ἐν τοῖς δίκαικοῖς· ἔχοντα δὲ ἀρχὴν ῥᾶον εὐρεῖν ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβὰς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν. ἀλλ’ ἤκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξιστηται. δεῖ οὖν ἀπορούντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύων κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ, Χάρητος δὲ ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ.

17.10. Speaking in a deliberative assembly is more difficult than in a law court, as one would expect, since it is concerned with the future, the other with the past, which is known already, “even to prophets,” as Epimenides the Cretan said (he used not to prophesy about the future but about things in the past that were unclear); and the law is a hypothesis in judicial cases: having a starting point, it is easier for one to find proof. And [deliberative oratory] does not have many opportunities for diatribes, for example, against the opponent or about oneself or to create pathos. Least of all [species of rhetoric can deliberative do this], unless one digresses. Therefore, one should do this [only] when at a loss for something to say, as do the orators at Athens and Isocrates; for even when giving advice, he uses invective, for example, against the Lacedaimonians in the *Panegyricus* and against Chares in the *Symmachicus*.

²¹¹ The importance of maxims for rhetoric is testified by Erasmus’s *Adages* (1508), wherein are compiled over three-thousand classical Greek maxims with accompanying explanatory essays (Geanakoplos, *Greek Scholars in Venice* 278). The same year in Venice, Erasmus was present when Aldus Manutius printed *Rhetores Graeci* that included the first Greek edition of Aristotle’s *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* (280).

1418a 21. χαλεπώτερον [*chalepôteron*] (more difficult): The subject of difficulty begins a third division of chapter 17, focusing on appropriate modes of argumentation (§§10-12), still with a view to variety of rhetorical appeals. In the present section, Aristotle outlines the reasons why deliberative (*dêmêgorik*) is more difficult than judicial rhetoric, and given these challenges, the appropriate mode of argumentation. Deliberative rhetoric is more difficult for three reasons: first, it concerns setting policy for an unknown future; second, it requires an inductive mode of argumentation based in historical example; third, it does not usually allow opportunities for digression (*diatribê*), for instance, to establish *êthos* or to create *pathos*. Given these reasons, Aristotle concludes that deliberative rhetors should only digress “when at a loss for something to say” on the subject, following examples in Athenian *dêmêgorik* rhetoric (cf. 3.12.5). For similar reasons, Cicero allows for an optional *digressio* (Enos, *Literate Mode* 62, 72).

1418a 23-24. Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρήσις [*Epimenidês ho Krês*] (Epimenides the Cretan): This prophet of history (*mantis*) teaches an insightful lesson, serving as a humorous anecdote for Aristotle, about the difficulty of demegoric rhetoric since it concerns setting policy for an unknown future. To reduce the difficulty, Epimenides (like political orators) became a prophetic historian, offering interpretations of the past which may be applied to the future by analogy because it is easier to interpret the past than the future. It should be noted that false analogy is called the historian’s fallacy. Epimenides was a poet and prophet of Crete who was well regarded by the Athenians: when he came to Athens in *circa* 596, “he was looked upon by the Greeks as a great sage and as the favourite of the gods” (*Biographical Dictionary* 2:37; Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives* 1.109). Engaging in deliberative rhetoric, the apostle Paul in his Epistle to Titus (1:12) quotes Epimenides regarding the historical *êthos* of Cretans.

1418a 25. ὁ νόμος ὑπόθεσις [*ho nomos hypothesis*] (the law is a hypothesis): Law itself makes the mode of judicial rhetoric deductive because the law serves usually as the predicate of the proposition that a litigant seeks to prove or disprove. Aristotle observes that deductive mode is easier than inductive mode of invention and argumentation because, given a starting point (*archê*, i.e., a hypothesis or thesis statement), “it is easier to find proof [*rhaon eurein apodeixin*]” (1418a26). It is easier to find proof in support of a given proposition than examine a sufficient number of examples to create a reasonable proposition.

1418a 27. διατριβάς [*diatribas*] (diatribes): The term literally means “wearing away” of time, and by extension a “discourse,” or negatively “waste of time,” and in rhetoric an “occasion for dwelling on a subject” at length (LSJ 416). Kennedy comments on its rhetorical usage: “*Diatribê* literally means ‘spending time’ on some subject, but came to mean a personal attack. To illustrate Aristotle’s point, compare the general absence of personal invective against his Athenian opponents in Demosthenes’ deliberative speeches with his extended invective in judicial speeches, including *On the Crown*” (244n198). Requiring time and an attentive, patient audience, *diatribê* is a common mode of argumentation in epideictic and judicial rhetoric, but not in Athenian *dêmêgorik* (democratic) assemblies.

1418a 29-30. οἱ Ἀθηνησι ῥήτορες [*hoi Athênêsi rhêtores*] (the orators at Athens): “The Athenian orators and Isocrates” serve to illustrate *diatribê* in political rhetoric, specifically how to digress from the subject in the context of Athenian *dêmêgorik* rhetoric. Aristotle discourages *diatribê*, though it is a common mode of political argumentation when facing an *aporia*: “when at a loss for something to say” pertinent to the issue. The participle *aporounta* is related to *aporia* (an impasse, lack of resources, puzzlement) which serves as the exigency for engaging in *diatribê*. As examples, Aristotle names *Panegyricus* by Isocrates, regarded as deliberative for its

Panhellenic purpose of advising the Greeks to join together under Athenian leadership against Persia, though the oration includes epideictic *diatribê* with extensive praise of the Athenians; Aristotle also mentions *Symmachicus* (better known as *On the Peace*) for similar reasons (Kennedy 244n200).

17.11. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις, οἷον Ἴσοκράτης ποιεῖ· αἰεὶ γὰρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὃ ἔλεγε Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταῦτό ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ Ἄχιλλεα λέγων Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἶτα Αἰακόν, εἶτα τὸν θεόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείαν, ἢ τὰ καὶ τὰ ποιεῖ ἢ τοιόνδε ἐστίν.

17.11. In epideictic one should interweave the speech with praise, as Isocrates does; for he is always bringing in somebody [to praise]. What Gorgias used to say—that he was never at a loss for words—is similar: if he is talking about Achilles, he praises [his father] Peleus, then [his grandfather] Aeacus, then the god [Aeacus' father, Zeus]; similarly, with courage, that it does this and that or has certain qualities [that can be amplified].

1418a 33. τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιοῦν ἐπαίνοις [*ton logon epeisodioun epainois*]

(interweave the speech with praise): The verb emphasizes variety: intersperse logical argument with ethical and emotional appeals, including praise to create the proper tone, such as the epideictic tone of celebration. Derived from *episodes* (*epis-hodos*), meaning “multiple paths,” the verb pictures a confluence of ways; in poetry and drama, the term means “vary by introducing episodes,” being the source of English “episodes” (LSJ 615). For examples in epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle mentions Isocrates and quotes a maxim by his teacher Gorgias informing their successful epideictic practices, namely, one can always find something to praise.

17.12. ἔχοντα μὲν οὖν ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃς ἐνθυμήματα, ἠθικῶς· καὶ μᾶλλον τῷ ἐπεικεῖ [1418b] ἀρμόττει χρηστὸν φαίνεσθαι ἢ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ.

17.12. If one has logical arguments, one should speak both ethically and logically; if you do not have enthymemes, speak ethically. And to seem virtuous suits a good person more than an exact argument does.

1418a 38. ἠθικῶς λεκτέον καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς [*êthikôs lekteon kai apodeiktikôs*] (speak both ethically and logically): The advice about variety in proof comes in the context of advice for epideictic rhetoric, but it repeats a general principle that one should use a mixture of rhetorical appeals in order to speak to the whole person. Reasoning about *êthos* is more important than logical proofs in the rhetoric of praise and blame.

1418a 39. ἐνθυμήματα [*enthymata*] (enthymemes): Enthymeme is associated with *apodeixis* for emphasis, not definition, as in 3.17.7 (Grimaldi, *Studies* 148-50; cf. 3.17.9 and 17 for the association of enthymeme with maxim; cf. discussion at 3.1.1, 1403b13).

1418b 1. τὸν λόγον ἀκριβῆ [*ton logon akribê*] (an exact argument): An exact argument may be overrated, according to Aristotle, because general audiences make assumptions about character, such as shrewdness in a person desirous and capable of creating an exact argument. Aristotle contrasts the “good person” with exact argument (*logon akribê*), for general audiences may often assume that a good person *qua* good would not create an exact argument, while the person with an exact argument may be shrewd (cf. discussion of character management at 3.16.9).

17.13. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν δεικτικῶν, ὅτι ὅσα ἔλεγχον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δῆλον ὅτι συλλελογίσται· παρ’ ἄλληλα γὰρ μᾶλλον τ’ ἀναντία γνωρίζεται.

17.13. Refutative enthymemes are better liked [by audiences] than demonstrative ones because what makes a refutation is more clearly syllogistic; for inconsistencies are clearer when placed side-by-side.

1418b 2. μᾶλλον εὐδοκιμεῖ [*mallon eudokimeî*] (better liked): As of first importance on the subject of refutation, Aristotle observes that refutative enthymemes are “better liked” than positive argumentation. The verb *eudokimeî* (from *eudokeô*) means “to be well-pleasing or acceptable,” creating “consent” and “approval” (LSJ 710). “Better” or “more” (*mallon*), used

three times in the passage (once in each *côlon*), creates antithesis, illustrating the process described. With an antithetical enthymeme (an inverted syllogism), Aristotle supports his proposition with two reasons, both based in the first principle of style: “To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people” (3.10.2; cf. *Met* 1). The first premise is that refutative enthymemes are “more clearly syllogistic” to an audience. The second premise supports the first: because refutative arguments create antithesis and, thus, show more clearly contrastive meaning and significance. Since refutation is better liked, it is often more effective than positive argumentation, also showing the weaknesses in the opponent’s argument. Whatever creates easy or clear learning will be rhetorically effective. For this reason, antithesis is Aristotle’s preferred style of syntax and species of enthymeme (cf. 3.9.8-9).

17.14. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἀντίδικον οὐχ ἕτερόν τι εἶδος, ἀλλὰ τῶν πίστεων ἐστίν [τὰ μὲν λῦσαι ἐνστάσει τὰ δὲ συλλογισμῶ]. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐν συμβουλῇ καὶ ἐν δίκῃ ἀρχόμενον μὲν λέγειν τὰς ἑαυτοῦ πίστεις πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ πρὸς τὰναντία ἀπαντᾶν λύοντα καὶ προδιασύροντα. ἂν δὲ πολύχους ἢ ἢ ἐναντίωσις, πρότερον τὰ ἐναντία, οἷον ἐποίησε Καλλίστρατος ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνιακῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ· ἃ γὰρ ἐρούσι προανελῶν οὕτως τότε αὐτὸς εἶπεν.

17.14. Refutations of the opponent are not a separate species but belong to proofs. Some disprove by objection [to a premise or conclusion], some by [a counter-]syllogism. In both deliberation and in court the opening speaker should state his own premises first, then should meet those of his opponent by disproving and tearing them to pieces before he can make them. But if the opposition has many good points to make, put the refutations first, as Callistratus did in the Messenian assembly; for first removing the objections they were going to voice, he then spoke his own case.

1418b 5. τῶν πίστεων [*tôn pisteôn*] (belong to proofs): The case is genitive: “of proofs,” alluding to the same phrase in 3.13.4: “For replies to the opposition belong to the proofs [*tôn pisteôn*]” (1414b9). In classical rhetoric, refutation is one of the six standard parts of an oration, though refutation has its own heading more for pedagogical purposes than for formal or functional definition, which is Aristotle’s contention (cf. 3.13.5). Kennedy notes: “Aristotle does not regard the refutation as a distinct part of an oration, as did Theodorus (cf. 3.13.5), but later

writers often so list it; cf., e.g., *Rhetoric for Herennius* 1.4. In *Rhetoric for Alexander*, chapters 7 and 13, refutation is one of several subheadings of proof” (245n201; also cf. 2.26.3). The term proofs (*pisteis*) in this context has a technical meaning unique to Book 3, referring to “that part of a speech wherein one formally demonstrates one’s thesis or proposition,” or in this case, argues against the opposition’s thesis (Grimaldi, *Studies* 70; cf. discussion at 3.13.2, 1414a35).

In judicial rhetoric, an antithetical distinction exists between *aitia* and *elenchus*. *Aitia* refers to simple “cause” or reproach, an accusation without proof, which may be true or false; *elenchus*, however, refers to an accusation that is true, often implying an acknowledgment of fact on the part of the accused. Demosthenes describes the distinction: “Very often both reproach and accusation are distinguished from refutation; for it is accusation when one employs a mere statement without furnishing credence in what he says; it is refutation when one at the same time demonstrates the truth of what he says” (*Adversus Androktionem* 600). The difference between these legal terms, similar to *charge* and *convict* versus *convince*, is the distinction between moral reproach and legal reproof, where that latter implies a statement followed by proof.

1418b 6. λῦσαι ἐνστάσει [*lysai enstasei*] (disprove by objection): More literally, the phrase is “refute by objection.” Both words are technical terms in logic and legal rhetoric. The term *lysis* means “loosing, releasing,” such as the logical ties of a syllogism or enthymeme, and thus technically “refutation of an argument” (LSJ 1066; Kennedy 189). The second term *enstasis* (related to *stasis*, cf. 3.17.1-4) means “stand in the way of, to block,” used in logic and legal rhetoric meaning “to object” and thus an “objection to an argument,” such as a premise or conclusion made by an actual or assumed opponent (*antidikon*) (LSJ 574; Grimaldi 2:356, 02a35, s.v. ἐνστάσεις; cf. *Rhet* 3.18.4, 1419a17; *APr* 69a37). Refutation is accomplished in two ways: “refute by objection” and counter-syllogism. In 2.25, Aristotle discusses both processes:

objections and refutations of an opponent's enthymemes; these are also discussed throughout *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*.

1418b 7. ἀρχόμενον [*archomenon*] (opening speaker): The advice in this section answers a question: How should the opening speaker begin, with positive arguments or with refutations? Aristotle provides sound advice: the answer depends on the strength of the opponent's argument, considering how the opponent's argument may likely create a relatively neutral or skeptical audience. The situation "in an Athenian court [is that] the speakers would have known most of the arguments of their opponents from the preliminary hearing" (Kennedy 245n203). In most situations, the opening speaker "should state his own premises [*pisteis*] first," then vigorously refute (*lyonta*) the opponent's premises, "tearing them to pieces" or "ridiculing them beforehand" (LSJ 1474; cf. *Rhetoric to Alexander* 1433b9). However, "if the opposition [*enantiōsis*] has many good points to make, then put the refutations [*enantia*] first," thus diminishing the quality of the opposition's argument and creating credibility for one's own arguments. While Aristotle addresses refutation occurring in deliberative and judicial situations, the principles apply to epideictic rhetoric and writing style. When addressing a sympathetic audience, it is advisable to state one's arguments first and counterarguments last; when addressing a skeptical audience, the reverse, seeking first to refute reasons for doubt in order to create an open-minded audience willing to consider one's positive arguments.

1418b 10. Καλλίστρατος [*Kallistratos*] (Callistratus): This Athenian orator, commander, and ambassador, greatly admired by Demosthenes, serves as a notable illustration of speaking "refutations first" in demegoric rhetoric (*Biographical Dictionary* 1:577; also mentioned at 1.7.13). Kennedy comments: "On an embassy to the Messenians in 362 B.C. Callistratus began with reasons why they should not ally with Thebes before introducing

arguments why they should join with Athens (see Nepos, *Epaminondas* 6). When an orator confronts a hostile audience, it is often most effective to face immediately the arguments or prejudices in their minds. Cicero’s speech *For Cluentius* is a large-scale example” (245n204).

17.15. ὕστερον δὲ λέγοντα πρῶτον πρὸς τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον λεκτέον, λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον, καὶ μάλιστα ἂν εὐδοκιμηκότα ἢ ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον προδιαβεβλημένον οὐ δέχεται ἡ ψυχὴ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδὲ λόγον, ἔαν ὁ ἐναντίος εὐδοκῆ εἰρηκέναι. δεῖ οὖν χώραν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀκροατῇ τῷ μέλλοντι λόγῳ· ἔσται δὲ, ἂν ἀνέλῃς. διὸ ἢ πρὸς πάντα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα ἢ τὰ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἢ τὰ εὐέλεγκτα μαχεσάμενον οὕτω τὰ αὐτοῦ πιστὰ ποιητέον.

ταῖς θεαῖσι πρῶτα σύμμαχος γενήσομαι.

ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἥραν.

ἐν τούτοις ἤψατο πρῶτον τοῦ εὐηθεστάτου. περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα.

17.15. But if you speak second you should reply first to the opposing speech, refuting and offering opposed syllogisms, especially if what was said seems to have met with approval. Just as the mind is not receptive toward a person who has been previously criticized, in the same way it is not [receptive] toward a speech if the opponent seems to have spoken well. One should thus make room in the hearer’s mind for the speech one is going to give, and this will happen if you take away [the impression that has been left]. Thus, after fighting against everything or the most important things or the popular things or the easily refutable things, one should then make one’s persuasive points:

First shall I be a defender of the goddesses,

And shall show she does not speak justly.

For I do not think that Hera. . . .

In these lines [Hecuba] seizes first on [Helen’s] most foolish argument. So much for arguments [*pisteis*].

1418b 13. λύοντα καὶ ἀντισυλλογιζόμενον [*lyonta kai antisyllogizomenon*] (refuting and offering opposed syllogisms): The advice in this section answers the question: How should the second speaker respond, with positive arguments or with refutations? The second speaker should first reply to the opposing speech, using two methods: refutation (*lysis*) and counter-syllogism (*antisyllogismos*). This is especially so if the oppositional argument was well-liked (εὐδοκῆ). The reason is twofold: one “makes room [*chôran poiein*]” for one’s own argument by “taking away [*anelês*]” the favorable impression made by the opponent. After “fighting against [*maxesamenon*]” the opposing arguments, one may then make one’s positive argument. As an illustration of the second speaker replying by refutation, Aristotle quotes from Euripides, *Trojan*

Women (969-1032), “where Hecuba begins her reply to Helen by defending the action of the goddess (Aphrodite) in the judgment of Paris. *She is Helen*” (Kennedy 245n205).

17.16. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἔπειδὴ ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἴσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἄρχιλοχος ψέγει· ποιεῖ γὰρ τὸν πατέρα λέγοντα περὶ τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ “χρημάτων δ’ ἄελπτον οὐθέν ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἀπώμοτον,” καὶ τὸν Χάρωνα τὸν τέκτονα ἐν τῷ ἰάμβῳ οὐ ἀρχὴ “οὐ μοι τὰ Γύγεω.” καὶ ὡς Σοφοκλῆς τὸν Αἴμονα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὡς λεγόντων ἑτέρων.

17.16. In regard to *ethos*, since there are sometimes things to be said about oneself that are invidious or prolix or contradictory, and about another that are abusive or boorish, it is best to attribute them to another person, as Isocrates does in the *Philippus* and in the *Antidosis* and as Archilochus does in censure; for he introduces the father speaking of his daughter in an iambic poem: “Nothing is unexpected nor declared impossible on oath” and [introduces] Charon the carpenter in [another] iambic work, which begins “Nothing to me the [wealth of] Gyges.” And as Sophocles does, making Haemon speak to his father about Antigone on the basis of what others say.

1418b 26. ἕτερον χρὴ λέγοντα ποιεῖν [*heteron chrê legonta poiein*] (attribute them to another person): A literal gloss is “make another speak,” referring to dramatic indirection.

Aristotle advises using indirect attribution for statements harmful to *êthos* in order to avoid causing oneself to seem a self-flatterer or censorious. When statements about oneself are invidious (*epiphthonon*), prolix (*makrologian*), or contradictory (*antilogian*), or about another are abusive (*loidorian*) or boorish (*agroikian*), one should use dramatic indirection by “making another person speak” the words (e.g., “As so-and-so said about him, ‘He always embellishes the truth.’”). The practice of indirection is illustrated with five examples, either by reference or by quotation. On the one hand, concerning self-flattery, Isocrates attributes flattering remarks to his friends in *Philippus* 4-7 and *Antidosis* 132-139 and 141-149; on the other hand, concerning censure, Archilochus, a sixth-century poet, when disappointed in love for Neobule, attributed disreputable remarks about her to her father in a passage beginning with the line quoted

(Kennedy 246n206-7). The last example is a reference is to Sophocles, *Antigone* (689-700) (cf. Maurice Natanson, “The Arts of Indirection”).

17.17. δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον “χρὴ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν.” ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ “εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὥσι καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἱ καταλλαγαί, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.”

17.17. Sometimes it is advisable to change enthymemes into maxims; for example: “Sensible men should seek reconciliations when successful; for thus they get the greater advantage.” As an enthymeme this would be “If it is necessary to seek reconciliations whenever such changes are most profitable and most advantageous, then it is necessary to seek changes when one is successful.”

1418b 33. μεταβάλλειν [*metaballein*] (to change): The infinitive is a metaphor for rhetorical style based in the visual action of “change of direction,” showing that style is navigation along a pathway. *Metaballein* works as a Hellenic model for style: style is *navigation*, navigating a course, with changes of course, changes of tack, involving turns and transfers of direction (cf. discussion at 3.1.2 and 3.12.3).

1418b 34. γνώμας [*gnômas*] (maxims): Aristotle’s brief discussion of the maxim focuses on how-to illustration, showing the close relationship between maxims and enthymemes, following up the fuller discussion in 2.21 and 3.17.9. Aristotle advises the use of maxim (*gnômê*) because it incorporates ethical reasoning in statements and enthymemes which already are familiar and acceptable to an audience, thus creating common ground. On the form of this argument, Kennedy notes: “In syllogistic form, if A = B when B = C, then A, since B = C. The maxim cited here, however, fulfills the requirements of an enthymeme as given in 2.21.2, since it already has a supporting reason” (246n209). For further discussion and illustration on the close relationship between enthymeme, maxim, and rhetorical appeals, see Grimaldi, *Studies* (148-50).

CHAPTER 18

TAXIS: INTERROGATION

OUTLINE

DEVELOPMENT

18.1-4. Questions in interrogation (1418b 39–1419a 19)

18.6-5. Replies in interrogation (1419a 19–1419b 2)

18.7. Humor in debate (1419b 2–1419b 9)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

18.1. περὶ δὲ ἐρωτήσεως, εὐκαιρόν ἐστι ποιεῖσθαι μάλιστα [1419a] μὲν ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον εἰρηκῶς ἦ, ὥστε ἑνὸς προσερωτηθέντος συμβαίνει τὸ ἄτοπον· οἷον Περικλῆς Λάμπωνα ἐπήρετο περὶ τῆς τελετῆς τῶν τῆς σωτείρας ἱερῶν, εἰπόντος δὲ ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀτέλεστον ἀκούειν, ἤρετο εἰ οἶδεν αὐτός, φάσκοντος δὲ “καὶ πῶς ἀτέλεστος ὢν;”

18.1. As for interrogation (*erôtêsis*), it is most opportune to use it when an opponent [1419a] has said one thing and, if the right question is asked an absurdity results. For example, Pericles questioned Lampon about the holy rites of the Savior Goddess. When he replied that it was not permitted for an uninitiated person to hear about them, Pericles asked if he knew them himself. Since he admitted he did, [the next question was,] “And how, since you are uninitiated?”

1418b 39. ἐρωτήσεως [*erôtêseôs*] (interrogation): Aristotle treats judicial interrogation in three parts: when to question one’s opponent given four opportune situations (§§1-4), how to reply to one’s opponent given the four *staseis* (§§5-6), and use of humor or mockery (§7). For Aristotle, interrogation is an extension of proof (cf. 3.13.4). Accordingly, the discussion follows a logical arrangement: the first part on questioning is based on syllogistic structure (propositions and conclusions), and the second part on answering is based on his four *staseis* questions (cf. 3.17.1). *Erôtêsis* means “questioning, interrogation,” and is the term which Dionysius Thrax used for interrogative adverbs in his *Art of Grammar* (LSJ 696). *Erôtêsis* is neither a part of Aristotle’s system of *taxis*, nor ever became a species of rhetoric, nor became a distinct part of

the classical Greek or Roman oration, but interrogation is an extension of proof useful in judicial situations but also in demegoric rhetoric (Carawan, “*Erotesis*” 210; Kennedy 247).²¹²

According to Athenian judicial procedure, interrogation could occur in the preliminary hearing (*anakrasis*) and in the trial (*dikê*), wherein either party could ask questions and demand answers. Kennedy describes the process: “Indictment resulted from a preliminary hearing before one of the archons, or magistrates, at which some *prima facie* evidence of a wrong was presented and witnesses offered testimony. It is likely that the defendant could interrogate the witnesses and try to show that there was no merit in the charge. The evidence of the witnesses was taken down in writing and then read out by a court secretary if a trial took place” (246).²¹³ Prosecution and defense could discuss testimony and question witnesses, but no cross-examination of witnesses existed. Aristotle discusses the process of interrogation between litigants, though questions often became rhetorical questions, for which no answer was asked or desired (246).

1418b 39. εὐκαιρόν [*eukairos*] (opportune): *Eukairos* refers to four opportune situations in which an opponent has stated an implicit or explicit contradiction, providing an advantageous opportunity to interrogate the opponent in order to reveal the contradiction. *Eukairos* means “*well-timed, seasonable*” regarding the opportune moment (LSJ 717), and for Aristotle is a key

²¹² Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca discuss questions as a mode of creating (implying or forcing) shared meaning: “The interrogative is a modality of considerable rhetorical importance. A question presupposes an object to which it relates and suggests that there is an agreement on the existence of this object. To answer a question is to confirm this implicit agreement,” agreeing with the speaker and admitting to an audience; for when a speaker practices “the interrogative form, [he or she] admits of appeal to communion with an audience” (159).

²¹³ On Athenian judicial procedures, cf. Bonner and Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle* (1930-1938), and Carawan, “*Erotesis: Interrogation in the Courts of Fourth-Century Athens*” (1983). Examples of Athenian judicial procedure are found in Plato’s *Apology* (24d-27d), Lysias’s *Against Eratosthenes* (12.25), and other sources. *Rhetoric for Alexander* 5, as Kennedy observes, discusses investigational oratory (*exetasis*) and has some similarities to Aristotle’s chapter but does not mention the possibility of replies” (247).

determination for discovering when and how to apply that which is appropriate (*prepon*) in the rhetorical situation. *Eukairos* is only used in Book 3 twice (cf. 3.7.8, 1408a36), while *kairos* is employed throughout Books 1 and 2 (cf. 3.7.8 for discussion of Aristotle's term *eukairos* in relation to Isocrates's key term *kairos*).

1419a 2. τὸ ἄτοπον [*to atopon*] (absurdity): The first and “most opportune” situation to ask a question is when an opponent has stated an implied contradiction so that, if one asks “the right question,” the contradiction becomes evident, resulting in “the “absurdity.” *Atopon* literally means “out of place,” and in this context refers to “logical absurdity” (LSJ 272). The term refers to the situation called *reductio ad absurdum* (“reduction to the absurd”), often achieved by showing proof of contradiction. Aristotle illustrates this kind of situation and the “right question” by quoting Pericles in his interrogation of Lampon, called “the seer” by Plutarch (*Lives* 154, *Pericles* 6.2). In *Sophistical Refutations* 15-16, Aristotle treats the topic of questioning and replying in sophistical debate.

18.2. δεύτερον δὲ ὅταν τὸ μὲν φανερόν ᾗ, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτήσαντι δῆλον ᾗ ὅτι δώσει· πυθόμενον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ τὴν μίαν πρότασιν μὴ προσερωτᾶν τὸ φανερόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπεράσμα εἰπεῖν, οἷον Σωκράτης Μελήτου οὐ φάσκοντος αὐτὸν θεοὺς νομίζειν [εἴρηκεν ὡς ἂν δαιμόνιον τι λέγοι], ἤρετο εἰ οὐχ οἱ δαίμονες ἦτοι θεῶν παῖδες εἶεν ἢ θεῖόν τι, φήσαντος δὲ “ἔστιν οὖν” ἔφη “ὅστις θεῶν μὲν παῖδας οἶεται εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ οὐ;”

18.2. A second situation is when something is self-evident and it is clear to the questioner that the opponent will grant another point. Receiving the expected answer to this, one should not ask about what is self-evident but should state the conclusion to which it points, as Socrates did when Meletus denied that Socrates believed in the gods. He asked if *daimones* [“spirits,” in which Meletus admitted Socrates believed] were not either children of gods or something divine, and when Meletus said “They are,” Socrates asked, “Does anybody think there are children of gods but not gods?”

1419a 6. φανερόν [*phaneron*] (self-evident): The adjective means “plainly evident” or “obviously true” to an audience; however, in this context, *phaneros* refers to a proposition whose logical conclusion is plainly evident to the questioner but as yet hidden from the opponent who

stated the proposition. This kind of situation provides a second opportunity for interrogation. The situation is likened by Aristotle to an incomplete syllogism and illustrated by the trial of Socrates, wherein Meletus accuses Socrates of atheism (Plato, *Apology* 27d). The situation is syllogistic in form:

- A. The opponent states or admits a minor premise whose conclusion clearly contradicts the opponent's claim: e.g., Meletus admits that *daimones* (spirits) are "either children of gods or something divine."
- B. The questioner understands the implied major premise: e.g., all offspring have parentage, including *daimones*.
- C. Therefore, the questioner "should state the conclusion to which [the premise] points": e.g., Socrates asks, "Does anybody think there are children of gods but not gods?"

The answer to the rhetorical question is obvious to all, including judge and jury, revealing clearly the fallacy of the opponent's allegation.

1419a 8. Σωκράτης [*Sôkratês*] (Socrates): The example from the trial of Socrates carries historical significance. First, the example confirms Plato's account of the trial. Kennedy comments: "The exchange is incorporated in Plato's *Apology* 27d, which Aristotle apparently regarded as a faithful record of what Socrates said" (247n210). Second, the example may suggest authorial purpose for this chapter, and quite possibly the treatise, since Aristotle's "questioner" identifies with Socrates as a defendant on trial, defending philosophy against culture. That Aristotle chose to extend his treatment of proof with a discussion of interrogation illustrated by the trial of Socrates indicates a rhetorical situation with an exigency for Aristotle and his select

students to learn the art of rhetoric amid a perilously litigious culture (Poster 244; Kennedy 17; see discussion at 3.13.4 and 3.15.1).²¹⁴

18.3. ἔτι ὅταν μέλλῃ ἢ ἐναντία λέγοντα δείξειν ἢ παράδοξον.

18.3. Another situation is when [the speaker] intends to show that [the opponent] is contradicting himself or saying something paradoxical.

1419a 13. ἐναντία λέγοντα [*enantia legonta*] (contradicting himself): A third opportune situation for interrogation is when one perceives contradiction. The phrase literally means “saying the opposite,” where the adverb “opposite” (*enantia*) is a compound of *en* and *anti*, meaning both “in opposition to” and “in place of” what one had intended to prove (*deixein*) (LSJ 554). Whether an opponent speaks a blatant contradiction or an apparent contradiction (*paradoxos*), the situation is advantageous for interrogation. Usually by asking a rhetorical question, the questioner would seek to make the contradiction clear to the judge and jury.

18.4. τέταρτον δὲ, ὅταν μὴ ἐνῆ ἄλλ' ἢ σοφιστικῶς ἀποκρινάμενον λύσαι· ἐὰν γὰρ οὕτως ἀποκρίνηται, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἔστι δ' οὐ, ἢ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, ἢ πῆ μὲν πῆ δ' οὐ, θορυβοῦσιν ὡς ἀποροῦντος. ἄλλως δὲ μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐνστή, κεκρατῆσθαι δοκεῖ· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε πολλὰ ἐρωτᾶν διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ. διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ.

18.4. And a fourth when it is not possible to answer the question except sophistically; for if he answers that it is and isn't or “Some yes, some no” or “In a way, but in another way not,” [the audience] calls out that he is at a loss. Otherwise, do not attempt interrogation; for if the opponent resists, you seem to be defeated; for it is not possible to ask a series of questions because of the weakness of the audience (For the same reason one should condense enthymemes as much as possible.)

1419a 16. ἀποροῦντος [*aporountos*] (at a loss): A fourth opportune situation for interrogation is when one's opponent is caught in an *aporia* (*aporountos* is the participle form),

²¹⁴ Giving a reason for fleeing Athens in 323, Aristotle allegedly said that “he did not want the Athenians to commit a second crime against philosophy,” alluding to the trial and execution of Socrates (Barnes 9). That year occurred the unexpected death of Alexander the Great at age thirty-two. Anti-Macedonian sentiment in Athens became vocal and directed at Aristotle since he was a known friend of the King of Macedonia. When Aristotle was fraudulently accused of blasphemy, he fled into retirement on the island of Chalcis (11).

meaning an impasse, puzzlement, or confusion. Facing an *aporia*, the opponent cannot answer the question “except sophistically,” referring to equivocation that an audience would recognize as contradictory, denounce as deceitful, and call out the *aporia*: “he is at a loss [*aporountos*].” Aristotle uses the adjective *sophistikôs* as a slur against sophists, engaging in the rhetoric of blame by appealing to *êthos*. Aristotle gives two examples of being caught in an *aporia*, illustrating effects so one may recognize the opportunity for interrogation. The first example, “Some yes, some no,” refers to explicit contradiction or false distinction. To illustrate, Cope refers to Aristophanes, *Acharnians* (396) where Cephisophon, being asked if Euripides was at home, replies, “Yes and no, if you understand me,” then explaining how Euripides’ mind was outside collecting poetry while his body was inside composing tragedy (Cope 3:213). The second example refers to what Freese describes as “the adversary being reduced to such a position that he cannot answer without having recourse to sophistical divisions and distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty” (464nA). In either case, interrogation is advantageous because the opponent is caught in an *aporia* as evidenced by speaking contradictions.

1419a 17. μὴ ἐγχειρεῖν [*mê encheirein*] (do not attempt interrogation): Aside from the four opportunities found in four kinds of contradiction in the opponent’s argument, Aristotle advises “not to interrogate” because if the opponent “resists [*enstê*]” with an objection or a reasonable answer, the questioner “seems to be defeated.” The term *enstê* derives from *enstasis*, meaning “objection” to an argument or question (LSJ 574; cf. 3.17.14, 1418b6). Aristotle advises cautious judgment: opportunities (*eukairos*) for interrogation that may be advantageous to one’s case are limited. Aristotle anticipates an objection from his students, answering thus: “it is not possible to ask a series of questions,” as is done in dialectical exercises, “because of the weakness of the audience” in their inability to follow fine distinctions in lengthy logical

argumentation (cf. 1.2.13). If an opportunity does not present itself, Aristotle advises silence. Based on prior references to the trial of Socrates, Aristotle may imply the use of rhetorical silence, that is, intentional silence used strategically in political contexts that “influences that meaning of its context more than the context influences its meanings” (*ERC* 627-28, s.v. “Rhetoric of Silence”).

1419a 19. ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μάλιστα συστρέφειν [*enthymêmata hoti malista systrephein*] (condense enthymemes as much as possible): The advice that “enthymemes should be condensed as much as possible” emphasizes that the enthymeme is a highly variable form. Grimaldi comments that this statement accords with “everything which A. says about the character of rhetorical argumentation,” and that “A. wants to enable the auditor to acquire a quick, solid, and comprehensive grasp of the arguments” (1:57, 57a16; cf. *Studies* 95-114). Aristotle’s statements in this passage problematize traditional interpretations to the effect that the enthymeme *by definition* is an abbreviated syllogism because syllogisms are rigid forms while enthymemes are highly variable in form, subject to expansion and concision as one chooses.

18.5. ἀποκρίνασθαι δὲ δεῖ πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀμφίβολα διαιροῦντα λόγῳ καὶ μὴ συντόμως, πρὸς δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐναντία τὴν λύσιν φέροντα εὐθύς τῇ ἀποκρίσει, πρὶν ἐπερωτῆσαι τὸ ἐπιὸν ἢ συλλογίσασθαι· οὐ γὰρ χαλεπὸν προορᾶν ἐν τίνι ὁ λόγος. φανερὸν δ’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν καὶ τοῦτο καὶ αἱ λύσεις.

18.5. Amphibolies need to be answered by examining them logically and in some detail, supplying a resolution of seeming contradictions directly in the answer before [the opponent] asks a follow-up question or draws a conclusion; for it is not difficult to see to what the train of argument may lead. Let how to do this and how to make replies be evident from the *Topics* [book 8].

1419a 20. τὰ ἀμφίβολα [*ta amphibola*] (amphibolies): The topic of amphibolies, or equivocations, begins a discussion of how to reply to an opponent during interrogation, first regarding replies to propositions (§5) and second replies to conclusions (§6). Beginning with equivocation creates a chiasmic arrangement since the last section dealt with equivocation.

Kennedy defines the term: “An amphiboly (lit. what ‘shoots both ways’) is an equivocation based on a word or phrase with an ambiguous meaning, often creating a fallacious argument” (207n61; cf. 3.5.4, 1407a32). In the current context, amphiboly refers to an ambiguity in the opponent’s statement or a “loaded question” so that it cannot be answered in the same terms as asked; for example, a deplorable modern instance is “Have you stopped beating your wife yet?” (Kennedy 248n212). Given a loaded question, one should not seek to answer but discuss the question, clarifying its implicit contradiction.

1419a 20. διαιροῦντα λόγῳ [*diairounta logô*] (examining them logically): The solution to equivocation is to make a clear distinction, which is what Aristotle advises. The verb *diaireô* (from which *diairesis* derives) refers to the process of dividing into genus and species in order to define and distinguish (LSJ 395). The distinction needs to be made immediately and exactly or risk the results of confusion. Since equivocation may lead to a contradiction, the distinction needs to be clarified “before [the opponent] asks a follow-up question or draws a conclusion [*syllogisasthai*],” so that the argument may be stopped at the proposition before a conclusion is suggested, especially if the conclusion regards *stasis* of fact, which is what the context seems to assume. Once the conclusion is reached, the judge or jury will form an interpretation along with an imagined scenario of events and characters, a representation difficult to remove.

1419a 24. ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν [*ek tôn topikôn*] (from the *Topics*): In this tenth and last reference to *Topics*, Aristotle directs his students to book 8, concerning the headings “on asking questions” (*pôs dei erôtan*) and “about distinctions” (*peri apokriseôs*), for further discussion of judicial interrogation.

18.6. καὶ συμπεραινομένου, ἐὰν ἐρώτημα ποιῆ τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὴν αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν· οἶον Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτῶμενος ὑπὸ Πεισάνδρου εἰ ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡσπερ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προβούλοις, καταστήσαι τοὺς τετρακοσίους, ἔφη “τί δέ; οὐ πονηρά σοι ταῦτα ἔδοκει εἶναι;” ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν σὺ ταῦτα ἔπραξας τὰ πονηρά;” “ναὶ” ἔφη. “οὐ γὰρ ἦν ἄλλα

βελτίω.” καὶ ὡς ὁ Λάκων εὐθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτώμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικάϊως ἀπολωλέναι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. ὁ δὲ “οὐκοῦν σὺ τούτοις ταῦτ’ ἔθου;” καὶ ὅς ἔφη. “οὐκοῦν δικάϊως ἄν” ἔφη “καὶ σὺ ἀπόλοιο;” “οὐ δῆτα” ἔφη. “οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταῦτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ, ἀλλὰ γνώμη.” διὸ οὔτε ἐπερωτᾶν δεῖ μετὰ τὸ συμπεράσμα, [1419b] οὔτε τὸ συμπεράσμα ἐπερωτᾶν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ πολὺ περιῆ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

18.6. If a conclusion takes the form of a question, explain the reason for the conclusion; for example, when Sophocles was asked by Pisander if he had approved establishing the government of the Four Hundred, as the others on the committee to draft legislation did, he admitted it. “But why? Did these measures not seem to you to be wicked?” He agreed. “Did you not then do these wicked deeds?” “Yes,” he said, “but there were no better alternatives!” And as the Spartan replied, when rendering an account of his term as ephor: being asked if it did not seem to him that the others on the board had justly been put to death, he agreed. The examiner asked, “Did not you take the same measures as they?” He admitted it. “Therefore would it not be just to put you also to death?” “Not at all,” he replied, “for they took bribes to do these things; I did not, but acted in accordance with my own judgment.” Thus, one should not ask any further question after drawing a conclusion [1419b] or couch the conclusion as a question unless the balance of truth is in one’s favor.

1419a 25. τὸ συμπεράσμα [*to symperasma*] (the conclusion): The section treats how to reply to the opponent’s conclusion with qualification so as to remove the conclusion’s quality with reference to *stasis* of quality: harm, importance, and justice (cf. 3.17.1). *Symperasma* here refers to the conclusion in a logical syllogism (cf. *APr* 30a5, 42a5; *Top* 155b23). The discussion assumes that one agrees with the opponent’s propositions and thus the conclusion, but in such a way that the context reinterprets the quality and meaning so as to draw an entirely different conclusion. The interpretive context comes in the advice to “explain the reason,” where reason (*aitia*) refers to cause, such as one’s motivation or efficient cause for the admitted action (cf. 3.16.11, 1417b17). After the advice to “explain the reason,” what follows are two examples that address *stasis* of harm and *stasis* of justice, respectively.

1419a 26. Σοφοκλῆς [*Sophoklês*] (Sophocles): This Sophocles is the statesman and orator who was one of the ten “involved in the oligarchic revolution of 411 BC, not the dramatist,” also mentioned in 1.14.3 (Kennedy 248n213). Interrogation in his trial illustrates how

context can reinterpret a conclusion in one's favor, in his case regarding the *stasis* of harm since circumstances constrained options for choosing what was advantageous regarding governance for the city-state of Athens.

1419a 31. ὁ Λάκων [*ho Lakôn*] (the Spartan): This Spartan served in the administrative office of ephor, whose trial illustrates interrogation regarding the *stasis* of justice. When rendering an account for his term of duty, he claimed that he acted not on bribery as others, but on principle (*gnômê*) (cf. Cope 3:215; *Pol* 2.9, 1270b10).

1419a 36. μετὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα [*meta to symperasma*] (after drawing a conclusion): This “conclusion” is different from the opponent's conclusion because one has stated the reason for one's action, thus reinterpreting the opponent's conclusion to draw one's own conclusion. In the phrase, *meta*, followed by the accusative case, refers to sequence, such as what is “after, next” in time. After reinterpreting the situation and drawing one's conclusion, Aristotle advises suspending further speech or questions.

1419b 1-2. τὸ πολὺ περιῆ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς [*to polu periê tou alêthous*] (the balance of truth): The phrase is idiomatic meaning “the balance of truth is unmistakable in our favour” (Freese), but the phrase suggests degree of force, magnitude, and worth: “preponderance [of evidence] for the truth” or “the multitude [of proofs] about the truth.” What is notable is that Aristotle assumes his immediate audience is just, having the truth on their side and in their favor. Aristotle always assumes a just and wise orator (cf. 1.1.12; Grimaldi 1:25-28).

18.7. περὶ δὲ τῶν γελοίων, ἐπειδὴ τινα δοκεῖ χρῆσιν ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι, καὶ δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθεῖρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι τὸν δὲ γέλωτα σπουδῇ, ὀρθῶς λέγων, εἴρηται πόσα εἶδη γελοίων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀρμόττει ἐλευθέρῳ τὸ δ' οὐ. ὅπως οὖν τὸ ἀρμόττον αὐτῷ λήψεται. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖ τὸ γελοῖον, ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἐτέρου.

18.7. As for humor, since it seems to have some use in debate and Gorgias rightly said that one should spoil the opponents' seriousness with laughter and their laughter with seriousness, the number of forms of humor have been stated in the *Poetics*, of which some are appropriate for a gentleman to use and some not. Each speaker will take up what suits him. Mockery [*eirôneia*] is more gentlemanly than buffoonery [*bômolokhia*]; for the mocker makes a joke for his own amusement, the buffoon for the amusement of others.

1419b 3. δεῖν εἶπε Γοργίας [*dein ephê Gorgias*] (Gorgias rightly said): Affirming the use of humor (*geloios*) and laughter (*gelôs*) in debate (*agôn*) generally, and most likely in all species of rhetoric, Aristotle quotes a statement by Gorgias to establish the principal function of humor: "to spoil the opponents' *spoudê*," meaning seriousness or earnestness of attention (LSJ 1630), and conversely the use of seriousness to spoil "their laughter." The infinitive "to spoil [*diaphtheirein*]" has the basic meaning of "destroy utterly," such as the cause or effect of seriousness or mirth (LSJ 418). Whichever kind of humor one uses, the function of humor in debate is to run interference and confound the opponent's arguments. Cicero affirms a similar role for *ridiculum* in *De Oratore* (2.58.236; cf. Quintilian 6.3.22-112).

1419b 5. εἶδη γελοίων [*eidê geloiôn*] (forms of humor): For a full discussion of species of humor, Aristotle refers to the now-lost second book of *Poetics*, wherein he discusses the number and forms of humor as an element of dramatic comedy (cf. *Poet* 1.11.29). Of the available species of humor, speakers choose that which is appropriate (*harmotton*) to their character. Two types serve contrastive illustration: *eirôneia* (understatement, subtle mockery, deceptive irony) and *bômolochia* (ribaldry, buffoonery, coarse jesting). Aristotle contrasts the two modes of humor according to their intended effect and indicative character: the mocker makes a joke for his own sake, characteristic of an *eleutheros* (a free, liberal, educated person), while the buffoon (*ho bômolochos*) uses humor for the sake, or at the expense, of others,

indicative of coarse character.²¹⁵ The former attracts attention to irony of situation, ridiculing some apparent contradiction, while the latter ridicules character, often appealing to cultural prejudices. The object of verbal irony and jesting is to confound the opponent's process of argumentation. For Aristotle, irony is close to a rhetorical figure, the form of which is praising by blaming and blaming by praising (*ERC* 355, s.v. "Irony"; cf. discussion on verbal irony at 3.11.6). Aristotle associates species of humor with species of character since humor expresses character and, as such, humor communities that share the same sense and style of humor. Humor becomes problematic when speakers assume wrongly that others belong consubstantially to their humor community, thus asking audiences to appreciate and endorse with their laughter the values and tastes that inform the speakers' humor.²¹⁶

²¹⁵ Plato regards *eleutheros* as "liberality," being the virtue of a free person (cf. also *EN* 4.1-2 and *Rhet* 1.9.10).

²¹⁶ Cf. Wayne C. Booth, "The Pleasures and Pitfalls of Irony: Or, Why Don't You Say What You Mean?" *Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration*. Ed. Don M. Burks. W. Lafayette: Purdue UP, 1978. 1-13; cf. also Booth, *A Rhetoric of Irony*, 1975.

CHAPTER 19

TAXIS: EPILOGUE

OUTLINE

INTRODUCTION

- 19.1 Four objectives of epilogue (1419b 10–1419b 13)

DEVELOPMENT

- 19.1. Characterization (1419b 14–1419b 19)
 19.2. Amplification or diminution (1419b 19–1419b 24)
 19.3. Emotional response (1419b 24–1419b 28)
 19.4. Recapitulation (1419b 28–1419b 32)
 19.5-6. Form of epilogue (1419b33–1420b 3)

TEXT AND COMMENTS

19.1. ὁ δ' ἐπίλογος σύγκειται ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ τε τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσαι εὖ τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον φαύλως, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ αὐξῆσαι καὶ ταπεινώσαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστήσαι, καὶ ἐξ ἀναμνήσεως. πέφυκε γὰρ μετὰ τὸ ἀποδείξει αὐτὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον ψευδῆ, οὕτω τὸ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ ἐπιχαλκεύειν. δυοῖν δὲ θατέρου δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς, ὁ δ' ὅτι κακὸς τούτοις ἢ ὅτι ἀπλῶς. ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ τοιούτους κατασκευάζειν [δεῖ], εἴρηνται οἱ τόποι [πόθεν σπουδαίους δεῖ κατασκευάζειν καὶ φαύλους].

19.1. The epilogue is made up of four things: disposing the hearer favorably toward the speaker and unfavorably toward the opponent; amplifying and minimizing; moving the hearer into emotional reactions [*pathê*]; and [giving] a reminder [of the chief points in the argument]. After he has shown himself to be truthful and his opponent false, the natural thing is [for a speaker] to praise and blame and drive home the point. One should aim at showing one or the other of two things: either that the speaker is a good man in terms of the issues or that he is good generally; or either that the opponent is a bad man in terms of the issues or that his is bad generally. The topics from which such characterizations are derived have been discussed [in Book 1, chapter 9].

1419b 10. ἐπίλογος [*epilogos*] (epilogue): The epilogue, or conclusion, is a rhetorical requirement, not a logical necessity, useful for coherence, emphasis, and memory in a concise form, thus creating a sense of recency (cf. 3.13.3-4). Kennedy comments on the term: “*Epilogos*

simply means a *logos* that is added on (*epi*). The Latin is *peroratio*” (248). The *epi* prefix signifies what is “added on” in several senses, in terms of quantity, purpose, and emphasis (LSJ 621). These connotations suggest the general function of epilogue which “conclusion” and “summation” do not quite suggest. Aristotle discusses epilogue according to four functions: characterization (§1), amplification (§2), emotional response (§3), and recapitulation as a reminder of the chief proofs of an argument (§4). He then discusses the form of epilogue, how to begin, proceed, and conclude (§§5-6). The fourfold function of epilogue is not a delimitation of subdivisions; though they may occur successively, the objectives are usually interwoven in the process of recapitulation and reminding an audience of the chief points of an argument. In introducing *taxis*, Aristotle summarizes the function of epilogue with the term “reminds” (*anamimnêskô*), emphasizing that the epilogue is not for demonstration but primarily for emphasis and recollection of what has previously been demonstrated in the proof (3.13.4, 1414b12). According to Enos, “The epilogue is all about recency, just as the prologue is all about primacy,” suggesting the significance of time, tense, and memory (“Classical Rhetoric”). While epilogue performs specific rhetorical functions, epilogue is just as much an audience expectation: “The artistic need for an epilogue is characteristic of Western speech, Western literature, and Western music, carried to its fullest formal development in traditional perorations and in the concluding sections of the sonata form” (Kennedy, “Hoot” 17). As Aristotle recognizes, epilogue has no logical function but serves important rhetorical and artistic expectations in Greek and Western cultures generally, which desire coherence and closure.

1419b 11. κατασκευόσσι εὔ [*kataskeusasai eu*] (disposing favorably): The first function of an epilogue is that of rendering the audience as favorably disposed toward the speaker and unfavorably toward the opponent. The verb *kataskeuzô* means to “construct” a positive

argument, “furnish” a “frame” of understanding so as to “represent” or “make” a characterization (LSJ 911). Representation of character is accomplished by showing (*apodeixai*) the speaker to be truthful (*alêthê*) and the opponent false (*pseudê*). In particular, Aristotle advises one of four possible characterizations: positively, showing that the speaker is good (*agathos*) regarding the issues or simply (*haplôs*) a good person; negatively, showing that the opponent is bad (*kakos*) regarding the issues or simply (*haplôs*) a bad person. The focus of characterization is sincerity or insincerity of speech or nature, while the purpose is to prepare the audience to trust the speaker and believe the speaker’s argument, and the opposite for the opponent. The speaker should refrain from both negative and positive characterizations, lest the art appear contrived and thus insincere (cf. discussion on hiding art at 3.2.4-5).

1419b 18. οἱ τόποι [*hoi topoi*] (the topics): The reference is to Book 1, chapter 9, where Aristotle discusses topics of *êthos* under four headings: “virtue [*aretê*] and vice [*kakia*] and honorable [*kalon*] and shameful [*aischron*],” from which are derived portrayals of ethical character (1.9.1). Kennedy comments: “All [four terms] carry an implication of what is or is not ‘fine, seemly,’” for the terms throughout 1.9 concern characterization appealing to popular social values (75n160). Rhetorical usage of popular values is pragmatic and necessary since audiences make judgments based on representations. Not suggesting insincere portrayal, Aristotle assumes of his audience virtuous intent and for this reason finds legitimacy in pragmatic means to achieve just ends when arguing before a popular audience. Kennedy remarks: “That a speaker can be allowed a certain amount of cleverness in obtaining legitimate ends, given the unsophisticated nature of popular audiences, is an assumption of traditional rhetoric” (cf. Quintilian 12.1.36-45). Aristotle finds much coherence between popular and philosophical values: “though often consistent with his discussions of moral values in his ethical treatises, they are here couched in

popular form (as more appropriate for rhetoric) and as a whole place somewhat greater emphasis on social and financial success than on intellectual and moral values he himself elsewhere stresses as the most worth attaining” (Kennedy 75). Since Aristotle views reputable, received opinions (*endoxa*) and popular opinions (*doxa*) as having some consistency, he is able to explain the coherence and differences between philosophical and popular views of practical knowledge, an insight particularly useful when creating rhetorical characterization (cf. discussion of *doxa* and *endoxa* at 3.1.5, 1404a 2; also cf. Grimaldi 2:356 and Haskins 23-26).

19.2. τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο δεδειγμένων ἤδη, αὐξεῖν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ταπεινοῦν· δεῖ γὰρ τὰ πεπραγμένα ὁμολογεῖσθαι, εἰ μέλλει τὸ ποσὸν ἐρεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῶν σωμάτων αὐξησις ἐκ προὔπαρχόντων ἐστίν. ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ αὐξεῖν καὶ ταπεινοῦν, ἔκκεινται οἱ τόποι πρότερον.

19.2. After this, in natural order, is the amplification or diminution [of the importance] of what has already been shown [in the proof]; for what has been done should be agreed upon before talking about its importance. Similarly, the growth of bodies comes from the preexistent. The topics which should be used for amplification and diminution have previously been laid out.

1419b 20. αὐξεῖν [*auxein*] (amplification): The second purpose of epilogue is “to amplify [*auxein*]” or “to diminish [*tateinoun*]” what already “has been demonstrated [*dedeigmenôn*]” in the proof regarding the speaker’s and the opponent’s respective arguments. Amplification is part of the epilogue, coming in “natural order [*physin*]” after the proof, because the subject-matter, facts, and proofs (*pragmata*) of the case need to be explained and agreed upon before one can emphasize their importance for an audience. Thus, the primary function of epilogue is emphasis and recollection by means of recapitulating the important points of the argument. For the topics on how to amplify and diminish importance, Aristotle refers his students to Book 2, chapter 19, concerning degrees of magnitude (2.19.26-27).

1419b 22-23. ἐκ προὔπαρχόντων [*ek prouparchontôn*] (from the preexistent): Like amplification (*auxêsis*) in arrangement, “the growth of bodies [*sômatôn auxêsis*]” comes from

what came before, the preexistent. The natural analogy emphasizes the functional principles of cohesion and coherence which are so important for both syntax and *taxis*.²¹⁷ Aristotle emphasizes these principles by repeating frequently *physis*, meaning “natural order.” As opposed to the static formulas of the sophists, Aristotle frames his theory of *taxis* on dynamic natural analogy, establishing a mimetic, functional basis (cf. 3.13.3-5). The analogies from *physis*, like “growth of bodies,” imply a concept for which Aristotle coined the term *entelecheia* (entelechy), signifying natural processes of development according to a dynamic, goal-orienting principle. Derived from three roots, *en* (within), *telos* (end, purpose), and *echein* (to have), *entelecheia* describes the vital relationship among form (*eidos*), action (*energeia*), and purpose (*telos*) in nature and in the arts. In one sense, *entelecheia* is the formalization of the *panta rhei* philosophy of Heraclitus, which had become part of Greek cultural wisdom.²¹⁸ Aristotle’s coinage is often translated as actualization, fulfillment, or the principle of perfection (cf. Burke, *Grammar of Motives* 249-62). Kennedy comments: “Aristotle regarded politics, poetry, rhetoric, etc., as developing analogously with biological organisms; their matter and form have potential to be actualized” (249n216). *Entelecheia* informs the totality of Aristotle’s theory of the arts, as Richard E. Hughes observes: “The literal *life-ness* of the arts, and particularly the language arts,

²¹⁷ Joseph Williams emphasizes the same point, quoting Thomas de Quincy: “The two capital secrets in the art of prose composition are these: first, the philosophy of transition and connection; or the art by which one step in an evolution of thought is made to arise out of another: all fluent and effective composition depends on the connections; secondly, the way in which sentences are made to modify each other; for the most powerful effects in written eloquence arise out of this reverberation, as it were, from each other in a rapid succession of sentences” (*Style* 74). The quotation is from de Quincy’s *Memorials and Other Papers* (vol. 1).

²¹⁸ In *Cratylus*, Plato quotes the “ancient wisdom” of Heraclitus, also spoken by Homer: “Heraclitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream.” λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι “πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει,” καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῆ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς “δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης” (402a; cf. 401d). Referenced often by Greek authors, the “wise saying [*sopha legonta*]” of Heraclitus became Greek wisdom.

is the heart of Aristotle’s rhetoric” (38). From heuristics to arrangement, *entelecheia* gives Aristotelian rhetoric its dynamic forms and vital functions that always adjust to the situation; because this principle is mimetic, derived from natural analogy, audiences tend to find Aristotelian rhetoric both insightful and commonsensical, in theory and practice (cf. 3.11.2).

19.3. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, δῆλων ὄντων καὶ οἷα καὶ ἡλίκα, εἰς τὰ πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροατὴν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ἔλεος καὶ δεινῶσις καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ μῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις. εἴρηνται δὲ καὶ τούτων οἱ τόποι πρότερον.

19.3. After this, when the nature and importance [of the facts] are clear, lead the hearer into emotional reactions. These are pity and indignation and anger and hatred and envy and emulation and strife. Their topics have also been mentioned earlier.

1419b 25. εἰς τὰ πάθη ἄγειν [*eis ta pathê agein*] (lead into emotional reactions): The third function of epilogue is to create emotional response in the audience. While facts may persuade, facts alone do not move an audience to response, such as creating attitudes and actions based on information. The phrase is literally glossed “to lead into the feelings” from which arise emotional response (LSJ 1285, s.v. *pathêma*). Emotional responses include “pity [*eleos*] and indignation [*deinôsis*] and anger [*orgê*] and hatred [*misos*] and envy [*phthonos*] and emulation [*zêlos*] and strife [*eris*].” For *topoi of pathos*, Aristotle refers to Book 2, chapters 2 to 11, regarding his systematic treatment of human psychology. In those chapters, Aristotle divides his discussion of *pathos* according to his theory of “four causes,” considering the functional definition of each emotion, the reason for the emotion, the state of mind of the person, and the effect on the person toward whom the emotion is directed (Kennedy 114; cf. Grimaldi 2:19 ff.).

The strong verb *agein* (to lead) is a probable allusion to Plato’s and Gorgias’s definition of rhetoric as *psychagôgia*, metaphorically “leading souls” to persuasion. For Plato, the metaphor is a denigrating construal associating rhetoric exclusively with emotional reaction, but it is the high art of human leadership for Gorgias who associates the term with rational and emotional

response (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 271d; Murphy and Katula 41; Grimaldi, *Studies* 38). For Aristotle, the task “to lead the hearer into the feelings ” is a proper function of epilogue. Emotional appeal based in ignorance is manipulative and fraudulent, but emotion based in represented facts is appropriate response. If a proper place and timing exists for emotion, that place is the epilogue.

19.4. ὥστε λοιπὸν ἀναμνήσαι τὰ προειρημένα. τοῦτο δὲ ἀρμόττει ποιεῖν οὕτως ὥσπερ φασὶν ἐν τοῖς προοιμίοις, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγοντες· ἵνα γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ἦ, κελεύουσι πολλάκις εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν δεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ λανθάνῃ περὶ οὗ ἡ κρίσις, ἐνταῦθα δὲ δι' ὧν δέδεικται κεφαλαιωδῶς.

19.4. What remains, then, is to remind the audience of what has been said earlier. This may be fittingly done in the way that [writers of rhetorical handbooks] wrongly speak in discussing prooemia. They require that points be made several times in order to be easily learned. In the prooemion it is right to identify the subject, in order that the question to be judged not escape notice, but in the epilogue one should speak in recapitulation of what has been shown.

1419a 28. ἀναμνήσαι [*anamnêσαι*] (to remind): The fourth and final function of epilogue is to remind the audience by recalling in summary form what has been demonstrated earlier in the proofs. *Recapitulation* is the term for this process, meaning a restatement of the capital heads or chief points of an argument. Recapitulation derives from Latin *recapitulatio*, which is a translation of the Greek *anakephalaiosis* (*ana-kephala* means “new head”), and describes the process of restating the capital headings of a previously stated argument. Aristotle places *kephalaiôdôs* last in statement to emphasize the process of recapitulation.

1419b 30. εὐμαθῆ [*eumathê*] (easily learned): Continuing the polemic with sophistic theories of *taxis* (begun in 3.13.3), Aristotle agrees with the advice that the main points of an argument need to be repeated for easy learning, but he reverses the placement. Rather than the introduction, the part of speech fitting (*harmottei*) for repetition is the epilogue through the fourfold process of characterization, amplification, emotional response, and recapitulation.

19.5. ἀρχὴ δὲ, διότι ἂν ὑπέσχετο ἀποδέδωκεν· ὥστε ἅ τε καὶ δι' ὃ λεκτέον. λέγεται δὲ ἐξ ἀντιπαραβολῆς τοῦ ἐναντίου. παραβάλλειν δὲ [ἦ] ὅσα περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄμφω εἶπον, ἢ [μὴ] καταντικρῦ· “ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν τάδε περὶ τοῦδε, ἐγὼ δὲ ταδί, [1420a] καὶ διὰ ταῦτα.” ἢ ἐξ

εἰρωνείας, οἷον “οὗτος γὰρ τάδ’ εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε. καὶ τὶ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί;” ἢ ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως· “τί οὐ δέδεικται;” ἢ “οὗτος τί ἔδειξεν;” ἢ δὴ οὕτως [ἢ] ἐκ παραβολῆς, ἢ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ἐλέχθη, [1420b] οὕτως τὰ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν, ἐὰν βούλη, χωρὶς τὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου λόγου.

19.5. The starting point [of the epilogue] is to claim that one has performed what was promised, so there should be mention of what these things are and why. The discussion is [sometimes] derived from comparison with the case for the opponent. Compare what both have said on the same subject: “But he says this about that, while I say this and for these reasons.” [1420a] Or use mockery: “He says this, I that. And what would he have done if he had shown this but not that?” Or use interrogation: “What has not been shown?” or “What did he show?” Either do this by comparison or in the natural order as the statements were made, [1420b] first one’s own and again, if you want it, the opponent’s claim separately.

1419b 33. ἀρχὴ [*archê*] (the starting point): After discussing the fourfold function of epilogue, the discussion turns to successfully starting, creating (§5), and ending (§6) the epilogue. Aristotle offers sound advice: “The starting point is to claim that one has performed what was promised” (e.g., “I have demonstrated my innocence; I have shown you his culpability; I have proved the folly of my opponent’s policy and the advantage of my advice”). Since in the proof a speaker has stated and argued for the thesis and against the antithesis, in the epilogue a speaker should assert that the proof has been provided.

1419b 34. ἀντιπαραβολῆς [*antiparabolês*] (comparison with the [opposing] case): *Antiparabolê* is a methodology for creating a successful epilogue; the term means comparison of opposite views, often by point-against-point comparison (*parabolê*) or refutation (*elenchos*) in order to highlight contradiction and the strength of one case over against the opposing case. After the initial assertion that “one has performed what was promised,” Aristotle mentions three common methods of *antiparabolê*: first, by comparing (*paraballein*) arguments (“he says, I say”) plus restating the speaker’s reasons; second, by comparing arguments (“he says this, but I that”) plus asserting *eirônias*, often in an ironical question meant to show contradiction in the opposing case; third, by using questions (*erôtêseôs*), meaning rhetorical questions for

emphasizing the strength of the speaker's case and the weakness of the opponent's case.

Aristotle advises pursuing *antiparabolê* using some method of claim-against-claim comparison, such as repeating the “natural order [*physin*]” in which the statements were made in the proof.

19.6. τελευτῆ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἀρμόττει ἡ ἀσύνδετος, ὅπως ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος ἢ· “εἶρηκα, ἀκηκόατε, ἔχετε, κρίνατε.”

19.6. Asyndeton is appropriate for the end of the discourse, since this is an *epi-logos*, not a *logos*: “I have spoken; you have listened, you have [the case], you judge.”

1420b 2. ἡ ἀσύνδετος [*hê asyndetos*] (asyndeton): For the epilogue's end, “the most appropriate style is the asyndetic,” referring to *côla* without coordinating conjunctions. The example consists of short, rapid, parallel, asyndetic clauses. Previously, Aristotle observed, “Asyndeton thus creates amplification [*auxesis*]” (3.12.4; cf. 3.5.6 and 3.9.1). For the same reason, asyndeton is associated with *lexis agônistikê* (3.12.5). Asyndeton marks the end of many judicial epilogues, including the end of Lysias's *Against Eratosthenes*: “You have listened, you have seen, you have suffered, you have [the case]. You be the judge,” showing that Aristotle's example is an echo of a common form (Kennedy 250n220). The forceful, asyndetic parallelism rings of summation, while the repetition of “you have” makes an implied claim, namely, the speaker “has performed what was promised” and what was necessary for the judges to make a responsible judgment in favor of the speaker.

1420b 2-3. ἐπίλογος ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγος [*epilogos alla mê logos*] (an *epi-logos*, not a *logos*): Creating an enthymeme, Aristotle supports his proposition about asyndetic style with his second common topic: “from [different] grammatical forms of the same word [*ek tôn homoiôn ptôseôn*]” (2.23.2), supporting the reason with an example from a well-accepted cultural example.

1420b 3. κρίνατε [*krinate*] (you judge): The last word of the *Rhetoric* is given to the audience and concerns its judgment. Derived from *krisis*, the verb *krinate* (second person, plural, aorist, indicative, active) refers to the audience's present ability to discern and judge critically about an argument's merit with that judgment giving shape to the future (Smyth 417 [§ 1865]). In rhetorical communication, the audience has the role of *kritês* (judge and critic) so that persuasion is an adjudication of audience, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca emphasize: “*it is in terms of an audience that an argumentation develops*” (*New Rhetoric* 5). Aristotle highlights the role of audience as *kritês* at either end of *Rhetoric* III, creating an *inclusio* for reminder and emphasis (cf. 3.1.1; 1.3.2). In the realm of rhetoric, audience rules: evaluating the merit of each case, either past facts, future policies, or present propriety, so that the last word is the audience's judgment.

CONCLUSION:

INTERACTIVE RHETORIC

How does one interpret the *Rhetoric* as Aristotle might have taught the *Art* at his Lyceum in Athens? While one cannot be certain, an interpreter can follow some sound principles which should bring readers to a better understanding of Aristotle's text and theory. Moreover, an interpreter's principles and assumptions should be made clear so that they may be evaluated along with the discoveries. This new commentary has sought to follow a rhetorical methodology that derives from the *Rhetoric*, including three interrelated methods: first, applying the hermeneutical principles that William M.A. Grimaldi has explicated in his *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1972); second, avoiding the traditional tendency to interpose a Platonic idiom of philosophical pairs and hierarchies; third, recognizing that the *Rhetoric* has a rhetoric since its writer practices the very theory that he teaches. These three principles guide this commentary and, it is hoped, offer a better, more originary, more Aristotelian reading of *Rhetoric* III than previously afforded. While these principles are evident throughout the commentary, what follows highlights the relationship between methodology and discovery, focusing on the interactive rhetorical relations among style and thought (*lexis-dianoia*), style and logic (*lexis-logikê*), arrangement and thought (*taxis-dianoia*), and ultimately practice and theory (*praxis-theôria*).

Where traditional commentators like Cope have found inseparable dichotomies among thought, style, and arrangement, the current commentary finds inseparable interactivity among these significant categories, which strongly argues for the unity of treatise and coherence of theory. One may suspect that dichotomous philosophical pairs are an unexamined assumption in many interpreters' methodology. Kennedy makes a similar observation, writing, "the central

problem with the *Rhetoric* for those who approach it philosophically is that it comes to us already ‘deconstructed,’ filled with *différance*, *supplements*, and ‘traces’” (“Responses” 244). In other words, the *Rhetoric* is devoid of major hierarchical distinctions; if they are found, they are read-in by the interpreter. Where Aristotle makes divisions, such as between the three rhetorical appeals and invention and style, the distinctions are always for purposes of analysis and arrangement, not definition or relegation. *Lexis* and *taxis* are not supplements to thought, but coextensive and interactive with thought. This issue is the difference between Plato’s rationalist rhetoric, on the one hand, and on the other, Aristotle’s rhetorical rationality, which Grimaldi calls “epistemology of the probable” (*Studies* 26).

According to Aristotle, rhetorical rationality is the basis of *technê rhêtorikê*, studied as linguistic functions of cause-and-effect relationships, but practiced as the dynamic art of communication. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle theorizes rhetorical causation in the relative equality among the rhetorical appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, and *logos*) and, as Grimaldi observes of Greek education in general, “an awareness of the intimate relation between thought and language” (*Studies* 21). Thus, among the arts of interactive rhetoric, summarized as thought (*dianoia*), style (*lexis*), and arrangement (*taxis*), one finds coextensive categories in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (2.26.5).

Relating the dynamic of *lexis-dianoia*, this commentary elucidates how *lexis* includes the inherent metaphor of *selection*, suggesting that, by the classical visual idiom, style is navigation, choosing a pathway (*hodos*) of invention in the discovery of expression (cf. 3.1.2). Given the inherent, metaphorical association of style and sense, one better perceives how aspects of style—diction, grammar, emphasis, propriety, rhythm, sound, syntax, antithesis, parallelism, metaphor, *energeia*, and various types of urbanity—“all bear closely on the conditions of intelligibility and

therefore stylistic clarity” (Halliwell, “Style and Sense” 62). For Aristotle, clarity is the first virtue of style and the culminating union of *dianoia-lexis*, leading to informed suasion.

Relating *lexis-logikê*, Aristotle develops insights about metaphor that account for its hybridity as a trope (*tropos*) and a topic (*topos*) of invention. For this reason, Newman calls Aristotle’s metaphorology “the Western intellectual tradition’s founding and most influential statement on this subject” (“Aristotle’s Notion” 1). In his study of metaphor, Aristotle defines formal categories (*Poet* 21), explores psychological processes (3.11), and examines rhetorical functions (3.10), including the fact that metaphor enables logical inference, rendering it equivalent to an elliptical, stylistic syllogism (cf. 3.10.2, 1410b13). Relating form, function, and meaning, Aristotle asserts, “metaphor most brings about learning” (3.10.2). Aristotle not only develops a theory of cognitive metaphor but also illustrates metaphorical rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*, wherein all key terms are metaphors from analogy (including *metaphor* itself), producing quick, clear understanding and, thus, pleasant learning with suasion (cf. 1.1.1, 1.2.1, 3.2.1, 3.14.1). Instead of rationalist rhetoric, exemplified by Plato’s philosophical pairs, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* exemplifies a rhetorical rationality of interactive *lexis-logikê* from beginning to end.

Relating *taxis-dianoia*, Aristotle treats arrangement not as static formulae as do the sophists (3.13.3) but according to topical procedures of invention. Distinct from common and material topics, the localized topics of *taxis*, called both “sources” and “topics,” function as responsive heuristics within the divisions of a discourse, enabling a rhetor to suit the composition to the situation and meet the particular needs of responsive, dialogic argumentation. Aristotle’s topical treatment of *taxis* shows how coextensive *taxis-dianoia* interact, for which reason Aristotle considers arrangement not a formula but a faculty of mind (*dynamis*) and, thus, an art of rhetoric.

These three examples illustrate broad, categorical interactivity among invention, style, and arrangement and, moreover, show close correlation of theory and practice (*theôria-praxis*). Since rhetoric is “the systematization of natural eloquence,” the hallmark of any useful rhetorical theory is the help it provides in translating into practice what was translated from practice (Vickers 1). Recently, the *Rhetoric* has been the focus of theory-practice debates. Poster, for instance, argues that feminists should reject the *Rhetoric* because it exemplifies a bias against pedagogy that, in turn, works against women in academia (“(Re)positioning Pedagogy” 327 ff.). Lunsford and Ede, however, come to the opposite conclusion: the *Rhetoric* should be the foundation stone of rhetoric and writing studies: “If we see Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* as a work which unites rhetor and audience, language and action, theory and practice, then we have a model for our own *antistrophos*” (“On Distinctions” 49). Lunsford and Ede note that the *Rhetoric* is revolutionary and valuable because “it establishes rhetoric as an art and relates it clearly to all fields of knowledge. Despite the efforts of modern rhetoricians, we lack any such systematic theory to inform current practice” (48). The debaters both recognize the quality of the *Rhetoric*, which Aristotle addresses implicitly to his students and has used as a handbook for his “afternoon” lectures on rhetoric (Kennedy 5).

What is often at issue in pedagogy is the interactivity of *praxis-theôria*. In this regard, readers may rightly observe that all of Aristotle’s practical categories are interactive in a coherent, unified theory. Further, that Aristotle practices what he teaches, writing the *Rhetoric* as rhetoric, not only helps readers approach his theory as practice but also nearly disintegrates the practice-theory hierarchy in the process. An accurate, accessible, and rhetorical interpretation of Aristotle’s handbook should afford a better perception of its interactive character, including the practice-theory integration of the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric*.

GLOSSARY OF GREEK TERMS IN *RHETORIC* III

Greek terms are alphabetized according to the twenty-four letters of the Greek alphabet. For convenience, the Greek letters are listed along with their traditional transliteration in English letters, giving an approximate phonetic value for Greek in the classical period.²¹⁹

α β γ δ ε ζ η θ ι κ λ μ ν ξ ο π ρ σ/ς τ υ φ χ ψ ω
a b g/n d e z ê th i k l m n x o p r s t u/y ph ch ps ô

The glossary uses traditional English transliteration that represents Reconstructed Classical Pronunciation. Accordingly, long ê represents eta (η), long ô represents omega (ω), and y or u represents upsilon (υ pronounced as German *ü*). Where Latin writers used the letter *c* to represent Greek kappa (κ), I follow standard modern practices by using *k* for kappa and *ch* for chi (χ as in Scottish *loch*) to maintain the distinction. Greek has no letter *h*; instead Greek applies a rough breathing or aspiration mark, a ‘ placed over the first vowel or diphthong in a word, which adds an “h” sound. Words that begin with a rho (ρ) or upsilon (υ) also take a rough breathing mark: ϱ́ [rh] and ύ [hy]. For instance, ύπερ [hyper] is pronounced “huper.” The smooth breathing mark, a ’ placed over the first vowel or diphthong, is unpronounced. Readers should also note that gamma (γ) usually has a hard “g” sound as in “go,” but gamma can sometimes have a nasal “n” sound when it is immediately followed by other velar stops (γ, κ, ξ or χ). This is the case with ἐλεγχος [elenchos], the term for refutation as well as the Socratic Method. Parts of speech are indicated according to standard abbreviations. For nouns, since the definite article is omitted, grammatical gender is indicated by *m.*, *f.*, or *n.* Thus, *m.* refers to masculine, *f.* to feminine, and *n.* to neuter gender in respective nouns. Finally, English-language derivatives are included [in brackets] for the sake of association, unless already part of the definition.

²¹⁹ Traditional transliteration is found in H.W. Smyth’s *Greek Grammar* (p. 7), *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th ed. (p. 436), and other authorities on classical Greek.

A.

ἀγαθός [agathos] (adj.): *good, beneficial, serviceable; morally good*. With reference to *agathos* but especially *kalon*, also meaning good, it was a peculiarity of ancient Greek culture that “ancient Greeks could not dissociate between the good and the beautiful” (Enos, “Classical Rhetoric”; cf. Kennedy 75n160). In an ideal-aesthetic sense, what was good was perceived as beautiful and vice-versa. (1417a26; 1419b17) [Agatha]

ἀγών [agôn] (m.): *contest, struggle, debate, or main argument*. (1414a13; 1416a32; 1419b3) [agonistic] (See λέξις ἀγώνιστική [lexis agônistikê] for oral, debating style of rhetoric.)

ἀίνιγμα [ainigma] (n.): *riddle, dark saying, enigma; indirect image*. (1415b1) [enigma]

αἰτία [aitia] (f.): *reason, cause*; used also of Aristotle’s “four causes” (*Phys* 194b16 and *Met* 983a26). As a legal term, *charge, cause for complaint, accusation* (1417a28, 34; 1417b17, 34; 1419a26) [aetiology or etiology]

ἀκρίβεια [akribeia] (f.): *accuracy, exactness, precision* generally (1414a16). The adjective ἀκριβής (*akribês*) is used in rhetoric to indicate an *accurate* or *closely reasoned style of discourse*; also *nicely finished, highly correct*. (1408b31; 1413b9, 13; 1414a9; 1418b1)

ἀμφισβήτησις [amphisbêtêsis] (f.): *dispute, controversy* generally; *the question at issue* at the heart of a debate (see comments at 3.17). This concept renders Aristotle’s pre-*stasis* theory of rhetorical invention; at 3.17.1 he states his four *stasis* questions: fact, harm, importance, and justice. (1416a9; 1417a8; 1417b22 +)

ἀναλογία [analogia] or ἀνάλογον [analogon] (n.): *analogy, explicit comparison; proportion or ratio* (in geometry). Aristotle defines analogy in the *Nicomachean Ethics*: “*analogia* is an equality of ratios containing at least four terms,” as A is to B, so C is to D, which he further explains: “as the first term is to the second, so is the third to the fourth; and hence,

- by alternation, as the first is to the third, so is the second to the fourth” (*EN* 5.3.8-12, 1131a). Analogy is a composite concept ruled by ratio or equity; metaphor from analogy is a species of metaphor; see μεταφορά (*metaphora*). (1405a11; 1406b31; 1407a14; 1408a8, 11, 12; 1408b4; 1411b22; 1412b34)
- ἀναμιμνήσκειν [*anamimnêskein*] (v.): *remind, recall to mind, recall to memory*, implying the recall is easily done (LSJ 113); cf. synonym μνημονεύειν [*mnêmonēuein*], remember). The purpose of epilogue is to remind an audience of what has been demonstrated (3.13.4). (1414b12; 1416b26; 1417b14; 1419b13, 28) [*anamnesis, reminiscence*]
- ἀντίδοσις [*antidosis*] (f.): *exchange of property or legal penalty; given in lieu of, in return for; remedy*. (1416a29); Isocrates, *Antidosis* (1418b27) [*antidote*]
- ἀντίθεσις [*antithesis*] (f.): *antithesis, opposition, contrast, counter-proposition; opposition of words, phrases, or propositions (in logic)*. Aristotle’s favored style of syntax since antithesis is an effectively lucid method of explanation allowing quick learning; the term occurs only in Book 3 (see 3.9.9; 3.10.7; 3.11.10). Antithesis is characteristic of the prose style of Gorgias: “Helen was not a sinner, but a sufferer” (*Encomium on Helen* 7). (1410a22; 1410b1, 36; 1411b1; 1412b31)
- ἀντιπαραβολή [*antiparabolê*] (f.): *reply by comparison or contrast; the method of replying with a point-against-point comparison or refutation*. The term occurs only in Book 3 and is related to παραβολή [*parabolê*], meaning “comparison” generally; rather than synonyms, ἀντιπαραβολή [*antiparabolê*] is a restricted subspecies of the general term. The two terms appear in proximity in 3.19.5. (1414b2, 10; 1419b34)
- ἀποδείκτικός [*apodeiktikos*] (adj.): *demonstrative, affording proof, logically valid*. (1414b1; 1417b21; 1418a38) [*apodictic*]

ἀπόδειξις [*apodeixis*] (f.): *logical demonstration by syllogism* (cf. *Top* 1); in rhetoric the term means *demonstration, rational discourse*, or treating in a *valid manner* the sources of evidence (*pragma*) as well as *êthos* and *pathos* relevant to the subject-matter of practical reason (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 148). (1414a36; 1417b23, 24, 33; 1418a4, 17, 26, 38)
[*indicate*]

ἀπολογεῖσθαι [*apologeisthai*] (v.): *tell an account, long story, fable, apologue, allegory* (not *apologia*, which is a speech in defense). (1415a28; 1417a7)

ἀποπλάνησις [*apoplanêsis*] (f.): *digression, wandering from the subject, diverting attention* from what is unfavorable to one's case; *lead astray, wander from the truth*. (1414b17)
[*planet*]

ἀρετή [*aretê*] (f.): *excellence of any kind; virtue, valor; qualities of human and esp. moral excellence that produce leaders* (*EN* 1102a6, 1106a15; *Pol* 1295a37; Plato, *Apology* 18a); the “*virtue of style*” in rhetoric and poetics. (1404a22; 1404b2, 37; 1414a21; 1414b34; 1417a3) See λέξεος ἀρχή [*lexeos aretê*] for Aristotle's “*virtue of style*.”

ἁρμονία [*harmonia*] (f.): *pitch or intonation of the voice; accent; change of pitch* (in music); *union, method of joining* generally. (1403b31; 1408b33) [*harmony*]

ἁρμόττειν [*harmottein*] (v.): *accommodate, adapt in a fitting manner; suit to the subject or situation* (verbal synonym for *prepon*). (1404b13; 1407a25, b19; 1408a26, b7, 11, 19; 1409a12; 1413b3; 1414a25; 1418b1; 1419b6; 1420b2)

ἁρμόττον [*harmotton*] (n.): *suitableness, fittingness, harmonious adaption* (synonym for *prepon*). (1419b7) [*harmony*]

ἀρχή [*archê*] (f.): *beginning, origin, starting point; first principle* of knowledge and an art (*technê*); *first cause; rule, authority; ruler, originator*. (1407a19; 1407b16; 1409a11, 12,

36; 1410a 25 +; 1412b4, 6; 1414b19; 1415a15, b11; 1418b31; 1419b33) [prefix *arch-* and suffix *-archy* in numerous words]

ἀστειῖος [*asteios*] (n.), frequently pl. ἀστειῖα [*asteia*]: *urbanity, elegant language, refined taste; wit, liveliness; well-formed*. Derived from *astu*, the term literally means “of the town” or “town-bred,” and by implication, “good taste, polite, elegance”; used in rhetoric as a descriptor or modifier of language. As a noun, Stanford states, “the Aristotelian concept of Neatness—ἀστειότης [*asteiotês*]—a pleasing quality of small and compact things,” moves Aristotle to prefer metaphor over simile (*Greek Metaphor* 40). The term is used only in Book 3. (1410b7, 16; 1411b 21; 1412a18, 22; 1412b2, 3, 27, 28; 1413a18)

ἀσύνδετον [*asyndeton*] (n.): *asyndeton; without conjunctions (but not without connection) in a series of coordinate words or phrases: i.e., A, B, C, etc. rather than A and B and C, etc. (the latter is πολλῶν σύνδεσμοι [*polloi syndesmoi*]). Later rhetoricians considered *asyndeton* and *polysyndeton* figures of style involving either absence or abundance of conjunctions. The term is used only in Book 3 (3.6.6; 3.12.2; 3.19.6). (1407b38; 1413b19, 29, 31; 1420b2)*

αὐξήσις [*auxêsis*] (f.): *increase (literally); in rhetoric: amplification or intensification* of a statement to heighten its effect; characteristic of epideictic oratory, but used in all three species of rhetoric (its opposite is μείουσις [*meioun*] or μειότης [*meiotês*], meaning deprecation or reduction). (1413b34; 1414b10; 1417b32; 1419b22)

B.

βαστάζεσθαι [*bastazesthai*] (v.): *lift up, raise; metaphorically exult, ennoble* as popular and esteemed in public opinion (LSJ 310); referring to “those who write for the reading

public,” whose literature and distinguishing style of written composition are extremely popular and highly esteemed. (1413b12)

Γ.

γλῶττα [*glôttā*], pl. γλῶτται [*glôttai*] (γλῶσσα [*glôssa*] in non-Attic Greek) (f.): *tongue, speech, spoken language or dialect* (generally); in rhetoric, a *strange, obsolete, or foreign word* that needs explanation and which causes frigidity in style. (1404b28; 1406a7, b2; 1410b12) [*gloss*]

γνώμη [*gnômê*] (f.): *maxim, practical saying* relating to the conduct of life (Latin *sententia*).

Aristotle treats the maxim in 2.21. Freese states, “Maxims are to enthymemes as premises are to syllogisms, not in the case of every enthymeme, but only those that deal with the actions and passions of ordinary life” since maxims create common ground (473). A common Greek *gnômê* related to *prepon* is *meden agan*, “nothing too much” or “everything in moderation.” (1418a17, b34; 1419a36) [*gnomic*]

Δ.

δεικνύναι [*deiknunaî*] (f.): *demonstration, proof, exposition* (Latin *designatus*). Derived from δειξις (*deixis*) and related to *deigma* and *paradeigma* (example), the term refers to the inductive mode of proof by example. (1410b8; 1416b20, 23; 1419b20, 32; 1420a3) [*deictic, indicate*]

δειξις [*deixis*] (f.): *mode of proof* in order to demonstrate and explain (3.7.6). (1408a26, cf. *APr* 34a4) [*deictic, indicate*]

διαβολή [*diabolê*] (f.): *prejudicial attack, slanderous attack, false accusation; slander or prejudice against êthos* (LSJ 390). The related verb *diaballô* means “attack” or

- “misrepresent” a person’s argument or character (LSJ 389). How to respond to *diabolê* is treated in 3.15. (1415a27 +; 1416a4) [*diabolic*]
- διαίρεσις [*diairesis*] (f.): *division* of an argument into logical heads. Book 3 uses διαιροῦντα λόγῳ [*diairounta logô*] to mean “detailed explanation” (3.18.5), as opposed to conciseness (συντόμως [*syntomôs*]). (1409b15) [*diaeresis*]
- διαλέγεσθαι [*dialegesthai*] (f.): *teaching, information; comments or critique*. By this term Aristotle represents two modes of rhetorical teaching: the familiar, conversational, narrative aspect, and the argumentative, dialectical aspect. The term is derived from διαλέγω [*dialeghô*] which, for Academics, refers to logical dialectic (LSJ 400). (1404a27, b34) [*dialectic*]
- διάνοιᾶ [*dianoia*] (f.): *thought, understanding* often created by heuristics including metaphor; *mind, intelligence* revealed in speech and action. (1404a19; 1410b27; 1409b8; 1410b26; 1415a13) [*dianoetic*]
- διαστιῤειν [*diastizein*] (v.): *punctuate, distinguish by a mark*. (1407b13, 14)
- διατριβή [*diatribê*] (f.): *digression*. Literally, *diatribê* means “wearing away” of time, and by extension a lengthy “discourse,” or negatively “waste of time,” and in rhetoric an “occasion for dwelling on a subject” (LSJ 416). Kennedy notes: “*Diatribê* literally means ‘spending time’ on some subject, but came to mean a personal attack,” such as an abrasive tirade or philippic (244n198). (1418a27) [*diatribe*]
- διήγησις [*diêgêsis*] (f.): *narration, account; narrative statement* of the cause in an oration; literally “a leading through” the facts or events (cf. *exêgêsis* and *eisêgêsis*). *Diêgêsis* is one of the parts of a *logos*, treated in 3.16. (1414a36, 38, b13; 1416b16+; 1418a17)

διηρημένη [*diêrêmenê*] (adj.): *divided* clauses or *côla*, as distinguished from contrasted

(*antikeimenê*). Most commonly, divided clauses refer to synonymous parallelism, while contrasted clauses refer to antithetical parallelism. The latter is Aristotle's favored style of syntax because antithetical clauses create the most learning and thus pleasure (cf. 3.9.7). Freeze notes: "disjointed (of style), in which the members or clauses of a period are marked off by a connecting particle," such as a coordinating conjunction (475).

(1409b32)

διπλά ὀνόματα [*dipla onomata*] (f.): *compound words*; literally, "double names." (1404b29;

1405b35; 1406a30, 36; 1408b10) [*double*]

E.

εἶδος [*eidos*] (n.): *form, shape; species, class, kind* (a subdivision of γένος [*genos*], genus; see

discussion at 1414b15). Aristotle also uses εἶδη [*eidê*] (pl.) to mean *specific topics* of invention (as opposed to common topics; see τόπος [*topos*]). (1403b14; 1404b27;

1405a3; 1409a11; 1415b15; 1419b5) [*idea*]

εἰκῶν [*eikôn*] (f.): *simile, similitude; explicit analogy; likeness; comparison; image* (Latin *simulacrum*). While *eikôn* is the general term for simile, Aristotle restricts its usage in rhetoric because it is a poetical term (i.e., Homeric simile), which reduces its power to persuade in general discourse. (It is a mystery why εἰκῶν does not appear in the *Poetics*.)

In the *Rhetoric*, παραβολή [*parabolê*] is a second, often preferred, term for simile.

Aristotle considers *eikôn* (simile) to be a species of metaphor, metaphor with a preface, differing in form only by adding a particle of comparison (cf. 3.4.1; 3.10.3). (1406b20+;

1407a11+; 1410b16, 17; 1411b7, 9; 1412a7, b32; 1413a13) [*icon*]

εἰρωνεία [*eirôneia*] (f.): *irony, mockery, dissimulation* (i.e., feigned ignorance to provoke or confound an antagonist); *mockery* or *sarcasm* (making a joke, or comment about irony of situation, for one's own amusement). Socratic irony (mock-modesty or understatement) is part of the Socratic Method. (1408b20; 1419b7; 1420a1) [*irony*]

ἔλεγχος [*elenchos* or *elenchus*] (m.): *refutation, argument of disproof, or reproof* (in legal oratory); *logical cross-examination, scrutiny for refutation* (the central technique of the Socratic Method). In judicial rhetoric, *elenchus* refers to reproof that is true, a statement followed by proof, often implying an acknowledgment of fact on the part of the accused (cf. Demosthenes, *Adversus Androtonem* 600). Concerning *taxis*, Aristotle treats *elenchus* as a subcategory of proof (3.17.13-15). (1410a22; 1414b14; 1418b3)

ἑλληνίζειν [*hellênizein*] (n.): Greek or Hellenic language. Aristotle uses the term to mean “good grammatical Greek,” referring to pure or proper usage, grammatical correctness, and observing the conventions of the language (3.5). (1407a19; 1413b6) [*Hellene*]

ἐνδοσίμων [*endosimon*] (n.): *signal* for a race (generally); *key-note* in music (3.14.1); *key-note* of a speech (3.14.4) (LSJ 561). (1414b24; 1415a7)

ἐνέργεια [*energeia*] (f.): *motion, energy, activity; vivification, sometimes personification* (opposite of static and stationary). For an urbane style, *energeia* should modify metaphor, creating visualization (*pro ommatôn poiein*) that is not static but given motion by active verbs (cf. 3.11.1-5). Metaphors having *energeia* are stylistically superior because of their function, creating quick, pleasant learning; metaphors “in motion” activate the visual imagination. Homer's poetry illustrates metaphoric *energeia* (cf. 3.11.3-4). Aristotle often uses *energeia* as a synonym for *entelecheia*, defined as energy acting on form

- leading to *telos*: mature form and perfect function, giving Aristotelian rhetoric a generative vitalism. (1410b36; 1411b28+; 1412b32) [*energy*]
- ἐνθεον [*entheon*] (adj.): *inspired by god*. Aristotle uses the term theologically: “inspired poetry,” ἐνθεον ἡ ποίησις [*entheon hê poiêsis*] (3.7.11, 1408b19). [*enthusiasm*]
- ἐνθύμημα [*enthymêma*] (n.): *enthymeme, rhetorical syllogism* in form; often an inverted syllogism or an elliptical syllogism (i.e., proposition plus proof(s), and example, if any). Kennedy describes enthymematic form as “a statement with a supporting reason introduced by *for, because, or since* or an *if . . . then* statement” (315). Concerning form, enthymemes are deductive structures used for creating inferential conclusions about practical knowledge, not “necessarily valid” as in logical syllogisms. Concerning subject-matter, enthymemes are rhetorical because premises are drawn from logical, ethical, and emotional topics in order to create “strong arguments” by proving propositions to an audience’s satisfaction (cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 145-50). (1403a17, 24, b13; 1410b20+; 1418a1, 5+, 39, b2, b33; 1419a19)
- ἕξις [*hexis*] (n.): *acquired habit; permanent habit of mind and morals* that has been acquired through practice (πρᾶξις [*praxis*]). Aristotle develops this term in his treatise on virtue ethics (*EN* 2.1). (1408a27+)
- ἐπάνοδος [*epanodos*] (f.): *recapitulation, summary, or review* in a speech; *return, rising up* (generally). (1414b2)
- ἐπεισοδιῶν [*epeisodioun*] (n.): *accessory, addition, or episode; vary by introducing episodes* (often parenthetical for the purpose of giving pleasure, esp. in epideictic rhetoric; cf. 3.17.11); episodes in epic poems, such as the catalogue episodes in the *Iliad* (LSJ 615). (1418a33) [*episode*]

ἐπιδείκτικὴ [*epideiktikê*] (f.): literally, “fit for display”; in rhetoric, the grand style (*epideiktikê lexis*) suited for epideictic, ceremonial speeches. (1414a17; 1414b22, 28, 30; 1415a11; 1415b28; 1416b16; 1417b31; 1418a32)

ἐπιδείκτικός [*epideiktikos*] (m.): *epideictic* or *demonstrative* rhetoric; oratory of praise or blame that extols virtues and deplores vices; laudatory oration. Aristotle names three genres of rhetoric: epideictic (praise and blame), judicial (prosecution and defense), and deliberative (exhortation and dissuasion), which are respectively suited for ceremony, trial courts, and policy-making (1.3). Epideictic creates public morality through the rhetoric praise and blame. (1414a37; 1414b24; 1415a5)

ἐπίθετον [*epitheton*] (n.): *epithet*; *addition*; any characterizing word or phrase that accompanies (as a modifier) or occurs in place of (as a metonymy) a proper name, especially a person’s name. “Any strengthening, descriptive, or ornamental addition” (Freese 476). Also ἐπιθέσεις [*epithesis*], meaning “application of epithet” (LSJ 634). (1405a10; 1405b21, 22; 1406a11+; 1407b31; 1408b11) [*epithet*]

ἐπιλόγος [*epilogos*] (m.): *epilogue*, *conclusion* of a speech, *peroration* (Latin *peroratio*); *reason*, *explanation*, *subjoined sentence*. (1414b1, 4, 9, 12; 1415a29, 33; 1419b10; 1420b3) [*epilogue*]

ἐρώτησις [*erôtêsis*] (f.): *questioning*, *requesting*, *interrogation*; “a question put to the adversary, which only requires a simple affirmative or negative answer; opposed to πᾶσις [*peusis*] or πύσμα [*pysma*], which needs an explanation” (Freese 476). (1418b39; 1419a25; 1420a3)

εὐανάπνευστος [*euanapneustos*] (adj.): “easy to repeat in a breath” (LSJ); “easily uttered by the breath” (Kennedy); “easily said in a breath” (Freese). Adamik prefers “easily

utterable with regard to breath, from the point of view of breathing,” so as not to restrict the length of the period. This *eu*-adjective is a coinage of Aristotle, occurring only once, referring to the form, function, and rhythm of the period. (3.9.5, 1409b14)

εὐήθης [*euêthês*] (adj.): *simple, silly, foolish; empty, lacking force or gravity* of style in speeches; antonym: εὖογκος [*euonkos*], *weighty, important*. Term occurs only in Book 3. (1404a24; 1413b19; 1418b23)

εὐκαιρος [*eukairos*] (adj.): *well-timed, good opportunity*. Contrasting *kronos* (quantitative time, chronology) and *kairos* (qualitative time, opportunity), Mark R. Freier observes, “It is not an understatement to say that *kairos* moments alter destiny. To miscalculate *kronos* is inconvenient. To miscalculate *kairos* is lamentable” (3). While *kairos* occurs throughout the *Rhetoric*, *eukairos* is a coinage of Aristotle, occurring only twice (3.7.8 and 3.18.1). (1408a36; 1418b39)

εὖογκος [*euonkos*] (adj.): *weighty matters*, requiring an appropriately weighty style in speeches; literally “*good onkos*” wherein *onkos* means expansion or dignity (3.6); antonyms: εὐτελής [*eutelês*], *cheap, meager*; and εὐήθης [*euêthês*], *simple, silly* (LSJ 724; Freese 477). This *eu*-adjective is a coinage of Aristotle, occurring only once (3.7.2). (1408a12)

εὕρεσις [*heuresis*] (f.): *heuristic, finding, discovery, invention* (not by chance but by methodology, generated by topics of invention; Latin: *inventio*). Books 1-2 specifically concern invention, for Aristotle defines rhetoric as an art of “discovering the available means of persuasion” (1.2.1). Invention is the first of the arts of rhetoric; while the term occurs only in Book 1, it is inferred in the topical method throughout the treatise.

[*heuristic, eureka*; cf. the exclamation by Archimedes: *Eureka!*]

εὐρύθμος [*eurythmos*] (adj.): *rhythmical, well-rhythmed, harmonious movement*, according to the qualitative principles of propriety and the golden mean. The term occurs only in Book 3 (3.8.7). (1409a21, 22) [*eurhythmic*]

ἔφοδος [*ephodos*] (f.): *artful introduction in rhetoric; method of reasoning in argument; generally means approach, method of procedure*. (1411a12)

Z.

ζητεῖν [*zêtein*] (v.): *seek, search, inquire into generally; investigate, examine*, of philosophical investigation; *inquire into the question* in judicial rhetoric (LSJ 756). (1403b18; 1404a4; 1410b19, 23; 1418a9, 16)

H.

ἡδύς [*hêdus*] (adj.): *pleasure, enjoyment*, of senses or feelings, such as pleasant style or pleasure of easy learning; *simple, pleasant, or courteous*, of persons. (1404b12; 1405a8, 32; 1406a19; 1409b1; 1410a19; 1414a19+; 1415b2; 1417a7) [*hedonic, hedonism*]

ἠθικός [*êthikos*] (adj.): *ethical character; ethical style; showing or expressing character*. (1408a11, cf. 25; 1413b10; 1417a15, 21; 1418a15, 18, 38, 39)

ἦθος [*êthos*] (n.): *character, ethical character; habitual temper or disposition* (as the result of habit, ἕξις [*hexis*]). Aristotle uses the term in three different but related ways. In Book 1, *êthos* is appeal from the speaker's moral character (or the presentation of character), for Aristotle writes, "*êthos* is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion" (1.2.4) since audiences tend to trust an orator who has good sense (*phronêsis*), good character (*aretê*), and good will (*eunoia*) (2.1.5). In Book 2, *êthos* is the character and customs of an audience, to which the speaker seeks to adapt the address and his or her *êthos* (2.12-17). In Book 3, *êthos* also denotes a style of speech suited to one's knowledge of and due

regard for an audience's *êthos* (3.7.6; 3.16.8-9). (1408a31; 1413b31; 1414a21; 1417a17+; 1418b16, 24)

Θ.

θεωρεῖν [*theôrein*] (v.): *observe, see, perceive, discover; contemplate, theorize*; Academic term for the act of philosophical contemplation and speculation; “to grasp intellectually the meaning or utility of [something]” (Kennedy 37). The act is necessary for the creation of metaphor: “for to use metaphor well is to see [*theôrein*] similarities” (3.2.8). Aristotle combines *theôrein* with “methodology [*hodos poiein*]” for defining rhetoric as an “art [*technê*]” (1.1.2). (1404b27; 1412a12; 1417b8) [*theory*]

Ι.

ἰατρεύματα [*iatreumata*] (n., pl.): *remedies*, derived from *iama* (also Ionic *iatreia*) meaning “remedy, cure, medicine” often for purposes of “soothing, pacification” (cf. *iatros*, “physician”) (LSJ 815). Applied to rhetoric, especially introductions, *remedies* are methods for countering prejudicial attack, inattention, or apathy (LSJ 816; Freese 477). Positively, *remedies* are used “to make the audience receptive or teachable (Latin *docilis*), well disposed (*benivolus*), and attentive (*attentus*) (Kennedy 234). (1415a25) [*psychiatry, psychê + iatreia*]

ἴδια ὀνόμα [*idia onoma*], pl. ἴδια ὀνόματα [*idia onomata*] (n.): *specific names, proper nouns* (LSJ 818). Merit exists in “calling things by their specific names [*idia onomata*] and not by circumlocutions [*periechonta*]” (3.5.3). (1407a 31) [*name, noun*]

Κ.

κατασκευάζειν [*kataskeuazein*] (v.): *construct, prepare, make ready* (generally); in rhetoric: *put into a certain frame of mind*; “disposing the hearer favorably toward the speaker and unfavorably toward the opponent” (3.19.1). (1419a11, 18)

κατεστραμμένη [*katestrammenê*] (adj.): “turned down,” *returning, circular*; refers to the periodic of syntax based in hypotactic syntax, including antithesis and balanced clauses.

Aristotle describes this style as the ideal rhetorical prose style (3.9). See λέξις

κατεστραμμένη [*lexis katestrammenê*] and περίοδος [*periodos*]. (1409a26, 34)

κατηγορεῖν [*katêgorein*] (v.): *accuse, prosecute, make a legal charge* against someone in judicial rhetoric. (1415a29; 1416a29, 33, 34; 1418a30) [*categorize*]

κατηγορία [*katêgoria*] (f.): *accusation, prosecution, legal charge* made against someone in judicial rhetoric; in logic, *category, predication, head of predicables; predicate of* (a person or thing). (1414b3). [*category*]

κείμενα ἐν μέσῳ [*keimena en mesô*] (m.): “placed in the middle” (grammar); in rhetoric, the phrase means the *middle part* of an oration; *posited in the middle* (Latin: *in medio posita*); *laid down in argument; let it be assumed; intermediate*. (1414a25)

κλίμαξ [*klimax* or *climax*] (f.): *ladder or staircase* (literally); in rhetoric, “a figure of speech in which the principal word of each clause is caught up and added to the next” (LSJ 960). Latin: *gradatio* or *scala*. A figure of thought (implied analogy) in which the words are connected one with another (cf. Rom. 5:3-5). Synonym is ἐποικοδομεῖν [*epoikodomein*]. (1365a16) [*climax*]

κόσμος [*kosmos*] (n.): “order” literally; referring to style: *ornamental word; ornateness* signifying *orderly and pleasing language* having form and function, fashion and honor, beauty and dignity in the whole and in the parts (LSJ 985). As a subcategory of *lexis*, *kosmos* has three categories: selection of words (*eklogê*), composition of words into sentences (synthesis), and figures of thought and of language (*schêmata*). The noun occurs only in Book 3. (1408a14; 1415b38) [*cosmos, cosmetics*]

κύριος [*kyrios*] (n.): *prevailing meaning* of words (*kyria onomata*), *proper* or *common* meaning of words; meaning of words according to context; *vernacular*, opposed to foreign, figurative, or archaic words. Kennedy comments: “*Kyrios* refers to the prevailing meaning in good current usage and may also be translated ‘proper’ in the sense found in dictionary definitions; it is not necessarily the semantic, etymological, or essential meaning of a word” (198n15). In Hellenistic usage, *kyrios* means sir, master, lord, and Lord. (1404b6, 31, 35, 39; 1405b11; 1410b12) [*curia*]

κῶλον [*kôlon* or *côlon*] (n.): “*limb*” of the body, literally; concerning syntax and style, *phrase* or *clause*; a *unit of rhythm and thought* being a subdivision of the period. Latin synonyms are *membra* or *caesa*. The *côlon*’s form and length are governed by what is appropriate, the middle being ideal (3.9.6). One *côlon* composes a clause a phrase; two *côla* a compound unit and the basic period; three or more *côla* form long periods; a very short *côlon* is a κόμματτα [*kommata*] (see περίοδος [*periodos*] for the classical concept of period. (1409b13+, 32+)

Λ.

λεκτικός [*lektikos*] (adj.): *common, conversational style; plain style*, as opposed to poetic style (LSJ 1037). (1408b33)

λέξεως ἀρετή [*lexeôs aretê*] (f): “*virtue of style*” or “*stylistic excellence*.” A coinage of Aristotle whose discussion on style focuses on four qualities: clarity (*saphê*), propriety (*prepon*), correctness (*hellênismos*), and ornamentation (*kosmos*) (3.2). The four virtues appear in most subsequent treatments of rhetorical style. Contrasted with “virtues” are “frigidities” (ψύχρῖα [*psychria*]). The coined phrase occurs twice but prominently (*Rhet* 3.2.1 and 3.12.6 and *Poet* 22, 1458a17). (1404b1; 1414a22)

λέξις [*lexis*], pl. λέξεις [*lexeis*] (f.): *style; diction, composition* (Latin *elocutio*); *selection of words, phrasing, syntax, sound, rhythm, figures, and timing or placement* (cf. 3.1.2).

Lexis refers to *how* something is said, as opposed to *what* is said (3.2.1). *Selection* is the basic metaphor inherent in *lexis*, which, along with other terms based in the root metaphor of *hodos* (pathway), creates the sense that rhetorical style is navigation, choosing a way. (1403b2, 8, 15+; 1404a19; 1404b10, 33; 1405b34; 1407a19, b26; 1408a10+, b21+; 1410b20, 28; 1412b20; 1413a23, b4+; 1414a22; 1420b2)

λέξις ἀγωνιστική [*lexis agônistikê*] (f.): *oral debating style* of speech suited for contests and assemblies; high debating style; synonymous with *dêmêgorikê lexis* (1414a7) and comparable to *lexis hypokritikê* (1413b9). *Lexis agônistikê* includes definite techniques: oral delivery, repetition, asyndeton, general (not exact) details, and suitable for large demegoric assemblies, deliberative rhetoric, sometimes judicial, but not epideictic (3.12; cf. Chart 12.1). (1413b4, 9, 20) [*agonistic*]

λέξις γραφική [*lexis graphikê*] (f.) *written style* of rhetoric; *fine, precise literary style* intended for literary compositions; includes definite techniques: written delivery (*graphia*), concision, exactness of detail, small or individual audience, and suitable for epideictic, sometimes judicial, but not deliberative rhetoric or demegoric assemblies (3.12; cf. Chart 12.1). (1413b4, 8, 20; 1414a17) [*graph*]

λέξις εἰρομένη [*lexis eiromenê*] (f.): “*strung on*” *style of syntax*; what rhetoricians call “loose,” “running,” or “cumulative” sentence structure based in paratactic syntax, as contrasted with the periodic style. Cumulative syntax begins with a major clause, then “strings on” additional subordinate phrases and clauses. Cumulative sentences are common in conversation, show little art, and are useful for providing immediate understanding of the

main idea and for supplying a great amount of supporting detail (3.9.1-2). (1409a24+; 1414a22, 28)

λέξις κατεστραμμένη [*lexis katestrammenê*] (f.): “turned down” style of syntax; periodic style based in hypotactic syntax, as contrasted with the cumulative style. Periodic form of syntax is Aristotle’s preferred style because it functions to create quick learning, usually including antithesis and balanced clauses (3.9). Later rhetoricians adopted Aristotle’s terms to describe a slightly different style and function, called “climatic” or “suspended” sentence, which, withholding the main clause and idea until the end, after a series of subordinate phrases and clauses, creates a sense of dramatic suspense and emphasis. When skillfully arranged, because it tends to work up to a pitch an audience’s interest and feeling before learning what the sentence is about, the climatic sentence is called the orator’s sentence. The image of “turned down [*katestrammenê*]” “resembles a circular line, which returns and ends at certain point” (Freese 477). (1409a24+)

λέξις ξενική [*lexis xenikê*] (f.): exotic style, exoticism. From the metaphor of ξένος [*xenos*] (stranger), Aristotle creates *exoticism* as his preferred rhetorical style. The “exotic style” is controlled exoticism, having slightly deviant diction, the mean between excessively poetic and overly common prose (cf. *Poet* 22, 1458a21). Aristotelian exoticism employs metaphoric language that creates attention, thoughtfulness, and learning by using defamiliarized choices of words and phrasing: e.g., “virtues of style.” (1404b36; 1405a8; 1406a15; 1414a27) [*exotic, xeno-phobia*]

λέξις ὑποκριτικὴ [*lexis hypokritikê*] (f.): oral delivery style of speech suited for acting and oral rhetorical performance, comparable to *lexis agônistikê* and distinct from but not opposed to *lexis graphikê* (3.12.2). Describing oral delivery and acting, Aristotle names three

variables: “volume [*megethos*], change of pitch [*harmonia*], and rhythm [*rhythmos*]”

(3.1.4). (1403b23+; 1404a13, 23; 1413b9) [*hypocrisy*]

λιτός [*litos*] (adj.): *plain style; simple, unadorned style*; opposed to “confusing [*poikilos*]”

(3.16.2). (1416b25) [*litotes*]

λογογράφος [*logographos*] (m.): professional *speechwriter* (often used as a term of reproach);
prose writer, recorder. (1408a34; 1413b13) [*logography*]

λόγος [*logos*] (m.): (a) *argument, speech, statement*; (b) *persuasive appeal by logical statement* or formal instrument (enthymeme and example). *Logos* never refers to a single word, but always a statement or a series of statements, nothing less than a noun (ὄνομα [*onoma*]) plus a predicate (ῥηῖμα [*rhêma*]) (Else 128; LSJ 1057). In contrast to *rhêma* (what is said), *logos* refers to thought-statements. *Logos* is also one of three equal rhetorical appeals (*êthos, pathos, logos*), wherein *logos* refers to statements in the form of deductive enthymeme or inductive example, most often with logical and factual subject-matter (*pragma*), and thus rational arguments that appeal to an audience’s reason. (1403b8; 1404a18, 28, 31; 1404b2+; 1405a4, 7; 1405b9; 1406a13; 1406b24; 1407a13, 17; 1408b30; 1409a6; 1409b25; 1414a7, 30, 37; 1414b5, 19, 29, 31; 1415a2+; 1415b33; 1416a28, 33; 1416b18+; 1417a19; 1418a15, 33, 35; 1418b1, 13+; 1419a20, 23; 1420b2, 3) [*logic, logo-* prefixes, *-ology* suffixes]

λόγος πρὸς τὰ πράγματα [*logos pros ta pragmata*] (m.): *speech or statements pertaining to the logical and factual subject-matter, thus referring to rational argumentation*; synonymous with πίστεις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι [*pisteis en autô tō pragmati*], indicating that the means of persuasion are “in the subject-matter” itself; a reference to persuasion by *logos*.

λόγος πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους [*logos pros tous akroômenous*] (m.): speech or statements pertaining to ornament; speech without rational argumentation; synonymous with πίστεις ἔξω τῶν πραγμάτων [*pisteis exô tôn pragmatôn*], implying that the means of persuasion are “outside the subject-matter”; a reference to sophistic persuasion by *êthos* and *pathos* without *pragma* (logical and factual subject-matter).

λύσις [*lysis*] (f.): *refutation* of an argument. *Lysis* literally means “*loosing, releasing,*” such as the logical ties of a syllogism or enthymeme, and thus “*refutation of an argument*” (LSJ 1066; Kennedy 189). Refutation is accomplished by objection and by counterargument, discussed respectively throughout *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*. (1419a21, 25)
[*auto-lysis*]

M.

μέγεθος [*megethos*] (adj.): *greatness, magnitude* (generally, of quality or degree); *grandeur, loftiness* (of style in rhetoric). Concerning delivery, *megethos* means “*volume*” as a quality of voice (φωνῆ [*phonê*]) (3.1.4). (1403b31; 1409a36; 1416a9) [*megaphone*]

μειρακιώδης [*meirakiôdês*] (adj.): *adolescent or juvenile in style*; characterized by youthful force and vehemence, which is inappropriate for the mature and elderly (Freese 478). In enthymemes, “hyperboles are adolescent [*meirakiôdeis hyperbolai*], for they exhibit vehemence” (3.11.16). (1413a29)

μεταφέρειν [*metapherein*] (v.): *transfer a word to a changed sense; create metaphor* by means of perceiving analogy (*analogos*), likenesses (*homoia*), epithet (*epitheton*), and riddle (*ainigma*); *transfer a word to its literal meaning, reinterpreting it etymologically* (cf. *Top*112a32; *EN* 1167a10; LSJ 1118). (1405a36, b36; 1406b23; 1412a10)

μεταφορά [*metaphora*] (f.): *metaphor; trope of transference* of a word from one domain of reference to another; *implicit comparison* or *synthetic identification* between a literal subject and a figurative subject with partial hypostatization. Aristotle outlines formal classifications of metaphor in *Poetics* 21.7 and discusses functional and cognitive aspects in *Rhetoric* 3.2, 3.10, and 3.11, along with simile 3.4. Since metaphor is a *tropos* (“turn”) that is also and primarily a *topos* of invention, Aristotle understands metaphor as a “stylistic syllogism,” having creative functions: logical inference and easy, visual learning which audience find pleasant. Metaphor is quasi-philosophical because likenesses are generic, not individual (cf. related terms ἀναλογία [*analogia*], εἰκῶν [*eikôn*], and τρόπος [*tropos*]). (1404b32, 34; 1405a3+; 1406b5+; 1407a11+, b31; 1408a8; 1410b13, 17, 31, 35, 36; 1411a26+; 1411b27+; 1412b11, 31+; 1413a5, 14+)

μέτρον [*metron*] (n.): *measure (generally); meter, measure of syllabus (in poetry and prose)*. Quintilian, in his section called “Difference between rhythm and metre,” discusses these related but distinct terms: “Rhythm consists of lengths of times, while meter, besides length, requires the times to be in a certain order; thus the one seems to refer to quantity, the other to quality [i.e., syllables must be in a certain order]” (9.4.46). Two other differences exist: “Rhythm has indefinite space, meter definite; meter runs in a certain circle, rhythm flows on as it has commenced, as far as the μεταβολή (*metabolê*), or point of transition to another kind of rhythm; and meter is concerned only with words, while rhythm is applied even to the motions of the body” (9.4.50). See also ῥυθμός [*rhythmos*].

μίμησις [*mimêsis*] (n.): *artistic imitation, fictive representation; imaginative enactment of experience; creative construction* following artistic principles (not simply copying). *Mimêsis* is the centerpiece of Aristotle’s poetic theory, associated with formal metaphor,

but in rhetoric he focuses on functional, cognitive, and pedagogical aspects of metaphor.

Kennedy notes: “Style in poetics is an aspect of imitation [*mimêsis*], in rhetoric of

persuasion [*peithô* or *pistis*]” (197n14). (1404a21, 22, 35) [*mime, mimetic*]

μνημονεύειν [*mnêmonēuein*] (v.): *remember, call to mind, make memorable; call to another’s mind* (LSJ 1139); cf. μνήμη [*mnêmê*], memory; also cf. ἀναμιμνήσκειν [*anamimnêskein*], meaning “remind” easily). The purpose of epilogue is to remind the audience (3.14.7).

(1409b7; 1414a6; 1415a33) [*mnemonic*]

μονόκωλος [*monokôlos*] (adj.): “one *côlon*” (literally); of periods, consisting of only one *côlon*, clause, phrase, or line (3.9.5). See κῶλον [*côlon*] and περίοδος [*periodos*]. (1409b17)

μούρος [*myouros*] (adj.): “mouse-tailed” (literally); *curtailed, cut short; too brief*, of a period which seems to end too soon (3.9.6); opposite of μακράι [*makrai*], lengthy. (1409b18)

N.

νόμος [*nomos*] (m.): *custom, habitual practice or use; cultural law or principle* (LSJ 1180; cf.

ERC 473, s.v. “Nomos”). *Nomos* is a factor of *êthos*; contrasted with φύσις [*physis*]

(nature). (1406a23; 1418a25) [*norm*]

Ξ.

ξένος [*xenos*] (m.): *stranger; refugee; guest; strange or unusual word or phrase* (opposite of

οἰκεία [*oikeia*]: native and common word or literal sense; LSJ 1189, 1202). *Xenos* is

Aristotle’s personified metaphor for “making the style exotic” (ξενικὴν ποιεῖν τὴν λέξιν [*xenikên poiein tēn lexin*]) (1406a15). Aristotelian exoticism refers to usages of

defamiliarized diction, metaphors, and urbanities that create attention, thoughtfulness,

and quick, pleasant learning: e.g., “virtues of style.” Refer to λέξις ξενικὴ [*lexis xenikê*]

“exotic style.” (1404b9, 11; 1408b11; 1412b14, 15; 1415a7) [*exotic, xeno-phobia*]

O.

ὄγκος [*onkos*] (m.): *expansiveness, amplification; weight, dignity*. Literally *onkos* means “bulk, mass, swelling,” but Aristotle uses it figuratively to mean “*elevation, dignity*” of style (discussed in 3.6). (1407b26)

οἰκεῖος [*oikeios*] (adj.): “*of the house*” (literally); *native or common word; literal sense; fitting or suitable meaning or style* (LSJ 1202); opposite of ξένος [*xenos*]: *strange or unusual diction; sometimes synonymous with κύριος [*kyrios*] in 3.2.6 and with πρέπον [*prepon*] in 3.7.4. (1404b32, 35; 1405b12; 1408a20, cf. 31; 1414a12; 1415a7) [*eco-* prefixes]*

ὁμωνυμία [*homonymia*] (f.): *homonym; equivocal word* (i.e., a word with one sound but two or more meanings); *equivocation* causing possible *ambiguity*. Aristotle indicates that sophists employ homonyms to make spurious arguments (3.2.7; cf. 2.24.2); on the other hand, homonym may create well-liked verbal irony when a word’s different usages (common and unusual [*xenos*]) are quickly perceived by an audience (3.11.8). (1404b38; 1412b11, 12)

ὁμοιοτέλευτον [*homoioteleuton*] (n.): “*same ending*” (literally); rhyme at the end of *côla*; like endings of two or more clauses or verses; synonymous with *paromoisis*. (1410b1)

ὄνομα [*onoma*] (n.): *name, noun; single word* (denoting “first substances,” in contrast with ῥήματα [*rhêma*] denoting verbs and predicates). *Onoma* (sg.) and *onomata* (pl.) signify proper and common nouns and pronouns, also including proper and common adjectives derived from nouns (Kennedy 276n26). (1404a21, 33; 1404b5, 26+; 1405b6, 35; 1407a31; 1407b7, 27+; 1408a6, 14, 30; 1407b6, 10; 1410a26+; 1410b11, 31; 1412a30, 33; 1414b16)

ὄνομα πεποιημένον [*onoma pepoiemenon*] (n.): “made up word” (literally); *coined word, neologism*; term invented for the occasion (3.2.5). (1404b29)

Π.

πάθος [*pathos*] (n.): *passion* from which arises *emotion*; emotional state of mind or mood (understood as a temporary state of mind). *Pathos* is a means of persuasion among the rhetorical appeals (*êthos, pathos, logos*), usually associated with the grand style of oratory and usually considered a valid appeal only when based on credible information. In Book 3, the term can mean *pathetic style* or *pathetic speech* appealing to the emotions, especially in adjectival form: παθητικὴ λέξις [*pathêtikê lexis*] and παθητικῶς λέγειν [*pathêtikôs legein*] (3.7.3). (1403b28; 1408a10, 16, 24; 1408b12; 1413b10; 1417a36; 1418a12, 19, 28; 1419b13, 25)

παιάν [*paian*] or παιών [*paion*] (m.): *paean*; in prosody, “a metrical foot consisting of one long and three short or three short and one long syllables, regarded by Aristotle as the most appropriate rhythm in prose” (Kennedy 317; cf. 3.8.5-6). (1409a2+)

παραβολή [*parabolê*] (n.): *comparison, simile, illustrative parallel*; “placing side by side” (literally) for a picturesque, extended comparison (3.19.5). (1420a4)

παραγραφή [*paragraphê*] (f.): *mark made in the margin* to indicate a stop or change; “anything written beside, marginal note or sign, to mark the close of a sentence” (LSJ 1306). Formal punctuation was developed in the third and second centuries BC (1409a20).

παράδειγμα [*paradeigma*] (n.): *example, inductive argument, proof from example; paradigm* as an “instance”; Latin *exemplum*; *rhetorical induction* (as enthymeme is rhetorical deduction). Aristotle distinguishes three types of example: from history, from fable, and

- from parable (*parabolê*); the three types “serve as means of persuasion and differ not so much in form as in content” (McCall 27). (1414b26; 1417a2, 13, 29; 1418a1, 3)
- παραλογισμός [*paralogismos*] (m.): *logical fallacy*; “*beyond reason*” (literally); erroneous or fallacious reasoning (with or without intent to deceive). (1408a20; 1414a6)
- παρίσον [*parison*] (n.), also παρίσωσις [*parisôsis*] (f.): *balanced clauses*; *exactly balanced and even clauses*; an equal number of syllables in each of two *côla* (3.9.9; LSJ 1340). (1410a23; 1410b1; 1412b31)
- παροιμία [*paroimia*] (f.): *proverb, maxim*. (1413a14)
- παρομοίωσις [*paromoiôsis*] (f.): “*similar sounds*” at the beginning or ending of various *côla*; rhyme scheme (3.9.9). (1410a24)
- πείθω [*peithô*] (v.): *persuade, convince* (to embrace a certain opinion or reasoned judgment); *prevail on, win over* (by entreaty or argument); *appeal to; strive to please; conciliate*. The three aims (*officia*) of rhetoric are *to teach, to please, and to persuade* (in Cicero’s Latin: *docere, delectare, flectere*, but Augustine substitutes *doctrina* for *docere*), but the three aims are means to the main aim of persuading, or more objectively and artistically, “to discover [*theôrêsai*] the available means of persuasion” (1.2.1). (1406a4)
- πειστικός [*peistikos*] (adj.): *persuasive, convincing, winning*. (1355b29)
- περίοδος [*periodos*] (f.): *unit of thought-rhythm*, having a beginning and an end in itself and consisting of one or two or more *côla* (lines, phrases, or clauses). Aristotle observes that a period resembles a line of verse: it has magnitude, limits, and rhythmic number (3.9.3). An Aristotelian *period* comes in two types: a single *côlon*, called a “simple period,” and two *côla*, which makes the “basic period” (3.9.5). The basic period can be either divided (two coordinate *côla*) or contrasted consisting of antithesis with balanced clauses (3.9.7).

The antithetical period is Aristotle's preferred syntax because it creates the most learning.
(1409a35; 1409b5+; 1410b2)

πιθανός [*pithanos*] (adj.): *persuasive, plausible*, esp. of popular sayings and speakers; also

πείθω [*peithô*] (adj.) with specific reference to persons (LSJ 1403). (1403b20; 1404b20;
1414a27; 1417b2)

πίστις [*pistis*] (f.), πίστεις [*pisteis*] (pl.): *proof, means of persuasion, rhetorical appeals* that result in persuasion, confidence, or belief; Latin *fides* (LSJ 1408; Grimaldi 1:20).

Aristotle suggests that *pisteis* come in two categories: artistic appeals (πίστεις ἔντεχνοι [*pisteis entechnoi*]) and non-artistic appeals (πίστεις ἄτεχνοι [*pisteis atechnoi*]). *Pisteis* occur forty-one times in the text, are connected with *enthymeme* and *entechnoi*, and “everything else is supplementary” (Grimaldi 1:8). Grimaldi describes the semantic range in the *Rhetoric* according to five meanings for *pistis*: (1) the state of mind of *persuasion, conviction, belief* resulting when a person judges and accepts a proof, demonstration, or argument; (2) the logical instrument of the reasoning process, such as deductive enthymeme and inductive example, that will create conviction or belief in an audience, (3) the source material, based in *logos, ethos, or pathos*, that will create conviction or belief in an audience; (4) pledge or word of honor; and (5) a technical meaning in Book 3 for the “proof,” meaning “that part of a speech wherein one formally demonstrates one’s thesis or proposition” (“Studies” 70; 1:19-20, 349 ff.). *Pistis* has a range of semantic meaning best determined by context and which describe the rhetorical means of addressed to the whole persons. (1403b7, 9; 1414a35; 1414b7, 8, 9, 11; 1416b34; 1417b21; 1418a18; 1418b5, 8, 23)

πίστις ἄτεχνος [*pistis atechnos*] (f.), πίστεις ἄτεχνοι [*pisteis entechnoi*] (pl.): *Non-artistic appeals, atechnic proofs, facts*; means of persuasion that result in conviction or belief. The non-artistic category is given, not created by the rhetor and ready for use. Non-artistic appeals are pre-existent evidences: “witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like” (1.2.2), which compose a case’s facts, rather than the orator’s creative analysis (cf. *pistis* for textual reference).

πίστις ἔτεχνος [*pistis entechnos*] (f.), πίστεις ἔτεχνοι [*pisteis entechnoi*] (pl.): *Artistic appeals, entechnic proofs*; means of persuasion that result in conviction or belief. The artistic category has to be invented by the rhetor; these are the creative, analytical, and critical part of the art which make rhetoric a reasoned *technê*. Among artistic *pisteis*, there are three means of persuasion (*êthos, pathos, logos*), which can be separated for analysis but are integrated in the speech and response (cf. *pistis* for textual reference).

ποίημα [*poiêma*] (n.): *anything made or done; artifact; poem or literary work in prose; deed or act*. (1406a31; 1408b31)

πολλοὶ σύνδεσμοι [*polloi syndesmoi*] (m., pl.): *polysyndeton, “many conjunctions”* in a series of coordinate words or phrases: i.e., A and B and C, etc. rather than A, B, C, etc. Aristotle uses the term *polloi syndesmoi*, but later rhetoricians employ *polysyndeton*. Both *polysyndeton* and its opposite *asyndeton* are considered figures of style, involving either abundance or absence of connectives or conjunctions (3.5.6). (1407b12, 37, 38)

πράγμα [*pragma*] (n.), πράγματα [*pragmata*] (pl.): *subject-matter, facts*. Plato and Aristotle use the term technically to refer to the logical and factual subject-matter of dialectic, without which rhetoric is empty and false. Making a basic distinction, Aristotle regards the means of persuasion [*pisteis*] as “in the subject” itself (πίστεις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ

πράγματι [*pisteis en autô tô pragmati*]) and “outside of the subject” (τὰ ἔξω τῶν πραγμάτων [*ta exô tôn pragmatôn*]) (1.1.3, 2.1.2). Persuasion “in the subject matter” comes about by dialectic, while “outside of the subject” refers to appeals to *êthos* and *pathos* without *pragma*. This distinction characterizes much of the rhetorical tradition’s dialogue with philosophy since Aristotle. (1403b19; 1404a6; 1408a23; 1409a30; 1414a31; 1414b6; 1415a24, 26; 1415b6, 7, 22, 23, 34; 1416b36; 1417b32, 37; 1419b31) [*pragmatic*]

πραότης [*praotês*] (f.): *humility, meekness; mildness, gentleness*; the virtue of these traits as an aspect of *êthos* and style. (1366b2; 1380a6)

πρέπον [*prepon*] (n.): *appropriateness, propriety* as a quality of style (Latin *decorum*); *fitting* or *timely*. τὸ πρέπον [*to prepon*] is Aristotle’s main principle of style, affiliated with the doctrine of the golden mean and an application of classical good sense expressed in the motto *meden agan*, “nothing too much.” The term has theoretical roots in Plato’s Academy as a principle of “proportionate equality” (*Gorgias* 508a). Proportionality is simple realism, operating with the principle of equation, correspondence, and what is just. These qualities, along with considering audience and situation, are essential to choosing the appropriate style. (1404b4, 17, 31; 1408a10; 1414a24, 27)

προαίρεσις [*proairesis*] (f.): *deliberate choice, moral purpose, resolution; a deliberate course of action or policy*. Kennedy defines the term as “a decision made on the basis of character” (318). The term literally means “choosing one thing before another,” indicating premeditation (LSJ 1466). The opposite of *proairesis* is *anankê*, meaning constraint or necessity (LSJ 101). An ethical term, Aristotle defines *proairesis* teleologically according to what end or purpose (*telos*) a person has chosen (cf. *An*

- 433a14-15). Rhetoric concerns “dialectic and ethical studies” since its subject-matter involves human choice (1.2.7; cf. Grimaldi, *Studies* 146). (1417a17+; 1418a16)
- πρόθεσις [*prothesis*] (f.): *thesis statement, proposition* in the introduction of an argument; thus, “*pro-thesis*,” meaning early statement of the thesis or purpose; the *prothesis* is a necessary part of a speech (3.13.1-4). In logic, *prothesis* is synonymous with thesis, suggesting only early placement; in grammar, it means preposition, prefix, or placing first; in drama, it is synonymous with *prôlogos*: “The prologue is the whole portion of a tragedy prior to the chorus’ parodos [first song]” (*Poet* 12.18). (1414a34; 1414b7, 8; 1410b18)
- προίμιον [*prooimion*] (n.): *introduction, prologue, preface, prelude, proem* (Latin: *exordium, praefatio*). A term in music composition, *oimos* means the course or strain of a song; a *pro-oimion* is thus a prelude or introductory to a song or speech. Aristotle writes, “The *prooemion* is the beginning of a speech, what a prologue is in poetry” (3.14.1). (1414b1, 8, 12, 19+; 1419b29)
- πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν [*pro ommatôn poiein*] (n.): “*bringing-before-the-eyes*”; *visualization, visual style of figuration, making clear to the mind’s eye*. Aristotle discusses *pro ommatôn poiein*, and the adjective, modifying term *energeia*, in his explanation of “smart” metaphors that create quick, enjoyable learning (3.10-11). In “Aristotle’s Notion of ‘Bringing-Before-the-Eyes’” Sara J. Newman explores the cognitive capacity for psychological vision and for stylistic visualization, observing that “Aristotle characterizes ‘bringing-before-the-eyes’ as a perceptive capacity” for metaphoric and figurative language (5). (1405b13; 1410b33; 1411a26+; 1411b24+)

P.

ῥῆμα [*rhêma*], or ῥῆματα [*rhêmata*] (n.): *saying, expression; verb, predicate; verbal statement*;
 “(1) generally, that which is spoken; (2) grammatically, a verb as opposed to a noun
 (ὄνομα)” (Freese 480). Literally, *rhê-ma* means “said-thing,” indicating the predicate of a
 sentence or the matter of a speech. *Rhêma* properly denotes statement or expression in
 contrast to ὄνομα [*onoma*], a single word that denotes the noun of “first substances.”
 (1404b6, 26)

ῥητορικὴ [*rhêtorikê*] (f.): *orator's art [technê]; Latin eloquentia*. According to Aristotle,
 “rhetoric is the ability [*dynamis*], in each particular case, to see [*theorêsai*] the available
 means of persuasion” (1.2.1). Aristotle understands rhetoric to be a faculty of mind, a
 practical art, and a theoretical art, summarized as “the relationship between cognition and
 expression” (Enos, “Classical Rhetoric”). As an art, rhetoric is the systematization of
 natural eloquence: finding, organizing, theorizing, and practicing the methods for
 generating and communicating persuasive and eloquent arguments. (1403b25; 1404a2)

ῥήτωρ [*rhêtôr*] (m.): *orator, rhetor, public speaker* (Latin *orator*); one who is skilled and
 practiced in communicating eloquently and persuasively; *lawyer* or *speaker in the*
assembly (ἐκκλησία [*ekklêsia*]); later a teacher of the art of eloquence, rhetorician:
 ῥητορικός [*rhêtorikos*] (1404b37; 1414a12); derived from the term for speech and
 discourse, ῥῆμα [*rhêma*]. (1404a18; 1407a7; 1413b1, 16, 21; 1414a15; 1418a30)

ῥυθμός [*rhuthmos*] (m.): *rhythm; time*; “any regular recurring motion” (LSJ 1576). Freese states,
 “in general, any regular harmonious movement, in sound or motion, which can be
 measured by number; thus, it may be applied to the tramp of a body of soldiers, the
 flapping of birds’ wings, the dance, music, and writing, the last expressed in long and

short syllables” (480). See μέτρον [*metron*] for distinctions between meter and rhythm. (1403b30, 31; 1408b29+; 1414a27)

Σ.

σαφής [*saphês*] (n.): *clarity, perspicuity*; σαφές [*saphes*] (adj.): “*clear, plain, distinct*, of things heard, perceived, or known” (LSJ 1586). *Saphês* is the first “virtue of style,” described functionally as being both the prerequisite and culmination of style (3.2.1); defined as the mean between ἀδολεσχία [*adoleschia*] (verbosity, wordiness) and συντομία [*syntomia*] (excessive conciseness) (3.12.6). *Saphês* originally meant “sponged off, cleaned off,” and came to mean “clean, clear, complete, and exact” (LSJ 1586). (1404b2, 6; 1405a8; 1406a35; 1414a23)

σεμνός [*semnos*] (adj.): *stately or solemn in style; reverent, dignified, serious; august, majestic; holy*. (1406b3, 7, 8; 1408b13, 32, 35)

σόλοικίζειν [*soloikizein*] (n.): *solecism, mistake in word usage; incorrect or ungrammatical utterance; any form of speech contrary to hellênizein, the pure idioms of the Greek language; derived from σόλοικος [*soloikos*], one who speaks incorrectly or speaks broken Greek (3.5.7); to speak like the people of Σόλοι [*Soloi*], an Athenian colony in Cilicia whose corrupt Attic dialect the Athenians considered barbarous in style, not grammatically bad, but corrupt and gibberish. (1407b18)*

σοφιστής [*sophistês*] (m.): *Sophist; orator or teacher who claims wisdom (sophia) but makes specious arguments (as opposed to philosophos and dialektikos); an orator who typically speaks in an ornate style, makes many emotional appeals, commits fallacies, neglects argument from the logical and factual subject-matter (pragma), and has self-serving motives. Before the fifth century: “master of one’s craft, adept, expert; wise, prudent, or*

statesmanlike man,” but the term narrows: “from late fifth [century] BC, a Sophist, i.e., one who gave lessons in grammar, rhetoric, politics, mathematics, for money, such as Prodicus, Gorgias, Protagoras” (LSJ 1622, cf. Erickson, *Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric* 7 ff.). (1404b38; 1419a14) [*sophistic, sophisticated*]

στάσις [*stasis*] (f.): *dispute* (in a debate); the *issue* or *question* at debate, heart of a conflict.

Aristotle develops his pre-*stasis* theory using the term ἀμφισβήτησις [*amphisbêtêsis*], being synonymous with *stasis*; at 3.17.1 he states his four questions for identifying *stasis*: fact, harm, importance, and justice (cf. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* 97-101). *Stasis* is used once in the *Rhetoric* (2.15.3, 1390b30).

στενός [*stenos*] (adj.): *thin, meager, pitiful* in style (3.12.2). (1413b15) [*stencil, stenography*]

στοιχείον [*stoicheion*] (n.): *element, fundamental principle, topic* of language (i.e., letter or phoneme), of argument (i.e., points that are argued and arranged in a speech), of learning. (1403a17+) [*stoichiology*]

στρογγύλος [*strongulos*] (adj.): *compact, dense, overly concise* in style. (1394b33) [*strong*]

συλλογισμός [*syllogismos*] (m.): *syllogism; inference; conclusion*. As theorized by Aristotle, the logical syllogism is a formal mode of deductive argumentation for demonstrating or creating knowledge; the syllogism consists of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. (1410a21).

σύμβολα [*symbola*] (n. pl.): *probable signs, indications*; any phenomena serving as proof of identity; physical evidence that serves as probable indication of natural laws, social customs, and personal motive. “Probable signs” as distinct from logically necessary “signs [*sêmeia*],” called a *tekmêrion* (1.2.16-18; cf. *APr* 2.27) and as distinct from linguistic “primary signs [*sêmeia prôtôs*]” (*Int* 1, 16a7). The gloss “probable signs” is a

- synecdoche (substitution of effect for cause) because what is probable is not the sign but knowledge of its cause. (1416a36; 1417b2) [*symbol*]
- συνάγειν [*synagein*] (v.): *gather, bring or draw together; contract* (3.11.12). (1413a4)
[*synagogue*]
- σύνδεσμος [*syndesmos*] (m.): *bond of union* (generally); *conjunction, connective* (in grammar).
Connectives (*syndesmoi*) include prepositions, copulative conjunctions, and certain particles. Discussing correctness (ἑλληνίζειν [*hellênizein*]), Aristotle suggests that using correct connectives contributes to proper usage meeting grammatical expectations (3.5.2; cf. also *polloi syndesmoi* and *asyndeton*). (1407a20+; 1407b12, 37, 38; 1409a24; 1413b32)
- συνθέσις [*synthesis*] (f.): “putting together” (literally); *composition* of words into phrases, clauses, figures, and units of rhythm; a subcategory of *kosmos* in theory of style (3.2-11).
- συντομία [*syntomia*] (f.): *conciseness, concision*. (1407b28)
- συστρέφειν [*sustrephein*] (v.): *compress, compact, make concise*. For instance, due to audience *weakness* (ἀσθένειαν [*astheneian*]), Aristotle suggests that “one should *condense* (συστρέφειν [*sustrephein*]) enthymemes as much as possible” (3.18.4). (1419a19)
- σχῆμα [*schêma*] or σχῆματα [*schêmata*] (f.): *figure of speech; turn of meaning*. Later rhetoricians make the distinction between “figures of style” (σχῆματα λέξεως) [*schêmata lexeôs*] and “figures of thought” (σχῆματα διανοίας) [*schêmata dianoiias*]; the former refers to tropes, the latter to figures, being implicit or explicit analogies. The development of *schêma* theory begins immediately after Aristotle, probably with his pupil Theophrastus (Sullivan 135). (1408b21, 28; 1410b28) [*schema*]

T.

τάξις [*taxis*] (f.): *arrangement, organization, structure, or distribution* of the parts of a speech; Latin: *dispositio*; conventional parts of an oration. For Aristotle there are two parts of a speech: statement [*prothesis*] and proof [*pistis*], to which are added introduction [*prooimion*], narration [*diêgêsis*], and epilogue [*epilogos*], which are flexible according to the rhetorical situation and genre (3.13). The word *taxis* is a military term with connotations of strategic arrangement of troops for battle; applied in rhetoric, the term implies a functional arrangement with the strategic aim of persuasion (3.13-19). (1403b2; 1414a29) [*syntax, taxonomy*]

ταπεινή [*tapeinê*] (adj.): *common, banal, bald, low, mean, vulgar* in diction or of style. Concerning “common style” (ταπεινή λέξις [*tapeinê lexis*]), Aristotle writes, “Virtue of style is being clear without being common [*tapeinê*]” (*Poet* 22; cf. *Rhet* 3.2.1). (14043+; 1408a19; 1414a23; 1419b12, 20, 23)

τέλος [*telos*] (n.): *end, goal, or purpose* (of an action); degree of *completion or maturity; conclusion*. According to R. Rackham, “*Telos* means not only nor primarily aim or purpose, but completion or perfection: the aim of a living organism, the final cause of its being, is to realize the potentiality of its nature, to grow into a perfect specimen of its species. Hence comes the assumption that not only can conduct or purposive action be centered on a single aim. . . . *Telos* also connotes End in the sense of ultimate point, the last term of series, the summit and crown of a process . . . [the] one Good which is the Best” (*EN*, Introduction xxvi). (1409a30, 31; 1415a23; 1417a18) [*teleology*]

τεχνή [*technê*] (f.): “*art or craft*” (i.e., a methodology or set of procedures for making or doing, whether of the practical arts or the fine arts) (LSJ 1785); “*handbook*” on the art of rhetoric. An art is an ability (*dynamis*) of mind (*psychê*); “a reasoned habit of mind

(*hexis*) in making something” (*EN* 6.4.3). A *technê*, such as the *art* of rhetoric, is learned by both theory and practice; a student acquires the art when he or she has learned the art’s set of first principles (*archê*) and can apply the principles and method to create a work of art, such as a written or oral argument. (1403b35; 1404a22; 1414b17; 1416b6, 20)

[*technology*]

τόνος [*tonos*], pl. τόνοι [*tonoi*] (m.): *tone, pitch accents* (of words or syllabus), including volume. Every Greek word has *tonoi*, which are either acute (rising tone), grave (falling tone), or circumflex (rising and falling tone) and occur on one of the last three syllables of a word. Instead of pitch accents, it is acceptable to pronounce Greek words according to Latin or English rules of stress accent. (1403b29; 1413b31) [*tone*]

τόπος [*topos*], pl. τόποι [*topoi*] (m.): “*topic*” of invention; mental “*place*” from which to look for an argument or find the argument itself. Aristotle organizes his heuristic procedure according to topics; he states, “a topic [is a heading] under which many enthymemes fall” (2.26.1), showing the heuristic capacity of topics is central to Aristotle’s art of rhetoric. Aristotle theorizes two types of *topoi*: (1) εἰδή [*eidê*], “specific topics” or “material topics” that are useful for discovering material for specific subjects and propositions pertinent to the three species of rhetoric; (2) κοινοὶ τόποι [*koinoi topoi*], “common topics” or “formal topics” that apply to all three species of rhetoric and are useful for forming material into arguments. According to Grimaldi, formal topics are “logical modes of inference which generally obtain the matter for their inference from the *eidê*. The general, formal topics are forms of reasoning” (*Studies* 183). Formal topics are imposed as forms on the material in order to clarify and determine it further. Grimaldi classifies Aristotle’s twenty-eight *koinoi topoi* into three types of inferential patterns: (a)

antecedent-consequent, cause-effect, (b) more-less, and (c) relation (1:356). (1403b15; 1416a6, 13; 1419b18, 24, 27)

τρόπος [*tropos*] (m.): “*turn*” of speech; *trope*; transference of a word or phrase from its ordinary or “literal” sense to an unusual, non-literal sense. Distinguishing trope from figure, Stanford writes, “Trope tampers with the *meanings* of words, figure only with their form or *order* (*Greek Metaphor* 19). Tropes come in four basic species: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony; subspecies include myth, allegory, parable, proverb, hyperbole, and riddle (enigma); less elaborate tropes are euphemism and epithet (hypocorism), including pet-name, nick-name, and derisive-name from diminutives (22). The criterion of metaphor is the double meaning, wherein both meanings are equally important for stylistic comparison and definition. (3.2, 3.4, 3.10, 3.11)

Υ.

ὑβρις [*hybris*] (f.): *pride, insolence, haughtiness*, often resulting in outrage or violence (3.7.3). (1408a16) [*hybristic*]

ὑπερβολή [*hyperbolê*] (f.): “*overshooting*” the mark (literally); *hyperbole*; *extravagant exaggeration* or *overstatement* for emphasis and humor, also showing adolescent vehemence. Aristotle understands hyperbole to be a species of metaphor having exaggerated proportions: “Well-liked hyperboles are also metaphors” (3.11.15). (1406a32; 1408b1; 1413a19, 22, 29)

ὑποκορισμός [*hypokorismos*] (m.): *diminutive; use of diminutives; endearing* or *pet name*.

Discussing sources of epithets, Aristotle writes, “A diminutive makes both bad and good less so” (3.2.15). (1405b28)

ὑπόκρισις [*hypokrisis*] (f.): *delivery, oral presentation; acting*; includes declamation and expression (gesticulation is not discussed by Aristotle). Delivery is the last of Aristotle's stated four arts of rhetoric (it assumes the art of memory), and the last of the five arts in the rhetorical tradition (discussed at 3.1.3-7). (1403b22, 34; 1404a18; 1404b23; 1413b11, 18, 25; 1414a15) [*hypocritical*]

Φ.

φωνή [*phônê*] (f.): *sound; spoken word* (voice, *vox*). Sound was a vital aesthetic quality of classical rhetorical art. Aristotle, for instance, advises that metaphors have an appropriate accompanying sound to assist their appeal; his advice assumes the sound-meaning relationship called imitative form, the phenomenon that sound mirrors meaning. Sound helps emphasize meaning, create pleasure, and affect favorable reception. (1403b27; 1404a21; 1404b22); 1405a32, 34, 35; 1405b18; 1408b6; 1414a16)

Χ.

χῆσμός [*chiasmus* or *chiasmus*] (m.): *chiasm*; syntactical figure having crosswise clauses or phrases in contrasted pairs to give alternate stress, figured as diagonal lines like *chi* (χ); an inverted parallel structure arranging phrases as a-b, b-a; "placing crosswise, diagonal arrangement, esp. of the clauses of a period, so that the 1st corresponds with the 4th, and the 2nd with the 3rd" (LSJ 1991). "By this figure, both the extremes and the means are correlated" (Smyth 677, §3020). Term is absent but the practice is present in the discussion of syntax and periodic style, especially with antithesis, *parisôsis*, and *paromoiôsis* (3.9).

χώρα [*chôra*] (f.): *room, space, place* in the hearer's mind to accept an argument; *credible disposition* necessary to hear and accept an argument as credible. The term provides the

twofold reason for refutation: one “makes room [*chôran poiein*]” for one’s own argument by “taking away [*anelês*]” the favorable impression made by the opponent’s argument. This is done by replying with refutation (*lysis*) and counter-syllogism (*antisyllogismos*) (3.17.15). (1418b16; 1420b1)

Ψ.

ψιλός [*psilos*] (adj.): *bare, bald; stripped of cover*; in rhetoric, “bare language [*psiloi logoi*]” (i.e., *prose*, contrasted with poetry which is clothed in meter); a *mere* speech *unsupported by evidence*; speak *nakedly, without alleging proofs*” (LSJ 2024). (1404b17, 33)

ψυχρία [*psychria*] (f.): *chilliness* (literally); what makes cold (generally); “*frigidity*” of style; *bad taste* in language; offenses against good taste or *prepon*; lack of measured moderation, making language frigid, insipid, cold, which affects the soul (ψυχή [*psychê*]) with coldness (3.3). “Frigidities” are opposites of Aristotle’s “virtues of style” (ἀρετὴ λέξεως [*aretê lexeôs*]). (1405b34; 1406a33; 1406b5)

Ω.

ὡσπερ [*hōsper*] (adv.): *as, like, even as; similarly*; comparative particle used to mark and introduce similes (LSJ 2040). Aristotle considers metaphor to be a composite category, wherein proportional metaphor and simile are both species but differing only by the comparative particle ὡσπερ. In all other ways, simile and metaphor from analogy are the same: similes are explicit analogies, metaphors implicit analogies. Aristotle prefers metaphors for formal reasons: neat concision (without ὡσπερ) and explicit predication (cf. 3.4.1 and 3.10.3). (1413b22)

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS CITED

EDITIONS OF THE GREEK TEXT OF THE *RHETORIC*

Kassel, Rudolf, ed. *Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica."* Berlin: De Gruyter, 1976. Print.

Ross, W. David, ed. *Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica."* Oxford: Clarendon, 1959. Print. *Theaurus Linguae Graecae: A Digital Library of Greek Literature.* U of California, Irvine. Web. 15 Jan. 2011. <<http://www.tlg.uci.edu/>>.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF THE *RHETORIC*

Cooper, Lane. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle.* 1932. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960. Print.

Freese, John H. *Art of Rhetoric.* 1926. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006. Print. Loeb Classical Library 193.

Kennedy, George A. *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse.* 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2006. Print.

Lawson-Tancred, Hugh C. *Aristotle, "The Art of Rhetoric."* London: Penguin Books, 1991. Print.

Roberts, W. Rhys. *Rhetorica* in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 11. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924. Rpt. in *Aristotle, "Rhetoric" and "Poetics."* Trans. W. Rhys Roberts and Ingram Bywater. New York: Modern Library, 1954. Print.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Aristides Quintilianus. *On Music [De Musica].* Trans. and ed. Thomas J. Mathiesen. New Haven: Yale UP, 1983. Print.

Aristotle. *Categories.* 1938. Trans. H. P. Cooke. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999. Print. Loeb Classical Library 325.

---. *Metaphysics.* Trans. Hugh Tredennick. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1933-1935. Print. Loeb Classical Library 271, 287.

- . *Metaphysics*. Trans. Hugh C. Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin Books, 1998. Print.
- . *Nicomachean Ethics*. 1926. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999. Print. Loeb Classical Library 73.
- . *On Interpretation*. 1938. Trans. H. P. Cooke. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999. Print. Loeb Classical Library 325.
- . *De Anima [On the Soul]*. 1964. Trans. W. S. Hett. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1975. Print. Loeb Classical Library 288.
- . *Poetics*. 1987. Trans. Stephen Halliwell. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005. Print. Loeb Classical Library 199.
- . *Posterior Analytics*. 1960. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004. Print. Loeb Classical Library 391.
- . *Prior Analytics*. 1938. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1999. Print. Loeb Classical Library 325.
- . [anonymous]. *Rhetoric to Alexander [Rhetorica ad Alexandrum]*. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1957. Print. Loeb Classical Library 317.
- . *On Sophistical Refutations*. 1955. Trans. E.S. Forester. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004. Print. Loeb Classical Library 400.
- . *Topics [Topica]*. 1960. Trans. E.S. Forester. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004. Print. Loeb Classical Library 391.
- Augustine, Aurelius, Bishop of Hippo. *The Confessions of St. Augustine*. Trans. E. B. Pusey. London: J.M. Dent, 1907. James J. O'Donnell (Georgetown U), Augustine: Texts and Translations. Web. 1 Jul. 2009. <<http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jod/augustine/>>.

- . *De Doctrina Christiana* [*On Christian Teaching*]. 1930. Trans. Thérèse Sullivan. *S. Aureli Augustini De Doctrina Christiana Liber IV: A Commentary with a Revised Text, Introduction, and Translation. Patristic Studies 23* (1930). Rpt. in Enos and Thompson 33-183. Print.
- . *De Trinitate* [*On the Holy Trinity*]. 1887. Trans. Arthur West Haddan. New York: Christian Literature Publ. Co., 1890. Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Web. 16 Jun. 2009. <<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/mpnf103.html>>.
- Cicero. *Academica*. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1933. Print. Loeb Classical Library 268.
- . *Brutus*. Trans. G.L. Hendrickson. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1939. Print. Loeb Classical Library 342.
- . *De Inventione* [*On Invention*]. Trans. H. M. Hubbell. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1949. Print. Loeb Classical Library 386.
- . *De Oratore* [*On the Orator*]. Trans. G.L. Hendrickson. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1939. Print. Loeb Classical Library 342.
- . [anonymous]. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Trans. Harry Caplan. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1954. Print. Loeb Classical Library 403.
- Demetrius. *Demetrius On Style*. Trans. Doreen C. Innes (Based on W. Rhys Roberts). Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005. Print. Loeb Classical Library 199.
- Diogenes Laërtius. *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: A Digital Library of Greek Literature*. U of California, Irvine. Web. 15 Jan. 2011. <<http://www.tlg.uci.edu/>>.

- Dionysius of Halicarnassus. *Lysias. Critical Essays*. Trans. Stephen Usher. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1974. Print. Loeb Classical Library 465.
- . *On Literary Composition*. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition: Being the Greek Text of the De Compositione Verborum*. London: Macmillan, 1910. Web. 30 Aug. 2010. *Internet Archive, American Libraries*. <<http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924026465165>>.
- Dionysius Thrax. *Art of Grammar* [Greek text]. Bibliotheca Augustana. Web. 10 Aug. 2010. <http://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/graeca/Chronologia/S_ante02/DionysiosThrax/dio_tech.html>. *The Grammar of Dionysios Thrax*. Trans. Thomas Davidson. St. Louis: Studley, 1874. Rpt. from *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Open Library. Web. 10 Aug. 2010. <http://openlibrary.org/books/OL13509413M/grammar_of_Dionysios_Thrax>.
- Isocrates. *Against the Sophists*. Trans. George Norlin. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000. Print. Loeb Classical Library 227.
- . *Antidosis*. Trans. George Norlin. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000. Print. Loeb Classical Library 227.
- . *Evagoras*. Trans. George Norlin. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1956. Print. Loeb Classical Library 373.
- Plato. *Gorgias*. 1925. Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996. Print. Loeb Classical Library 166.
- . *Phaedrus*. 1914. Trans. Harold North Fowler. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005. Print. Loeb Classical Library 36.
- . *Protagoras*. Trans. W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1977. Print. Loeb Classical Library 165.

Plutarch. *Lives*. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge: Harvard UP. *The Perseus Digital Library*.

Ed. Gregory Crane. Tufts U. Web. 30 Aug. 2010.

<<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collections>>.

---. *Moralia*. Trans. Bernadotte Perrin. Cambridge: Harvard UP. *LacusCurtius*. Ed. William P.

Thayer. U of Chicago. Web. 30 Aug. 2010. <<http://www.attalus.org/info/moralia.html>>.

Quintilian. *Institutes of Oratory* [*Institutio Oratoria*]. Trans. Rev. John Selby Watson. London:

H.G. Bohn, 1856. *Quintilian's Institutes of Oratory*. Ed. Lee Honeycutt. Iowa State U. 15

Jan. 2007. Web. 30 Aug. 2010. <<http://honeyl.public.iastate.edu/quintilian/>>.

Strabo. *Geography*. Trans. H.L. Jones. Loeb Classical Library, 8 vols. *The Perseus Digital*

Library. Ed. Gregory Crane. Tufts U. Web. 8 Jul. 2010.

<<http://classics.mit.edu/Strabo/strab.6.html>>.

Suidas [anonymous]. *Suda*. *Suda On Line*. Sr. Ed. David Whitehead. Web. 10 Jul. 2010.

<<http://www.stoa.org/sol/>>.

Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. Rev. Ed. Trans. Rex Warner. London:

Penguin Books, 1972. Print.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Abrams, M. H. *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition*. Oxford:

Oxford UP, 1953. Print.

Adamik, Tomás. "Aristotle's Theory of the Period." *Philologus* 128 (1984): 184-201. *JSTOR*.

Web. 15 Feb. 2009.

Adler, Mortimer J. *Aristotle for Everybody: Difficult Thought Made Easy*. New York:

Touchstone, 1978, 1997. Print.

- Agnew, Lois. "The Classical Period." *The Present State of Scholarship in the History of Rhetoric: A Twenty-First Century Guide*. Eds. Lynée Lewis Gaillet with Winifred Bryan Horner. Columbia, MO: U of Missouri P, 2010. 5-41. Print.
- Anderson, Floyd Douglas. "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean and its Relationship to Rhetoric." *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 34 (1968): 100-07. JSTOR. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- "Aristotle's Lykeion Found in Athens?" *Anistoriton* 1 (Oct. 1997) A972. Web. 1 Jan. 2011.
<<http://www.anistor.gr/english/enback/index.htm>>.
- Arnhart, Larry. *Aristotle on Political Reasoning: A Commentary on the "Rhetoric."* DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 1981. Print.
- Atwill, Janet M. *Rhetoric Reclaimed: Aristotle and the Liberal Arts Tradition*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1998. Print.
- Auerbach, Erich. *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*. 50th Anniversary Ed. Trans. Willard Trask. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003. Print.
- Bakhtin, M. M. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Trans. Vern W. McGee. Ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1986. Print.
- Ballif, Michelle, and Michael G. Moran, eds. *Classical Rhetorics and Rhetoricians: Critical Studies and Sources*. Westport, CN: Praeger, 2005. Print.
- Barnes, Jonathan, ed. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984. Print.
- , Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, eds. *Articles on Aristotle: Psychology and Aesthetics*. London: Duckworth, 1979. Print.
- Berlin, James A. "Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories." *College English* 44.8 (1982): 765-77. JSTOR. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.

- Birdsall, J.N. "Logos." *New Bible Dictionary*. Ed. I. Howard Marshall, et. al. 3rd ed. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity P, 1996. 693-694. Print.
- Bitzer, Lloyd. "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 45 (1959): 399-408. Rpt. in Enos and Agnew 179-91. Print.
- . "Rhetoric and Public Knowledge." *Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration*. Ed. Don M. Burks. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue UP, 1978. 67-93. Print.
- Bizzell, Patricia, and Bruce Herzberg, eds. *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present*. 2nd ed. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2001. Print.
- Black, Max. *Models and Metaphors*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1962. Print.
- Blettner, Elizabeth. "Asyndeton in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 16 (1983): 49-54. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Bonner, Robert, and Gertrude Smith. *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*. 2 vols. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1930-1938. Print.
- Booth, Wayne C. *The Rhetoric of Fiction*. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983. Print.
- Braet, A. C. "Aristotle's Almost Unnoticed Contribution to the Doctrine of Stasis." *Mnemosyne* 52 (1999): 408-435. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Brandes, Paul D. *A History of Aristotle's "Rhetoric"*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow, 1989. Print.
- Bremmer, Jan. *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*. Beckenham, UK: Croom Helm, 1989. *Google Books*. Web. 24 Jun. 2010.
- Burke, Kenneth. "Colloquy: The Party Line." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 62.1 (Feb. 1976): 62-68. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Oct. 2010.
- . *A Grammar of Motives*. 1945. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. Print.

- . *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*. 3rd ed. Berkeley: U of California P, 1973. Print.
- Burkert, Walter. "Aristoteles im Theater: Zur Datierung des 3. Buch der *Rhetorik* und *Poetik*." *Museum Helveticum* 32.67-72. Print.
- Burnyeat, M.F. "Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion." Furley and Nehamas 3-55. Print.
- Butler, Paul. *Out of Style: Reanimating Stylistic Study in Composition and Rhetoric*. Logan: UT: Utah State UP, 2008. Print.
- Carawan, E. M. "Erotesis: Interrogation in the Courts of Fourth-Century Athens." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 24.3 (1983): 209-26. Print.
- Caston, Victor. "Why Aristotle Needs Imagination." *Phronesis* 41.1 (1996): 20-55. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Chadwick, Henry, trans. *Saint Augustine, Confessions* [translation, introduction, and notes]. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991. Print.
- Chroust, Anton-Hermann. "Aristotle's Earliest Course of Lectures on Rhetoric." *L'Antiquité Classique* 33(1964): 58-72. Rpt. in Erickson 22-36. Print.
- Clark, Donald Lemen. *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education*. New York: Columbia UP, 1959. Print.
- Clayton, Edward W. "The Audience for Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Rhetorica* 22 (2004): 183-203. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Cole, A. Thomas. *The Origins of Greek Rhetoric*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1991. Print.
- Connors, Robert J., Lisa S. Ede, and Andrea A. Lunsford, eds. *Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1994. Print.

- . "The Revival of Rhetoric in America." Connors, Ede, and Lunsford 1-15. Print.
- Connors, Robert J. "The Rise and Fall of the Modes of Discourse." *College Composition and Communication* 32.4 (1981): 444-455. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Consigny, Scott. "The Styles of Gorgias." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 22.3 (1992): 43-53. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Oct. 2010.
- . "Transparency and Displacement: Aristotle's Concept of Rhetorical Clarity." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 17 (1987): 413-19. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Cooper, Lane. "Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.16.1417b, 16-20." *American Journal of Philology* 50 (1929): 170-80. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- . Introduction. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle: An Expanded Translation with Supplementary Examples for Students of Composition and Publish Speaking*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932, 1960. xvii-xxviii. Print.
- . "A Pun in the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle" [at 3.11, 1412a33-1412b3]. *American Journal of Philology* 41.1 (1920): 48-56. Print.
- . "The Rhetoric of Aristotle." *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 21.1 (1935): 10-19. Print.
- Cope, E. M. *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices*. London and Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1867. Rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1970. *Google Books*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- . *The Rhetoric of Aristotle with a Commentary*. 3 vols. Ed. J. E. Sandys. London and Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1877. Rpt. Hildesheim: Olms, 1970. *Google Books*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Corbett, Edward P.J. *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print.

- Crider, Scott F. *The Office of Assertion: An Art of Rhetoric for the Academic Essay*. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2007. Print.
- Davis, Janet B. "Translating Gorgias in (Aristotle) 980a10." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 30 (1997): 32-. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Dearin, Ray. D. "The Fourth *Stasis* in Greek Rhetoric." *Rhetoric and Communication*. Ed. Jane Blankenship, and Herman G. Stelzner. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1976. 3-16. Print.
- Denniston, J. D. *Greek Prose Style*. New York: Oxford UP, 1952. Print.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. 1967. Trans. G. C. Spivak. Rev. ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997. Print.
- . "While Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." 1971. *Margins of Philosophy*. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982. 207-271. Print.
- De Saussure, Ferdinand. *Course in General Linguistics*. 1915. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Print.
- Diels, Hermann. "Über das Dritte Buch der Aristotelischen Rhetorik." *Abhandlungen der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Philologische-Historische Klasse*, 1886. IV.11-16. Print.
- Dieter, Otto Alvin Loeb. "Stasis." *Communication Monographs* [formerly *Speech Monographs*] 17.4 (1950): 345-69. Rpt. in Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 211-41. Print.
- Dominik, William J., and Jon C. R. Hall, eds. *A Companion to Roman Rhetoric*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. Print.
- Dover, K. J. *The Evolution of Greek Prose Style*. New York: Oxford UP, 1997. Print.
- Eco, Umberto. *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984. Print.

- Edel, Abraham. *Aristotle and His Philosophy*. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1982. Print.
- Edmonds, John Maxwell. *The Fragments of Attic Comedy*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1961. *Google Books*. Web. 28 Jun. 2010.
- Else, Gerald F. *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry*. Ed. Peter Burian. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1986. Print.
- Enos, Richard Leo. "Ciceronian *Dispositio* as an Architecture for Creativity in Composition: A Note for the Affirmative." *Rhetoric Review* 4.1 (1985): 108-10. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Oct. 2010.
- . "Classical Rhetoric." Graduate Seminar. Texas Christian University. Fort Worth. 2006. Lecture.
- . "The Classical Tradition(s) of Rhetoric: A Demur to the Country Club Set." *College Composition and Communication* 38.3 (1987): 283-290. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- . "The Epistemology of Gorgias' Rhetoric: A Reexamination." *The Southern Speech Communication Journal* 42 (1976): 35-51. *JSTOR*. Web. 23 Oct. 2010.
- . *Greek Rhetoric Before Aristotle*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1995. Print.
- , and Ann M. Blakeslee. "The Classical Period." *The Present State of Scholarship in Historical and Contemporary Rhetoric*. Ed. Winifred Bryan Horner. Columbia, MO: U of Missouri P, 1990. 9-44. Print.
- , and Lois Peters Agnew, eds. *Landmark Essays On Aristotelian Rhetoric*. Mahwah, NJ: Hermagoras Press, 1998. Print.
- . *The Literate Mode of Cicero's Legal Rhetoric*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988. Print.
- , and Janice M. Lauer. "The Meaning of *Heuristic* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Its Implication for Contemporary Rhetorical Theory." Enos and Agnew 203-12. Print.

- , ed. "The Most Significant Passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: Five Nominations." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 12 (1982): 2-20. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- , and Elizabeth Odoroff. "The Orality of the 'Paragraph' in Greek Rhetoric." *Pre/Text* 6 (1985): 51-65. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- . "The Persuasive and Social Force of Logography in Ancient Greece." *Central States Speech Journal* 25 (Spr. 1974): 4-10. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- , and Roger C. Thompson, Amy K. Hermanson, Drew M. Loewe, Kristi Schwertfeger Serrano, Lisa Michelle Thomas, Sarah L. Yoder, David Elder, and John W. Burkett. *The Rhetoric of St. Augustine of Hippo: De Doctrina Christiana and the Search for a Distinctly Christian Rhetoric*. Waco, TX: Baylor UP, 2009. Print.
- , *Roman Rhetoric: Revolution and the Greek Influence*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1995.
- Enos, Theresa, ed. *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric and Composition: Communication from Ancient Times to the Information Age*. New York: Garland, 1996. Print.
- Erickson, Keith V., ed. *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow P, 1974. Print.
- . "The Lost Rhetorics of Aristotle." *Communication Monographs* [formerly *Speech Monographs*] 43 (1976): 229-37. Rpt. in Enos and Agnew 3-13. Print.
- . *Plato: True and Sophistic Rhetoric*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1979. Print.
- Erlich, Howard S. "The Congruence of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*." *Southern Speech Communication Journal* 38 (1973): 362-70. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Fahnestock, Jeanne. "Aristotle and Theories of Figuration." Gross and Walzer 166-84. Print.
- Farrell, Thomas B. *Norms of Rhetorical Culture*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1993. Print.

Fish, Stanley. *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities*.

Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980. Print.

Fisher, Walter R. *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 1989. Print.

Fleming, Edward G. "A Comparison of Cicero and Aristotle on Style." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 4.1 (1918): 61-71. Print.

Florescu, Vasile. *La retorica nel suo sviluppo storico*. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1971. Print.

Flory, Dan. "Stoic Psychology, Classical Rhetoric, and Theories of Imagination in Western Psychology." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 29.2 (1996): 147-67. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.

Fortenbaugh, William W. *Aristotle on Emotion*. London: Duckworth, 1975. Print.

---. "Aristotle's Accounts of Persuasion through Character." *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*. Ed. Johnstone, Christopher Lyle. Albany: State U of New York P, 1996. 147-68. Print.

---. "Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*." *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*. Ed. Ian Worthington. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007. 107-23. Print.

---. "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude Towards Delivery." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986): 1-22. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.

---. "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970): 40-70. Rpt. in Erickson 205-234, and in Barnes et al. 133-53. Print.

---. "Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetorical Doctrine." *Rhetorica* 23.1 (2005): 37-64. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.

---, and D.C. Mirhady, eds. *Peripatetic Rhetoric After Aristotle*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994. Print.

- . "Theophrastus on Delivery." *Rutgers University Studies* 2 (1985): 269-88. Print.
- . *Theophrastean Studies*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2003. Print.
- Foss, Sonja K. *Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice*. 4th ed. Long Grove, IL: Waveland, 2009, Print.
- Fowler, R. L. "Aristotle on the Period (Rhet. 3.9)." *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982): 89-99. Print.
- Freier, Mark. "Time Measured by *Kairos* and *Kronos*." Whatif Enterprises, LLC. Web. 2 Dec. 2010. <<http://www.whatifenterprises.com/whatif/whatiskairos.pdf>>.
- Furley, David J. and Alexander Nehamas, eds. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1994. Print.
- Gabin, Rosalind J. "Aristotle and the New Rhetoric: Grimaldi and Valesio—A Review Essay." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20.3 (1987): 170-82. Print.
- Gaines, Robert N. "Aristotle's Rhetorical Rhetoric?" *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986): 194-200. Print.
- Garver, Eugene. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1994. Print.
- . "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a Work of Philosophy." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986): 1-22. Print.
- Garver, Newton. Preface. *Speech and Phenomena*. By Jacques Derrida. Trans. David Allison. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973. ix-xxix. Print.
- Gayle, John K. *burkettcommentary*. Web log. 11 Nov. 2010. Web. 15 Nov. 2010. <<http://burkettcommentary.blogspot.com/>>.
- . "A Feminist Rhetorical Translating of the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle." Diss. Texas Christian Univ., 2008. Print.

- Geanakopulos, Deno John. *Greek Scholars in Venice: Studies in the Dissemination of Greek Learning from Byzantium to Western Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962. Print.
- Genette, Gérard. *Figures of Literary Discourse*. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Columbia UP, 1982. Print.
- González, José M. "The Meaning and Function of *Phantasia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III.1." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 136 (2006): 99-131. JSTOR. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Graff, Richard. "Reading and the 'Witten Style' in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 21 (2001): 502-09. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Green, Lawrence D. "Aristotelian *Lexis* and Renaissance *Elocutio*." *Gross and Walzer* 149-65. Print.
- . "The Reception of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the Renaissance." *Fortenbaugh and Mirhady*. 320-348. Print.
- . *John Rainolds's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Edited, translated, and commentary by Lawrence D. Green. Newark, NJ: U of Delaware P, 1986. Print.
- Grimaldi, William M. A., S.J. *Aristotle's Rhetoric: A Commentary*. 2 vols. New York: Fordham UP, 1980, 1988. Print.
- . "The Aristotelian Topics." *Traditio* 14 (1958): 1-16. Rpt. in Erickson 176-93. Print.
- . "The Enthymeme in Aristotle." Diss. Princeton U, 1955. Print.
- . "How Do We Get from Corax-Tisias to Plato-Aristotle in Greek Rhetorical Theory?" *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*. Ed. Christopher Lyle Johnstone. Albany: State U of New York P, 1996. 19-43. Print.
- . "Rhetoric and Philosophy in Aristotle." *The Classical Journal* 53.8 (1958): 371-75. Print.

- . "Rhetoric and Truth: A Note on Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1355a 21-24." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 11 (1978): 173-77. Print.
- . "Semeion, Tekmerion, and Eikos in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *American Journal of Philology* 101.4 (1980): 383-98. Print.
- . *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric*. *Hermes: Zeitschrift für Klassische Philologie* 25. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972. Rpt. in Enos and Agnew 15-159. Print.
- . Rev. of *Aristotelis Topica et Sophistici Elenchi*, ed. W. D. Ross. *American Journal of Philology* 81.3 (1960): 315-22. Print.
- Gross, Alan G. "The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 34 (2001): 275-291. Print.
- , and Arthur E. Walzer, eds. *Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2000. Print.
- Groupe μ [J. Dubois, et al.]. *A General Rhetoric*. Trans. P. B. Burrell and E. M. Slotkin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981. Print.
- Grube, G. M.A. "Thrasymachus, Theophrastus, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus." *American Journal of Philology* 73 (1952): 251-67. Print.
- Gumpel, Liselotte. *Metaphor Reexamined: A Non-Aristotelian Perspective*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984. Print.
- Haley, Michael Cabot. *The Semeiosis of Poetic Metaphor*. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988. Print. Peirce Studies 4.
- Halliwel, Stephen. Introduction. *Poetics*. By Aristotle. Trans. Stephen Halliwel. LCL 199. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2005. 3-26. Print.

- . "Style and Sense in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Book 3." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 47.184 (1993): 50-69. Print.
- Harris, H.A. "A Simile in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (III. 9. 6)." *Classical Review* New Ser., 24.2 (1974): 178-79. Print.
- Haskins, Ekaterina V. *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle*. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 2004. Print.
- Hauser, Gerald A. "The Example in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: Bifurcation or Contradiction?" *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 78-90. Rpt. in Erickson 156-68. Print.
- . "Aristotle's Example Revisited." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 18 (1985): 171-79. Print.
- Havelock, Eric A. *The Muse Learns to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the Present*. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1986. Print.
- . *Preface to Plato*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1963, 1982. Print.
- . "The Preliteracy of the Greeks." *New Literary History* 8.3 (1977): 369-91. *JSTOR*. Web. 30 Jun. 2010.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics [Einführung in die Metaphysik]*. 1935. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale UP, 2000. Print.
- Hendrickson, George L. "The Peripatetic Mean of Style and the Three Stylistic Characters." *American Journal of Philology* 25.2 (1904): 125-46. Print.
- . "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style." *American Journal of Philology* 26.3 (1905): 249-90 and 376. Print.
- Hill, Forbes. "The Amoralism of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 22 (1981): 133-47. Print.

- . "Aristotle's Rhetorical Theory, With a Synopsis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric*. 3rd ed. Eds. James J. Murphy and Richard A. Katula, with Forbes I. Hill and Donovan J. Ochs. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003. 59-125. Print.
- Holland, L. Virginia. *Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric*. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1959. Print.
- Hornblower, Simon, and Anthony Spawforth, eds. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd ed. rev. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.
- Howell, Wilbur Samuel. "The Method of Dialogue in Dante's *Inferno*." Diss. Cornell U, 1931.
- . *Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic: Studies in the Basic Disciplines of Criticism*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1975. Print.
- Howland, R. L. "The Attack on Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*." *Classical Quarterly* 31.3/4 (1937): 151-59. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Dec. 2010.
- Hughes, Richard E. "The Contemporaneity of Classical Rhetoric." *Landmark Essays on Rhetorical Invention in Writing*. Ed. Richard E. Young and Yameng Liu. Davis, CA: Hermagoras P, 1994. 37-50. Print.
- Huseman, Robert C. "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean: Implications for Rhetorical Style." *Western Speech* 34.2 (1970): 115-21. Print.
- . "Aristotle's System of Topics." Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 191-99. Print.
- Innes, Doreen C. "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style." *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work*. New Brunswick: Transaction Book, 1985. Print.
- Jacoby, Felix. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1923-58. *Google Books*. Web. 24 Jun. 2010.

Jaeger, Werner. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. 3 vols. 2nd ed. Trans. Gilbert Highet.

New York: Oxford UP, 1945. Print.

---. "The Rhetoric of Isocrates and Its Cultural Ideal." Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 119-41. Print.

Johnson, Samuel. *A Dictionary of the English Language: In which the Words are Deduced from*

their Originals, and Illustrated in their Different Significations by Examples from the

Best Writers. 9th ed. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1805. *Google Books*.

Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Jordan, William J. "Aristotle's Concept of Metaphor in Rhetoric." Erickson 235-50. Print.

Kassel, Rudolf. *Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik: Prolegomena zu einer Kritischen*

Ausgabe. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1971. Print.

Kauffman, Charles. "Poetic as Argument." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 67 (1981): 407-15.

Print.

Kennedy, George A. "Aristotle on the Period." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 63

(1958): 283-288. Print.

---. *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*.

2nd ed. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1999. Print.

---. *Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction*. New York: Oxford

UP, 1997. Print.

---. "A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 25.1

(1992): 1-21. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan. 2011.

---. *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994. Print.

---, et al. "Responses to George A. Kennedy's *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic*

Discourse." *Rhetoric in the Vortex of Cultural Studies*. Rhetoric Society of America,

- Proceedings of the Fifth Biennial Conference, May 21-23, 1992. Ed. Arthur Walzer. St. Paul, MN: Rhetoric Soc. of Amer., 1993. 223-46. Print.
- . "Reworking Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*. Ed. Christopher Lyle Johnstone. Albany: State U of New York P, 1996. 169-84. Print.
- . "Theophrastus (c. 370 – c. 285 B.C.)" Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 203-10. Print.
- . "Theophrastus and Stylistic Distinctions." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 62 (1957): 92-104. Print.
- . "Two Contributions to Aristotelian Studies." *American Journal of Philology* 111.1 (1990): 86-91. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Killeen, J.F. "Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1413a." *Classical Philology* 76 (1971): 186-87. Print.
- Kinneavy, James L. *Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith: An Inquiry*. New York: Oxford UP, 1987. Print.
- , and Catherine Eskin. "*Kairos* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Written Communication* 17.3 (July 2000): 432-444. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- . *A Theory of Discourse: the Aims of Discourse*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. Print.
- . "William Grimaldi—Reinterpreting Aristotle." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 20 (1987): 183-200. Rpt. in Enos and Agnew 161-75. Print.
- Kirby, John T. "Aristotle on Metaphor." *American Journal of Philology* 118.4 (1997): 517-54. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Kolln, Martha. *Rhetorical Grammar: Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects*. 5th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. Print.

- Kreeft, Peter. *Socratic Logic: A Logic Text Using Socratic Method, Platonic Questions, and Aristotelian Principles*. 2nd ed. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's P, 2005. Print.
- Lakoff, George. "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor." Ortony 202-52. Print.
- . "Image Metaphors." *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 2/3 (1987): 219-22. Print.
- . "The Meanings of Literal." *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity* 1/4 (1986): 291-96. Print.
- , and Mark Johnson. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980, 2003. Print.
- , and Mark Turner. *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990. Print.
- Lawson-Tancred, Hugh C. Introduction. *Aristotle, "The Art of Rhetoric."* Trans. Hugh C. Lawson-Tancred. London: Penguin Books, 1991. 1-61. Print.
- LeFevre, Karen Burke. *Invention as a Social Act*. Studies in Writing and Rhetoric. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987. Print.
- Leff, Michael C. "The Uses of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in Contemporary American Scholarship." *Argumentation* 7 (1993): 313-27. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Lending, Jona. "Herodotus of Halicarnassus." *Livius: Articles on Ancient History*. Web. 1 Mar. 2010. <<http://www.livius.org/>>.
- Levin, Samuel R. "Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 15 (1982): 24-46. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Lewis, C. S. *The Oxford History of English Literature*. Vol. 3 [*English Literature in the Sixteenth Century excluding Drama*]. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954. Print.
- Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones, and Roderick McKenzie, eds. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Rev. and augm. with Supplement. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996. CD-ROM.

- Lienhard, Joseph T. "A Note on the Meaning of *Pistis* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *American Journal of Philology* 87.4 (1966): 446-54. Print.
- Lindsay, Stan A. *Implicit Rhetoric: Kenneth Burke's Extension of Aristotle's Concept of Entelechy*. Lanham, MD: UP of America, 1998. Print.
- Liu, Yameng. "Aristotle and the Stasis Theory: A Reexamination." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 21.1 (1991): 53-59. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Jul. 2010.
- Lloyd, G.E.R. *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought*. New York: Cambridge UP, 1968. Print.
- Lord, Carnes. "The Intention of Aristotle's 'Rhetoric.'" *Hermes* 109.3 (1981): 326-39. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Jul. 2010.
- . "On the Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus." *The American Journal of Philology* 107.2 (1986): 137-61. *JSTOR*. Web. 7 Jul. 2010.
- Lunsford, Andrea A., and Lisa S. Ede. "On Distinctions Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric." *Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*. Eds. Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede, and Andrea A. Lunsford. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. 37-49. Print.
- MacKay, L.A. "Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, 16, 11 (1417b12-20)." *American Journal of Philology* 74.3 (1953): 281-86. Print.
- Martin, Prestonia Mann. *The Most Important Question in the World: Is Mankind Advancing?* New York: Baker and Taylor, 1910. Print.
- McBurney, James H. "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory." Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 169-90. Print.

- McCall, Marsh H., Jr. *Ancient Rhetorical Theories of Simile and Comparison*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1969. Print.
- Merlan, Philip. "Isocrates, Aristotle, and Alexander the Great." *Historia* 3 (1954): 68-69. Print.
- Miller, Bernard A. "Retrieving a Sophistic Sense of *Doxa*." *Rhetoric in the Vortex of Cultural Studies*. Rhetoric Society of America, Proceedings of the Fifth Biennial Conference, May 21-23, 1992. Ed. Arthur Walzer. St. Paul, MN: Rhetoric Soc. of Amer., 1993. 32-41. Print.
- Modrak, Deborah K. *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning*. New York: Cambridge UP, 2001. Print.
- Molette, Carlton. "Aristotle's Union of Rhetoric and Dramatic Theory." *Southern Speech Journal* 34 (1968): 47-54. Print.
- Moran, Richard. "Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the *Rhetoric*." Rorty 385-98. Print.
- Mulroy, David. *The War Against Grammar*. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 2003. Print.
- Murchland, Bernard. "Aristotle, Metaphor, and the Task of Philosophy." *Dictima* 3 (1975): 95-104. Print.
- Murphy, James J. "The Metarhetoric of Aristotle, with Some Examples from His *On Memory and Recollection*." *Rhetoric Review* 21.3 (2002): 213-28. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Nadeau, Raymond. "Some Aristotelian and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stases." *Communication Monographs* [formerly *Speech Monographs*] 26 (1959): 248-54. Enos and Agnew 193-201. Print.
- Natanson, Maurice. "The Arts of Indirection." *Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration*. Ed. Don M. Burks. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue UP, 1978. 35-47. Print.

- Newman, Sarah J. "Aristotle and Metaphor: His Theory and its Practice." Diss. U of Minnesota, 1998. Print.
- . "Aristotle's Notion of 'Bringing-Before-the Eyes': Its Contributions to Aristotelian and Contemporary Conceptualization of Style and Audience." *Rhetorica* 20 (2002): 1-23.
- . *Aristotle and Style*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2005. Print.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich. "On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense." 1873. Trans. Maximilian A. Muegge. *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Ed. Oscar Levy. Vol. 2. New York: Russell and Russell, 1964. 171-92. Print.
- Nikolaides, A.G. "Aristotle's Treatment of the Concept of *Proatês*" [Humility]. *Hermes* 110 (1982): 414-22. Print.
- Nimis, Steve. "Aristotle's Analogical Metaphor." *Arethusa* 21 (1988): 214-25. Print.
- Noel, Jana. "*Phronesis* and *Phantasia*: Teaching with Wisdom and Imagination." *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 33.2 (1999): 277-86. Print.
- North, Helen. *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1966. Print.
- Novak, Joseph A. "A Sense of Eidos." *EIDOS: Canadian Graduate Journal of Philosophy*. 1-6. U of Waterloo. Web. 7 Mar. 2008. <<http://www.eidos.uwaterloo.ca/pdfs/novak-eidos.pdf>>.
- Nussbaum, Martha. "Review of Rudolf Kassel's *Der Text der Aristotelischen Rhetorik: Prolegomena zu e. krit.*, and *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*. Text griech, edited by Rudolfus Kassel." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 63.3 (1981): 346-350. Print.
- Ochs, Donovan J. "Aristotle's Concept of Formal Topics." *Speech Monographs* 36.4 (1969): 419-25. Rpt. in Erickson 194-204. Print.

- O’Gorman, Ned. “Aristotle’s *Phantasia* in the *Rhetoric*: *Lexis*, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of Discourse.” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 38 (2005): 16-40. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Ohmann, Richard. “Prolegomena to the Analysis of Prose Style.” *Style in Prose Fiction: English Institute Essays, 1958*. Ed. Harold C. Martin. New York: Columbia UP, 1959. 1-24. Print.
- Ong, Walter J. *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*. New York, Methuen, 1982. Print.
- Ortony, Andrew, ed. *Metaphor and Thought*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. Print.
- Panther, Klaus-Uwe, and Günter Radden, eds. *Metonymy in Language and Thought*. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publ., 1999. Print.
- Patillon, Michel. “Aristotle, Corax, Anaximène, et les Autres dans la *Rhétorique à Alexandre*.” *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 110 (1997):104-125. *JSTOR*. Web. 16 Mar. 2010.
- Peirce, Charles Sanders. “Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs.” *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*. Ed. Justus Buchler. 1940. New York: Dover Books, 1955. 98-119. Print.
- Perelman, Chaïm, and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*. Trans. John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1969.
- Pernot, Laurent. *Rhetoric in Antiquity*. Trans. W.E. Higgins. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic U of America P, 2005. Print.
- Pohlenz, Max. “To Prepon: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Geistes.” *Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen, Philologische-historische Klasse*, 1933. (vols. unnumbered) 53- 92. Print.
- Pomeroy, Ralph. “Aristotle and Cicero: Rhetorical Style.” *Western Speech* 25 (1961): 25-32. Print.

- Poster, Carol. "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Against Rhetoric: Unitarian Reading and Esoteric Hermeneutics." *American Journal of Philology* 118.2 (1997): 219-49. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 Mar. 2009.
- . "(Re)positioning Pedagogy: A Feminist Historiography of Aristotle's *Rhetorica*." *Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle*. Ed. Cynthia A. Freeland. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1998. 327-350. Print.
- Price, Robert. "Some Antistrophes to the *Rhetoric*." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968): 145-64. Rpt. in Erickson 72-89. Print.
- Rabe, Hugo. "De Theophrasti Libris Peri Lexeos." Diss. U of Bonn, 1890. Print.
- Ramage, Edwin S. *Urbanitas: Ancient Sophistication and Refinement*. Norman, OK: U of Oklahoma P, 1973. Print.
- Richards, I.A. *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*. 1936. London: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.
- . *Principles of Literary Criticism*. 1924. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1959. Print.
- Ricœur, Paul. *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*. Trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, S.J. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1977. Print.
- Rist, John M. *The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1989. Print.
- Roberts, Robert C. *Spirituality and Human Emotion*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983. Print.
- Roberts, W. Rhys. *Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism*. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1928. Print.
- . "References to Plato in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Classical Philology* 19.4 (1924): 342-46. Print.

- Robinson, T.M., trans. and ed. *Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi*. New York: Arno Press, 1979. Print.
- Rorty, Amélie Oksenberg, ed. *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996. Print.
- Ross, W. D. *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1955, rpt. 1964. Print.
- Rowland, Robert C., and Deanna F. Womack. "Aristotle's View of Ethical Rhetoric." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 15 (1985): 13-31. Print.
- Rummel, Erika. "Isocrates' Ideal of Rhetoric: Criteria of Evaluation." Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 143-54. Print.
- Schaeffer, John D. *Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism*. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1990. Print.
- Schenkeveld, Dirk M. "*Ta asteia* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: The Disappearance of a Category." Fortenbaugh and Mirhady 1-14. Print.
- Schiappa, Edward. "Did Plato Coin *Rhêtorikê*?" *American Journal of Philology* 111.4 (1990): 457-70. *JSTOR*. Web. 18 Mar. 2009.
- . Introduction. Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* xi-xiv. Print.
- . *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*. 2nd ed. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 2003. Print.
- . "The Importance of George A. Kennedy's *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*." Rev. of George A. Kennedy, trans. *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*. *Rhetoric Review* 11.1 (1992): 206-08. Print.
- . "Sophistic Rhetoric: Oasis or Mirage?" *Rhetoric Review* 10.1 (1991): 5-18. Rpt. in Schiappa, *Landmark Essays* 67-80. Print.

- , and Maureen Taylor. "How Accurate is Plato's Portrayal of Gorgias of Leontini?" *Rhetoric in the Vortex of Cultural Studies*. Rhetoric Society of America, Proceedings of the Fifth Biennial Conference, May 21-23, 1992. Ed. Arthur Walzer. St. Paul, MN: Rhetoric Soc. of Amer., 1993. 23-31. Print.
- , ed. *Landmark Essays on Classical Greek Rhetoric*. Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1994. Print.
- Self, Lois. "Rhetoric and *Phronesis*: The Aristotelian Ideal." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 12 (1979): 130-45. Print.
- Sloane, Thomas O. *On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric*. Washington, D.C.: Catholic U of America P, 1997. Print.
- Smith, J. E. "Time and Qualitative Time." *Review of Metaphysics* 40 (1986): 3-16. Print.
- Smith, William, ed. *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology*. 3 vols. London and Boston, 1849. Rpt. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007. U of Michigan Digital Library Production Service. Web. 11 Jun. 2009. <<http://www.ancientlibrary.com/smith-bio/index.html>>.
- Smyth, Herbert Weir. *Greek Grammar*. 1920. Rev. G.M. Messing. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1984. Print.
- Solmsen, Friedrich. "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric." *American Journal of Philology* 62.1 and 2 (1941): 35-50 and 169-90. Rpt. in Enos and Agnew 215-43. Print.
- . Introduction. *Rhetoric and Poetics*. By Aristotle. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts and Ingram Bywater. New York: Modern Library, 1954. v-xxii. Print.
- . Review of Kassel, *Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica."* *Classical Philology* 74.1 (1979): 68-72. Print.

- Sonkowsky, Robert P. "An Aspect of Delivery in Ancient Rhetorical Theory." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 90 (1959): 256-74. Rpt. in Erickson 251-66. Print.
- Spengel, Leonhard. *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*. 2 vols. Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1867. Print.
- . *Über das Studium der Rhetorik bei dem Alten*. Munich: 1842. *Google Books*. Web. 14 Jun. 2008.
- Speight, Allen. "'Listening to Reason': The Role of Persuasion in Aristotle's Account of Praise, Blame, and the Voluntary." *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 38 (2005): 213-25. *JSTOR*. Web. 15 Feb. 2009.
- Sprague, Rosamond Kent, ed. *The Older Sophists: A Complete Translation by Several Hands of the Fragments in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker Edited by Diels-Kranz with a New Edition of Antiphon and Euthydemus*. Corrected Reprint. New York: Hackett, 2001. Print.
- Stanford, William B. *Greek Metaphor*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1936, 1972. Print.
- . *The Sound of Greek: Studies in the Greek Theory and Practice of Euphony*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1967. Print.
- Sullivan, Thérèse. *S. Aureli Augustini De Doctrina Christiana Liber IV: A Commentary with a Revised Text, Introduction, and Translation*. *Patristic Studies* 23 (1930). Diss. The Catholic U of America, 1930. Rpt. in Enos and Thompson 33-183. Print.
- Swiggers, Pierre. "Cognitive Aspects of Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor." *Glotta* 62 (1984): 40-45. Print.
- Tamba-Mecz, I., and P. Veyne. "Metaphora et comparaison selon Aristotle." *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 92 (1979): 77-98. Print.

Tejera, Victorino. *Aristotle's Organon in Epitome, the Poetics, the Rhetoric, the Analytics:*

Aristotle's Tool-Kit. Lewiston: E. Mellen P, 1996. Print.

Thompson, Wayne N. *Aristotle's Deduction and Induction*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1975. Print.

---. "Stasis in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58.2 (1972): 134-41. Rpt. in Erickson 267-77. Print.

Trevett, J. C. "Aristotle's Knowledge of Athenian Oratory." *Classical Quarterly*. 46.2 (1996): 371-79. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Jul. 2010.

Untersteiner, Mario. *The Sophists*. Trans. Kathleen Freeman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954. Print.

Vickers, Brian. *In Defence of Rhetoric*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. Print.

Vlastos, Gregory. "Socratic Irony." *Classical Quarterly* 37.1 (1987): 79-96. *JSTOR*. Web. 10 Jan. 2011.

Walker, Jeffrey. *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.

Walton, Douglas. "Ad Hominem Arguments." *Argumentation* 15.4 (1998): 503-7. Print.

Weaver, Richard M. *The Ethics of Rhetoric*. 1953. Davis, CA: Hermagoras P, 1985. Print.

---. "Language is Sermonic." Bizzell and Herzberg 1351-60. Print.

---. *A Rhetoric and Handbook*. 1957. New York: William Morrow, 1974. Print.

Williams, Joseph M. *Style: Lessons in Clarity and Grace*. 9th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007. Print.

Wisse, Jakob. *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero*. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989. Print.

Wooten, Cecil W. "The Ambassador's Speech: A Particularly Hellenistic Genre of Oratory." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 59 (1973): 209-12. Print.

---, ed. and trans. *Hermogenes' On Types of Style*. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1987.

Print.

VITA

JOHN WALT BURKETT

PERSONAL

- ☞ Born October 23, 1967, Long Beach, California
- ☞ Son of Thomas B. Burkett, Jr., and Arlyss M. Bishop
- ☞ Married Fawn Houston of Fort Worth, Texas, June 9, 2007
- ☞ One son named after a Hellenistic rhetorician

EDUCATION

- ☞ Diploma, Los Alamitos High School, California, 1985
- ☞ Bachelor of Science, Business Communication, University of Southern California, 1989
- ☞ Master of Arts, Biblical Literature, Reformed Theological Seminary, 1997
- ☞ Master of Arts, English Literature, Mississippi College, 2005
- ☞ Doctor of Philosophy, Rhetoric and Composition, Texas Christian University, 2011

EXPERIENCE

- ☞ First Lieutenant, U.S. Army Medical Corps, Germany 1989-1992
- ☞ Accounting Assistant, Armed Forces Recreation Center, Germany, 1993-1994
- ☞ Teacher, Mississippi School for the Blind, 1997-2002
- ☞ Instructor of Composition, Mississippi College, 2003-2005
- ☞ Writing Center Tutor, Mississippi College, 2003-2005
- ☞ Instructor of ACT Grammar Review, Mississippi College Outreach Program, 2003-2005
- ☞ Teacher, English as a Second Language, First Presbyterian Church, Jackson, 2003-2005
- ☞ Instructor of Composition, Texas Christian University, 2005-2008
- ☞ Instructor of Rhetoric and Composition, The College at Southeastern, 2009-present
- ☞ Director of the Writing Center, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2009-present

MEMBERSHIPS

- ☞ Rhetoric Society of America
- ☞ Southeastern Writing Center Association

ABSTRACT

ARISTOTLE, *RHETORIC* III: A COMMENTARY

by John Walt Burkett, Ph.D., 2011
Department of English
Texas Christian University

Richard Leo Enos, Professor of English

Dan Williams, Professor of English

Ann George, Associate Professor of English

Kirk Gayle, Director of Intensive English Program

This new commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III serves the purpose which the text held at the Classical Lyceum: elucidating Aristotle's theory of style (*lexis*) and arrangement (*taxis*) for scholars, teachers, and practitioners of rhetoric. This commentary provides a much needed update because the last commentary, written by Cambridge classicist E.M. Cope in 1877, is now understood as a misinterpretation that reads Aristotle Platonically, takes seriously only rational appeals, assumes a mimetic theory of language that depreciates style, and misdefines central concepts like the enthymeme and common topics. Providing a new interpretation, this commentary may be summarized by three adjectives: Grimaldian, rhetorical, and accessible. First, this *Grimaldian* commentary applies the new rhetoric philosophy of William M.A. Grimaldi, S.J., which he explicates in *Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle's Rhetoric* (1972) and in his two-volume *Commentary* (1980-1988), wherein Grimaldi develops an integrated and contextual interpretation of the *Rhetoric*. Second, this *rhetorical* commentary observes the rhetoric in the *Rhetoric* since Aristotle typically practices what he teaches: writing with enthymemes, defining by metaphor, clarifying by antithesis, and arranging units by thesis,

analysis, and synthesis. This commentary observes how Aristotle applies his three rhetorical appeals (*êthos*, *pathos*, *logos*), his theories of propriety (*prepon*), exotic (*xenos*), and virtue (*aretê*) in style, and the systems of Greek imagery, all of which develop a unified and interactive theory of invention, style, and arrangement. Attention is given to Aristotle's creative theory of metaphor, being a *tropos* (turn) and a *topos* (place) of invention, functioning as a stylistic syllogism for creating knowledge with quick, pleasant learning. Arrangement also functions creatively with localized topical procedures for responding to the particular needs of each part of a composition. Third, this *accessible* commentary features text, translation, comments, and glossary for readers who may not be familiar with Aristotle's idiom but who have an interest in his rhetorical theory and technical terms. Finally, incorporating recent scholarship, this commentary provides insights from classical rhetoric and new rhetoric, showing their interrelationship and how contemporary research in rhetoric builds on and helps to elucidate Aristotle's expansive rhetoric as a general theory of language.