For Peace, Civilization, and Expansion:

The United States Factory System, 1796-1822

by

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INTRODUCTION

The narrative of European and American Indian interaction is a dismal tale. Europeans arriving in the New World brought with them lethal diseases. American Indians had no immunological experience with European diseases and childhood illnesses such as smallpox, measles, and influenza often proved fatal to large numbers of Indians. Furthermore, these epidemics were most likely to kill healthy adults. The inability of healthy adults to care for other adults, children, or the elderly destabilized society even further. With no one to grow food, gather water, or maintain their communities, Indian societies suffered a demographic collapse. Complicating matters further, the incubation period on these diseases was long enough to allow those fleeing the sickness to spread the disease to other villages. Some historians estimate that the aboriginal populations in the New World declined by as much as ninety five percent.[1]

The traditional narrative asserts that Europeans, armed with deadly weapons and diseases, simply brushed aside the Indians who served as only passive barriers to European imperialism. However, Indian history has undergone a renaissance during the past twenty years. Both colonial and Indian societies existed in precarious states. Indian societies ravaged by disease sought new allies and European colonists desperately needed to establish footholds in this new land. Richard White's groundbreaking work, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815,* argues that Europeans and Indians were incapable of exerting complete dominance over each other. This

[1] The topic of aboriginal decline has been discussed at length in a number of works. While there is no consensus on the original numbers of Indians before European contact, all the major works all agree that the importation of epidemic diseases dramatically reduced the aboriginal populations. See Alfred W. Crosby, *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1972); Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe 900-1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Alfred W. Crosby, "Virgin Soil Epidemics as a Factor in the Aboriginal Depopulation in America," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd series, 33 (Apr. 1976): 289-299; Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (New York: Norton, 2005).

led them to create a unique system of meaning and exchange which White termed "the Middle Ground." Indians did not act as simple barriers to European expansion but rather shaped European and later American policymaking. Whites and Indians both wanted stable and peaceful relationships on the frontier and both sides wished to pursue lucrative trade. Daniel Usner's *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* maintains a similar system of "networks of cross-cultural interaction through which native and colonial groups circulated goods and services" prevailed in the South as well. Again, the French, Spanish, British, and Americans could not exert power over the Indian peoples of the region and therefore had to create a diplomatic framework based on trade and exchange to serve their interests.[2] This system of common meaning and exchange colors the entire narrative of American-Indian relations.

Beginning in 1796, the United States established trading posts, known as factories, to facilitate trade between whites and Indians. Policymakers designed the factory system with political motives in mind rather than economic considerations. The United States lacked the brute force necessary to achieve their policy objectives through military means during the country's formative period. The factories are an excellent example of how the United States constructed a common system of meaning and exchange to pursue their national policy objectives. The factory system operated at cost and sought to deal with the Indians fairly. It operated until 1822, when pressure from Congress and private trading firms forced it to close. Trade and reconciliation defined the institution's entire existence. The factories were, in effect, the institutionalization of White's "middle ground," providing the United States with a way to pursue its Indian policy without resorting to warfare.

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[2] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indian, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991): ix-xi; Daniel H. Usner, *Indians, Settlers,& Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992): 5-9.

Early works on the factory system framed it in economic terms. Royal B. Way's "The United States Factory System for Trading with the Indians, 1796-1822," describes the factories as the United States attempt to secure the valuable fur trade from international and domestic entities that could be harmful to the country. Ora B. Peake's *A History of the United States Factory System, 1795-1822* also applied a strictly economic framework to the factory system, placing an emphasis on the dichotomy between profitable private enterprise and wasteful government intervention in the fur trade. These studies remain definitive discussions of the factories but they downplay the political motives that characterized the factory system.[3] Furthermore, there has been a great deal of scholarship since their publication that is applicable to the factories.

Francis Paul Prucha's extensive body of work shifted the focus from economics by looking at the Trade and Intercourse Acts passed from 1790 to 1834. He characterized early American Indian policy as a piecemeal attempt to ensure the orderly expansion of the United States and acknowledged that policymakers had to reconcile their objectives with the actions of frontier whites. Bernard Sheehan's *Seeds of Extinction* adds an entirely different element to discussions of Indian policy. He argued that Jefferson had an admiration for the American Indian and wanted to assimilate them into white society. He hoped that by introducing agriculture to the Indians and thereafter acquiring their land, the United States could ultimately accept the Indians as citizens of the Republic. Anthony Wallace's *Jefferson and the Indians* argued similarly but the author emphasized that Jefferson was preoccupied with

[3] Royal B. Way, "The United States Factory System for Trading with the Indians, 1796-1822," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 6 (Sept. 1919): 220-235;Ora B. Peake, *A History of the United States Factory System, 1795-1822* (Denver, 1954).

expansion and taking the Indians land rather than civilizing them.[4] Herman J. Viola contributes to this body of scholarship through his numerous works concerning the Indian affairs in the post-War of 1812 era, particularly his book on Thomas L. McKenney. Viola asserts that McKenney followed the example of Thomas Jefferson and had a genuine concern for the Indians.[5] All told, these studies have redefined the narrative of Indian policy by emphasizing the varied motives of policymakers.

The quantity of furs that passed through the factories meant little compared to maintaining friendship with the Indians, civilizing them, and providing for territorial expansion. None of these studies emphasizes the role the factories played in achieving these aims. Policymakers intended for the factories to be the main instrument through which they pursued these policies. Furthermore, these studies examine the issue from the national level and largely ignore the implementation of this policy. There are several minor studies that focus specifically on the factories and agents responsible for carrying out the policies established in Washington. Conversely, these works take a narrow view of United States Indian affairs and fail to incorporate national policy into their narrative.[6] This study fills a gap in the historiography by reconciling these two disparate threads of scholarship.

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[4] Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Bernard Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973); Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).

[5] Herman J. Viola, *Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1974); Herman J. Viola "From Civilization to Removal: Early American Indian Policy" in Jane F. Smith, Robert M. Kvasnicka , eds., *Indian White Relations: A Persistent Paradox* (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1976)

[6] Wayne Morris "Traders and Factories on the Arkansas Frontier, 1805-1822" *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 28 (Spring 1969): 28-48; Russell M. Magnaghi, "Sulphur Fork Factory, 1817-1822," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 37 (Summer 1978): 168-183; Aloysius Plaisance, "The Arkansas Factory, 1805-1810," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 11 (Autumn 1952): 184-200; Joyce Purser, "The Administration of Indian Affairs in Louisiana, 1803-1820," *Louisiana History, The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association,* 5 (Autumn 1964): 401-419.

The first two chapters provide a baseline understanding of U.S. Indian policy and the entire factory system by focusing on the national picture. George Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox established the factories to help bring about peaceful relationships between whites and Indians on the frontier. Washington hoped to attach the Indians through ties of interest and thereby secure valuable allies in the turbulent Early National period. He also recognized the detrimental effect private traders had on U.S.-Indian relations and hoped that a well-organized public trade could effectively prevent hostilities between frontier whites and Native Americans. Thomas Jefferson essentially continued Washington's program but added a more thoughtful, if less pragmatic, element to national Indian policy. Jefferson desired to civilize the Indians by encouraging them to adopt a sedentary, agricultural way of life. Jefferson believed one day the natives could be assimilated into white society and become part of his yeoman Republic. To achieve this goal and simultaneously provide for expansion, Jefferson surreptiously wanted to drive the Indians into debt, thereby forcing them to give up their vast hunting grounds in lieu of small farming plots. Both Washington and Jefferson deemed the factories to be the main instrument of United States Indian policy and used it extensively to achieve their policy objectives.

The War of 1812 placed significant strains on the entire factory system. The war disrupted operations and saddled the War Department with significant debt. The conflict left the factories in shambles and with a large quantity of low quality goods. Furthermore, the Indian conflicts associated with the War of 1812 arose, in part, due to the factory system. The factories failed to maintain peace on the frontier; whites did not view the Indians as more civilized; and, the land cessions garnered through the factories caused the natives to take up arms against the United States. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and Thomas L. McKenney

assumed control of the factory system from 1816 until its closure in 1822. During their tenure, they tried to continue their predecessors' program but faced significant pressure to end the factories. The American Fur Company and other private trading firms successfully lobbied congress in 1822 to close the factory system. This marked the end of the factories but also a shift from a less coercive Indian policy to a more heavy-handed approach in United States Indian affairs.

The third chapter investigates the actual implementation of national policy at the Sulphur Fork Factory to find incongruences between what policymakers intended and what occurred on the frontier. This trading post, located in the Red River Valley in present-day Arkansas, provides a window into national Indian affairs. The officials there could not successfully implement national policy objectives. Whiskey traders and frontier whites continually harassed the Indians and the factors could do little to prevent their actions and alleviate the tension. Large scale conflict did not erupt but this cannot be attributed to the factors and their efforts. Furthermore, Sulphur Fork factory did not provide the Indians with agricultural implements and never managed to garner land cessions from the Indians. The factory's failure to realize these national objectives stemmed from the overly bureaucratic nature of the system itself and the inability of the factors to negotiate problems with local civilian and military interests.

The factory system failed to achieve U.S. policy objectives. Broadly speaking, the factories played a significant role in the fur trade, but did little to achieve the political goals that Washington and his successors intended. Conflict between frontier whites and Indians continued throughout the Early National period. The factories could neither prevent white encroachment onto Indian land nor stop private traders from operating in the Indian country.

While the United States did obtain Indian land, these cessions did little to civilize the Indians. Moreover, the factories provided relatively little to encourage the Indians to adopt agriculture. Sulphur Fork Factory shows that the disorganization within the Office of Indian Trade and the distance between Washington and the frontier caused the most serious problems for the factories. If the agents in the field could not find local solutions to their problems, the trading posts could not implement broader political objectives. Furthermore, in the case of Sulphur Fork and more broadly, the factors lacked an understanding of the national mission and therefore did not to carry it out.

CHAPTER 1:

FOUNDATIONS

The Indian policy formulated by George Washington and Thomas Jefferson set precedents that future lawmakers essentially followed well into the nineteenth century and beyond. For George Washington and Henry Knox, peace and tranquility on the frontier defined their entire Indian policy. They sought to end the bitter and tumultuous conflicts that erupted during the 1780s and 1790s. During the Jefferson administration, a relative period of peace allowed him to pursue Indian land and devote significant effort to civilizing the Indians. Jefferson hoped that by forcing the Indians onto smaller tracts of land, the United States could coerce them into adopting a sedentary, agrarian livelihood and make them part of the idealistic yeoman republic he envisioned. The factory system played a crucial role in implementing their policies. The United States established these trading posts to be the primary method through which the country could achieve its policy objectives with the Indians. As implemented under Washington, the factory system limited the ability of white traders and frontiersmen to encroach on Indian land by placing the trade under the power of the federal government. Under the Jefferson administration, the factors' mission became more sophisticated and mature. The factories became Jefferson's primary approach through which the United States could provide the Indians with the implements of civilized life, and gave the country a means through which to acquire Indian lands.

After the American Revolution, the United States found itself in a precarious situation, surrounded on all sides by well-established imperial powers. Yet Americans perceived the Britons as their greatest threat. The British Empire had ceded control of their territory west of the Appalachian Mountains and east of the Mississippi but still controlled

Canada and contested the Northwest Territory. Great Britain also controlled a number of forts in this region which, allowed Indians to raid the American frontier settlements and retreat safely to the British territory. England destabilized the American position in the New World and used the Indians as a buffer between Canada and the United States, so they armed the Indians and offered them safe haven. The Indians were "fully and notoriously supplied by their agents with everything necessary to carry on the war."[1]

Conditions in the southern United States proved similar. Spaniards controlled the Mississippi River and the vast territory to the west, which included the valuable port of New Orleans. Spain also controlled Florida, thereby giving them complete control of the Gulf of Mexico. In these borderlands, Spaniards, Britons, and Americans constantly struggled for control of land and influence over Indians.[2] While historians have generally dismissed Spain as a legitimate imperial power at this time, the empire had undergone a series of major reforms during the eighteenth century that strengthened the Spanish empire. The Hapsburgs had allowed the empire to languish but Bourbon rule brought about a new era in Spain during which they sought to reform the administration of colonial affairs, and streamline the imperial economy. Spain no longer sought to make Indians vassals but wanted to include them into their international policy as had the other European nations. In fact, they controlled the territory but much of the land within their boundaries belonged to Indians. The Spanish forged alliances with these Indians to coexist with them and prevent other European powers

[1] See Walter H. Mohr, *Federal Indian Relations 1774-1788* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1933) for a good account of the relationship between the British, Americans, and Indians. Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 11 August 1786, in Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* vol. 5 (Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1905): 187. Hereafter cited as *WTJ*; Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris, 10 March 1792,*WTJ,* 8:310.

[2] John Francis Bannon, *The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970): 206-229; See also David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 172-235.

from encroaching on the land.[3] Spanish Indian policy also embodied many French and British ideas and succeeded, at least for a time, in limiting the influence that other European nations had on its northern imperial frontier.[4] This subsequently posed a challenge for the United States because it allowed the Spanish to exert influence over the frontier with renewed vigor well into the nineteenth century. The Spanish Empire remained significantly weaker than the British, but the United States still confronted a formidable and resurgent Spain along the Gulf Coast and the Mississippi. Also, like the British, the Spanish sought to exploit the power of the Indians in the South. By forming alliances with the tribes, supplying them with weapons and manufactured goods, and providing safe haven for their raiding parties, the Spanish created a buffer between their positions along the Gulf of Mexico and destabilized the American claim to the territory.[5]

The United States Constitution afforded the federal government authority to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" but did little to define precisely the role the federal government would have in Indian affairs. George Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox played a crucial part in charting the course that the United States followed in its Indian affairs. Conflict between whites and Indians on the frontier defined Indian affairs during the Washington administration until the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 ushered in a relative period of peace. Washington and Knox did not seek to break the ability of the Indians to resist the forces of the United States. Instead,

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[3] David J. Weber, "Conflicts and Accommodations: Hispanic and Anglo-American Borders in Historical Perspective, 1670-1853," *Journal of the Southwest* 39 (Spring 1997): 6.
[4] David J. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005): 2-10, Abraham P. Nasatir, *Borderland in Retreat: From Spanish Louisiana to the Far Southwest* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press): 53-57.
[5] Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Carmichael and Short, 3 November 1792, *WTJ*, 8:425. Thomas Jefferson to Messers. Carmichael and Short, 31 May 1793, *WTJ*, 9:101; See also Frank L. Owsley Jr. and Gene A. Smith, *Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997): 16-20.

Washington and Knox wanted to achieve the ultimate aim of peace between the United States and the tribes. Washington noted that the "first wish of the United States with respect to the Indians is, to be at peace with them all, and to cultivate a good understanding of our mutual benefit." The president recognized that the United States could not "obtain this without the effusion of blood" but wanted "to pursue such measures as may terminate the hostilities in the speediest manner."[6]

The President and his Secretary of War had a number of motivations for pursuing such a policy. The foremost of these considerations stemmed from practical concerns. Policymakers wanted to make sure that the United States became a player in the Indian trade. They hoped to attach the Indians to the country to ensure that trade remained open and limit the influence of British and Spanish traders. By having fair and open trade between the United States and the Indians, Washington hoped the Indians would "go to whichsoever their interest convenience, or inclination, might prompt them."[7] Furthermore, the United States lacked the ability to pursue a large-scale and prolonged conflict against Britain, Spain, or a confederation of Indian tribes. Conflicts in the Indian country often proved brutal and expensive. Henry Knox believed that without great expenditures on raising a larger army their efforts "would probably be utterly inadequate to the object; a useless expense, and disgraceful to the nation." Rather, he believed that negotiation to be the proper means of pursuing peace with the Indians.[8] George Washington also deemed open conflict "unadvisable and dangerous" given "the inadequacy of our force to admit a division, and

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[6] George Washington to William Moultrie, 5 May 1792 in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. *The Writings of George Washington* vol. 32 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1931): 35. Hereafter cited as *WGW*.
[7] George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 13 July 1795, *WGW*, 34:238-239.
[8] Henry Knox to George Washington, 7-7-89 in W.W. Abbot, ed., *The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series* vol. 3 (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1987): 134-141. Hereafter cited as *PGW*.

thereby running the hazard of being beaten… we must expect to encounter a powerful confederacy."[9] Washington had no interest involving the United States in larger conflicts, writing that the "madness of the European powers, and the calamitous situation into which all of them are thrown by the present ruinous war, ought to be a serious warning to us, to avoid a similar catastrophe."[10] Peace with the Indians played an important role in avoiding conflict with Spain and Britain. A frontier conflict between white settlers and Indians could quickly escalate if the tribes formed a confederacy or the Indians' European allies entered the conflict as Henry Knox expressed in his advice to George Washington concerning the Creeks. Knox states, "The Policy of the Spaniards—The Jealousy that power entertains of the extension of the United States would lead them into considerable expense to build up if possible an impassable barrier—They will therefore endeavor to form and cement such a Union of the southern Indians."[11] Indian conflict always had the potential to become uncontrollable and Washington wanted to terminate conflicts between whites and Indians quickly and efficiently so they did not grow into more serious problems.

Beyond the practical concerns of protecting U.S. interests, Washington and Knox wanted their affairs with the Indians to operate on a high moral plane. From the earliest years of the Washington administration, Henry Knox supported a policy that respected the rights of the Indians. "It is presumable, that a nation solicitous of establishing its character on the broad basis of justice, would not only hesitate at, but reject every proposition to benefit itself by the injury to any neighboring community, however contemptible and weak it might be." Knox further elaborated that a "system of coercion and oppression would probably amount to a much greater sum of money; but the blood and injustice would stain the character of the

[9] George Washington to the Secretary of War, 13 August 1792, *WGW*, 32:114.
[10] George Washington to Edmund Pendleton, 22 January 1795, *WGW*, 34:100.
[11] Henry Knox to George Washington, 7 July 1789, *PGW*, 3:134-141.

nation beyond all pecuniary calculations."[12] Washington's views seem to be congruent with those of Knox. "The tranquility, which prevails on our northwestern frontiers gives me much satisfaction and affords a pleasing prospect that the exertions of government to bring the hostile Indian tribes into a pacific mood will not have been exercised in vain," Washington declared, "our finances call for it, and if these did not, our reputation does."[13] Both men wanted the United States' Indian policy to reflect the virtuous character they envisioned for the nation. As Knox writes, "but in future the obligations of Policy, humanity and Justice, together with that respect which every national sacredly owes to its own reputation unite in requiring a noble, liberal, and disinterested administration of Indian affairs."[14] In doing so, they recognized that the United States faced a number of challenges in formulating an Indian policy that ensured peace on the frontier and maintained the high moral character of the United States.

Land ownership proved to be the most pressing issue facing Washington and Knox as they tried to formulate the nation's Indian policy. Both recognized the role that land had in causing violence between frontier whites and Indians. Very early on, Henry Knox declared that the country recognized "Indian tribes possess the right of the soil of all lands within their limits" and that "they are not to be divested thereof, but in consequence of fair and bonafide purchase, made under the authority, or with the express approbation, of the United States."[15] The Indians owned an abundance of land and whites wanted more. Both the President and his Secretary of War realized that they had to provide a means for alleviating tension on the

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[12] Henry Knox, Report from Henry Knox, Secretary of War to the President of the United States, 15 June 1789 in Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., *American State Papers: Indian Affairs* vol. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832): 12-14. Hereafter cited as *ASPIA*.
George Washington to the Secretary of War, 1 September 1792, *WGW,* 32:104.
[14] Henry Knox to George Washington, 7 July 1789, *PGW*, 3:134-141.
[15] Henry Knox, Report from Henry Knox, Secretary of War to the President of the United States, 15 June 1789, *ASPIA*, 1:12-14.

frontier. To do so, they placed Indian affairs firmly in the purview of the federal government. Washington stated that the Indians "are very much irritated by the continual pressure of land speculators and settlers… and by the impositions of unauthorized and unprincipled traders…. Nothing but the strong arm of the Union" could correct the abuses.[16] Henry Knox also expressed this sentiment, stating that "Indian wars almost invariably arise in consequence of disputes relative to boundaries or trade, and as the rights of declaring war, making treaties, and regulating congress are vested in the United States, it is highly proper they should have the sole direction of all measures."[17]

Washington and Knox, with their aim of peaceful relations between whites and Indians in mind, had to devise a policy that could uphold the virtue of the nation by recognizing the native right to the soil and keep whites from moving onto Indian land. Henry Knox advocated using the military as a police force on the frontier. "No peace with the Indians can be preserved, unless by a military force." Knox states, "The lawless whites, as well as Indians, will be deterred from the commission of murders when they shall be convinced that punishment will ultimately follow detection."[18] In essence, Knox wanted the military to provide a buffer between the whites and Indians in the hopes that this could prevent the conflicts that arose over land disputes. He proposed that the United States enlarge the military and build a string of forts to limit white encroachment and protect the whites from Indians. He believed that only this could prevent whites from exacting revenge on all Indians for the acts of a few and thereby disgracing the national character.[19] Washington believed that "the frequent destruction of innocent women and children, who are chiefly the

[16] George Washington to Edmund Pendleton, 22 January 1795, *WGW*, 34:99-100.
[17] Henry Knox, Secretary of War to the President of the United States, 4 January 1790, *ASPIA*, 1:59-61.
[18] Henry Knox, Secretary of War to the President of the United States, 4 January 1790, *ASPIA*, 1:59-61.
[19] Henry Knox, Notes on the State of the Frontier, January 1790, *PGW*, 5:76-81.

victims of retaliation, must continue to shock humanity; and an enormous expense to drain the Treasury of the Union." Peace between whites and Indians was simply more efficient than war.[20] Moreover, by alleviating the tension on the frontier, Washington hoped to bring the Indians "nearer to the civilized state, and inspire them with correct conceptions of the Power, as well as the Justice of the Government."[21]

Washington and Knox also wished to provide land for white settlers moving out onto the frontier. What Knox expresses in his writings is a slow and steady erosion of Indian land that would ultimately bring about the end of the Indians. He explained that as the whites approached the Indian boundaries "game will be diminished and new purchases may be made for small considerations." Knox did regret that expansion came at the expense of the Indians. "It is however painful to consider that all the Indian tribes once existing in those States, now the best cultivated and most populous, have become extinct." He lamented, "If the same causes continue, the same effects will happen, and in a short period the idea of an Indian on this side of the Mississippi will only be found in the page of the historian."[22] Knox did not find this outcome pleasing. Rather, he wanted to impart "knowledge of cultivation and the arts, to the Aboriginals of the Country by which the source of future life and happiness had been preserved and extended." He did not see the Indians as fully human or equal to the European but believed "the human character under such the influence of such stubborn habits as to be incapable of melioration or change a supposition entirely contradicted by the progress of society from the barbarous ages to its present degree of perfection." To instill in

[20] George Washington, Seventh Annual Address to Congress, 8 December 1795, *WGW*, 34:392.
[21] George Washington, Eighth Annual Address to Congress, 7 December 1796, *WGW*, 35:311. See also William B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992): 68-86. Skelton argues that the army functioned almost exclusively as an instrument of internal control from 1784 until the War of 1812, blurring the distinction between civil and military affairs.
[22] Henry Knox to George Washington, 7 July 1789, *PGW*, 3:134-141.

the Indians the blessings of civilization, Washington and Knox believed that only "a love for exclusive property" could achieve this goal.[23]

Washington and Knox based their policy on trade. They rejected the former models of the European colonial governments, believing it to be good policy "to annihilate the Indian Customs and expectations of receiving presents, and thereby disgusting them in such a manner as to induce them to connect themselves more closely with said colonies."[24] They hoped that this would "tend to strengthen and confirm their attachment to that constitution of Government, upon which, under Divine Providence, materially depend their Union, their safety, and their happiness" and that trade would be "an effectual means of attaching them to us by the strongest of all ties, interest." George Washington insisted, "to render tranquility with the savages permanent, by creating ties of interest, Next to a rigorous execution of justice on the violators of peace, the establishment of commerce with the Indian nations on behalf of the United States, is most likely to conciliate their attachment." He envisioned a trading system conducted "without fraud, without extortion, with constant and plentiful supplies" Furthermore, Washington wanted to cut the private interests out of the trade and leave it to the virtuous government. "Individuals will not pursue such a traffic, unless they be allured by the hope of profit," he states, "but it will be enough for the United States to be reimbursed only."[25] The President believed that if the U.S. government controlled the Indian trade, they could maintain tranquility on the frontier and bring civilization to the Indians.[26]

Several important pieces of legislation passed during the Washington administration that defined the entire character of Indian relations in the United States. The Trade and

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[23] Henry Knox to George Washington, 7 July 1789, *PGW*, 3:134-141.
[24] Henry Knox, Secretary of War to the President of the United States, 4 January 1790, *ASPIA*, 1:59-61.
[25] George Washington, Fourth Annual Address to Congress, 6 November 1792, *WGW*, 32:212; George Washington, Memorandum of Matters to be Communicated to Congress, November 1793, *WGW*, 33:160.
[26] George Washintgon, Seventh Annual Address to Congress, 8 December 1795, *WGW*, 34:391-392.

Intercourse Acts of July 22, 1790 required traders interacting with Indians to have a license to operate. The act also recognized the Indians' right of ownership for the land on which they lived. Furthermore, it placed the right to purchase Indian land firmly in the hands of the federal government by requiring all acquisitions of Indian-owned land to be part of ratified treaties of the United States. It also established that the United States had the right to confiscate contraband travelling into the Indian country and to punish whites who committed crimes upon the Indians. Congress enacted the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 as only a temporary measure intended to last only two years. It appears Congress was simply unwilling to put into place more permanent measures until they could evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation.[27]

The second Trade and Intercourse Act passed during March 1793. It reinforced the provisions of the original Trade and Intercourse Act and provided stronger measures to limit both the non-governmental purchase of Indian lands and punish whites that committed criminal acts against Indians. The legislation granted the President the authority to grant gifts to Indian tribes to gain their friendship and discussed the topic of civilizing the Indians for the first time.[28] Washington and Knox envisioned a system where "missionaries of excellent moral character" would be appointed to live amongst the Indians and supply them with "all the implements of husbandry, and the necessary stock for a farm. The believed "such a plan, although it might not fully effect the civilization of the Indians, would most probably be attended with the salutary effect of attaching them to the interest of the United States." Knox

[27] Intercourse Act, 22 July 1790, in Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed. *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History*, vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1973): 2151-2153; See also Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962); Prucha provides the definitive account of the Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 1790s and 1800s and an excellent discussion of the bureaucracy that the laws established.
[28] Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962): 47.

recognized that such a system may be expensive but noted that "compared with a system of coercion it would be found the highest economy to adopt it."[29] Washington's vision of peace between Indians and whites in the United States depended on both groups having mutual interest. To limit white encroachments on Indian land and provide a framework of commerce, Washington proposed a system of trading posts on the frontier manned by "qualified and trusty persons" to "contribute to the preservation of peace and good neighborhood."[30] These agents acted as the face of the U.S. government and Washington and Knox instructed them to carry themselves in a dignified manner in their negotiations with the Indians. Henry Knox instructed one of his negotiators to "omit no opportunity of speaking of the cordial views of the General Government towards the Indians and how much it desires to impart to them the blessings of civilization."[31] These trading posts supplied a method of dealing fairly with the Indians and protecting them from the privations of white frontiersmen and traders. Moreover, the factory system could bring civilization to the Indians by providing them with the necessities of agrarian life. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1796 continued to strengthen federal power concerning Indian affairs. The law drew a definitive line between whites and Indians, delineating each group's respective territory for the first time. It surpassed previous laws in its restrictions on whites attempting to purchase Indian land and it established the factory system in the United States that would exist in essentially the same

[29] Henry Knox to George Washington, 7 July 1789, *PGW*, 3:134-141.
[30] George Washington, Fourth Annual Address to Congress, 6 November 1792, *WGW*, 33:208.
[31] Henry Knox, Instructions to John Heth, an Ensign in the 1st Army Regiment, 31 May 1791, *ASPIA*, 1:125-126. There are numerous other examples in the record such as his letter to Colonel Timothy Pickering in which Knox instructs him that the Indians "should be treated with entire justice and humanity…. The great object of the proposed meeting will be to impress on the minds of the Indians that their interest and happiness depend on the protection and friendship of the United States. See Henry Knox, Instructions to Col. Timothy Pickering, 2 May 1791, *ASPIA*, 1:165-166. See also his instructions to the commission for treating with the Southern Indians in which he states "you will please to remember, that the Government of the United States are determined, that their administrations of Indian Affairs shall be directed entirely by the great principles of justice and humanity. Henry Knox to the Commission for Treating with the Southern Indians, 29 August 1789, *ASPIA*, 1:65-68.

form until 1822.[32] During John Adams' presidency, Congress renewed the law as a temporary measure again in 1799 with few changes and little debate.[33]

Washington saw trade as the primary method and the factory system as the mechanism for peaceful Indian white relations. He thought that by providing the Indians with an ample supply of trade goods, the United States could ensure the tribes' friendship. The factory system could also mitigate the detrimental effects that private, unlicensed traders had upon Indian affairs. The shoddy merchandise they peddled and their backhanded deals to acquire Indian land had a destabilizing effect on the frontier. The United States simply had too much at stake to place Indian relations in the hands of frontier traders driven by their own interests. By developing friendly relations with the Indians, the government could also establish a market for American goods that did not seek a direct profit. The factory system operated at cost and dealt with the Indians fairly. [34] Also, governmental of the Indian trade limited the European powers' ability to do so more effectively than private traders could.[35] These trading posts symbolized Washington's goals for Indian-white relations: peace on the frontier and avoidance of conflict between Indians and settlers, much less the United States and a European power.

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[32] See also Treaty of Greenville, 3 August 1795, in Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History*, vol. 4 (New York: Random House, 1973): 2295-2303; The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1796 seems to be a compliment to the Treaty of Greenville signed in 1795. It uses the same line the treaty does to delineate Indian and white territory. Furthermore, the Trade and Intercourse Act echoes the provisions of the treaty prohibiting unlicensed trade, punish whites committing crimes in Indian country and the ability of the United States to evict whites in the Indian country. Furthermore, both documents use the line defined in the Treaty of Greenville as the definitive boundary between whites and Indians.

[33] Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962):49-50.

[34] By establishing a market for American goods, the government effectively stimulated business in the United States. By purchasing goods to supply the factors with their wares, the United States did enjoy some indirect benefits beyond simply recovering the original expenditures.

[35]Francis Paul Prucha, *American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962):84- 87.

Thomas Jefferson assumed the office of the President in March 1801. In terms of Indian affairs, Jefferson essentially continued the Federalist program established by George Washington. Like his predecessor, Jefferson wanted to maintain peaceful relationships between the United States and its Indian neighbors based on common ties of trade and reconciliation rather than open conflict between whites and Indians. Also, like Washington and Knox, he wished for the Indian affairs of the United States to be operated on a high moral plane as it had been under the Federalist regime. Thomas Jefferson believed that the Indians should be attached to the United States by ties of interest and placed a high importance on the civilization program. Finally, Jefferson also wanted to obtain Indian land to fuel the expansion of the United States. He wanted the United States, founded on enlightened principles, to expand across the continent and become a shining example to the corrupt societies of Europe. His vision required an ample supply of land to provide to the yeoman citizenry he wanted to populate the United States. At the most basic level, Jefferson's plan for the nation's Indian affairs remained remarkably similar to that of Washington and Knox but his outlook on the role Indians played in the American narrative differed significantly. His viewpoints about the Indians reveal an idealistic and visionary air. Jefferson wanted to construct an "empire of liberty" and determined that the United States should not rely on the coercive elements like those of the European powers but rather wanted to conquer without war by using economic and peaceable means. War threatened the institutions and values of republican government and Jefferson believed conflict should be avoided at nearly any cost.[36] Under his administration, the policies started by Washington

[36] Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): ix, 16-17. See also Donald Jackson, *Thomas Jefferson and the Stony Mountains: Exploring the West from Monticello* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981); Jackson details Jefferson's fascination with the West and discusses how expansion into the western territory became paramount

and Knox matured and became more firmly entrenched than they ever had been and became the guiding principles until the middle of the nineteenth century and beyond.

Thomas Jefferson expanded his goals for the factory system beyond the scope that Washington had envisioned. He saw it as the primary way through which he could carry out his Indian policy. He declared to Congress, "among our Indian neighbors, also, a spirit of peace and friendship generally prevails, and I am happy to inform you, that the continued efforts to introduce among them the implements and practice of husbandry and the household arts, have not been without success."[37] In a special address to Congress in 1802, Jefferson called for the act to be renewed in its previous form, amending it only to prohibit the sale of liquor to the Indians.[38]

Congress responded and passed the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802. The legislation provided the most comprehensive Indian policy the United States had passed to date. In many ways, the law continued the policies put in place under the Washington administration. The act reiterated that traders needed to have a license to operate in the Indian country and the right of the nation to regulate that trade. It also asserted the United States' sole right to purchase Indian land. The legislation reaffirmed the right of the United States to punish whites who committed crimes in the Indian country. The law also appropriated fifteen thousand dollars "to cause [the Indians] to be furnished with useful domestic animals and implements of husbandry" to further their move toward civilization. Most importantly, this legislation did not have the two year expiration like its previous incarnations. The Trade and

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for the Jefferson administration. For a discussion of Jefferson's philosophy on expansion see Frank L. Owsley Jr. and Gene A. Smith, *Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997): 26-27. The authors assert that Jefferson's "empire of liberty" required expansion founded on agrarian democratic ideals rather than conquest.

[37] Thomas Jefferson, Communicated to Congress, 8 December 1801, *ASPIA*, 1:646.

[38] Thomas Jefferson, Special Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, 28 January 1802, *WTJ,* 3:349.

Intercourse Act of 1802 became the definitive policy for United States Indian Affairs until 1834.[39]

The Trading House Act of 1806, a compliment to the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1802, codified the operation of the factory system. It established the position of Superintendent of Indian Trade in the War Department and made it lawful for the President to "establish trading houses at such posts and places on the frontiers for the purpose of carrying on a liberal trade with the several Indian tribes." It also established funding for the operation and declared that goods be priced such that "the capital stock, furnished by the United States, shall not be diminished." Unlike the Trade and Intercourse Act, the Trading House Act only had a term of three years.[40]

Jefferson's third annual address championed the factory system, proclaiming that it has "the most conciliatory and useful effect upon them, and is that which will best secure their peace and good will."[41] He recognized the importance of the factory system in establishing these friendships and protecting Indians from the depredations of frontier whites. "If we had gone to war for every hunter or trader killed, and murderer refused, we should have had general and constant war."[42] Jefferson emphasized the importance of two other distinct goals. First, he wanted the factory system to civilize the Indians. Second, he intended for these trading posts to facilitate the acquisition of Indian land by the United States by "honest and peaceable means" that "will obtain them as fast as the expansion of our

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[39] Intercourse Act, 30 March 1802, in Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed. *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History*, vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1973): 2155-2163.
[40] Trading House Act, 21 April 1806, in Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed. *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History*, vol. 3 (New York: Random House, 1973): 2164-2168; The factory system existed before this legislation passed. This law affirmed the President's position on the factories and established a working bureaucracy to facilitate the factory system.
[41] Thomas Jefferson, Third Annual Message to the Senate and House of Representatives, 17 October 1803, in *WTJ,* 3:351.
[42] Thomas Jefferson to Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, 20 August 1808, *WTJ*, 12:139.

settlements, with due regard to compactness, will require."[43] Jefferson desired both of these outcomes and engineered his in such a way that the two concepts complimented and accentuated one another.

Jefferson, like Washington, emerged from a world torn asunder by bitter conflicts between whites and Indians. As a legislator and governor of Virginia during the American Revolution, he suffered from the violent conflicts between Americans and the British-allied tribes to the west. This world produced a surprising outcome in Jefferson's views on the Indians. One would expect a sense of bitterness and resentment toward Native Americans or, at the very least, that Jefferson might have shared Washington's pragmatic views on peace with the Indians but not fully accepted them as part of American society. Almost the opposite is true. Jefferson developed an admiration for the American Indian and hoped that they could one day be assimilated into the American population. Jefferson exhibited considerable interest in Native American culture, language, and history. From an early age, he developed a fascination with the Indians and "acquired impressions of attachment and commiseration from them which have never been obliterated." He recounted to John Adams about a boyhood experience he had with a Cherokee named Outassette, stating "His sounding voice, distinct articulation, animated action and the solemn silence of his people at their several

[43] Thomas Jefferson to General Andrew Jackson, 16 February 1803, *WTJ*, 10:357. See also Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999); Bernard Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973). These two books are the definitive works on Jefferson's civilization and land acquisition program. Sheehan argues that Jefferson based his policy decisions in philanthropy. He hoped that by civilizing the Indians, he could secure them a place alongside whites in American society. Sheehan asserts that this misguided philosophy doomed the Indians to extinction and culminated in the Indian Removal of the Jacksonian era. Wallace asserts that Jefferson's philanthropic intent was little more than lip-service. The author argues that acquiring land to fuel the westward expansion of the United States superseded Jefferson's other concerns with Indian affairs.

fires, filled me with awe and veneration."[44] He broached the topic in his *Notes on the State of Virginia,* discussing his views on the aboriginal peoples of North America and also providing an analysis of their decline since the arrival of Europeans. Jefferson praised the Indians, asserting that they were not defective but rather brave, affectionate of their children, keen in sensibility and have a "vivacity and activity of mind" equal to that of whites. He also recognized the Indians had suffered a population decline. He declared that "the melancholy sequel of their history, may, however, be argued from the census of 1669; by which we discover that the tribes therein enumerated were, in the space of sixty-two years, reduced to about one-third of their former numbers." Jefferson ultimately blamed this on "spiritouous liqours, the smallpox, war, and an abridgement of territory to a people who lived principally on the spontaneous productions of nature."[45]

During his lifetime, he collected considerable information about Indian languages. "I have long believed we can never get any information of the ancient history of the Indians," Jefferson posited, "but from a knowledge and comparative view of their languages." He corresponded with several people with experience in dealing with the Indians to acquire as much information on Indian language as he could.[46] Jefferson also collected a great number of artifacts and displayed them in his "Indian Hall" at Monticello. His collection included a wide variety of bones and fossils as well as a broad collection of Indian artwork and sculpture. Jefferson included the Indian artwork alongside established European sculptures and paintings. For Jefferson, the comparison between the European and Indian sculptures and paintings symbolized his belief that American Indians could be assimiliated into white

[44] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 June 1812, in Lester J. Cappon, ed., *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams* vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959): 307-308.
[45] Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia,1782, *WTJ*, 2:81-96, 127-146.
[46] Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, 14 March 1800, *WTJ*, 10:160.

society. In Jefferson's Indian hall at Monticello, he attempted to present a microcosm of human development, showing the journey of the human race from primitive savagism to enlightened civilization. His interest went beyond scholarly musing. For Jefferson, these artifacts demonstrated the Indian's potential for civilization and believed that the items would become relics of the distant past once they accepted yeomanry and the blessings of civilization.[47] This concept guided all of Jefferson's investigations of the Indians. He believed the Indians to "be in body and mind equal to the white man." Jefferson did not intend this to mean that Indians would continue to exist in their current state but he did not necessarily believe the race would become extinct. Rather, Jefferson insisted that they could be included into the republic.[48]

The Lewis and Clark expedition is another excellent example that illustrates this point. Jefferson recognized that his *Notes of the State of Virginia* described Indians broadly and attributed characteristics to all Indians. The Lewis and Clark expedition gave Jefferson the oppurtunity to receive reports about Indians in a more primitive state thus allowing him to see the progress of man from savagery to civilization.[49] Jefferson recognized the importance of studying individual tribes and their language, customs, and history. His instructions to Lewis and Clark demonstrated that he wanted more information on the Indian tribes to serve America's interests but also to discover knowledge about the tribes in the West. Jefferson instructed the expedition to determine "the commerce which may be carried on with the people" in the area, how many people are in the tribe, how many warriors there

[47] Joyce Henri Robinson, "An American Cabinet of Curiosities: Thomas Jefferson's "Indian Hall at Monticello,"" *Winterthur Portfolio* 30 (Spring 1995): 56-58.
[48] Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999): 76-77.
[49] Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999: 96.

might be and the estimated volume of trade. But he also wanted to know about these tribes' language, customs, religion, relations with other tribes and a variety of ethnographic questions. "It will be useful to acquire what knowledge you can of the state of morality, religion, and information among them," Jefferson remarked, "as it may better enable those who many endeavor to civilize and instruct them, to adapt their measures to the existing notions and practices of those on whom they are to operate."[50]

For Jefferson, Indians exemplified man's true nature. He saw their culture as uncorrupted with a clear sense of right and wrong that allowed their society to exist without coercion. Jefferson considered them to be natural republicans. Jefferson believed their society showed that Indians existed without a class structure that depended on hierarchy and submission to authority to maintain order. Instead, it relied on the simple sociable nature of man. He refuted natural philosophers such as Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon who claimed that the New World caused society to degenerate rather than progress. Jefferson suspected that Indian virtue could not persist unless Europeans left the Native Americans to their own devices. European corruption and interference drove the Indians into becoming the merciless savages and that did not coincide with Jefferson's vision. Left with the options of allowing further outside influence drive the Indians further into savagery or to change their way of life, Jefferson opted to pursue the latter. He believed the introduction of civilization

[50] Donald Jackson, *Letters of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, with related documents, 1783-1854,* vol. 1 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978): 62-63; Frank L. Owsley Jr. and Gene A. Smith, *Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997): 26-27; John Laruitz Larson, "Jefferson's Union and the Problem of Internal Improvements" in Peter S. Onuf, ed. *Jeffersonian Legacies* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993). Robert J. Miller. *Native America, Discovered and Conquered: Thomas Jefferson, Lewis and Clark, and Manifest Destiny* (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 2006); Larson and Miller take a far more critical view of Jefferson's goals for the Lewis and Clark Expedition and the Louisiana Purchase. Larson states that it "belonged to a comprehensive system of government action that undermined Indian autonomy, broke down Indian resistance, and prepared the way for American settlers who would inevitably possess Indian lands and bring them into the empire of liberty. Miller frames the expedition as an attempt by Jefferson to secure the right of preemption to the Western lands to limit the ability of European powers to lay claim to them.

and republicanism could save the Indians and that they were naturally inclined to accept this way of life.[51]

In Jefferson's eyes, the yeoman farmer epitomized the perfect citizen for the American republic and agriculture acted as the benchmark of civilization. Frontier expansion depended on the ability of whites to carve out farming plots from the wilderness. Farmers acted as the vanguard of civilization and sedentary agriculture acted as the dividing line between savagery and civilization.[52] For Jefferson, the yeoman farmer controlled his own destiny, and remained free from corrupt influences. For him, farms and estate houses acted as the centers of civilization in the New World. He believed that if the United States could entice Indians to adopt a lifestyle of sedentary agriculture, civilization would quickly follow. Jefferson wanted the Indians to become symbolic of the virtue and energy of the New World.[53] "Habits of industry, easy subsistence, attachment to property, are necessary to prepare their minds for the first elements of science, and afterwards for moral and religious instruction." Jefferson insisted "letters are not the first, but the last step in the progression from barbarism to civilization."[54] Writing to Governor James Jay, he outlined this progression:

> The plan of civilizing the Indians is undoubtedly a great improvement on the ancient and totally ineffectual one of beginning with religious missionaries. Our experience has shown that this must be the last step in the process. The following is what has been successful:
> 1st, to raise cattle, etc., and thereby acquire a knowledge of the value of property;
> 2d, arithmetic, to calculate that value;

[51] Peter S. Onuf, ""We shall all be Americans": Thomas Jefferson and the Indians," *Indiana Magazine of History* 95 (June 1999): 104, 112-113, 117; Joseph J. Ellis, *American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997): 35.
[52] Thomas R. Wessel, "Agriculture, Indians, and American History," *Agricultural History* 50 (Jan. 1976): 14.
[53] Rhys Isaac, "The First Monticello" in Peter Onuf, ed. Jeffersonian Legacies (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993) 96-97
[54] Thomas Jefferson to James Pemberton , 16 November 1807, *WTJ*, 11:394; Thomas Jefferson to James Pemberton, 21 June 1808, *WTJ*, 12:74.

> 3d, writing, to keep accounts, and here they begin to enclose farms and the men to labor, the women to spin and weave;
> 4th, to read, "Aesop's Fables" and "Robinson Crusoe" are their first delight.[55]

Once civilized, Americans could assimilate Indians into white society and include them into Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty" as noble citizens of the republic. It represented a policy of regeneration of Indian virtue. They, like many colonists during the Revolution, had been subject to corruption and their old way of life had been destroyed. Indians had embodied one noble side of human development and Americans embodied the other. The cultivation of soil could reestablish the link between the Indians and the laws of God and nature. Furthermore, the promotion of civilization and agriculture provided a less costly avenue to take in promoting republican dispensation amongst the Indians. Through his policies, Jefferson attempted to reconcile his urge to expand the borders of the United States and republican idealism by moving the Indians from a lower to a higher state.[56]

Animal furs comprised the vast majority of the Indians trade goods. This exhaustible resource repeatedly put Indians in precarious situations. The Indians continually increased the number of furs obtained to meet their debts and desire for American goods. This left their hunting grounds depleted and unable to support their society much less their economy. In response to mounting debts, the Indians hunted the game within their territory to near extinction. When the Indians found themselves in insurmountable debts, the factors encouraged them to satisfy their obligations through land cessions. If the Indians were

[55] Thomas Jefferson to Governor James Jay, 7 April 1809, *WTJ*, 12:270.
[56] Harold Hellenbrand, "Not "To Destroy But to Fulfill": Jefferson, Indians, and Republican Dispensation," *Eighteenth Century Studies* 18 (Autumn 1995): 526-527, 531-532, 541. Reginald Horsman, "The Indian Policy of an 'Empire of Liberty,'" in Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman, Peter J. Albert, eds., *Native Americans and the Early Republic* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1997): 60.

unwilling to make concessions, the threat of military force often proved enough to convince the Indians to make land cessions and avoid open warfare.[57]

Jefferson recognized the Indians' propensity to deplete the game within their hunting grounds. In fact, this concept provided a crucial part of his policy. He hoped that the Indians would eventually "abandon hunting, to apply to the raising stock, to agriculture and domestic manufactures, and thereby prove to themselves that less land and labor will maintain them in this, better than in their former mode of living" and that "the extensive forests necessary in the hunting life will then become useless."[58] Jefferson believed that the ever-increasing debt that the Indians drove themselves into would coerce the Indians into selling large chunks of their land to the United States government. He also believed that the Indians would embrace American civilization and yeomanry. The factories, by providing the Indians with the implements of civilization, could demonstrate the benefits of agriculture to the Indians. Once this happened, the Native Americans would gladly give up their large hunting grounds in favor of small plots of good farmland. But Jefferson also recognized that the Indians would not eagerly embrace whites. "The two principles on which our conduct towards the Indians should be founded, are justice and fear." Jefferson explained, "After the injuries we have done them, they cannot love us, which leaves us no alternative but that of fear to keep them from attacking us. But Justice is what we should never lose sight of, and in time it may recover their esteem."[59] Jefferson and other philanthropists saw the land as central to their program. As long as the Indians maintained their vast tracts of land, they could continue to base their livelihoods on hunting and gathering with limited agriculture. For Jefferson, these

[57] Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999:225.
[58] Thomas Jefferson, Confidential Message Recommending a Western Exploring Expedition, 18 January 1803, *WTJ,* 2:489.
[59] Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, 13 August 1786, *WTJ*, 5:390.

possessions symbolized the Indians' stasis in the savage state. Only when the United States divested the Indians of their lands could the aboriginals become more than mere savages.[60]

Jefferson summarized his entire plan for Indian policy in a "private and friendly" letter to territorial governor William Henry Harrison. The United States wanted "to live in perpetual peace with the Indians, to cultivate an affectionate attachment from them." Jefferson wanted Indian women to leave the "labors of the field for those which are exercised within doors." Most of all he wanted the Indians to leave their lands and sell them to the United States in "exchange for the necessaries for their farms and families." He believed that the United States should "be glad to see the good influential individuals among them run in debt" so that the Indians "become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands." Jefferson wanted the factory system to facilitate this because "this is what private traders cannot do, for they must gain." As the United States approached the Indian boundary, the Indians would "either incorporate with us as citizens of the United States or remove beyond the Mississippi." Should "any tribe be foolhardy enough to take up the hatchet at any time, the seizing of the whole country of that tribe and driving them across the Mississippi would be an example to others and a furtherance of our final consolidation."[61]

Jefferson's letter demonstrates that these two policies cannot be easily separated and compartmentalized. He wrote it privately to Harrison, informing him that he should "perceive how sacredly it must be kept within your own breaks and especially how improper to be understood by the Indians."[62] This candid source of information shows that Jefferson himself did not separate the two ideas. The acquisition of Indian land provided an essential element

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[60] Bernard Sheehan, *Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1973): 168.
[61] Thomas Jefferson to Governor William H. Harrison, Washington, 27 February 1803, *WTJ*, 10:368.
[62] Thomas Jefferson to Governor William H. Harrison, Washington, 27 February 1803, *WTJ*, 10:368.

in his policy convert to savages into yeomen. Jefferson's views on civilizing the Indians did not act as his justification for the marginalization of the American Indian. Jefferson did not plan for the Indian peoples in North America to become extinct but wanted their way of life to change dramatically. This did not necessarily run counter to their ideas of national honor which depended on their belief in the superiority of whites over Indians and their need to control all land east of the Mississippi and beyond.[63] This, coupled, with his intense investigations of and admiration for Indian language, customs, history, and culture make a good argument for his being genuinely interested in Indian welfare rather than simply removing them from the land they owned.

Of course, one element of this policy proved dramatically more successful than the other. By the end of Jefferson's presidency, the United States government had managed to acquire vast swathes of Indian land. The government controlled almost all of the land along the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Indian possessions within the United States contracted to islands surrounded by white society. American forts and settlements peppered the land with an infrastructure to support them.[64] The frontier itself expanded across most of the United States after the Louisiana Purchase; the Indian bureaucracy had expanded along with it. The philanthropic thrust of the plan remained unfulfilled although Jefferson did believe the Indians had progressed under the plan. He discussed the improvements the southern tribes made in a letter to John Adams. "[The Cherokee] consisting now at about two thousand warriors, and the Creeks at about three thousand are far advanced in civilization." Jefferson extolled, "They have good cabins, enclosed fields, large herds of cattle and hogs, spin and

[63] Robert M. Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," *Journal of the Early Republic* 22 (Autumn 2002): 435.
[64] Anthony F.C. Wallace, *Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999: 239.

weave their own clothes of cotton, have smiths and other of the most necessary tradesmen, write and read, are on the increase in numbers, and a branch of the Cherokees is now instituting a regular representative government." He believed that "English seductions" would prove ineffective on these more civilized tribes. Jefferson concluded that the tribes who had not made progress would suffer a less favorable fate. He asserted that "these will relapse into barbarism and misery, lose numbers by war and want and we shall be obliged to drive them, with the beasts of the forest into the Stony Mountains."[65] Many Indians continued to pursue the fur trade for their livelihood and few adopted agriculture as a way of life. Often, when the hunting grounds became depleted, the Indians simply forfeited their land and moved further westward to continue their lifestyle. Americans still did not perceive those Indians that did adopt agriculture as being equal to whites and worthy of being citizens of the United States. His outlook shifted subtly from civilization and incorporation to removal. He had always supported the assimilation of Indians into white society but with the Louisiana Purchase he reevaluated his program to continue his philanthropic intent west of the Mississippi.[66]

Washington and Jefferson formulated a national Indian policy based on maintaining tranquility on the frontier, obtaining Indian land, and attempting to civilize the Indians. The factory system acted as the means to those ends. By limiting frontier whites and unscrupulous traders, the factory system enabled peaceful relations between whites and Indians on the frontier. Jefferson used the factory system to entice Indians to give up their land and adopt the yeoman way of life. The factors provided the Indians with all the

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[65] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 June 1812, in Lester J. Cappon, ed., *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams* vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959) 307-308.

[66] Christian B. Keller, "Philanthropy Betrayed: Thomas Jefferson, the Louisiana Purchase, and the Origins of Federal Indian Removal Policy," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical* Society 144 (March 2000): 41-46.

necessary implements for yeomanry and also the trappings of white society. In doing so, the debt the Indians accrued coerced them to sell their land to the United States and either take up a sedentary life or move further west. Overall, the factory system proved remarkably successful in achieving the policy aims of Washington and Jefferson. The frontier remained relatively peaceful, the Indians sold vast amounts of land to the United States, and some tribes made significant progress toward what Jefferson called civilization. After Jefferson's term in office, the factory system encountered its greatest challenges. The War of 1812 stressed the factories to the breaking point and following the conflict, a concerted effort to shut down the system ensued.

CHAPTER 2:

DECLINE

The War of 1812 marks a significant turning point in the history of United States Indian policy and the factory system. The United States proved victorious in the conflict but the nation's Indian policy changed irrevocably. Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and the Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney guided U.S. Indian policy following the war. Both adhered to their predecessors' principles of maintaining peaceful relationships on the frontier, civilizing the Indians, and expanding the borders of the United States. In the years following the war, the factory system declined precipitously and became a less important aspect of United States Indian policy. Pressure from private traders and Congress ultimately forced the factories to close and the proponents of the system adopted other measures to civilize the Indians and maintain peaceful relationships with them. The factory system's closure demarcates a policy shift in U.S. Indian affairs from a less forcible policy to a more heavy-handed one.

The British presence in Canada plagued relations between Great Britain, the United States, and the Indian tribes. Both Britain and the United States struggled to control the fur trade and Americans often suspected the British of supplying and abetting Indian raids. England wished to influence the Indians and create symbiotic relationships based on protection from a common enemy in the Americans. British officials in Canada communicated and treated with the Indians in the United States, but did little to foment conflict. Nonetheless, Americans suspected the British of instigating Indian hostility.[1] The

[1] Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1962): 16-17; Robert S. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, the British Crown and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 14 (Fall 1988): 3; Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968): 95-96.

Chesapeake Affair of 1807 caused a shift in British policy predicated on the fear that American's might invade Canada in retaliation to England's aggressive maritime policy. War with the United States became a very real and very sudden threat. Furthermore, Britain's weak state due to the Napoleonic Wars forced them to turn to the Indians. Sir James Craig, the Captain General and Governor-in-Chief in British North America, developed a policy to attach the Indians to the British Empire while providing for the defense of Canada. He believed that if the British did not ally with the Indians, the Americans certainly would, and the British position in Canada would be untenable. Yet while the British understood Canada to be weak and undermanned and that the Indians of the Old Northwest could be excellent allies, they did not want to precipitate a conflict on the frontier. British officials tasked their agents with keeping the Indians on amicable terms but stopping them from attacking American settlements.[2]

This volatile situation gave rise to Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa. The changing world overwhelmed the Shawnee. The tribe had lost land, their economic opportunities declined, and alcoholism plagued their society. Shawnee traditionalists asserted that a return to the traditional ways could restore order over chaos and bring prosperity back to the tribe. Lalawethika, an alcoholic Shawnee of no particular import, fell into a coma one day, seemingly dead to observers. He awoke and told his family he met the Master of Life who told him the Shawnee were doomed if they did not return to the traditional ways. Lalawethika renounced alcohol and changed his name to Tenskwatawa. He experienced other visions and made it his goal "to reclaim the Indians from bad habits and to cause them to live in peace

[2] Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1962): 159; Robert S. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, the British Crown and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 14 (Fall 1988): 6; Robert M. Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," *Journal of the Early Republic* 22 (Autumn 2002): 413.

with all mankind."[3] Tenskwatawa's traditionalist revivals quickly spread to other tribes, and his followers grew in number as did the militancy of the movement after 1805. In Tenskwatawa's brother, Tecumseh, the Indians found a leader with political and military solutions to this spiritual problem.[4]

British officials met with the Indians at Amherstburg, and, although the Indians harbored concerns over the British having previously abandoned them, the meeting successfully tied the British cause to the Indian cause. "We are now determined to defend it ourselves," Tecumseh declared, "and after raising you on your feet leave you behind but expecting you will push forward towards us what may be necessary to supply our wants."[5] Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa desired to establish a pan-Indian resistance movement to counter the Americans that constantly encroached on their lands, and, as a consequence, threw themselves into a convenient alliance with the British. The brothers did not necessarily want a war with the United States but insisted that the land cessions stop.[6]

The Americans did not understand this dilemma. Upon assuming office, James Madison declared to Congress that "with our Indian neighbors, the just and benevolent system, continued towards them, has also preserved peace, and is more and more advancing the habits favorable to their civilization and happiness."[7] William Henry Harrison had been

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[3] Quoted in R. David Edmunds, "Tecumseh, The Shawnee Prophet, and American History: A Reassessment," *The Western Historical Quarterly* 14 (July 1983): 266-67.
[4] R. David Edmunds, "Tecumseh, The Shawnee Prophet, and American History: A Reassessment," *The Western Historical Quarterly* 14 (July 1983): 268-270, 274. Robert M. Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," *Journal of the Early Republic* 22 (Autumn 2002): 425.
[5] Speech of Tecumseh to Major Taylor, 15 November 1810, in *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections,* vol. 25 (Lansing: Robert Smith and Co, State Printers and Binders, 1894): 275-277.
[6] Robert S. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, the British Crown and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 14 (Fall 1988): 3, 9-12; Robert M. Owens, "Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of William Henry Harrison," *Journal of the Early Republic* 22 (Autumn 2002): 427.
[7] James Madison, Annual Message to Congress, 29 November 1809, in J.C.A. Stagg, et. al, *The Papers of James Madison: Presidential Serie,s* vol. 2 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004): 209. Hereafter

remarkably successful in obtaining Indian lands in the Old Northwest. In doing so, he became the instigator of Tecumseh and the resistance movement. News that Tecumseh had traveled south to attempt to sway other tribes into his movement ignited fears of hostility across the Western frontier.[8] Heightened tension between the Americans and the Indians accompanied heightened tensions between the Americans and the British. U.S. officials assumed that the two were interrelated. South Carolina Congressman John C. Calhoun suggested "that symptoms of British hostility towards the United States have never failed to produce corresponding symptoms among the tribes. It is also well known that on all such occasions abundant supplies of the ordinary munitions of War have been afforded," to the Indians by British agents.[9] Thomas Jefferson communicated to John Adams concerning Tenskwatawa, calling him "more a rogue than a fool." Jefferson relayed that his administration had let him act unmolested but "his followers increased until the English thought him worth corruption and found him corruptible."[10] The rise of the traditionalist Indian revival led to a rise in Westerners' demands for an invasion of Canada. This was not a basic cause of the War of 1812, but it certainly added to the fervor and helped proponents of conflict gain popular support.[11] By 1812, Madison received messages from Americans,

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cited as *PJM.* This passage demonstrates that the President assumed that the United States could continue the Indian policy that it had in the years prior. It appears that he did not recognize the problems that were becoming more serious on the frontier.

[8] Reginald Horsman, "William Henry Harrison: Virginia Gentleman in the Old Northwest," *Indiana Magazine of History* 96 (June 2000): 136-137; Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968): 283.

[9] John C. Calhoun, Report on the Causes and Reasons for War, 3 June 1812, in Robert L. Meriweather, *The Papers of John C. Calhoun,* vol. 1 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959): 117. Hereafter cited as *PJCC.*

[10] Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 20 April 2012, in Lester J. Cappon, ed., *The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams,* vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1959): 299.

[11] Reginald Horsman, *The Causes of the War of 1812* (New York: A.S. Barnes & Company, Inc., 1962): 267; Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989): 47; Historians generally agree on three causes of the War of 1812. Maritime concerns were foremost amongst these. In the years prior to the outbreak of hostilities, restrictions of American trade with France and the impressment

demanding that the United States take action against the British and their Indian allies. One writer asserted that it is every American's duty "when we see our country surrounded on every side with perils, when we see the infernal engines set in motion by the agents of Great Britain and the bloody tomahawk and scalping knife suspended over our heads reeking with the blood of our citizens, to come forward and offer up his life and property a willing sacrifice on the altar of Liberty." Another declared that if Great Britain "will not refrain from arming and instigating the merciless savages to murder our unoffending and defenseless frontier inhabitants, resistance will be a virtue, and submission a crime. Vengeance, under God will belong to Americans, and we will repay it."[12]

The South proved equally volatile and in 1813-1814, the Creeks prosecuted a war against the Americans. Tecumseh had travelled to the South in 1811 to spread his message. He found eager disciples among the young faction of Creeks known as the Red Sticks. Tecumseh maintained that the whites "encouraged us to dissent more among ourselves, to hate and fear our neighbor tribes, knowing what they could not take from the whole, they can easily take from the pieces" and that "all the land belonged to all the Indians, and that not even the whole membership of a single tribe could alienate the property of the race."[13] The Red Sticks, emboldened by the British-Indian victories in the Northwest and promises of aid from Spanish and British officials, chose war against the United States.[14] The British offered

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of American sailors formed the bulk of grievances levied against Great Britain. The Republican Party also wanted to establish unity and consolidate their power base. Historians also note that the drive for farmland and the effort an end to the British influence over the Indians by breaking their power in Canada was important to Americans in the West.

[12] Ebenezer Sage to James Madison, 8 February 1812, *PJM*, 4:173-174; Elbridge Gerry to James Madison, 25 February 2012, *PJM,* 4:211-212; These letters are indicative of the vitriol being directed toward Great Britain and their Indian allies.

[13] Quoted in Susan K. Barnard and Grace M. Schwartzman, "Tecumseh and the Creek Indian War of 1813-1814 in North Georgia," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 82 (Fall 1998): 494.

[14] Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989): 147.

immediate support to the Creeks since this new conflict provided a much-needed distraction for the Canadian front.

The British were happy to help but received incomplete reports on the situation in the South and failed to understand the divisions between the Creeks and the positions of the various tribes in the region (such as the Choctaw) who had allied with the United States.[15] The Creeks divided into two factions, the Upper and Lower Creeks. The Upper Creeks proved more militant and the Lower Creeks less so due to their long history with whites, particularly agent Benjamin Hawkins. The conflict caused a rift between the nation and led to a civil war between the two factions which the British and Spanish simply did not understand. Furthermore, both Britain and Spain could not adequately supply and support the Creeks. The Napoleonic Wars had left the Spanish Empire in a state of disarray and unrest plagued the majority of the empire. The Spanish could barely supply their own small force in West Florida much less provide adequate support to their Indian allies. Americans in the South viewed the Indian movement as part of a larger imperial plot against them. The Indian tribes isolated the territories from the rest of the United States and fear bred a mistrust of the Spanish and the British. The isolation of the Americans exaggerated their fears, and the Spanish became a malevolent force that supplied Indian raiding parties, limited American travel on waterways, and stirred up resentment amongst the natives in an effort to weaken the American position in the South. As in Old Northwest, Americans suspected more nefarious British and Spanish purposes than actually existed.[16]

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[15] John K. Mahon, "British Strategy and Southern Indians: War of 1812," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 44 (April 1966): 285-288.

[16] For a thorough of the Creek War and the Gulf Coast in the War of 1812 See Frank L. Owsley Jr., *The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812-1815* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1981); Frank L. Owsley Jr. "British and Indian Activities in Spanish West Florida during the War of 1812," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 46 (Oct. 1967): 112-114; Robert V. Haynes, "The Southwest and the War of 1812," *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association* 5 (Winter 1964): 44.

The British-Indian alliance met with some success during the War of 1812 but, ultimately, the United States proved victorious in the conflict. Americans killed Tecumseh at the Battle of Thames, and his confederacy surrendered and disbanded shortly afterward. Andrew Jackson soundly defeated the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend, and forced them to sign the Treaty of Fort Jackson which gave the United States control of all Creek lands east of the Mississippi River and forbid them to neither "hold intercourse with any British or Spanish post, garrison, or town" nor admit foreign traders into their territory. Jackson called the cession "an ample indemnification for all expenses incurred in prosecuting the war" and believed it could "prevent future connections, injurious to our tranquility."[17] British officials negotiating the Treaty of Ghent tried to include provisions for the Indians. They sought to create an Indian barrier between the United States and Canada to ensure that the Western tribes would remain loyal to the British. The Americans rebuffed these proposals and others that the British suggested to protect their Indian allies. In the Treaty of Ghent, the two countries ultimately agreed to return the Indians "all the possessions, rights, and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to… previous to such hostilities."[18] The Americans had no intention of honoring the treaty or returning any of the Indian possessions they had acquired during the War of 1812. Great Britain knew the treaty did not guarantee the Indians protection against future encroachments. The British no longer provided aid to the Indians and looked at America in terms of markets and raw materials rather than in terms of furs and Indian allies. The global thinking of the British Empire simply shifted away from

[17] The Treaty for Fort Jackson, 9 August 1814, in Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., *American State Papers: Indian Affairs* vol. 1 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832): 826-827. Hereafter cited as *ASPIA*; Extract of a letter from Major General Jackson to the Secretary of War, 8 October 1814, *ASPIA,* 1:838.
[18] Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989): 289, 290-292, 296. Transcript of Treaty of Ghent (1814)**,** http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=20&page=transcript, (accessed 2-19-12).

the Indians. Instead, the British turned to a policy of civilizing and Christianizing the Indians through the use of agriculture and a reservation system.[19]

The War of 1812 resulted in a number of important outcomes for United States Indian policy. The conflict broke the real power of the Spanish and British in the New World. The United States ushered in an era of peace with England. The Spanish Empire, left in a state of chaos because of the Napoleonic Wars, could no longer threaten the United States. Also, the United States became more willing to spend more on the military during peacetime. James Madison declared that, "experience has taught us that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the continuance of peace."[20] Most importantly, the War of 1812 broke the Indian power in both the Northwest and the Southwest. The Indians could never threaten the United States again and the lack of a strong foreign power in the region meant that outside influences could no longer meddle in the affairs of the United States.[21] Lewis Cass declared in 1817, "And a very few years more will present an iron frontier which [will] laugh to scorn the combined efforts of British and Indians."[22]

The War of 1812 revealed significant failures in the factory system. The growth of pan-Indian resistance during the years prior to the War of 1812 and during the conflict illustrates that the U.S. policy toward the Indians did little to prevent conflict or attach the Indians to the country in any way. Agents such as Benjamin Hawkins met limited success in

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[19] Colin G. Calloway, "The End of an Era: British-Indian Relations in the Great Lakes Region after the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 12 (Fall 1986): 4; Robert S. Allen, "His Majesty's Indian Allies: Native Peoples, the British Crown and the War of 1812," *Michigan Historical Review* 14 (Fall 1988): 23; Frank L. Owsley Jr. and Gene A. Smith, *Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny, 1800-1821* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1997): 98-102.

[20] James Madison to Congress, 18 February 1815, Annals of Congress, 13th Congress, 3rd Session, 255-56.

[21] Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989): 303-307.

[22] Governor of Michigan Territory to Jouett, 21 July 1817, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., Territorial Papers of the United States vol. 17, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1934-1962): 526.

preventing their associated tribes from waging war on the Americans. The Lower Creeks did not join the Red Sticks in their fight, in large part due to their contact and rapport with Hawkins, but the agent ultimately failed in preventing a large-scale war between the Creek nation and the United States.[23] The civilization program also proved less effective than officials hoped. The Indians made progress toward civilization, but few saw them as the yeomen that Jefferson envisioned. One aspect of U.S. Indian policy had been extraordinarily effective. The United States had managed to obtain vast tracts of land from the Indians during the pre-War of 1812 period. This policy had an ironic effect. The Indians did not become civilized and the loss of land unified them against the United States in the War of 1812.

Following the War of 1812, Congress considered the continuance of the factory system. In 1816 Secretary of War William H. Crawford defended the factory system and urged the Congress to continue it. He touted the Jeffersonian ideology that had defined the factory system before the war and called for "a considerable increase of the capital invested in it." Crawford reminded Congress that the factory system did not operate at a profit, but it did entice the Indians to attach themselves to the United States and to adopt a civilized way of life. "This influence," he stated, "skillfully directed for a series of years, cannot fail to introduce among them distinct ideas of separate property. These ideas must necessarily precede any considerable advancement in the arts of civilization." Crawford declared that "no plan can be devised for carrying on the Indian trade that will be equally advantageous to the Indians, although it may be more economical to the public."[24] Congress generally agreed with Crawford, noting that it had been more costly than expected but these problems

[23] Susan K. Barnard and Grace M. Schwartzman, "Tecumseh and the Creek Indian War of 1813-1814 in North Georgia," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 82 (Fall 1998): 495.
[24] William H. Crawford, Communicated to the Senate, 13 March 1816, *ASPIA,* 2:26-28.

originated 'in our recent belligerent state" rather than "out of any defect in the organization or government of the trade."[25] The war left the factories themselves in shambles, completely disrupting the operation of the system and resulting in many to being abandoned or destroyed. Moreover, the ones that did continue to operate throughout the war stocked lower quality American-made goods. After the war, the factories that managed to continue to operate were saddled with large amounts merchandise that their customers did not desire. Furthermore, private traders also contested the ability of the government to monopolize the trade and wanted the federal factories to stop competing with private enterprise.[26]

Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and the Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney took charge of United States Indian affairs shortly after the war. The War of 1812 left the War Department in deplorable condition with a significant amount of debt. Calhoun wanted to define peacetime policy and modernize the army.[27] During his tenure as Secretary of War, the United States did maintain a larger army than at any peaceful time in the nation's history which Calhoun hoped could properly maintain the United States "military science."[28] With Calhoun at the head of the War Department, the United States developed a coherent national defense strategy.[29] Calhoun's military policy intertwined with his Indian policy. A larger army and more fortresses on the frontier allowed Calhoun to begin reigning in the decentralized and inefficient state of U.S. Indian affairs. By expanding the defensive perimeter, the United States could limit British traders and protect American traders

[25] Mr. Thomas, Communicated to the House of Representatives, 4 February 1817, *ASPIA,* 2:127.
[26] Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, eds., *The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1824-1977* (Lincoln: University Press of Nebraska, 1979): 2; Herman J. Viola, *Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1974): 9-10.
[27] Richard W. Barsness, "John C. Calhoun and the Military Establishment, 1817-1825," *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* 50 (Autumn 1966): 43.
[28] John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Military Peace Establishment, 27 February 1815, *PJCC*, 1:277.
[29] Calhoun's activities in War Department are discussed in detail in William J. Meigs, *The Life of John Caldwell Calhoun* vol. 1 (New York: De Capo Press, 1970): 225-286; John M Murrin, "The Jeffersonian Triumph and American Exceptionalism," *Journal of the Early Republic* 20 (Spring 2000): 20.

operating amongst the Indians.[30] The Treaty of Ghent assured that the British traders could not operate in the U.S. territory and Calhoun planned to use the military to enforce this policy. The fur trade represented a significant economic activity and officials believed that control of it determined control of the Indians. The government still operated on the principle that private traders could not effectively exact U.S. policy objectives. Calhoun used the army to provide security for the fur trade and thus to provide for the expansion of U.S. sovereignty. Calhoun tasked the army with patrolling Indian country to keep out unscrupulous traders and establish the power of the United States on the western frontier.[31]

Calhoun's plan for expanding the military called for posts near the Indian agencies. This enabled the United States to limit the influence of British traders more effectively and to exert more control over the Indians by ensuring that the immediate threat of military force backed the activities of the agents and factors.[32] Calhoun declared that "our Northwest frontier will be rendered much more secure than heretofore and the most valuable fur trade in the world will be thrown into our hands," adding "that the act and instructions can have but little efficacy to remedy of the evil without military force properly distributed." Calhoun's goals for American expansion tinged his policy. Calhoun believed that the expanded army and control of the Indians would lead to "the mighty growth of our republic" that is "now ready to push its civilization and laws to the western confines of the continent."[33] Calhoun

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[30] Richard W. Barsness, "John C. Calhoun and the Military Establishment, 1817-1825," *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* 50 (Autumn 1966): 45-46.
[31] Francis Paul Prucha, "The United States Army and the Fur Trade," in Francis Paul Prucha, *Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981): 65-66, 75.
[32] Francis Paul Prucha, "The United States Army and the Fur Trade," in Francis Paul Prucha, *Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981): 67
[33] John C. Calhoun to the Chairman of the Military Committee, 29 December 1819, in Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds., *American State Papers: Military Affairs* vol. 2 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832): 33-34; Calhoun to Thomas A. Smith, 16 March 1818, Correspondence of John C Calhoun, in J. Franklin Jameson ed. Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1899, vol. 2, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900): 136.

represents the more practical aspects of Jeffersonian Indian policy. Like Jefferson, he wanted to ensure the U.S. had a tranquil frontier by limiting the influence of private traders and foreign nations.

For advice on how to conduct the nation's Indian affairs, Calhoun often turned to the Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas Lorraine McKenney. McKenney's father had been a merchant but the young McKenney served in the local militia, rising to the rank of Colonel. During the War of 1812, he served as the chief supply officer for the U.S. Army. A Quaker by birth and a humanitarian, McKenney believed strongly in the reform movements that swept the country during the years before the Civil War. He advocated opening orphanages, Sunday schools, and Bible societies and spoke out against dueling, the evils of whiskey, and cruelty to animals. He directed much of his philanthropic efforts toward the Indians by encouraging missionary societies and church groups to Christianize and civilize them. McKenney truly had a genuine concern for the well-being and advancement of all the Indians in the United States. He believed strongly in the U.S. factory system and as Superintendent of Indian trade he directed the factories and parlayed the position into the unofficial center of Indian affairs.[34]

McKenney's views on the Indians invoked Jefferson's. He believed strongly that they could be civilized and assimilated into American society and thought agriculture could

[34] Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall, *Biographical Sketches and Anecdotes of Ninety-Five of 120 Principal Chiefs from the Indian Tribes of North America,* (Philadelphia: Frederick W. Greenough, 1838); Thomas L. McKenney and James Hall, *The Indian Tribes of North America with Biographical Sketches and Anecdotes of Principle Chiefs,* Frederick Webb Hodge, ed. 3 vols. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1933); Shirley H. Bowers, ""Captured on Canvas": McKenney-Hall's History of the Indian Tribes of North America," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 71 (Jan. 1993): 339; Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, eds., *The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1824-1977* (Lincoln: University Press of Nebraska, 1979): 1; Herman J. Viola "From Civilization to Removal: Early American Indian Policy" in Jane F. Smith, Robert M. Kvasnicka , eds., *Indian White Relations: A Persistent Paradox* (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1976): 45-47. See also Herman J. Viola, *Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1974) for the definitive biography of Thomas L. McKenney;

unlock their potential as yeoman republicans. "Our object is not to keep these Indians hunters eternally," McKenney explained, "we want to make citizens out of them." He expressed his belief that they must be "anchored in the soil else they will be flying about whilst there is any room for them in the wilderness or animal to be trapped." He urged his factors to supply goods and set an example by cultivating gardens near the factories "to impress the Indians with notions of providing for their own wants."[35] Like Jefferson, McKenney believed that the factories provided the perfect mechanism for the civilization program. He thought that the factors could convince the Indians to "seek their support from the Earth, and exchange, for her certain compensation, the uncertain products of the chase. The instructions to the Factors also, direct them to cultivate among the Indians a regard for, and attachment to our Government and country."[36] He also dedicated efforts to preserving Indian culture by asking his agents for artifacts, weapons, clothing, and various ornaments of the tribes to keep them as a record. When he met with Indian delegations and chiefs, he had their portraits painted because he wanted to preserve a pictorial record of their lives. He hung these in his office and in 1830 began a program to print a portfolio of his collection, ultimately publishing his book, *History of Indian Tribes in North America* in 1837.[37]

Calhoun and McKenney faced a number of problems in conducting U.S. Indian policy. The American Fur Company and other private traders increasingly pressured the War Department between 1817 and 1822. Emerging during the late 1780s as a business to purchase and sell furs, by 1808, the company had become an international empire trading in furs, silks, and teas in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. John Jacob Astor, who owned the

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[35] Quoted in Herman J. Viola, *Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1974): 26.
[36] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 19 August 1818, *PJCC,* 3:47.
[37] Shirley H. Bowers, ""Captured on Canvas": McKenney-Hall's History of the Indian Tribes of North America," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 71 (Jan. 1993): 340-342.

company and managed to consolidate and grow his business, wished to establish a single corporate entity with control over the fur trade by employing private traders and supplying them with goods to acquire furs from the Indians. He hoped to dominate the market by maintaining advantages in size, transportation, and control of supply. Astor did not want a government sponsored monopoly, but rather preferred for the government to pass favorable legislation for his company or at least not take actions that would negatively affect it. The factory system directly competed with Astor and the American Fur Company and drew the ire of company officials who wanted to shut down the system to better secure a monopoly over the fur trade.[38]

The general lawlessness of the American Fur Company caused conflict with the War Department. McKenney lamented at "how powerfully that very influence is at work, to undermine the United States policy which is the only barrier that keeps out the force of that otherwise overwhelming torrent, which, having its source in avarice would inundate and lay waste the whole Indian Country!"[39] Their traders often ignored federal regulations governing the fur trade. The American Fur Company's trappers operated on Indian lands and their traders made unfair and backhanded deals with the tribes. They also smuggled copious amounts of alcohol into the Indian country. Thomas McKenney called whiskey "the curse that has ever since been wearing down the strength of the once mighty population of the region." Thomas McKenney lamented the detrimental effect the traders had on the factory system. "The source of all the difficulty is to be found in the necessity which the traders esteem themselves to be under to carry spirituous liquors into the Indian country; and it is

[38] John D. Haegar, "Business Strategy and Practice in the Early Republic: John Jacob Astor and the American Fur Trade," *The Western Historical Quarterly* 19 (May 1988): 188-191.
[39] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 8 April 1818, *PJCC,* 2:234.

from this source that so much wretchedness and so many evils proceed." He complained, "The trader with the whiskey, it must be admitted, is certainly getting the most furs."[40]

The military policed the liquor smuggling going on throughout the frontier by searching for whiskey and arresting the carriers. For the most part, the military took the duty very seriously but the deluge of alcohol flowing into the frontier made it nearly impossible to contain with a limited number of soldiers facing off against crafty traders with a great deal of experience in transporting contraband. While the American Fur Company did not blatantly authorize the unscrupulous practices, the organization did stand behind its traders by suing Indian agents and factors that interfered with company men. On the other hand, Astor viewed the government activity in the trade as detrimental to his business, informing Calhoun that the activities "occasioned by Officers and Agents acting under Government, and by which means we have been great sufferers, so much so, that it would indeed be ruinous to continue the Trade under such circumstances."[41]

The War Department constantly fought against the American Fur Company and Congressmen such as Missouri Senator Thomas H. Benton to keep the factory system in operation. Congress and the Monroe administration began requesting information about the War Department's agents and factors and cutting the budget of the Indian Office, leaving them understaffed and underpaid.[42] The agents and factors lamented the decision. Agent Return J. Meigs complained to Calhoun, "as retrograde movements are generally unpleasant

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[40] Thomas L. McKenney to James Barbour, 14 February 1826, *ASPIA,* 2:659-660.
[41] John Jacob Astor, President of the American Fur Company to John C. Calhoun, 14 March 1818, *PJCC,* 2:191; David Lavender, "Some American Characteristics of the American Fur Company," *Minnesota History* 40 (Winter 1966): 186,
[42] William S. Belko, "John C. Calhoun and the Creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: An Essay on Political Rivalry, Ideology, and Policymaking in the Early Republic," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 105 (July 2004): 175-177; See also Charles M. Wiltse, *John C. Calhoun; Nationalist, 1782-1828* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1944): 221. The author discusses Benton's election to the Senate and points out that he won the election one vote. He attributes his successful campaign to the lobbying efforts of the American Fur Company and implies that this caused Benton's vigorous opposition to the factories.

where interest is in question, I feel some regret at the reduction of my compensation, but I respect the laws of my Country and those who are the administrators of them."[43]

When Congress first submitted to Calhoun a resolution to end the factory system, he solicited advice from his Superintendents of Indian Affairs and Thomas McKenney on "the relative merit of the present system or the improvements of which it is susceptible."[44] McKenney replied in staunch defense of the factory system. "Judging of the future by the past," McKenney warned, "there are abundant reasons to justify the conclusion that a withdrawal of the existing Government system would be attended with consequences serious in their application as well to the Indian as to our frontier Citizens and [relations with the Indians] would tumble into ruins, and blast, at once the happiness of thousands of Indians who now enjoy its benefits." McKenney attacked the American Fur Company and private traders for the depredations they had continually committed in the Indian country. He also complained to Calhoun, noting that private traders had a habit of surrounding the factories and preventing "the principles emanating from it, which are enlightening and humane, and which all tend to attach the natives to our Government" from operating.[45] He asserted that "if the object of the Government be to civilize and preserve our Aborigines" the "pernicious intercourse" by the private traders must be stopped.[46] McKenney acknowledged a number of problems with the system but noted that "all this good design is not lost and that but for its working, savagism would characterize, and deform, and desolation would brood over minds which civilization and social life, and the principles of improvement, have a fixed and

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[43] Return J. Meigs to John C. Calhoun, 17 June 1818, *PJCC,* 2:343. This letter is indicative of the responses by the other agents and factors whose salaries had been cut. They all disliked the reduction in their compensation but, for the most part, continued their work for the War Department.
[44] John C. Calhoun to Lewis Cass, Ninian Edwards, and William Clark, 25 May 1818, *PJCC,* 2:393-394**.**
[45] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 17 July 1818, *PJCC,* 2:393-394.
[46] Thomas L. McKenney to Henry Southard, 7 January 1820, printed in *Washington National Intelligencer*, 25 February, 1820.

permanent control." He blamed the terrible state of Indian affairs in the United States on the backhanded and unscrupulous practices of the traders that continually allowed alcohol to flow into the Indian country. Furthermore, he also feared that the American Fur Company would establish a powerful monopoly in the fur trade. "The object of private enterprise is proclaimed in the undertaking and that object is gain." McKenney concluded, "All methods appear, to be alike convenient; and adopted, or rejected, as they may seem most likely to factor, or oppose, his hopes."[47]

Michigan Territorial Governor Lewis Cass, on the other hand, disagreed with McKenney. He believed that private traders could adequately fill the void the factory system left and carry on the Indian trade effectively.[48] "This system must have been originally introduced in consequence of our peculiar relations with the Indians, and from an impression that American Capital and enterprise could not supply the demands of this trade, or that the Indians from the nature of it would be liable to imposition." Cass continued that the Indians never "understood nor appreciated" the factories purpose and they believed that the goods were "sent among them for the same reason which induces individuals to embark in the trade." Cass maintained that "if more discretion were vested in the Officers granting the license with respect to whom licenses should be granted or refused, and to arrest any person found introducing spirits the beneficial results of this change would soon be experienced." Cass later redacted this letter noting that his plan could not be effectively implemented.[49]

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[47] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 19 August 1818, *PJCC,* 3:44-47.
[48] William S. Belko, "John C. Calhoun and the Creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: An Essay on Political Rivalry, Ideology, and Policymaking in the Early Republic," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 105 (July 2004): 176-181.
[49] Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, 14 September 1818, *PJCC,* 3:123-127*;* Lewis Cass to John C. Calhoun, 1 October 1818, *PJCC,* 3:177-178.

Calhoun opted to compromise between these two viewpoints. He wanted to continue the factory system that he believed produced a number of beneficial effects. “If wars have not been entirely prevented by it, they probably, without it, would have been more frequent,” he related to Congress, “and if the Indians have made but little advances in civilization, they probably, without it, would have been made less.” Calhoun also recognized the pressure to open the Indian trade to private traders, a “task of much greater difficulty.” He related to the legislature the difficulty of policing the vast Indian territory and the sheer number of Indians “render it impossible to apply, with propriety, any one uniform system in the whole.” Instead, he suggested that two separate policies be pursued, one for the tribes who already had extensive contact with the United States and another for the tribes on the frontier “who still retain their original character and customs.” Calhoun supported opening the trade with the nearby settlements through continued use of the licensing system and a strict ban on alcohol sales in the Indian country. He hoped that the private traders could “be put effectually under the control of the Government,” and the Indians “protected against the fraud and the violence to which their ignorance and weakness would, without such protection, expose them.” Furthermore, he desired to establish a method that allowed the government to monitor more closely the private traders. “It would be almost impossible to inspect the conduct of the multitude of traders with small capitals diffused over the Indian country.” He stated, “the greatest vigilance on the part of the superintendent and his agents would be unequal to the task.” Calhoun also suggested forcing the traders to establish fixed settlements; “by rendering them stationary, and compelling the proprietor to keep books,” he argued, “important checks will be presented to prevent fraud and exorbitant charges.” Moreover, “it will also strongly tend to prevent collision between the traders, and consequently, the creation of parties among

the Indians, a state of things unfriendly to their interest, and dangerous to the peace of the frontier." By taking into account these provisions, Calhoun hoped that the trade with Indians surrounded by settlements could be opened to private traders with "results equally salutary to the Indians and ourselves."[50]

Calhoun saw the frontier and the remote Indian tribes as an entirely different matter. He believed that "The system proposed for the partially civilized tribes bordering on our settlements would prove altogether inadequate to this branch of our Indian trade," he suggested. Controlling the Indian trade in the vast regions to the west was an object of great national importance. The region provided an abundance of furs but Calhoun saw foreign traders "whose influence must at all times be hostile to our interest, and dangerous to our peace" as a threat that had to be excluded from the trade. Calhoun believed that without an efficiently organized system, the U.S. could not compete with British and Spanish traders. Without the firmly established control of the factory system "a state of disorder and violence would universally prevail which would strongly tend to turn the trade and with it the influence over the Indians, to the well-organized foreign fur companies near our limits," and this could "obviated only by removing the diversity of interest by which it would be excited by subjecting the trade completely to the will and control of the Government."[51] The Congress responded by renewing the factory system, acknowledging that the "establishments have been a pecuniary loss to the United States" but "have been a great advantage, not only on the score of humanity to the Indian tribes, but also in preserving the lives and property of our frontier inhabitants."[52]

[50] John C. Calhoun, Communicated to the House of Representatives, 8 December 1818, *ASPIA,* 2:181-184.
[51] John C. Calhoun, Communicated to the House of Representatives, 8 December 1818, *ASPIA,* 2:181-184.
[52] Henry Southard, Communicated to the House of Representatives, 15 January 1819, *ASPIA*, 2:185-186.

Calhoun had his reasons for encouraging Congress to allow the factory system to continue even though its opponents made some very good points about its declining usefulness. He feared a void in Indian affairs that could assuredly have appeared with the sudden abolition of the factories. Furthermore, abolishing an entire portion of the Indian bureaucracy would have only increased his duties and left his close friend McKenney unemployed. Self-interest tinged also McKenney's decisions. He viewed the reform efforts as an integral part of maintaining the factory system and hoped he would be the one to administer the funding, thus allowing him to continue in his career with more discretion in Indian affairs. So, in part, McKenney and Calhoun founded their policy on institutional survival. [53]

During the early 1820s, the factory system finally came to an end. Officials shifted away from gift-giving and supplying the Indians as a major component of policy. "The policy of making presents in merchandise, or other article, to the Indians, either for the purpose of conciliating their friendship or of preserving peace," Calhoun explained, "has been found to have a bad tendency, by encouraging idleness and a dependence upon the government, which opposes its very best efforts for their improvement and its beneficial influence, if it really has any, exists only while it is continued."[54] Congress began serious cuts in 1821, decreasing the size of the army by forty percent and slashing Calhoun's program for fortification which had a tangential effect on the factory system by limiting the amount of influence they could exert over the private traders and the Indians. Furthermore, Congress cut funding the factory system, purposefully giving the operation roughly half of

[53]William S. Belko, "John C. Calhoun and the Creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: An Essay on Political Rivalry, Ideology, and Policymaking in the Early Republic," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 105 (July 2004): 177-179; Robert M. Kvasnicka and Herman J. Viola, eds., *The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 1824-1977* (Lincoln: University Press of Nebraska, 1979): 3.
[54] John C. Calhoun to Thomas L. McKenney, 13 April 1820, *PJCC,* 5:31-32.

what it needed to operate. By 1822, Congress succeeded in making the factories untenable. McKenney and Calhoun faced an enormous amount of debt accrued from their operation and Congress determined to end the factory system.[55]

McKenney, unwilling to let the factories disappear without staunch resistance, defended the system with zeal. He channeled the rhetoric and ideology of Jefferson in his communications to the legislature. "Before the quiet of the aboriginal solitude was disturbed, and the habits which nature had invested its natives were torn off by the hands of a more enlightened, but perhaps, less humane race of men, there were no demands to satisfy other than the forests furnished," he declared to the committee on Indian Affairs, "But the advance of civilization upon this simple state has changed these easily adjusted relations; and tis blessings; however highly to be appreciated have in reference to our Indians, been less numerous than its curses." McKenney asserted that by introducing commerce to the Indians, whites also introduced "disease, physical and moral" that have resulted in "bereavement, and suffering, and death" for the Indians. He declared that whites had a duty to "meliorate the condition and recover from barbarism those whose domain they invaded" and "it would be to perish them *en masse* to decree their exclusion from the commerce which has grown out of their new relations with the civilized world."[56]

McKenney acknowledged that private enterprise might have been able to meet these demands "but it is not so certain that such an intercourse would be characterized by the traits with which justice and humanity, or, that laws could be enacted adequate in their provisions to secure them." McKenney questioned the ability of the government to regulate the trade,

[55] William S. Belko, "John C. Calhoun and the Creation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: An Essay on Political Rivalry, Ideology, and Policymaking in the Early Republic," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 105 (July 2004): 186-188.
[56] Thomas L. McKenney, Communicated to the Senate, 14 January 1822, *ASPIA,* 2:260-261.

noting that "it is not so much to what the law threatens what offenders look," but rather "to the probable chances which promise their safety from its punishment. In regions wide and wild, like those inhabited by our Indians, laws are of little more importance in regulating the conduct of the avaricious than would be the testimony of the Indian for the security of whose person and property they might be enacted." McKenney believed the private trader, "skilled in the arts of deception and speculation," could fool other whites much less "an ignorant and powerless community of dependent savages!" [57] He concluded by summarizing the benefits of the factory system in four simple points:

> First. In the disinterestedness which characterizes it, and the superior advantages which it holds out in the way of trade to the impoverished race for those who benefit it has been established, over any other system originating in plans of gain.
> Second. In the harmony which is the natural consequence of such a system.
> Third. In the tranquility and peace which are the fruits of this harmony
> Fourth. In the consequently easy access, under its benevolent operations, to the confidence and friendship of the Indians; and in the state of preparation which it secures for the introduction of those intellectual and moral lessons, which, in the presence of any other system of commercial intercourse, it were useless to attempt to enforce upon them.[58]

McKenney's final defense of the factory system changed little from his earlier rhetoric. Even with the weight of Congress and the American Fur Company bearing down upon him, he still believed in the upright and moral principles that established the factories.

In January 1822, Benton called three close friends acquainted with the factory system to communicate to Congress the advisability of continuing the factory system. John Biddle, Ben O'Fallon, and John R. Bell responded to a questionnaire submitted to them by Benton and responded roughly a week after McKenney's defense of the system. All three reported negatively on the factories. "As it has been conducted," Biddle stated, "a useless institution

[57] Thomas L. McKenney, Communicated to the Senate, 14 January 1822, *ASPIA,* 2:260-261
[58] Thomas L. McKenney, Communicated to the Senate, 14 January 1822, *ASPIA,* 2:260-261.

has been kept up for years, by plausible statements on paper, and by general declamations about atrocities which never were committed and horrors to be apprehended." He asserted that the factors manipulated their records and the government to show some evidence of trade and believed the system "might remain whole *ad infinitum*, without a particle of business being done."[59] O'Fallon criticized the quality of the goods, noting that "Until the conclusion of the late war the goods in the factories were inferior to such as the individual traders made use of those factories or trading-houses have continued to be furnished with goods of a very inferior quality, and much less adapted to the Indian trade than those in the hands of individuals." He concluded that the Indians could not be attached to the factories and thus abandoned them to pursue private traders. O'Fallon also decried the system, saying that it "has no good effect in conciliating the good-will of the Indians towards us" but rather gives the unfavorable impression "by exhibiting the Government of the United States in the light of the common trader."[60] Bell espoused similar concerns and also noted that "it is not in the interest of the trader or the factor to encourage civilization in the Indian population as they advance in that, they recede in the hunt, and the trade becomes less valuable."[61] McKenney responded to the criticisms but his pleas fell on deaf ears in the Congress.

The debate reached a high point of vitriolic rhetoric shortly thereafter. Benton called the factories "McKenney's schemes to amend the heads and hearts of the Indians, to improve their moral and intellectual facilities to draw them from the savage and hunter state, and induct them into innocent pursuits of civilized life" and asserted that "the factory system is worse than useless; that every public consideration requires it to be immediately abolished, the accounts of all concerned be settled up and closed, the capital be returned to the public

[59] John Biddle to Thomas Hart Benton, 19 January 1822, *ASPIA,* 2:327-328.
[60] Ben O'Fallon to Thomas Hart Benton, 21 January 1822, *ASPIA,* 2:328.
[61] John R. Bell to Thomas Hart Benton, 23 January 1822, *ASPIA,* 2:328-329.

treasury, the salaries of all officers stopped, and that its profit and loss be shown at the next session of Congress."[62] McKenney, his reputation harmed, replied defending the virtue of his office against the "imputations which have been, with so little ceremony, and with less justice, heaped upon them" but the fate of the factories had been sealed.[63] After significant lobbying by John Jacob Astor and the American Fur Company, Congress formally declared that the factory system abolished in May 1822. Senator Thomas H. Barton later wrote, "The experience of the Indian Factory System is an illustration of the unfitness of the Federal Government to carry on any system of trade. The liability of the benevolent designs of the government to be abused and the difficulty of detecting and redressing abuses in the management of our Indian affairs."[64] A defeated McKenney addressed the factors and missionary societies he had supported for so long, "I shall not cease to cherish for you, and for those whose condition you have so generously volunteered your services to meliorate, and ardent solicitude for your success and their welfare." He encouraged them to find ways to supply the Indians and civilize them adding that "obstacles may multiply, and opposition itself may blacken the sky of your prospects—but persevere."[65] In June, the factors began liquidating their stock.

The abolition of the factory system symbolizes the government's exchange of a less coercive policy for the more coercive policies pursued later in the nineteenth century. Calhoun and McKenney attempted to continue the system of their predecessors but pressure from the American Fur Company and Congress divorced the government and the Indian

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62 Annals of Congress, 17th Congress, 1st Session, 235-236, 317-331.
63 House Journal, 17th Congress, 1st Session, 4 May and 6 May 1822, 55.
64 Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View; or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850, vol. 1 (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1854-1856), 20-21.
65 McKenney to "the corresponding secretaries of the several societies in the United States, for the promotion of Indian civilization," May 28, 1822, printed in *Niles' Weekly Register, June 8, 1822.*

trade. The events of the following chapter parallel those of this one, except by viewing federal policy at the ground level. Discussing the guiding principles of the United States Indian policy is meaningless without investigating the actual implementation of those policies to find congruence or incongruence between national Indian policy and the experiences of the agents operating in the field. Therefore, the following pages focus on the Sulphur Fork Factory and how it dealt with the changes in U.S. Indian affairs.

CHAPTER 3:

SULPHUR FORK FACTORY

The Sulphur Fork factory operated from 1817 to 1822 after relocating from Natchitoches to the Red River Valley in present-day Arkansas shortly after John Fowler arrived to take over operations there.[1] Officials wanted to maintain peaceful relationships on the frontier. They hoped to achieve this aim by limiting private traders through the use of a large and organized system of exchange with the Indians. They also wanted to civilize the Indians, and obtain Indian land to provide for white expansion. National policymakers meant for the factories to implement this policy. Unfortunately, the Sulphur Fork Factory proved utterly incapable of achieving any of these objectives. The factor continually encountered hostility between whites and Indians and could do little to alleviate the tension. Furthermore, the factory did very little to provide the Indians with the implements of civilized life and never managed to obtain any Indian land. Disorganization and inexperience plagued the factory and completely prevented it from effectively implementing any national Indian policy.[2]

The Red River Valley held strategic importance to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and other policymakers. Calhoun wanted to establish a firm grasp on the territory and expand the U.S. sphere of influence westward to accommodate expansion. The Spanish settlements

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[1] Wayne Morris "Traders and Factories on the Arkansas Frontier, 1805-1822" *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 28 (Spring 1969): 28-48; Russel M. Magnaghi, "Sulphur Fork Factory, 1817-1822," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 37 (Summer 1978): 168-183; Morris' work looks broadly at the Arkansas Post, Spadra Bayou Factory, and Sulphur Fork Factory. The author argues that the factories managed to open the Indian trade regardless of the federal regulations that hindered them. Magnaghi's work focuses specifically on Sulphur Fork Factory. His narrative is excellent but he largely ignores broader issues of United States Indian affairs.

[2] Joyce Purser, "The Administration of Indian Affairs in Louisiana, 1803-1820," *Louisiana History, The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association,* 5 (Autumn 1964): 401-419; Purser discusses the Indian policy in Louisiana from the Louisiana Purchase until 1820. She takes a fairly broad view of the subject and focuses on the Indian agents and the territorial governors while touching on the factories briefly. She concluded that the officials responsible for Indian affairs fulfilled their goals by preventing large scale conflict on the frontier but largely ignores the policies focused on civilizing the Indians or obtaining Indian land.

to the west in Texas troubled Calhoun. He believed that their influence could only be counteracted by having a system of trade as "organized and efficient as theirs."[3] Calhoun turned to the factories to carry out his policy for the western frontier. He recognized that the "remoteness of the post will in some respects render it unpleasant to those who may be detailed for the service" but hoped that the agents sent to the region would meet these challenges with "cheerfulness" given the importance of the service. He believed that by establishing a post in the region the United States could "push its civilization and laws to the western confines of the continent."[4] Louisiana and Arkansas became central to American expansion and to U.S. Indian affairs.

Superintendent Thomas L. McKenney appointed Captain John Fowler as factor for the Natchitoches factory in November 1816. Fowler then embarked on his journey from Baltimore to New Orleans in mid-December 1816. He arrived at the Mississippi port thirty four days later, complaining of the unusually long passage around Florida and into the Gulf of Mexico. Shortly thereafter he encountered difficulty finding passage to Natchitoches as the boats travelling northward were full and "the country so inundated" from recent rain. He noted to McKenney that "such is the difficulty ascending this river; that we were 27 days making the high land about 120 miles where I left the boat and came by land." [5] The long distance between Washington and the factory, sixty one days of travel, proved to be a continual source of difficulty for Fowler. His subsequent reports to his superiors in Washington required at least two months to reach their destination and two additional months

[3] John C. Calhoun to Henry Clay, 5 December 1818, in Robert L. Meriweather, *The Papers of John C. Calhoun* vol. 2 (Columbia, University of South Carolina Press, 1959): 352. Hereafter cited as *PJCC.*
[4] John C. Calhoun to Thomas A. Smith, 16 March 1818, in *PJCC* vol. 2, p. 195.
[5] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 19 February 1817, in Letterbook of the Natchitoches-Sulphur Fork Factory, 1809-1821, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, Microfilm T1029, 1 roll, p. 99. Hereafter cited as LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029.

for their advice to be relayed back to Fowler. The distance prevented Fowler from receiving much advice or support from Washington and forced him to rely on local infrastructure to carry out his duties as factor. This also hindered the logistical integrity of the factory by lengthening the amount of time for supplies to reach the factory and for the furs acquired from the Indians to be shipped elsewhere for sale. This increased the cost of the factor's goods and placed increased strain of the operation of the factory.[6]

Fowler arrived at Natchitoches to find that the military garrison of the region had been moved to Fort Selden. He noted to McKenney that "nothing, whatsoever, had been done toward building the trading house at the new post" but asserted that he would "immediately proceed to take possession of what public property is here and proceed." He expressed hope that "if the goods are well supplied, the trade will be considerable this year." His arrival at Fort Selden tempered his enthusiasm because he found the buildings in a state of disarray. The logs used to construct them had long since rotted and the fixtures of the buildings were unusable. A Catholic congregation also laid claim to the land and the buildings upon it. Fowler took a lackadaisical attitude toward resolving the situation and did not seem to understand why the congregation wanted to cause him so much difficulty in establishing the operation. "The building would sell for very little." he told McKenney, "The dwelling and store under one roof is the only house worth anything and were it to be removed would bring very little." He believed that the congregation placed far too much value on the buildings but he noted that the "subject having been so long a matter of frustration between my predecessor and the congregation" required him to resolve the situation by purchasing the buildings. This troubled Fowler little and he thought a successful trading season could

[6] Royal B. Way, "The United States Factory System for Trading with the Indians, 1796-1822," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 6 (Sept. 1919): 228.

recuperate the loss. "The Public Trade having been surrounded for so long a time in the quarter and the Indians having been so much imposed on by private traders," Fowler explained, "a considerable business will probably be done here when the public store is established." He concluded by requesting $15,000 of "carefully selected" goods to enable him to compete with the numerous private traders.[7]

Construction of the trading house began in March after Fowler negotiated with Lt. Col. William A. Trimble the labor of the soldiers. The commander of the post did not eagerly submit his men to the factor's service because they had been exhausted moving post and Trimble thought that if he worked them too hard, the men would not reenlist.[8] Operations came to an abrupt halt in April when Dr. John Sibley claimed ownership of the land. It is unclear exactly on what Sibley based his claim but Fowler thought it legitimate and sent to his superior in Washington asking whether or not he should continue constructing the trading house or pursue another option.[9] These initial difficulties illustrate several problems Fowler faced as he took over operations of the factory and contributed to his failures to implement U.S. Indian policy. Inexperience and unfamiliarity with the region plagued his attempts to consolidate the factory. As an outsider, Fowler did not understand the locals and proved ill-equipped to handle the situation. This also extends to the military. McKenney likely informed him that the military would provide assistance but his dealings with the commander and soldiers show that his superior left the extent of that help unclear. Finally, the poor state of the factory reflects the broader effects that the War of 1812 had on all the factories.[10]

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[7] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 4 March 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 100-101.
[8] Fowler only secured their services by offering them more than the standard 15 cents and gill of whiskey per day.
[9] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 1 April 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 103-104.
[10] See also, Peter J. Kastor, "Motives of Peculiar Urgency": Local Diplomacy in Louisiana, 1803-1821," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 58 (Oct. 2001): 819-848; Kastor discusses the important role local diplomacy played in extending sovereignty on the frontier. Foreign policy and domestic affairs overlapped on a daily basis

By April 1817, Fowler deemed the factory at Fort Selden untenable and suggested it be moved north into the Arkansas territory. Fowler had a number of motivations for doing so. The Indians did not frequent Natchitoches as much as they had previously because of the proliferation of white settlers in the region; he believed the United States could limit Spanish influence by placing the post closer to the settlements in Texas. Private traders, "who practice the most degrading and fraudulent imposition," also worried Fowler and he hoped moving the factory could hinder them and protect the settlers in the Red River Valley.[11] Taken within the context of broader national Indian affairs, his request reflects exactly what that policy intended. The factories acted as a crucial American vanguard since their inception during the Washington administration. Officials hoped the posts could attach the Indians to the United States, limit their interaction with foreigners, and maintain peace by dealing with the Indians fairly rather than allowing private traders to run rampant through the country. Fowler's recommendation to move the post coincided with all these policies.

During late April and early May, Fowler travelled northward to find a suitable location for the factory and discover more about the situation in that area. He described to McKenney the difficulties of the journey due to the heavy spring rains. Even so, his expedition ultimately confirmed his opinion on moving the post. "I conceive this to be an important point as the Indians are numerous," he wrote, "who by the greater part have seen non but the worst of white men and have no knowledge of the protection extended to them by the Government. A little attention would secure the friendship of these Indian permanently."

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and American officials "had to rely on—and contend with—civil and military officials on the periphery charged with numerous responsibilities. This is perfectly illustrated throughout Fowler's time at Natchitoches-Sulphur Fork as he was unable to successfully handle the diplomatic relationships on the ground to successfully implement national policy objectives.

[11] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 8 April 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 108. John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 14 April, 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 111.

Fowler also met Major David Riddle who had travelled "a considerable distance up the river in pursuit of illicit traders." Major Riddle's expedition against the illicit traders proved rather successful. He confiscated between $5,000 and $6,000 worth of illicit goods and sent a number of traders to New Orleans for trial. Fowler remarked that the "Indians were much pleased at it and persons who have always disregarded these laws begin to see the importance of observing them. I am much gratified at it as the laws heretofore have been shamefully neglected." Fowler and Riddle arrived at a Coushatta village around the same time and the Indians there complained to both men about the whites peddling whiskey in their territory. The officials discovered that some soldiers had stolen whiskey and given some to the Indians in the village who "begged for more and finding it could not be had and perceiving valuable skins would procure it, immediately brought them forward and would have given any amount for a bottle full." Fowler deplored these acts and complained to McKenney that the whites "obtain their valuable furs and peltries and leave them without means of clothing their family." These events cemented his opinion that by moving the factory the government could secure the friendship of the Indians and stop the actions of the private traders. [12]

Fowler's expedition north reflects a number of issues pertinent to national Indian policy. The additional twenty-five-day journey north only exasperated communication and logistical issues that already plagued the factory located in Natchitoches. The factor's reaction to the privations of the illicit traders also shows that he, like other humanitarians involved in the factory system, had a genuine concern for the Indians. The private traders disgusted Fowler for moralistic reasons, but also raised practical concerns. He recognized that the success of his endeavor rested on the friendship and trust of the Indians. The

[12] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 9 May 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 113-117; John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 10 May 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 117-118.

military's effort to stop the illicit trade also demonstrates some interesting things about national Indian policy. Secretary Calhoun intended for the army to act as the security and police force for the fur trade. He wanted them to pursue illicit traders to give the United States a firm hold on the frontier and extend the nation's sovereignty. The expedition to capture the traders operating illegally in the Indian country shows that the military did indeed pursue this policy yet a close reading of the sources reveals some in congruencies between what national policymakers intended and what actually occurred on the frontier. The expedition succeeded but it is difficult to ascertain whether or not $6,000 represented a significant amount of contraband relative to the amount of whiskey being transported onto the frontier. Furthermore, the soldiers' involvement in the illicit trade proves that officers in the area faced significant difficulty in controlling their men and pursuing effective measures to limit the private traders.[13]

Fowler, having not received any orders or confirmation for his plan to move the factory, resigned to spend the trading season in Natchitoches. Dr. Sibley's claim deadlocked the operation at Fort Selden and nothing had been done toward either completing the buildings or removing them to another area. Fowler frustratingly expressed his distaste for his assistance to McKenney, noting that he was "entirely dependent on those of the military and judging of the future by the past, I consider them very uncertain." He lamented the military post's disorganization, complaining that "one officer undertakes to disapprove and suspend what another had commenced and nearly completed," due to the "command being so frequently changed at this post." Furthermore, the officer decided to move his post away

[13] Wayne Morris, "Traders and Factories on the Arkansas Frontier, 1805-1822," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 28 (Spring 1969): 31; Ora B. Peake, *A History of the United States Factory System, 1795-1822* (Denver, 1954): 110-125; These authors both assert that the governmental supply of whiskey to soldiers stationed on the frontier as part of their wage caused a great deal of frustration to Indian agents and factors because the troops invariably traded it with the Indians.

from Fort Selden due to sickness amongst his men. By October, Fowler declared that he was "not in a situation to sell any goods" and did not "see a prospect of renting" a building to carry on the trade.[14] Again, Fowler proved utterly incapable of negotiating solutions to his problems with the locals or the military and this directly affected his ability to carry on with the operation of the factory much less broader national Indian policy.

McKenney agreed with Fowlers observations and thought relocating the factory would accommodate the needs of frontier settlers and the Indians and finally cleared Fowler to move the post in November. The factor praised McKenney's decision. "The Indians are very numerous to the West and North of that point and are constantly increasing by Emigration." Fowler explained, "Game is very plenty at a convenient distance to trade to that place. The Indians are all friendly and will continue so as long as the Government treat them with some attention." He warned that the Indians "should not be neglected for they are very numerous and warlike." The decision relieved Fowler who had been scrambling to find a suitable way to carry on the public trade. Fort Selden had been completely abandoned and he had rented a building in Natchitoches to store goods but he lacked the space to carry on the trade effectively. His hopes for a good trading season withered and he declared that he had "no expectation of doing but very little, if anything, in the way of Indian Trade until a place shall be fixed upon and the factory built."[15] He informed McKenney that he hoped to have the new post operational by the following May but his plan immediately met with challenges.

Throughout the winter and spring, Fowler encountered considerable difficulty in securing passage northward. He insisted that the military accompany him to the new site but

[14] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 8 July 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 120-121; John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 11 August 1817, LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 122; John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 8 October 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 125-126.
[15] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 14 November 1817, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 127.

the commander remained unwilling to commit any soldiers to that purpose. In late April 1818, Fowler received a small detachment of twelve men led by a sergeant to accompany him to Sulphur Fork.[16] He gathered supplies during the following months and finally departed Natchitoches in June. Upon arrival at the new site, he found that completing the buildings for the factory proved more difficult than he imagined. Fowler wanted to construct the buildings "on the most economical scale possible to answer their purpose" but even that proved difficult due to a profound shortage of labor. The Captain who ordered the men to accompany Fowler did not think the Secretary of War bound him to provide labor for Fowler and gave no order that they should do so.[17] Fowler searched wide in the surrounding area to secure as much labor as he could but found few willing to work for him for less than $30 to $40 per month in addition to their daily allotment of whiskey. He supplied the laborers well but most simply left the factory after collecting their first wages. Fowler managed to entice the soldiers to work for him for double the daily wage and whiskey ration, much to the dismay of McKenney. The Superintendent of Indian Trade admonished him for spending more than the daily allotment for labor and told him to "explain how it happens that a greater price is allowed than that fixed by the War Department."[18] Fowler's inability to secure the assistance of the local population and the military again displays his inexperience and ineptitude. This also illustrates the inflexibility of the War Department regarding the factory

[16] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 21 April 1818, LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 140; John C. Calhoun to Thomas L. McKenney, 21 February 1818, in *PJCC,* vol. 2, p. 153; This order only came after Calhoun directed the commander at the post should send an attachment of troops to protect Fowler as he attempted to build a trading post.
[17] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 21 April 1818, LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 140
[18] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 22 November 1919, in Clarence E. Carter ed., *The Territorial Papers of the United States* vol. XIX, Arkansas Territory (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953): 120-122; Hereafter cited as in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory;* Thomas L. McKenney to John Fowler, 7 August 1819, *in Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 94-95.

system. McKenney's criticism of Fowler illustrates that he did not realize some of the difficulties facing Fowler as he tried to establish the new factory.

By July, with construction of the factory buildings underway, Fowler remarked that he "was much pleased with the situation and prospects and think it embraces the greatest advantages both for the Factory and military post on the frontier" but also expressed misgivings about the situation. White traders "of the most abhorrent character" had traveled extensively in the country and supplied the Indians "with very little except whiskey." The Indians' prior dealings with whites made the situation volatile. "The Indians have become very disorderly," Fowler warned, "and have committed some outrages and are much unsatisfied. The chiefs say they have no order or subordination in their villages and very little control over their men… [because] whites come among them with such quantities of whiskey they have all become very miserable."[19]

The Indians complained to Fowler that the whiskey peddlers followed them when they relocated their settlements. "They are becoming very restless," Fowler warned, "seeing at last, no doubt, the necessity of holding; if possible, some part of the country free from white instigation." Fowler attempted to reconcile the situation and bring about a more peaceable situation along the frontier. He expressed that it would "do an act of justice toward the Indians in this quarter, as well as policy… to prevent effectually all white settlement on the right bank of the Red River and to break up the [illegible] of straggling whiskey traders on the left bank." Again, he expressed his distaste for the private traders disregard for the laws regulating trade with the Indians. "I am in the neighborhood of men who are in the daily and regular habit of violating them." Fowler laments, "They leave Natchitoches… loaded with whiskey with the avowed intention of trade with Indians and trade wherever they please

[19] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 10 August 1818, LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 151-154.

without any regard, whatsoever, to the agent there."[20] Fowler's report of the Indians troubles with the private traders confirms this problem did cause significant difficulty for the United States on the frontier by provoking the Indians to commit depredations against whites. It also proves that the measures taken by the government to hinder the illicit trade remained ineffective. John Jamison, the Indian agent at Natchitoches, did little to stop the traders from loading up on whiskey in Natchitoches and taking it into the Indian country. Moreover,while the military had recently conducted a successful raid, there were still a large number of illicit traders amongst the Indians.

During the following year, Fowler tried to deal with these challenges and successfully make Sulphur Fork a trading hub in the region. He exchanged goods such as flour, salt, tobacco, and manufactures for the furs the Indians acquired in their hunts. The factor cared for the furs to ensure that insects and worms did not destroy them while they awaited shipment to New Orleans.[21] The goods supplied to the factor to trade with the Indians did not meet quality standards, especially the rifles. "I have had three returned," he complained, "as unfinished in the caliber and very imperfectly finished, and the barrels of all to thin."[22] Fowler established a firearm repair service at the factory to deal with this problem and keep the Indians' weapons functional for their hunts. He also spent time travelling amongst the tribes gathering information and trying to alleviate tensions between whites and Indians.[23] Although Fowler succeeded in opening the legal Indian trade on the Red River, there remain several important things that can be gleaned from the record. Fowler's complaints about the

[20] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 10 August 1818, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 151-154.
[21] Natchitoches-Sulphur Fork factory journal and daybook, 1816-1822, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75, 1 roll, p. 31-55. Hereafter cited as JDBNSFF, RBIA, RG75.
[22] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 4 July 1818, LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 147-148.
[23] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 10 August 1818, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 151-154; John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 22 December 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 130.

poor quality of goods shipped to him confirmed the wider problem that all factories faced during and after the War of 1812. The Indians also overwhelmingly exchanged their furs for items related to hunting and the factor did little to supply the Indians with the implements of civilized life. At the national level, this had been a major goal of the factory system but Fowler seems to have done little to achieve this. He did not cultivate a garden at the factory to set an example for the Indians, and he only supplied them with few agricultural implements.[24]

In April 1819, a Caddo chief visited Fowler, causing the factor some frustration. Fowler vented to John Jamison that the chief had recently toured the Spanish territory and "probably received new presents with the old advice." The chief claimed the lands all around the Red River and vowed to "drive every American off" of the land. "He appears to be entirely insensible of the obligations he is under to the Government for all the presents he has received together with rations, repairs of Arms, and his hatred to the Americans seems invincible," Fowler cautioned. "He has no kind of respect for advice given him by agents of the Government and no doubt grossly misleads the Tribe." The chief criticized the American agents while among the Indians and tried to limit the ability of other tribes to sell their goods to the factory. Fowler recommended drastic measures to handle this Chief. "If the present chief were displaced and a more civilized one substituted it would be a great advantage to the tribe," Fowler suggested. "Considering the length of time his tribe has had constant intercourse with the whites, they are singularly savage and far inferior to any Indians that

[24] The agricultural implements that Fowler did trade generally went to the Indians who had emigrated to the region from the southeast. These Indians did relatively little hunting compared to the other tribes in the area and had adopted a more sedentary life. In regards to the tribes who had not been exposed extensively to the factory system already, Fowler did very little to encourage their civilization.

visit this place." He also recommended that the government cease supplying Indians if they did not acquiesce to the demands.[25]

` Although Fowler attributed the Caddo chief's disposition toward the Americans to Spanish influence, evidence suggests that he had other longstanding grievances with the Americans. In November 1818, the Caddo offered to cede their lands on the eastern side of the River in exchange for the United States protecting them from the depredations of private traders and their rival tribes. They hoped the trading house could separate the tribe from the whites. By discouraging Indians from travelling into the white settlements, and vice versa, the Caddo hoped to alleviate the continued evils brought upon them by frontier whiskey.[26] Fowler seems to have utterly misunderstood the Caddo chief's motives. His assumption that Spanish manipulation precipitated the negative attitude toward the factory illustrates that the factor and national Indian policy did not recognize that the Indians would act in their interests even if they contradicted U.S. policy.

The chief wanted to protect his tribe from white encroachments and establish hegemony controlling the region's fur trade. He wanted to place his tribe in a position of power and protection. Fowler thought his actions stemmed from his less civilized state and thought the chief should be replaced. He also overestimated the Spanish, who could do little to exert influence on their northern frontier. The Comanche effectively controlled Texas. They raided and exploited the Texas-Louisiana border region well into New Mexico and the Spanish could do little to counteract this influence. Meanwhile, the Caddos found themselves located between the Comanches and the United States, meaning that the actions of the chief are not surprising. He simply pursued a policy that could afford him a more advantageous

[25] John Fowler to John Jamison, 16 April 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 70-71.
[26] Lt. Col. William A. Trimble to John C. Calhoun, 27 November 1818, in *PJCC* vol. 3, p. 308-310.

position in the region by securing a monopoly over the trade with the whites. Fowler's suspicions of Spanish meddling were probably exaggerated.[27]

John Jamison took a less extreme position. He met with the chief, who denied the charges leveled against him by Fowler, but stated that "did the Indians not generally believe he was a mere agent, he would have long since been driven away." Jamison thought the threats simply came along with establishing a trading post on the Red River and that "it will be a subject of envy and that everything can be done, will be done to effect its destruction." The agent cautioned the Caddo chief that "any violation offered to Captain Fowler or the property he had charge of, would be an offence against the United States and punished accordingly" but dismissed the chief as a real threat to U.S. interests in the region. "It is my candid belief that this fellow will in the end cost us some trouble," Jamison wrote to Calhoun, "although we have not much to dread from his physical force he many nevertheless cost us both blood and treasure. He is vain, and with his vanity ignorant of our resources." He concludes by suggesting sending the chief to Washington so that he could see the power of the United States.[28]

Fowler disliked Jamison's decision. He wrote to McKenney that he had assumed the agent could handle the issue but "it seems even this little matter shares the fate of most other Indian business on this Frontier—there is no person authorized to act—at least, no person

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[27] For information on Spanish Texas see Brian DeLay *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Pekka Hämäläinen *The Comanche Empire*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007); DeLay and Hämäläinen argue that the Comanche destabilized the Spanish Empire's northern frontier to the such an extent that the Spaniards could do little to manage affairs in the region much less exert power against the United States in the region. Barr's study places the negotiations between the Indians and Spanish within a gendered framework but contains valuable insights into the Spanish position in Texas. She points out that the Indians acted as the hegemonic power in the region rather than the Spanish. These works show that Fowler's suspicions of Spanish influence amongst the Indians were probably exaggerated, especially as far north as the Red River Valley.

[28] John Jamison to the Secretary of War, 26 May 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* 69.

does act." He had already stressed to McKenney the importance the Caddo tribe played in his operation. According to Fowler they were the oldest tribe in the region and "looked up to with a degree of reverence by all the Indians on the Red River." He even suggested the establishment be named the "Caddo Factory" due to their prevalence in the region. Fowler also relayed that the tribe had murdered and robbed many whites in the region "but have always escaped punishment from the great distance these outrages were committed from white settlements." Fowler lamented the deplorable condition of the tribe who were "far below any Indians that visit this place in point of Civilization" regardless that they "lived in this neighborhood and had an intercourse with whites nearly one hundred years."[29] McKenney and Jamison's inaction on this issue illustrates that their policies proved utterly ineffective at addressing the concerns of the factors. Fowler's letters took months to reach Washington, and provoked little response once they arrived. Considering that the factories aimed at preventing conflict between whites and Indians as well as civilizing them, this event shows that Sulphur Fork could not effectively achieve those goals.

Fowler continued to face challenges from unruly whites along the Red River. One man named Music convinced a number of Delawares to allow him to cultivate one of their fields. After the Indians planted their crops, Music "raised a quarrel with the Indians and, with the assistance of some white men, drove the Indians off and took possession of the whole." Shortly afterward, he sold the land to other whites for nine hundred dollars. Music was later involved in a similar incident in which he beat a half-blood Cherokee near the point

[29] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 10 August 1818, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 151-154. See also F. Todd Smith, *The Caddo Indians: Tribes at the Convergence of Empires, 1542-1854* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1995) for more information on the Caddo tribe. The author argues that the Caddos positioned themselves at points of convergence between the imperial powers to establish themselves as a major power in the region. Again, the author emphasizes Indian agency by showing how they manipulated various European powers to get what they desired.

of death because he had complained of the whites' efforts to take land from the tribe. Several "principal Cherokees" informed officials of "the constant disorder occasioned in the Village by means of liquors sold to the Indians." They threatened to "come to their houses and knock the heads of whiskey barrels." The traders also misinformed the Indians that the military would drive them from their lands if they refused to trade with them, leaving them wary of asking for assistance from the one institution that could alleviate the problem. Fowler expressed his unhappiness with the affairs, stating that he thought "the well-disposed Indians were most shamefully treated and no person in this quarter protects them from a band of infamous characters who have flocked together here in consequence of its being more exposed to their depredations than any other place." He called attention to the "irregular practice of Government" that "affords an easy and safe entrance into the Indian countries to the worst characters and too often ends in most cruel and unhappy wars." Fowler again expressed that the whites should be prohibited from settling on the land to give the Indians more time with their land and game.[30]

Information about Fowler's problems traveled up the chain of command and eventually reached the Secretary of War. McKenney's message to Calhoun reflected his fatigue at the constant complaints from his factors about illicit traders. "[I] took for granted it was the effect of hostility against the factory entertained by the traders who almost literally drown that country with whiskey," he wrote to Calhoun, "This, however, is so common as to have lost much of its fearfulness."[31] Calhoun's response to the troubles displayed an utter lack of interest for the problems of this factory. He simply quoted the law to Jamison and instructed him to take "such measures as you may deem expedient for the violators of the

[30] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 14 June 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory* p. 73-75. John Fowler to John Jamison, 1 June 1919, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 75-76.
[31] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 16 July 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 86

law."[32] Jamison had no interest in settling such disputes. Fowler complained to McKenney that he had "been repeatedly called on to go abroad and settle disputes between Indians and whites in their trades," which he believed fell under the purview of the Indian agent and forced him to leave his post unattended for extended periods of time.[33] McKenney responded by stating that the agent should handle the disputes and even authorized him to hire a clerk to assist him in his duties.[34] Again, Sulphur Fork Factory proved unable to compete effectively with the illicit trade in the region and establish itself as the center of trade. McKenney's and Calhoun's lacking response to the issue displayed that this problem occurred so often on the frontier that the factories could not cope with it.

Fowler turned to the military to alleviate some of these concerns but even there he found little help. He informed Captain Robert L. Coomb that a number of white traders who had no licenses to trade had therefore violated the law of the United States. Fowler implored him to "comply with the wishes of Government and do an act of justice to the Indians by obliging these men to move off from the Village." The Cherokee had already complained of the "misconduct of certain whites who brought liquor into the village and defrauded them of their property" but little action had been taken to address their concerns. It appears that Coomb took no action against the white traders.[35] Furthermore, Fowler's call for a garrison in the Red River Valley generally went unheeded. He begged for more troops to be stationed at Sulphur Fork due to the increasing numbers of Indians migrating to the region. Fowler feared that the Spanish influence, without any American troops to counteract it, could be troublesome for the United States. Fowler acknowledged that the Spanish could not establish

[32] John C. Calhoun to John Jamison, 15 August 1819, in in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory, p.* 85
[33] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 22 December 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory, p.* 130.
[34] Thomas L. McKenney to John Fowler, 24 April 1820, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory, p.* 167.
[35] John Fowler to Robert L. Coomb, 29 December 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 134.

authority in the country and he hoped that preemptively placing a military post could firmly claim the territory for the U.S. and improve the Indian trade. The Indians, weary of white encroachment, discussed moving westward which also worried Fowler. "I am really apprehensive," Fowler stated, that "an attempt will be made in the course of next fall to plunder this place if the force here is not augmented." He also explained that "it is in their power to do it almost without resistance" given that he only had a few men available to him.[36]

The few men Fowler did have available to him proved to be more troublesome than protective. Eventually, Fowler only had a corporal and eight men as the soldiers finished their terms of service and left the post. Those that did stay were "nearly without clothing and their rations have been out more than a month" and Fowler feared that "unless very shortly supplied they will be compelled to abandon the place." He describes the disorderly conduct of the troops and his difficulties in securing their assistance. "A few nights past they broke into a House (by making a hole in the roof) and stole about fifteen gallons whiskey." He complained, "Two of the men (found drunk the next morning) acknowledged they stole whiskey," This exasperated Fowler and the situation left him with few options. "From the conduct of the Corporal I have no doubt he was concerned in the Theft—he is one of the most worthless and insolent among them." Fowler explained, "If I want the services of a man for fifteen minutes only, in the Smiths shop, store, or any other way the price must first be stipulated or the work left undone however urging—If I have a hireling they endeavor to dissatisfy him that he may go off. Men who enlist in time of peace for five dollars per month feel no responsibility and cannot be trusted from under the eye of a superior." Fowler implored his superiors to help him with this situation. He complained that the post had been

[36] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 2 July 1819, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* 95-96.

exclusively under the command of a sergeant or corporal and that the assistance of the men "under the present regulation it is little more than a nuisance."[37] The situation continued to grow worse and the soldiers virtually imprisoned Fowler and repeatedly threatened his life.[38]

McKenney and Calhoun responded to these issues in unassuming fashion. McKenney forwarded the complaints to the Secretary of War, apologizing for troubling Calhoun with so many complaints but expressing that he wanted them forwarded to the proper authority.[39] Calhoun forwarded the letters to Daniel Bissell and did admonish him to some extent. "I regret extremely that there should be so frequent complaints of misconduct from that quarter," Calhoun scolded, "and trust that official measures will be immediately adopted to prevent similar occurrences." The Secretary of War instructed him to "order a commissioned officer to take command of the Post and preserve good order and discipline among the guard, and see that all officers of the Government are duly respected."[40] Bissel responded by sending "a vigilant subaltern" to the post to take charge but noted that it was "almost impossible to find noncommissioned officers in service that can safely be trusted on such commands." He also admitted that this represented the first complaint about the troops in the region he had received. He also apologized that the Secretary had "been so frequently troubled with them."[41]

These events reflect a broader problem with Calhoun's policy of using the military as the security for the factories and the fur trade. The military in Louisiana and Arkansas had managed to lead a few successful expeditions to curb the whiskey traders operating in the Indian country but apparently, these raids did little to provide any long-term solution to the

[37] John Fowler to Thomas L. McKenney, 22 November 1919, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 130.
[38] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 7 July 1820, in *PJCC*, vol. 5, p. 242.
[39] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 13 July 1820, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 205.
[40] John C. Calhoun to Daniel Bissel, 18 July 1820, in *PJCC* vol. 5, p. 264-265.
[41] Daniel Bissel to John C. Calhoun, 15 August 1820, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 212.

problem. The soldiers placed at Sulphur Fork did nothing to assist Fowler in his duties. In fact, they hindered Fowler more than they helped and essentially held him hostage for several months. Calhoun's military policy seemed well founded on paper, but in the case of Sulphur Fork it proved completely ineffective. Calhoun's policies essentially left the direction of Indian affairs in the hands of drunken, rambunctious soldiers.

The actions of the McKenney, Calhoun, and Bissel proved moot. Fowler abandoned the factory in June 1819 due to the friction between him and the soldiers stationed there. In October, he wrote to McKenney informing him that he had abandoned the factory citing ill health and "on account of collisions between him and the Soldiers." Fowler asked for a respite from his duty due to ill health. McKenney asked him to resign because of the importance of maintaining the factory.[42] These sudden developments sent McKenney scrambling to find a suitable replacement. He initially nominated William Ward but withdrew him from consideration in January 1820; he finally appointed William McClennan as the factor. Throughout the spring of 1821, McKenney tried to patch things together at factory. He initially sent a letter to Larkin Edwards, Fowler's assistant, instructing him to "continue to preserve the property" and tend the peltries to keep them free of worms.[43] A month later, McKenney learned that Edwards had abandoned the factory and Alfred Mitchell had assumed control over affairs at Sulphur Fork.[44]

William McClennan finally arrived at the factory in May 1821 to find everything in a contemptible state. He reported that the Caddo welcomed him to the country and were

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[42] Thomas L. McKenney to John C. Calhoun, 8 January 1821, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 254; John McClellan to Thomas L. McKenney, 9 March 1821, in LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 187. It is unclear what exactly caused Fowler's abandonment of the factory. The soldiers certainly precipitated the initial move by Fowler to leave the post but it is certainly clear that Fowler's health did indeed decline around that time or shortly after because he died on 9 December 1820.

[43] Thomas L. McKenney to Larkin Edwards, 24 March 1821, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 278-279.

[44] Thomas L. McKenney to Alfred Mitchell, 4 April 1821, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 280.

anxious to discover the condition of the furs they had left at the factory. Much to his dismay, McClennan found them "very much injured by the worms" and "that a great many of the goods on the shelves, are damaged, with the moths and Rats." He also noted that Edwards had "taken away nearly all the furniture of the house and all the property of the late factor" and that the buildings had fallen into disrepair from neglect. He did not even have rope available to bale the furs so he could ship them to New Orleans for sale.[45] He quickly attempted to handle matters at the factory. He retrieved the goods sent to the factory in 1820 via a keel boat but did not have funds available to pay for the freightage. McClennan also managed to find Larkin Edwards and recover some of the goods stolen from the factory; unfortunatley most had already been sold. McClennan requested more troops and managed to begin trading again, relating that he had not completed the inventory because he "had to sell every day; less or more to supply the Indians for their summer hunting."[46]

The distance and communications lag played key roles in this incident. Fowler first complained of his troubles with the soldiers in November 1819. McKenney did not receive the letters until late January or early February 1820 and it took him until July to forward the letters to Calhoun. Calhoun responded quickly to the problem but Bissel received his order to address the problem at Sulphur Fork in August. All the while, Fowler had abandoned the factory and McKenney had not learned of this until four months later in October. By the time McClennan initially arrived at Sulphur Fork, nearly two years had passed since Fowler's initial complaint. Everything at the factory lay in a state of disrepair and the furs stored at the post were ruined. Calhoun stated that he wanted the factories to be organized under the

[45] William McClennan to Thomas L. McKenney, 20 May 1821, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 293-294.
[46] William McClennan to Thomas L. McKenney, 4 June 1821, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 295.

federal government to counter adequately private and foreign traders but this instance illustrates that this policy did not translate effectively to the frontier. A two year process of addressing concerns at the factory certainly hindered the organization of the government fur trade.

By the fall of 1821, McClennan had managed to address many of the problems that arose from the factory being abandoned for so long. He obtained the proper trade goods he needed to supply the Indians for their hunts. The factor saw to it that the buildings were repaired and provided accommodation for George Gray, the newly appointed Red River Indian agent. He also oversaw the construction of a ferry that allowed the Indians to cross over and hunt more effectively.[47] McClennan managed to reopen the trade with the Indians in full force during the autumn of 1821. Indians and white settlers alike traveled to the factory to acquire a wide variety of trade goods. Congress abolished the factory system in May 1822 but Sulphur Fork continued operating for some time afterward. Trade continued throughout the summer and into the fall of 1822.[48] This period marked the high point of trade at Sulphur Fork. The factory had only been operated in the region effectively from 1818-1819 under Fowler and then again from 1821-1822 under McClennan. Like Fowler before him, McClennan seemed to do little in the way of accomplishing national policy objectives in his operation of the factory. The post did little to limit the influence of private traders and prevent conflict between whites on the frontier. Furthermore, McClennan made no serious efforts to civilize the Indians, opting instead to supply them with the implements necessary to continue their lives in the hunter state. Finally, neither Fowler nor McClennan ever

[47] William McClellan to Thomas L. McKenney, 30 September 1821, LBSFF, RBIA, RG75, T1029, p. 196.
[48] JDBNSFF, RBIA, RG75. p. 172-177.

mentioned land cessions by the Indians in the record. In fact, the Indians distaste for the whiskey traders pushed them farther westward than the factory could have ever hoped.

Treasury Department official R.N. Johnston arrived during the fall to begin liquidating the factory and ending its operation. George Gray remained at the site for several years afterward, using it as a base for his Indian agency after Johnston passed possession of the buildings to him.[49] He continued the Indian trade but placed it in the hands of private traders by issuing licenses to them. Like his predecessors, he continued to encounter difficulties in managing Indian affairs in the Red River Valley. Whiskey traders continued to plague the region and their depredations on the Indians continually caused friction.[50] The military continued to be unwilling to assist the Indian agents in evicting whites from the Indian country. The commanders did not want to commit troops and dodged Gray by telling him that they had no orders to pursue such action and to contact another post.[51] By 1825, the Indians in the Red River valley had moved even farther west to distance themselves from the whites. Gray opted to abandon Sulphur Fork permanently and relocate his agency to Caddo Prairie to be closer to the numerous Indians there.[52]

Sulphur Fork factory did not, at any time, fulfill its intended purpose as defined by Washington policymakers. The factory did manage to conduct a significant amount of business in the relatively short time it operated but the quantity of furs that passed through the factory does little to illustrate its more abstract purposes. Throughout its existence and beyond, tension between whites and Indians continued and the factory did not attach the

[49] George Gray to John C. Calhoun, 1 April 1823, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 504-505.
[50] George Gray to John C. Calhoun, 30 December 1824, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 739-740.
[51] George Gray to John C. Calhoun, 13 Jan 1825, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 745.
[52] George Gray to John C. Calhoun, 30 December 1824, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 739-740; George Gray to John C. Calhoun, 13 January 1825, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 745; Thomas L. McKenney to George Gray, 4 February 1825, in *Territorial Papers, Arkansas Territory,* p. 765.

natives to the United States through ties of interest. Whiskey traders operated throughout the region with impunity and the factors could not compete with them to secure a firm hold on the fur trade. Large scale conflicts did not break out between whites and Indians but this cannot be clearly attributed to the success of the factory system. Moreover, the smaller conflicts between whites and Indians show that the factories did not successfully alleviate tensions. Sulphur Fork did not provide the Indians with farming implements or entice them to leave the hunter state for a sedentary life of agriculture. In fact, it supplied them with things that only encouraged them to continue with the fur trade. Finally, the factory failed to obtain any land from the Indians whatsoever. Fowler's inexperience and inability to negotiate with the locals and the military crippled the factory. The overly bureaucratic nature of the entire factory system hindered the factor's ability to pursue national policy objectives. Admittedly, it is difficult to ascertain broader issues with the factory system by focusing on one particular post but events at Sulphur Fork reveal broader difficulties that faced the entire factory system. The factories, particularly the most important ones located at the edge of the frontier, could not be effectively managed by the federal government. If the factors operating the posts did not have experience and could not handle the problems facing them efficiently, they had little hope of succeeding.

CONCLUSION

Sulphur Fork Factory and the Indian factory system as a whole did not achieve the lofty expectations of U.S. policymakers. Conflict between whites and Indians persisted around Sulphur Fork and across the entire frontier. Whiskey traders severely impeded the government's attempts to attach the Indians to the United States and the factors could do little to combat the problem. Sulphur Fork never managed to obtain any Indian land and even the factories that could did not entice the Indians to adopt agriculture. Furthermore, Sulphur Fork provided relatively few agricultural implements to the Indians. Disorganization within the War Department and the Office of Indian Trade plagued the factory system. If the agents lacked the talent and ability to negotiate problems at the local level, the factories failed to operate effectively. While the policies of Washington, Jefferson, Calhoun, and McKenney seemed legitimate, Sulphur Fork Factory proves the ineffectiveness of their policies and reveals broader failures in national Indian policy.

McKenney searched for something that could replace the factories to fulfill his humanitarian goals. He found his answer when Reverend Cyrus King established a school for the Cherokee to teach their children reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as agriculture, weaving, carpentry, and other trades. He ensured that the War Department authorized and supported this first school, called Brainerd, and provided the school with the necessary equipment. McKenney thought the idea excellent and urged Congress to help establish schools throughout the Indian country, estimating that each would cost roughly $1,000 to establish. Congress rebuffed McKenney's proposal and he instead turned to church groups and missionary societies offering them any assistance he could to further their educational programs. These societies quickly rallied around McKenney and he finally succeeded in

establishing funding for the Indian schools. Congress appropriated $10,000 and left McKenney to oversee its implementation. The government paid for two thirds of the building costs and made additional appropriations based on the number of pupils. Thirty-two schools for Indians opened using the formula that Brainerd had and McKenney commented that he had "good reason to believe that an entire reformation may be effected" amongst the Indians if the United States applied "the same zeal and intelligence which have so far characterized those who superintend and conduct" the schools.[1]

McKenney focused on two important innovations in this particular education program. The schools did not use Indian languages but rather forced natives to learn English. "I have always, myself, esteemed language to be the very centre of the power which is to reform and bless our Indians," he writes, and believed it to be the thing that could change "the character and destiny of these people. It is the lever by which they are to elevate themselves into intellectual and moral distinction." Furthermore, McKenney focused on the vocational training provided to the Indians. He viewed religious and moral instruction as key to civilizing the Indians but suggested "teaching, in the arts of life and in the means appointed for man's more certain subsistence, ought not be neglected. It is in man's nature to be idle. Labor is painful. Education and habit alone, can reconcile him to it." However, this system failed to enact widespread reform amongst the Indians. The schools caused tension between the idealistic missionaries and the more practical Indian agents. Furthermore, the Indians themselves proved more than willing to accommodate the whites who taught their children vocational skills but were more disdainful of the inevitable religious instruction that

[1] U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, *Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1824-1831,* vol. 1 (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1976):106-107.

accompanied the lessons. Finally, the school system was simply too small to accommodate thousands of Indians across a vast frontier.[2]

The War Department dismissed McKenney in 1824, but Calhoun established the Bureau of Indian Affairs and made McKenney the first U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs. McKenney continued to support civilization and educational programs for the Indians. In 1825, Monroe and Calhoun proposed that the Indians should be removed from the United States and placed in territory west of the Mississippi. McKenney also advocated for Indian removal eventually. The death of his adopted Choctaw son, McDonald, finally crushed his hope for whites and Indians living alongside each other anytime in his near future. He had adopted the Choctaw boy and employed him in the Indian Office of the War Department. McDonald attended school and did quite well, eventually moving west to practice law. However, white society did not accept him as an equal, and he committed suicide when a white woman rejected his marriage proposal. This event shocked McKenney and made him shift his belief in civilizing Indians. He recognized that while the Indians may have acted white, society still did not accept them as equals. McKenney resigned himself that the Indians needed more time to allow the Indians to acculturate to white society and for white society to be able to accept them.[3]

Jackson co-opted McKenney for his moral character to add legitimacy to Indian removal. McKenney advocated that the states had rights over the Indians living in their jurisdiction and that removal was in the best interest of their people. Although, unlike the

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[2] Quote from Herman J. Viola "From Civilization to Removal: Early American Indian Policy" in Jane F. Smith, Robert M. Kvasnicka , eds., *Indian White Relations: A Persistent Paradox* (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1976): 51-53.

[3]Herman J. Viola, *Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1974); 185-199; Herman J. Viola "From Civilization to Removal: Early American Indian Policy" in Jane F. Smith, Robert M. Kvasnicka , eds., *Indian White Relations: A Persistent Paradox* (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1976): 53-54.

majority of removal supporters, he believed that the issue should be voluntary. Jackson and many other supporters of Indian Removal did not envision a world where whites and Indians could live side by side in a pluralistic society but rather envisioned a world where Indians conformed to the norms and mores of white society. The proponents of civilization policy thought their culture superior to that of the Indians and could not understand why the Indians wanted to maintain their own traditions. The Jacksonians yielded to political pressure from southern and western interests that wanted them to acquire Indian land, but unlike Jefferson, they fundamentally rejected the idea that Indians deserved to be part of American society.[4] While assimilation continued to play a role in United States Indian affairs well into the twentieth century, the termination of the factory system truly symbolized the end of less coercive policy and the beginnings of the dispossession of the American Indian.

[4] Francis Paul Prucha, "Federal Indian Policy in United States History," in Francis Paul Prucha, *Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981): 23, 35. Francis Paul Prucha, "Thomas L. McKenney and the New York Indian Board," in in Francis Paul Prucha, *Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981): 120-123; Reginald Horsman, "The Indian Policy of an "Empire for Liberty"," in Frederick E. Hoxie, Ronald Hoffman, Peter J. Albert, eds., *Native Americans and the Early Republic* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999): 60.

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ABSTRACT

For Peace, Civilization, and Expansion:
The United States Factory System, 1796-1822

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This study emphasizes the role the United States factory system for played in Indian affairs during the Early National period. The first two chapters discuss national policy relating to the factories. These trading posts existed from 1796 until 1822. Washington initiated the policy as a means to help bring about a peaceful frontier. Thomas Jefferson desired to use the factory system to civilize the Indians and obtain their land. The War of 1812 disrupted the factory system. Following the war, John C. Calhoun and Thomas L. McKenney attempted to continue with their predecessor's policies, but pressure from Congress and the American Fur Company eventually forced the factory system to close. The third chapter focuses on Sulphur Fork factory and shows the disconnection between national policies and their implementation. Disorganization and ineptitude on the part of the factor caused him to utterly fail at instituting any national policy objective.