ALTERNATIVES TO PERSUASION:
AN INVITATION TO REREAD CLASSICAL RHETORIC

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
AddRan College of Liberal Arts
Texas Christian University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts

May, 2011
for Greg Spencer, who first invited me into the study and practice of rhetoric
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Chapter 1—Introduction

Rhetoric has never been a static discipline. Rather, as an art, rhetoric is fluid, crossing borders and boundaries, intersecting disciplines, and weaving throughout history. As Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg point out in their introduction to The Rhetorical Tradition, “Rhetoric has a number of overlapping meanings” (1). Indeed, numerous scholars have attempted to define rhetoric, from Aristotle’s “the faculty of discovering all available means of persuasion” to I.A. Richards’ “the studies of misunderstandings and their remedies.” According to Bizzell and Herzberg, “it is less helpful to define it once and for all than to look at the many definitions it has accumulated over the years” (1). Yet despite the relative difficulty in claiming one definition of rhetoric, classical rhetoric\(^1\) tends to assume a static position, stereotyped as agonistic. To many feminists, classical rhetoric is related to patriarchy and seen as exclusionary and elitist. While these conceptions are true of some instances of classical rhetoric, they are not characteristic of all forms of classical rhetoric.

Ironically, feminism itself is also resistant to definition. Like definitions of rhetoric, feminist perspectives are “numerous, not easily categorized, and not mutually exclusive” (Foss, Griffin, and Foss 118). Though definitions vary considerably, most feminist rhetoric scholars agree that feminist rhetoric seeks to include women in the rhetorical tradition, values a broad range of historical texts so as to include texts by women not typically thought of as rhetorical, focuses on collaboration and cooperation, recognizes multiple perspectives, and seeks to erase boundaries and compartmentalization in favor of reaching common ground (Bizzell, Mattingly, Sutherland). Feminist rhetoric scholars, in efforts to create uniquely feminist rhetorical theories, have sought to “correct” the traditional rhetorical history by

\(^1\) By *classical rhetoric*, I refer to rhetoric from the sophistic movement to Augustine.
including women (Bizzell 51). This new approach to rhetoric also worked to redefine rhetoric, making it inclusive of women, and sought to “generate genuinely new and feminist terms, even by way of opposition, from the male tradition” (Bizzell 54). One such approach was the concept of invitational rhetoric, proposed by Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin in 1995. Invitational rhetoric focuses on creating mutual understanding between audience and rhetor as its main goal, and claims to counter traditional forms of rhetoric, which were focused on persuasion, or moving an audience to accept the rhetor’s point of view.

However, in containing classical rhetoric within an agonistic, violent stereotype, many feminists, including Foss and Griffin, exclude classical rhetoric from feminist rhetoric, forcing these rhetorics into oppositional categories. Despite this characterization, classical rhetoricians such as Quintilian and Augustine promote a theory of rhetoric that is focused on education and gaining understanding, similar to the goals of invitational rhetoric. The respective rhetorics taught by Quintilian and Augustine share many characteristics with invitational rhetoric, revealing the harmonies that can exist between feminist rhetoric and classical rhetoric. This project identifies the correlations between aspects of classical rhetoric and feminist rhetoric, suggesting that not only are these two dimensions of rhetoric compatible, but that by viewing them together, they reveal a similar orientation towards rhetoric as an educational tool that promotes the good. These correlations will demonstrate the relevance of classical rhetoric to modern scholarship, despite the differences in cultural context. Focusing on these areas of commonality and what they seem to offer both classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric will revitalize each respective theory and suggest the need for an alternative theory of rhetoric that is sensitive to the features these rhetorics share.
without limiting its classification to the gender of its authors, reinforcing the feminist value of inclusion.

**Research Questions**

Although feminist rhetorical theories and classical rhetorical theories are usually seen as separate entities with little overlap, viewing these two types of rhetoric as compatible theories can offer new understandings of feminist rhetorics and classical rhetoric. Therefore, this project poses the following questions: What are the relationships between the invitational rhetoric advocated by feminists and the rhetoric of Quintilian and Augustine? Why have the rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine been largely ignored by feminists? What might be gained by reclaiming classical rhetoric for the field of feminist rhetorics? This project is an examination of each of the respective rhetorical theories listed above, illustrating the intersections among them.

**Literature Review**

This study is concerned with three general areas of scholarship: literature on invitational rhetoric, literature on classical rhetoric, and literature on feminist analyses of classical rhetoric. For the literature on invitational rhetoric, I will look at literature that supports invitational rhetoric, literature that criticizes it, and literature that examines ways in which to practice invitational rhetoric. In discussing classical rhetoric, I will focus on literature that details rhetoric as a form of education, the understanding of *ethos*, and classical rhetoricians who offered alternatives to persuasion. When examining connections between feminism and classical rhetoric, I will focus on literature discussing the recovery of women within classical rhetoric, the intersections between classical rhetoric and feminism, and invitational concepts in other (non-feminist) rhetorics, demonstrating that areas of
compatibility already exist between feminist rhetorics and classical rhetoric, and between invitational rhetoric and other non-feminist rhetorics.

A Discussion of Invitational Rhetoric

The Rationale Behind Invitational Rhetoric

Foss and Griffin focus their conception of rhetoric on three principles they claim are essential to feminism: equality, immanent value, and self-determination (4). These principles necessarily require that invitational rhetoric is focused on establishing relationships of equality, acknowledging that every human being is valued and respected, and allowing others to make their own decisions (4). While not completely explicit about their position on persuasion, Foss and Griffin identify persuasion and traditional forms of rhetoric with “a desire for control and domination” of the audience (3). Invitational rhetoric is based largely on the work of Sally Miller Gearhart, whose article “The Womanization of Rhetoric” (first published in 1979) is cited heavily throughout Foss and Griffin’s “Beyond Persuasion” (1995). In her article, Gearhart equates traditional rhetoric and its emphasis on persuasion with violence, linking the intention to change others with “the conquest model of human interaction” (242). In a follow-up to “Beyond Persuasion,” written in 1997, Sonja Foss, Cindy Griffin, and Karen Foss claim invitational rhetoric “contributes to the creation of a non-dominating culture” and seeks “to transform the ideology of domination” through efforts to “reconceptualize, revision, or reconstruct” rhetorical theories believed to contribute to the ideology of domination (119, 130).

Although Foss and Griffin are opposed to the idea of persuasion, they do acknowledge the possibility of transformation as an end result of rhetoric. In their 1994 text Inviting Transformation: Presentational Speaking for a Changing World, Foss and Foss
define transformation as “growth or change,” which they, along with Griffin, insist is
different from the change that results from persuasion. In *Inviting Transformation*, Foss and
Foss also discuss the interactional goal of “securing adherence,” in which “efforts are
directed toward securing the adherence of others to your perspective—to persuading them to
think as you do, to accept your proposal, or to act in ways you believe are most appropriate”
(14-15). Foss and Foss claim this is different from traditional conceptions of persuasion
because in the process of securing adherence, “your aim is not to destroy your opponents and
overpower your audience members and motivate them to adopt your perspective or to act as
you desire,” rather, in invitational rhetoric, the audience is still allowed to “participate fully
in that change process, freely choosing if they will adhere to your claim” (15). Foss and Foss
claim that speakers who use invitation as a rhetorical strategy respect “the integrity and
authority of audience members,” implying an environment of mutual understanding, which
they argue is different from the combative environment produced through traditional
rhetorical practices (4). This section of literature is important to my project because it
illustrates the feminist values inherent in invitational rhetoric. These pieces of literature offer
a rationale for the inclusion of invitational rhetoric as a more widely accepted rhetorical
theory, even outside of feminist circles.

*Criticism of Invitational Rhetoric*

Despite providing a uniquely feminist definition of rhetoric, invitational rhetoric has
been criticized by both rhetoric scholars and feminist scholars alike. Scholars object to
invitational rhetoric’s association of persuasion with violence, its apparent insistence that
invitational rhetoric be used in any situation, its essentialism, its lack of agency, that it
actually functions as “persuasion in disguise” (Bone et al. 435), and that it focuses too much
on the self, which actually counters invitational rhetoric’s goal of *mutual* understanding (Ryan and Natalle 74).

The largest area in which invitational rhetoric has been criticized—by feminists and non-feminists alike—is in its characterization of persuasion, and in its insistence that invitational rhetoric, rather than persuasion, be used in all situations. Mark Pollock et al. (1996) claim Foss and Griffin assume an essentialized definition of persuasion in that persuasion must always be a detrimental outcome (149). According to Pollock et al., Foss and Griffin’s view of persuasion actually works to undermine some of the invitational concepts they espouse. As Pollock et al. point out, “By essentializing persuasion (or, more accurately, the *intent* to persuade), we abstract from it any context of use, ruling out of bounds questions about who speaks to whom, for what reasons, and in what manner” (149). Such assumptions leave out scenarios in which persuasion is necessary, such as convincing a loved one not to commit suicide, or part of the greater good, such as coaxing a woman to leave her abusive husband. Pollock et al. argue that particularly in regards to issues of social justice, certain actions are “preferable to others,” and some injustices are “in urgent need of remediation,” which necessitates efforts to persuade (150). In addition, feminism as a social movement often seeks radical cultural change, which seems difficult to achieve without some form of persuasion.

Other rhetoric scholars, including feminist rhetoric scholars such as Christine Mason Sutherland (2002), have pointed out that in equating persuasion with violence, Foss and Griffin take on an adversarial tone. Sutherland cautions that while many feminists (Foss and Griffin included) have advanced inclusivity as “a virtue in scholarship,” feminists are becoming “selective” in their inclusivity—in “asserting the value of invitational rhetoric,”
feminists are also “obliged” to “deny the value of the traditional form,” excluding these areas of rhetorical study (116). Sutherland suggests that although invitational rhetoric seeks to promote mutual understanding, in insisting that persuasion is a form of violence invitational rhetoric actually does the opposite (116).

Celeste Condit (1997) also objects to the association of persuasion with violence, pointing out that a person’s intent should factor into Foss and Griffin’s account of persuasion. Condit argues that invitational rhetoric should at the very least “attend to the goals behind intentions to change others,” because “intentions to change racists toward greater tolerance of others for the larger benefit of society seem substantially different, even within feminist accounts of care for others, from intentions to change others to increase one’s own influence and power” (105).

Other feminist critics of invitational rhetoric fault it for being too essentialist or “gynocentric” (Dow 110). According to M. Lane Bruner (1996), Foss and Griffin oversimplify argumentation, dividing it into strictly “patriarchal” and “feminist” categories, which assumes that “patriarchal argumentation and feminist argumentation are mutually exclusive ways of arguing” (187). Condit argues that recent scholarship on classical rhetoric has associated the study of rhetoric “as closely aligned with what might classically have been identified as ‘feminine’ attributes as it has been with masculine attributes,” and that the act of studying rhetoric itself “feminized” men (101-102). Bonnie Dow (1995) questions why Foss and Griffin have equated invitational rhetoric with feminism at all, pointing out that while the values Foss and Griffin espouse in their article—equality, immanent value, and self-determination—are often linked with feminism, assuming that all feminists will agree with invitational concepts is essentializing in and of itself (110). Such gynocentric theories, Dow
argues, demand that feminism “reject categorically the possibilities of using existing (and presumably patriarchal) activities and structures to achieve feminist goals, insisting instead that a separate women’s culture is the only way that feminist goals can be realized” (112). Not only do such beliefs “fail to account for crucial differences in feminist theory and politics,” (Dow 113) but such dichotomization “disempowers feminism itself, caus[ing] feminist argumentation to become oxymoronic” (Bruner 187).

Invitational rhetoric is further criticized for lacking agency or action. Richard Fulkerson (1996) claims that there is no end result in invitational rhetoric, there is no movement or change in the audience or the speaker, and “whatever policies and procedures existed prior to the sharing are likely to continue, even sexist, patriarchal ones” (206). In addition, in her article “Complicity as Epistemology: Reinscribing the Historical Categories of ‘Woman’ Through Standpoint Feminism” Maureen Mathison (1997) points out that in its efforts to work towards equality, invitational rhetoric “assumes that all positions are equally valuable, when this is clearly not the case, as shown throughout history” (156). For example, we certainly would not put the same moral value on the dogma of Nazi Germany as we would on the points of President Barack Obama’s new health care bill. Assuming that they are both equally valuable positions would render us immoral. As Fulkerson notes, “the idea that a rhetor must grant unconditional value to all auditors seems highly problematic” and ironically, such efforts to grant equality and immanent value to all participants “leads not just to tolerance but to a complete moral relativism” (205-206).

Additionally, in their critique of invitational rhetoric, Kathleen J. Ryan and Elizabetti J. Natalle (2001) challenge invitational rhetoric’s emphasis on the self or the individual as the center of knowledge, pointing out that it would be impossible to reach new levels of
understanding without stepping outside the self and accepting the influence of external sources (74). In describing their principle of self-determination, Foss and Griffin claim, “self-determination allows individuals to make their own decisions about how they wish to live their lives. Self determination involves the recognition that audience members are the authorities on their own lives” (4). However, in order to learn, to improve, to better ourselves, we must be willing to see the value in someone else’s knowledge and experience, and they must be willing to share that knowledge in a way that is beneficial. If we focus on the self, which Foss and Griffin seem to suggest when describing self-determination, we are actually not open to learning and understanding someone else’s point of view, which counters the goal of invitational rhetoric itself (Ryan and Natalie 74). According to Ryan and Natalie, “if the goal of invitational rhetoric is engagement in dialogue through offering and willingness to yield, yet the participants are communicating based on a subjective position, then a fundamental contradiction is set up and true dialogue is compromised” (73). Because of this problem, Ryan and Natalie argue that invitational rhetoric “falls short as a theoretically useful model of either dialogic communication or alterative rhetoric” (69).

Understanding the criticism of invitational rhetoric is essential to my project because it points out the need to re-examine invitational rhetoric. Scholars (including many feminist scholars) are still trying to figure out how to situate invitational rhetoric within rhetorical theory, even 15 years after its creation, which suggests both that it contributes valuable insights to rhetoric (such as its use of rhetoric in producing understanding, its discussion of the relationship between audience and rhetor, its recognition of the importance of listening in the invention process, and its emphasis on creating an ethical, relational rhetoric) but also that the theory has yet to gain traction in the field of rhetoric.
Attempts to Explain Invitational Rhetoric

As a result of this criticism, most of which was published in the two years immediately following Foss and Griffin’s article, invitational rhetoric has not made a significant impact on creating new rhetorical theories. In fact, there has been very little work done with invitational rhetoric since the 90s, although invitational concepts have been employed in other ways. Krista Ratcliffe’s *Rhetorical Listening* (2005), for example, argues for a rhetoric of listening, which Ratcliffe claims will “promote an understanding of self and other” (26) and will create “a stance of openness that a person may choose to assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” (1). These goals follow very closely with invitational concepts, although Ratcliffe does not cite Foss and Griffin in her text. Interestingly, although invitational rhetoric and rhetorical listening employ many of the same concepts, Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening has been much more widely accepted than invitational rhetoric, though both are feminist theories. However, three views of invitational rhetoric have been proposed to help redeem it as a rhetorical theory: equating invitational rhetoric with dialectics (Sharon D. Downey), relating invitational rhetoric to standpoint hermeneutics (Ryan and Natalle), and viewing invitational rhetoric as a move towards civility (Jennifer Emerling Bone, Griffin, and T. M. Linda Scholz).

Downey (1997) presents invitational rhetoric and traditional constructions of rhetoric as counterparts to each other, much like Aristotle’s relation of rhetoric and dialectics. Downey equates invitational rhetoric with dialectics, which she claims is “concerned with how human understanding and change occur in a world beset by contradictions” (141). Even more importantly, according to Downey, equating invitational rhetoric with dialectics suggests wholeness between two different positions, or that “two oppositional realities can maintain
distinct identities and also work together to transcend those materialities to create a new reality at a greater level of abstraction” (144). Without participation from both parties and a recognition of the need for mutual cooperation, “the value of the dialectic will fall apart” (143). Likewise, Downey argues invitational rhetoric can also be seen in a dialectical position to classical rhetoric, and much like the interdependence that strengthens marital relationships, the seeming contradictions that occur between “feminine” invitational rhetoric and “masculine” classical rhetoric actually serve to strengthen, rather than undermine these respective rhetorics, because invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric are interdependent, and “cannot be defined, enacted, or reaffirmed with any integrity unless that abiding connection is acknowledged” (142). In other words, when invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric can be viewed as counterparts of each other, new possibilities and new realities at greater levels of understanding become possible. For example, when viewed as counterparts to each other, the civic aspect of classical rhetoric is restored. Classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric each serve a civic function in their respective historical moments. Classical rhetoric served a humanizing, civic, and in some ways mediating purpose for Greeks and Romans in Antiquity, and this mediating function is often overwhelmed by classical rhetoric’s association with persuasion. However, when viewed as a counterpart to invitational rhetoric’s orientation toward communication, which promotes civic responsibility and equality, the humanistic tendencies of classical rhetoric are more easily illustrated.

Another attempt at explaining invitational rhetoric involves relating invitational rhetoric to philosophy through standpoint hermeneutics. According to Ryan and Natalle, invitational rhetoric “suffers from a misinterpretation of its epistemological grounding,” a
misinterpretation\textsuperscript{2} that can be remedied through the use of feminist standpoint theory (which stipulates women have a unique standpoint in society that provides the justification for feminist claims) and philosophical hermeneutics, the combination of which Ryan and Natalie term “standpoint hermeneutics” (69). They use Hans Georg Gadamer’s discussion of philosophical hermeneutics in *Truth and Method* to defend invitational rhetoric. Gadamer argues that every “true conversation” involves an effort to reach mutual understanding:

Thus it belongs to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but what he says. What is to be grasped is the substantive rightness of his opinion, so that we can be at one with each other on the subject. Thus we do not relate the other’s opinion to him but to our own opinions and views. (385)

As Ryan and Natalie point out, Gadamer’s definition of conversation employs invitational concepts (79). By relating invitational rhetoric to philosophical hermeneutics, Ryan and Natalie argue that invitational rhetoric *does* lead to action: “Each person is engaged in trying to understand the other person’s ideas and positions,” while realizing it is not possible to “completely know the other” (79). Ryan and Natalie claim “to understand is to act,” nullifying Fulkerson and Mathison’s respective arguments that invitational rhetoric lacks agency.

Jennifer Emerling Bone, Griffin, and T. M. Linda Scholz (2008) argue that invitational rhetoric should be viewed as a move towards civility. Invitational rhetoric is “grounded in

\textsuperscript{2} According to Ryan and Natalie, the misinterpretation involves invitational rhetoric’s premise of “knowing as self-oriented,” which needs to be expanded to “knowing other people” (69).
civility” because it “consists of respecting the audience and reaching an understanding,” even if no agreement is made in the end (449). When invitational rhetoric is viewed in connection with civility, it is easy to see the connections with classical rhetoric, whose goal, according to Donald Lemen Clark, was to successfully “humanize and civilize the young” (264). As an educational tool, classical rhetoric under Quintilian and Augustine sought to bring up students in ways that would allow them to benefit society. Likewise, invitational rhetoric also seeks to promote civility. As Bone, Griffin, and Scholz suggest, “when we speak from a place of invitation, of civility, we cannot pretend that we journey alone, that others are unworthy or without voice, or that our view is the only ‘right’ view” (457). Such an outlook promotes mutual understanding and the civil responsibility that certain dimensions of classical rhetoric espoused.

This body of literature contributes to my study in that it illustrates various attempts to interpret invitational rhetoric. All of the literature in this section hint at possible intersections between invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric, without directly examining the two together. This literature points to the need for such an analysis.

**Classical Rhetoric**

Interestingly, all three attempts to interpret invitational rhetoric previously outlined link invitational rhetoric to classical rhetoric in some way. I propose that this is because invitational rhetoric and certain facets of classical rhetoric share three important concepts: the belief that rhetoric should be educational, the understanding of the importance of *ethos* in the character of the rhetor, and the conviction that rhetoric should produce understanding rather than persuasion. An exhaustive history of classical rhetoric is well beyond the purposes and scope of this project. Therefore, I would like to briefly discuss the
contributions of classical rhetoricians whose use of rhetoric was for educational purposes (rather than judicial or deliberative purposes), which is more equivalent to the uses of invitational rhetoric Foss and Griffin suggest. In choosing to discuss Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine, I realize that I am covering only a small portion of all of classical rhetoric. However, such a limited focus is necessary for the purposes of this project. In addition, when comparing classical rhetoric to invitational rhetoric one must of course account for the dramatically different cultural contexts and political realities of the respective time periods. Rhetoric in Antiquity was typically available only to upper class males and was sometimes used to gain political power, creating a social hierarchy vastly different from the mutual relationship Foss and Griffin propose. However, other forms of rhetoric did exist in the classical tradition, and it is these facets of classical rhetoric that I would like to discuss.

The Role of Rhetoric in Education

When considering the role of rhetoric in Antiquity, it is important to remember that rhetoric also served as an educational tool, a means to train and prepare students for their future roles as responsible citizens. Donald Lemen Clark’s *Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education* discusses the importance of rhetorical training, particularly for students who would later enter careers as advocates (64). The study of rhetoric was so important that George Kennedy claims there were only two areas of “effective human action” in Greek culture: speech and war. Speech, through the study of rhetoric, was the main concern of responsible citizens during a time of peace\(^3\) (11-12). As such, the study of rhetoric was not just meant to prepare students for future careers, but for their future *lives*. Teachers of

\(^3\) As mentioned earlier, many feminists object to classical rhetoric for its association with violence. According to Kennedy, rhetoric was associated with peace, while the “antithesis of the orator had been the man of action, the soldier” (14, emphasis mine).
rhetoric, Clark argues, taught students “how to think well and live well while they teach how to speak well” (64). In fact, the use of rhetoric as an educational method was widely accepted in later Greek and Roman cultures, so much so, Kennedy claims, that the system and practice of rhetoric was completely accepted “as a good in itself” (29).

Isocrates was the first to open a school of rhetoric, recognizing that through such training Athenians had “escaped the life of wild beasts” and were able to establish cities, create laws, and invent arts (75). Not only was rhetoric the fulcrum for civic life, it also played a significant role in supporting moral life. For Isocrates, rhetoric was inextricably linked with morality, and a rhetorical education allowed one to “confute the bad and extol the good” (75). This understanding transformed the study of rhetoric from the Sophistic view of rhetoric as a tool to gain an advantage, to the view of rhetoric as a service to society (Bizzell and Herzberg 71).

Cicero later expounded this view of rhetoric in his De Oratore. In his treatise, Cicero describes the functions of rhetoric as bringing help to the suppliant, raising up those who had been cast down, providing security for the vulnerable, establishing freedom to those in peril, and maintaining civil rights for those wronged (I.viii). The use of rhetoric for Cicero was not to win an argument or establish the rhetor’s superiority. Rather, rhetoric was to be used as a service to society, and those trained in rhetoric had the moral responsibility of defending themselves, and others, against false accusations.  

Rhetorical education then, not only gave students the tools with which to defend others, but also created the moral responsibility necessary to provoke rhetors to that defense.

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4 Note that while many feminists equate classical rhetoric with aggression, Cicero describes it as a tool of defense.
Quintilian, whose *Institutio Oratoria* is considered the most complete discussion of rhetorical education, also focused on the importance of morality in the training of the rhetor. Quintilian’s focus was on making education more humane and more moral, which he believed could be gained through studying rhetoric (Kennedy 40). In fact, as a requisite, the rhetor, according to Quintilian, must be a good man (Kennedy 75). Therefore, in order to even use rhetoric, the rhetor must be of good moral character. The study of rhetoric then, was designed not to equip students with an advantage over others, but to promote “a love for doing well” (XII.xi.31). Rhetorical education under Quintilian continued to provide moral instruction, and students educated in rhetoric were taught to serve others. According to feminist rhetorics scholar Cheryl Glenn, Quintilian was more concerned with moral virtue than even Cicero, and Quintilian’s rhetoric “expands the province of the ideal orator to include being of strong moral character as well, an idea Cicero only implied” (60). Glenn further explains that Quintilian’s educational system was based on his belief “that the purpose of education was to train citizens fully equipped in character, intellect, and all the high qualities of leadership,” and his rhetoric served that purpose (61).

Finally, the rhetoric of Augustine also focuses on rhetoric as an educational tool. For Augustine, it was the duty of the rhetor to “teach what is right, and to correct what is wrong,” (IV.iv.6) to “assist the silent listener,” (IV.x.25) and to “help” the audience toward the good (IV.xxv.55). Instruction, for Augustine, “preceded persuasion” (IV.xxii.28). Also, like Quintilian and others before him, Augustine’s motivation for using rhetoric was one of moral obligation. As Ernest L. Fortin argues, Augustine had a *duty* to teach, because he both wanted others to share in the knowledge he had, and he wanted his students to be able to share their knowledge with others (225-226). Rhetorical education provided a means by
which to share knowledge, motivated by Christian love for the audience, not a means to control or dominate the audience.

By illustrating the educational focus of classical rhetoric, this section of literature offers an alternative to agonistic portrayals of classical rhetoric. The literature in this section also points out that Quintilian and Augustine were not exceptional in their treatment of rhetoric as an educational tool, but rather, the understanding of rhetoric as educational was a common practice in Antiquity. While there are certainly limitations to comparing rhetoric in Antiquity to invitational rhetoric (discussed further in chapter three of this thesis), such as the sometimes-hierarchical relationship between teacher and student, commonalities do exist, and these commonalities offer at least the potential for a more inclusive theory of rhetoric.

Ethos and Establishing a Relationship

An important part of classical rhetorical education was the understanding of the rhetor’s ethos. Ethos, also commonly referred to as the character of the speaker, was seen as “the most authoritative form of persuasion” (Aristotle I.ii.4). In his discussion of ethos, Aristotle lists three reasons why a speaker is persuasive—competence, integrity, and goodwill—and claims “a person seeming to have all these qualities is necessarily persuasive to the hearers” (II.i.5-6, emphasis mine). Even Aristotle, so often noted for his emphasis on logical argument, recognizes the pivotal role that ethos plays in persuasion. It is necessary, Aristotle argues, that the audience perceive a sense of goodwill from the rhetor, that they can trust the rhetor, and that they believe the rhetor has their best interest in mind (II.i.2-4). A sense of mutual respect between rhetor and audience was also important in establishing ethos, because it helped to create trust between audience and rhetor. Clark asserts the rhetor
“always, everywhere, and to all men act and speak honorably,” never boasting or speaking arrogantly or with a condescending or angry tone (102).

So central was the *ethos* of the speaker that Isocrates claims it is inconceivable for the rhetor to support unjust or malicious causes, because the rhetor is “devoted to the welfare of man and our common good” (77). Strong moral character proved more persuasive than any other sort of probability or proof, and the rhetor who possessed this character necessarily sought the best interest of the community (Isocrates 77). As such, those who were bent on controlling or taking advantage of others could not possibly be as effective as those who demonstrated concern and genuine care for their audience.

Cicero claims *ethos* is of primary importance to the rhetor and that even before speaking on an issue the rhetor “must first secure the goodwill of the audience” (I.xxxi). Likewise, Quintilian also focuses on *ethos* as central to the rhetor’s development. In fact, *ethos* is implicit in Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric, a good man speaking well. As Kennedy maintains, “If the orator is a good man, as required, his goodness will find its natural expression in his manners” (75). According to Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric, it is impossible for the rhetor to even be called such without an attention to moral character, and therefore, those who seek to dominate or control others do not practice rhetoric at all. Augustine further espouses the importance of *ethos*, because since Augustine spoke for the Christian church, his life and moral character must be held in the highest regard (Baldwin 202). As Fortin points out, the willingness of the audience to accept the rhetor’s message “is as much a function of the opinion that others have formed of him as a man as it is of his competence or his ability to speak well” (223). The audience is trusting of and open to receiving the rhetor’s message only if they perceive that the rhetor is a good person and has
their best interest in mind. Because *ethos* was such a dominant concern in classical rhetorical theory, few rhetoricians would conceive of teaching rhetors tactics to deceive or manipulate the audience, or of forcing them to acknowledge a certain position over others. While there were certainly those rhetors who aimed at winning arguments at all costs, the dominant schools of rhetoric clearly emphasized moral responsibility on the part of the rhetor.

As opposed to fighting against the audience, classical rhetoricians actually sought to work *with* the audience. Persuasion was not the only goal of classical rhetoric. Rather, rhetors often sought to establish a relationship with their audience in order to gain understanding and trust between audience and rhetor. As Clark points out, rhetors were concerned with the appropriateness of a message for its audience, and speeches would be adapted to meet the needs of different audiences (101). In *De Oratore*, Cicero insists, “One kind of style is not suited to every case, or every audience, or every speaker, or every occasion,” suggesting that speaking styles should change based on the rhetorical situation, and that persuasion is not the aim of every interaction (III.lv). Kennedy also points out that Quintilian “never forgets that he is a teacher,” modifying theories to meet students’ needs, and proposing “alternative approaches” that might be of benefit (56). Clark even implies that rhetors valued the act of listening to their audiences, quoting the declaimer Scaurus’ assertion (which is quoted by Seneca in *Controversiae*), “It is a greater virtue to know how to stop than how to speak” (265-266). *Ethos* was thus an important factor to the rhetor because the rhetor sought to establish a relationship with the audience, allowing trust to occur between audience and rhetor.

The discussion of *ethos* is vital to my project because it illustrates rhetoric as relational, connecting certain aspects of classical rhetoric to feminist rhetorical theories. The
literature in this section demonstrates the importance of the relationship between audience and rhetor in classical rhetoric.

*Alternatives to Persuasion*

Because classical rhetoricians like Quintilian and Augustine wanted to establish a relationship with the audience, persuasion or agreement was not the only end result of these rhetorics. Rather, rhetors of this other strain of classical rhetoric more often strove to create mutual understanding and invite others into a shared body of knowledge. The goal for many classical rhetoricians was to provide educational training that would promote strong moral character in its citizens. Isocrates argues that it was through a rhetorical education that students gained knowledge and were trained in morality, “for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul” (75).

In addition, not all rhetorics in Antiquity were equated with violence or force. Cicero claims that rhetoric, “so worthy of the free,” was “indispensable” as a tool to defend oneself against wicked men (I.viii). As a tool in *defense*, rhetoric is surely not related to violence, but rather viewed as an instrument to protect oneself *against* violence. Quintilian also places rhetoric in opposition to violence. As Kennedy points out, Quintilian actually opposed a group of orators who he claims practiced not rhetoric, but “uncontrolled violence” (57).

Persuasion was not always seen as rhetoric’s end result. In fact, Quintilian denounces the definition of rhetoric as persuasion because “such an art may be attained by one who is far from being a good man,” (II.xv.3) which is impossible under Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric. Kennedy adds that for Quintilian, the definition of rhetoric as persuasion was too narrow because it did not allow for other end results, such as mutual understanding and the
benefits of increased knowledge (58). Glenn notes that Quintilian took rhetoric from the political scene to an educational sphere that emphasized strong moral character rather than winning arguments (60). Augustine echoes Quintilian’s view of persuasion, and actually claims that “persuasion is not of necessity, because there is not always need of it,” and focuses instead on a rhetoric whose aim is to labor for others (IV.xxii.28, IV.xxxi.64).

Many times the aim of classical rhetoric, as an educational tool, was to improve the student in some way. Clark notes that rhetorical training in Antiquity would often “vitalize and fructify” the minds of its students (263). As such, rhetorical training provided a way to teach students how to think critically, which often resulted in an increased desire to learn. Rhetoric also served as “an agent for the teaching of morality,” and functions, Clark claims, to “successfully humanize and civilize the young” (264). In other words, rhetoric taught students to treat one another with mutual respect, to show care for each other, and to value each other’s opinions, even if they were different from their own.

In fact, rhetoric’s knack for exposing students to other opinions and ideas and helping students to create their own was a key concept in classical rhetorical training. As Clark points out, classical rhetorical training was not content to merely have its students understand and appreciate a certain teaching or viewpoint. Rather, the student was encouraged to organize and synthesize learning, applying what was learned to the student’s own ideas (263-264). Teachers of rhetoric, Clark contends, should focus on freedom of thought and discussion, encouraging differing viewpoints (265). Clark insists that it is these differences of opinion that rhetoric must actually work to protect: “The most dangerous enemies of civilization are those fanatics who exalt their opinions, or the opinions of some leader, to an altar of orthodoxy and stifle all discussion or dissent as heretical” (265). Rhetoric promotes
the discussion and debate of alternative ideas, and as such, is a vital force in protecting the individual’s rights and a democratic society.

Literature discussing alternatives to persuasion within classical rhetoric contributes to my project because it provides an example of an area in which invitational rhetoric and certain forms of classical rhetoric can be viewed as compatible. This section of literature illustrates the possibility of rereading classical rhetoric and offers a strong argument for the need to do so. As Sheryl L. Finkle and Edward P. Corbett note, the “most common misconception” about classical rhetoric “is that it comprises a single theory … The Greeks and Romans held as many conflicting ideas about the teaching of public discourse as teachers do today” (161). This thesis works to illuminate some of these divergent facets of classical rhetoric that are often overlooked.5

**Connections Between Feminism and Classical Rhetoric**

Although Foss and Griffin position their work in direct opposition to classical rhetoric—Foss and Griffin describe classical rhetoric as “a rhetoric of patriarchy,” while invitational rhetoric is an alternative feminist rhetoric (4)—a few scholars have studied relationships between feminist studies and classical rhetoric. Feminist scholars have recovered the roles of women rhetors from Antiquity (Cheryl Glenn, Andrea Lunsford, C. Jan Swearingen) have related sophistic rhetoric to feminist rhetoric (Susan Jarratt), and have argued for new definitions of rhetoric—definitions that espouse feminist principles (Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford). While there has been little work to date relating invitational rhetoric

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5 The final chapter of this thesis offers a direct comparison between the respective rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine and that of Foss and Griffin. A more complete discussion of these divergent facets of classical rhetoric, including specific examples from the texts themselves will be offered then, after I have provided a richer context for the respective rhetorics in chapters two and three.
to classical rhetoric, other scholars have argued successfully that intersections between feminism and classical rhetoric do exist, and should be studied further.

*Recovery of Women within Classical Rhetoric*

Since the 1990s, feminist rhetoric scholars have been recovering the role of women in classical rhetoric. *Reclaiming Rhetorica* (1995), edited by Andrea Lunsford, was the first effort to provide a feminist rereading of rhetoric, focusing on women in the rhetorical tradition from Antiquity to the twentieth century. Lisa Ede, Cheryl Glenn, and Andrea Lunsford’s article (also 1995), “Border Crossings: Intersections of Rhetoric and Feminism,” specifically laid out feminist rhetoric in connection with the classical canon, and provides a rationale as to why such “border crossings” are important, both to the field of rhetoric as a whole and to the field of feminist rhetoric. Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford maintain that looking at rhetoric and feminism together not only helps us better appreciate past practices, but allows for the transformation of both the current study of rhetoric and feminism (437).

According to Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford, rhetoric lends feminism “a rich conceptual framework and terminology” that can be used as a heuristic (440), and feminism provides an opportunity to “bridge differences (rather than to create them), to include (rather than to exclude), and to empower (rather than to seek power or weakness),” lending rhetoric a more civic focus (Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford 437). Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford encourage further study of the intersections between rhetoric and feminism, claiming that such “mining” would “offer intriguing interconnections and new ratios among logos, pathos, and ethos, ones that

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6 Cheryl Glenn’s 1989 dissertation “Muted Voices from Antiquity Through the Renaissance: Locating Women in the Rhetorical Tradition” of course precedes *Reclaiming Rhetorica* (of which Glenn is a contributing author), and later became her 1997 *Rhetoric Retold*, discussed later in this thesis.

7 Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford quote Jamie R. Barlowe, in a conversation among contributors to *Reclaiming Rhetorica*.
would expand the province of rhetorical proof and hence to and with wider and more diverse audiences” (440). In other words, rereading classical rhetoric with a feminist lens not only expands scholars’ views of classical rhetoric, but also allows scholars to reach a larger audience.

Cheryl Glenn’s *Rhetoric Retold* (published in 1997, but based on her earlier dissertation) is one such rereading. Glenn challenges the patriarchal narrative of rhetoric, regendering the history of rhetoric from Antiquity through the Renaissance. In so doing, Glenn argues that one must “devise new ways of reading,” looking at texts “crookedly,” in order to “see what is familiar in a different way” (7). This type of reading challenges established understandings of the history of rhetoric, providing a definition of rhetoric that moves it “from an exclusionary to an inclusionary enterprise” (4). Glenn’s most notable application of this idea of rhetoric is her discussion of Aspasia of Miletus, whom Glenn claims was “an active member of the most famous intellectual circle in Athens” and an influence on Plato, based on discussions of Aspasia in texts written by male rhetoricians (43). Other works on Aspasia, particularly Susan Jarratt and Rory Ong’s “Aspasia: Rhetoric, Gender, and Colonial Ideology” (1995) have affirmed her role in classical rhetorical history (13).

Glenn also includes the influence of several women from the Roman tradition: Hortensia, Cornelia, and Laelia. Hortensia spoke in the Forum on behalf of the women of Rome in protest of an unfair tax imposed on them at a time of civil war (67-71). Cornelia, the mother of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, was known for her eloquence and was praised for providing her children with a superior education, much of which she provided herself, and Laelia was said to have an eloquence in speech that rivaled her father’s, Gaius Laelius.
Quintilian praised all three women in his *Institutio Oratoria*, further suggesting their legitimacy:

We are told that the eloquence of the Gracchi owed much to their mother Cornelia, whose letters even to-day testify to the cultivation of her style. Laelia, the daughter of Gaius Laelius, is said to have reproduced the elegance of her father's language in her own speech, while the oration delivered before the triumvirs by Hortensia, the daughter of Quintus Hortensius, is still read and not merely as a compliment to her sex. (I.i.6)

C. Jan Swearingen’s work on Diotima, “A Lover’s Discourse” (1995), also argues for the role of women in Greek society. Swearingen interestingly points out that in our attitudes to “so quickly question the historicity of women,” we are also simultaneously denouncing men “as uniformly evil appropriators of women” (28). In making such a sweeping claim, aren’t feminists just as much to blame for essentializing attitudes as the classical rhetoricians they find fault with? Certainly there are texts from Antiquity that offer at least glimpses of what one might now consider feminist perspectives. If women, although admittedly exceptional women, and very few at that, were able to participate in rhetoric and perhaps even influence rhetorical theory, it should be possible to see the influences of women’s perspectives on these texts. By rereading classical texts to “see what is familiar in a different way,” acknowledging that women can and should be a part of such histories, we can see areas of classical rhetoric that are compatible with and even parallel to feminist rhetorical theories.
Intersections of Classical Rhetoric and Feminism

Scholars such as Susan Jarratt have highlighted these intersections of feminist rhetoric and classical rhetoric. In *Rereading the Sophists* (1991), Jarratt points out that two groups of people are typically excluded from traditional rhetorical histories—women and sophists—and suggests these two groups shared a value for a “diverse range of human potentialities,” feasible only through public discourse and the teaching of “civic virtue” (63-64). Jarratt also examines Derrida’s *Spurs*, an analysis of Nietzsche’s classifications for woman. According to Derrida, Nietzsche claims three classifications for woman: the figure of falsehood, the handler of truth, and the power of overthrowing Truth (97), qualities that Jarratt claims have all have been associated with rhetoric (66-67).

In comparing the sophists with feminists, Jarratt points to two sophistic principles: the emphasis on *dissoi logoi* and an alternative to *logos* through attention to *nomos*. *Dissoi logoi* were sets of contradictory propositions, which Jarratt relates to feminism in that feminists often do not align themselves with one fixed position, but with many, often fluid, positions (70). In addition, Jarratt argues that sophists proposed an alternative to the relatively fixed concept of *logos* through their attention to *nomos*, the habits and customs of social behavior. As Jarratt suggests, “In opposition to *logos* as a permanent and ‘natural’ structure of law, rationality or language, *nomos* can be called into play as an alternative, designating the human, and thus necessarily discursive, construction of changeable codes” (74). In other words, a focus on *nomos* opens up rhetoric to other forces of influence—social or cultural customs— which in turn allows for once marginalized voices to be heard and makes possible the rewriting of histories (75). Rewriting and rereading histories, Jarratt claims, “allows not only for the identification of new works but also offers a way to reread
hegemonic texts” (79). The ability to go back and reread these texts from feminist perspectives disrupts the hegemony of such texts, opening them for possible areas of feminist scholarship.

Jarratt also sees a connection between classical rhetoric and feminism through the concept of *ethos*. In “The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of *ethos*” (1994) Jarratt and coauthor Nedra Reynolds claim that in *ethos*, “a strand running from the first sophist through Isocrates and Cicero, we find important connections between rhetoric and feminism” (44). According to Jarratt and Reynolds, *ethos* illustrates the idea of positionality, “the speaker having been created at a particular site within the contingencies of history and geography,” which produces “a constant awareness that one always speaks from a particular place in a social structure,” an awareness that Jarratt and Reynolds claim is common to both rhetoric and post-modern feminisms, though the “self” understood by each might differ (47). In addition, Jarratt and Reynolds claim *ethos* is a “process of finding and adopting positions,” which “necessarily locat[es] the speaker in the practices and experience of the group for whom he speaks,” illustrating the concepts of identification and goodwill that are distilled into *ethos* and the necessity for the speaker to take his audience into consideration (50). By positioning *ethos* as a feminist principle, Jarratt and Reynolds encourage the rereading of classical rhetoric for feminist interpretations.

*Invitational Concepts in Other Rhetorical Theories*

Not only has there been scholarship linking women to the classical rhetorical tradition and pointing out intersections of feminism and classical rhetoric, but there have also been alternative theories of rhetoric proposed which contain invitational concepts. Rogerian rhetoric, named for the psychotherapist Carl Rogers and derived from his work, offers an
understanding of rhetoric that is similar to Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric, 25 years before “Beyond Persuasion.” Rogerian rhetoric operates on the assumption that one has free will but will be hesitant to consider alternative viewpoints because of a sense of threat. If the speaker can eliminate this feeling of threat, the receiver of the message will be able to consider different perspectives (Young, Becker, and Pike 8). According to Richard E. Young, Alton A. Becker, and Kenneth L. Pike, the goal of Rogerian rhetoric, much like invitational rhetoric, “is not to work one’s will on others but to establish and maintain communication as an end in itself” (8).

In Rhetoric: Discovery and Change, published in 1970, Young, Becker, and Pike further discuss the need to develop a rhetoric “that has as its goal not skillful verbal coercion but discussion and exchange of ideas” (8). The rhetoric Young, Becker, and Pike espouse has a goal of achieving social cooperation, which they argue is obtained through writing and speaking. According to Young, Becker, and Pike, when one is able to use writing and speaking in such a way as to achieve social cooperation, one has also developed a means “for maintaining and improving a civilized community,” a goal the ancients had in mind and also a goal of invitational rhetoric (172). Young, Becker, and Pike claim cooperation is established through shared experience and shared knowledge, similar to Foss and Griffin’s claim that rhetoric must focus on the exchange of ideas, suggesting a mutual give and take of opinions between speaker and audience (172).

Feminists have conflicting opinions about Rogerian rhetoric. For example, Foss and Griffin cite Rogers’ psychological findings on the role of listening on patient autonomy in “Beyond Persuasion,” though there is no mention of Rogerian rhetoric per se. Additionally, in “Aristotelian vs. Rogerian Argument: A Reassessment,” Lunsford responds favorably to
Rogerian rhetoric, praising its emphasis on the audience, while her frequent coauthor Ede objects to its treatment of the audience and rhetor as opponents in her “Is Rogerian Rhetoric Really Rogerian?” These responses to Rogerian rhetoric, as well as its relation to invitational rhetoric, are discussed in greater depth in chapter two. This section of literature provides examples of invitational concepts within other forms of (non-feminist) rhetoric, demonstrating that there are commonalities between feminist rhetoric and other forms of rhetoric, and suggesting that traditional forms of rhetoric be reread to examine such commonalities.

**Research Design**

_Definitions of Terms_

In designing this project, I operate on a specific understanding of rhetoric and the rhetor. The rhetor should seek to create a relationship with the audience, using rhetoric as a means to invite the audience into a shared body of knowledge. Rhetoric should be used to promote understanding and increased knowledge, and as such, is focused primarily on education.

_Data_

For this project, I have chosen to examine invitational rhetoric as a feminist rhetorical theory, using Foss and Griffin’s article “Beyond Persuasion.” Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric provides a term—_invitational_—that I believe is important to the study of rhetoric in all forms. Describing rhetoric as invitational implies a relationship between rhetor and audience that is rooted in a desire for the audience to gain and benefit from the words of the rhetor. In this understanding of rhetoric, the audience is invited into a shared body of knowledge. This is an understanding that was also prevalent in classical rhetoric but is often
forgotten or overlooked. Viewing classical rhetoric as invitational amplifies these neglected values and returns classical rhetoric to its educational emphasis, which is largely forgotten in modern, agonistic conceptions of classical rhetoric. Despite providing rhetoric with this important new quality, invitational rhetoric has not made a significant impact in the construction of rhetorical theory, partially because it has often been misunderstood. In positioning invitational rhetoric in relation to classical rhetoric, I hope to provide another interpretation of invitational rhetoric, one that might be useful for both feminist scholars and classical scholars alike.

Given my focus on education, I have chosen to examine the rhetoric of Quintilian and Augustine for their respective reputations as teachers. Quintilian taught rhetoric for over twenty years and was the first endowed chair in rhetoric (Bizzell and Herzberg 359). His *Institutio Oratoria* is arguably considered the most comprehensive treatise on teaching and education, focusing on the lifelong development of the rhetor (Bizzell and Herzberg 360). Augustine is known especially for inverting Cicero’s famous *officia* of rhetoric, moving teaching to the forefront as rhetoric’s first goal (Hermanson et al. 5). Although other classical rhetoricians also discuss teaching and education, none do so as comprehensively as Quintilian and Augustine.

In comparing these respective theories of rhetoric, I will be focusing on three distinct features each theory appears to offer: an understanding of rhetoric as an educational tool that increases understanding, a realized importance of the role of *ethos* in creating a relationship between audience and rhetor, and the possibility of end results to rhetoric other than persuasion.
Procedures

The data for this study will be gathered primarily from the following sources: Foss and Griffin’s “Beyond Persuasion,” Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria*, and Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana*. These will be supplemented by other works written by each author, in addition to scholarly work written about these works. Using Lloyd Bitzer’s concept of the rhetorical situation as a framework, I will be analyzing each text in regards to the exigence, audience, and constraints as part of the rhetorical situation each piece describes, acknowledging and accounting for the different purposes and contexts of each respective theory, and looking specifically at the use of rhetoric as an educational tool or a means to aid understanding, the role of *ethos* in establishing a relationship between speaker and audience, and claims regarding an end result of rhetoric based on fostering understanding and increasing knowledge.

Significance of the Study

Although numerous scholars have pointed out the need for feminist revisions to classical rhetoric or feminist additions to classical rhetoric, few scholars have examined the ways in which these two bodies of scholarship might work together. Many feminists either ignore theories of classical rhetoric or view classical rhetoric as an area that offers little insight into feminist rhetorical theories. While perhaps not intending to, the exclusion of classical rhetoric actually undermines feminist ideas of inclusion and forces feminists into an “either/or” mentality. By illustrating the areas of overlap and the relationships between classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric, this study will open up and redeem classical rhetoric as a site for feminist scholarship, encouraging a “both/and” mentality, and will
provide a way to view feminist rhetoric and classical rhetoric side by side, as harmonious rhetorical theories.

In addition, this project will also discuss three areas of importance to both invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric: the understanding of rhetoric as an educational tool, the importance of ethos in establishing a relationship with the audience, and an end result of increased knowledge and understanding. Focusing on these areas and what they seem to offer both classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric will revitalize each respective theory. Viewing both classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric in new lights, “a bit crookedly,” allows us to reexamine familiar areas and see them anew.

Outline of the Study

In the first chapter, I situate my project in the related literature regarding invitational rhetoric, classical rhetoric, and feminist rereadings of classical rhetoric, demonstrating the similarities between invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric. The literature reviewed should point out that although many scholars do not relate invitational rhetoric with classical rhetoric, such an analysis is worth further examination. Chapter two will focus on invitational rhetoric. I will interrogate the principles laid out in this rhetorical theory, relating them to theories of classical rhetoric in their emphasis on creating understanding, their realization of ethos as communally constructed, and their focus on creating alternatives to persuasion. Chapter three will offer a rereading of the rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine, illustrating how invitational concepts can be applied to their respective works. Finally, in the last chapter, I will provide a summary of the project, demonstrating the importance of viewing classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric as harmonious rhetorical theories rather than oppositional rhetorical theories.
Chapter 2—Invitational Rhetoric

This chapter provides a discussion of Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin’s original article, “Beyond Persuasion,” (1995) analyzing the text using Lloyd Bitzer’s theory of the rhetorical situation. After examining the exigency, audience, and constraints for Foss and Griffin’s article, I will outline the contributions invitational rhetoric brings to the construction of feminist rhetorical theory, arguing for its inclusion as a viable rhetorical theory applicable to feminist and non-feminist rhetorics alike. Finally, by linking invitational rhetoric with Rogerian rhetoric and Krista Ratcliffe’s concept of rhetorical listening, I will show how invitational rhetoric can also be linked with classical rhetoric, demonstrating these different theories as being compatible rather than oppositional.

Exigency

Foss and Griffin first proposed invitational rhetoric as an alternative form of rhetoric in 1995, recognizing the need for a uniquely feminist rhetoric articulated by Sally Miller Gearhart in 1979 and more recently, by Patricia Bizzell in 1992. Feminist rhetoric\(^8\), as a theory of rhetoric, was just beginning to gain traction in the field at this time, with a surge of specifically feminist works such as Susan Jarratt’s *Rereading the Sophists* (1991), Andrea Lunsford’s *Reclaiming Rhetorica* (1995), and Cheryl Glenn’s *Rhetoric Retold* (1997). Foss and Griffin, along with other feminist rhetoric scholars, found dominant rhetorical practices problematic, and sought to create and advance alternative forms of rhetoric. Foss and Griffin envisioned invitational rhetoric as one such alternative, offering invitational rhetoric as a viable theory to be used in situations when persuasion was not the goal of the rhetorical interaction (17).

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\(^8\) By *feminist rhetoric*, I refer to any theory of rhetoric that is used to promote feminist values.
As a theory of rhetoric, invitational rhetoric provides a rhetoric that is more inclusive of women and other marginalized groups, and has the potential to transform culture. Invitational rhetoric, as described by Foss and Griffin, offers a redefinition of rhetoric that aims to create mutual understanding rather than to persuade an audience, and provides the term *invitational* as a way to describe feminist rhetoric. Invitational rhetoric also provides a new understanding of *ethos*, and calls for greater attention to the relationship between rhetor and audience. Invitational rhetoric lays out principles and methods for a specifically feminist rhetoric, contributing to the construction of rhetorical theory in its discussion of listening as a rhetorical strategy and its focus on invention.

According to Foss and Griffin, rhetoric has traditionally been defined as “the conscious intent to change others” (2). In the act of changing another person, what rhetors are really after, according to Foss and Griffin, is “a desire for control and domination” (3). Traditional rhetoric sets up a power dynamic in which the rhetor and the rhetor’s beliefs, ideas, and opinions are viewed as correct, appropriate, and the best course of action, while the audience is assumed to be incorrect, less experienced, and naïve. In fact, the preconception that the audience is in need of change necessitates that the rhetor make an *assumption*: the views of the audience are inadequate or inappropriate (3). Such assumptions, Foss and Griffin claim, “constitute a kind of trespassing on the personal integrity of others,” violating the relationship between rhetor and audience (3).

By redefining rhetoric as invitational, Foss and Griffin allow for a different type of interaction to occur. Instead of a rhetoric focused on inducing change in others, invitational rhetoric “is an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship,” and constitutes “an invitation to the audience to enter the rhetor’s world and see it as the rhetor
does” (5). The word invitation implies a request, rather than an insistence. While persuasion demands change, invitational rhetoric simply offers the potential for it. In an ideal situation, invitational rhetoric is reciprocal: first, the audience accepts the invitation offered by the rhetor to listen to and understand the rhetor’s positions, then the audience is invited to share their own positions. As Foss and Griffin point out, when rhetor and audience both participate in the interaction, both parties contribute to the discussion and thus both parties also gain a greater understanding of the issue (5).

Although invitational rhetoric does not insist upon change, invitational rhetoric often results in change, or the term Foss and Griffin prefer, transformation. Change, Foss and Griffin argue, “is defined as a shift in the audience in the direction requested by the rhetor, who then has gained some measure of power and control over the audience” (6). Transformation, on the other hand, “occurs in the audience or rhetor or both as a result of new understanding and insights gained in the exchange of ideas” (6). In their text on presentational speaking (1994), Sonja Foss and Karen Foss explain that transformation occurs only through exchange and interaction and cannot occur when one perspective is viewed to be the only “correct” perspective (4).

The distinction between change and transformation is important, Foss and Griffin claim, because in the first instance, the audience loses a sense of agency, while in the other, the audience chooses to respond. In traditional rhetoric, Foss and Griffin maintain, “the change process often is accompanied by feelings of inadequacy, insecurity, pain, humiliation, guilt, embarrassment, or angry submission on the part of the audience,” while in invitational rhetoric, the rhetor supports and respects the beliefs of others and thus “the changes that are made are likely to be accompanied by an appreciation for new perspectives gained and
gratitude for the assistance provided by others in thinking about an issue” (6). As such, Foss and Griffin introduce a method of rhetoric in which the relationship between audience and rhetor is preserved, because rhetors value the opinions others might bring to the discussion and acknowledge that these opinions might also benefit the rhetor. Instead of creating an environment of hostility or animosity, then, invitational rhetoric creates an environment of trust and respect.

Transformation can occur because in invitational rhetoric, rhetors offer a perspective to others rather than imposing a perspective on others. Foss and Griffin define offering as a rhetorical technique in which one gives “expression to a perspective without advocating its support or seeking its acceptance” (7). Offering thus provides an opportunity for the audience to hear an alternative belief to their own, without necessitating that they conform to that belief—a specifically feminist method based on a specifically feminist value. According to Foss and Griffin, such an interaction occurs when the rhetor is focused on “extending one another’s ideas, thinking critically about all the ideas offered, and coming to an understanding of the subject and of one another” (8). The focus of invitational rhetoric, then, is toward growth and education. Rhetor and audience participate in a rhetorical act that is mutually beneficial in that new ideas are shared and new understandings are reached by all involved.

A critical component of offering is what Foss and Griffin term willingness to yield, another key principle invitational rhetors employ. Rhetor and audience must both be willing to yield in order for perspectives to be heard. Such a willingness allows rhetor and audience “to call into question the beliefs they consider most inviolate and to relax their grip on those beliefs” (7). Without a willingness to yield, rhetors are not open to benefiting from the
experiences the audience shares, and the audience is not willing to consider the beliefs the rhetor presents. Similar to resisting *a priori* thinking, the invitational rhetor must be willing to set aside pre-established opinions and assumptions.

When audience and rhetor mutually offer ideas and opinions and are both willing to yield to each other they create an environment of safety, value, and freedom, which Foss and Griffin argue is necessary to reach mutual understanding (10). A safe environment contributes to the rhetor’s *ethos*, because it allows trust to be established between rhetor and audience. The features Foss and Griffin name as essential to creating this *ethos*—safety, value, and freedom—contribute to what they consider to be a new and uniquely feminist understanding of *ethos* that is focused more on the audience rather than the speaker. This new conception of *ethos* opens up rhetorical theory to other, less traditional forms of communication. It enables women and other marginalized groups to participate in various forms of discourse that may not be available to them in more traditional rhetorics.

**Audience**

Attending to the second component of Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, the audience, reveals additional insights into Foss and Griffin’s purpose in proposing invitational rhetoric as an alternative rhetorical theory. Invitational rhetoric is intended to be used by women and men, feminists and non-feminists alike (Foss and Griffin 5). As such, invitational rhetoric was not proposed merely for women or for feminists, but rather to the field as a whole. In fact, as Foss and Griffin explain, the goal of the theory is “to expand the array of communicative options available to all rhetors” (5, emphasis mine). Foss and Griffin, both working within the field of communication, aimed their article on invitational rhetoric, “Beyond Persuasion,” at the communication field (as evidenced by their use of
Communication Monographs and the Speech Communication Association convention as outlets for their theory), although I would argue that in using the word *rhetor* as opposed to *speaker*, Foss and Griffin suggest invitational rhetoric can influence the rhetoric and composition field as well, and open their intended audience to both fields.

The fact that invitational rhetoric was originally conceived within the communication field, not the rhetoric and composition field, might explain the relative inattention to invitational rhetoric at present, though invitational rhetoric has not gained the same amount of traction as similar theories, such as Krista Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening, even within the fields of communication studies and women’s studies. However, scholars within rhetoric and composition frequently pull from such related fields as English studies, philosophy, history, and women’s studies, in addition to communication studies. In fact, rhetoric as a discipline was part of the communication field until the late 1960s, when English departments embraced it for its applications to teaching writing, and rhetoric merged with composition. Such interdisciplinary “border crossing” is seen as an attribute of feminist scholarship, and invitational rhetoric should have been able to cross this disciplinary border.

For example, in their article “Border Crossings: Intersections of Rhetoric and Feminism,” Lisa Ede, Cheryl Glenn, and Andrea Lunsford argue that rhetoric has often had an interdisciplinary focus, pointing out its intersections with philosophy, linguistics, communication studies, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political studies (404). Ede, Glenn, and Lunsford further argue that much like rhetoric, feminism is multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary (404-405). In “Feminist Historiography: Research Methods in Rhetoric” Christine Mason Sutherland claims that the “erasure of boundaries,” and “the refusal to think in compartments and in isolation” is “typical” of feminist research methods
Carol Mattingly’s “Telling Evidence: Rethinking What Counts in Rhetoric” echoes Sutherland’s argument. Mattingly insists that feminist scholars draw upon “a wide range of materials” and “a broad range of historical texts, across genres” in constructing their research. Although invitational rhetoric was intended for both the communication and the rhetoric and composition fields, demonstrating the “border crossing” that feminist scholarship seeks to promote, invitational rhetoric has not been widely accepted within rhetoric and composition, even with many feminist rhetoric scholars, as evidenced by the criticism of invitational rhetoric by both feminist and non-feminist rhetoric scholars.

Although invitational rhetoric is clearly aimed at women rhetors (but intended for both women and men), Foss and Griffin do not claim only women should use invitational rhetoric or that it reflects the communicative strategies of all women. In fact, Foss and Griffin explain, “what makes it feminist is not its use by a particular population of rhetors but rather the grounding of its assumptions in feminist principles and theories (which Foss and Griffin name as equality, immanent value, and self-determination),” which they argue makes invitational rhetoric available for feminists—of whatever belief or political leanings—and non-feminists, in addition to men (5). While Foss and Griffin do argue that a separate form of rhetoric should be available for women, they do not insist that invitational rhetoric should be the only form of rhetoric available to women. Rather, they acknowledge the uses and potential benefits of various types of rhetoric, invitational and more traditional forms included (17).

The view of rhetoric that Foss and Griffin propose in invitational rhetoric is similar to the attitude Sutherland argues feminists must embrace if they hope to influence the rhetoric and composition field. Instead of viewing one position (feminist or traditional) as superior to
the other and insisting those positions are mutually exclusive, Sutherland argues we should take on a view based on Kenneth Burke’s terministic screens: “each viewer has his or her own particular perspective; only by adding one perspective to another can we build anything like a complete vision of the truth” (117). In other words, multiple visions and multiple theories of rhetoric are necessary to gain insights into other, alternative uses of rhetoric. One view of rhetoric, or one screen, necessarily limits perceptions of rhetoric, but when they are layered on top of each other and added together, they provide a richer image of the scope and potential for rhetorical interaction. Therefore, while very clearly aimed at a feminist audience, invitational rhetoric is also geared to a larger audience as well, and Foss and Griffin offer invitational rhetoric “to expand the array of communicative options available to all rhetors” (5, emphasis mine). Invitational rhetoric, added together with a classical rhetoric screen, might provide a richer understanding of the study of rhetoric as an educational practice.

**Constraints**

While invitational rhetoric offers important contributions to rhetorical theory, there are many constraints. As mentioned earlier, much of the scholarship written about invitational rhetoric is critical. Numerous scholars (feminist and non-feminist alike) object to its negative portrayal of persuasion and its apparent insistence that invitational rhetoric be used in any situation. While Foss and Griffin maintain that change is not the purpose of invitational rhetoric, they do acknowledge that it does occur, and that it might not always be painless (6). Foss and Griffin also clearly explain that while invitational rhetoric is a “viable form of interaction in many instances,” it is not the only theory of rhetoric and may not be appropriate in all situations or contexts (8). In a later article, Foss and Griffin, along with
Karen A. Foss, explain that in many cases, traditional rhetoric is the most appropriate practice, and that situations such as persuading a loved one not to commit suicide (a scenario in which critics such as Robert Fulkerson argue invitational rhetoric would not be effective), might actually “constitute an exigence for the use of traditional rhetoric” (123). Invitational rhetoric then, like most forms of rhetoric, is constrained by the rhetorical situation, and is not always the best rhetorical choice for a given scenario.

Another limitation of invitational rhetoric is the rather touchy subject of producing change in the audience. While Foss and Griffin assert that a change in the audience is not the end result of invitational rhetoric, they do claim that change can be a result (6). When change does occur, it is the result of new understanding between audience and rhetor (6). Foss and Griffin describe the change that takes place in invitational rhetoric as transformation rather than change, because the audience chooses to respond rather than being persuaded to respond. However, it is difficult to determine (perhaps even for the audience member herself) whether one is “choosing” to respond or being convinced to respond. Additionally, while Foss and Griffin only claim that change may happen, I would argue, along with Cheryl Glenn, that although one might not alter a position, if audience and rhetor truly hear each other, they will be changed. If one ascribes to this definition of rhetoric, then invitational rhetoric does result in change, and does produce a result (such as understanding), though perhaps not the same type of result as other forms of rhetoric.

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9 This is based on Glenn’s personal definition of rhetoric, articulated in a presentation entitled “Rhetoric and Feminism: The Possibilities” given October 5, 2009 at Texas Christian University.
Contributions to Rhetorical Theory

Despite its limitations, invitational rhetoric offers many contributions to the study of rhetoric. Invitational rhetoric offers a new definition of rhetoric, which provides an alternative to persuasion and opens up a rhetorical option for rhetors who seek to promote understanding, not gain agreement. As such, invitational rhetoric promotes the use of rhetoric as an educational tool or a means to aid understanding. Invitational rhetoric also provides a new understanding of ethos, and calls for a greater attention to the relationship between rhetor and audience and the environment that that relationship creates. Invitational rhetoric contributes to rhetorical theory in its discussion of listening as a rhetorical strategy and its focus on invention. In naming values such as equality, immanent value, self-determination, safety, and freedom, invitational rhetoric lays out principles that are distinctly feminist. Terms such as invitational, transformation, offering, absolute listening, and willingness to yield describe methods for a specifically feminist theory of rhetoric, methods that have not previously been examined by rhetoric scholars. While Foss and Griffin do claim invitational rhetoric is a feminist theory, they do not claim invitational rhetoric should be used to advance feminism, but simply to “provide an impetus for more focused and systematic efforts to describe and assess rhetoric in all of its manifestations” (5). Therefore, invitational rhetoric should not be limited to just a feminist theory, but should also be used to expand and advance other theories of rhetoric.

An Educational Tool

With its emphasis on reaching mutual understanding and creating knowledge, invitational rhetoric serves as an educational tool. Foss and Griffin advocate a rhetoric whose end result is that “everyone involved gains a greater understanding of the issue and its
subtlety, richness, and complexity,” suggesting a beneficial learning experience (5). In addition, Foss and Griffin suggest that it is the exchange of ideas that brings about change (6), implying that rhetor and audience both are changed, and that when change occurs in such a manner, there is “an appreciation for new perspectives gained and gratitude for the assistance provided by others in thinking about an issue” (6). While invitational rhetoric seems to be addressed to a general public in which rhetor and audience stand on equal footing and classical rhetoric often assumes a hierarchal teacher-student relationship, there are similarities. Like the study of classical rhetoric, invitational rhetoric promotes and allows for continuous, lifelong learning in that when a rhetor engages in invitational rhetoric, “she acknowledges the fact that her work is in progress,” which allows the rhetor to be open to other ideas, continuously revising and improving her own work (Foss and Griffin 8). The return to the study of rhetoric as an educational tool links invitational rhetoric to classical rhetoric, in which rhetoric was used to educate future citizens. Additionally, invitational rhetoric also offers a revitalized study of ethos, returning to a more classical understanding of ethos

A New Understanding of Ethos

Perhaps the greatest contribution invitational rhetoric brings to the study of rhetoric is its understanding of ethos. Invitational rhetoric stresses the importance of the relationship between audience and rhetor, acknowledging the role of ethos in creating and fostering this relationship, as opposed to the current dominant approach to ethos as being established only by the rhetor, with little regard to the relationship with the audience. Foss and Griffin are careful to point out, however, that it is not the rhetor’s authority that creates ethos, but rather

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10 I use ethos (italic) to denote the classical concept, and ethos (non-italic) to represent the more modern understanding of ethos.
the audience’s perceptions of the rhetor. As such, the construction of the rhetor’s *ethos* is actually a *joint* endeavor. Although Foss and Griffin suggest that this understanding of *ethos* is unique to invitational rhetoric, scholars such as Nedra Reynolds, S. Michael Halloran, and Krista Ratcliffe argue the joint construction of *ethos* is more closely related to the classical Aristotelian conception of *ethos* than to modern representations of the classical concept of *ethos*, such as the authoritarian view that Foss and Griffin challenge with invitational rhetoric.

According to Halloran, the word *ethos* as used in classical rhetoric has an individual *and* a collective meaning, with its “most concrete meaning” denoting “a habitual gathering place” (62, 60). Its association with a gathering place suggests *ethos* is a communal construction; Halloran claims “to have *ethos* is to manifest the virtues most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks” (60). The rhetor then, rather than *claiming* personal authority, is *granted* authority because she represents the values of the community. This social construction of *ethos*, Reynolds argues, “shifts its implications of responsibility from the individual to a negotiation or mediation between the rhetor and the community,” and as such, “the community decides, in turn, what constitutes justice, temperance, bravery, or ethics” (328). Any persuasiveness of the rhetor then, is because the rhetor represents the values the audience has *chosen* as being persuasive.

This understanding of *ethos* contrasts considerably with what Halloran calls the modern construction of ethos, in which the importance of the public sphere is lost (62). Ratcliffe echoes the need for more emphasis on the public sphere, claiming we have “reduced *ethos* to individual ethical appeal,” and that an “expanded concept of *ethos*” that reflects the shared values of the community is needed (124-125). Foss and Griffin challenge what Halloran
refers to as the “modern construction of ethos” in that invitational rhetoric focuses on the public sphere, on how the audience perceives the speaker. Foss and Griffin also suggest that invitational rhetoric offers what Ratcliffe calls an “expanded concept of ethos” by focusing on the relationship between audience and rhetor, a relationship that is constructed based on shared understanding and mutual respect. The rhetor who employs invitational rhetoric is always focused on the public sphere because this rhetor understands the importance of the audience in making meaning. The understanding of ethos that invitational rhetoric promotes helps restore the classical concept of ethos that Halloran claims is often overlooked in current scholarship.

*Listening as Invention*

Invitational rhetoric also adds to rhetorical scholarship in that it promotes the exploration of other rhetorics, particularly other rhetorics that offer alternatives to the traditional goal of persuasion or influence. One example of this is the role of listening in the communication process. Foss and Griffin discuss the importance of listening in the construction of rhetorical theory, claiming invitational rhetoric contributes to a process they call *absolute listening*, using Eugene T. Gendlin’s term\(^\text{11}\). When engaged in absolute listening as a rhetorical construct, listeners do not interrupt to comment, agree with, encourage, or offer any additional statement of their own to the speaker’s experience (Foss and Griffin 11). Instead, listeners allow speakers the space to discover their own

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\(^\text{11}\) Gendlin describes *absolute listening* as a process that occurs when the listener offers only expressions such as “Yes,” or “I see,” while listening to the speaker. Once the speaker has finished speaking, the listener engages in *say back*, listing the speaker’s ideas point by point. *Say back* was originally discovered and implemented by Carl Rogers, whose work forms the basis for Rogerian rhetoric (115-116). Peter Elbow’s response techniques provide a similar understanding, though Foss and Griffin do not mention Elbow’s work in “Beyond Persuasion.”
perspectives. While listening as a rhetorical theory was largely ignored at the time Foss and Griffin wrote “Beyond Persuasion,” the importance of listening has recently gained momentum in the field, as evidenced by Ratcliffe’s *Rhetorical Listening* (2005). The concept of absolute listening that Foss and Griffin describe in their article is very similar to what Ratcliffe calls *standing under* discourse. Ratcliffe explains that when listening is employed as a rhetorical tactic, *understanding* takes on deeper meaning than merely listening for a speaker’s intent or listening for what the listener wants to hear. Ratcliffe uses the phrase *standing under* instead of *understanding*, claiming *standing under* means “letting discourses wash over, through, and around us and then letting them lie there to inform our politics and ethics” (28). Although Ratcliffe’s concept of rhetorical listening seems to build off of invitational rhetoric, Ratcliffe does not mention invitational rhetoric anywhere in her text. This is just one example of why a deeper investigation of invitational rhetoric, specifically for its discussion of absolute listening, is needed. Incorporating invitational rhetoric with Ratcliffe’s concept of rhetorical listening would bolster Ratcliffe’s claims and add to scholarship in this newly growing area of the field.

In addition to its contributions to the understanding of rhetorical listening, invitational rhetoric also adds to rhetorical scholarship in its emphasis on the invention process. As Foss and Griffin explain, traditional rhetoric relies on previously established frameworks and terminology, while because of its involvement with the audience, invitational rhetoric constantly brings in new frameworks and vocabularies (16). In traditional rhetoric, the inventive process is restricted because only the rhetor is involved, and potential ideas are limited to the preconceived framework established by the rhetor. According to Sutherland, one of the “dangers” of traditional rhetorical scholarship is the belief that ideas stem from a
single mind (112). When the audience is invited to participate in the invention process, preconceived ideas are challenged, and already established frameworks can be adapted. The benefits of invitational rhetoric on invention are similar to the benefits from working collaboratively. In fact, invitational rhetoric actually encourages collaboration between rhetor and audience, allowing for a richer inventive process. Such a process, Sutherland argues, is actually a partnership, and this “holistic approach” “restores cooperation among ethos, logos and pathos,” allowing the invention process to be fully rhetorical (112).

According to Foss and Griffin, the emphasis on invention also allows for the development of alternative perspectives, interpretations, and problem-solving techniques that are not available in traditional models of rhetoric (6). These alternatives create a rhetoric that is more open to women and other marginalized groups, reinforcing the feminist value of inclusion.

Ratcliffe’s concept of rhetorical listening, like invitational rhetoric, also notes that listening to the audience can be beneficial to the invention process. Ratcliffe claims rhetorical listening can be used as “a trope for interpretive invention,” recognizing the importance of both interpretation and invention and suggesting the intersections between the two (17). Much like invitational rhetoric, rhetorical listening “constructs a space wherein listeners may employ their agency to foster conscious identifications that may, in turn, facilitate communication” (Ratcliffe 26). These identifications, when communicated

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12 Ratcliffe explains her term interpretive invention in an endnote on page 189: “By using the term interpretive invention, I hope to demonstrate the necessary intersections between interpretation, which is the dominant term for making meaning in philosophical hermeneutics, and invention, which is the dominant term for making meaning in rhetorical studies.” Additionally, by “listening” to these two bodies of knowledge and putting them in conversation with each other, Ratcliffe cleverly illustrates the benefits of employing multiple sources in her own invention process.
between audience and rhetor, can add to the invention process. As Ratcliffe argues, such listening “may help people invent, interpret, and ultimately judge differently in that perhaps we can hear things we cannot see,” assisting the listener in understanding multiple interpretations of an issue (25). This more inclusive listening, Ratcliffe claims, allows for the “potential for personal and social justice,” because rhetorical listening requires that “new ground” must be created, a place in-between, a “synthesis that is greater than its parts” (25, 93-94). This “new ground,” created out of a need for ethical communication, also offers an additional site for invention to occur. According to Ratcliffe, rhetorical listening “turns hearing (a receptive process) into invention (a production process),” which links rhetorical listening to traditional conceptions of rhetorical invention while also complicating “rhetoric’s traditional focus on the desires of the speaker/writer into a harmonics and/or dissonance of the desires of both the speaker/writer and the listener” (46). As such, rhetorical listening reflects invitational concepts, and both theories offer important contributions to invention, both in process and in theory.

An Ethical, Relational Rhetoric

Invitational rhetoric also reconstructs the relationship between the rhetor and the audience, creating a more ethical rhetoric. According to Foss and Griffin, traditional rhetoric often positions the rhetor and audience as opponents, with the rhetor trying to “win over” the audience (16). When the audience is viewed as an opponent, a relationship cannot be established. Instead, feelings of hostility, competition, and aggression are assumed to occur between rhetor and audience. Such tensions not only create an environment of insecurity, but also constitute an ethical violation in that the audience cannot trust the rhetor. In contrast, in invitational rhetoric the rhetor and the audience work together to achieve mutual
understanding. The audience is able to trust the rhetor, because the rhetor creates a safe environment and maintains respect and value for the audience. As Foss and Griffin point out, invitational rhetoric encourages the development of a new model of ethics, one in which the primary concern is the audience’s best interest (16).

This value for the relationship between audience and rhetor is shared with Rogerian rhetoric, which was originally conceived based on the work of psychotherapist Carl Rogers, and seeks to reach understanding between audience and rhetor. As previously mentioned, Rogerian rhetoric, though it precedes Foss and Griffin’s article by 25 years, includes what could be considered invitational concepts, such as the goal of achieving social cooperation, rather than persuasion. Foss and Griffin even cite Rogers’ notion of unconditional positive regard as a key to creating a successful relationship between audience and rhetor (12). Invitational rhetoric, then, features Rogerian concepts, which in turn have been linked to Aristotelian rhetoric. Feminist rhetorics scholar Andrea Lunsford points out corresponding similarities in Rogerian and Aristotelian rhetoric, noting that Aristotle’s demand that a rhetor be able to argue both sides of a case “implies a full understanding, then, of the other person’s positions and views,” and is related closely to the Rogerian tenet of conveying to the audience that they are understood (“Aristotelian” 148). Lunsford also suggests that Aristotle had his own version of Rogers’ unconditional positive regard, explaining Aristotle’s discussion of love and friendship as the relationship that should be created between audience and rhetor (“Aristotelian” 148). According to Lunsford, “the techniques used in Rogerian argument are not neglected by Aristotle—rather they form the foundation which is necessary before successful argumentation begins” (“Aristotelian” 148). Therefore, Rogerian concepts can be linked to classical concepts, and invitational rhetoric, which can be linked to Rogerian
rhetoric, can also be associated with classical concepts. These three rhetorics share components such as the importance of establishing a relationship between audience and rhetor, with Rogerian rhetoric serving as a link between classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric.

As Lisa Ede points out, however, Young, Becker, and Pike’s discussion of Rogerian rhetoric often positions audience and rhetor as opponents, with one side “winning” a part of the argument (45), a view that is inconsistent with invitational rhetoric. Additionally, Phyllis Lassner’s “Feminist Responses to Rogerian Argument” argues that Rogerian rhetoric, in its insistence of the rhetor maintaining a neutral demeanor (due to its psychology background), denies women’s use of emotion as a rhetorical strategy (226). Paul Bator proposes Rogerian rhetoric as a “step beyond” Aristotelian rhetoric, claiming Rogerian rhetoric moves from Aristotle’s ability to argue both sides of a case to Rogerian rhetoric’s “initial explicit agreement” (429). Based on the arguments of Ede, Lassner, and Bator, Rogerian rhetoric fails to represent the feminist ideals that invitational rhetoric seeks to uphold: equality, immanent value, and mutual understanding. Therefore, while Rogerian rhetoric and invitational rhetoric share many of the same key concepts, many feminist rhetoric scholars have been unwilling to acknowledge these similarities.

If we remember, however, that Aristotle considered rhetoric and dialectic to be intimately related, as Lunsford points out, Aristotelian and Rogerian rhetoric become more compatible with invitational rhetoric. As Lunsford explains, “dialectic helps us to achieve knowledge; rhetoric helps us to put that knowledge into action by persuading others of its efficacy … Aristotle's system of rhetoric and argument presupposes that we have achieved understanding [post-dialectic], whereas Rogerian argument begins in misunderstanding [pre-
dialectic]” (“Aristotelian” 150). According to Lunsford, Rogerian argument is “congruent with” the beginning stages of Aristotelian argument, the initial search for knowledge “which forms the very foundation upon which effective persuasion, as Aristotle sees it, must always build” (“Aristotelian” 150). Viewed in this way, Rogerian rhetoric and Aristotelian rhetoric are similar in that both value dialectic and input from the audience in reaching understanding, a trait they also share with invitational rhetoric. Therefore, although there are certainly distinctions between the three theories of rhetoric, commonalities exist between all three; there are invitational concepts which are derived from Rogerian concepts, which in turn, are derived from Aristotelian concepts. The presence of these commonalities within such divergent theories of rhetoric suggests the importance of these concepts and the need for an alternative theory of rhetoric that highlights these features.

Feminist Methods

Invitational rhetoric provides a rhetorical theory that is inclusive of women and expands communicative methods to include styles some have argued are typical of women, such as seeking cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning over an audience (Bizzell, Mattingly, Sutherland). Women and other marginalized groups can use invitational rhetoric to challenge traditional and often oppressive systems of communication which establish hierarchical relationships between audience and rhetor, and invitational rhetoric also promotes equality, which Foss and Griffin claim cannot be developed under traditional rhetorical practices (16, 4). Because invitational rhetoric is grounded in feminist ideas, it provides a means to resist traditional forms of rhetoric that may not be inclusive of the communicative styles of women or other marginalized groups in that it expands the range of rhetorical options available to rhetors (Foss and Griffin 5).
Invitational rhetoric also names values representative of feminism—equality, self-determination, and immanent value—providing feminist rhetorical theory with terms all their own. According to Foss, Griffin, and Foss, these values were developed by studying women’s communication and the cultures of other marginalized groups (119). The principles of equality, self-determination, and immanent value challenge traditional rhetoric’s focus on persuading and changing others (Foss and Griffin 4). As such, invitational rhetoric offers a transformation of established systems of rhetoric because it refuses to use previously established terms and instead, provides its own (Foss and Griffin 17).

In addition to transforming rhetorical theory, invitational rhetoric also has the potential to transform culture. According to Foss, Griffin, and Foss, invitational rhetoric “contributes to the creation of a non-dominating culture” in that it is “an effort to create a rhetoric built on a new set of values” that might work to benefit both women and men (119). Such an effort contributes to the transformation of culture in that it works to benefit both men and women, whereas traditional theories of rhetoric only work to support the dominant culture (119). By “forgetting” traditional constructions of rhetorical theory in order to view them in new ways, Foss, Griffin, and Foss claim we can restructure, reform, and reconceptualize rhetorical principles so that they are more inclusive and reflect the communicative strategies of marginalized groups (130). The rhetorical strategies that invitational rhetoric promotes have positive effects on developing and maintaining human relationships, a focus Foss, Griffin, and Foss maintain would benefit all people, improving society and culture (119). Moreover, the formation of relationships invitational rhetoric espouses are often relationships rooted in equality, which therefore contribute to “the
elimination of the dominance and elitism that characterize most human relationships,” further transforming dominant culture (Foss and Griffin 4).

**Invitational Rhetoric and Classical Rhetoric**

Despite these important contributions, invitational rhetoric has not been widely accepted as a rhetorical theory, even by feminist rhetoric scholars. As previously mentioned, feminist scholars such as Ryan and Natalle, Downey, and Bone, Griffin, and Scholz have offered perspectives on invitational rhetoric, explaining invitational rhetoric as standpoint hermeneutics, a dialectic, and a move towards civility, respectively. These various attempts to explain invitational rhetoric all share one common tie—a throwback to classical rhetoric—though none of the authors make that claim. Ryan and Natalle point out the connection between classical rhetoric and philosophical hermeneutics (78), and the connection between invitational rhetoric and philosophical hermeneutics (77-80), but neglect any association between classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric. Bone, Griffin, and Scholz argue for invitational rhetoric’s influence on promoting civility (449), also a function of classical rhetoric, which sought to educate responsible future citizens, but Bone, Griffin, and Scholz completely omit this connection. Downey comes the closest when she describes invitational rhetoric as a dialectic (141-142), but much could be gained if scholars could view invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric as counterparts (reminiscent of Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as the counterpart to dialectic) interdependent on each other.

While Ryan and Natalle, Downey, and Bone, Griffin, and Scholz’s respective explanations of invitational rhetoric lend greater understanding to invitational rhetoric as a rhetorical theory, these viewpoints are limited. I believe what invitational rhetoric really calls for is a return to the study of rhetoric as an educational and civic practice, illustrating its
role in producing understanding and influencing social change. As Sutherland points out, the current study of argument has “nothing to do with discovering truth, but only with winning” (112). When rhetoric is used as a tool only to “win,” it serves no greater purpose outside of the specific situation. However, when rhetoric is used as an educational tool, as a means to discover truth and gain understanding, its use is not limited to one situation. Rather, it can be used in many different situations, not only when agreement is required. Invitational rhetoric also promotes rhetoric as the study of what is good, returning rhetoric to its ethical roots. As Bone, Griffin, and Scholz argue, invitational rhetoric asks rhetors to consider “the ethics of change,” encouraging rhetors to take on a responsible role when educating others (457). The emphases on education, creating understanding, and on ethical uses of rhetoric align invitational rhetoric with certain aspects of classical rhetoric. Ratcliff’s rhetorical listening and Young, Becker, and Pike’s Rogerian rhetoric provide links in the chain connecting invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric. When we look at invitational rhetoric as an invitation to re-examine classical rhetoric, it is possible to see areas of overlap between these theories—which are typically viewed as dichotomous rather than compatible theories—opening up classical rhetoric as a site for feminist rhetorical scholarship, revitalizing both classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric as rhetorical theories, and allowing for a both/and mentality that will enrich the study and practice of all forms of rhetoric.
Chapter 3—Classical Rhetoric

This chapter examines two pivotal texts in the study of classical rhetoric: Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* and Augustine’s *De Doctrina Christiana*. As in the previous chapter, I will use Bitzer’s rhetorical situation to analyze each text, taking into account the exigency, audience, and constraints for Quintilian’s and Augustine’s respective texts. Using Bitzer’s rhetorical situation as a theoretical lens, I will discuss the areas of overlap that exist between classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric, namely, an emphasis on rhetoric as an educational tool, the importance of *ethos* in constructing a relationship between audience and rhetor, and an end result of rhetoric other than persuasion, using *Institutio Oratoria* and *De Doctrina Christiana* as examples. I choose to examine Quintilian and Augustine because of my focus on education and their respective reputations as teachers. *Institutio Oratoria* is widely considered to be the most comprehensive text on educating the rhetor, and *De Doctrina Christiana* illustrates Augustine’s emphasis on teaching as the most important aspect of rhetoric. In addition, Quintilian and Augustine’s rhetorics were ones that evolved from centuries of refined theories of classical rhetoric; their theories can be considered summations of earlier classical theories. Both texts are considered central to the study of classical rhetoric, and my argument will illustrate the similarities that exist between aspects of invitational rhetoric and aspects of classical rhetoric, suggesting that these theories are not as opposed as they might initially seem, as evidenced by these respective theories.

**Exigence**

*Quintilian’s Rhetoric*

Before discussing the exigence for *Institutio Oratoria* (95 C.E.), it is important to take note of the historical context of the time. As George Kennedy explains, there were only two
areas for “effective human action” in early Greek culture, speech and war (11). Gradually, speech became a more influential form of social action in Greek society, and the teaching of rhetoric became important in government, law, and business (2). Young children went to grammar school and learned to read and write, then studied rhetoric, and by the first century B.C.E., Romans had come into contact with Greek rhetorical education, and “rhetoric was a regular part of education” in Rome (14). Quintilian wrote *Institutio Oratoria* after his retirement from teaching, and was able to reflect on his entire career as an orator and teacher. As such, *Institutio Oratoria* is focused extensively on pedagogy.

Quintilian had several goals in mind while composing *Institutio Oratoria*. First and primarily, Quintilian sought to provide a thorough treatise on the training of the rhetor from infancy to adulthood, covering the entire life of the rhetor. As Kennedy argues, Quintilian was “interested in producing a perfect orator and in keeping him at the peak of his form,” and *Institutio Oratoria* offers a much broader view of rhetoric, rhetoric as a lifelong practice (11, 32-33). Kennedy also helpfully points out that the word *institutio* as used by Cicero and Seneca implies a “systematic training or education of the intellect,” a sharing of and invitation to knowledge (31). Second, Quintilian aimed at reforming the educational system of Rome, offering a redefinition of and a fuller account of rhetoric. While both purposes were equally important to the history of rhetoric, I would like to focus most of my efforts on this second exigence, which is more relevant to the current practice of rhetoric and returns rhetoric to the study of what is good, emphasizing rhetoric’s ethical roots.

According to Kennedy, Quintilian wanted to return rhetoric to a “more classical literary style than had become popular,” suggesting a rhetoric that was “more humane, more moral, more practical, somewhat more profound, slightly broader” (20, 40). With such
suggestions, Quintilian offers a redefinition of rhetoric, necessarily opposing two popular schools of thought at the time: those who focused only on declamation and ignored theory, and those who practiced rhetoric and were praised for their “vigor,” though they also ignored theory. Quintilian claims this last group practices not rhetoric, but “uncontrolled violence” (57). Instead of violence, Quintilian sought to cultivate a rhetoric that was essentially moral. As Bizzell and Herzberg explain, “he wants to design a total environment for encouraging love of the good, as embodied in caring teachers, as well as mastery of rhetorical technique, as simplified in the practicing orator’s rules of thumb” (361).

Additionally, Quintilian offers a new understanding of the role of ethos as essential to the communicative experience. As Kennedy suggests, “if the orator is a good man, as required, his goodness will find its natural expression in his manners [read character]” (75). According to Quintilian, it was impossible for the rhetor to even practice rhetoric unless the speaker’s goodness was evident to the audience. Although Quintilian discusses ethos as if his understanding of ethos was widely accepted, according to Kennedy, Quintilian’s account of ethos is unique among writers of the time, at least to the best of our knowledge (75). This new understanding of ethos, along with Quintilian’s emphasis on morality and the use of rhetoric as an educational tool, offer a view of rhetoric as providing something other than persuasion. Rather, Quintilian offers a rhetoric that seeks to share knowledge and inspire a love of what is good.

Augustine’s Rhetoric

_De Doctrina Christiana (DDC)_ was written towards the end of Augustine’s life, with Books 1-3 written around 397 and Book 4 written in 427 C.E. Books 1-3 detail how to interpret the Bible (exegesis), and Book 4 how to convey those truths to others. Like
feminist rhetoric, Augustine’s rhetoric came out of a social need or urgency; there is a strikingly social and communal dimension to both Augustine’s rhetoric and feminist rhetoric. The exigence for Augustine’s *DDC* was primarily threefold: to create a Christian rhetoric, to save the study and practice of rhetoric from secularism, and to promote the study of rhetoric as a teaching tool to train preachers and advance Christianity. These goals were obviously interconnected and dependent on each other. At the time of writing *DDC*, Augustine was witness to a tumultuous clash of rhetoric and religion. The Christian church deeply mistrusted “pagan” rhetoric, yet needed an effective means to quell heretical teaching. As a student and teacher of rhetoric, Augustine clearly understood the benefits of a rhetorical education. As a Christian, Augustine sought to share the knowledge and truth of Christianity with others. What better way to communicate and promote God’s message than through the study of rhetoric?

Augustine’s first task, however, was to provide a view of rhetoric that the Christian church would accept. The fourth century church was wary of a rhetorical education, relating rhetoric with paganism, and decrying sophistic teaching for its extravagance. Peter Brown helpfully explains, “As long as there was nothing to put in its place, Christian critics of a classical education were all the more confused and bitter for lacking constructive alternatives,” and to complicate matters further, those Christians who rejected a classical education were “met by a pagan ‘fundamentalism,’” in which classicists “divinized” their traditional texts, claiming they were gifts from the gods (262). Augustine thus set about to “begin rhetoric anew,” attempting to create a Christian rhetoric that focused on returning to the “ancient idea of moving men to truth” (Baldwin 187-188). According to John D. Schaeffer, Augustine understood the advantages of rhetorical training, but at the same time
recognized the need for a slightly different understanding of rhetoric, one that would oppose the “applause-seeking artificiality that he thought characterized many of his contemporaries,” and would instead reflect a more classical understanding of rhetoric (295). As Ernest L. Fortin explains, Augustine’s orator considered the teaching aspect of Cicero’s three officia of rhetoric as the most important aspect, the orator’s highest and only duty (225-226).

Augustine then, while holding closely to classical understandings of rhetoric, also sought to create a distinctly Christian rhetoric, which would reform the sophistic understanding of rhetoric into a rhetoric more focused on education and teaching.

Augustine, it seems, was also deeply invested in providing a new understanding of rhetoric, in saving rhetoric from the pagan, secular associations it was so commonly linked with at the time. Charles Sears Baldwin argues Augustine “set about recovering for the new generation of Christian orators the true ancient rhetoric,” redeeming the study of rhetoric from its sophistic roots to a more noble use (188). Augustine recognized the importance of rhetoric and sought to defend rhetoric against fideists that feared rhetoric and saw the study of rhetoric as an attack on the church. These early Christians associated rational inquiry with anti-Christian arguments, and rejected rhetoric on the basis that wisdom and knowledge should be acquired through faith alone (Hermanson 311). James J. Murphey helpfully adds, “It was an age also in which former teachers of rhetoric—Jerome, Basil, and Augustine, among others—felt that they must decide whether their former profession deserved a place in the new order” (213). For Augustine at least, the answer was obvious: rhetoric can and should be used to preach the gospel, and Augustine sets about showing how preachers can use aspects of classical rhetoric to share Christianity with others. In such a way, Augustine
aimed to redeem the study of rhetoric from its secular associations, preserving rhetoric as a worthy educational and teaching tool.

Finally, Augustine wanted to demonstrate that rhetoric could be used as a teaching tool to train preachers and advance the gospel. As Amy Hermanson argues, “By navigating a path between sophism and fideism, Augustine preserved rhetoric as a useful tool specially crafted to meet the needs of the Christian preacher” (314). Augustine understood rhetoric as primarily a tool to be used to influence people towards the good, a conviction he shared with classical rhetoricians such as Cicero, Isocrates, and Quintilian (Bizzell and Herzberg 452). As a means to share knowledge and invite audiences to the truth, rhetoric was pivotal to Augustine’s Christian witness. *DDC* was used widely to train preachers, and is still extensively studied as a landmark text in biblical exegesis (Bizzell and Herzberg 452).

**Audience**

*Quintilian’s Rhetoric*

The audience for Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* is wide, and varies based on the section and book of the treatise. The introduction is of course addressed to Marcellus Vitorius, a Roman senator and close friend of Quintilian’s, but it is safe to assume that Quintilian also sought a much wider audience. The first chapter of the first book is addressed to parents, and details the early stages of Quintilian’s pedagogy. Later, in Book II, Quintilian seems to be addressing teachers, discussing the importance of using various teaching methods depending on the student’s needs (II.vi.1-7). At other places in *Institutio Oratoria*, such as Book II, Chapter ix, Quintilian focuses on students, directing them to develop caring relationships between their teachers and fellow students, at the same time that he directs teachers to foster safe learning environments for their students (II.ix.1-3). Quintilian’s
Institutio Oratoria then, details the full development of the rhetor from young child into adulthood, and recognizes the importance of both teacher and student, or rhetor and audience. By addressing both teachers and students, Quintilian suggests that both groups are involved in rhetorical study, and that the relationship between the two affects the ease with which knowledge is shared.

Augustine’s Rhetoric

Augustine’s primary audience for *DDC* were church clergy, people in the Christian community who were in leadership positions within the church and were able to promote change. At the time when Augustine wrote *DDC*, the Christian community faced several problems, namely that it lacked an effective way to train preachers and it faced criticism from Rome’s educational leaders outside the church. Augustine saw rhetoric as a means to solve these problems, giving preachers the education and training needed to invite their audiences to Christianity while simultaneously giving them the skills needed to refute heretical claims against the church. As Hermanson et al. explain, “The Christian tradition fought to quell various schismatic and heretical alternatives regarding questions of doctrine and religious discipline,” alternatives that “demanded an ongoing, effective, and vigilant response,” which Augustine answered by introducing rhetoric to preachers and church leaders (3). Through *DDC*, Augustine argued for the rhetorical training of preachers and church leaders, explaining how rhetoric could be used to defend Christianity against secularism:

> For since through the art of rhetoric both truth and falsehood are pleaded, who would be so bold as to say that against falsehood, truth as regards its own defenders ought to stand unarmed, so that, forsooth, those who attempt to plead false causes know from the beginning how to make their audience well-
disposed, attentive, and docile, while the others remain ignorant of it; so that
the former utter their lies concisely, clearly, with the appearance of truth, and
the latter state the truth in a way that is wearisome to listen to, not clear to
understand, and finally not pleasant to believe; so that one side, by fallacious
arguments, attacks truth and propounds falsehood, the other has not skill
either in defending the true, or refuting the false. (IV.ii.3)

In pointing *DDC* at church leaders, Augustine hoped to implement rhetoric as a training tool, demonstrating its use and value in defending Christianity.

Another reason Augustine aimed *DDC* at church leaders was to illustrate the potential for rhetoric to be used for evangelical purposes. According to Hermanson et al., “the need to win souls for the Christian faith necessitated that clergy be able to reach audiences unfamiliar with Scripture and to move them toward Christ, making rhetoric attractive as an evangelical tool” (3-4). David W. Tracy suggests that the diverse and “often unruly” congregation of Hippo (where Augustine served as bishop while *DDC* was composed) presented a problem that Augustine sought to solve by writing *DDC* (270). It was because of audiences who were less schooled in biblical tradition, such as that in Hippo, that rhetoric should be taught to preachers. Augustine recognized the potential influence of rhetoric for teaching and discovering the Truth, and through *DDC*, revealed the power of rhetoric to influence people toward the Truth. Directing *DDC* at church leaders insured that rhetoric would remain within the church, effectively reforming rhetoric as the study of the Truth or what is good, or as Baldwin claims, “begin[ning] rhetoric anew” (187).
Constraints

Quintilian’s Rhetoric

There are, of course, many limitations in comparing a traditional and ancient theory of rhetoric to a modern feminist theory of rhetoric. One must consider the cultural context in which Quintilian wrote. In 95 C.E., when *Institutio Oratoria* was first published, Rome’s educational system was an exclusive one. Grammar schools were open to both boys and girls, but rhetorical study was open only to boys, and these students typically came from the senatorial or equite classes (Kennedy 40). Although there were certainly exceptions to this rule (Aspasia, from the Greek tradition; and Hortensia, Cornelia, and Laelia from the Roman tradition), Quintilian, according to Kennedy, “expects the quality orator to come from the upper levels of society” (41). This of course meant that rhetoric was not available to all: receiving an education was a political move, and those from the upper classes of society benefited from this hierarchy while women and members of the lower classes were often limited or excluded. However, according to Kennedy, while the orator was originally considered an aristocrat, “it became possible for someone to rise by ability and luck” (13). This might help to explain how women like Aspasia received rhetorical training. Despite this training though, women were still not allowed to practice rhetoric in the public sphere—the famous funeral oration credited to Aspasia was delivered by Pericles, not its female author, and Hortensia is the only known women to have delivered a public oration in Antiquity.

As feminist rhetoric scholar Cheryl Glenn notes, however, Quintilian does seem to have advocated some type of rhetorical training for women and girls. According to Glenn, Quintilian believed “Children of both sexes must be educated to become the well-educated nurses, Roman matrons, and *pater familii*, who, in turn, would teach their own charges” (60).
While Glenn is careful to note Rome was “a men’s club,” she also points out the important role of women in educating their children: “a Roman woman was a *civis romana* who gave birth to *civis romanus*. And Quintilian expected her, too, to take responsibility for the proper education of her children” (60). To be sure, Quintilian argues for advanced education for women:

> Above all see that the child’s nurse speaks correctly. The ideal, according to Chrysippus, would be that she should be a philosopher: failing that he desired that the best should be chosen, as far as possible. No doubt the most important point is that they should be of good character: but they should speak correctly as well …. As regards parents, I should like to see them as highly educated as possible, and I do not restrict this remark to fathers alone. (I.i.4, 6)

In fact, according to Glenn, “Quintilian argues for the practicality of equal education that enacts impressive results for *all* Roman citizens,” women and less privileged classes included (60, emphasis mine).

Quintilian was also influenced by the political conservatism of his time. As Kennedy explains, some of the recommendations Quintilian suggests could not be implemented, because of “the adherence to status quo in Roman society” (53). In other words, Kennedy seems to suggest that Quintilian’s educational reforms were limited by the conservative social and political nature of Rome at the time. This consideration at least makes feasible the possibility that Quintilian had more radical changes in mind, changes that might have produced a rhetoric even more audience-centered than *Institutio Oratoria*. According to Kennedy, “Extensive revision in the curriculum, which may seem desirable to us, was
unthinkable” (53). The changes, for example, that many feminists would have espoused were simply not acceptable in Roman society.

Augustine’s Rhetoric

There are two large limitations to consider when viewing DDC as a rhetorical treatise: first, there is the recognition of DDC as a distinctly Christian view of rhetoric, and finally, there is the implication of DDC as being aimed at church leaders, who were both in positions of power and undeniably male. Additionally, there has been much debate over Augustine’s opinion of women and their role in society.

It is impossible to remove religion from Augustine’s theory of rhetoric. Indeed, it permeates every line of his text. As such, it is important to recognize that Augustine’s rhetor might have different reasons for entering a rhetorical situation than other rhetors. Augustine’s rhetoric focuses on evangelism; Augustine was concerned with influencing lost souls toward the Truth, a truth he believed existed only in Christianity. For Augustine, the truth belongs ultimately to God, not to the speaker (Bizzell and Herzberg 454), and because of this fact, the speaker plays a significantly lesser role in the rhetorical interaction. Augustine then, was primarily motivated by love for the audience. He was convinced that believing in the Christian faith was for the ultimate good of the audience and therefore used rhetoric not as a means to gain an advantage, but rather as a means to invite the audience to Truth. However, DDC is not meant as a solely Christian rhetoric. As Tracy argues, DDC is not merely a “rhetoric of Christian apologetics,” “not a rhetoric of conversion,” but rather “constitutes an authentic whole,” in that it explains Augustine’s rhetorical theory (272). Therefore, despite its Christian roots, and despite the undeniable presence of religion within Augustine’s rhetorical theory, DDC was not meant as only a Christian rhetoric separate from
other theories of rhetoric, but rather as a means to reform the study and practice of rhetoric as a whole.

An additional limitation is that *DDC* was written primarily for those who held authority within the church: clergy and other church leaders. Rhetorical training was not available to women, who could not hold leadership positions within the church, or to the uneducated or unbelieving. Despite Augustine’s desire for Christianity to be available to all, rhetoric still existed as a hierarchy, especially because of Augustine’s involvement in the Roman Catholic Church. However, given Augustine’s purpose of reaching a wide audience and adapting his teaching methods to meet the needs of the audience, it is reasonable to suggest that Augustine’s rhetoric sought to invite all people, regardless of sex or political status, to the Truth. Therefore, while perhaps not advocating that all people be educated in rhetorical training, Augustine at least desired that all people be able to benefit from the knowledge that rhetoric fostered. Such a desire reflects both the cultural context of his time and also a feminist value of sharing knowledge with all people.

However, Augustine’s view of women has been much debated. Augustine has been criticized for his portrayal of women as subservient to men and their sexed bodies as “obstacles along the path to God” (McDuffie 103). According to Rosemary Radford Ruether, Augustine’s opinion of the husband-wife relationship was significantly more restrictive than the legal and social customs of his time: while it was a customary Roman practice for the woman to retain control of any economic capital she brought into a marriage, Augustine believed the wife, along with any financial assets she brought to wedlock, became the property of the husband (57). On the other hand, Felicia McDuffie points out that Augustine’s *Confessions* “contains a powerful rhetoric of the feminine” in that Augustine
portrays God as a mother-figure and himself as a child, and then later God as the loving spouse, and himself as the feminine beloved (116-117). Joanne McWilliam examines the letters Augustine wrote to women, arguing these interactions were neither condescending nor patronizing, and “whatever Augustine thought of women’s bodies, he did not discount their intellectual interests and powers” (201). Rather, “Augustine took the women and the issues and questions contained in their letters seriously. He thinks them capable not only of deep and prayerful spiritual lives but also of sound practical judgment and exemplary leadership both in their families and in religious communities” (190).

The debate about Augustine’s view of women only further demonstrates the need for more scholarship examining the interrelationships between Augustine’s rhetoric (and that of other classical rhetoricians) and feminist rhetoric. As Judith Chelius Stark explains:

> Our contemporary work on Augustine draws out the consequences of his own thinking, even if he himself did not think them through or dare to do so. If he could not have developed these implications for all sorts of cultural and social reasons, there is nothing stopping us from doing so and thereby reaping the benefits for women more fully than Augustine could ever have imagined.

(238)

Additionally, McDuffie helpfully acknowledges, “Since Augustine’s work does celebrate some aspects of the feminine, however, perhaps his rebellious postmodern daughters can enter into a dialogue with him and bring the revalued feminine—valued in its own right—back into discourse and into the lived experience of real women’s lives” (117). The next chapter of this thesis puts feminist rhetoric and classical rhetoric into a dialogue with each other, revaluing the feminine, as McDuffie argues, but also revaluing the classical tradition as
well. The following section will examine the contributions of classical rhetoric to rhetorical theory, demonstrating the revaluing of the classical tradition.

**Contributions to Rhetorical Theory**

Despite the many limitations of applying classical rhetorical theory to present times, particularly the problems regarding cultural context, political power, and gender, the study of classical rhetoric is vital to the current practice of rhetoric. Classical rhetoric, as exemplified by the works of Quintilian and Augustine, offers three important contributions to rhetorical theory. First, these classical rhetorics aim to teach, using rhetoric as an educational tool that increases knowledge and understanding in its audience. Second, these classical rhetorics place an emphasis on the role of **ethos** in establishing a relationship of trust and care between audience and rhetor. Finally, these rhetorics focus on creating understanding, not persuasion, as the end result of the rhetorical interaction. These contributions, while perhaps only present in certain works of classical rhetoric, lay the foundation for current rhetorical practices, and must be understood as foundational theories on which other theories, such as Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric, are built. In the sections that follow, I will argue why each of these contributions must be included in current rhetorical theories.

*The Use of Rhetoric as an Educational Tool*

Understanding rhetoric as an educational tool opens up the possibility of an end result of rhetoric other than persuasion and restores classical rhetoric’s emphasis on learning and increasing knowledge, which is often overshadowed by the focus on persuasion. Typically, classical rhetoric is associated with agonistic and persuasive styles of rhetoric, and it is this understanding that we assume reflects all aspects of classical rhetoric. However, as Sheryl L. Finkle and Edward P. Corbett helpfully point out, while argumentative writing seems to
“dominate other forms of writing and all forms of speaking in the modern curriculum,”
classical rhetoricians did not emphasize or privilege these styles over others (162). In fact,
Finkle and Corbett argue that the main emphasis of Aristotle, Plato, and Isocrates’ respective
theories of rhetoric is the understanding that “rhetoric should advance inquiry as well as communicate knowledge,” suggesting a focus that is much more compatible with invitational rhetoric than many feminists would acknowledge (162). Instead of classical rhetoric teaching the rhetor to trick or deceive the audience, or to force the audience into accepting the rhetor’s view, teachers of classical rhetoric used rhetoric to increase understanding, and students of classical rhetoric were taught to use rhetoric both to increase their own knowledge and to share that knowledge with others.

As an educational tool, classical rhetoric takes on a much more audience-centered focus. With education as its emphasis, the classical rhetorician aims to increase understanding for the audience, not to gain adherence from the audience. The classical rhetorician, motivated to increase understanding, used rhetoric as a means to share knowledge with the audience. Although classical rhetoric typically situates the rhetor as the one with knowledge and the audience as those who need to gain knowledge, the motivation behind the discourse is care for the audience, not hostility towards it. Much like teachers today, teachers in Antiquity aimed for improvement in the minds of their students, and the study of rhetoric was the means to help these students improve. According to Donald Clark, in the opening of Institutio Oratoria, “Quintilian voices his considered confidence in the human mind and in the power of education to improve it” (15). Education for Quintilian of course meant the study of rhetoric. When the educational focus of classical rhetoric is
realized, the audience becomes more important than typical understandings of classical rhetoric allow.

Therefore, while classical rhetoric does position the rhetor in a hierarchical position over the audience, the intention is for the audience to eventually reach the same level of knowledge as the rhetor. For example, while at the beginning of discourse the rhetor possesses knowledge that the audience does not have access to, through discourse, the audience is invited into this body of knowledge in the hopes that both parties will leave the interaction with the same knowledge. It is also important to remember the role of the rhetor in Antiquity and the relationship this rhetor typically had with the audience. For Augustine, the rhetor had a duty—almost a moral responsibility—to teach (Fortin 225-226). However, this teaching was not indoctrination, but was the equipping of students to be responsible citizens and critical thinkers. According to Clark, “Teachers of rhetoric should lead the fight for freedom of thought and discussion,” suggesting that while classical rhetoricians often had a privileged position over their students, it was not a permanent position, and students were invited to challenge and interrogate that position (265). Teachers of rhetoric in Antiquity, therefore, had an ethical responsibility to improve the knowledge and training of their students in order to prepare them for their future role as active citizens.

The study of rhetoric in Antiquity was also considered to be instruction in morality. Looking back to Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric, it is impossible for one to study rhetoric without having the moral certitude and ethical conviction of doing good. If we recall this definition of rhetoric, then rhetoric must in all cases promote goodwill, not domination over the audience. The classical understanding of rhetoric helps us to remember this important distinction, and recognizing the emphasis that classical rhetoric places on education gives us
a method for ensuring that rhetoric does in fact produce what is good. As Clark explains, we must remember that “the teaching of the art of speaking and writing was in antiquity and can be at all times an agent for the teaching of morality” (264). According to Clark, the teaching of rhetoric “fails in its traditional educational duty” if it does not help students to become “prudent, temperate, courageous, or just” (265). Robert Scholes argues the current decline of English as a discipline is partly due to the divide between English and the civic orientation of rhetoric. Scholes claims teachers of rhetoric and writing need to return to this classical orientation, putting modern students “in touch with a usable cultural past” (104). Returning to a classical understanding of rhetoric means returning to the teaching of rhetoric as promoting moral and ethical responsibility, equivalent to the feminist values of promoting equality and immanent value. Coupling classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric together brings classical rhetoric into the modern age, making classical rhetoric more relevant, or more “usable,” for today’s more egalitarian student.

Good rhetors, and thus good teachers, bring learning to life and inspire their students because their focus is on producing change in those students. While many feminists, including Foss and Griffin, object to the goal of changing the audience, we must keep in mind the motivation behind this change. When rhetoric is used for educational purposes, change is desired in order to allow the audience access to the knowledge the rhetor has, resulting in increased understanding for the audience. The desire to change the audience then, is motivated not by the rhetor’s dismissive attitude towards the audience but by the rhetor’s care for the audience. When rhetoric is used as an educational tool, the rhetor seeks to invite the audience to share in the knowledge the rhetor possesses, and for Augustine, this knowledge also leads to salvation. Rhetoric thus produces change that is more similar
(though not identical, since change in the rhetor was not as emphasized in classical rhetoric) to Foss and Griffin’s understanding of transformation, which they distinguish from change in that transformation “occurs in the audience or rhetor or both as a result of new understanding and insights gained in the exchange of ideas” (6). Through the understanding of rhetoric as an educational tool, rhetors give back to the community, inviting students into a body of knowledge and teaching them how to become a part of it themselves, enacting the type of transformation Foss and Griffin promote.

When we compare invitational rhetoric with classical rhetoric we cannot of course ignore the cultural context of the time. In classical Antiquity, students were in most cases male-only and of the patrician class only, certainly an exclusive group. Women were for the most part excluded from the study of rhetoric, as were men born to the lower classes. In this context, it is easy to see why Foss and Griffin promote a rhetoric that they see as vastly different from the exclusive nature of classical rhetoric. However, as G.B. Kerferd points out in *The Sophistic Movement*, while women in Antiquity certainly did not have equal status with men, there were Sophistic schools of thought that argued for greater equality for women (159-162). Bizzell and Herzberg argue in their introduction to classical rhetoric that even Plato recommended greater equality between men and women, as seen in his *Republic* (28). Therefore, while the majority opinion in Antiquity restricted access to a rhetorical education

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13 However, there is increasing evidence suggesting exceptions to this rule, notably Aspasia and Hortensia. Richard Leo Enos suggests the need for more and different forms of primary research, pointing out his own near miss of important evidence: While doing research in the British Museum in 2001, Enos nearly overlooked three pieces of pottery depicting Athenian women reading from scrolls. These pieces date from the fifth century B.C., and according to Enos, “it is clear that while the literate ability of these ladies was praiseworthy, they were not depicted as aberrations but rather as a mark of pride” (66). It is possible, therefore, that while a classical education in rhetoric was primarily for men, educational opportunities for women existed as well.
to only certain classes and sexes of people, this was not true of all schools of classical rhetoric. To dismiss the entirety of classical rhetoric because of its sexism and classism would do a disservice to the study of rhetoric and would overlook the many important contributions the study of classical rhetoric has to offer. For example, the theory that rhetoric can be educational and can promote understanding, the recognition of ethos as communally constructed, and the emphasis on alternatives to persuasion are all valuable to the study of rhetoric in that they allow classical rhetoric to be relevant to the modern student. Additionally, the classical understanding of ethos is more resonant with our present egalitarian values than is the modern understanding of ethos. Thus, while we cannot ignore that the cultural context demanded an exclusive rhetoric, we can transcend that exclusiveness in our study and practice of classical rhetoric in the current age.

*The Role of Ethos in Establishing a Relationship*

In addition to emphasizing the use of rhetoric as an educational tool, a classical understanding of rhetoric is also important for its understanding of ethos. Ethos, according to Aristotle, is “the most authoritative form of persuasion” and is comprised of competence, integrity, and goodwill (I.2.4, II.1.5-6). It is necessary, Aristotle argues, that the audience perceive a sense of goodwill from the rhetor, that they can trust the rhetor, and that they believe the rhetor has their best interest in mind (II.1.2-4). The study of classical rhetoric is important because of its understanding of ethos, which demands that rather than being manipulative or forceful, the rhetor must be concerned with establishing goodwill; consequently, rhetoric must always promote the good.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) This understanding of ethos is not unique to Aristotle. Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine all share similar theories on ethos. Their respective theories are discussed in the
A classical perspective of *ethos* is particularly important because it restores the understanding of *ethos* as a communal, joint creation established or granted by the audience, not “earned” by the rhetor. As S. Michael Halloran points out, the classical understanding of *ethos* differs from the current understanding of ethos:

The classical ideal of character pointed toward public life, the life lived in that gathering place which serves as the root metaphor in the Greek term *ethos*. In modern times we seem to have lost our sense of the distinction between the private and the public spheres, or to have lost our sense of the importance of the latter. Consider, for example, how often a display of personal charm serves as a candidate’s major qualification for public office. (62)

According to scholars such as Krista Ratcliffe, Nedra Reynolds, and Halloran, the classical, communal understanding of *ethos* needs to be restored. Reynolds echoes Halloran’s concern that the current understanding of ethos implies ethos can be garnered or “faked” by manipulating the audience’s emotions (328). Rather, Reynolds argues, if we return to a classical understanding of *ethos* we realize that *ethos* is inextricably linked with character, and “Character is formed by habit, not engendered by nature, and those habits come from the community or culture” (329). A classical understanding of *ethos* then, ensures that *ethos* is genuine, because it is established by a community (the audience) not earned by the rhetor. This understanding also suggests the importance of the audience in the rhetorical interaction.

James L. Kinneavy and Susan C. Warshauer also point out that this communal understanding of *ethos* takes the emphasis off of the speaker, contrary to typical feminist understandings of classical rhetoric in which all of the importance is placed on the speaker.

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first chapter of this thesis. I use Aristotle here simply because he was the first to discuss *ethos* in depth.
Kinneavy and Warshauer argue that the speaker “must exhibit that quality of character that culture, and not the individual, defines as virtue,” noting the etymology of the word *ethos*, which is derived from Greek words meaning “custom,” “habit,” “usage,” and “character,” all of which suggest a connection to community-established social values (175). Additionally, the speaker must be involved with the audience, identifying with them, “holding some of their basic aspirations, speaking their language, and if necessary, sharing and affirming their prejudices” (Kinneavy and Warshauer 176). In this way, the speaker in Antiquity was actually only one part of the rhetorical interaction, and the audience was considered a vital part of discourse. The emphasis on the audience’s role in the exchange is often overlooked, but is an important feature classical rhetoric shares with invitational rhetoric.

When the audience is involved in the interaction rather than merely addressed, a relationship is established between audience and rhetor. *Ethos* allows for this relationship to occur, adding a social dimension to current understandings of ethos. When a relationship is established through *ethos*, through a co-created understanding of values, then the audience can become open to the possibility of change because they trust the rhetor and believe the rhetor’s words will benefit them in some way. Likewise, because the classical understanding of *ethos* is communal, it also allows for the possibility of the rhetor being changed by the audience, an important distinction that the classical perception of *ethos* shares with Foss and Griffin’s invitational impression of *ethos*.

In addition, Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds also see important similarities between classical rhetoric and feminism through the classical understanding of *ethos*. As Jarratt and Reynolds make clear, the classical understanding of *ethos* “explains the process of character formation through learning to speak to the interests of the community,” a feature of classical
rhetoric that they claim resonates well with feminism (44). Jarratt and Reynolds believe the classical understanding of *ethos* allows the speaker to recognize “differences between himself and the audience without having to deceive the audience into believing they share common goals,” an acknowledgement they claim “works well for feminists, for whom *ethos* must become an acknowledgement of difference rather than an attempt to create an impression of similarities” (54). According to Jarratt and Reynolds, *ethos* helps the speaker gain “a constant awareness that one always speaks from a particular place in a social structure—an awareness common to rhetoric and to post-modern feminisms” in that *ethos* is the place in which speaker and audience converge, “the admission of a standpoint, with the understanding that other standpoints exist and that they change over time” (47, 53). The classical understanding of *ethos* therefore not only acknowledges the audience’s viewpoints, but often speaks to these viewpoints and for them, because of the communal nature of *ethos*. By restoring the classical understanding of *ethos* as communally created, feminist and classical rhetorics can be viewed as more compatible theories, allowing scholars to glean from both theories together.

Classical rhetoric provides rhetorical theory with an important understanding of *ethos* in that it emphasizes the ethical responsibility of the rhetor. Returning to a classical understanding of *ethos* also restores the understanding of *ethos* as communal and co-created by the audience, which demonstrates the importance of establishing a relationship with the audience, and consequently indicates the areas of compatibility between classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric.
Providing Alternatives to Persuasion

When we consider the emphasis classical rhetoric places on education, we open up facets of classical rhetoric that offer alternatives to persuasion, such as gaining understanding or increasing knowledge. These facets present classical rhetoric as more compatible with Foss and Griffin’s theory of invitational rhetoric. Classical rhetoric’s educational emphasis and value for a communal construction of ethos both suggest a more active, participatory audience role and allow the possibility of an end result other than persuasion. These alternatives to persuasion are important because they provide a fuller account of classical rhetoric, allowing current scholars an enriched picture of classical rhetoric and opening up the study of classical rhetoric for feminist research.

Typically, scholars (including feminist rhetorics scholars) emphasize the importance of the speaker or rhetor’s position in the study of classical rhetoric, and object to the audience’s limited role. The audience is seen as a passive beneficiary of the rhetor’s superior knowledge. As Ratcliffe argues, “Classical theories foreground a rhetor’s speaking and writing as means of persuading audiences; these theories are only secondarily concerned with how audiences should listen and hardly at all concerned with … the desires of particular audience members” (20). While the role of the speaker in classical rhetoric is typically to impart knowledge on the audience, the method is not always through persuasion. As Kennedy helpfully points out, Quintilian rejected a definition of rhetoric that equated rhetoric with persuasion, and opted instead for a definition that captured the moral responsibility he felt was a necessary product of rhetoric (58). Bizzell and Herzberg argue that according to Augustine, the most important result of rhetoric was charity, and “Any interpretation that encourages charity is not wrong” (453). Additionally, while feminist scholars (specifically
Foss and Griffin) typically object to the somewhat privileged position of the rhetor over the audience, claiming rhetors are merely trying to convince their audiences to believe what they believe and to essentially create replicas of themselves, Kennedy argues that Quintilian was actually quite flexible when teaching his students: “we cannot fairly accuse him of trying to direct all imitation toward a single model as the perfect form in each genre. Indeed, his actual position allows for a good deal of variety since he recognizes changes in taste and usage and insists strongly on the need to adapt a particular work to its particular circumstances” (113-114). The rhetorical tradition of Quintilian and Augustine suggest a form of classical rhetoric in which the audience was considered an important part of the communication exchange. Rather than passive beneficiaries, the audience was seen as active participants.

William M.A. Grimaldi also carefully points out that while most conceptions of classical rhetoric practically ignored the audience’s role in the rhetorical interaction and focused almost exclusively on the speaker, Aristotle’s Rhetoric offers a much different view. For Aristotle, “the auditors are the final goal of all rhetorical discourse, for they are the ones who must reach a judgment on their own” (“Auditor’s Role” 67). Viewed in this way, it is impossible for the audience to be “totally passive partners completely subject to the technical skills of the speaker,” but rather the audience is seen as “nonspeaking partners actively engaged in the exchange taking place between speaker and auditor” (“Auditor’s Role” 67). Grimaldi goes on to explain that in Aristotelian rhetoric there is a “close affinity between speaker and auditor,” because of the relationship that is established through ethos, noting particularly the importance of the audience’s ethos. If the speaker were to “overlook the
salient features of the [ethos\textsuperscript{15}] of his auditors, or dismiss them as insignificant or irrelevant to his purpose, he effectively negates or weakens the force of his own [ethos] as entechnic pistis” ("Auditor’s Role" 74). When the audience is seen as actively participating in discourse, then rhetoric can have an end result other than persuasion. As active participants with a valuable role in the rhetorical interaction, the audience actually has the potential to change the speaker, in addition to the typical expectation of the speaker changing the audience. Grimaldi’s discussion of Aristotelian rhetoric allows for a different kind of interaction between audience and rhetor, which in turn allows for a different end result of rhetoric, suggesting the possibility of alternatives to persuasion.

Quintilian and Augustine’s respective rhetorical theories provide a relationship between audience and rhetor that is similar to Aristotle’s, but is a relationship that is not typically accounted for when one studies classical rhetoric. It is all too easy to label classical rhetoric as merely agonistic, but Quintilian and Augustine provide theories of rhetoric that open up the possibility for alternatives to persuasion. These alternatives are important because they provide a fuller account of classical rhetoric. If we label all of classical rhetoric as patriarchal, agonistic, and violent, we miss out on the contributions classical rhetoric offers to the study of rhetoric. Instead of dismissing classical rhetoric for its antiquated notions of gender roles, we need to reread classical rhetoric, looking for compatibilities with modern theories of rhetoric that might support or inform more inclusive theories of rhetoric. Examining classical rhetoric for areas of compatibility, for overlooked conceptions of classical rhetoric, for alternatives to persuasion, allows the possibility of using classical rhetoric for feminist research, and returns the study of rhetoric to the study of what is good.

\textsuperscript{15} Grimaldi uses the Greek word, which I have transliterated using brackets for ease of reading.
Classical rhetoric, viewed through the respective theories of Quintilian and Augustine, is more concerned with producing good than with reaching agreement. Likewise, much of feminist rhetorical scholarship is equally as concerned with the good. Why not view these theories as compatible, and allow their respective theories to inform and enrich one another?

**Compatibilities Between Classical Rhetoric and Invitational Rhetoric**

While it would be naïve to ignore the fact that classical rhetoric was only available to certain groups of people and actively discriminated against women and those of less privileged socioeconomic standing, it would also be ridiculous to ignore the fact that this was a commonly accepted practice during the time period. It is also important to remember that while rhetoric in Antiquity was exclusive, it was still a civic practice that promoted social responsibility. We must consider forgiving Quintilian and Augustine for their patriarchal ways because they had no other truth available to them at the time. Despite these glaring problems, the whole of classical rhetoric should not just be dismissed as an outdated, offensive, and irrelevant theory. Classical rhetoric as presented by Quintilian and Augustine offers important contributions to the study of rhetoric, namely an understanding of rhetoric as an educational tool, an emphasis on *ethos* in developing a relationship between audience and rhetor, and the possibility of an end result to rhetoric other than persuasion. Without these contributions we would lose the foundation of our study in the field.

These contributions also allow us to see the areas of overlap between classical rhetoric and other theories of rhetoric, such as invitational rhetoric. If we can see these theories as compatible rather than oppositional theories, then we can build on this foundation, offering new and revitalized ways of viewing classical rhetoric and allowing feminist rhetoric to use classical rhetoric as a research site, while allowing both theories to inform and enrich
each other. The final chapter illustrates these areas of overlap, offering a direct comparison between Quintilian and Augustine’s respective theories and Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric. In laying these theories side by side, I will demonstrate the areas of compatibility that exist between these two seemingly oppositional theories, suggesting that they share valuable contributions to rhetorical theory. In doing so, I will argue for a revitalized and hybridized theory of rhetoric that promotes rhetoric as the study of what is good, which is an inherently feminist value. Restoring the classical understanding of rhetoric as the pursuit of truth, which Grimaldi claims “carries no meaning save to the human,” and I would add, to the humane, aligns classical rhetoric with feminist values, and reveals the compatibility between classical rhetoric and feminist rhetoric (“Corax-Tisias” 42).
Chapter 4—Conclusion

In this final chapter, I will first offer a direct comparison of invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric, as represented by Quintilian and Augustine’s respective theories. This comparison will demonstrate the areas of compatibility that exist between these seemingly opposing theories, while also acknowledging the differences in cultural context that must exist when comparing theories from such dramatically different historical periods. Despite the difference in historical context, these compatibilities demonstrate the relevance of classical rhetoric for the modern scholar, even with current more egalitarian values. These compatibilities also allow rhetorical scholars to view these theories in connection, offering three important contributions to the study of rhetoric. First, viewing invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric as compatible theories opens up classical rhetoric as a potential site for feminist scholarship, particularly for primary research of non-traditional sources,\textsuperscript{16} renewing feminist studies. Second, viewing invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric together returns classical rhetoric to its educational emphasis as the study of what is good, a focus that is often ignored in current studies of classical rhetoric, and offers a valuable heuristic for re-examining classical rhetoric. Finally, viewing these theories as compatible offers important contributions to rhetorical theory as a whole, providing a revitalized and hybridized theory of rhetoric with an educational focus, an understanding of \textit{ethos} as communally-constructed, and an emphasis on alternatives to persuasion, which creates a rhetoric that is a blend of classical and feminist values.

\textsuperscript{16} Enos argues we must not restrict ourselves to print sources only, but rather “we need to expand our history of rhetoric by including sources that are not only visible but tangible,” such as pottery, statues, and other artifacts (66).
Areas of Commonality

While there are certainly limitations in claiming classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric are similar theories of rhetoric, there are many areas of overlap that exist between the two theories, and these commonalities suggest that the theories can at least be viewed as compatible rather than oppositional. Each of these theories of rhetoric is grounded in civic and social activities that offer important insights into audience, ethos, public knowledge, morality, and critical thinking. While there are many differences between Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric and the respective rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine, these theories share three key concerns which I believe are important to the study of rhetoric and return rhetoric to its focus on the good: an emphasis on the study of rhetoric as an educational practice that increases knowledge and understanding, a realized importance of the role of ethos in establishing a relationship between audience and rhetor, and a view of rhetoric that focuses on understanding, not persuasion, as its end result. I will review how Foss and Griffin, Quintilian, and Augustine address each of these concerns in the following sections.

The Emphasis on Education and Understanding

Foss and Griffin, Quintilian, and Augustine all view rhetoric as a tool in education, as a means by which to offer and build knowledge. Although Foss and Griffin describe invitational rhetoric as “the giving of expression to a perspective without advocating its support or seeking its acceptance,” (7, emphasis mine) implying that there is no “goal” or end result to their rhetoric, invitational rhetoric does have an aim, not in conversion, but in sharing knowledge, extending ideas, and reaching mutual understanding (8). They claim that through invitational rhetoric, “rhetors will be able to recognize situations in which they seek not to persuade others but simply to create an environment that facilitates understanding,
accords value and respect to others’ perspectives, and contributes to the development of relationships of equality” (Foss and Griffin 17). However, while invitational rhetoric does not force acceptance on the audience, Sonja Foss and Karen Foss claim invitational rhetoric can create “an environment in which others may change if they are inclined to do so” and that speakers can “select communicative options that either facilitate or impede the development of these conditions in [a] particular speaking situation,” suggesting that the speaker is in some sort of position to at least encourage transformation, and that the speaker has certain rhetorical options available to her (5). While perhaps not intending to be instructional in a traditional sense, the change that occurs through invitational rhetoric seems unavoidable, because if speaker and audience really seek to understand each other, if they really hear each other, they will be changed, whether or not a position is accepted or rejected.

Likewise, Quintilian and Augustine, while opposed to persuasion as the only result of rhetoric, still sought to use rhetoric to transform the minds and hearts of their students. Quintilian was largely concerned with education, and viewed rhetoric as a means to educate the young. According to George Kennedy, *Institutio Oratoria* focused on reforming the educational system of Rome, and Quintilian sought to provide a fuller account of rhetoric, to make it “more humane,” and less focused on persuasion or “uncontrolled violence” (40, 57). Like Foss and Griffin, Quintilian wanted to provide a new definition for rhetoric, one that was founded in moral excellence and sought to increase understanding and knowledge, not to merely win or control an audience (II.iii.12). Augustine’s rhetoric is also focused on instruction, with the motivation of helping the audience, not forcing them into agreement. For Augustine, it was the duty of the rhetor to “teach what is right, and to correct what is wrong,” (IV.iv.6) to “assist the silent listener,” (IV.x.25) and to “help” the audience toward
the good (IV.xxv.55). Instruction, for Augustine, “preceded persuasion” (IV.xxii.28). In fact, Augustine even claims “persuasion is not of necessity, because there is not always need of it,” but rather, “the mere exposition of the truth” is of primary importance (IV.xxii.28). Although it is easy to assume that Augustine envisioned the rhetor as the one to expose such truth, there is at least the possibility of that truth coming from a source outside of the rhetor because according to Augustine, “any interpretation that encourages charity is not wrong,” whether it comes from a trained rhetor or from a member of the audience (Bizzell and Herzberg 453).

While Foss and Griffin are opposed to the privileged position of the speaker and what they, along with Karen Foss, call the “presumption” that the rhetor “knows about others’ experiences what they, themselves, do not” (125), even if the rhetor seeks only “to create an environment that facilitates understanding,” there is at least some hierarchy of power in that the rhetor creates this environment (Foss and Griffin 17). Unless rhetor and audience speak simultaneously (so that there is no way to distinguish who is speaking and who is listening), it seems impossible to eliminate all power imbalances. Additionally, invitational rhetoric calls for “a willingness to yield,” which stems from humility, and suggests that part of the rhetorical process includes listening and being willing to change your thinking, which should be a mutual experience. In other words, while the rhetor is expected to be willing to yield to the audience, the audience must still be willing to yield to the speaker, much like in other forms of rhetoric.

*The Role of Ethos in Establishing a Relationship*

Invitational rhetoric’s goal of creating a mutually beneficial relationship between speaker and audience is a goal that is evident in both Quintilian and Augustine’s respective
rhetorics. Foss and Griffin propose that invitational rhetoric should create “an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship” (5). Interestingly enough, Quintilian recommends that the rhetor actually adopt “the feelings of a parent towards his pupils” and that pupils regard their teachers as parents “of their minds,” establishing a relationship as intimate as that of a parent and child (II.ii.4, II.ix.1). While Foss and Griffin may object to this paternal characterization, which positions the rhetor as the source of knowledge and the audience as naïve children, Quintilian assumes this relationship to exist both out of the rhetor’s love for the audience and out of the audience’s love for the rhetor (II.ix.1-2). While in this case Quintilian does not view the rhetor and the audience as equals, which counters what invitational rhetoric proposes, we must consider the motivation behind the rhetor’s attempts to communicate knowledge. Quintilian’s purpose in using rhetoric was to inspire “a love for doing well,” and he believed that even if the audience was not persuaded, so long as the rhetor spoke truth, the rhetor “attained the full end of his art” (XII.xi.31, II.xvii.23).

Quintilian’s rhetoric was concerned with the relationship between audience and rhetor, and while he perhaps did not view audience and rhetor as equal participants, he at least desired to create understanding and promote the good, and acknowledged that there might be different ideas as to what this “good” really was, which resonates at least somewhat with Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric.

Augustine’s concept of Christian charity fits the definition of invitational rhetoric as “an invitation to understanding as a means to create a relationship” as well (Foss and Griffin 5). In Book III of his De Doctrina, Augustine calls the “enjoyment” of others part of the rhetorical experience (III.x.16), and in Book IV discusses the conduct of the rhetor as such that will “offer an example to others” (IV.xxviii.61, emphasis mine). In Augustine’s rhetoric,
the rhetor is offering herself—for acceptance or rejection—out of respect for her audience, not placing herself on a pedestal to be esteemed by the masses below. Additionally, in order to enjoy another person, the rhetor must respect the audience and must be interested in establishing a relationship. Without this mutual love and respect, rhetoric—classical or invitational—cannot exist.

Most importantly, however, invitational rhetoric and the respective rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine share a focus on ethos as a communally created—rather than rhetor-created—value. In invitational rhetoric, the relationship between speaker and audience exists around an exchange of ideas. It is the exchange of ideas that brings about change and builds ethos (6), implying that rhetor and audience both are changed, and that when change occurs in such a manner, there is “an appreciation for new perspectives gained and gratitude for the assistance provided by others in thinking about an issue” (6). According to Foss and Griffin, the connection between audience and rhetor “is not dependent on rhetors’ approval of the choices made by audience members,” and it is the audience that grants approval to the rhetor, a concept that clearly illustrates the classical conception of ethos (12).

In similar fashion, Quintilian and Augustine’s respective theories also capture this communal understanding of ethos. Quintilian’s rhetoric was largely concerned with moral excellence and character formation, which feminist rhetoric scholars Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds claim was part of ethos, and “necessarily locat[es] the speaker in the practices and experience of the group for whom he speaks” (50). William M.A. Grimaldi agrees, arguing that the Latin tradition—which includes Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria—“recognized the importance of the speaker as a person, and to a degree, of the auditors, and the contribution
each makes toward establishing acceptance of the subject proposed by the speaker,” implying the importance of the audience in establishing ethos (“Auditor’s Role” 75, emphasis mine). Ernest Fortin argues Augustine’s rhetoric also recognized the importance of the audience in establishing ethos, explaining “the confidence that he [the speaker] inspires is as much a function of the opinion that others have formed of him as a man as it is of his competence or his ability to speak well,” because the audience will only trust the speaker “if they are convinced that he is a good man and that he has their common good at heart” (223). In other words, it is the speaker’s character that helps inspire trust from the audience, but it is only the audience that can grant ethos to the rhetor, reinforcing the importance of the audience in the rhetorical exchange. Invitational rhetoric helps restore the emphasis on the audience and the importance of their role in creating ethos, an emphasis that is often lost when modern scholars look back at classical rhetoric. A feminist rereading such as Foss and Griffin’s would provide a valuable and sensitive heuristic for re-examining classical rhetoric.

**Providing Alternatives to Persuasion**

Finally, these respective rhetorics all focus on producing beneficial mutual understanding between audience and speaker, not persuasion, as an end result of rhetoric. Foss and Griffin’s main complaint about “traditional” rhetoric is its emphasis on persuasion, which Foss and Griffin equate with “a desire for control and domination” of the audience (3). The image of classical rhetoric Foss and Griffin create is one of aggression and violence, which is true for some instances of classical rhetoric, but not all. Such an over-simplification is unrepresentative of classical rhetoric. For example, Augustine actually claims that “persuasion is not of necessity, because there is not always need of it,” and focuses instead on a rhetoric whose aim is to labor for others (IV.xii.28, IV.xxxi.64). Likewise, according to
Kennedy, Quintilian actually opposed a group of orators who were popular in his time but who practiced a rhetoric Quintilian equated with “uncontrolled violence” (57). In fact, Quintilian denounces the definition of rhetoric as persuasion because “such an art may be attained by one who is far from being a good man,” (II.xv.3) which is impossible under Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric. In addition, Kennedy adds that for Quintilian, the definition of rhetoric as persuasion was too narrow, because it did not allow for other end results, such as the mutual understanding that Foss and Griffin seek to promote (32-33).

Instead of persuasion as the end result of rhetoric, Foss and Griffin advocate a rhetoric whose end result is that “everyone involved gains a greater understanding of the issue and its subtlety, richness, and complexity,” suggesting a beneficial learning experience (5). These ideas however, are not unique to invitational rhetoric. Creating a beneficial learning experience was the goal of Augustine’s rhetoric, where the result was not that what was “distasteful becomes pleasant, nor that what one was unwilling to do is done,” (in other words, persuasion,) “but that what was obscure becomes clear,” allowing greater understanding of an idea without the motivation to persuade an audience (IV.x.25-IV.xi.26). Augustine even acknowledges that his audience already holds powerful insights, recognizing that God can speak to the audience just as God can speak to the rhetor. His rhetoric is not bent on telling the audience what they must do, because they already know what they “ought to do” (IV.xxii.27).

Quintilian also sought for rhetoric to provide greater understanding and a mutually beneficial experience. The aim for Quintilian’s rhetoric is not persuasion, as Foss and Griffin claim is the goal for all “traditional” rhetorics, but rather “speaking well,” or showing love through the act of speaking, and “a love for doing well” (XII.xi.31). In fact, Quintilian even
acknowledges that it is this goal, “a love for doing well,” that he hopes to provide, not a skill that might be “advantageous” or that might privilege one who has studied rhetoric over one who has not (XII.xi.31). While Foss and Griffin might object to the “change” in the audience, albeit for the good, that Quintilian’s rhetoric aims at, the intention of Quintilian’s rhetoric—to benefit those involved—aligns itself with invitational rhetoric. As feminist rhetoric scholar Celeste Condit points out in her defense of classical rhetoric, sometimes the intentions to change others are ethical ones, as is the case in trying to “change racists toward a greater tolerance of others.” In this example, the change created in the audience is beneficial to society, and differs from intentions to change others that are grounded in a desire to “increase one’s own influence and power” (105). Therefore, Quintilian’s rhetor, although aiming at a change in the audience, is actually much like Foss and Griffin’s rhetor in that the aim is for greater understanding, with the purpose of benefiting those involved (though it might not always be achieved), so that the rhetor invites the audience to share in knowledge that is mutually created. Foss and Griffin, Quintilian, and Augustine all promote theories of rhetoric that are civically oriented and work to improve social progress, though social progress would likely be defined differently by each.

Implications for the Study of Rhetoric

The similarities outlined above, as well as the arguments advanced throughout this thesis, offer important implications for the study of rhetoric in that feminist rhetoric and classical rhetoric can now be viewed as compatible, rather than oppositional theories, at least as evidenced by Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric and the respective rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine. In the first chapter, I note that the available literature (including work done by feminist scholars) discussing invitational rhetoric all hints at comparisons to
classical rhetoric as a way to explain invitational rhetoric as a viable rhetorical theory. For example, Sharon D. Downey; Kathleen J. Ryan and Elizabetti J. Natalle; and Jennifer Emerling Bone, Cindy L. Griffin, and T.M. Linda Scholz associate invitational rhetoric with dialectics, standpoint hermeneutics, and gaining civility, respectively, all of which suggest areas of compatibility between invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric, though these scholars do not make that claim directly. In addition, Cheryl Glenn, Susan Jarratt, and C. Jan Swearingen, among others, offer examples of women in the rhetorical tradition, opening up the possibility of women’s influence on classical rhetoric. For these reasons, classical rhetoric needs to be reread in order to allow other, more feminist readings of these texts.

Chapter two examines invitational rhetoric and argues that invitational rhetoric better captures the classical understanding of *ethos* as a communally constructed value than do modern understandings of the concept of ethos. As such, invitational rhetoric offers an important heuristic to re-examine classical rhetoric. In addition, I noted the similarities that exist between invitational rhetoric, Krista Ratcliffe’s rhetorical listening, Rogerian rhetoric, and prominent classical theories. These rhetorics all share an emphasis on the relationship between audience and rhetor and an alternative to persuasion, despite their divergent backgrounds, suggesting that these features need to become part of one rhetorical theory instead of remaining segmented into four distinct theories of rhetoric.

In chapter three, I analyze classical rhetoric, with Quintilian and Augustine as my representatives. In doing so, I discover that both Quintilian and Augustine offer somewhat feminist values in their respective theories of rhetoric: an emphasis on producing understanding, which helps promote the feminist principle of imminent value; the importance of the relationship between audience and rhetor, which fosters the feminist principle of
equality; and the possibility for end results to rhetoric other than persuasion, which supports the feminist principle of self-determination. The presence of feminist values within facets of classical rhetoric suggests the need for further study of classical rhetoric to recover more evidence of either women in the classical tradition or women’s influence on the classical tradition.

In directly comparing feminist rhetoric (through Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric) and classical rhetoric (through the respective theories of Quintilian and Augustine), this thesis demonstrates that these theories can be seen as compatible. When we view classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric together, we are able to revitalize each respective theory, seeing them anew. Viewing them in conjunction allows each theory to inform the other, effectively strengthening each theory individually. For example, invitational rhetoric’s emphasis on the relationship between audience and rhetor offers us an enriched understanding of the classical concept of *ethos*, an understanding that is often overlooked by modern scholars and could offer important insights into classical rhetoric. Practically speaking, the understanding of *ethos* offered by invitational rhetoric makes classical rhetoric more relevant in today’s egalitarian society, and allows modern students to connect more with classical theories—the foundation of rhetoric—enabling students to see the importance in studying and practicing rhetoric. Likewise, classical rhetoric’s educational emphasis illustrates the feminist value of inviting others into a knowledge community, putting the emphasis on student learning and altering discourse so that students feel comfortable and confident participating in discourse. When viewed together, these respective theories strengthen and support the most important features of each theory, and each theory is stronger when viewed together, because the salient features in each are highlighted and
reinforced (though using different language), suggesting the importance of these features in a theory of rhetoric.

**Implications for Feminist Rhetorical Studies**

Noting the similarities that occur between a “feminist” theory of rhetoric such as invitational rhetoric and a “masculine” theory of rhetoric such as classical rhetoric raises important questions for feminist rhetorical studies. I note in the first chapter of this thesis that both *feminism* and *rhetoric* as terms have often resisted definition. One of the reasons why feminism has resisted definition is because once you define something you restrict its use in some way. As the novelist Samuel Butler writes, “A definition is the enclosing of a wilderness of ideas within a wall of words” (from his *Notebooks*). To place a fixed definition on feminism is also to exclude certain ideas and values; to label such a rhetoric in that way (or to exclude other rhetorics by *not* labeling them this way) is to make a dangerous generalization that undermines the core values of many feminists. A feminist rhetoric promotes and serves the ends of feminism, which has various principles and values—some of which I have identified (based on Foss and Griffin’s emphasis) as equality, imminent value, and self-determination—whether or not these principles are necessarily met in the rhetorical exchange. In other words, I believe we need to open up the definition of feminist rhetoric to include rhetorics that promote feminist values, although they might not necessarily be achieved in that particular rhetorical situation, in much the same way that we need to open up the definition of rhetoric to include interactions where persuasion might not necessarily be achieved.

In addition to the tendency for generalizations to create boundaries, these generalizations do not account for all facets of rhetoric. This thesis has demonstrated how
the respective rhetorics of Quintilian (95 C.E.); Augustine (427 C.E.); Young, Becker and Pike (Rogerian rhetoric, 1970); Foss and Griffin (invitational rhetoric, 1995); and Ratcliffe (rhetorical listening, 2005) all share similar features: an emphasis on rhetoric as an educational tool to aid understanding, a focus on the relationship between audience and rhetor, and the possibility of alternative end results to rhetoric other than persuasion, despite being written by different genders and in vastly different time periods with different cultural contexts. It seems we need another term that accounts for some of these other, somewhat alternative theories of rhetoric. The term feminist is too limiting. What about rhetorics that promote feminist principles, though they might not always achieve them? Rhetoric scholars need to be more open to multiple rhetorics that might serve feminist ends, instead of dismissing certain rhetorics because of their association with a particular time period, culture, or the gender of its author. We need a method of study and of criticism that is sensitive to alternative end results of rhetoric, such as learning and understanding; we need a method that considers the educational and civic emphasis of rhetoric, as well as the persuasive effectiveness.

Placing these rhetorics side by side allows us to see the areas of overlap between vastly different theories of rhetoric: one written by a male from Antiquity, one from a Christian bishop in Antiquity, one from a group of men in modern times but with a psychology background, one from a team of women in modern times with a feminist background, and one from a woman writing in the current cultural context. If we can see the shared features of these theories, then how can we label one feminist and the other(s) not? While it is difficult to conceive of feminism without a hard and fast definition for it, we have allowed multiple, complex definitions of rhetoric. By keeping the definition of rhetoric open,
we allow for multiple types, styles, and situations of rhetoric to occur. Likewise, if we can remain open to multiple rhetorics that can serve feminist ends, instead of those conventionally considered feminist, we can offer new and revitalized ways of viewing rhetorics that have traditionally been closed to feminist ends, and we can invite new methods of rhetorical criticism that account for alternative ways of judging effective rhetoric.

**Implications for Classical Rhetorical Studies**

Viewing classical rhetoric in connection with feminist rhetoric provides a revived understanding of classical rhetoric, making it more relevant for modern scholars in that it is more applicable to today’s egalitarian society, offering a useful heuristic for re-evaluating classical rhetoric. Instead of relegating classical rhetoric as outdated or insensitive to current understandings of rhetoric, we can instead look for areas where classical rhetoric might enrich our current practice and study of rhetoric. As Sheryl Finkle and Edward Corbett argue, “Classical rhetoric need not be discarded simply because someone has pointed out its inconsistencies or deficiencies. It needs, instead, to be updated and applied in a wider variety of ways” (162). If we can look for connections between classical rhetoric and feminist rhetoric, we open up a whole new area for further research, and we also allow for the possibility of a new understanding of classical rhetoric, one that is more inclusive and more applicable to current scholars.

Looking at the compatibilities that exist between invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric also offers a renewed understanding of the classical concept of *ethos*, which Grimaldi (among others) argues has often been forgotten in modern times. If we can restore the classical concept of *ethos*, which originated with Aristotle, then we can also restore the importance of the audience, reclaiming classical rhetoric from its current rhetor-centered
bias. As Grimaldi explains, Aristotle’s understanding of the audience “as cooperative, and in some ways codeterminative, participants in discourse is not really the perception of the auditors we now find,” as current understandings of classical rhetoric, evidenced by Foss and Griffin and Ratcliffe clearly demonstrate (“Auditor’s Role” 77-78). However, if we can restore this understanding of the audience’s role in discourse, relating it to the importance that rhetorics such as Foss and Griffin’s and Ratcliffe’s place on the audience, then we restore an understanding of classical rhetoric that considers alternative end results other than persuasion, making rhetoric more inclusive, more focused on education and increasing knowledge and understanding, and less focused on “winning” or coercion—the agonistic rhetoric that is almost exclusively associated with classical rhetoric. The presence of such alternative theories of rhetoric, even within classical rhetoric, offers important new insights for rhetoric scholars, such as the need for a new theory of rhetoric that captures these alternative emphases.

*Implications for Rhetorical Studies as a Whole*

The similarities that exist between invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric, in addition to other similarities between other rhetorics such as rhetorical listening and Rogerian rhetoric, point out the need for a theory of rhetoric that captures these important features, establishing them as prominent features of an alternative rhetoric. Instead of four different and divergent theories of rhetoric, divided by their respective authors’ genders, why not view these theories as compatible, recognizing the similarities among these theories? Certainly if these features of rhetoric have survived through thousands of years, multiple authors, disparate historical and cultural contexts, and different genders, these features are important and need to be recognized. A new theory of rhetoric that captures some of the values
important to both feminists and traditionalists would further open rhetoric and rhetorical theory to alternative forms of rhetoric, allowing for and accounting for new rhetorics to exist and to be accepted as part of the rhetorical tradition, rather than viewed as radical, only for women, or only for specific situations.

This thesis has looked at two areas of rhetoric that are typically viewed in opposition to each other—invitational rhetoric and classical rhetoric—and has demonstrated that areas of compatibility exist, despite radically different cultural contexts. In addition to the compatibilities between invitational rhetoric and the respective rhetorics of Quintilian and Augustine, similarities also exist between Rogerian rhetoric and rhetorical listening. These compatibilities—an emphasis on rhetoric as an educational tool that increases understanding, a measured importance on the relationship between audience and rhetor and a communal understanding of ethos, and an alternative end result to rhetoric other than persuasion—need to be recognized as part of a new rhetorical theory, a theory that encompasses these values and transcends the respective genders, cultural contexts, and political status of its authors.
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VITA

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ABSTRACT

ALTERNATIVES TO PERSUASION:
AN INVITATION TO REREAD CLASSICAL RHETORIC

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Although numerous scholars have pointed out the need for feminist revisions to classical rhetoric or feminist additions to classical rhetoric, few scholars have examined the ways in which these two bodies of scholarship might work together. Many feminists either ignore theories of classical rhetoric or view classical rhetoric as an area that offers little insight into feminist rhetorical theories. While perhaps not intending to, the exclusion of classical rhetoric actually undermines feminist ideas of inclusion and coaxes feminists into an “either/or” mentality. By illustrating the areas of overlap and the relationships between classical rhetoric and invitational rhetoric—such as the emphasis on increasing understanding, the importance of ethos as communally constructed, and the possibility of end results of rhetoric other than persuasion—this study will open up and redeem classical rhetoric as a site for feminist scholarship, encouraging a “both/and” mentality, and will provide a way to view feminist rhetoric and classical rhetoric side by side, as harmonious rhetorical theories.