“A VICTORY AS NEVER CROWNED THE WARS OF THE WORLD”

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS IN AMERICAN HISTORICAL MEMORY

By

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Catherine Price Stoltz (1921-2012)

You would have loved me in the purple robes
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Introduction: "A Correct Remembrance of Great Events"

On January 8, 1828, thirteen years to the day after Andrew Jackson’s army famously defeated the British, the citizens of Concord, New Hampshire, met to commemorate the American victory. The residents of the state capital gathered around a litany of speakers, who variously explained to them the importance of the battle and what it meant for the country. The Battle of New Orleans saved the western United States, one speaker assured the audience. For the British to return to the Americans a city as important as New Orleans “could not have been within the ordinary calculations of military results.” Another speaker blatantly connected the battle to the impending presidential election of 1828, implying Americans would need Jackson’s leadership in the future.¹

The last speaker, though, used his time on stage to argue a different point. Nathan Felton implored the crowd that maintaining "a correct remembrance of great events, in which nations or individuals have been concerned, is important on many accounts." He reminded them “accounts of such events are commonly preserved, and transmitted by history and tradition. History and tradition, however, in their ordinary forms, produce their effects but imperfectly, unless accompanied by other means, calculated to fix upon them our attention, and excite an interest in them.” Felton explained that, “among the means that have been used for these purposes, none have been more effectual than public celebrations.”²

² Ibid.
As Felton asserted, public celebrations and popular memory play an important role in how a society crafts its historical narrative. Historians certainly influence the shaping of this memory, but artists, playwrights, movie directors, and musicians often sway more people than historians. Each generation of these authors of public memory has retold the story of Jackson’s victory in their own way. Some narratives have focused on American martial spirit, and others on the multicultural nature of the American army. By examining the popular historiography of an event like the Battle of New Orleans, historians can gain new insight into the culture and society of various generations of Americans.

This manuscript is by no means the first to embark on such an endeavor. Len Travers’s *Celebrating the Fourth* and David Blight’s *Race and Reunion* played fundamental roles in inspiring the methodology behind this work’s investigative strategy. Like many other projects in the growing field of historical memory, Travers and Blight explore how a generation that experienced significant events in history shapes the narrative of their actions. These studies often, but not always, continue the investigation to explore how the succeeding generation reacts to earlier interpretation of events. Blight and Travers both insist that, often, children of the first generation vociferously support the original narrative and try to live up to their understanding of the original generation’s presumptive ideals. Not only is the original narrative not questioned, but the children of the original generation often embellish the story further.  

3. Len Travers, *Celebrating the Fourth: Independence Day and the Rites of Nationalism in the Early Republic* (Amherst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press,
This project seeks to build on previous works of memory scholarship by expanding the scope of the investigation. This piece, like those that inspired it, examines the generation that participated in the historical event and succeeding generations. By exploring later generations, we gain new insights into how facts evolve into legends, how some myths never die, and how each successive generation uses history as a lens through which to see itself. Historians often embarked on these types of investigations for studying the historiography of an event and how historical ideas have traveled intellectually through their profession. Yet they have paid less attention to the same type of phenomena among the larger society.

One factor that makes such a popular historiography of the Battle of New Orleans challenging is that Americans have not always remembered the event with the same enthusiasm. Indeed as a general trend, the battle has played a diminishing role in American culture as time advanced. The nature of that diminishment makes the topic more intriguing for historical investigation. Memory studies that explore the methodology of how a society “forgets” traditionally focus on dramatic events that the larger world community views as distasteful. Historians have paid far less attention to the memory of historical incidents that fade slowly over time or get overshadowed by subsequent events.4

During the early 1820s, Americans across the country celebrated the Battle of New Orleans as a national holiday on par with the Fourth of July. One hundred and ninety years later, even the City of New Orleans where the battle occurred needed historical societies to advocate commemorating the event. How does the memory of an event considered so spectacular by its contemporaries die over time? That research question plays a critical role in this topic’s investigation.

This project also builds on other important fields of memory scholarship. Edward Linenthal’s *Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields* and Timothy Smith’s *The Golden Age of Battlefield Preservation* started important investigations into how Americans have formed battlefield parks. The United States is unique in the sense that it is one of the few countries that has preserved battlefields from pre-twentieth century conflicts. In Europe especially, land needed for the expansion of cities has limited the ability to preserve the landscape of the continent’s most prominent military engagements. The wake of the American Civil War and the Progressive movement’s organizational impulse aided the development of the first five National Park Service Civil War battlefields. Those preservation efforts spurred similar actions across the United States.5

This study's investigation of the efforts to preserve the Chalmette battlefield builds on Linenthal and Smith's. Unlike the sites within their studies, the efforts to preserve the Chalmette battlefield occurred amidst an urbanizing landscape that rested on valuable riverfront property. Because of this geography, the exploration of the Chalmette battlefield's development permits a duel investigation into battlefield preservation and urban planning.

Richard Moe and Carter Wilkie have performed diligent work in their study *Changing Places: Rebuilding Community in the Age of Sprawl* just as have the authors in *Giving Preservation a History: Histories of Historic Preservation in the United States*. The books focus on the tough decisions that preservationists face and discuss how those actions affect the memory of the historical event they try to preserve. In the case of the Battle of New Orleans, the decision by the National Park Service to remove an African American neighborhood from a portion of the existing battlefield prevented African Americans from learning about their important contributions to the past.6

How Americans learned of and understood their past changed dramatically in the beginning of the twentieth century. The rise of tourism as a commercial industry led to a commodification of culture across the United States that also

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impacted New Orleans. The city embellished anachronistic cultural distinctions in order to create a more attractive market for tourists. Anthony J. Stanoni’s Creating the Big Easy New Orleans and the Emergence of Modern Tourism, 1918-1945 and Jonathan Mark Souther’s New Orleans on Parade: Tourism and the Transformation of the Crescent City build on the already extensive literature about this topic and have been especially helpful in the development of this work.†

As the twentieth century progressed, movies and music played an ever-larger role in the memory of historical events. Though music and theater always had a significant impact on the memory of events like the Battle of New Orleans, the commercialism of the twentieth century extended the leverage of these mechanisms to a scale without parallel. Peter Rollin’s works Why We Fought: America’s Wars in Film and History and Hollywood As Historian: American Film in a Cultural Context played an invaluable role in shaping how this author approached the sections dealing with Cecil B. DeMille’s depiction of the New Orleans campaign.\n
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Organizationally, this work consists of eight chapters. While in roughly chronological order, each chapter focuses on specific facets of the Battle of New Orleans’s memory. Especially in the chapters dealing with the twentieth century, though, topical discussion supersedes chronological organization, for the clarity of the reader.

In order to properly understand the course of the Battle of New Orleans’s memory, one must first understand what really happened on the Plains of Chalmette. In American historical memory, many myths have clouded a complete understanding of the battle and distorted the nation’s understanding of it. Chapter one offers a brief survey of the New Orleans campaign and highlights the particular features that later mythology has distorted.

The ubiquitous cotton bale has long been a source of pride for many promoters of the Battle of New Orleans and a well of grief for historians of the engagement. Though Jackson’s troops did briefly use cotton bales to raise the height of the rampart, they did so without orders from the military engineers directing the barrier’s construction. When British artillery struck the cotton-filled section of the rampart, the white substance caught fire. The flames alerted the engineers to their troops’ creative, yet foolish, construction method and the engineering officers directed all cotton removed from the earthworks. The only cotton used in the preparation of Jackson’s defensive position lay below the artillery emplacements.

The cotton sopped up the moisture in the ground and provided a more stable firing platform for the cannons.\(^9\)

Chapter one asserts that artillery played a far more important role than some histories of the battle have emphasized, especially those directed towards a popular audience. Jackson’s defensive line had at least one cannon battery roughly every one hundred yards. Though some of these gun emplacements had only one cannon in them, they were often larger pieces of artillery than normally appeared on a battlefield. In an era when the Royal Artillery used a six pounder as its standard field piece, Jackson’s line possessed several twenty-four pounders and one thirty-two pounder.\(^{10}\)

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9. Stereotypes concerning the nature of Jackson’s rampart have existed for over one hundred and fifty years and regularly focus on Jackson’s ramparts as being extremely improvised in nature, especially as concerns the use of cotton bales. To this day, the regimental logo of the 7th Infantry Regiment features a cotton bale because of the supposed use of cotton bales as protection during the unit’s service at New Orleans; Regular Army Special Designation Listing, United States Army Center for Military History, last modified February 4, 2013, http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/spdes-123-ra_ar.html. For more on the supposed use of cotton bales and veteran’s public assertions that it did not occur see: Bennington Vermont Gazette, January 29, 1828; New Orleans Daily Picayune, May 29, 1845; Little Rock Arkansas Whig, August 28, 1852; New Orleans Daily Picayune, September 14, 1877; New York Times, January 28, 1894. For real information on the rampart see: Howell Tatum, Major Howell Tatum’s Journal While Acting Topographical Engineer (1814) to General Jackson Commanding the Seventh Military District, ed. John Spencer Bassett, (Northampton: Department of History of Smith College, no.19) 112; Ted Birkedal and John Coverdale, The Search for the Lost Riverfront: Historical and Archeological Investigations at the Chalmette Battlefield, Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve, ([New Orleans, La.]: National Park Service, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 2005) 485-487, 924.

The last important myth involves the militia. Thanks to the Louisiana militia, Jackson had far more troops at his disposal than American popular histories have traditionally depicted. Though still outnumbered on the Chalmette battlefield on January 8, 1815, roughly 3,000 Louisiana militiamen defended alternate paths to New Orleans, channeling the British to assault Jackson’s position. Furthermore, while the militia played an important role in the climactic January 8 battle, they did so as artillersmen rather than wielding long rifles. Chapter one challenges the mythical narrative of the frontier Kentuckian deftly felling his British opponents with aimed long rifle fire.11

Chapter two explores how the original facts of the battle evolved into the first myths and memories of the event. After the battle, Republican newspapers, playwrights, and artists depicted a Battle of New Orleans that represented their ideals for America. These popular cultural icons generated a myth of the battle that focused on the agrarian woodsman protecting hearth and home. They promoted a militia-based national defense force that decried a large standing army and kept no occasion did they [the Americans] assert their claim to the title of good artillery-men more effectually than on the present. Scare a ball passed over or fell short of its mark, but all striking full into the midst of our ranks, occasioned terrible havoc.” In G.R. Gleig, The Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans, 1814-1815, 1834. Reprint (San Francisco: Lulu Press, 2012) 281.

11. Latour, 295. In fact, Louisiana militia units defended posts on the Gentilly road, the Rigolets and Chef Menteur Passes that allowed access to Lake Pontchartrain and Bayou St. John, and downriver of the main British force on the east bank of the Mississippi. While these troops’ effectiveness in a had on conflict with the British is doubtful; they provided intelligence to Jackson, denied intelligence to the British forces, and limited the ability of the British to find alternate routes around Jackson’s main position. For an in depth study of the origins of the largely non-Anglophone Batalion d’Orleans and its artillersmen see: Jane Lucas De Grummond and Ronald R. Morazan. The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans. (Baton Rouge, La: Legacy Pub. Co, 1979).
martial power closer to state control than federal dominance. They depicted a battle that exulted in the western victories of the war while highlighting the struggles of the industrializing east. These accounts insinuated that the eastern United States had begun to grow soft.\textsuperscript{12}

Republican political operatives found that the memory of New Orleans could further their interests as well. The War of 1812 highlighted a number of flaws in Republican political ideology. The nation had a clear need for a national bank; the army could not remain as small as it had been before the war; and poor national infrastructure had doomed the American war effort from the start of the conflict. Banks, armies, and national roads long embodied Federalist policies and many Republicans disliked the idea of publicly co-opting them. With attentions fixed on commemorating New Orleans and other victories, Republicans discovered a way to camouflage their policy change. Even as many Republican politicians made speeches promoting the Battle of New Orleans’s mythology, they also adopted many policies that ran counter to the created memory of the battle.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} For some views on the role of militia see: Samuel Woodworth, \textit{The Hunters of Kentucky or the Battle of New Orleans} (New York: Brown, [1818]); \textit{Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle}, February 3, 1818.

The memory of New Orleans during the late 1810s and early 1820s also helped Republicans not only to retain control of the Federal government, but also to usher in the one-party “Era of Good Feelings.” The War of 1812 had been a disaster for Republicans. By all rights, the American voters should have thrown out the War Hawks and brought back the Federalists. Indeed during the 1814 elections that occurred near the end of the war, voters began that process. The Battle of New Orleans, the Hartford Convention, and the announcement in the United States of the Treaty of Ghent’s signing created the appearance that the Federalists lost their momentum. The close chronological proximity of the three events gave the appearance and created the memory that the Battle of New Orleans ended a victorious war just as the Federalist-dominated New England states prepared to leave the union and make a separate peace with England. Republicans pounced on the opportunity to embarrass their political opposition. The ability of Republicans to tie the Federalists to secession and connect the Battle of New Orleans to victory became so successful that within a few years the Federalists ceased to be a viable party on the national level.14

Chapter three moves the story of the Battle of New Orleans’s memory into the Jacksonian Era. Republican efforts to use the battle as a promotional tool highlighting the ideology of the frontier farmer and their rugged individualism aided Jackson in his goal to become President of the United States. The memory of New Orleans made Jackson such a household name that he did far better in the 1824 presidential election than many professional politicians anticipated. During the next four years, urban political machines used the popularity of the Battle of New Orleans to run what many historians have called the United States’ first modern presidential campaign.15

The fullness with which the Democratic Party harnessed the memory of the January 8 victory alienated many Americans. As January 8th commemorations transitioned to focusing the celebration on the man rather than the event, even some of the battle’s veterans refused to participate in the ceremonies. By the height of Jackson’s presidency, entire sections of the United States no longer participated in the national holiday. Some Whigs even publicly discredited the scale of the victory.16

By the time Jackson left office, “Jackson Day” as the Democratic Party had branded it, had become the birthday of the party. Spectacular celebrations in honor


of the battle still occurred around the country, but the politicization of the events limited them to predominantly Democratic districts.\textsuperscript{17}

Chapter four explores how sectionalism affected the memory of the Battle of New Orleans. Democratic support of battle’s memory fueled a sense of martial superiority in westerners. In the 1830s, on the United States Mexican border, participation in the Battle of New Orleans instantly marked someone as an expert on military affairs. As a several scholars of the Texas Revolution have asserted, many Texans argued that although the Mexican government had a large professionally trained and well equipped army, the rebels had little to fear. To them, since citizens of the Old Southwest had already beaten Wellington’s Heroes, those warriors had little to fear from a Mexican Army qualitatively inferior to the British Peninsular soldiers.\textsuperscript{18}

That same martial confidence crept into the minds of the succeeding generation of Southerners. As the political issue of slavery became ever more divisive, Southerners further refined their memory of New Orleans. Many of them insisted that the “westerners” so championed by the Jeffersonian Republicans and

\textsuperscript{17} Richmond Enquirer, January 3, 1835; Pittsfield [MA] Sun, January 8, 1835; Concord New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, January 17, 1835.

then the Democrats had predominantly in fact, hailed from south of the Ohio River. Western frontiersmen had not defeated the British so much as Southerners had.19

On the eve of the Civil War the South faced the prospect of a war against an industrial, quantitatively superior foe. According to a skewed memory of events, Andrew Jackson and his army of Southern troops faced the exact same situation against the British. The memory of New Orleans encouraged the resolve of many Southerners to confront the long odds ahead of them.20

After the defeat of the Confederacy, the Democratic Party attempted to use the Battle of New Orleans as a way to heal the sectional wounds festering across the United States. The party once again organized spectacular Jackson Day balls across the country, but Southerners refused to attend when prominent former Union generals such as Philip Sheridan, George Meade, and Benjamin Butler showed up at the galas. Instead, Battle of New Orleans commemorations slowly withered around the South.21

Even in New Orleans, long the heartland of commemorating Jackson's victory, Southerners found the battle too painful to memorialize. During the Union occupation of the city, Benjamin Butler had ordered the words “The Union Must and

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19. For early uses of the battle as an example of Southern and Western state’s military prowess see: Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, December 13, 1816; Baltimore Patriot, January 8, 1822; Charlestown Franklin Monitor (MA), March 18, 1820; Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle, February 3, 1818.
Shall be Preserved” etched on the famous monument to Jackson and the victory. The base of the equestrian statue existed as a permanent source of doubt for many New Orleanians who questioned if they had made the right decision in supporting the Confederacy.22

Southern men did eventually celebrate the Battle of New Orleans again, as chapter five reveals, but only thanks to the efforts of Southern women. The late nineteenth century witnessed the rise of numerous patriotic organizations, both ancestry-based and otherwise, across the United States. Groups like the Ladies Hermitage Society and the Daughters of 1812 promoted the memory of New Orleans as a way for Southerners to move past the embarrassment of the Civil War.

In Nashville, the Ladies Hermitage Society encouraged commemorative events focused on the Battle of New Orleans through their management of Andrew Jackson’s old mansion. The Ladies organized Jackson Day balls like the ones witnessed earlier during the nineteenth century. They also leveraged their traditional feminine roles of educational supervision to ensure that school books in the South properly highlighted the martial glory attained by the students’ predecessors. Finally they organized reenactments of the 1815 battle that allowed Confederate veterans to play the part of Jackson’s victorious troops.23

In New Orleans during the same period, the Daughters of 1812 rallied efforts to complete the long forgotten Chalmette Monument that locals had started prior to

23. Nashville Banner, 8 January 1915.
the Civil War. The plight of the monument highlighted the grave situation the original battlefield faced. The Daughters strove to duplicate battlefield preservation efforts of groups like the Daughters of the Confederacy and the Grand Army of the Republic. If the Daughters could keep the battlefield safe from development, they believed it would play a valuable part in promoting the memory of the Battle of New Orleans.24

The United States’ increasingly close relationship with Great Britain and the realities of the World War I battlefield, affected the commemoration of Jackson’s victory and consequently its memory. Across the United States from 1912 to 1915, War of 1812 memorialization promoted the idea of one hundred years of peace between the English-speaking nations of the Atlantic. As the “last battle” of the war, the Battle of New Orleans received special attention as the final place at which those nations had fired in anger at one another. Consequently, whereas in the nineteenth century the memorialization of the battle focused on the triumph over British arms,

during the twentieth it symbolized friendship between those of a common
language.25

Chapter six explores the twentieth century’s reassessment of how the
Americans won at New Orleans. Jean Laffite and his Baratarians played an ever-
larger role in a narrative that had once focused exclusively on the successes of the
frontier rifleman. Laffite had been a popular rogue of legend and myth throughout
the nineteenth century, but the development of twentieth century mass-market
entertainment secured him and his men’s place in the pantheon of Chalmette
heroes.26

The movie industry’s ability to alter popular understanding of events began
to drastically shape American’s knowledge of the past. Cecil B. DeMille’s 1938 The
Buccaneer and its 1958 remake did not defy this trend. DeMille used Lyle Saxon’s
book Laffite the Pirate as the basis for his film rendition of the Battle of New Orleans.
Because the film focused on the swashbuckling privateer, Americans left the theatre
convinced that the Gulf corsair played a central role in American success. The

25. Nashville Tennessean, 12 April 1914; Henry Watterson, The Perry
memorial and centennial celebration under the auspices of the national government
and the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, New York, Rhode
Island, Kentucky, Minnesota and Indiana (Cleveland: Interstate Board of the Perry’s
Victory Centennial Commissioners, 1912); The Battle of New Orleans, Official
Programme (New Orleans: Louisiana Historical Society, 1915).
26. Mary Devereux, Lafitte of Louisiana (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co, 1902);
Alexander E. Powell, Gentlemen Rovers (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1913); James
Joseph Alcée Fortier, and Charles Gayarré. The story of Jean and Pierre Lafitte, the
pirate-patriots, including a note on the indispensable victory at New Orleans, January
8th, 1815; a publication of the Louisiana State Museum, James J.A.Fortier, editor; and a
reprint of Historical sketch of Pierre and Jean Lafitte, the famous smugglers of
Louisiana, 1809-1814, by Charles Gayarré, from the Magazine of American history,
v.10, July-Dec., 1883, Historical publication co., New York, by courtesy of Howard
Memorial Library (New Orleans: [c1880]).
popularity of the films and the 1959 hit music single “The Battle of New Orleans,” shaped the memory of the historical event in another way. They mobilized public support for the preservation of the original battlefield. 27

Chapter seven examines the troubles of creating a battlefield park in an urban landscape. The Daughters of 1812 managed the historic site for more than two decades, but the organization could not afford to compete against the commercial interests also desirous of the battlefield’s land. Accordingly, the federal government, represented first by the War Department and then by the National Park Service, took on the role of battlefield preservation and interpretation. Thirty years of negotiation between the federal government, the State of Louisiana, and private businesses eventually resulted in the formation of the Chalmette National Historical Park. 28

As tourism played an increasingly greater role in the City of New Orleans’ economy, business interests paid more attention to the Battle of New Orleans and how its memory could make a profit. The sesquicentennial celebrations in 1965 turned into a massive advertising campaign for the city and the region paying little attention to historical accuracy. Commemoration focused on the traditional myths

and stereotypes of the Battle of New Orleans because those facets encouraged visitors to the area and commercial revenue.29

Race relations during the mid-twentieth century also affected the development of the Chalmette battlefield park and the memory of the battle. Completing the park required the removal of an entire African American neighborhood. Undereducated, the residents of the neighborhood did not understand the purpose of the battlefield park and had no tangible way to oppose their removal. The displacement of the residents crippled many of the families financially and further soured an already tenuous relationship between African Americans in New Orleans and the battle’s memory.30

The importance of the interpretation that occurred at the Chalmette battlefield and other New Orleans area museums is the subject of the final chapter. By the 1960s, only a handful of cities in the country still had large-scale commemorations of the battle. As genealogical groups like the Daughters of 1812 began to play an increasingly less conspicuous role in promoting the memory of the battled, the National Park Service’s efforts at memorialization took on added importance. Individual decisions the NPS made for institutional and financial

reasons had dramatic consequences for the popular interpretation of the battle as that organization became one of the primary caretakers of the memory.\footnote{31}

During the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, organizations like the Park Service struggled to find a meaning for the Battle of New Orleans that resonated with a modern audience. As the fields of historical interpretation and public history professionalized, the Park Service increasingly focused on the culturally and ethnically diverse force that manned Jackson’s ramparts. Not only historically accurate, this interpretation also served as a poignant rebuttal to the whitewashed version of the battle popular in the mid-twentieth century.\footnote{32}

As the Bicentennial of the Battle of New Orleans fast approaches, this work serves as a timely assessment of efforts to commemorate the event. Already various government and private entities have begun planning efforts for 2015. Like previous celebrations, the experiences of the current generation will affect the Battle of New Orleans’s commemoration and memorialization.\footnote{33}

\footnote{31. \textit{New Orleans Times Picayune}, 7 January 2013, 10 January 2013, 7 April 2008; 7 February 2013, 5 February 2009.}
Chapter 1: “By the Eternal, they shall not sleep on our soil”

During the past one hundred and ninety years the phrase Battle of New Orleans has generally referred to the single-day event on January 8, 1815. Each generation, Americans marvel at the scale of the British defeat and wonder how the U.S. achieved such a total victory against a qualitatively and quantitatively superior enemy. To comprehend Andrew Jackson’s battlefield success requires an examination of the entire six-month campaign against the United States Gulf Coast, not just the incidents of a single day. Further, a proper understanding of the actions that occurred over the winter of 1814/15 is imperative to any investigation into the myths and memories of the battle.

Crown forces began preparing for their descent on New Orleans during the summer of 1814. British officials hoped to take advantage of the ethnically divided nature of the region. Aware that numerous minority groups lived under American rule, Crown officers approached Native Americans, runaway slaves, and the Baratarian smugglers all in hopes that these groups would lend assistance to the British invasion force. British sympathizers also approached the French and Spanish speaking populations along U.S. shore to gauge their support for the American government.¹

¹ Frank Lawrence Owsley, Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1812-1815 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1981) 96-99. Owsley’s work is perhaps the most balanced and well-researched account of the New Orleans campaign to date. It connects the Battle of New Orleans into the broader narrative of conflict in the Old Southwest in the early nineteenth century, especially the influence of the Creek War on the British invasion.
Geographically speaking, New Orleans presented a nightmare to military strategists attempting to plan its defense and offered a plethora of challenges to any attacker. Access to naval resources provided an invader admittance to numerous avenues of approach. Luckily for the British, they had the Royal Navy, “Mistress of the Seas.” Just west of New Orleans, Baratatia Bay allowed a seaborne invader access to the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico by way of numerous bayous. Navigating this tertian required the use of skilled pilots. If the British could talk the Baratarians into helping them, the invasion force would have the necessary guides.²

Moving east, the next route for an attack lay directly up the Mississippi River. New Orleans rested ninety miles from the mouth of the Mississippi making any attack up the river a slow affair for wind-powered vessels. The frequent turns required either cooperative weather or a significant amount of physical labor to pull the invasion fleet north against the current. The Americans could also fortify the most prominent bends in the river and rain fire down on the slow-moving naval force.³

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A third path extended through the network of lakes east and north of New Orleans. Actually estuaries, Lake Borgne, and, past it, Lake Pontchartrain offered water access to a number of land approaches to the city. The shallow waters of the lakes limited the mobility of any attacker though. Ocean-going vessels had too great a draft to access the lakes, necessitating the use of small boats. Once an invader picked one of the land approaches to the city the lakes offered, the logistical feat of moving men and materiel along the axis of advance limited the ability to try a new route should the first fail.⁴

The last invasion corridor available to the British required them to first capture the City of Mobile, one hundred miles east of New Orleans. With Mobile in British hands, their forces would have access to a large harbor and overland routes to the Mississippi River. Their army could then march west and cut off New Orleans from the United States. At this point, the British would have the option to lay siege to the city and negotiate its surrender or attack it directly.

During the summer of 1814, the British explored all of these options. In August, Royal Navy officers approached Jean Laffite’s Baratarians about joining the British cause, but the overtures fell on deaf ears. That same month, Royal Marine Major Edward Nicholls landed in West Florida to coordinate and train Creek and Seminole warriors as well as runaway slaves. Unfortunately for the British, Andrew Jackson had crushed the most militant faction of the Creek nation only a few months before at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. In the wake of that battle and the

⁴ Tatum, 100-101; Gleig, 259-260
subsequent Treaty of Fort Jackson, Nicholls could only raise a token force to assist British operations.\footnote{5}

Knowing the main British force would soon arrive, Nicholls launched a preparatory attack on Mobile attempting to gain the port for the invasion fleet’s use. One hundred and twenty Royal Marines and Native Americans disembarked from their warships on September 16. The small force assailed Fort Bowyer from the land as five Royal Navy vessels bombarded the Americans from the water. The ships moved closer to shore attempting to provide support to their land troops and grounded in the shallow coastal waters. Fort Bowyer’s artillery batteries opened up with renewed intensity and eventually \textit{HMS Hermes} exploded from the incessant barrage. The loss of the \textit{Hermes} brought the British attack to a close and the troops returned to Spanish Pensacola, where the British made a temporary base.\footnote{6}

With the arrival of the British on the coast, Jackson began to plan for the region’s defense. The British had tipped their hand with the attack on Mobile and Old Hickory raced south to thwart the invasion. In Jackson’s mind, Spain forfeited its neutrality by harboring the British force in Pensacola. Accordingly, on November 7, Jackson invaded Spanish territory flushing the British from the harbor and forcing them to operate without a land base from which to plan their assault on Louisiana.\footnote{7}

Jackson believed that the British would be foolish to attempt an attack on New Orleans without the use of a harbor and so became fixated on the idea of

\footnotesize{6 Latour, 33-41}
\footnotesize{7 Latour, 42-45; Tatum, 72-83}
defending Mobile. The Governor of Louisiana pleaded with the general to come to New Orleans and see to the city’s defenses personally. President James Madison and Secretary of War James Monroe similarly pushed Old Hickory to attend to Mobile’s defense remotely while directing his personal attention towards the Crescent City.\textsuperscript{8}

These officials concerns resulted from the destitute state of the city’s fortifications, the previously unenthusiastic moral of the state militia, and the fear that, without some show of American military power, the foreign-born population of the city might aid the British. On November 22, Jackson left Mobile for New Orleans. Along the way, he made appeals to the city’s population to ardently attend to the condition of the militia and began working with his military engineers to find maps of the region and plan a defense.\textsuperscript{9}

Jackson arrived in New Orleans on December 1 to great fanfare. He and his engineers continued their efforts to understand the condition of the fortifications in the surrounding area. Personally inspecting the existing works defending New Orleans, Jackson also directed his engineers to build new strong points at various other strategic locations. In addition, the general boosted the city’s moral by conducting a military review of the local volunteer militia and the U.S. regulars at his disposal.\textsuperscript{10}

The parade, took place in the \textit{Place de Armes} fronting the St. Louis Cathedral. Roughly seven hundred U.S. Army infantry marched in crisp order to the sound of their field music. The battalion of Major Jean Baptiste Plauche followed the regular

\textsuperscript{8} Latour, 46; Tatum, 85-89
\textsuperscript{9} Latour, 48; Tatum 89
\textsuperscript{10} Latour, 48-49; Tatum 96-102
army soldiers. Composed predominately of French-speaking militiamen, Plauche’s battalion numbered some four hundred and fifty men, drawn from a variety of backgrounds. Most notably, a number of the unit had previous military experience in European service, especially the French army of Napoleon Bonaparte. Following Plauche’s men marched many of the city’s free men of color under the command of Majors Louis Daquin and Pierre La Coste. Heading Jackson’s call to arms, these men consisted of both native-born Louisiana Creoles and refugees from San Domingue. In all, the tiny army consisted of no more than 2,500 men, but the parade in the small square located in the middle of the city accomplished its intended purchase -- calming public nerves.\(^\text{11}\)

The arrival of troops from across the Mississippi River Valley also buoyed the citizens of New Orleans’ morale. On December 20, 800 Tennessee volunteers under the command of Brigadier General John Coffee arrived in New Orleans. At roughly the same time, Major Thomas Hinds rode into town at the head of his Mississippi Dragoons, followed shortly after by the 3,000 men of Brigadier General William Carroll’s Tennesseans. With New Orleans critical to western commerce, the citizens of the Mississippi’s tributaries rushed downriver to defend their livelihoods.\(^\text{12}\)

By December, the British also had reinforcements in the Gulf theatre as the main invasion force arrived off the coast of Louisiana. With advance forces failing to take Mobile or encourage support from the Baratarians, the British resigned themselves to attacking by way of the lakes north and east of New Orleans. The invasion fleet anchored off of the suitably named Ship Island and made preparations

\(^{11}\) Latour, 47
\(^{12}\) Tatum, 105-106
to disembark the army. Before any real landing could occur, the British first needed to gain control of littoral waterways along the coast. United States Navy Lieutenant Thomas ap Catsby Jones and his fleet of gunboats intended to thwart the British’s plans.\(^\text{13}\)

Jones’ force had been observing the British fleet’s movements ever since it arrived in American waters. His orders gave Jones significant latitude in responding to the British threat and Jones had stayed close to the enemy to keep his options open. By December 14, the British decided to chase off Jones’ small fleet of seven gunboats. Becalmed by an easterly wind, the American force could not retreat and, rather than scuttle his vessels, Jones decided to combat the British advance.\(^\text{14}\)

The British attached with a force of 1,200 sailors and marines divided across forty-two small boats each loaded with a carronade in the bow. The British stopped just outside of American cannon range to eat their lunch and then rowed against the current for an hour towards the American vessels. The whole combat lasted just less than two hours and resulted in the capture of the American force. The British now possessed compete control of Lake Borgne.\(^\text{15}\)

Admiral Cochrane ordered his sailors to begin ferrying the invasion force ashore a to small island where the soldiers would be less crowded than in the ships. At the same time, army officers worked with their Royal Navy counterparts to scout the American coast and find a place to land. They contacted the residents of a small

\(^\text{14}\) Latour, 51-52; 262-264
\(^\text{15}\) Latour, 53, 54; Tatum, 102
fishing village on the southern shore of Lake Borgne and paid for information concerning the water routes to the Mississippi River available through the swamps and bayous nearby.\textsuperscript{16}

By December 22, satisfied with their preparations and reconnaissance, an advance guard of the British troops set off in boats for Bayou Bienvenue with the balance of the invasion force following them. They advanced cautiously and managed to take the American militia guarding the mouth of the bayou by surprise. Next, the soldiers and sailors had to work together to navigate the narrow swamps ahead of them. Finally, around noon the British arrived at the Villeré plantation. Members of the elite 95\textsuperscript{th} Regiment (Rifles), encircled the house and managed to capture all of the defending militiamen except for one, who fled off into the swamp.\textsuperscript{17}

With the plantation captured as a base of operations, the commander of the advance guard, Colonel William Thorton, called a halt in order to await the balance of the invasion force. The serpentine bayou and the considerable distance to Pea Island made reinforcing the advance force a logistical nightmare. All through the night and following day, the Royal Navy worked to row the troops and supplies to shore.\textsuperscript{18}

Jackson learned of the British landing only around noon on December 23. Ordering all available troops to concentrate on his position and march down river, He exclaimed to his staff, “by the eternal they will not sleep on our soil tonight!”

\textsuperscript{16} Latour, 64-65; Tatum, 106; Gleig 266-268. 
\textsuperscript{17} Latour, 65-68; Gleig, 272-275. 
\textsuperscript{18} Gleig, 276-280.
From all around the city, soldiers prepared for the expedition down the Mississippi. Infantrymen sharpened their flints and gave their muskets a good cleaning. Caissons and artillery limbers rattled along at a gallop through the mud and cobblestone streets.19

Guarding Fort St. John on the shore of Lake Pontchartrain, Plauche’s volunteer militia battalion learned of Jackson’s call. Plauche and his French-speaking unit dashed off at brisk jog determined to get their chance at combating their people’s ancient enemy. At around 2 o’clock, Jackson ordered his column down the river to face the British. Hearing a commotion of to his left, he sighted Plauche’s unit running to join the formation. As the New Orleans militia came within earshot, Jackson bellowed, “Ah, here come my brave Creoles!”20

As Jackson rode south he had with him the 7th and 44th U.S. infantry regiments, Daquin’s and Plauche’s battalions of volunteer militia, Coffee’s Tennesseans, and a hand full of smaller company-size formations. To Jackson’s northeast, Governor Claiborne commanded the 1st, 2nd, and 4th, regiments of Louisiana militia totaling roughly 2,500 men. Downriver of the British, Brigadier General David Morgan commanded an additional force of some 800 Louisiana militiamen. Claiborne and Morgan’s forces protected Jackson’s operational flanks by defending the other avenues of approach the British might take.21

19. Latour, 68; Tatum, 107
21. Latour, 69
By the afternoon, Jackson’s troops began forming up into battle lines on the Rodriguez and Chalmette plantations. Less than two miles separated them from the British and it was too dangerous to still be in column. The Americans sent scouts forward to reconnoiter the British position. Jackson’s army waited until nightfall to attack.\(^{22}\)

Shortly after sundown, British soldiers noticed the mast of a ship on the Mississippi River adjacent to their position. Believing it to be a vessel of the Royal Navy, the soldiers ran up onto the levee and began to hail the brig, cheering its arrival. As the guns of the *USS Carolina* opened fire, the soldiers realized they had made a fatal mistake.\(^{23}\)

Jackson’s army launched forward into the British camp as soon as they heard the naval vessel begin firing. The U.S. regulars as well as Plauche’s and Daquin’s battalions attacked the British head on. Coffee’s Tennesseans and the New Orleans rifle company of Thomas Beale pressed the British right in an attempt to encircle the surprised army. Unfortunately for the enfilading force, they ran right into British reinforcements making their way from Bayou Bienvenue.\(^{24}\)

The fighting soon degenerated from ordered combat to a close-fisted brawl, the inky darkness only broken by the flash of musket volleys or cannon blast from the *Carolina*. Before he lost complete control of his army in the nighttime melee, Jackson ordered a retreat back to the Rodriguez planation and the cover its canal offered. Falling back in reasonably good order, the American army took up its new

\(^{22}\) Latour, 68; Tatum, 107  
\(^{23}\) Latour, 72, Tatum, 108-110; Gleig, 286.  
\(^{24}\) Latour, 68, 74-75, 80-83; Gleig, 288-292.
defensive position and braced itself for any British counter assault. Still perplexed by the rapid American advance, the British commander found his force in no condition to pursue. Thorton ordered his men to take up their own defensive positions in case Jackson's army made another attempt.25

For the next few days the armies sat and stared at each other. The Royal Navy continued to ferry British troops to shore and the army evacuated some of their wounded on the transport boats returning to the fleet. The Americans, after assessing their position, decided to dig in further along the Rodriguez Canal and Jackson's engineers went about planning the new field fortifications.26

Jackson had a large and well-trained staff of military engineers on hand that directed the construction of the fortifications. The right (river) side of Jackson's line was proportionately stronger because the soldiers began on that end and had time to prepare more elaborate defenses. The whole line “as far as the woods, was proof against the enemy's cannon.” To accomplish this level of fortifications, Jackson's engineers directed numerous cypress planks driven into the ground vertically with the distance between planks increasing as the line continued north and the rate of construction increased. Horizontal crossbars then secured the vertical planks together and helped support the weight of the soil thrown up on the breastwork.27

25. Latour, 75; Tatum, 110-111; Gleig, 297-298.
26. Latour, 83-84; Tatum, 111; Gleig 305-206.
On Christmas Day, Major General Sir Edward Pakenham finally arrived to take command of his army. Eager to discern exactly what lay in front of him, Pakenham directed that the army carry out a reconnaissance in force. As designed, this type of maneuver gave the appearance of a full attack by virtue of the number of men involved, but the individual unit commanders had orders not to bring on a general engagement. The threat of attack should cause Jackson to deploy his available forces and allow the British the chance to observe and assess their opponent’s army.\(^{28}\)

The reconnaissance commenced on December 28, and it went better than Pakenham could have hoped. With the rampart incomplete on the extreme left of Jackson’s line, the militia defending it had almost no protection against the British formations approaching them. The American troops broke and ran out of fear for their chances at confronting the British in the open field. Under instructions to conduct a reconnaissance, the British unit commanders failed to follow up on this good fortune and Pakenham finished the day only with the knowledge Jackson possessed a significant amount of cannon.\(^{29}\)

The British commander determined to deal with Jackson’s artillery by using cannon of his own. He directed the Royal Navy to ferry the British army’s artillery to shore, and if possible, also bring some of the navy vessels’ cannon. The weight of the larger ships’ cannons and their mounting on naval carriages made bringing them inland to the army a ponderous labor-intensive affair. Still, Pakenham endeavored that the “lines...though not completed, were yet proof against musket-shot, and had already five pieces of cannon in battery.” Latour, 88.

to mass as much artillery as he could and breach the American works before sending his men against them. The knowledge that every day his army delayed attacking offered the Americans time to make their rampart that much stronger only troubled Pakenham all the more.30

The morning of New Year’s Day, Pakenham ordered his artillery to commence the greatest bombardment it could muster and attempt to breach Jackson’s line. For hours the British and American cannons roared back and forth across the open plain belching fire at one another. Unable to assist, the American soldiers huddled behind the rampart protecting themselves from the British fire. The soldiers in Pakenham’s army stood by and watched as Royal Artillery rounds bounced fleetingly off of the American earthworks and the U.S. guns slowly knocked the less protected British artillery out of action. Seeing that his cannonade had accomplished nothing, Pakenham ordered his guns to cease firing.31

Pakenham and his staff worked diligently on a way to assail Jackson’s position, constantly aware the American shovels continued to make the rampart stronger. Eventually they determined on a complex plan involving three coordinated assaults and a river crossing. To get to the other shore of the Mississippi required boats from the fleet and British engineers went to work extending Bayou Bienvenue as close to the British position as possible and preparing to make a cut in the Mississippi’s levee. British troops would then carry boats from the bayou to the river. Once they accumulated enough boats, a specially tasked force would cross the river, capture the American guns on the west bank, and

30. Latour, 94-95; Tatum, 119-120; Gleig, 322-324.
31. Latour 95-97; Tatum, 120-122; Gleig, 325-326.
turn the artillery on Jackson’s position. While the army’s engineers and the Navy worked at the logistical feats needed for the plan, the infantrymen built the ladders and fascines necessary to surmount Jackson’s rampart. For a week the British went about their tasks preparing for the attack. At the same time, Jackson’s men awaited more reinforcements and improved their own defensive position.32

The Rodriguez Canal formed the basis for Jackson’s defense. No longer in use as an irrigation source, the canal had a dry bottom with banks that had caved in by the time Jackson’s engineers started fortifying it. The soldiers cut the levee, opening the canal to the Mississippi and flooding it along its length to a depth of five to six feet deep. Next, the soldiers began raising a parapet upon bank of the canal. As they dug into the ground and threw that dirt upon the bank, they increasingly made the rampart thicker and higher in relation to their position behind it.33

Jackson’s engineers also constructed a “demi-bastion” on the right of Jackson’s line where the canal intersected the road along the river. “Two embrasures were constructed in its base to rake the Canal and plane [sic] in front of the line, and two others in its face for the purpose of raking the Levey [sic] & road. It was encircled by a [moat].” A bridge over the Rodriguez canal connected the small fortification to the main American line. Inside the demi-bastion, Jackson placed two

33. Latour 103
brass 12 pounders and a six-inch howitzer mounted in field carriages so they could easily fire out any of the available gun embrasures.34

Numerous other artillery pieces fortified Jackson’s main line as well. Ninety feet to the left of the demi-bastion rested battery two consisting of a twenty-four pounder manned by the Navy. The Baratarians crewed the two twenty-four pounders of battery three fifty yards down the line from battery two. Next, only twenty yards away – continuing right to left-- more sailors of the U.S. Navy served the thirty-two pounder of battery four. U.S. artillerymen manned battery five and its two six pounders. Over two hundred yards separated batteries four and five, but the range of the naval caliber artillery on Jackson’s right meant that those pieces could more than assist against any assault on the American left. Just thirty-six yards from battery five rested a twelve pounder crewed by French immigrants with prior service in Napoleon’s army. Before Jackson’s line entered the cypress swamp on the northern end of the American position, the U.S. Army and a handful of Carroll’s Tennessean’s manned batteries seven and eight consisting of an eighteen-pound culverine, a six pounder, and a small brass carronade. The soldiers compensated for the relatively small caliber of these weapons by loading them with grapeshot and hundreds of musket balls, turning them into enormous shotguns. Any assault against the American lines would face a considerable amount of cannon fire before the British even had a chance to scale Jackson’s rampart.35

By January 7, Pakenham’s plan finally seemed ready for execution. Colonel William Thorton and his 85th Regiment of Foot along with a contingent of Royal

34. Quotes from Tatum, 124-125. Artillery information from Latour, 104.
35. Latour, 104.
Marines would cross the Mississippi River around midnight and take the American artillery on the west bank by surprise around dawn. Back on the east bank, a second force, under Brigadier General John Keane, would assail the American line along the riverbank. Pakenham intended Keane’s brigade to demonstrate in front of the American line, but not make a serious attack. These men would keep the Americans near the riverbank in place and prevent Jackson from reinforcing his left. There, on the northernmost portion of the battlefield, Major General Samuel Gibbs would lead the main attack.36

Pakenham’s staff took deliberate care in preparing their attack force. The 95th Regiment of Foot would lead Gibb’s column. Armed with rifles and wearing specially designed dark green and black uniforms meant to blend into the terrain, the 95th represented the vanguard of nineteenth century light infantry doctrine. Not only could the men of this regiment shoot as well as the American frontiersmen, their organization as regular soldiers provided them a significant advantage in tactical flexibility and morale. When the attack began, the 95th would spread out across the field in front of the column and specifically target American officers and artillerymen. Under the protection of the 95th, Gibb’s force would advance on Jackson’s position under the cover of the morning fog. When the column neared the American ramparts, the 44th Regiment of Foot would rush forward and place the ladders and fascines necessary to scale Jackson’s line. With those tools in place, the

36. Gleig, 328-329.
remainder of Gibb’s column would breach the American rampart and route the U.S. troops all the way back to New Orleans.\textsuperscript{37}

Unfortunately for Pakenham, the plan began to fall apart almost as soon as his staff finished their meeting the night of the 7\textsuperscript{th}. Getting the boats for the river crossing into the water took far longer than expected. Pakenham went to sleep around midnight but, Keane’s force still had not crossed the river. The current also proved far swifter than the British predicted and the Mississippi carried the attack force significantly farther downriver than anticipated. By mid-morning, Keane’s men continued to slog through thick mud up the Mississippi’s western bank. Before they had gotten into position, they heard the battle open.\textsuperscript{38}

Determined to make the attack on the east bank even if Keane’s force had not taken out the batteries on the other shore, Pakenham gave the order to advance. Royal Artillery batteries commenced fire at around 8:00am with the American artillery responding moments later. Gibb’s force lurched forward and began their march somewhat protected from the American cannon fire by the morning fog and the curve of the cypress swamp. Just as the tree line began to turn back towards the American position, the fog also started to lift exposing the British column to the full horrors of the American artillery. The carefully prepared charges in batteries seven and eight tore gaping maws into Gibb’s column halting the men.\textsuperscript{39}

The time had come for the 44\textsuperscript{th} to lay the fascines and place the ladders necessary to escape the hell that the British found themselves. In the pre-battle

\textsuperscript{37} Gleig, 329-332.  
\textsuperscript{38} Tatum, 129; Gleig 332-333.  
\textsuperscript{39} Latour, 108-110; Tatum, 125; Gleig, 333.
confusion, though, the 44th could not find the scaling implements and its commander assumed another regiment had taken the tools. The soldiers of the column stood in the open field under the withering America artillery fire as their officers tried to sort out the situation.40

Just under a mile to the left of the Gibb’s column, Keane’s encountered far more success. Leading the way for Keane was the light infantry companies from across Pakenham’s army. These men served much the same role as the 95th, but had roughly the same uniforms as regular red-coated British infantrymen and only smoothbore muskets. Despite the material deficiencies, these light infantrymen had earned a reputation of tenacity and daring during their time under Wellington. The light companies not only kep Jackson from reinforcing his left, but had also begun to breach the American line.41

Unaware of the success on his left, Pakenham rode forward towards Gibb’s column and ordered some troops from Keane’s column to follow him. Abandoning the light infantrymen, and ruining any chance to take advantage of their success, the 93rd Regiment of Foot marched to aid the faltering attack on the right. The 93rd had garrisoned South Africa throughout the Napoleonic Wars and its commander possessed little field experience. He led the unit diagonally across the American front exposing his thousand-man regiment to every gun in Jackson’s line. The unit presented such a large target that even Americans armed only with smoothbore muskets had little difficulty hitting it from one hundred yards away.42

40. Latour, 110; Tatum, 125; Gleig, 333-334.
41. Latour, 110; Tatum, 126; Gleig, 334.
42. Gleig, 334-335.
The deaths of the Highland Scots in the 93rd proved futile. Pakenham desperately tried to cajole his troops forward, but, without the ladders and fascines, the attackers faced tremendous difficulty in surmounting Jackson’s rampart. A few British soldiers did manage to claw their way up the embankment, but Americans either shot them dead immediately or forced their surrender. The British could not get enough men at once over the wall to overwhelm the Americans. His horse shot from under him, Pakenham remounted another only to receive a piece of grapeshot in his thigh. Losing massive amounts of blood, his staff dragged Pakenham to the rear. Major General John Lambert, commander of the reserve brigade then called off the attack ordering all British troops to the rear.43

On the west bank, Keane’s force managed to route the Americans and take their guns, but not before the defenders spiked the cannons, preventing their use against Jackson’s force. With the main attack a disaster, and no idea how many American troops might be in front of them, Keane withdrew his men back across the Mississippi. The Americans soon returned to their position and began to fix the damaged artillery. From start to finish, the entire Battle of New Orleans had lasted only thirty minutes.44

Lambert, now the acting commander petitioned Jackson for a temporary truce so that the British could attend to their wounded. For the next week, the Americans and British continued to stare across their lines at each other as both sides planned their next moves. Some Americans argued the Jackson should attack, but Old Hickory did not want to push his luck. He knew fortune had smiled on his

43. Latour, 109; Gleig 335-336.
44. Latour, 118-119; Tatum, 127-129; Gleig, 338.
army many times already during the campaign. Further, it was one thing to fight the British from behind a strong earthwork, attacking them in an open-field engagement would be quite another.\textsuperscript{45}

Eventually the British fled their camp during the night and retreated back to their fleet. Using a stronger force, they captured Fort Bowyer near Mobile and began preparations to take the city itself and continue operations against the United States’ Gulf Coast. Before Lambert could start these actions, word arrived that diplomats had signed the Treaty of Ghent only a day after Jackson attacked the British on December 23.\textsuperscript{46}

With the British fleet gone, Jackson and his army returned to the New Orleans, the center of great fanfare. The citizens held a spectacular celebration for the general in the square that now bears his name. He continued to hold the city under martial law until receiving definitive word of a peace treaty’s signing. This action raised the ire of many citizens, but he continued to elicit the support of those that had fought alongside him on Line Jackson.\textsuperscript{47}

The success during the campaign resulted from a number of factors. First, Jackson’s force had the protection of a significant fortification. Soldiers worked on the rampart continuously from December 24 to January 7. For fourteen days they improved and refined the design under the direction of professional engineers, many of who had training in military construction. Second, Jackson’s line averaged more than one cannon every hundred yards, and many of the batteries mounted

\textsuperscript{45} Latour, 111; Tatum, 131-132; Gleig, 336
\textsuperscript{46} Latour, 122-123, 140-144; Tatum, 134-135; Gleig, 334, 334-335, 349-350.
\textsuperscript{47} Tatum, 135-136
artillery larger than usual for service on a battlefield. In land engagements, twenty-four and thirty-two pounders typically only appeared during sieges and inside masonry forts. Possessing a significant amount of ordnance protected by strong earthworks offered Jackson an enormous advantage. Finally, the American troops operating around Jackson’s position, but not on Jackson’s main line, deserve special note. These militiamen, often Louisianians from the surrounding area, provided Jackson valuable intelligence and denied information to the British. The 1st, 2nd, and 4th, Regiments of Louisiana militia guarded the various alternative approaches Pakenham’s force might take. The presence of these troops in significant numbers denied the British any ability to send scouts to find a way around Jackson’s main position. Additionally, once it became clear the British intended to try and hammer their way through his line, Jackson could concentrate his energies towards making the Rodriguez Canal fortifications even stronger. Jackson’s victory did not occur out of sheer luck, providence, or frontier knowhow. Rather the Americans won because an American army guarded a strategic chokepoint and defending it with professionally designed fieldworks and artillery.
Chapter 2: “Half a Horse and Half an Alligator”

In October of 1817, the New York National Advocate enticed its readers with the news that, at long last, they could visually perceive how the American victory at New Orleans came to pass. Jean Hyacinth Laclotte had finally completed his much anticipated depiction of the battle and it was now for sale in the United States. Laclotte served as one of Jackson’s engineers throughout the campaign and did numerous sketches during the British assault on Louisiana. He prepared the print from his sketches, from his experience during the campaign, and from interviews with other veterans of the engagement. Now, Americans could own a depiction of the battle whose “accuracy [was] attested to by all the officers of the army who resided at New Orleans when the drawing was completed.”

The National Advocate’s article captured the imagination of the country and word quickly spread from the Chesapeake to New England that Americans could now buy Laclotte’s print. Many editors reprinted the Advocate’s story, telling their readers that from “a national point of view, [the print] merits encouragement,” and assured their readers that they themselves already had a copy in their office. The battle had been “one of the greatest deed of arms yet known on the continent of America and which decided the fate of an important war.” American interest grew even further when some newspapers reported the possibly apocryphal story that “the English have taken so great a liking to these engravings, that they do not allow them to remain in the print-shops, but buy them up as fast as the appear.” The foreign correspondent to the

1. New York National Advocate, October 8, 1817; quote from Boston Weekly Messenger, October 16, 1817.
Albany Argus assured the American audience though that “all [the British’s] efforts to prevent the circulation of them will be fruitless – some thousands are on their way to the United States, if not already arrived.”

During the decade following the Battle of New Orleans, Americans became enthralled with the “ardent love of country” and “enthusiasm” of the city’s defenders. They relished the idea of understanding how the United States could go from getting its capital sacked and burned by an invading army to inflicting one of the most lopsided defeats in British military history until that time. How had a rag-tag force of frontier militia bested the grizzled veterans of Europe that not once, but twice put down the Corsican Ogre, Napoleon Bonaparte? A flurry of music, theatre, and print media strove to answer this question for Americans, and sometimes to further the authors’ own agenda in the process. In the case of snuff boxes sold with rather dubiously accurate depictions of the battle enameled on them, these efforts were just to capitalize monetarily off of the popularity of the event. Other times, artists and authors actively used the Battle of New Orleans to promote an ideological or political agenda. All of these efforts left an indelible mark on the national memory and a stilted understanding

2. “a national point of view...” in Washington City (DC) Weekly Gazette, October 18, 1817; Remaining quotes in Albany Argus, November 18, 1817; Troy (NY) Farmer’s Register, November 9, 1817; Boston Patriot and Independent Chronicle, November 19, 1817; Norfolk (VA) American Beacon and Commercial Diary, November 20, 1817; Boston Yankee, November 21, 1817; Providence (RI) Patriot & Columbian Phoenix, November 22, 1817; Brattleboro (VT) American Yeoman, November 25, 1817; Petersburg (VA) American Star, November 27, 1817; Stockbridge (MA) Berkshire Star, November 27, 1817; Hallowell (ME) American Advocate and Kennebec Advertiser, November 29, 1817.
of the Battle of New Orleans, creating myths and legends of the event that continued well into the twenty-first century.\(^3\)

One of the earliest pieces of popular culture that left an indelible mark on the battle’s memory appeared in American popular culture less than a year after the guns fell silent. Samuel Woodworth’s “The Hunters of Kentucky or The Battle of New Orleans” rapidly became a standard feature of January 8\(^{th}\) commemorations and patriotic events. The song recounts a fictionalized version of the battle in which Kentucky soldiers helped defeat “John Bull in [his] martial pomp” through the cunning use of “rifles ready cocked.” These soldiers, “half a horse, and half an alligator,” won because of their backwoods upbringing and willingness to protect hearth and home in the face of Britain’s larger, more professional, army.\(^4\)

Explanations for the American victory like the one Samuel Woodworth provided appealed to many Americans, especially those of the Jeffersonian Republican persuasion. Republicans had always found comfort in the idea of the militia and a state-controlled military for the country. The fictionalized version of the Battle of New Orleans provided by Woodworth accentuated Republican Party ideology. Republican newspapermen, politicians, and activists found numerous opportunities to promote their beliefs through the idea that the Battle of New Orleans provided many lessons the

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3. *Albany Argus*, November 18, 1817. Samples of the snuffboxes can be found in the holdings of the Historic New Orleans Collection, New Orleans, LA.

young nation should learn and embrace. Their efforts to encourage their ideas by promoting the memory of the battle only reinforced many of the fictitious beliefs about the victory that developed during the first few years after the engagement. Those efforts also assisted in the demise of one political party and, eventually, the rise of another.5

Americans who lived in the wake of the war had an insatiable appetite for information regarding the battle. Across the country, newspapers carried stories about products and events related to the victory at New Orleans. The many new information sources available to Americans represented the vanguard of the communications revolution during the mid-nineteenth century. This burgeoning network provided a national forum for product distribution as newspapers reprinted advertisements for goods and services from across the country.6


Songs like Woodworth’s “Hunters of Kentucky” were not the only performance pieces that took inspiration from the Battle of New Orleans. *The Triumph of Liberty or Louisiana Preserved* and *The Battle of New Orleans or Glory, Love, and Loyalty* both explored aspects of American nationalism and the battle’s significance in American culture. These plays received considerable support from newspaper editors who provided advertising space and endorsements of the theatrical quality. Performances about the Battle of New Orleans emerged as some of the first works of the fledging American playwright community. In fact, Americans had previously consumed plays of British origin, but in the years following the War of 1812, American theatre came into its own. *The Battle of New Orleans* and *The Triumph of Liberty* attracted American audiences both because of their nationalistic topics and because they helped define the future of American theatre.⁷

Of all the various forms of popular culture that examined the Battle of New Orleans, editors promoted printed media the most. Writers flooded the early national period with written accounts of Jackson’s victory told in works of poetry, autobiography, or fictionalized renditions of the Battle of New Orleans. Many editors suggested these books helped American to “see the history of [their] country’s honor

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and virtue” and reading the books would “infuse into the mind, the principles of liberty, virtue and patriotism.” Others felt that the books about the battle would “make an impression on the memory” and that the popular topic might “lead [readers] to inquiry and more serious reading.” For whatever reason, editors across the United States used their papers to distribute information and messages about the Battle of New Orleans.8

Thanks to the burgeoning new information network in the early nineteenth century, publicity for items and events relating to the Battle of New Orleans spread rapidly across the continent. The proliferation of newspapers and increasing rapidity of transportation allowed disparate regions of the country to discover quickly the latest methods of commemoration and also conduct a national conversation about those techniques. The publication of George Gleig’s, A Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans aroused the attention of many Americans because it came from the perspective of a British army officer. The New York Spectator announced the book’s printing in early May 1821, along with a brief preview of the work’s contents. The next day, the Baltimore Patriot reprinted the Spectator’s story. By mid-June, the Danville, Vermont North Star and the New Bern, North Carolina Carolina Centennial had also repeated the original announcement and extract. The end

of June witnessed the story’s publication in the Nashville Gazette, and by July citizens of Missouri knew of Gleig’s book, thanks to the St Louis Enquirer.9

As fast as word had concerning the publication of Gleig’s manuscript, news spread even more rapidly when the British residing in France began to buy up Laclotte’s prints of the battle. On September 18, 1817, the Albany Argus first ran its story of British Battle of New Orleans art lovers. Overnight, the Boston Independent Chronicle repeated the Argus’s story, and a day later the Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary also reported the news to Virginians. Within eleven days of the story’s first printing, Hallowell, Maine, could also read of the events in Paris thanks to the American Advocate and Kennebec Advertiser.10

Not all information was omnidirectional; frequently, regions of the country exchanged accounts about each other’s methods of celebrating the Battle of New Orleans, providing a national forum of cultural exchange. In 1819, newspapers around the country carried stories of their city’s battle anniversary celebrations alongside articles focusing on what other cities planned. The New York Daily Advocate informed its readership of a pithy toast delivered at a Dearing, New Hampshire commemorative dinner that made light of the tremendously disproportionate casualties at the battle. In the same month, readers of the Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle learned of the

9. New York Spectator, May 6, 1821; Baltimore Patriot, May 7, 1821; Richmond Enquirer, May 18, 1821; Salem Essex Register, May 30, 1821; New Bern Carolina Centennial, June 16, 1821; Danville North Star, June 19, 1821; Nashville Gazette, June 30, 1821; St Louis Enquirer, July 28, 1821.
10. Albany Argus, November 18, 1817; Boston Independent Chronicle, November 19, 1817; Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, November 20, 1817; Boston Yankee, November 21, 1817; Providence Patriot & Commercial Phoenix, November 22, 1817; Brattleboro American Yeoman (VT), November 25, 1817; Petersburg American Star (VA), November 27, 1817; Stockbridge Berkshire Star (MA), November 27, 1817; Hallowell American Advocate and Kennebec Advertiser (ME), November 29, 1817.
national flags displayed around New York harbor on the eighth of January that year.

Editors of the *American Mercury* in Hartford, Connecticut expressed excitement at discovering that the Battle of New Orleans continued to receive considerable celebration throughout the country. All the while, newspapers up and down the Atlantic seaboard carried news of the Louisiana legislature’s decision to make the eighth of January a day of public thanksgiving and its mandate of an elaborate annual celebration.11

The interest shown by newspapers and their readership around the country in the commemoration of the Battle of New Orleans occurred largely without precedent in United States history. Previously, on a national scale, Americans had only celebrated events such as the Fourth of July or George Washington’s birthday. These anniversaries transcended the regionalism the United States struggled with at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Indeed, sponsors of celebrations about the Battle of New Orleans should have faced the same struggles promoters of celebrations about American Revolution victories had faced. The nature of the American military system, with a reliance on the militia, meant that most battles would be regional encounters between an enemy and American troops drawn from that area. Accordingly, the states involved in the conflict took the most pride in the subsequent commemoration. The

The vast majority of troops who fought at New Orleans came from the western states of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Louisiana. Even the two U.S. Army regiments at the battle had recruited predominantly from western states. Citizens of the old Northwest Territory, and especially Americans living in the Atlantic coastal states, had little precedent for taking as much pride in the Battle of New Orleans as they did.¹²

That pride in the battle corresponded with an insatiable appetite for explanations about why the American army won a resounding victory. Put simply, some 4,000 American militiamen should not have defeated 10,000 professional soldiers, especially George III’s Peninsula veterans. Britain’s troops, some of the finest in the world, had recently defeated the forces of Napoleon Bonaparte himself. By the end of 1815, Americans knew that Britain’s troops had dethroned Napoleon not just once, but twice. The Battle of Waterloo only added to the mystique of New Orleans in Americans’ eyes and made them ask that much harder: how America had won the victory?

A number of explanations emerged during the decade following the battle. Some argued that God himself had willed the Americans to be the victors, evidence that the divine being smiled on American fortune. Others felt that the success resulted from the political nature of the American government; people born outside the control of a king would value freedom that much more and fight that much harder to preserve it. Some

even argued that Americans had become a hardier and more masculine race than the Anglo-Saxon stock from which many of them descended.

The “species of force that manned the ramparts of New Orleans” received considerable attention during the years following the battle, as Americans tried to understand exactly how they had won. For Samuel Woodworth and others, the answer clearly lay in the “hardy freeborn race” that slew the British lion. American men, especially those who fought the Battle of New Orleans, had grown up in the wilderness and along the frontier. They may not have possessed the “martial pomp” or training of the British soldier, but their background had prepared them for fierce conflict. Americans did not need military pageantry to fight; they did so naturally.13

Americans may have been naturally gifted fighters, but at the same time, they did not overtly seek a quarrel. Proper republican behavior dictated that American men only fought when necessary. Because peaceful negotiation and mutual understanding formed the cornerstone of republicanism, they used force only as a last resort. The unity of troops engaged against the British exhibited “pure American feelings – feelings which proved that a difference of opinion in relation to public men and public measures should never impair the claims of private worth or individual friendship.” While American men may disagree at times, they would stand with one another in an hour of need despite their political differences.14


14. New York Columbian, January 1, 1818; Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle, January 12, 1818; Baltimore Patriot and Mercantile Advertiser, January 14, 1818; Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, January 20, 1818.
When Americans did fight, the heartiest of them would trade in their plows for muskets. The agricultural background of many of the American participants in the battle reinforced the Jeffersonian ideal that the country should consist of yeoman farmers, each possessing and working his little piece of Americana. The idea that “hardy woodsman” defeated the mighty British army furthered this ideal by suggesting that the manly pursuits of rural life had instilled in Jackson’s forces a virility that the urban men on the eastern seaboard lacked.

In the 1815 *Chronicles of Andrew*, the British held a council of war, following their first failed assault on the breastworks in front of New Orleans earlier in the campaign. As they deliberated, one British soldier remarked, “What kind of folks are those Tennesseans and Kentuckians? Surely they are not saltwater militia, such as those we found at Washington City. From what race did they spring? Behold Andrew’s army are all sharpshooters and strangers to fear.” The authors, Joseph Dorris and Jesse Denson, felt that the rural upbringing of the Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers had led to their success. American men needed to remain “half a horse, and half an alligator,” as Samuel Woodworth described it, so as not to become soft city dwellers like those who defended Washington D.C..15

Yet, the most important reason for American men to remain stout and virile lay in their role as protectors of females. Protecting women, whether related to the man or

15. Joseph Dorris and Jesse Denson, *The Chronicles of Andrew: Containing an Accurate and Brief Account of General Jackson’s Victories South, Over the Creeks, Also His Victories Over the British at Orleans with Biographical Sketches of His Life, &c.*, (Milledgeville: S&F Grantland, 1815); “half a horse...” Samuel Woodworth, *The Hunters of Kentucky or the Battle of New Orleans* (New York: Brown).
not, easily overshadows any other suggestion of masculine behavior found in the media concerning the Battle of New Orleans during this period.

Writers often portrayed the Englishmen’s desire for American women in terms of a direct challenge. In the *Hunters of Kentucky*, Packenham declares, “he’d have their girls and cotton bags, in spite of old Kentucky.” *The Chronicles of Andrew* depicted British soldiers, taunting the Americans, pronouncing, “We will plunder your cities and embrace your wives and your sisters.” If these allusions to what would happen in the event of a British victory were not clear enough, one poem went so far as to talk “of the foreign-vassal-vandal hordes,” who were enticed “to murder, rape, and robbery.” In the face of such rhetoric, American men could hardly shirk from the defense of their women.¹⁶

The alleged attitude of British soldiers stood in direct contradiction to the portrayal of American male interactions with women in many of the same sources. In the play *The Battle of New Orleans, or Glory Love and Loyalty*, after an American army colonel captures a British woman and young boy, the officer brings the suspected female spy to General Jackson. In the course of the interview, the colonel pleads with Jackson to take pity on the woman and allow her to reside at the Ursuline convent in New Orleans for the duration of the battle rather than in the city jail. Jackson agrees and afterward makes sure to inform the colonel that he approved of his actions because

¹⁶. Samuel Woodworth, *The Hunters of Kentucky or the Battle of New Orleans* (New York: Brown); Joseph Dorris and Jesse Denson, *The Chronicles of Andrew: Containing an Accurate and Brief Account of General Jackson’s Victories South, Over the Creeks, Also His Victories Over the British at Orleans with Biographical Sketches of His Life, &c.* (Milledgeville: S&F Grantland, 1815); “of foreign...” *Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary*, December 13, 1816.
“humanity in a soldier is but the common duty of a man; and he is unworthy of heaven’s best gift indeed – who hesitates to give a woman honorable protection.”

Another reference to manly duty in the same scene occurs in relation to the young boy captured along with the women. Jackson jokingly asks the young boy if he would like to leave his mother’s side. The boy gets excited about the idea of glory and adventure but solemnly informs Jackson that he will have to decline the offer. He has a duty to remain near his mother to protect her until they find his father, lost to them for a number of years.

In a twist of plot, the audience learns that the boy’s father is an American sailor the British impressed into Royal Navy service a few years before the battle. Serving begrudgingly for years, the sailor fortuitously arrives off the coast of Louisiana, along with the British invasion force. Realizing he is almost home, he dives overboard in an effort to desert. British soldiers on shore capture the sailor and take him to Packenham for judgment. After a brief interview in which the sailor explains he is American, Packenham threatens him. The sailor tells Packenham that he will take “with heroic courage” whatever British officers trained in “remorseless butchery, cold-blooded assassination, [and] torture” choose to do to him because he knows America is in the right. Eventually, a soldier, an American who joined the British army before the war, helps the sailor escape the camp and return to his wife and child.

A variety of sources informed American men of how they should act. The proper republican American should be compassionate to women, loyal to his country, resolute


in his cause, and primarily agrarian in his lifestyle. If American men followed these
guidelines, they would ensure that no enemy could advance “into the heart of [their]
land without meeting the punishment for their temerity.” In return for these exertions,
men in the United States would win “the smiles of the American fair.”

The United State’s early playwrights and balladeers did not limit their
discussions of women simply to terms of defenseless individuals in need of constant
protection. While considerably fewer sources dealing with the Battle of New Orleans
address the place and role of women in early American society, those that do offer a
striking lens through which to examine the topic. As some historians have already
discussed, in the early national period, “the ideal wife and mother devoted her life
exclusively to domestic tasks; she was expected to run an efficient household, provide a
cultured atmosphere within the home, rear moral sons and daughters, display social
grace on public occasions, and offer her husband emotional support.” When women did
make an appearance in the memory of the battle, they did so frequently in support of
these social values.

Only a few weeks after the British army retreated to its ships and left the shores
of Louisiana, Governor William C.C. Claiborne issued a proclamation reflecting on the
campaign and urging his fellow citizens to remain vigilant and dutiful. Along with a

19. “into the heart...” Opinion article written by the Southern Patriot, Boston
Patriot and Daily Chronicle, February 3, 1818; “the smiles of...” An Oration Delivered at
Mr. Days Hotel on Friday, 16th April 1819 on the Rise and Progress of New Orleans Since
The Memorable Battle on the 8th of January, 1815: With Observations of Its Future
20. Steven Mintz and Susan Kellogg, Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of
American Family Life (New York: The Free Press, 1988) 53; for additional information
on the role of women in early America see also Rosemarie Zagarri, Revolutionary
Backlash: Women and Politics in the Early Republic (Philadelphia: University of
number of other groups and organizations, Claiborne thanked the women of New
Orleans for their service during the campaign. They had provided valuable assistance
in caring for the wounded as well as crafting clothing and supplies for the hastily raised
volunteers from Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Claiborne assured them that the
men they aided would not forget the actions “of that tender sex, whose smiles soften the
misfortunes of life and whose charms heighten the enjoyment of freedom.”

The contributions of women also received acclaim in The Chronicles of Andrew.
The authors insisted that after the battle, “the delicate fair damsels crowneth [Jackson]
with magnificent honor and exalteth him to the skies.” Though flowery, this statement
contains considerable historical basis. When American forces returned to New Orleans,
an elaborate public ceremony occurred in the place d’arms in front of the city cathedral.
As Jackson made his way through the square, rows of young women vested in the
names of the various states of the union flanked his passage. Two more women, attired
as Justice and Liberty, occupied positions beneath a triumphal arch erected especially
for Jackson to pass under. A final two young ladies rested atop pedestals under the arch
in order to hold laurel wreaths over the victorious general. The exclusive role of
women in the victory ceremony illustrates the importance Jeffersonian society placed
on the need for women to emotionally support their men.

21. William C.C. Claiborne, Militia General Order (New Orleans: January 26,
1815); Resolutions of the Louisiana Legislature in Arsène Lacarrière Latour, Historical
Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815, ed. Gene A. Smith,
22. “the delicate fair...” Joseph Dorris and Jesse Denson, The Chronicles of
Andrew: Containing an Accurate and Brief Account of General Jackson’s Victories South,
Over the Creeks, Also His Victories Over the British at Orleans with Biographical Sketches
of His Life, &c. (Milledgeville: S&F Grantland, 1815); Robert V. Remini, The Battle of New
The plays about the Battle of New Orleans provide perhaps the best examples of early American society’s desired role for women. *The Battle of New Orleans or Glory, Love, and Loyalty* features two strong female characters from which women of the early national period could take example. The first is Louisa, a British woman captured at the beginning of the play. As one scene opens, Louisa is sitting in the Ursuline convent reading a book. Jeffersonian society expected American women to impart a sense of culture on their children and act as advisors or sounding boards for their husbands. Women could not fulfill this role if illiterate; therefore, early American society placed a premium on education for women. Openly showing Louisa reading made it clear to females in the audience that, despite previous generations’ negative attitudes toward women’s education, times had changed.\(^\text{23}\)

Later, the audience learns that Louisa traveled to America in search of her husband, an American sailor impressed into the British navy. In her effort to reunite her family and defend her spouse, Louisa undertakes a quest across the ocean, a feat that playwrights of earlier times generally reserved for male characters.

The main female protagonist is Charlotte, the daughter of a wealthy New Orleanian and the romantic interest of Colonel Oakwood, the story’s male protagonist. Despite the danger to those who remain in the city, Charlotte dutifully stays to protect the home while the rest of the family either flees to the countryside or defends the ramparts south of the city. As the final battle commences, the audience witnesses Oakwood leading his men during the engagement. At the climactic moment of the

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scene, the British take the American redoubt in front of the main works. As Oakwood leads a charge to recapture the position, he dashes forward into a melee with a British officer. Suddenly, Oakwood slips and falls. Then, just as the Englishman raises his sword to deliver a killing blow, an American soldier fires a shot into the British officer, saving the young colonel’s life. The recoil of the musket knocks the volunteer’s shako off, revealing Charlotte’s hair falling from under the hat. Despite the danger to them both, they have time for a quick exchange of lines in which Charlotte explains to Oakwood that “in her dear country’s cause, a woman’s spirit towers above her sex – and heaven in this was ordinate.” Charlotte then picks up a fallen American flag and helps Oakwood retire to the American lines.

After the battle, as Jackson gives a booming closing speech to his troops, he extols upon them the significance of a woman protecting the United States’ colors. In the course of the monologue, the actor portraying Jackson even reveals that the character of Charlotte represents Columbia herself. Thus, the actions of the Charlotte character take on even greater significance as she represents the allegorical symbol of the United States.

The public discourse surrounding the Battle of New Orleans further indicated the ideals of republican womanhood when such discourse explored concepts such as the protection of family, the education of women, and the support of men. If American society dictated that men perform the fighting and strategic planning, it left to women the less glamorous but essential roles of logistics and staff work.

Charlotte’s statements concerning the ordination of American roles and duties by a higher power are not the only ones that appear in the depictions of the battle. Starting at the turn of the nineteenth century, Americans assumed a newfound interest in religion, culminating in the Second Great Awakening. Many of the country’s evangelical protestant sects received their first initial boosts in membership. In order to compete, many of the country’s more traditional protestant sects began efforts to reclaim devotees and gain conversions. The situation became even more competitive with the appointment of the first Catholic bishop to the United States, who placed Catholics under local control, rather than under the direct rule of Rome. Fortunately, the vast open lands of the United States, combined with the ever-expanding population, and a common enemy in the form of belief systems such as deism and Unitarianism, allowed the various denominations to recruit and interact with only a modicum of inter-religious animosity.25

Given the rising interest in religion during the early national period, it is no surprise that the issue surfaced in discussions of the Battle of New Orleans. Indeed, from the start, the works of art, journalism, and literature produced about the battle depicted the event as a clash between the forces of good and evil; one Massachusetts broadside went so far as to compare the British soldiers to the minions of Lucifer himself.26

Making full use of biblical prose, *The Chronicles of Andrew* recounts the exploits of the “Madisonites” in their battle against the British. The book reveals that Packenham “came like a hailstorm with thunder and lightning and much rain: and landed his furious host at the seaside” to make the Americans once again the servants of King George. When the battle goes poorly, the British fear that “surely the God of Israel fighteth” on the side of Jackson’s forces.27

Even the soldiers who actually manned Jackson’s ramparts and shared in real danger of the battle had assurances that they fought on the spiritually correct side of the conflict. Governor Claiborne himself appealed to the soldiers, claiming that “it has pleased the almighty to look propitiously on our cause; it is one which he delights to prosper: the cause of justice.” The rhetoric concerning the Battle of New Orleans bombarded Americans with the idea that God had been on their side and that their cause and actions pleased him. These general notions of divine guidance and support eventually led to continent-encompassing ideas such as Manifest Destiny. In the meantime, Americans’ interest in religion and the divineness of their cause manifested in less grandiose ideas, but ones that nonetheless shaped the fabric of early national society.28

A number of newspaper editors felt that *The Late War Between the United States and Great Britain, From June 1812 to February 1815, Written in the Ancient Historical Style* could prove quite useful in the promotion of both education and spirituality. The

27. Joseph Dorris and Jesse Denson, *The Chronicles of Andrew: Containing an Accurate and Brief Account of General Jackson’s Victories South, Over the Creeks, Also His Victories Over the British at Orleans with Biographical Sketches of His Life, &c.* (Milledgeville: S&F Grantland, 1815).

Vermont Gazette informed its readers that the author maintained “the simplicity of the scriptural style … throughout,” and that the briefness of the syntax was “calculated to make an impression on the reader.” The paper’s editors further informed their readers that it would be a “valuable book for schools,” as the work contained, “a faithful chronicle of events.”

The longest lasting, and most important interpretations, of the Battle of New Orleans came from proponents of the Republican Party in their efforts to advance federal policy and their ideology. Jackson’s army, almost entirely composed of militia had not just beaten but decimated a force of, supposedly, the world’s finest soldiers. Republicans latched onto Americans’ interest in the victory and quickly put forward their message on how the United States had achieved success. This promotion allowed the Battle of New Orleans to transcend the localism of previous American military victories and provided Republicans the opportunity to use the battle as a vessel for advancing their ideology.

For Republican writers, the most important message to emphasize repeatedly and sell to the American public was that the agrarian woodsman, defending hearth and home, had been the primary architect of American victory. While the majority of Jackson’s force consisted of militiamen from across the western states and territories, later scholarship has revealed that the rural, rifle-armed militia of lore played only a minor role in the decisive final engagement. Rather, most British casualties resulted from the artillery manned by U.S. Army and Navy artillerists, urban French-speaking militia from New Orleans, and former pirates. When the rifle-equipped militia did fire,

29. Bennington Vermont Gazette, October 22, 1816
they did so at close range without patched balls that could take advantage of their skill with a rifle. They simply fired as fast as they could at an enemy only a few dozen yards in front of them. The embellishment concerning the militia’s role in the battle helped republicans frame three significant policy arguments: the encouragement of an agrarian United States, the promotion of the militia as the primary method of national defense, and the idea that Federalists worked against a republican form of government.30

Thomas Jefferson and his Republicans had, since the founding of the nation, argued for a more agricultural way of life than the Federalists promoted. While Federalists vied for a national bank and an urban mercantile economy for the United States, many Republicans dreamed of a country of rural yeoman farmers. They believed that an agrarian lifestyle would encourage a connection to the land, promote national defense, and generate self-interest in the region’s improvement. Republican writers

quickly latched onto the fact that the majority of troops at New Orleans led exactly the type of lifestyle many Jeffersonians wanted encouraged.\textsuperscript{31}

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, even newspapers in the Federalist-dominated Northeast ran stories highlighting “the bravery of the Kentuckians, the Tennesseans, &c.,” the “green back-woodsmen of America,” and the “sons of the soil” as the reason the United States had won the battle. These metaphors were especially important in the context of the previous battles fought during the War of 1812. Time and again the forces of the United States had squared off against the armies of Great Britain in Canada and the northern portions of the U.S., and, more times than not, the U.S. troops had fallen back in disorder and disgrace. By the closing months of the war, Americans could point to only a handful of victories to encourage the American martial spirit.\textsuperscript{32}


Then in 1815 at New Orleans, American westerners, each of whom was “half a horse, and half an alligator” stood “with rifles ready cocked” to “protect the ladies” and defend the national honor. Samuel Woodworth’s famous song *The Hunters of Kentucky* may have been one of the first pieces of popular culture or opinion about the battle that promoted the western residence of the battle’s victors, but it was far from the last. Many writers, especially in the West, rallied around the idea that rural Republican soldiers had been the defining cause of American victory. Northern troops from more urban Federalist regions of the country had consistently fled in the face of British arms, but westerners, often agrarian by trade, had stood firm with Andrew Jackson and mauled the largest British army of the war. As a result, the Battle of New Orleans “ought to fill every citizen of [the United States] with proud and glorious recollection” of “men freshly drawn from the pursuits of agriculture” defeating a force of regular soldiers.33

Some writers took so much artistic license that they argued “hardy woodsmen” achieved a victory that had “never been more inspiration for firmness and strength” in history. Others were willing to admit that the battle *might* be less glorious than “the contest at the pass of Thermopylae,” but the source of success clearly lay with “the gallant sons of the west.” Though these cases represent the most embellished, one of the Battle of New Orleans’s recurring themes has always been the rural backwoodsman defending hearth and home. The industrializing north had numerous attempts to garner martial glory during the war, and it failed almost every time. Republicans

argued that the cause of that limited success had been that many Northern soldiers, drawn from urban lifestyles, did not possess the ardor to defend their country because they had no vested stake in land or property. If the United States wanted to continue as a successful experiment in Republicanism, the perpetuation and expansion of an agrarian lifestyle must occur.34

The reason northerners had failed to achieve much success in the war did not just fall to their urban lifestyles though, argued some Republican writers. The problem occurred because many northerners wanted to rely on paid hirelings to do their fighting for them. Republicans quickly held up the Battle of New Orleans as one of the militia system’s crowning achievements, and used it as propaganda to diminish Federalists calls for a larger standing army.

Admittedly, in the eyes of many, the militia had earned a checkered reputation during the American Revolution. Federalist leaders profited from the militia’s lackadaisical performance in open field combat and built up the U.S. Army during the presidential terms of George Washington and John Adams. Republican presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had also expanded the army, but their party supporters consistently wrestled with what they thought might be a devil’s bargain. Many Republican writers felt that the Battle of New Orleans offered an opportunity to bring new hope to the idea of the part-time citizen-soldier’s being the primary means of

34. Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, December 13. 1816; Baltimore Patriot, January 8, 1822. The National Park Service interpretive panels at the Chalmette National Battlefield continue to promote the myth of the Kentucky rifleman to thousands of visitors a year even as of the author’s latest trip to the site on January 8, 2012.
national defense. “If ever there was a stain upon ‘raw militia,’” one writer opined, “It was wiped away on the 8th of January.”

Numerous Republicans in the early nineteenth century still harbored a deep fear and paranoia towards full-time soldiers, whether they wore British or American uniforms. Others simply resented the cost of supplying a standing army and felt that such an institution was a drain on national finances. The North American British colonies that became the United States had, and should, always defend themselves first and foremost by the militia. Indeed, the British army that assaulted New Orleans had been a force of “veteran troops” fresh from the battlefields of Europe. An army of considerably smaller size composed of “freemen in arms” not only defeated Napoleon’s conquerors, but also gave them a thrashing that, captured British soldiers claimed, had been worse than they experienced while fighting in the Napoleonic Wars.

Throughout the country, print shops exploded with endorsements of the militia system in the years following the Battle of New Orleans. Published works repeatedly emphasized that a green force of undisciplined militia halted “John Bull in martial


pomp.” Like their fathers before them in the Revolution, the men of the United States had beaten Britain, and they had done so, according to most newspapers, thanks to the militia. Some writers did point to the superiority of the artillery fire or the stoutness of the earthworks at New Orleans as the deciding factor, but there was no examination into who had been firing the artillery or who constructed the earthworks. The professional engineers who directed the construction, the trained artillerists who manned the cannons, and the labor of enslaved people who helped build the ramparts received no publicity in the poplar tales of Jackson’s victory.37

To Republican writers the battle of New Orleans “proved the prowess and patriotism of those bands of undisciplined militia” at a “critical moment for the reputation of the republic.” British “legions who had met and defeated the veteran soldiers of Europe” fled before “the firmness of freemen fighting for glory – for their country – and many of them, for the safety of that city which enclosed their wives, their children, and their property.” When hearth and home were at stake, many Republicans asked, what type of person would want to trust the defense of the wives and children to other people. They argued that, if the Federalists had their way, they would put just

such a system in place because a national army, and other men, would be in charge of protecting the United States.\textsuperscript{38}

By 1820, some writers in the northeast, long a bastion of Federalist thought, had begun to repudiate the old ideologies of their region. They pleaded with northeastern voters to examine how the Federalist leadership had mismanaged the defense of their region at the local level. Federalists had refused to provide the militia the federal government requested. They had failed to provide adequate defenses for Maine and allowed British soldiers to invade New England. “Kentucky, with half the population of Massachusetts” defended herself, and “sent her brave troops to Orleans.” Tennessee “fought and vanquished the Creeks, and under her unconquerable chief [Andrew Jackson] shrouded herself in glory at New Orleans.” Massachusetts, “who boasted of her militia,” had allowed the institution to fall into disrepair under the Federalists, and “did not even protect herself” during the war. The state had even “permitted a faction to attempt in her name a separation of the Confederacy” at the Hartford Convention.\textsuperscript{39}

The Battle of New Orleans and the Hartford convention occupied the minds of many Republican writers in the months before the 1820 presidential election. A flurry of articles appeared across the United States extolling Republican success in the War of 1812 and the Federalists’ supposed attempts to leave the union in time of war.


\textsuperscript{39} Charlestown Franklin Monitor (MA), March 18, 1820. For more on the demise of the Federalist Party see Fischer, The Revolution of American Conservatism; Livermore, The Twilight of Federalism; Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings.
These authors sought to use the two events as dual examples of why Republicans should be in power and Federalists should not. The editor of the Republican *Boston Patriot & Daily Chronicle* went so far as to suggest that loyal Republicans should allow Federalists supporters the freedom to extol the virtues of the Hartford Convention long enough to make the critical error of supporting secession. Then the patriotic Republican could explain to the Federalist that they should be happy Republicans won at New Orleans because that victory distracted the Madison administration from prosecuting treasonous language like the Federalist had just spoken.40

The promotion of events like the Battle of New Orleans and the Hartford Convention reinforced the work James Monroe began during his goodwill tours of the country. When Monroe took the oath of office in 1816, the Federalist Party was on the ropes and Republicans sensed an opportunity to do away finally with party politics in the United States. While Monroe toured the country in his Revolutionary War regalia and acted as the charming face of the Republican Party, Republican writers worked tirelessly to sell their ideology to a politically receptive United States.41


Two of the biggest policy issues that Republicans and Federalists battled over in the early national period centered on the issue of the United States being agrarian or industrial and whether the army of the militia should be the primary means of national defense. With the Battle of New Orleans, Republican writers had access to an incredibly patriotic event that they could translate into a fable of Republican values. This positive reinforcement of Republican ideals combined with a cooption of some Federalist policies assisted the party into gaining support and tamping down the divisive politics that had plagued the United States for so long. By the 1820 election, Monroe ran virtually unopposed and the Federalist Party did not even nominate a candidate. From that moment on, the Federalist Party ceased to play a role in national politics.42

Ironically, Republican writers, in their efforts to exorcise competing factions from the American political process, ended up advancing the very figure that would reintroduce faction to national politics. The promotion of the Battle of New Orleans as a seminal issue with lessons from which all Americans could draw succeeded so well that it allowed for the rise of popular politics in the form of the battle's architect, Andrew Jackson. If Americans should aspire to an agrarian lifestyle and militia service, then Jackson could argue that he met those qualifications far better than any other political figure at the national level. Jackson rode the battle's publicity into the national political spotlight and quickly made use of the promotional efforts Republican writers had first

developed to combat the Federalist Party. In their effort to defeat one political party, Jeffersonian Republicans ended up creating an entirely new one.\textsuperscript{43}

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Chapter 3: “Under the Command of a Plain Republican – an American Cincinnatus”

On January 8, 1853, wind-chilled Americans huddled around each other in the streets of Washington, D.C. They eagerly anticipated the unveiling of artist Clark Mills’ newest work. The first equestrian statue produced in the United States. In Lafayette Square, across from the White House, Stephen A. Douglas gave an invigorating speech that slowly increased the crowd’s emotions to a fever pitch. Finally, as Douglas’s monologue ended, workers removed a large tarp that covered the statue. There, above the assembled gatherers stood a twenty-foot-tall edifice of the man the crowd adored, former President of the United States Andrew Jackson.¹

Presumably, the onlookers had come to celebrate the old general’s presidency more than his military career. By 1853, though, the two had become forever linked; it made complete sense that a statue to commemorate a popular president would take the form of a martial edifice. Indeed, Jackson and his political supporters had made a constant effort to connect Jackson the general with Jackson the political figure even as early as Old Hickory’s 1824 run for the White House.

The Jacksonian period of American history left an indelible mark on the Battle of New Orleans’s place in United States culture as a fledgling political party used the event to build its base. As a result, that party’s opposition downplayed and resented celebrations of the battle as nothing more than the political pandering of an organization that played to the basest emotions of American society. The polarization

of feelings concerning Jackson’s policies weakened the national celebration of the battle. Unlike the early political use of the battle by Jeffersonian Republicans, the Jacksonians’ political agenda smacked more of personal advancement than of a sincere example to use the “lessons” of the event as an example for the United States. Unlike in the early national period, the Jacksonians’ promotion of the battle occurred in a period of presumed party unity. As the factions of the old Jeffersonian Republicans grew increasingly divergent, both sides needed to develop an identity to differentiate themselves from their opponents. The Jacksonian supporters’ repetitious use of the Battle of New Orleans to promote their candidate and policies made it a natural point of reaction and conflict. By the early 1850’s, what had been a national point of celebration turned into a fractious time of commemoration for the Democratic Party.²

That Jackson became the primary candidate of the conservative wing of the old Jeffersonian Republicans is hardly surprising. He was a largely self-made man who found opportunity on the western frontier of the United States. Though a general and a plantation owner, at the time of the battle his house consisted of nothing more than a two-story log cabin. His political career had regularly favored the western agrarian farmer and he had no tolerance for European interference in U.S. expansion. In short, Jackson was the archetypal figure Republican media had lionized during the ten years following the Battle of New Orleans.³

² For an excellent survey of the period see Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pages 15-18 are particularly useful in highlighting the contested meaning of the battle.

³ For a summary of Jackson’s early years see Robert Vincent Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767-1821 (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 1-26; For more on Jackson’s initial flirtations with the idea of running for president see
With Jackson represented in Jeffersonian newspaper accounts and popular culture as an idyllic model of Republican sentiments, it hardly a surprised some that those enamored with the old general would stand him up for the presidency in 1824. Though the nomination amazed the more progressive factions of the party, the public interest in Jackson emerged as a logical outgrowth of the tactics used to cripple the Federalists as a viable national organization. Jackson became the candidate for Americans who wanted to scale back the adoption of some Federalist policies by the Republican Party after the War of 1812. In order to win the election, Jackson’s supporters needed to find a way to highlight the reasons they felt their candidate represented the people of the United States better than his opposition. To that end, they looked to the already established public interest in the Battle of New Orleans and the Republicans’ previous efforts to highlight the battle as a symbol of their vision for the United States. These efforts provided readymade platforms from which to launch only slightly revised messages about the battle that highlighted the central role Jackson played and symbolized how his success at New Orleans represented what could do for the people of the nation if they elected him president.4

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4. The 1824 presidential campaign was far from the first time that political movements had harnessed popular sentiment. As Simon P. Newman points out “the ideology of impoverished and disenfranchised white men who were absorbed into the Jefferson polity pushed forward to Jacksonian democracy.” Simon P. Newman, *Parades
Ironically, one of the first uses of the Battle of New Orleans during the 1824 election attempted to lure Jackson away from running for the presidency. John Quincy Adams, looking for a regional balance to his presidential ticket, tried to woo Jackson into running as his vice-presidential candidate. On January 8, 1824, Louisa Adams, John Quincy’s wife, hosted a spectacular ball at the couple’s home on F Street in Washington. Despite the more than one thousand people present to commemorate the ninth anniversary of Jackson’s victory, the old general remained committed to the idea that, if he ran for president, he would do it as the main candidate and not as a Washington insider.5

What many career politicians like John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and John Calhoun could not have known is that Jackson’s candidacy heralded a new era of electoral politics. The American public loved Jackson despite him being, what older statesmen like Thomas Jefferson considered, “one of the most unfit men … for [the presidency],”6 He was the hero of New Orleans, the savior of the country, the representation of the common citizen’s aspirations. Unfortunately for Jackson and a plurality of the American voters, the general did not gain enough electoral votes to win the election outright, and the House of Representatives decided the outcome. There, Speaker of the House Henry Clay threw his support behind John Quincy Adams, who became the sixth president of the United States. In response to the usurpation of the People’s will, supporters of Jackson began what amounted to a four-year-long political

campaign for the 1828 presidential election. Throughout those years, the central tenet of Jackson's campaign focused on his leadership as a general. His supporters felt that he had best exemplified that commanding ability through his actions at the popularly known Battle of New Orleans.

To promote Jackson for the presidency, his boosters borrowed heavily from the materials already popular in the United States concerning the Battle of New Orleans. Soon, rather than just singing “The Hunters of Kentucky” on the January anniversary, Jackson’s supporters exposed Americans to the hymn year-round. The message constantly the same: if you liked the United States winning the Battle of New Orleans, you liked Andrew Jackson.

Essential in this promotion of the battle and Jackson became making sure Americans understood Old Hickory had been the primary reason that their nation succeeded at New Orleans. Publicists and party boosters worked hard to direct the attention onto the man they supported for president. One point of contention that repeatedly emerged following the battle was who had the idea to defend the position known as Line Jackson on the Chalmette plantation six miles downriver of New Orleans.


Numerous people claimed to have thought of fortifying the Rodriguez Canal, but by the 1820’s, it could be politically dangerous to do so.  

One of the most heated incidents occurred when newspapers reported that John Adair, the commander of the Kentucky militia at the battle implied that he had been the one to recommend the position along the Rodriguez Canal and the fortifications that the army dug. At first, many anti-Jackson newspapers repeated the story as a way to undermine Jackson’s credit for to the victory, but also to make fun of the old general’s supporters. “As the victory of the 8th January had been thought to deserve the Presidency, we think if these facts are made to appear that in common justice, Adair and not Jackson ought to me made President.”

The Democratic Party political machine quickly swarmed into action. Newspaper editors across the country denounced Adair for trying to steal Jackson’s glory and suggested that Adair showed great “magnanimity” in waiting more than ten years to set the record strait. After all, “it [was] wonderful that during the contest between him and Gen. Jackson” surrounding “the credit due to the Kentucky troops, [Adair’s] own gallantry in the field, and unrivalled wisdom in council, should never have

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9. In an earlier incident that the one described below, Jackson had to face of against no less a figure than James Monroe himself. Monroe, Secretary of War at the time of the battle believed that he should deserve at least as much credit for the victory as Jackson since it had been Monroe’s leadership on the strategic level that had allowed Jackson to succeed at the operational level. Donald B. Cole, *Andrew Jackson: The 1828 Election and the Rise of the Two-Party System* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009) 77-81.


11. *Richmond Enquirer*, September 5, 1826
been mentioned.” Jackson newspapers assured their readership that stories of Jackson not being the sole architect of the victory were patently false.¹²

Eventually, Adair publicly addressed the outcry against him and assured the American people that all of Jackson’s “measures for the defense of New Orleans, after [Adair] arrived there, were calculated to ensure success.” Adair himself “did not reach [Jackson’s] camps until the 3d of January, at which time his line of defense was nearly finished, and his men at their posts.” He then went one step further and rebutted the general’s detractors who claimed Jackson’s victory only meant he had guts and brawn, which hardly signaled one’s fitness for the White House. “The Commander in Chief of an army, in a difficult and complicated service, must possess a cool, calculating head, a vigorous mind, a rapidity of reasoning, with clear perceptions, that will bring him, at once, to conclusions, upon which he is ready to act.” Adair explained that he felt “there are fewer men, thus highly qualified to distinguish themselves at the head of an Army, than to fill any other station in any Government” and that “it would be unjust & illiberal to deny Genl. Jackson the possession of these qualifications.”¹³ What had started as an attempt by his detractors to undermine Andrew Jackson’s qualifications for government office and take away his seminal role as the battle’s hero, quickly became an opportunity for Jackson supporters to finagle a ringing endorsement of the general from a man that had once been a political rival.

Adair was not the only public figure pilloried into promoting the very individual they politically opposed, even Jackson’s old presidential campaign opponents, John

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¹² All quotes from Richmond Enquirer, September 5, 1826; For more reactions see Richmond Enquirer, September 8, 1826.

¹³ Pittsfield [MA] Sun, October 15, 1826; Baltimore Patriot & Mercantile Advertiser, December 2, 1826.
Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, also felt the pressure of supporting the battle, and by extension, Jackson. The first incident resulted from Adams’s attempt to court Jackson in 1824 by celebrating the battle. Because Adams had thrown such a lavish January 8\textsuperscript{th} celebration the year of the presidential election, proponents of Jackson immediately began to question the sitting president’s failure to host the former general at another commemoration in 1825 in the White House. For a public figure like the President of the United States to no celebrate a major holiday such as January 8 concerned the Jackson supporters. They publicly warned the President that such oversight “may turn out to be as fatal to Adams as to Packenham.”\textsuperscript{14} Adams had thrown Jackson a sumptuous celebration only a year earlier. Then in 1825, the Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s armed forces failed to show the old general and his veterans the proper respect they deserved. Surely, the President had chosen not to celebrate the battle out of base political animosity towards Jackson, and in the process, Adams sullied the name of the great general, the troops under Jackson’s command, and the memory of the event achieved some ten years earlier.

Jackson’s other major campaign opponent in the 1824 election, Henry Clay, also felt the pressure to support the battle and the general. Yet Clay also asserted the clarification that support of the battle’s memory did not necessarily equate to an endorsement of Jackson for President. “I take pleasure,” Clay informed a Lexington, Kentucky, audience “on every occasion to bestow upon [Jackson] merited praise for the glorious issue of the Battle of New Orleans. No American citizen enjoyed higher satisfaction than I did with that event … and felt grateful to him who had most

\textsuperscript{14} Salem Gazette, January 4, 1825.
contributed to the ever memorable victory.” Clay continued, explaining that he “believed and yet believe him to have trampled upon the constitution of his country [during Jackson’s conduct of the First Seminole War] and to have violated the principles of humanity. Entertaining these opinions, I did not and could not vote for him.”

Despite appeals to the American public by men like Henry Clay to separate commemorations of the Battle of New Orleans from celebrations and political endorsements of Andrew Jackson, the two subjects became increasingly fused together. The height of this melding occurred in 1828 as the three previous years’ groundwork finally paid dividends during the presidential campaign.

Jackson’s supporters needed to use the Battle of New Orleans, because as Jackson’s detractors later decried, the general had little record to run on. He was a folk hero who had risen in the ranks of public opinion through popular media. The 1824 election had proven that Jackson could come close to winning; indeed, he had gotten the majority of the popular and electoral votes. As the 1828 election drew nearer, Jackson supporters decided to use the popularity of the Battle of New Orleans to inflate the


16. As Adams and others began to realize Jackson was a serious contender for the office of the president in 1828, their supporters laid the groundwork for opposition to the former general. January 8th became the natural date to refute their claims and assertions in a public forum meant to celebrate the hero’s of New Orleans; Jackson among them. Abner Greenleaf, “Address Delivered at Jefferson-Hall, Portsmouth, N.H., Jan 8, 1828, Being the Thirteenth Anniversary of Jackson’s Victory at New Orleans,” (Portsmouth, N.H.: 1828)
general’s reputation even higher than it already had been in the minds of some voting Americans.17

The most important region for Jackson-men to try and build the general’s reputation in was the Northeast. Jackson already had considerable support in the South and the West, but in the old Federalist strongholds in the North, Jackson wielded less influence. In those decisive political battleground states, Jacksonians had to influence voters, and subsequently altered the memory of the Battle of New Orleans. Groups like the Jacksononians of Merrick County, New Hampshire, staged votes for whether they should commemorate the Battle of New Orleans in 1828. In fact, Jackson supporters performed this political theatre to show citizens’ willingness to support Andrew Jackson in the coming election.18

Jackson-friendly newspapers reported on the votes and proclamations to celebrate what most Americas already commemorated as a national holiday. The news stories also regularly emphasized a reference to the great hero of the day set apart from the main text by boldly capitalizing ANDREW JACKSON’s name. These votes and their publication enhanced the association of Jackson as the main feature of the battle and initiated the process of politicizing the Battle of New Orleans in a way that partisan politics had not done since the years immediately after the event when Jeffersonian

17. For example, in 1828 Amos Kendall called upon the citizens of Kentucky to form county nominating committees in preparation for a state convention to nominate Jackson as their party’s candidate for president. The date he proposed for the convention was January 8. Donald B. Cole, A Jackson Man: Amos Kendall and the Rise of American Democracy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004).
Republicans used the battle to weaken support for the Federalist Party in the Northeast.19

Unlike the Federalist Party, opponents of Andrew Jackson successfully fought the supporters of the general’s message at times. Papers loyal to John Quincy Adams ran stories decrying the blatantly partisan attempts to politicize what should have been an apolitical national holiday. These papers reported the “prodigious efforts” by Jackson supporters to celebrate the battle and informed their readers that “there was more ... electioneering than patriotism or gratitude in” the purpose of the January 8 celebrations organized in 1828.20

The debate concerning whether to celebrate the Battle of New Orleans anniversary in 1828 soon transitioned to a discussion surrounding how readers opposed to Andrew Jackson should commemorate the day if they still felt so inclined to take part in the patriotic activity. Residents of Hartford, Connecticut, decided that they should do so privately within the home. They felt that “certain ambitious and disappointed political aspirants have imprudently laid hold of the martial fame of General Jackson, and are seeking ... their devious way to political power and place, and are striving, by means of ’Jackson dinners’ ... to turn the hearts of the people to gluttony.” With no centralized national party apparatus, individuals or groups on the local level could use popular events like Jackson’s election campaign and the popularity of the Battle of New Orleans for private gain with relative ease. These events created a

distrust of those who supported the battle in a public way and lack of public commemoration would diminish the influence and memory of the battle over time.21

Local Democratic Party organizations throughout the Northeast flooded newspapers with stories of Battle of New Orleans commemorations despite the protests of their political opponents. During the winter of 1828, numerous people’s “hearts glow[ed] with gratitude to Gen. Jackson for his undeviating patriotism, and his victory at New Orleans.” In Portsmouth, New Hampshire, “the anniversary of the victory of New Orleans was celebrated by the Democratic Republicans with great joy.” Pittsfield, Massachusetts’s residents “friendly to the election of ANDREW JACKSON to the presidency” celebrated the thirteenth anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans. The Bay Staters toasted “the glorious War of 1812 – it taught American that ENEMIES were less dangerous than TRAITORS, and that Democrats might bid defiance to both.” Furthermore, “Andrew Jackson – the hero – the patriot – the Man of the People [had] learned how to govern his country by learning how to save it.”22

At the January 8 celebrations in Concord, New Hampshire, in 1828 a variety of speakers stood before the crowd and turned the Battle of New Orleans commemoration into a political rally for Jackson, just as many of the anti-Jackson newspapers had warned. Isaac Hill began the proceedings with a speech about the battle and its main


22. “hearts glow... from Concord New Hampshire Patriot, January 28, 1828; “the anniversary of the victory...” from Portsmouth New Hampshire Patriot, January 28, 1828; “friendly to the election ...” from Pittsfield [MA] Sun, January 24, 1828. See also Pittsfield [MA] Sun, January 17, 1828.
protagonist. He explained to the crowd that victory at New Orleans “could not have
been within the ordinary calculations of military results.” The scale of the American
success was too grand for history to attribute the success only to a well-placed mud
banquette. No “mere military chieftain” could attain such a success. Only a leader and
thinker of the highest order, like Jackson, could have won at New Orleans. Hill
continued with an examination of Jackson’s and John Quincy Adams’s youth as an
example of how the general’s rural background and self-made successes rooted his
hearty demeanor and rugged personality. J.B. Thornton then explained to the crowd
how Adams and his ilk represented nothing more than Federalists in sheep’s clothing; a
theme later expounded upon by the final speaker Nathan Felton.23

Felton wooed the crowd, explaining that at the end of the war the country was
“paralyzed by the existence of slaves in the South, and traitors in the North, who
seemed ready to rise, and act in concert with one another, and with the savages upon
our borders, on the first approach of a formidable force for their support.” By linking
the Hartford Convention attendees with British-recruited slave soldiers, hostile Native
Americans, and invading Redcoats, Felton allowed the audience to associate Federalists
with each listener’s greatest fear. Furthermore, he then identified Jackson as the
country’s savior from that fear.24

Allusions to Jackson’s deity-like status could be even more explicit. Francis
Yvonnet, speaking at a Troy, New York, Baptist church, explained to his audience that
when Jackson arrived at New Orleans, “he found a population composed of the

23. Isaac Hill, An Address, Delivered at Concord, N.H. January 8, 1828, Being the
Thirteenth Anniversary of Jackson’s Victory at New Orleans (Concord: Manahan, Hoag &
Co. 1828)
24. Ibid.
inhabitants of several nations, many of them disaffected towards our government, and others of such an abandoned character that the entrance of a hostile army would introduce into the city anarchy and confusion.” Despite the warnings of an imminent attack, “no military force had been organized” before Jackson’s appearance and “no arms provided for the few who might be disposed to use them; and [the locals], so little accustomed to the discipline of camp, that little reliance could be placed on them.” Jackson worked tirelessly to prepare the city’s defenses and denied himself sleep for four nights. Finally, the best he could show for his actions “was a small band, far inferior to their enemies’ number, consisting of men, fresh from walks of life, the simple yeomanry of the West, who now, for the first time, wielded the destructive implements of death, and whose commander, like themselves, was little accustomed to war.” Because the United States and Andrew Jackson had won that day despite everything going against them, “we are almost irresistibly led to the conviction, that not human agency, but a special interposition of Divine Providence, must have accomplished the victory.” If God had worked through Jackson once to thwart the British in their efforts against Great Britain, why should voters assume the Divine Maker did not have similar plans for Jackson as President of the United States?25

The results of the 1828 election surpassed even the wildest dreams of many Jackson supporters as the old general won by a more than two-to-one advantage in the Electoral College. The scale of the victory compared to James Monroe’s defeat of the

Federalist Party in 1816, with a few notable points. Unlike Monroe, Jackson had not been able to sell his message to many people in New England despite his supporters’ tireless efforts. The rough-around-the-edges, British-killing, Indian-fighter simply did not appeal to many people Northeasterners. Few New Englanders felt they could ignore Jackson’s lack of education, especially when the alternative candidate was a well-educated individual like John Quincy Adams.26

Jackson did continue to do well out west, though, and every state added to the Union west of the Appalachians tilted in the General’s favor during the election. Jackson’s campaign message brought forth through the promotion of the Battle of New Orleans highlighted ideals valued by rural Westerners or urban Eastern laborers, many of whom dreamed of being able to move out west some day. To retain this support during his first term, and to prepare for the 1832 presidential campaign, the newly styled Democratic Party continued to play to its base and held Battle of New Orleans celebrations throughout the presidency of Andrew Jackson. In time, January 8 not only became a famous day to celebrate the Battle of New Orleans and the architect of its success, but also a day of celebration for the Democratic Party in general.

Even in the Northeast, Jackson supporters championed the cause of their hero and maintained that Jackson’s opponents represented nothing more than Federalists in disguise. Charles Gordon Atherton pleaded with his listeners on January 8, 1829, to notice “the states, without any exception, which voted for the first Adams, have now

voted for the second.” People from those states in 1828 used “the same methods ... the same system of detraction and slander ... as by those who formerly opposed the great and illustrious Jefferson” in 1796 and 1800. Then, when the failures of the Federalist Party became clear after the War of 1812 the same people who decried Jefferson at the turn of the century “shrank from all imputations of hostility” and “before [Jefferson’s] death, went on pious pilgrimages to his residence, and now weep tears of shame and contrition over his grave.” Atherton assured his assembled congregation that “so it will be hereafter with those who have so insidiously reviled the Hero of New Orleans.”

Democracy would prove the closet New England Federalists wrong and the actions of Jackson and the memories of Jefferson and the Battle of New Orleans would provide the inspiration and the guiding principles for that victory.27

Despite the attention many Democratic writers focused on the supposed former Federalists of New England, there were many around the country uncomfortable with the use of the Battle of New Orleans in political campaigning. In Louisiana, of all places, the state legislature found itself struggling with the efforts of the Jackson supporters to co-opt what had become a popular annual holiday. As the state prepared for the 1828 commemoration of the victory at New Orleans, some legislators suggested that Jackson receive an invitation to the event since the old general had not yet attended one of the celebrations. On its face, the suggestion did not seem surprising, but once Jackson accepted the invitation the political machine of the future Democratic Party began promoting the event for presidential campaign purposes. The state legislature, which

contained a significant number of Adams supporters, issued a clarifying statement that Jackson’s attendance only commemorated the national holiday. If Jackson and his supporters wished to use the event for political reasons, the general would have to pay his own travel expenses.  

Desirous to have the general attend the Battle of New Orleans ceremonies since the memory of the event was the center of their political campaign, Jackson-men across the New Orleans area rallied funds for the general’s visit. Unfortunately for the future Democrats, the $6 per plate price of the subscription dinner they held to raise money for the general’s visit proved too pricy and they had to lower the entrance fee to $3. Though Jackson may have had to travel with less pomp and circumstance than his followers liked, roughly 35,000 met the old general on the wharf at New Orleans. Despite the efforts of the Adams supporters in the state legislature, Jackson once again proved triumphant at New Orleans and solidified the connection between his military victory and political aspirations at the site of the original battle.

Members of the Louisiana state legislature were not the only Southerners to find distasteful the blatant attempts to coopt the memory of the Battle of New Orleans into a presidential campaign. Some battle veterans of even decided in later years to excuse themselves from the annual commemorations because of their conviction that the events had become too politicized and Jackson too idolized. Beverly Chew, a member of the socially prestigious Beale’s Rifle Company had fought throughout the New Orleans

campaign. By the late 1820s and early 1830s he found himself so disgusted with how his neighbors commemorated the battle that he refused to participate in the annual gathering of veterans in New Orleans. Eventually these sorts of simple personal exemptions from commemoration became full blown attacks on the memory of the battle as anti-Jackson political sentiment grew during his presidential campaign and time in office.\textsuperscript{30}

During the course of anti-Jackson groups’ efforts to contend with the Democrats’ promotion of the battle, two prominent criticisms of the Battle of New Orleans surfaced. The first focused on the assertion that the armies fought the battle after diplomats in Ghent, Belgium, had signed the peace treaty. Though neither government had yet ratified the document, Jackson’s critics contended that the Battle of New Orleans held little actual importance to the war since the conflict had ended. In their eyes, the battle had been nothing more than “a mere mistake.” They assured Americans that they did not intend to “disparage the Battle of New Orleans,” but who would not feel “a pang at the thought that such a battle, with all its woe and carnage, was fought by two nations who were at that moment on terms of amity.”\textsuperscript{31} These individuals sought to dampen the overt nationalistic fervor of Jacksons’ victory by portraying the battle as a meaningless affair that should stand more as a lamentation of slow communication and the folly of war than as a resounding victory over a longtime foe.

Some New England Democrats continued arguing for the importance of the battle even in the face of these accusations. They asserted whenever they could that England frequently and famously broke treaties when it suited her national interest.

\textsuperscript{30} Sacher, 42, 60, 99. 
\textsuperscript{31} Middlesex [CT] Gazette, January 16, 1828;
They also maintained that control of New Orleans would have allowed Great Britain to control trade in the entire Southern half of the United States and dictate the nation’s westward expansion. Surely England would not pass up an opportunity such as that just because of a piece of paper signed in Belgium.32

The other flaw in the memory of the Battle of New Orleans that emerged in the years surrounding Jackson’s prominent period in American politics revolved around him being held in contempt of court following the battle. Anti-Jacksonians pointed to the incident as an example of his behavior as an autocratic military chieftain. They argued that by celebrating the battle, Americans also embraced the events surrounding the campaign including Jacksons’ tyrannical behavior while holding New Orleans under martial law.33

Criticisms of the battle and hesitancy to celebrate the victory because of its association with the political campaign of Andrew Jackson greatly altered the memory of the Battle of New Orleans for many Americans. The event transformed from being a popular nationalistic celebration of an American victory to political fodder for the Democratic Party. Opponents of the Democratic Party felt increasing concern about celebrating the battle because of its associations with their political opponents and

33. Sacher, 35; Cole, A Jackson Man, 140-141; Cole, Vindicating Andrew Jackson, 157-159; Amos Kendall, “General Jackson’s Fine.” United States Magazine and Democratic Review (New York), Jan. 1843, 58-77; Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 478-479. Jackson’s allies, like Amos Kendall, tried various efforts to combat the criticisms surrounding his behavior while the city was under martial law. Most notable was the argument that the women of New Orleans actually took up a collection to pay the fine for the general, and that Jackson, in his benevolence, asked that the money instead be donated to charity.
feared what would happen if those opponents got or retained power. The politicization of the battle meant that many Americans chose to either ignore passively the memory of New Orleans, at best, or actively degrade the memory, at worst. Despite their efforts, Democrats failed to accuse those who did not commemorate the battle of being unpatriotic. Unlike the Federalists before them, Jacksonians detractors successfully argued for the separation of battle memorialization from political usage. They asserted that they would still celebrate the victory on an annual basis just as they had before. Despite those assurances, the Democrats’ continued use of the battle’s memory caused Battle of New Orleans memorialization in the most anti-Jackson and anti-Democrat regions of the country to diminish over time. By the end of the 1830’s, large-scale public commemorations of the Battle of New Orleans became the exception rather than the rule in New England. 34

In the rest of the country, the Democrats’ efforts to promote their party through the Battle of New Orleans proved highly successful until the eve of the Civil War. Even Andrew Jackson’s departure from office did not slow the ability of party boosters to make the connection. Henry Gilpin, a Democratic Party member campaigning in Philadelphia, found the Battle of New Orleans still a popular way to generate interest in his political candidates during the 1836 election. He explained to the northerners gathered to hear his January 8th speech that “the blow [the troops at New Orleans]

34. Another possible explanation for the difference in the ability of the press and popular culture to manipulate New England sentiment in the late 1830’s as easily as in the late 1810’s is the literacy rate in New England and the level of readership and number of publications. As Richard Brown points out, by the 1840’s, New Englanders had such a diversity of information from which to choose from they it was possible to select their sources and insulate themselves from ideas they were less enthralled with. Richard D. Brown, *Knowledge Is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-1865* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 243-244.
struck was for the safety and welfare of the North, as much as for the protection and glory of the South.” If the fate had reversed the situations and Pennsylvania had defended the Delaware as Louisiana defended the Mississippi, Pennsylvanians would want Louisianans to remember what they did. Because of that, Americans could “never cease gratefully to cherish, and, as the anniversary returns, cheerfully to commemorate [the battle’s] sacrifices and triumphs.” Gilpin reminded his audience that while in Europe the majority of soldiers were paid “mercenaries” of the government, that had not yet been the case of United States troops and “such is the triumph we are assembled to celebrate.” The soldiers at New Orleans represented “sons of the forest and the plain, hastily summoned from their daily and necessary toil. They left their homes and their families; they deserted their fields from which the gained sustenance ... they sacrificed their comforts and risked their lives with no possible prospect of profit.” All the troops who fought at New Orleans wanted in return was “a consciousness of deserving gratitude of their country.” With the crowd now in a patriotic furor, Gilpin then abruptly changed tack and began a long tirade about the rise of the Whigs and why Martin Van Buren should be the next president of the United States.35

The post-Jackson Democratic Party furthered its association with the old general and his victory by linking its policies with the anniversary of the battle. Specifically it did this by making sure that the day the Democratic Party’s efforts to pay off the national debt coincided with the anniversary of the battle. They argued that it allowed the nation to celebrate Jackson’s two most important victories with greater ease, but it

35. Henry D. Gilpin, A Speech Delivered at the Union and Harmony Celebration, by the Democratic Citizens of the City and County of Philadelphia, of the Twenty-first Anniversary of the Victory of New Orleans, January 8, 1836 (Boston: Beales & Greene, 1836).
also meant that the party’s domestic political efforts would also always evoke memories of the great and important national memory of New Orleans. Soon every January 8, chapters of the Democratic Party held annual “Jackson Day” celebrations to memorialize the founder of their party, his actions in office, and the battle that rocketed him into the national consciousness.36

The parties became annual coming out balls for the prospective leadership of the Democratic Party and an opportunity for emerging politicians to network with the Old Guard of the organization. Throughout the antebellum period, the grandest and most influential of these gatherings occurred regularly in the nation’s capital. There, assembled in their finest clothes, the who’s who of the Democratic Party gathered and commemorated the Battle of New Orleans and the man it made. The party printed pamphlets of the proceedings and distributed them to state chapters of the organization around the country. The evening traditionally began with a recitation of the popularly remembered rendition of January 8, 1815. Traditionally, speakers placed particular emphasis on the irregular nature of the military forces arrayed to oppose the British. No less a figure than John Breckinridge brought the crowd to cheers when he recalled

36. Richmond Enquirer, January 3, 1835; Pittsfield [MA] Sun, January 8, 1835; Concord New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, January 17, 1835. Jackson Day balls and dinners continued to be held annually on January 8 until the eve of World War II when a shift began to hold the celebration of Jackson’s birthday rather than the anniversary of the battle. The Young Democratic Clubs of the District of Columbia Present the Jackson Day Dinner for the Benefit of the Democratic National Committee: to be Held at the Willard on Wednesday, January the Eighth, Nineteen Hundred and Thirty-six at Seven-thirty O’clock (Washington D.C.: National Capital Press, 1936).
how “that act of Jackson and his raw militia [would], in any future war be worth an army to the United States of America.”37

The annual Democratic Party balls assured that the memory of the Battle of New Orleans remained close in the consciousness of many Americans during the middle nineteenth century. Unfortunately for the battle’s memory, that image did not remain as positive as it had been in the early 1820’s. The political rise of Andrew Jackson, the architect of American victory at New Orleans left an indelible imprint on how many Americans thought about the January 1815 battle. For some the nation should celebrate the great victory on par with Saratoga and Yorktown. The Battle of New Orleans represented a testament to the moral and physical strength of the young nation. It secured the opportunity for westward expansion, saved the United States from division and conquest, and provided an inspiration for a fledgling nation. For others though, bullied by the politics of the Democratic Party, the Battle of New Orleans came to symbolize how easy the uneducated masses could be swayed. The battle became an example of blind unthinking patriotism and how individuals with a lust for power could manipulate the voting public. For these Americans, the Battle of New Orleans became

not only something that they refused to celebrate, but they also began to mock their neighbors for commemorating the annual event.\textsuperscript{38}

This attitude pervaded no region of the country more than the New England states. Despite Democratic efforts to follow the old models of James Madison and James Monroe in using the Battle of New Orleans to lure votes from the Northeast, their efforts failed. Whether it was because Democrats pushed too hard or because the memory of the Hartford Convention too old, Northeasterners proved more willing to confront the efforts of their political opponents in the 1830’s than they had been in the early 1820’s. Large-scale commemoration of the battle died out in New England as a result of the Democratic Party’s campaign tactics.

Despite losing the Northeast, proponents for celebrating the Battle of New Orleans still commemorated it in the rest of the country. Celebrations continued to rage every January 8, aided by the efforts of the Democratic Party. Only the most fervent Whigs in the South and the West excused themselves from celebrating a battle that had done so much for their livelihoods. In major East Coast cities like New York, the Democratic Party’s efforts to celebrate their organization kept the memory of the Battle of New Orleans alive and commemorated even into the Civil War.

The specter of slavery and fratricidal conflict haunted the United States throughout the 1850’s altering many aspects of American society, and the memory of New Orleans proved no exception. In 1852, only a year before he would give the speech at the unveiling of Clark Mills’ equestrian statue of Andrew Jackson, Stephen Douglas spoke at the annual January 8 celebration in Washington D.C.. Douglas asked the

assembled Democrats drawn from across the country, “how can such a union [as the United States] ever be dissolve?” After waiting for the “tremendous applause” to end, Douglas continued. “The North and South may quarrel and wrangle about a great question which should never enter the halls of Congress; but the Great West will say to the South, you must not leave us; and to the North, you must faithfully observe the Constitution.” At a forum meant to promote nationalism through the Battle of New Orleans’ memory, Douglas pleaded with the crowd to find a way to work though the sectional differences of the country. To Douglas, the Battle of New Orleans represented a national victory, one that Americans could look to as an example of the things the national could achieve if it worked together. Some Americans might disagree over domestic politics, but surely, Douglas asserted, an event like the Battle of New Orleans could inspire them to stick together in difficult times. The events of the next few years proved Stephen A. Douglas wrong.39

The citizens of New Orleans had always been proud of the statue. They placed it in the very center of their city. They renamed the 145-year-old square in honor of the statue’s figure. It had become a central meeting place for visitors and locals alike and a focal point of community activities. Now the statue appeared different, and many New Orleanians could not decide how that made them feel. There, on the pedestal of the statue to Andrew Jackson, were the words “THE UNION MUST AND SHALL BE PRESERVED.” This inscription had been the work of “the Beast,” General Benjamin Butler, during the Union occupation of New Orleans in 1863. In front of the statue, Union soldiers paraded on January 8 in “celebration” of Jackson’s victory.¹

The anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans had always been a national holiday, but it had especially been a New Orleans holiday. The battle represented what Americans could do but also provided an especially poignant example of what Southerners could do. In an evolving American national culture that depicted Southerners as strange or different because of their practice of slavery, or unpatriotic because of their strident claims for states’ rights, the Battle of New Orleans served as an example of Southern patriotism and genius.²

The use of the battle as a source of Southern martial pride and honor evolved as the nineteenth century progressed. That pride came to an awkward halt during the

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winter of 1862-1863. New Orleans had fallen to an enemy that once again invaded up the river. Just like the British in 1815, the Union military had superior numbers, more supplies, and greater professional training than the troops that defended the city. Unlike in 1815, though, the invader swiftly blew past the fortifications at the mouth of the Mississippi River and captured the city itself without firing a shot. To make matters worse, and more bizarre, the enemy this time celebrated the same holidays, knew the same history, and had been a friend only a few years before. Union General Benjamin Butler, the federal appointed military governor of the captured city, held membership in the same political party as the secessionist residents of the city and also worshiped the figure of Andrew Jackson as fervently as they did.³

The secession crisis, Civil War, and Reconstruction had profound impacts on how American society celebrated the Battle of New Orleans. The process started with Southerners’ increasing alienation -- voluntary at times and involuntary at others -- from the rest of American society. As a distinct Southern regionalism transformed into a regional nationalism, the memory of events like the Battle of New Orleans became subtly altered and new meanings developed. By the 1850s, Battle of New Orleans had became a Southern victory rather than an American victory won in the South. Southerners noted that their ancestors fought the battle while the ancestors of Northerners had shown cowardice and little martial prowess during the “second war of independence.” The South, not the North, shouldered the spirit of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison – all of whom, as antebellum Southerners recalled, were

Southern. Jackson and his victory at New Orleans became cornerstones of Southern martial pride and militarist thought during the antebellum era.4

Additionally, the Democratic Party used the Battle of New Orleans as a way to hold the party, and, by extension, the country, together. Jackson Day celebrations had always been central to the operation of the Democratic Party, and took on increased importance on the eve of the Civil War. The Jackson Day celebrations became an opportunity to reflect on a time when the regions of the country had gotten along reasonably well together and when expansionism and slavery had not yet become the divisive partisan issues they were in the 1850’s. For Northern Democrats January 8 was a time to focus on national unity and patriotism; a chance to remind all parties involved that their hero, and a Southerner, Andrew Jackson, had been a unionist.5

For some Southerners though, January 8 celebrations became a reminder of how much times had changed, which fueled their desire for war. The celebrations also reminded them that the South had defeated a larger, more industrialized, enemy before and offered the fallacious hope that they could do it again. Popular memory’s omissions of the numerous artillery batteries, professionally designed earthworks, and the minimal effect of aimed rifle fire during the famous eighth of January lulled the South into thinking a fight against the North would be far easier than it really would be.


After the South lost the Civil War, the region found itself occupied by an army that also celebrated the Eighth of January and, at times, took considerable pride in celebrating the event in a way that further insulted the South. Actions like Benjamin Butler’s inscription of Jackson’s unionist sentiments on a monument to the hero of the Battle of New Orleans confused the South’s memory of the battle. Southern commemoration of the battle dimmed in the aftermath of the Civil War.

The Democratic Party attempted to once again use the battle as an example of national unity as it had in the 1830’s and 1840’s, but with people like Butler involved in the party at the national level those efforts largely failed. Outside the political arena, during the years following Reconstruction, celebrations of the Battle of New Orleans diminished in both size and scope. Only in the namesake city itself did the battle’s memory carry on to any significant degree, and even there occasional lulls happened, causing local newspapers to note that it seemed as if no one was celebrating. In the wake of the Civil War, as the “Lost Cause” became fully entrenched into the Southern psyche, many Southerners grew disenchanted with the idea of celebrating any an American holiday. From the 1850’s to the 1880’s, the memory of the Battle of New Orleans became a contested battleground in which various groups tried to shape the memory of the event to their own political aspirations.6

As the antebellum period began, Democrats found it increasingly hard to keep the sectional halves of their party together. As Southern fears of Northern intrusion on the economy and society of the Deep South grew, Democrats below the Mason-Dixon line came to think of themselves increasingly as a unique cultural construction. That new self-identification had a profound impact on the memory of the Battle of New Orleans and the way Southerners came to think of themselves regarding the engagement.7

Traditionally, the focus of who fought on the American side at New Orleans had always been the western frontiersman. This individual had blazed a trail through the Cumberland Gap, fought off the hostile Native Americans in the region, and preserved the Louisiana Purchase from the crafty designs of the Spanish and the British. Technically, though, the idea that the “Western” states and territories provided the bulk of Jackson’s manpower was not entirely accurate. Some people argued for a further distinction. After all, Ohio and Indiana units did not serve on Jackson’s line; nor did Michiganders or Illinoisans take part in the decisive battle. Rather, Jackson’s “western” heroes hailed from Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, and what became Alabama and Arkansas. States and territories west of the Appalachians could take pride

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knowing they performed better than troops drawn from the East. The states and territories that allowed slavery could also argue for the lion’s share of the distinction from the Battle of New Orleans, the most famous battle of the war.  

Southerners had used this boast numerous times since the January 1815 battle. Indeed, even as early as the 1820’s some writers felt compelled to argue for a more nuanced understanding of which portion of the country should get the most credit for the battle. In the so-called “Era of Good Feelings,” though, most Jeffersonian Democrats found it far more politically expedient to use the memory of the Battle of New Orleans for unifying purposes than to fuel sectional distinction. The Jeffersonians and later the Jacksonians did not intend the promotion of the westerner to encourage the region per se, but rather to support the regions’ stereotyped lifestyle and political leanings. For some Southerners on the eve of the Civil War, those preexisting publicities transformed into arguments that secession was possible, despite the logistical and numerical advantages the North had.  


9. For early uses of the battle as an example of Southern and Western state’s military prowess see: Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, December 13, 1816; Baltimore Patriot, January 8, 1822; Charlestown Franklin Monitor (MA), March 18, 1820; Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle, February 3, 1818. For more on the social implications of the growing militarism in the South see: Jennifer R. Green, Military Education and the Emerging Middle Class in the Old South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Rod Andrew, Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839-1915 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
Interestingly, the secession crisis was not the first time Southerners used the Battle of New Orleans to promote military activity or argue for Southern military prowess. As early as 1836, Southerners moving into northern Mexico or Tejas argued that to defeat a larger better-trained army, as General Jackson had done, one need only follow his model. Numerous Anglo-speaking Texians in their war for independence, looked to Jackson’s victory as inspiration and motivation for defeating the large European-style army of Antonio López de Santa Anna. For these men, having fought at the Battle of New Orleans was the ultimate boast of one’s martial distinction. The success of the rebels in the Texas Revolution and the subsequent mythology that arose in its aftermath fueled the already potent desire of some Southerners seeking sources of martial pride and distinction from the North.10

Some Southerners felt that they could generate support their audience if they portrayed the South as a victim. The troops at New Orleans, all Southerners, had saved the country from impending threat, and in return they received was criticism and looks of disdain from the rest of the country in the 1850’s. There had been a time when, as Andrew Ewing reminded his January 8, 1859, audience, “The war-cries of slavery and anti-slavery, union and dis-union, abolition and anti-abolition were ... unknown. The religious associations were still harmonious, and brethren everywhere recognizing each other as members of the same church.” He proclaimed that only few years earlier

“the religious associations were still harmonious, and brethren everywhere recognizing each other as members of the same church. The Northern schoolmaster was warmly welcomed in the South, and the Southern orator heard with delight throughout New England.” In those “halcyon days” of the past, “Southern troops ... were proudly estimated throughout the Union, and the names of Jackson, Carroll and others, were fondly cherished on the banks of the Ohio, the Kennebec, the Hudson, and the Delaware. According to Ewing, though, Jackson’s mere name had now “become a watchword of contest from the Aroostook to the placid waters of the Pacific.”¹¹

Despite what Ewing may have thought, many Northern Democrats, and even some Southern Democrats, longed for a political figure like Jackson to emerge. For the sake of their party's preservation as a national organization, Democrats felt they needed a leader who would transcend sectional differences and hold the union together. After all, during the 1830s, Jackson had stopped South Carolina’s talk of nullification and secession. As Alexander Everett had said to his January 8 crowd some twenty-three years before Ewing’s speech, “the of Disunion which, under the specious and seductive shape of State Sovereignty will attempt to undermine the foundations of our national greatness shall sink dismayed into silence at your rebuke.” If Americans wanted to preserve the great republican experiment that multiple generations of Americans had already fought for, they would have to focus on union over state sovereignty.¹²


¹². Alexander Hill Everett, An Address Delivered at Salem on the Eighth of January, 1836, at the Request of the Democratic Young Men of That Place, in Commemoration of the Victory of New Orleans (Boston: Beals & Greene, 1836)
Just at it had in 1832, the idea of secession again reared its head in the days before the Compromise of 1850. During the summer of that year, delegates from nine Southern states met in Nashville to discuss the possibility of secession from the Union if the United States Congress could not reach an acceptable decision on issues involved with the western expansion of the United States and slave states’ representation in the government. In response to these overtures, native Tennessean and prominent Southern Democrat Robert Armstrong assured the public he would “unsheathe the sword and rally the people of Tennessee to expel [the Convention], as entertaining treasonable designs.” Significantly, Armstrong was not talking about just any sword. Rather, it was the sword that Andrew Jackson had carried at the Battle of New Orleans and that he had given to Armstrong for loyal service during the British invasion. The mention of the sword, the general, and the battle at a moment of crisis like the 1850 Nashville Convention served as a pointed reminder to those contemplating secession that individuals had broached the idea before. Jackson handled the secessionists in 1832 just as he handled the British in 1814-15. If 1850s secessionists tried anything, those still loyal to the union, to Jackson, and to the memory of the battle would stop them.13

To accomplish that union, Americans would have to learn from their past and preserve the memory of events like New Orleans. On the eve of the Civil War, few states were more perplexed by the idea of union and secession than Missouri. Perhaps

sensing the tumultuousness of the times, Reverend W. M. Leftwhich could not help but editorialize while addressing the Missouri General Assembly on January 8, 1859. His lecture on the Battle of New Orleans began in a standard fashion by focusing on how Jackson with “only two regiments of regular troops, and a single regiment of Tennessee volunteers ... advanced to the field of conflict.” To his credit, he even mentioned that Old Hickory “called upon the free colored of Louisiana to defend their native soil from invasion by a foreign foe, and invoked the very pirates who infested the neighboring coasts to the rescue.” Leftwhich then began a colorful and dramatic rendition of the final battle and seemed poised to close by informing the assembled politicians "the 8th of January is observed by the nation as a great commemorative festival, only subordinate to the 4th of July." The reverend, though, had still more to say. Leftwich boomed,"when the American people cease to commemorate, with appropriate ceremonies, the events and names associated with these days, it will be a national calamity which ‘good men and true’ will deeply deplore.” He assured them that “When the strife of party, the warring of hostile sections, the jarring of contending factions, the wild spirit of fanaticism, the trickery of office-hunters, the love of money, applause and power, shall obliterate these festivals from the temples and altars of our country, then will our national gratitude degenerate -- then will our patriotic fires smolder to ashes, and our country’s alters crumble to decay.”

Reverend Leftwich reminded them that because of the Battle of New Orleans, "democratic liberty found a home between the seas and amid mountains.” During the

years following the revolution, the country had faced numerous troubles and vast resources lay untapped, but because of the battle, "a constellation hung over the ‘Chambers of the South,’ agriculture, industry, and trade all increased out west.” The event inspired a national confidence -- raised higher the national standard, and threw a blaze of glory upon the prowess of American arms." All of this success came because of God’s will Leftwich claimed; He had blessed the United States with this success and no human had the right to interfere with that.\textsuperscript{15}

For organizations like Tammany Hall in New York, perhaps the country’s largest and most organized seat of Democratic power, January 8 became all the more important in celebrating the actions and successes of the Democratic Party. As the political crisis in the country became increasingly difficult throughout the 1850’s, January 8 represented a day on which Democrats could pat themselves on the back and declare that they held the country together. “Against corrupt combinations of the Pulpit and the Press,” Democrats toiled to operate as a national party that bridged sectional division, just as the illustrious Andrew Jackson had done. To many of them, the movement against slavery represented just as great a threat to the security of the Union as the British had in 1815. Therefore, for these Democrats, their celebrations in Tammany hall, “decorated for the occasion by a full length portrait of our excellent chief magistrate, flags, tri-colors and union jacks, and suitable mottoes,” became a tangible

measure of their commitment to the union of the United States. Though they may not have said so in the same terms as Reverend Leftwich, for the Democrats at Tammany Hall, actively remembering the Battle of New Orleans became a source of patriotic pride that encouraged their commitment to hold the union together. The problem for these Democrats though was that the memory of the battle lacked a monolithic nature. Just as Southerners developed their own interpretation of the battle before the Civil War, events during and after the sectional conflict drastically impacted the Battle of New Orleans’s memory and its usefulness as a source of both unity and division.16

The height of the secession crisis occurred forty-six years after the decisive battle creating mixed feelings about how to celebrate the day. In New York City, the celebration of the battle became a celebration of “union-loving citizens to demonstrate their attachment to the confederation of States forming the great republic.”17 Across the North, other communities joined the spirit of the occasion and celebrated their attachment to the Union through the only major patriotic celebration to occur during the secession crisis. In Oswego, New York, “A national salute was fired ... in honor of General Jackson's firmness in resisting nullification in 1832.” Out west, in Marshall, Michigan, “one hundred guns” were “fired here today for the Union” on January 8. Just a hundred miles away in Detroit, “the Union men ... irrespective of party, are now firing one hundred guns in honor of the memory of Jackson, the hero of New Orleans.” In all,

the *Milwaukee Daily Sentinel* reported more than eighteen celebrations held in major cities around states that had not seceded. Reports of these events attempted to link General Andrew Jackson and Major Robert Anderson, garrison commander at the besieged Fort Sumter.¹⁸ For these Americans, the January 8th celebrations provided an opportunity to reaffirm their attachment to the union through the Battle of New Orleans’ memory.¹⁹

In the South, the situation became much more complicated, perhaps no more so than in the city associated with the 1815 battle. For a city the size of New Orleans, and one so closely connected to both the North and the South economically, the Civil War became an especially ideologically divisive event. Throughout the war, both sides attempted to win the allegiance of factions among the city’s large and diverse population. The issue became even more complicated after New Orleans fell to Union forces in April 1862. From that moment until 1877 New Orleans found itself under military occupation, which altered greatly the city’s perception of the battle.²⁰

One of the first incidents occurred just as Union forces took possession of the city. From the moment Louisiana seceded, members of the city’s free men of color

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population petitioned for service in defense of their home state. Veterans of the original Battle of New Orleans led the formation of these units. These men served in the two free men of color battalions formed immediately before the British invasion and had been staples of city’s commemoration of the battle throughout the Jacksonian and Antebellum periods. Citizens of New Orleans held the veterans in high regard and when they volunteered for service during the secession crisis, many Louisianans supported them. The governor of the state accepted the unit into state service and dispatched communications to Confederate President Jefferson Davis offering the Louisiana Native Guard Regiment to the Confederate Army for active use in the field.²¹

The Confederate government failed to reply to the overtures from Louisiana, and it quickly became apparent to the members of the Native Guard that their new government did not want their services at the national level. Despite this racial snub, the men volunteered for militia service in the city until its capture by Union forces. After the fleet of Admiral David Farragut arrived on the Mississippi River opposite the French Quarter, the men offered their service to the Union Army, again hoping to provide some useful and patriotic duty. Union general Benjamin Butler enjoyed the idea of allowing the unit to serve because he needed troops and wanted to promote Unionists sentiment in the city.²²


²² For more on the Louisiana free people of color regiments’ in the Union Army see: Nathan W. Daniels, and C. P. Weaver, ed., Thank God My Regiment an African One: The Civil War Diary of Colonel Nathan W. Daniels (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998);
Butler’s subsequent efforts to encourage unionism in the city raised considerable ire from his superiors, the public, and even foreign nationals. The longest lasting of all of Butler’s activities directly challenged some Southerners’ memories of the Battle of New Orleans and the understanding of it many of them had grown to accept by the eve of the Civil War. At the heart of the French Quarter lay the old place de armes. During the 1850's, the city leaders rechristened the old parade ground “Jackson Square” with a nearly exact replica of Clark Mill’s equestrian statue of Jackson located at the center.23

Upon viewing the statue, Butler decided to make an improvement. Specifically, he chose a feature planned for the original statue in Washington, but that Clark Mills had not actually implemented. In July of 1862, during a string of patriotic celebrations, speeches, and American flag raisings around the city, Butler ordered the words “THE UNION MUST / AND / SHALL BE PRESERVED” inscribed in the granite of the statue’s pedestal. For Confederates who had come to think of the Battle of New Orleans as a call to Southern martial pride, Butler’s desecration of the statue served as a hurtful reminder that the man they adored had not only been a Southerner and a slave owner, but also a fervent unionist. The celebrations of the Union Army that occurred thereafter on January 8 during the military occupation of New Orleans only further limited the

23. For more on the history of the place de armes see Lawrence N. Powell, The Accidental City: Improvising New Orleans (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2012); Leonard V. Huber, Jackson Square Through the Years (New Orleans: Friends of the Cabildo, 1982).
enjoyment Confederate-leaning Southerners could gain from the Battle of New Orleans’ memory.24

The Union war effort found other ways to make the memory of the Battle of New Orleans useful beside convincing secessionists of their mistakenness. Democrats decried many of President Abraham Lincoln’s actions during the war, especially his suspension of *habeas corpus*. In a witty riposte to his critics, Lincoln issued a long and stinging rebuttal that used one of the Democratic Party’s favorite events against it. After the final January 8 battle, Jackson continued to hold New Orleans under martial law until convinced the British no longer posed a viable threat. Many of the city’s residents objected to what they considered Jackson’s extraordinary measures and began to protest, at which point Jackson arrested one of the most prominent of them. When ordered by the local Federal Court Judge to release the arrested man, Jackson then had the judge arrested.25

For decades after the incident, political opponents on both sides of the aisle continued to debate the events of early 1815. Democrats insisted for almost fifty years that Jackson was right in his decision making while he held the New Orleans under martial law while the British had it under threat of immanent danger. How, Lincoln argued, did this differ from the situation he faced? In fact, the threat to the United States seemed considerably greater in 1863 than it had been in the winter of 1815.

because the enemy was closer, had more resources, and had greater numbers than the British could have ever martialed during their invasion.²⁶

Despite some limited uses, the Battle of New Orleans remained largely a Democratic Party event. In fact, as the war ended, the Democratic Party once again took up the Battle of New Orleans as a unifying force between the North and the South. Because of the gains made by the Republican Party during the war, and the known intentions of many Radical Republicans towards Reconstruction, Northern and Southern Democrats needed each other.²⁷

Though rebuilding trust would take time, the memory of the Battle of New Orleans could provide the Democratic Party a logical place to begin. The battle had “become so interwoven with the political history of the American people, that it [was] by no means probable that it [would] ever be expunged from the national calendar.” It had “mingled too deeply with the vital interests of our people ever to be forgotten.”²⁸ Though the war represented a traumatic experience for everyone, northern Democrats wagered that Southerners still remembered that they had made worthy political allies at one point and hoped the Battle of New Orleans might help close the rift between


²⁸. G. Volney Dorsey, An Address on the Character and Services of Andrew Jackson: Delivered by Invitation, Before the General Assembly of Ohio, January 8, 1864 (Columbus, OH: Glenn, Thrall & Heide, 1864)
them. Yet Northern Democrats failed to realize prominent members of their own party had been instrumental for some of the most outrageous events of the war. After all, Benjamin Butler was a Democrat.

Throughout the post-war period, newspapers around the country printed announcements of the annual January 8 celebrations. Southerners could hardly take pride in these events when the most prominent members of the national gatherings were northern generals of George Meade, Winfield Scott Hancock, and William Tecumseh Sherman. These men had systematically destroyed the Confederate States of America and bested Southern military prowess. They had proved falseness of Southern martial boasts; how could the Democratic Party expect Southerners to cavort with these men at an event to celebrate a victory that the South had increasingly tried to claim as its own?29

While some Southerners did retain the southern nature of the battle, for the most part interest in the event waned. No longer did numerous notices of annual Jackson Day picnics and militia parades appear in the newspapers of American cities, either South or North. Perhaps Americans knew the realities of war too well to “celebrate” a battle with a feast. The South also found it awkward to commemorate a victory won by an army that occupied its cities until 1877. Whatever the reasons, except for large Democratic Party gatherings, celebrations of the Battle of New Orleans diminished in both number and scale from the mid 1860’s to the mid 1880’s.30

29. Las Vegas Daily Gazette [New Mexico Territory], January 9, 1883; Las Vegas Daily Gazette, January 17, 1884; Nashville [TN] Republican Banner, January 6, 1867; Nashville [TN] Republican Banner, January 10, 1868
30. San Antonio Express [TX], January 11, 1868. For more on the reaction of Southerners to the war and their qualms about reconciliation see: Scott Reynolds
The sectional dispute of the mid-nineteenth century had a profound impact on the memory of the Battle of New Orleans. Though the period began with many Southerners trying to frame the battle as a regional victory that represented their martial prowess, Democrats at the national level strove to retain the battle as a source of national unity that overcame regional differences. The problem for these Democrats was that so much of the memory of the battle focused on the role of the rifle-armed Kentucky and Tennessee militiamen. Though Kentucky and Tennessee were border states with significant amounts of unionist sentiment, by 1860, the descendants of Jackson’s militiamen had populated Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.31

The legend of the western frontiersman promoted the idea of martial virility among descendants of Jackson’s soldiers and those that lived near them. Success in later conflicts only catalyzed the already boisterous attitude of Southerners, as men like David Crockett and Sam Houston led fellow veterans of the 1812 war in new military campaigns further west. Throughout the period, one of the greatest marks of distinction a man could have in his obituary in the Old Southwest was that he had served with Jackson at New Orleans. The Battle of New Orleans became the standard by which Southerners measured military prowess.

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That success in battle came to a violent halt though during the 1860's as Southerners lost the Civil War. The Union had attacked New Orleans with superior numbers and equipment just as the British had, but this time Western and Southern ingenuity had failed. To make matters worse, Union forces celebrated the January 8 holiday almost the same way as Southerners. The main distinction, though, was the reminder that Jackson himself had been a unionist and threatened to lead personally the effort to squash nullification and secession during his presidency. The commanding officer of the New Orleans occupation force also affixed permanently a reminder of that unionist sentiment on the city’s monument to its great hero.

After the war, the Democratic Party tried to use the battle as a source of sectional healing. With former Union generals maintaining prominent roles in the party, reconciliatory overtures went largely unheeded. While Democrats around the country still celebrated January 8, the day became far more about the party and less about the battle with each passing anniversary. In addition, because the parties usually included gatherings of prominent social figures highly placed within the party, these efforts at commemoration failed to connect to the average American.

For Americans trying to process the experiences they had just undergone in the Civil War, their minds turned more to the conflicts in which they themselves fought rather than the battles of their ancestors. Soldiers who had faced the slaughter of Pickett’s Charge or Fredericksburg probably felt a kinship for the British soldiers that Jackson’s troops had cut down on the sugarcane fields of the Chalmette plantation. At the same time, Southern soldiers faced the confusion of how they could have lost the war. Events like the 1815 Battle of New Orleans had shown them that their bloodline
possessed martial prowess. As the various strands of the Lost Cause mentality began to come together, many Southern men focused on their own memories of battle rather than on the historical memory of a battle they had not fought.32

Less than six miles down river from the “defaced” statue of Andrew Jackson stood another statue forgotten by many. The partially completed obelisk, covered in weeds, stood only yards away from the dilapidated remains of the rampart from behind which Jackson’s soldiers fired on the British. The monument’s construction began in 1855 as part of the same efforts to construct the much-venerated equestrian statue of Jackson at the heart of the French Quarter. Though the battlefield monument would be a memorial to both the general and his army, it received far less attention than the more prominently located equestrian statue.33

By 1859, money for the monument’s construction had run out, and, because of the outbreak of the Civil War and the resulting period of Reconstruction, no more money appeared for some time. Civil War soldier Elisha Stockwell of the Fourteenth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry noted that “the monument wasn’t finished, and there were a lot of bricks around there. Some boys in another company got some of them and


built a Dutch oven of them, using mud for mortar.” Twenty years later, the top of the monument was “covered with warped boards, and some of the top stones [had] fallen.” The visitor sadly noted that “a general air of decay prevail[ed] about the structure.”

The seeds of renewed interest in the site began to take hold by 1890. In a long letter to the editor of the New Orleans *Times-Democrat*, “An Admirer of Andrew Jackson” wrote that they had recently visited the site and could not “refrain from an expression of disgust as a result of the trip. The approach from the river is through a narrow lane, so grown up in weeds and underbrush that even the narrow footpath is almost impassible for ladies by reason of this growth, reaching to eight or ten feet in height.” Further, “the entire inclosure [sic] surrounding the monument was filled with weeds and rank vegetation eight or ten feet high, and without even footpaths by which the structure can be approached.” The individual wondered if “in the name of common decency invoked by the innate patriotism of every American, inaugurate some reform in existing conditions” or “wage such a war upon the negligent authorities who permit so flagrant an outrage as will result in a public sentiment sufficiently strong to force them to their duty to the country and this community?” The activism of this “Admirer of Andrew Jackson” would combine with the growing efforts of new movements undertaken Progressivism and women’s patriotic societies to inspire a revival of the

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Battle of New Orleans’s memory and help begin healing the sectional wounds of the nation.\textsuperscript{35}

Chapter 5: “True Daughters of the War”

The monument made for an impressive sight: a 100-foot tall tower of marble that shined brightly in the crisp winter air. Only a decade before, the Chalmette Monument sat half-finished and nearly forgotten in a cow pasture. Now in January 1915, it stood overlooking the 15,000 spectators gathered around its base. These admirers had come from around the United States to be on the spot where, exactly one hundred years earlier, Andrew Jackson and his army defeated the invading forces of Great Britain.

Five “true daughters” of the engagement’s participants sat in the shadow of the monument as the United States Daughters of 1812 organization dedicated the obelisk “to the memory of the American soldiers who fell in the Battle of New Orleans.” With that, an American and British flags rose up the shaft of the monument celebrating 100 years of peace between the United States and Great Britain that followed the battle.\(^1\)

Considering the apathy towards the battle’s commemoration during the turn of the twentieth century, the event had been a remarkable success. From the 1890s to the 1910s, the public memory of the Battle of New Orleans received bursts of attention and enthusiasm, thanks to women’s patriotic organizations around the country. These groups played an important role in battlefield and historic site preservation across the United States. In the South, groups like the Daughters of 1812 were especially

\(^1\)“True daughters” *New Orleans Times Picayune*, 9 January 1915; “to the memory of...” located on the plaque affixed on the observation deck in the Chalmette Monument.
important because they provided opportunities for white Southerners still upset over the Civil War to reengage in American patriotic events.

In the early 1890s, numerous ladies patriotic organizations formed across the country such as the Colonial Dames, the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC). The UDC in particular played a prominent role in shaping American historical memory, especially in the South. The UDC formed in 1894 through the national consolidation of numerous state organizations. These hereditary patriotic organizations originally organized with the intention of caring for Confederate veterans, widows, and orphans. Yet they quickly became vehicles for airing Southern grievances and coordinating resistance to federal government interference in Southern society. Considered less threatening because they consisted of organized women’s groups rather than gatherings of men who might take up arms, the U.S. government paid little attention to these meetings. Groups like the UDC played a critical role in shaping the memory of the Civil War and in developing the Lost Cause in the South.²

The United Daughters of 1812 also wrote its official charter in Washington, D.C. around the time the UDC formed. The Daughters of 1812 slightly predated the UDC, and formed with the purpose of promoting U.S. rather than Confederate patriotism. The 1812 organization even chose blue and grey for its official colors, ostensibly for the blue worn by the Navy and the grey worn by the army during the war. This color scheme

also represented a less-than-subtle suggestion of the group’s true intentions. The organization strove to emphasize an era before the Civil War, when, as they saw it, regional division did not threaten to tear the country apart. By the early 1900s, the popular memory of the War of 1812 depicted a second American Revolution when the various states of the union fought as one in a common cause. That memory appealed to some Southerners who grew tired of the Lost Cause and the constant emphasis on a lost war. The successes of the War of 1812 in the west appealed to people during the 1890s and 1900s for the same reasons historians have identified for the Daughters of the Republic of Texas’ advances in the same period. In New Orleans especially, home to the South’s greatest non-Civil War military success, the Daughters of 1812 grew dramatically in membership.3

The New Orleans area Daughters of 1812 had assistance in their chapter’s formation because they possessed a tangible goal with which to rally support: the completion of the Chalmette Monument. Only one year after the chapter’s formation in 1893, the Daughters successfully petitioned the State of Louisiana to hand over administration of the land surrounding the monument to the organization. The state also granted the Daughters a paltry $2,000 that basic care and maintenance of the grounds quickly exhausted. Undeterred, the Daughters commissioned an engineering

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report, focusing on the necessary steps to finish the memorial to Jackson and his army. Armed with this report, the Daughters travelled to Washington, D.C. to meet with President Theodore Roosevelt and a House of Representatives committee. Through their efforts, they persuaded the federal government to contribute $25,000 for the completion of the monument. Despite this, the appropriation made it clear that the Daughters would fund all future care and maintenance. The State of Louisiana also transferred ownership of the land to the U.S. War Department in 1907.4

Upon the completion of the monument in 1908, the New Orleans area Daughters of 1812 assumed official stewardship of the battlefield and monument. Unlike the Ladies Hermitage Association in Nashville and the Mount Vernon Ladies Association in Virginia, the Daughters had limited opportunities for fundraising at the Chalmette battlefield. While the historic homes of Nashville and Mount Vernon required constant renovation and upkeep, they also acted as showpieces to help generate fundraising. Tourists could daytrip from Washington or Nashville to visit the homes of Jackson and Washington and escape the rigors of the urban scene, but Chalmette offered few comforts. The rural pastureland surrounding the battlefield began to change even as the Daughters took over the battlefield’s stewardship.5

4. Louisiana Act No. 8 (January 17, 1894); An Act Providing for the Completion by the Secretary of War of a Monument to the Memory of the American Soldiers who fell in the Battle of New Orleans as Chalmette, Louisiana, and Making the Necessary Appropriation Thereof, 59th Cong., 2nd sess. (March 4, 1907)
The Chalmette battlefield sits on valuable waterfront property along the Mississippi River. In 1905, the New Orleans Terminal Company announced plans to build a docking slip a few hundred yards from the monument. Construction crews completed the slip two years later and, by the time they finished, the location of Jackson’s headquarters lay underwater. The development of the shipping slip also cut motor access to the battlefield that had traditionally come from a road along the Mississippi River. In addition, the river itself, long the primary method of travel became increasingly less frequented as the twentieth century progressed.

The Terminal Company also purchased land between the Chalmette monument and the U.S. military cemetery built during the Civil War -- land over which British and American forces had fought throughout the New Orleans campaign. Yet, the company could not develop the property because an African American neighborhood known as Fazendville sat in the center of the parcel and its residents refused to sell. Industrial development continued further down river, a location where the British headquarters and December 23 night battle occurred. The Daughters, who relied on the sale of pecans from the battlefield’s trees, raised funds through membership dues and renting the land north of the monument for pasture. They still had trouble competing with the industrialization transformation surrounding their site. Luckily for the Daughters and the community of Fazendville, the slip’s construction affected access to the military cemetery. The War Department persuaded the terminal company to provide land for a right-of-way over nearby train tracks and the Parish of St. Bernard to extend a nearby
highway so that visitors could have access to the cemetery. By extension, this right-of-way also preserved road access for the battlefield and the community of Fazendville.6

The New Orleans Daughters constantly battled industrialization, lack of funds, and even Mother Nature. After lightning struck the monument, the Daughters asked the war Department to help defray the expense of the repairs. Legally, though, the federal government could do little without going through the time and trouble of getting Congress to amend the law that banned the U.S. government from providing money for the site’s maintenance. Further, powerful commercial interests worked against the Daughters. Unlike Mount Vernon and the Hermitage, which existed in rural areas, the battlefield rested on property that a 1921 report found to be worth $500,000 on the open market.7

Despite what must have been a frustrating decade of lobbying and petitioning, the Daughters of 1812 had a great deal to celebrate. Through their efforts, they raised awareness concerning the plight of the Chalmette Monument, organized a campaign to complete the structure, and renewed efforts to memorialize the Battle of New Orleans. They did so in the face of pervasive industrialization in Chalmette and a resilient Lost Cause sentiment in the City of New Orleans itself that offered vast sums of money for Confederate memorialization. Also, despite the construction around it, and the

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7. F. Arnemann to United States Daughters, 1776 to 1812, December 6, 1909, United States Daughters of 1812, Chalmette Chapter, Papers, Tulane University Special Collections; House Report No. 81 to accompany House Resolution 2232, An Act in Reference to a National Military Park on the Plains of Chalmette (November 19, 1921).
difficulty of getting to it, the most important 16 acres of the battlefield remained intact. With the centennial of the battle just a few years away, the group could feel optimistic.\(^8\)

Though the Daughters of 1812 made many positive gains in New Orleans and played a major role in advocating for a restored Chalmette battlefield, they made no such headway in Tennessee. This lack of enthusiasm may seem surprising in light of the Volunteer State’s prominent role in the War of 1812 and at the Battle of New Orleans. Even so, the Tennessee Daughters of 1812 counted only twenty members statewide in the 1910s. Instead, the Ladies Hermitage Association took the lead in Tennessee War of 1812 memorialization.\(^9\)

After the Civil War, the state used Andrew Jackson’s home, Hermitage, as a respite for aging Southern veterans. In 1856, the state of Tennessee paid $48,000 to needy descendants of Old Hickory who could no longer take care of the 500-acre property. By 1889, the newly chartered Ladies Hermitage Association (LHA) took possession of the 25 acres that included Jackson’s mansion and tomb, holding the state

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land in trust for the specific purpose of promoting patriotism and tourism to the Nashville area.\textsuperscript{10}

The LHA soon decided that the best way to promote interest in the site, and by extension Jackson and patriotism, would be to restore the house to its former glory. Restoration took money, but the founding ladies of the LHA moved in Nashville’s most elite social circles. The women quickly recruited new members and planned an event that would make their organization the talk of the Cumberland Valley. “Jackson Day Balls” began in 1892 and remained one of Nashville’s more prestigious social events into the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{11}

Other events also offered creative opportunities to raise money for the Hermitage’s restoration and for the promotion of knowledge about the general and the Battle of New Orleans. A “Jackson Day Sale” occurred across Nashville when the LHA persuaded local businesses to donate five-percent of their profits to the organization. In addition, the Hermitage’s distance from the hustle and bustle of Nashville provided the LHA opportunities to rent the site for barbeques. During the early 1900s, a day traveler from Nashville could travel by riverboat up the Cumberland to tour the general’s former property for only a nominal fee.\textsuperscript{12}

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\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Tom Kanon, “Forging the ‘Hero of New Orleans:’ Tennessee Looks at the Centennial of the War of 1812,” \textit{Tennessee Historical Quarterly}, (Summer, 2012) 139-140. Kanon’s article is an indispensable examination of Tennessee’s attitudes towards both the Creek War and the War of 1812 one hundred years later.
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The LHA did not embody the only high-profile commemorative group to operate in the Nashville area at the turn of the century. With an eye towards the centennial, area businessmen formed the Andrew Jackson Memorial Association in 1914. The group decried what its members viewed as a lack of enthusiasm towards the upcoming Battle of New Orleans centennial. They also did not like that the replica of Clark Mills’ equestrian statue remained the only memorial to Jackson in the Tennessee state capital. Unaware of the statue’s historical or technical significance, the organization blustered that the monument was “not of very great artistic merit.”

The businessmen of the Memorial Association felt that the general’s memory deserved a grand “Jackson Boulevard” to serve as “a second Champs-Elysses.” As envisioned, the road would proceed from the steps of the state capital to the doors of the Hermitage – a distance of some 12 miles. To pay for the estimated one million dollars of construction, the group proposed to solicit funds from local, state, and federal governments. By 1915, the monetary plan for the boulevard called for $250,000 each from the city, county, and state, in addition to $500,000 from Congress and $50,000 to $100,000 that the Association would obtain from private donors. As spectacular as the finished result might be, the organization never garnered serious momentum towards the project’s completion due to the cost.

Unlike the short-lived Andrew Jackson Memorial Association, the Ladies Hermitage Association had no such qualms about the Clark Mill’s statue. In fact, it

14. Nashville Tennessean, 21 June 1914; Nashville Banner, 9 January 1915; Nashville Tennessean 22 July 1914;
greatly distressed the organization to learn in 1914 that Congress questioned the
placement of the Jackson statue in Lafayette Square near the White House.

In 1824, the federal government named the square after famed French noble-
turned-American-patriot Gilbert de Lafayette during the former general’s visit. In the
corners of the square stood monuments to Lafayette, Friedrich von Steuben, Thaddeus
Kosciuszko, and Jean de Rochambeau, all prominent foreign-born generals of the
American cause during the Revolutionary War. Then, conspicuously out of place in the
center of the square rose a bronze image of Jackson on his horse. For the sake of theme,
Congress wanted to move Jackson’s statue to another location. The Ladies protested
and quickly sprang into action. They solicited the assistance of Tennessee Congressman
Joseph W. Byrnes, and Congress’s plan soon faltered.15

The Ladies also used gendered social norms to their advantage whenever doing
so helped promote Jackson and the Battle of New Orleans. Education policy reform and
criticism stood as one of the few areas women in early twentieth century America could
affect public policy. To that end, the Ladies Hermitage Association regularly monitored
the publication of schoolbooks to make sure that children learned the “real” history of
the Battle of New Orleans. The Ladies Hermitage Association even published in 1935
the Battle of New Orleans, its Real Meaning: Exposure of Untruth Being Taught Young
America Concerning the Second most Important Military Event in the Life of the Republic.
The book is an impassioned response to those who would argue that the battle lacked
significance because of the Treaty of Ghent. It also squarely places the success of

15. Ladies Hermitage Association Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, January
1906-September 1914, Collections at the Hermitage (Nashville, TN), 129.
Jackson’s army into the hands of the Southern frontiersman and his trusty squirrel rifle.16

The LHA did not limit their attention on schools merely to textbooks. The children of Tennessee had to prove they learned the lessons with essay contests held around “Jackson Day.” Third grader Christine Tarwater informed all of Nashville that “Gen. Andrew Jackson made breastworks of mud and cotton bales” after he “formed a small army of Tennessee riflemen.” A classmate of Tarwater’s further elaborated: “When the British came up the bank at New Orleans they laughed” because “Andrew Jackson’s men were just squirrel shooters.” The Tennesseans soon halted the British laughter even though Jackson only “had one cannon.” The backwoodsmen put the field piece to effective use firing “scraps of iron and spikes.” Despite the dramatics, Everett Carlton summied up the moral of the story nicely proclaiming, “From that day on the British never fought with the Americans.”17

Everett Carlton probably never realized it, but in third grade he succinctly explained the driving theme of Battle of New Orleans commemorations around the United States in 1915--100 years of peace between Great Britain and the United States. Rather than focus on a war marked by domestic unpopularity and fought between nations whose international relations had greatly improved, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada chose to highlight the Treaty of Ghent. In the United States, the development of the Perry’s Victory & International Peace Memorial on Lake Erie exemplified these efforts. In Great Britain, the government sponsored the promotion of

a grand Anglo-American exposition. The festival, as planned, would last six months and act as a celebration of peace, prosperity, and the advancement of the arts and sciences that became possible when nations did not go to war.\textsuperscript{18}

In a tragic twist of fate, Anglo-American plans to celebrate peace experienced a dramatic change as Great Britain entered World War One. Logistically, the United Kingdom could no longer honor its commitment to hold the grand exposition it planned. Further, it became increasingly dangerous for Americans and Britons to traverse the Atlantic Ocean because of German naval activities. As a result, the American Peace Centenary Committee, along with its sister agencies in Great Britain and Canada, decided to modify the events planned for 1915. The American group called for the “postponement of all public rejoicing until the war in Europe is ended.” The only exceptions would be “churches, schools and colleges in the program of peace celebrations already arranged.” Negotiation between Canada and the United States resulted in a limited future schedule of official events. President Woodrow Wilson still spoke at the unveiling of a monument to the Treaty of Ghent in Washington, D.C., and held a national address on December 24 to mark the day the peace commissioners had signed the treaty. Finally, New Orleans would host a three-day event for the centennial of the war’s last major battle. The century “of peace between English-speaking peoples which followed that battle” should be the focus of the occasion.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Nashville Tennessean}, 12 April 1914. For more on the Ohio monument to the Battle of Lake Erie see: \textit{Interstate Board of the Perry’s Victory Centennial Commissioners; Watterson, Henry, 1840–1921. The Perry memorial and centennial celebration under the auspices of the national government and the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, New York, Rhode Island, Kentucky, Minnesota and Indiana} (Cleveland, Ohio: The Board, 1912).

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Nashville Tennessean}, 29 November 1914.
As politic as an emphasis on peace would be, it did not always sit well with some Americans. Until war actually began in Europe, some women involved in memorialization efforts like the Daughters of 1812 and the Ladies Hermitage Association rejected the emphasis on the peace rather than the battle that brought it. Writing to the *Nashville Tennessean*, one woman expressed concern that she had only heard plans to commemorate the Treaty of Ghent and peace. She remarked that the *New York Times* had recently published drawings of “a costly bridge across the Niagara River and huge memorial monuments at Detroit.” She was at a loss though to explain how any commemoration of the peace treaty could occur without “some very large hint of Gen. Andrew Jackson and his victory over the British forces at the world-famous Battle of New Orleans.” Without Jackson and his men, the “unparalleled prodigious success, which demolished British forces, driving them from [American] shores by land and sea” would have left the Treaty of Ghent a “rope of sand.”

Mary C. Dorris shared similar sentiments. She penned a historical treatment summarizing the War of 1812 and the Treaty of Ghent for the *Nashville Tennessean*, which ran her story under the large bold headline “Treaty of Ghent – Last Stand Against American Liberty.” The editors also assured their readers that the long piece below contained “an absorbing narrative of how Americans, forced to fight the British a second time on account of injustices and outrages on the high sea, carried the War of 1812 to a victorious climax with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.” They also explained that “the figure of Andrew Jackson looms high above any other American in this war, and the writer has vividly visualized the stalwart American General.” Despite

the efforts of peace centennial committees in Great Britain, the United States, and Canada to temper the celebratory aspect of the 1915 commemoration, Tennesseans had their own plans.

Mary Dorris took her case directly to the Ladies Hermitage Association later that year. She suggested that a commemoration of the battle and not the Treaty of Ghent “ought now to bend our energies and attention.” And not surprisingly, the LHA leant a sympathetic ear. After all, whatever was good for the memory of the Battle of New Orleans bolstered the memory of Andrew Jackson, which in turn benefited the preservation efforts of the LHA. Just like the Mount Vernon Ladies Association in Virginia and the Daughters of the Republic of Texas, the Ladies Hermitage Association faced the political and ethical realities of their commemoration efforts. These groups had a vested interest in defending the historical understanding that most profited the promotion of their respective topic regardless of current politics or even the most recent scholarship. The U.S. government’s preference for a change in the commemorative efforts to focus on peace rather than martial success threatened the LHA’s carefully sculpted narrative of the battle. For the Ladies, the greatest son of the Volunteer State led an army of backwoods frontier Tennessee rifleman in a desperate gamble that saved the Louisiana Purchase for the United States. If that story did not occur, then why would anyone donate money to preserve Jackson’s mansion and promote the history? The centennial festival arranged by the LHA in Nashville existed to promote the Ladies’ interpretation of the battle not to preserve the diplomatic relations of the United States.21

21. LHA Meeting Minutes, 141.
The LHA mustered all of its available clout in the Nashville area business and political communities. The group successfully petitioned local railroad operators to offer tickets to and from the city at a reduced rate on the day of the centennial. They also encouraged local businesses to give their employees a day off work on the holiday. The festivities opened with a two-mile-long parade that included numerous area organizations. Marching bands saluted the crowd with airs of both “The Star Spangled Banner” and “Dixie” as the column moved toward the state capitol building. Behind the bands, formed units of local police, Confederate veterans, and Tennessee National Guard soldiers, adding a martial element to the proceedings.22

Once the procession arrived at the capitol building, the grand event of the Nashville Battle of New Orleans centennial celebrations commenced. For weeks, newspapers teased their readers with promises of a sham battle meant to recreate Jackson’s famous victory. Event organizers built a replica of the “fort” the Tennesseans hid behind one hundred years earlier. The structure consisted of cotton bales placed near the steps of the state capitol building. The rather elaborate structure stretched for the length of a number of city blocks and stood shoulder high to the men placed behind it.23

Confederate veterans had the honor of portraying the Tennessee soldiers who served under Andrew Jackson. Dressed in confederate uniforms and wielding Civil War-era muskets and campaign equipment, the men valiantly fired blank rounds at the troops of the Tennessee National Guard. Smoke filled downtown Nashville as the khaki-uniformed National Guardsmen fell before the withering fire of the Confederate

22. Nashville Banner, 8 January 1915
23. Nashville Banner, 9 January 1915
veterans. Eventually, with the “British” assault decimated, the attackers slowly retreated, leaving the cheering Confederates in command of the state capital. One Confederate veteran interviewed after the event pridefully noted “the boys in grey [were] the victors.” Another newspaper remarked “the old guard were there,” that “it was an inspiring site to watch these veterans in battle lines again and to hear the ‘crack, crack’ of their rifles in the battle on the boulevard.”24

Other events only obfuscated further which war the events sought to commemorate. At the Hermitage, Mary Dorris -- the same woman who wanted to make sure that the battle’s memory took precedence over peace treaty’s -- laid a wreath on Jackson’s tomb. A gift of the Thomas Hart Benton Chapter of the Daughters of 1812, the wreath consisted of tree branches from the Civil War era Battle of Franklin site. Presumably, the USD chapter chose Franklin because of its nearby location and its association as a famous Tennessee military event. Yet Franklin representned an ironic selection because Confederate forces fought the battle in a useless attempt to take a heavily entrenched Union position. In fact, the Battle of Franklin stands as one of the Civil War’s most needless engagements and as a testament to the foolishness of charging a heavily fortified enemy. Dorris had fought tirelessly both to highlight the importance of the New Orleans battle despite its late date during the War of 1812 and to promote the idea of American (and Southern) superiority by emphasizing British arrogance in charging Jackson’s line in 1815. “Lost Cause” ideals dominated white Southern culture in the twentieth century though. It is not clear that anyone in attendance saw the paradox of placing a wreath gathered from the location of a

Confederate military disaster on the tomb of a man who had once uttered the words “our federal union; it must be preserved.”

Untroubled by these inconsistencies, the Nashville celebrations proceeded as planned. The LHA arranged for the culminating event of the festivities to be a grand banquet at the Maxwell House and the annual Jackson Day Ball at the Hermitage Hotel. At the banquet the city elite sat amongst local politicians, judges, the governor of Tennessee, and the chancellor of Vanderbilt University. The main topic of the banquet’s speeches centered on the need for a new and grander memorial to Jackson, commensurate with the Battle of New Orleans and its general’s importance. If the state did not provide for the monument, then “Tennessee has degenerated,” according to one figure. Apparently still unaware of the commemoration’s many ironies, another informed this crowd of wealthy supporters “Jackson was a student of the common people” and a man “who restored this government to the plain people.”

After the banquet, the 300 attendees left for the ball. To commemorate the one hundredth anniversary, the Ladies Hermitage Association planned a special occasion for the 1915 rendition of their annual event. At the beginning of the ball, “eighteen of Nashville’s most popular girls,” wearing “gowns of white, sashes of red, and badges of blue,” would enter the ballroom. Every girl wore on a badge the name of one of the

25. “The Celebration of Jackson Day, January 8, 1915,” *Tennessee Historical Magazine* 1 (March 1915). For more on the Battle of Franklin see: James L. McDonough and Thomas Lawrence Connelly, *Five Tragic Hours: The Battle of Franklin* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983). There is also the irony that, during the Battle of New Orleans, Thomas Hart Benton was vehemently anti-Jackson and had shot the general just a year before the British attacked the Gulf Coast. Jackson still carried Benton’s bullet in him throughout the New Orleans campaign; though, he did return it to Benton twenty years later after they became friends again.

26. Quoted in “Forging the ‘Hero of New Orleans,’” 149.
eighteen states in the union at the time of the battle. Around the room, the LHA hung banners proclaiming the names of Jackson’s military victories during the conflict and also hung laurels of Spanish moss and cotton boles. After all, cotton reportedly played an important part in Jackson’s victory.27

The Ladies Hermitage Association’s plans for centennial celebrations in Nashville occured just as advertisements for the events said they would. By all accounts, the festivities had been a resounding success, if not quite what the peace centennial commissions in Washington and London had in mind. The ceremonies in Nashville had been nothing if not triumphant and the recorded speeches rarely spoke of the importance of peace and understanding between English-speaking peoples.28

Though a celebration of the War of 1812 and the Battle of New Orleans, the Nashville centennial ceremonies could not escape the shadow of the Civil War and Reconstruction. The events became an opportunity to highlight Southern military prowess in the wake of the South’s greatest defeat. The commemoration efforts in Nashville typified a South still struggling with the memory of its past and trying to find a way to rewrite the history of the Civil War. At the same time, the ceremonies in Nashville marked a distinct success for the idea behind groups like the Daughters of 1812. Promotion of the battle encouraged patriotism in Southerners again. It might be a patriotism that skewed the historical facts when convenient, but its centennial ceremonies in Nashville had managed to convince Confederate veterans literally to march again to the beat of the “Star Spangled Banner.”

In New Orleans, the centennial celebrations shared many similarities with the Nashville ceremonies. Because events in the Crescent City carried the official sanction of the peace centennial commission, organizers paid more attention toward British sensitivities. According to the official program, at 8:20 a.m., Friday, January 8, 1915, the Louisiana National Guard began a 21-gun artillery salute timed so “that the last shot will be fired exactly one hundred years after the last cannon was discharged from the American lines.” The careful timing continued until 10:15 a.m., as public school children from around the city departed a train station en route to the battlefield. Less than an hour later, the adults boarded a fleet of small watercraft in a “river parade” descending the Mississippi.29

At the battlefield, the celebrants cheered as a Congreve rocket arced above the crowd and the drum of Jordan Noble sounded “The Long Role,” marking noon and the opening of the ceremonies. A series of speeches occurred, followed by a wreath laying on the Chalmette Monument by the Ladies Hermitage Association. Made from evergreens growing on General Jackson’s old property, the LHA’s choice appeared more apropos than the one selected for Jackson’s tomb by the Tennesseans. After the wreath-laying, the festivities continued with the flag raising detailed earlier. The ceremonies in Chalmette concluded with a close order drill demonstration by the Seventh United States Infantry Regiment--the unit that guarded the extreme right of Jackson’s line one hundred years earlier.30

Elsewhere in New Orleans, other events celebrated various aspects of the New Orleans campaign. The YMCA sponsored a six and a half mile race from Lake Pontchartrain to the French Quarter. The run commemorated the Orleans Battalion of Volunteers’ forced march from Fort St. John to join Jackson’s column descending the river on the night of the British landing. The Ursuline nuns hosted a benediction, *te deum*, and hymn to Our Lady of Prompt Succor, to whom the nuns had prayed the night before the final battle. Mrs. W. C. C. Claiborne, President of the Ursuline Academy Alumni Association and direct descendent to the governor of Louisiana at the time of the battle, gave the opening address.\(^{31}\)

The festivities lasted well into the first night. Military bands played in Lafayette and Jackson Square at the same time as the Louisiana National Guard and the Louisiana Naval Battalion hosted a military ball for visiting U.S Army and Navy units. At the Athenaeum, the Women’s Section of the Centennial Commission oversaw an event featuring historic tableaux by students. The scenes depicted women sewing clothes for the soldiers, a campfire scene of American troops guarding the Rodriguez Canal, and a street scene of the troops’ triumphant return. Period dances conducted in historic costume closed out the opening day.\(^{32}\)

While the second day of festivities largely centered on the activities of the Louisiana Historical Society and the unveiling of what eventually became the Louisiana State Museum, the third day opened in spectacular fashion. The event organizers arranged for a reenactment of the elaborate ceremony the city conducted upon Jackson’s return after the battle. Twenty women, adorned in white “Greek robes,” stood

\(^{31}\) *Official Program*, 10.
\(^{32}\) *Official Program*, 10-11.
in Jackson Square. Eighteen of them wore sashes with the name of the eighteen states of the union in 1815 and two with the words “justice” and “liberty.” The girls paraded in two lines from the gated entrance of Jackson Square to the doors of the St. Louis Cathedral forming a corridor. A Mr. Charles C. Hard, playing the role of Andrew Jackson, entered the line of girls and received the “palm of victory” from the woman representing Louisiana. The “general” and his staff made their way to the steps of the cathedral where the Right Reverend J. M. Laval greeted them. Laval played the part of Abbe Dubourg, the highest-ranking priest in New Orleans at the time of the battle. Laval gave the exact speech Dubourg spoke a century earlier and then placed a laurel wreath crown upon “the general’s” head. Hard then turned to the crowd and addressing “Abbe Dubourg” also gave Jackson’s speech as onlookers had recorded it one hundred years before. With that, the assembly proceeded inside the cathedral.33

After a High Mass, a parade marched from Jackson Square to Jackson Avenue three miles away. The procession included mounted police, state officials, and school children, followed by fraternal organizations like the Knights of Columbus, the Woodsmen of the World, Elks, and Druids. Unlike Nashville, no Civil War patriotic organization appeared anywhere in the centennial ceremonies official program. Granted members of the Daughters of 1812 could also be members Daughters of the Confederacy, but the UDC apparently did not act in any official capacity during the centennial ceremonies.34

Unlike in Nashville, the specter of the Civil War did not hang over the centennial ceremonies in New Orleans. Rather, World War One affected the mood of the

34. Official Program, 13-16.
centennial ceremonies in New Orleans. When organizers originally planned the events, they envisioned a reenactment of the battle occurring on the location of the original event. To add to the novelty, descendants of the battle's original participants would defend what remained of the ramparts. By the time of final preparations, though, the reality of World War One trench warfare began to unfold. Suddenly, the idea of showing “British soldiers” charging an entrenched position seemed extremely insensitive and politically incorrect.35

Instead, events and commentators focused on the marked contrast of how the centennial events compared to the horrors of Europe. They emphasized the century of peace between Great Britain and the United States suggesting that, if other nations got along as well as the two Anglo speaking countries did, there would be less violence in the world. Many of the speakers made overt efforts to avoid any sense of triumphalism.36

The description of Samuel Wilson’s speech is representative. He “dwelt at length on the Battle of New Orleans and the events that led up to it. He was lavish in his praise for everyone connected with the victory; but brought out the fact that the greatest result was not the victory itself but in the century of peace that followed it.”37

One of the few exceptions to this trend occurred during the International Peace Banquet the second night of events. After a round of toasts at the Hotel Grunwald, Major General Franklin Bell of the United States Army rose to speak. He assured the

35. New Orleans Times Picayune, 12 October 1914; New Orleans Times Picayune, 22 October 1914; Battle of New Orleans Scrapbook, 1815-1940, Louisiana Historical Center, Louisiana State Museum.
36. New Orleans Times Picayune, 8 January 1915 – 11 January 1915;
crowd “the army of the United States stood for peace” and had “always stood for peace.” A nation that prepared to defend itself did not automatically deserve the accusation of militarism. Clearly responding to the anti-war movement in the United States and the pacifism expressed numerous times at the centennial’s events, Bell suggested “the soldier does not protest that you teach your children it is disgraceful to fight for his rights.” He also added, “the soldier has the right to protest, and does protest, against turning the other cheek whether right or wrong. Every human right that has been won...has been won at the point of the sword.” At that point a disgusted spectator shouted “no” in response to the general, but the cheers of “yes” from the crowd drowned out the attempted rabble-rouser.38

The Peace Centennial Commission’s efforts to avoid offending Great Britain and Canada during the Battle of New Orleans’ commemorations went well and probably better than most had hoped. Not only had the forum provided an opportunity to focus on the friendship between the Anglo-speaking nations, but it also offered an opportunity for encouraging the United States to side with Britain should America enter the war.

For the Daughters of 1812 in New Orleans, the event had also been a great success. Despite the meager and sometimes superficial commemoration of the battle that had occurred at the beginning of the century, by 1915 the Daughters helped to reinvigorate interest in Jackson’s victory. Given the attention again paid to the event, the likelihood that the monument and what remained of the ramparts would succumb to Chalmette’s growing industrialization dramatically lowered. Could the Daughters

38. New Orleans Times Picayune, 10 January 1915.
translate the new public interest into the financial or political clout necessary to expand the battlefield?

Prior to the centennial, the Daughter’s paid for the construction of a five-room cottage onsite in which a caretaker could live in. Marcel Serpas became the caretaker in June 1915 and moved into the cottage with his family; the Serpases remained the caretakers of the Chalmette battlefield for seventeen years and even named one of their children Andrew Jackson Serpas, at the persuasion of the Daughters of 1812. The Serpas children gave tours of the site and also gathered the pecans the Daughters sold, eventually receiving a portion of the proceeds as their salary. Marcel also kept the money from the ten-cent deposit charged to visitors for borrowing the key to the monument if they wanted to climb to the observation deck on top. Despite the hopes of the Daughters, visitation remained low following the centennial commemoration, averaging only one group per day. Despite the advances in transportation, Chalmette simply remained too far off the path of most tourists and the site had little to offer beside the monument. By 1929, the Daughters informed the War Department that their organization could not serve as the financial stewards of the site anymore. If the United States government wanted to preserve the site of Jackson’s famous victory, it needed to manage the site as well.39

The federal government doubted it could do a better job. While to maintain the current property only cost $1,200 annually, expanding it would take significantly more money. The War Department felt, given the rampant industrialization surrounding the

site, that not expanding the park's footprint would only lead to even lower attendance as businesses constructed factories only a hundred yards from the monument. Congress balked at spending the necessary money as the War Department contended against influential industrial interests desirous of the same land. Despite the monetary concerns, the government realized if it could barely plan on winning the battle to preserve the site, it certainly could not ask the Daughters of 1812 to do so. The Daughters had done as much work as they could, and Secretary of War Patrick Hurley informed Congress that if it wished to preserve the site “in a manner commensurate with the importance of a great national victory,” the federal government had to come to the Daughters’ and the battlefield’s assistance.40

Though the New Orleans Daughters of 1812 had not been as successful as the Ladies Hermitage Association in fundraising for their historic site, they played an important role in preserving and shaping the Battle of New Orleans’ memory. By the closing years of the nineteenth century, the commemoration of the battle had faded considerably. The nation still struggled with the events of the Civil War and the efforts of groups like the United Daughters of the Confederacy only further intensified the mythologies and popular attention of the Lost Cause. The western South had always been the epicenter of Battle of New Orleans celebration, but by the 1880s, fewer and fewer Southerners commemorated Jackson’s victory. Women’s organizations like the LHA and the Daughters of 1812 used the UDC’s methods to reinvigorate public attention about the War of 1812 and the Battle of New Orleans. White Southerners in Nashville and New Orleans quickly bought into the renewed interest. It gave them an

40. Report no. 194 to accompany House Resolution 6151; Secretary Hurley quoted in Administrative History of Jean Laffite, 30;
opportunity to focus on a portion of their past that highlighted success of their ancestors rather than the failure of the Confederacy.

These successes did not occur without controversy. In Nashville, the UDC held enough power to insert itself into the Battle of New Orleans commemorations and the reenactment of the battle embodied a Lost Cause sentiment. Further, the Nashville commemorations highlighted the power of the Civil War’s memory. Southerners blended the Battle of Franklin, an overwhelming Confederate defeat, into a ceremony meant to commemorate the State of Tennessee’s greatest military victories. The pain of the Civil War’s loss altered Tennessee’s historical memory.

The Louisiana ceremonies, while a dramatic celebration of Anglophone people’s friendship, paid almost no attention to the role of non-white English speakers. The use of Jordan Noble’s drum at the Chalmette ceremonies represented one of the only references to any African American participation in the battle. In a showcase of white-pride meant to symbolize Anglo-American unity, many New Orleanians also conveniently forgot that many of their ancestors who fought in the New Orleans campaign had spoken French. The proud Creoles of New Orleans had often used every trick at their disposal to preserve the Gallic nature of the city in the face of what they perceived as a torrent of Anglo-American immigration. The political needs of the present, though, dictated a focus on Anglo-American unity.

Great Britain and the United States needed that unity as the two nations prepared for possible joint military action. Accordingly, the federal government exerted its influence to halt Anglophobia or triumphalism from entering into the official
commemoration. One cannot help but wonder how an ardent Anglophobe like Jackson felt about such sentiments.
Chapter 6: “Not Pirate... Privateer”: Reimagining the Battle of New Orleans in Early Twentieth Century Popular Memory

On April 2, 1917, some one hundred and two years after the War of 1812 concluded, The President Woodrow Wilson, stood before U.S. Congress. “I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made,” he contended. Continuing, the president explained that “American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of.” Wilson had hoped “it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence.” Nonetheless, “Neutrality [was] no longer feasible or desirable.... We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances.”

While James Madison may have completely approved of Wilson’s message, it would have surprised him to learn which nation was preying on neutral shipping and shocked to discover on which country’s behalf the U.S. would soon enter the war. The United States would again engage in a war involving Great Britain and the issue of “Free Trade and Sailors Rights,” but this time she would join with England in the conflict.

American hostility towards England had diminished by the 1910s. That process only continued as the two nations became allies in not one, but two active wars and peacetime allies together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Undeterred by the niceties of international politics, though, American popular culture nonetheless found new ways to interpret the Battle of New Orleans. Ultimately, the popular culture of these new iterations, *The Buccaneer* films and “The Battle of New Orleans” song became some of the most widespread and longest lasting versions yet.\(^3\)

These new versions of the battle resulted from changes in both the United States, domestic situation and its international policies. An increasingly prominent actor on the world stage, the bellicose Anglophobic celebrations of the Battle of New Orleans that characterized much of the nineteenth century festivities surrounding the event created political concerns. In addition, as the United States grew into a world power, American culture shifted from an incessant obsession with comparing itself to European nations in an adolescent-like need to justify its own existence. Accordingly, the celebrations surrounding the Battle of New Orleans took an increasingly less antagonistic tone towards the United States’ former colonial master. The Battle of New Orleans became a celebration of what many considered the redeeming qualities of American culture rather than a measuring stick of domestic progress. New opportunities for interpretation also opened the door for fuller and more inclusive...

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renditions of the battle. By acknowledging the accomplishments of the many participants on the American side, an even broader constituency could embrace the battle’s history.⁴

This development proved especially important as the Battle of New Orleans lost its traditional support by the Democratic Party. In 1941, Democrats abandoned the January 8 date of Jackson Day. Like the moment when Wilson gave his speech to Congress in 1917, in 1940, the United States once again prepared to enter a war on the side of Great Britain. Increasingly close friends with both the Prime Minister and King of England, President Franklin Roosevelt, nominal head of the Democratic Party, quietly moved Jackson Day to March. Publically, he claimed to have done so because the new date gave the party time to recover after the 1940 election. Yet the date never returned to January and, eventually, the event became called Jefferson-Jackson Day, occurring near the two men’s birthdays. For the most important political day of Roosevelt’s party to be a celebration of the stunning defeat of his nation’s newest and closest ally created political complications. This change in the commemoration was but one event in a colorful half century of American history during which a number of dramatic outside events shaped how the United States viewed the Battle of New Orleans.⁵

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⁴ This overt American confidence came to its fullest fruition in American consumer success both domestically and around the globe. The full implications on the consumer impact on the Battle of New Orleans is explored in the next chapter, but one of the most important books to explore the topic is Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Knopf, 2003). For a different take on the United States’ culture of confidence see Tom Engelhardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998).

⁵ By as late as January 5, 1941 newspapers reported that the Democratic National Committee had failed to set a date for the dinner; Dallas Morning News, January 5, 1941. Officially, the reason to delay the fundraiser, held on the same date for
The years following the battle’s centennial set the stage for a dramatic new rendition of the Battle of New Orleans in American popular culture. Previously, the focus of the battle had regularly centered on more traditional sources of American pride: martial conduct, glorious generals, and celebration of the frontier and westward expansion. Thanks to a new wave of popular attention, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, a new group became the center of attention: the outlaw, specifically the privateer Jean Laffite and his Baratarians.

Certainly scholars and artists who examined the Battle of New Orleans had dealt with Laffite and the Baratarians before. These studies, while not overtly negative in their treatment of the skilled artillerists, celebrated the civilizing of the sailors by joining Jackson’s force and reveled in their rejection of the British overtures made to Laffite and his men. In the traditional narrative of the nineteenth century, Laffite and his men had been criminals and pirates who gave up their ill-gotten gains in a burst of national enthusiasm to smite invading hoard.6

This narrative dovetailed nicely with the American depiction of the British as quick to use morally questionable groups for their nefarious purposes. After all, pirates rampaged across the waters of the world. They raped and pillaged for centuries around the Caribbean basin, and the Anglo-speaking world regularly depicted them as

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over one hundred and fifty years, was “to give the Democrats more time to recover from the recent [presidential] campaign; Dallas Morning News, November 26, 1940. Given that Roosevelt won the election 449 electoral votes to 82, one questions how taxed the Democratic National Committee really was.

barbarous beasts that the Royal Navy itself had standing orders to execute if captured. How despicable then, for the British, the very people that regularly hunted pirates around the world, to attempt to coerce pirates to join their force in the assault on New Orleans. Of course, the British also burned Washington, sacked Havre de Graces, and regularly employed Native Americans and former African slaves to attack white Americans. To many Americans growing up on this traditional interpretation of events, the British attempts to employ pirates, while despicable, hardly seemed surprising. The astonishment in the conventional narrative resulted from the pirates rejection of the British. Even as pirates, Laffite and his men did not want to associate themselves with the British. Most importantly for the purposes of the battle’s memory, the Baratarians did not play a central role in the story. They added to the grandeur of Jackson’s benevolence, to the polyglot nature of the American army, or to moral right of American victory. They never took center stage; and they were almost always pirates and always criminals.

In point of fact, the United States did not pardon Laffite and his gang for “piracy.” Prior to the New Orleans campaign, the Baratarians’ smuggling operations had been the only maritime activity federal officials charged the group with. The group operated with a letter of marque from the fledgling Republic of Cartagena against the

7. For more early examples of Laffite’s treatment in American popular culture see: Mary Devereux, Lafitte of Louisiana (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1902); Alexander E. Powell, Gentlemen Rovers (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1913). For more on American accusations of British depredations and alliances with unseemly characters see: Joseph Dorris and Jesse Denson, The Chronicles of Andrew: Containing an Accurate and Brief Account of General Jackson’s Victories South, Over the Creeks, Also His Victories Over the British at Orleans with Biographical Sketches of His Life, &c., (Milledgeville: S&F Grantland, 1815); Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, December 13, 1816.
Kingdom of Spain. While most Europeans decried the validity of the Cartagena rebel government, the United States certainly had trouble suggesting that American colonies did not have a right to rebel and create sovereign nations. The issue came when Laffite and his men tried to sell goods captured from Spanish vessels to the citizens of Louisiana. The Baratarians failed to pay taxes on the goods and, because of that, provoked the State of Louisiana’s ire.\textsuperscript{8}

Even in contemporary times, the public had mixed attitudes toward the Baratarians. The United States government’s frequent restrictions on trade in the years leading up to the War of 1812 resulted in many Americans ignoring mercantile restrictions for years. Especially for citizens in New Orleans, on the far edge of the American domestic commercial system, Laffite and his men represented the only way Louisiana could acquire many luxury goods, and even some non-luxury items. Furthermore, it was public knowledge that numerous members of the New Orleans and Louisiana government did business with Laffite and his men. While officials like William C.C. Claiborne decried the Baratarians for their flagrant violations of the law, they did not view Laffite and his men as serious threats to the public safety. Though Claiborne and others might have used the word \textit{pirate}, they did not harbor fears that Laffite and his men would descend on the banks of the Mississippi and hold New Orleans.

\textsuperscript{8} There have been numerous treatments on Laffite and his men, but many are less than reputable popular histories. For scholarly treatments of the Baratarians see: William C. Davis, \textit{The Pirates Laffite: The Treacherous World of the Corsairs of the Gulf} (Orlando, Fla: Harcourt, 2005); Robert C. Vogel and Kathleen F. Taylor \textit{Jean Laffite in American History: A Bibliographic Guide} (Saint Paul, Minn: White Pine Press, 1998); Jane Lucas De Grummond and Ronald R. Morazan, \textit{The Baratarians and the Battle of New Orleans} (Baton, Rouge, La: Legacy Pub. Co, 1979).
Orleans for ransom like Blackbeard had done to Charleston during the early sixteenth century.\(^9\)

Artists and writers during the nineteenth century rarely used the Baratarians as part of the Battle of New Orleans’s celebrated narrative. Some books and works of fiction did commemorate or promote Laffite and his men; indeed, *The Corsair* by the famed poet Lord Byron supposedly even celebrated the famed rouges of the Gulf Coast, but those incidents had little impact on the larger memory of the battle. Not until the early twentieth century would Laffite and his men fully enter the dialogue on the Battle of New Orleans or join pantheon of heroes associated with it. That change occurred in part, to prohibition, the Great Depression, and Cecil B. Demille.\(^10\)

The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1920 created an opportunity for a reassessment of the Baratarians’ image. In the wake of federal restrictions on alcohol, many Americans reassessed their presumptions on criminality and morality. Numerous Americans participated in the illegal importation, production, sale, and consumption of alcohol. Though the U.S. now deemed such activities illegal, many Americans did not consider their own criminality immoral. Personal instances of

\(^9\) A reader looking for the definitive scholarly examination of exactly what Laffite and his men were guilty of and their treatment be history should see Robert C. Vogel, “Jean Laffite, the Baratarians, and the Battle of New Orleans: A Reappraisal”, *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 261-276

nullification, so finely defined that even John C. Calhoun could have swelled with pride, occurred only more frequently when Americans discovered that many of their own civic and governmental leaders frequented the growing number of “speakeasies” around the nation. These Americans questioned whether the law should consider them criminals. Similarly, if they were not morally reproachable for opposing unjust laws, then maybe history had misjudged Lafitte and his men.\(^{11}\)

The moral reappraisal over the criminality and moral repugnance of the Baratarians also occurred amidst a reevaluation of the pirate lifestyle in general. By the Great Depression, the terrifying specters of maritime murder that pirates had been had been in contemporary times. Rather, as individuals like John Dillinger captured the public imagination, pirates received a reappraisal throughout American culture. Despite the efforts of groups like the Federal Bureau of Investigation and individuals like FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to highlight the extremely violent and murderous nature of bank robbers like Dillinger, the American people increasingly viewed these men as anti-heroes. In the view of many Americans, banks around the country had stolen their money in 1929 through unwise investment and risky trading. Individuals like Dillinger thumbed their noses at the system and made their own way through the world. The American public sought some sort of inspiration under a Herbert Hoover presidency many viewed as doing nothing to alleviate the struggle for the average American. Bank robbers like Dillinger offered a Robin Hood-esque figure to draw

inspiration from. They ignored the fact that Dillinger and his ilk rarely gave the money to anyone but their gang. Instead, the bank robber became a legend that centered on a fight against the system rather than a rampant thief and murder. Dillenger became a modern-day pirate, and if he and other bank robbers had a reason to do what they did, maybe historical pirates did too during their time.\(^\text{12}\)

As American society struggled with is feelings on criminality, Lyle Saxon wrote a new biography of Jean Laffite that leant a sympathetic ear to the corsair. Born in 1891 of distinguished New Orleans and Baton Rouge families, Saxon would become one of the most influential writers of New Orleans and Louisiana history. His works, many of which are still in print today because of their literary flare and scholarship, focused on the romantic history of New Orleans and the eccentricities of the region that made it stand out from the rest of the Untied States. Because of this interest, Saxon eventually decided to direct his energies towards Laffite. Written with novelistic flare and published in 1930, \textit{Laffite the Pirate} detailed the famed Baratarian during his time in New Orleans.\(^\text{13}\)

Saxon’s work painted an image of a Laffite that had traversed the Atlantic world for many years and seen many adventures. Yes, he had robbed and stolen at times, but


he always did so with a sense of honor and a fluid moral code that justified his unlawful behavior. Throughout the beginning of the book, we read of Laffite’s boyish charm and his comical interactions with the bungling Governor William C. C. Claiborne, who consistently tries and fails to halt Laffite’s illicit trade. When the serious issue of British invasion rears its head, Laffite rises to the defense of his country. Of course, Laffite defended his country; he is only a criminal, not a traitor!14

While Laffite the Pirate remains in print today and continues to be popular in the New Orleans area, neither the book nor Saxon’s interpretation of Lafayette would have spread so far if its message came through print alone. By the 1930s, Americans had grown quite fond of movies involving epic battles and sword fights and famed Hollywood director Cecil B. DeMille looked for the inspiration behind his next blockbuster. Laffite the Pirate had everything DeMille could want: a famous battle, a swashbuckling hero, and an historical epic. Production of The Buccaneer began in 1937. Shot on location in south Louisiana, with technical assistance from the Louisiana State Museum, The Buccaneer actually paid surprisingly close attention to historical detail (to the extent possible during the 1930s). The production company even cast people from the Baratarian swamp southwest of New Orleans as extras in the movie to play the role of their supposed ancestors. Criticized by some around the country for exaggerating the narrative of New Orleans, DeMille countered by asserting that his version of the battle would actually represent the battle in a fullness none had done before.15

From the beginning, *The Buccaneer* rehabilitated the image of Jean Laffite in the eyes of the America public. The opening credits explain to all that even the famed Lord Byron felt a warm place in his heart for the Gulf Coast corsair and Fredric March plays Jean Laffite perfectly for a movie based on Lyle Saxon’s interpretation (little surprise since Saxon was on set). The movie opens with scenes depicting the playful nature of Laffite’s supposed personality and sympathetic explanations of his criminal behavior. The script quickly informs the viewer the Laffite is a man of honor and orders his ships never to attack a vessel flying the American flag. The movie depicts these actions as pseudo-patriotic in nature rather than the practical realities of not wanting to antagonize the American government too much while operating a base within U.S. territorial waters.  

Laffite and his men lived as a band of misfits, cast out from every decent country in the world. Laffite is a pirate (or privateer) king that has all the power, riches, and fineries a man could want; but he lacks what he most desires: the hand of a beautiful woman. Laffite’s love interest is part of New Orleans high society and she explains to the roguish hero that they cannot be together until Lafitte is a respectable man able to walk the streets of New Orleans without a price on his head. When the British approach Lafitte with overtures to join them and offers of respectability in British society, the movie’s protagonist ultimately rejects a commission in the Royal Navy. He explains his reasoning to his men by stating that, like the Baratarians, the United States is the underdog in the conflict against Great Britain. America is a land of immigrants who have, for various reasons, had other nations kick them out. By siding with the United  

States, the Baratarians can finally have a country to call their own and one that, ultimately, reminds the pirates of the upstart, reject nature of their own existence.17

Even when the American government orders an attack on Barataria, thanks to the perfidious actions of a British spy who happens to be in the Louisiana legislature, Laffite and his men stay true to the United States. Their loyalty rests on Lafitte and his men’s faith in the man who will lead the defense of New Orleans, Andrew Jackson. While Old Hickory, played by Hugh Sothern, does not get as much screen time in a movie about the Battle of New Orleans as one might expect, the meaning behind Jackson’s character is critical to the thesis of DeMille’s movie. Like Laffite, Jackson is not a part of “the system.” Jackson, invariably followed by his buckskin-clad coonskin-hat-wearing aide Mr. Peavy, while adored by New Orleans polite society, is not part of it. Jackson is a rough and tumble frontier brawler who only cares about winning and has the ability to see the inner good in people despite what the larger society normally condones. *The Buccaneer’s* Andrew Jackson is a myth and memory that would bring a tear to the mid-nineteenth century Democratic Party’s eyes, but he also is not the main character of the story. Laffite is the real savior of New Orleans, providing manpower, material, and inspiration just when the city needs it the most. *The Buccaneer* paved the way for Laffite, the Baratarians, and their artillery to rise to the ranks of Jackson, the Tennesseans, and their hunting rifles.18

*The Buccaneer* never became the box office success that DeMille expected, nor did it receive the attention from film critics that the famous director’s other works did. The movie, though, did have a lasting impact on the memory of the Battle of New

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Orleans and, apparently, on DeMille himself. While the first part of that assertion is harder to prove tangibly, the latter helped further the memory of the battle. During the 1950s, after the development of Technicolor and other methods of making color films, DeMille began working in the new medium. He decided that we wanted to remake some of his old black and white movies into color and take advantage of the latest cinema technology to make their stories even grander than before. Of DeMille’s entire venerated filmography, he selected only two movies for this treatment: *The Ten Commandments* and *The Buccaneer*. In the shadow of his life, DeMille chose movies celebrating his interpretations of God and the United States. Unfortunately for DeMille, by 1957, when production started on the remake of *The Buccaneer*, his age advanced had advanced prevented him from going on set to film. Instead, he sent his son-in-law Anthony Quinn to direct the filming for him and DeMille put his mark on the product in postproduction through editing.  

While the 1958 edition of *The Buccaneer* shares an almost identical plotline and many of the same one-liners as its 1938 predecessor, it is very much its own work of art. The 1958 version has a more serious tone than its predecessor and the newer movie portrays the danger to the United States as much more imminent and grave. In the 1958 version, Laffite’s love interest, this time the fictitious daughter of governor Claiborne, tries a much more forceful method of obtaining the wayward pirate’s allegiance to the United States. As Laffite wistfully pines for her attention in the same manner as he does in the 1938 rendition, his paramour does not leave it to him to figure

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out a path to respectability; she insults him as she explains how the United States needs all the help it can get. To earn this woman’s respect, it is time for Laffite to stop living out the boy’s fantasy of playing pirate and being the pretend-king of a sandy spit of Gulf Coast property. The implication is that it takes a greater man to be willing to stand up for an ideal and fight for one’s country than to revel in personal liberties and individual freedoms carried to excess.20

The movie continues this theme when Laffite shows up at the New Orleans jail to free his men. Rather than deliver a bombastic and inspirational speech to his men, the 1958 Laffite has a quiet conversation with his second-in-command Dominique You. In an earlier scene, a drunk You lambasted Laffite for being willing to fight for a nation and its ideals. After all, Laffite had been the one to convince You to leave France and become a pirate in the first place. Later in the jail, Laffite explains that he had been wrong in his youth. It was easy to fight for nothing and live as an outlaw; real courage meant being willing to stand up for a belief.21

That the 1958 version of the Buccaneer should take a more sober view of national service is, in many ways hardly surprising. DeMille, an outspoken critic of the communist Soviet Union, regularly assisted the United States military and anti-communist organizations. Indeed, DeMille had used his skills at showmanship both to consult for the National Committee for a Free Europe and design the uniforms at the United States Air Force Academy. DeMille’s two color remakes, The Ten Commandments and The Buccaneer, represented some of his last attempts to capture his feelings on issues of God and country. While DeMille’s medical condition limited his involvement in

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the day-to-day operations of *The Buccaneer*, he took every opportunity to leave his mark when he could. In fact, he is the first person the audience saw when the film opened. Standing in front of a map showing the Louisiana Purchase, DeMille personally explains the strategic implications of the New Orleans campaign in a professorial style creating the impression that he is a historian.22

*The Buccaneer* (1958)’s nationalistic tones, though, should not give the impression that the movie is excessively right-leaning in all of its content. Indeed, either DeMille or Quinn made a number of changes dealing with the issue of race. The 1938 version portrays few African Americans in any but servant roles and all those with speaking roles have the notorious accents of a minstrel show performer. The 1958 *Buccaneer* features a much broader range of African American characters (comparatively speaking) and shows them fighting alongside whites in the final battle against the British. Further, some of the African Americans, presumably middle class New Orleans creoles by their dress, speak better English than any of the white soldiers from Tennessee or Kentucky. Further, the casting of Brynner as Laffite reveals an intent to make the character racially ambiguous. Yul Brynner (Laffite) received numerous roles throughout his career when a studio wanted someone “ethnic” looking. Brynner

had recently worked with DeMille in *The Ten Commandments*, portraying Egyptian King Ramses II and had previously played the King of Siam in *The King and I*.²³

The 1958 *Buccaneer* makes other attempts at expanding the racial diversity of its protagonists. After the capture of the *Corinthian*, an American merchant vessel attacked by a rouge Baratarian ship’s captain in both films, the 1958 version features an African American pirate rescuing a young boy and his dog off the sinking ship. In 1938, the pirate was a scraggly looking white male saving a beautiful woman with the implication that he desired some sort of sexual reward. The 1958 depiction is more selfless and builds on the film’s idea that it takes more courage to stand by convictions.²⁴

Later, during the final January 8-battle, Laffite rushes forward with a Choctaw warrior to signal the location of the British Army. The “brave,” as Laffite and Jackson call him, is rather stereotypically dressed and is, of course, armed with a bow and arrow. The Tennesseans and Kentuckians are similar caricatures of their historical equivalents. More importantly, the 1958 version of *The Buccaneer* exhibited a conscious production effort to depict the multi-racial nature of Jackson's army. That depiction of a multi-racial force fighting in unison for a set of ideals is best articulated in a scene where a South Asian man reads the preamble of the Declaration of Independence to Laffite’s Baratarians. That scene reached millions of American viewers in 1958 and tens of millions more during the fifty years of the film’s broadcast on television and subsequent theatre screenings.²⁵

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²⁴ *The Buccaneer* (1958)
²⁵ *The Buccaneer* (1958)
Those viewers also witnessed a different Andrew Jackson than the 1938 version. Portrayed by Charlton Heston, the 1938 Jackson is a far more forceful and explosive Old Hickory than Hugh Sothern some twenty years earlier. Heston presents Jackson at his prime: fiery, decisive, and not a little borderline crazy. While the 1958 Jackson does not receive much more screen time than the 1938 character, he is much more central to the storyline and is actually one of the first characters to appear in the movie.26

Both movies present Jackson’s army that travels to New Orleans as the traditional band of Tennessee and Kentuckian backwoodsman who can “shoot the eye of a squirrel at 300 yards.” They are coarse, they are vulgar, and they are hard fighters. Both versions of The Buccaneer depict the final January 8 battle in a manner that makes the historian cringe. Taking cover behind hastily prepared ramparts, both versions of the movies show the Americans still rolling cotton bales into position when Laffite arrives just as the British begin their assault. The British too suffer the indignity of almost 150 years of historical misrepresentation as, in both movies, kilt-wearing highlanders slowly march into the maw of lead and iron that dirty-shirted American have prepared for them.27

The Buccaneer was not the only prominent rendition of the Battle of New Orleans Americans observed in the late 1950s. In 1959, a year after the release of DeMille’s remake, musician Johnny Horton released “The Battle of New Orleans” with the Columbia Records Label. The song was an instant success and skyrocketed to the top of the Billboard Hot 100 list. In fact, during the first fifty years of Billboard’s

26. The Buccaneer (1938); The Buccaneer (1958)
27. The Buccaneer (1938); The Buccaneer (1958)
influential listing, “The Battle of New Orleans” ranked twenty-eighth overall -- the number one country song to appear on the chart.28

The success of “The Battle of New Orleans” stemmed in large part from Columbia Records’ skillful marketing of the song. The original writer of the lyrics, Jimmy Driftwood, had the thick accent of a native Arkansan. While Driftwood garnered lots of attention in the South, for a national release, Columbia went with the cleaner accented and younger Horton. The plan worked and, to this day, the Horton version of the song is the one most Americans are familiar with; though, in folk music circles, Driftwood’s original authorship is well understood.29

Born Neil Morris in 1907, Jimmy Driftwood learned to play American folk music at a young age, including the popular bluegrass tune The Eighth of January. The exact origins of the original fiddle tune are unknown, but, according to oral tradition in the Tennessee mountain country and interviews conducted by the Works Progress Administration, its origins lie deep in the nineteenth century. Originally without lyrics, Driftwood wrote words to accompany the tune while a high school history teacher in Arkansas to help teach the Battle of New Orleans to his students in 1936.30


29. Numerous artists have covered the song over the years including Johnny Cash (1972), Nitty Gritty Dirt Band (1974), and Dolly Parton (1976). One of the most recent covers was done in 2010 by a British indie rock group of Indian descent known as Cornershop.

In 1957, Nashville records publishers learned of Driftwood and signed him to a contract recording many of his original songs, including “the Battle of New Orleans.” By the end of the 50s and into the 60s, both Driftwood and Horton toured the United States and Europe performing the “Battle of New Orleans” for a wide variety of audiences. Driftwood achieved significant success in Europe because of his Southern accent and because of his racier lyrics. In the name of politeness though, Driftwood did ensure that he had alternate wording for performances in England so as not to offend his audience.\footnote{Robert Cochran “Remembering Jimmy Driftwood”, \textit{The Arkansas Historical Quarterly}, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Winter, 1998), pp. 435-438;}

Driftwood’s original lyrics did not conform to the United States’ federal radio standards of the day because of his use of the words “hell” and “damn.” Words that, as Driftwoods pointed out, people heard regularly in church, but that, according to the government, hearing on the radio would be indecent.

Federal standards aside, Driftwood’s song opens from the start as the bold and boisterous tale of American frontiersmen’s journey south “Along with Colonel Jackson down the mighty Missisip … to [meet] the bloody British in the town of New Orleans.” Driftwood continues that “I seed Mars Jackson come a-walkin’ down the street/And a-talkin’ to a pirate by the name of Jean Lafitte/He gave Jean a drink that he brung from Tennessee/And the pirate said he’d help us drive the British to the sea.” French speaking Creoles “told Andrew, ‘You had better run/For Packenham’s a comin’ with a bullet in his gun.’/Old Hickory said he didn’t give a damn/He’s a-gonna whup the britches off of Colonel Packenham.” The British then appeared, but the Americans, unimpressed with the proper soldiers’ high-step marching, hid behind their cotton
bales with their hunting rifles. Finally, with their small arms ammunition exhausted and the cannons overheated, the backwoodsmen “grabbed an alligator and we fought another round/We filled his head with minie balls and powdered his behind/And when we touched the powder off, the 'gator lost his mind.” The defeated British “ran through the briars and they ran through the brambles/And they ran through the bushes where a rabbit couldn’t go/They ran so fast the hounds couldn’t catch em/Down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico.”^{32}

While the section about Laffite and concerns over the loyalty of Francophone New Orleanians never made it into Horton’s radio edited version, the thesis of the song and its patriotic nature remain intact. The piece is a folky celebration of America that mocks Great Britain for challenging the virility of the American frontiersman. Similar to *The Buccaneer*, though, the song is not inherently anti-British as much as it is pro-American. Driftwood finds it silly that any force would challenge the western rifleman on his home soil in his native element whomever attacks. Like his contemporary DeMille, Driftwood’s art celebrated what he perceived as intrinsic values of American culture that should be highlighted and commemorated as part of the stand made by Jackson’s forces. He did this without resorting to the demonization of British soldiers and culture that occurred in much of the nineteenth century’s popular works that focused on the battle.^{33}

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33. For 19th century works that relied on tearing the British down to help build up the Americans see: *Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Daily*, December 13, 1815; James Ross, *Victoria Neo-Aurelina: Pax Gandavensis*, trans. Michael Fortune (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1816)
The 1930s and 50s witnessed a reawakening of the Battle of New Orleans’ place in American popular country. Artists like Johnny Horton, Jimmy Driftwood, and Cecile B. DeMille harnessed the burgeoning American post-war patriotism and confidence to market their work and celebrate their image of the United States. The rekindled enthusiasm for the military victory at New Orleans differed from its nineteenth century predecessor however.34

During the 1800s, the Battle of New Orleans had been an important victory over the British, one of the world’s super powers. By the mid-twentieth century, the United States stood as one of the world’s two super powers, and Great Britain (while an important and close ally) had clearly lost a step in the international arena. While both versions of The Buccaneer and “The Battle of New Orleans” in no way attempted to hide that Great Britain had been the enemy in the War of 1812, the films and song lacked an overtly anti-British character. More Pro-American than anything, the songs and movies used British stereotypes of military pomp and ordered ranks slowly marching forward into aimed rifle fire as straw men to iconize the typecasts of the American soldiers.

By the 1950s, the United States no longer needed to “prove” itself to the world. It had, according to many Americans still today, bailed Great Britain out of losing two World Wars and, at the height of the Cold War, “made the world safe for Democracy.” Great Britain and the United States were now partners, with the old colonial power clearly the junior member of the alliance. Thus, commemorations of the Battle of New

Orleans like *The Buccaneer* and the “The Battle of New Orleans” could focus on what their creators believed made America great without relying on a demonization of the British. Indeed, except for the issue of historical accuracy, one gets the feeling when watching *The Buccaneer* or listening to “The Battle of New Orleans” that Nazi Germany or Communist Russian could have as easily been Jackson’s enemy. It would not matter; Jackson, Laffite, and their men could take on anyone as long as the United States remained dedicated to the ideals that captured the hearts of DeMille’s Baratarians and kept hold of the frontier craftiness of Driftwood’s artillerymen.\(^{35}\)

This rekindled attention on the Battle of New Orleans also opened the door for more diverse interpretations of the battle’s story. While historians and writers had given the Baratarians attention before, this culturally heterogeneous group received newfound popularity in the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, the inclusion of African American participation in the battle depicted in the 1958 *Buccaneer* exposed many Americans to a visual depiction of the engagement rarely presented before. The steps, while small, paved the way for the reaction against a narrative of the battle that had gotten rather whitewashed over time. That reaction would not be without its opponents, but with hundreds of millions of people around the country having watched *The Buccaneer* and listened to “The Battle of New Orleans,” these

renditions of Jackson’s victory became some of the most lasting and influential interpretations ever.³⁶

Chapter 7: “Tourism Whetted by the Celebration”

Their vapory clouds of breath appeared and disappeared with vibrant frequency in the crisp January air. They were tired, so very tired. They had pushed themselves hard on the route from Fort St. John to the Vieux Carre. Thankfully, though, the end of their journey lay within sight. There, standing before them, the blue-coated officer waved them on and encouraged them, his shock of white hair clearly visible beneath the bicoroned hat resting on his head. Andrew Jackson did not cheer these young participants on, rather, Hugh Sothern did. The runners were not Plauche’s battalion in 1815, but, instead, New Orleans area joggers in 1938.¹

In recognition of The Buccaneers world premiere, New Orleans hosted a grand spectacle around the city. At this particular event, the winner of the “Brave Creoles Run” would receive the “Cecil B. DeMille” trophy. Elsewhere in New Orleans, city boosters carefully crafted an image of their region that mirrored the fantasy and myth depicted in DeMille’s screen version of New Orleans. Indeed, during a radio interview between Lyle Saxon and Cecil B. DeMille, the famous director opined, “More than a hundred years have passed since Jean Laffite held the future of America in the palm of his hand, yet here in New Orleans, steeped in tradition and romance, it almost seems as if he were still alive.”²

New Orleans’ mid-twentieth century history witnessed a city struggling to find an identity. Trying to cash in on the growing industry of cultural tourism, many in the New Orleans area lobbied for an aura that highlighted the romanticized past of the city.

². Radio conversation between Cecil B DeMille and Lyle Saxon, 10 January 1938, Lyle Saxon Papers, Tulane University.
Others, looking at the success of Southern cities such as Dallas and Atlanta felt that New Orleans must modernize at all costs to survive. This debate had dramatic implications for elements of the city’s past such as the Battle of New Orleans commemoration and the event’s historical memory.³

The most tangible evidence for New Orleans’ tri-cornered conflict between modernization, preservation, and cultural tourism lay six miles downriver from the French Quarter at the Chalmette Monument. The Daughters of 1812 had fought a valiant delaying action against the encroachment of industry on the Chalmette Battlefield, but, by the end of the 1920s, they needed help. The efforts of the federal government, in general, and the National Park Service, specifically, during the next thirty years provided an intriguing story that highlights the dynamic struggles of historic preservation efforts. Whereas many of the nation’s most famous battlefield parks (Gettysburg, Antietam, Saratoga) reside in largely rural areas, the Chalmette battlefield contended with a host of urban planning issues. As a result, the Park Service faced considerable difficulty in its preservation efforts and the outcome of those efforts had a lasting impact on citizens’ memories of the Battle of New Orleans.⁴

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⁴ Fort McHenry, like Chalmette, is an urban park site situated on valuable waterfront property. Unlike Chalmette, the fort had the benefit of being under the control of the United States Army from the start. The Army continued to use the grounds surrounding the fort well into World War II, even after the government transferred the property to the NPS in 1925. Harold I. Lessem and George C. Mackenzie. Fort McHenry National Monument and Historic Shrine, Maryland (Washington, D.C.:
Despite their efforts, the Daughters of 1812 had struggled to muster the monetary resources and political clout necessary to combat the growing industrialization near the battlefield. On June 2, 1930, President Herbert Hoover signed legislation giving the federal government control over the Chalmette Monument and the grounds surrounding it. Thereafter, the United States government took charge of efforts to preserve and care for the battlefield. Initial federal appropriations to the site, though, totaled only $1,200 annually – not really enough to persuade local business interests that Washington seriously intended to make preservation efforts a priority.5

Despite the paltry $1,200, federal assistance made an immediate impact on the monument property. The superintendent of the national cemetery just a few hundred yards downriver conducted an initial survey of the memorial grounds and provided it to his superiors. He recommended that the site needed immediate help, including repairs to the maintenance garage, outhouse, cistern, and chicken coop. His recommendations highlighted the rural and neglected nature of the memorial. Even as late as the 1930s, when National Military Parks like Gettysburg, Shiloh, and Vicksburg already had numerous wayside exhibits and extensive plans for museum buildings, the Chalmette

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5. An Act to Authorize the Secretary of War to Assume the Care, Custody, and Control of the Monument to the Memory of the Soldiers who Fell in the Battle of New Orleans, at Chalmette Louisiana, and to Maintain the Monument and Grounds Surrounding it, 71st Congress, 2nd Session (June 2, 1930); Report Number 194 to Accompany House Resolution 6151.
battlefield remained a rural backwater only six miles from one of the largest cities in the South. The fences were an especially important item of needed repair because they confined the cattle that ate the grass. Without the cattle, the park would have to pay someone to mow the grounds. The War Department eventually decided to let the cattle go, and maintenance personnel from the cemetery began caring for the monument grounds.6

While the National Park Service administered the original “Big 5” Civil War sites (Shiloh, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Antietam), no clear indication existed that the organization would remain in the business of battlefield preservation. During the same period, the War Department had assumed control of a number of sites, including Chalmette. Institutionally uncertain as to its mission in regards to these locations, the Secretary of War put the U.S. Army War College in charge of developing a plan. Well versed in the study of military history because of its courses of study, the War College launched a sweeping assessment of battlefields across the country. That study concluded, to accurately place markers depicting important spots in the battle or indicate the battle lines, the government needed to purchase 136 acres of land at a cost of $540,000. The annual cost of maintaining this expanded footprint would be some $10,000, considerably more than the $1,200 annual budget Congress appropriated. As such the War Department awaited directions for the next course of action.7

6. Robert W. Blythe, Administrative History of Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve (Atlanta: Cultural Resources Division, Southeast Regional Office, National Park Service, 2013) 29-31. Blythe’s work is the best single reference for those trying to understand how the Chalmette park came to be and the intricacies of NPS operations.

7. An Act to Provide for the Study, Investigation and Survey for Commemorative Purposes, of the Battle Field of Chalmette, Louisiana (February 5, 1931); Senate Document No. 27, 72nd Congress, 1st Session (December 11, 1931).
Publicity of the federal government’s investigation into the battlefield’s plight sparked new local interest in assisting with the preservation. The Louisiana Landmark Society, the Louisiana Historical Association, and the New Orleans Association of Commerce also championed an expanded historic site. The Association of Commerce’s newfound interest in history came from the growing business of cultural tourism. The War Department’s efforts to build up the Chalmette site coincided with a growing attention on the part of business in New Orleans to shape the image of the Crescent City and emphasize what had made the city unique. These organizations thirsted for anything that might convince a potential tourist visit and to open his or her wallet. “The establishment of this park can mean much to New Orleans,” the Association of Commerce wrote, “as a drawing card to tourists, aside from the historic and sentimental value.” Even if their efforts remained less than benevolent, the chamber of commerce could be a valuable ally in convincing the New Orleans Terminal Company to sell its property to the federal government. Luckily for the War Department, though, the future of the Chalmette battlefield became the problem of the National Park Service when, in 1933, War Department turned over control of its battlefield sites.8

The problem of how to expand the site into a viable park still remained despite the Chalmette Monument resting under the auspices of the National Park Service. The New Orleans Association of Business and local history groups continued their efforts to convince the federal government to purchase the necessary land. In 1935, Congressman Joachim O. Fernández presented a bill before Congress to acquire the

8. New Orleans Association of Commerce to Interested Organizations and Individuals, June 22, 1931, Jean Lafitte National Park vertical files, Tulane University Special Collection; Creating the Big Easy, 96-97.
necessary land. Despite its passage in both the Senate and the House, President Franklin Roosevelt vetoed the bill. In the middle of the Great Depression, the President could not justify spending half a million dollars buying land to create a park that would potentially limit industrial development and job creation.9

Unable to convince the federal government to purchase the land, park boosters shifted tactics, trying to convince the State of Louisiana to buy the property and then donate the land to the federal government. The park’s advocates received assistance from an unlikely source -- Hollywood. In 1937, Cecil B DeMille travelled to New Orleans to begin production on the film *The Buccaneer*. To raise public awareness about its efforts to purchase the land required for a park, the Louisiana Historical Society held a grand celebration during the film’s premier in 1938.10

The historical society worked with Paramount Studios to promote the film during the months before its release. In January, DeMille’s film had its world premiere at the New Orleans Saenger theatre in front of a packed house of Hollywood elite. To encourage national attendance for a premiere so far from Los Angeles, Paramount hosted a semi-annual meeting of its distribution executives from around the country.11

With national attention once again focused on the Battle of New Orleans, events moved quickly. In July of 1938, the governor Richard Leche signed a bill authorizing the state to purchase $300,000 worth of land for the establishment of a battlefield park. With state action finally underway, the federal government did its part and passed legislation officially establishing the Chalmette National Historical Park on August 10, 1938.12

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1939. With that action, Chalmette became only the third “national historical park” in the country.\(^{12}\)

Despite these successes, the future viability of the Chalmette battlefield became mired in a morass of Louisiana politics. Leche resigned the governorship shortly after the federal government indicted him on corruption charges. The monetary appropriation for the battlefield turned into a political football exploited by the various candidates for the governor’s office during the following election.\(^{13}\)

The question centered on the source of the money for the battlefield. Normally, tax revenue from mineral extraction within Louisiana normally contributed to nature conservation and education. While education might seem a fitting justification for the purchase of the Chalmette battlefield land, public school teachers in Louisiana disagreed. That $300,000 could supplement teacher salaries and improve classroom conditions around the state; instead the government had tagged that money for the purchase of an empty field. Democratic gubernatorial candidates like Sam Houston Jones argued in favor of the teachers in an effort to win their support at the polls. After winning the election, Jones quickly rescinded the state’s pledge to purchase the land and left the National Park Service baffled about how to proceed. By 1939, the NPS

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managed a park that only encompassed a narrow 33-acre strip commanded by a big marble obelisk; the agency lacked any Congressional authority to purchase land.\textsuperscript{14}

With no immediate prospect of gaining additional property, the Park Service delayed major improvements to the site. Nonetheless, work proceeded to make the monument grounds more comfortable to visitors and increase attendance. In fact, the Works Progress Administration assisted in these efforts, but still lack of funding hindered progress.\textsuperscript{15}

Part of these abandoned improvement plans highlights the struggles the NPS faced with telling the story of the battle in the context of the Jim Crow-era South. While designing bathrooms for the site, Park Service officials realized they had forgotten to provide for the “colored” facilities necessary to comply with Louisiana state law.

Though Andrew Jackson himself had called for racial unity in the New Orleans during the British invasion, one hundred and twenty years later the NPS faced the prospect of endorsing racial segregation. Though a lack of funding prevented the NPS from building the new restroom facilities, the attempted segregation of African Americans at the site did not occur only when they required a rest room. Segregation from battle commemorations affected the memory of the battle for most African Americans because

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{14} J Walter Coleman, Superintendent, Vicksburg National Military Park to Director, National Park Service, October 21, 1939, Jean Laffite National Park and Preserve Archives, Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans; Blythe, 41-42.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{15} Works Progress Administration photographs, Jean Laffite National Park and Preserve Archives, Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans}
few realized that more than five hundred free men of color fought in the campaign on the American side.\textsuperscript{16}

Louisiana’s fiscal decisions combined with World War II hindered all Americans’ ability to tour the Chalmette battlefield and memorialize the Battle of New Orleans. Even so, the Park Service planned for the day it would have the desired land. The agency also lobbied the New Orleans Terminal Company to make the donation. The NPS especially desired the portion of the land that included the Rodriguez Canal’s remnants and the Malus-Beuregard house. Jackson’s army used the canal as the basis for their famed rampart and it was the only surviving physical indication two armies had fought over the otherwise flat field. The Malus-Beuregard plantation house postdated the Battle of New Orleans, but park officials felt that it would make a useful teaching tool and a good building for a museum. Fortunately, both of these sat on the near (western) edge of the land the park wanted to purchase. Even if the park could not get the whole piece of property, at least the most historically relevant portions were the closest.\textsuperscript{17}

To acquire this land, the park and its boosters launched a lobbying campaign in Baton Rouge. They sent one thousand brochures to legislators and influential persons in the state. These brochures highlighted the familiar tropes of the New Orleans campaign: rustic frontiersmen, a brave general, and slow-moving toy soldier-like British soldiers. Ultimately, these efforts succeeded in convincing the state to agree once again

\textsuperscript{16} National Park Service Plan for Chalmette Comfort Station, Jean Laffite National Park and Preserve Archives, Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans; Blythe, 43.

\textsuperscript{17} Edwin S. Bres, \textit{Notes on the Establishment and the Development of the Chalmette National Historical Park} (1964), Sesquicentennial of the Battle of New Orleans Collection, Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection.
to purchase land for the park and donate it to the federal government. This time, the State of Louisiana appropriated only $100,000 for the endeavor, yet the decreased sum could be enough to get the land that included the Rodriguez Canal and Malus-Beuregard house.18

The Louisiana State Parks Commission began negotiations with the New Orleans Terminal Company in an effort to acquire as much land as possible. The state hoped to purchase all of the land that lay between the Chalmette Monument tract and the national cemetery. The state appealed to the corporation on philanthropic grounds and pointed to the tax benefits of such a large donation. The terminal company insisted, though, that the $2,000 an acre the state offered was not enough for the property. The company could not accept anything less than $3,000 per acre. Eventually, the state and the terminal company settled on $2,750 and Louisiana turned over to the Park Service some 36 acres. The terminal company also offered the state and federal government a one-year guarantee on the negotiated price if they could raise the additional money to buy the remaining land. That would give the park access to all of the land between the monument and the Fazendville neighborhood.19

Knowing that the federal government desired the land, and had raised almost $500,000 for its purchase at one point, the New Orleans Terminal Company had little reason to lower its asking price. Any threat to build on the land only raised public outcry for its preservation and raised the amount of money the state or federal

government might be willing to pay. Once the state and federal governments saw the
company would guarantee the initial $2,750 per acre price for up to one year, officials
immediately petitioned the state legislature and Congress for the additional funds.
After it became clear that the terminal company had as much money as it could get from
the State of Louisiana it sold the remaining portion of the battlefield to the Kaiser
Aluminum Corporation for only $1,000 an acre.20

Kaiser purchased the land in 1951, and as part of the defense industry, the new
corporation became an even trickier opponent. The federal government had bankrolled
the development of the Kaiser Corporation in an effort increase aluminum production
during the Cold War. Fully aware of the history that took place on the site of the new
facility, Kaiser’s public relations department invoked the memory of Jackson’s victory,
declaring that its factory was engaged in a “second Battle of New Orleans.” The
company announced, “a threat of foreign domination was removed by the American
victory of the past. Today, some of the silvery aluminum now being made on the same
ground is being used for national defense to safeguard this country from aggression
once again.”21

Many local residents quickly adopted the opinion that a battlefield park may not
the best idea. After all, national defense was important, and the 1,000 jobs that the
aluminum factory brought to the small community did not hurt either. Further, before
the new facility opened, Kaiser announced that it intended to double production
capacity and, presumably, expand onto the battlefield land. Preservation groups fought
an uphill battle as a doubled production capacity could mean doubled employment

21. Quoted in Blythe, 50.
numbers. The guarantee of jobs and income from the industrial site offered far more tempting prospects than the possibility of income from tourism to a hypothetical battlefield park. Business groups had always arrayed themselves against park proponents because of their hope that wealthy investors might use the land. With Kaiser Aluminum in their backyard, the local chambers of commerce fought even harder against government and preservationists’ efforts to set aside Chalmette.$^{22}$

Park activists became even more concerned when rumors surfaced of Kaiser’s building plans: a mammoth rolling mill for the production of aluminum sheeting. NPS officials repeatedly appealed to Kaiser officials to work out some sort of deal for the donation of the land, but many locals now squarely sat in the Kaiser camp and advocated increased production capacity and more jobs. Local government officials also to rallied against the Park Service and preservationists. New Orleans mayor deLesseps Morrison even recommended that Kaiser build something on the property as soon as possible in order to drive any remaining support away from the conservationists. “It would be a good idea to announce plans soon,” Morrison opined, “because of the possibility of a controversy raised by groups which want to see the site set aside as a national monument commemorating the Battle of New Orleans.”$^{23}$

The Parish of St. Bernard, long an advocate for a battlefield park, also publicly thwarted conservation efforts. The federal government had repeatedly warned the parish, which had dumped raw sewage into the Mississippi River, to update its public works. To avoid the impending fines, the parish begrudgingly constructed a new sewage treatment plant. Though the plant’s placement could have occurred in a variety

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$^{22}$ *St. Bernard Voice*, 11 April 1952.

of spots near the river, the parish decided to build it next to the Fazendville neighborhood on the route taken in 1815 by the British column assaulting along the river road. Despite Kaiser’s repeated insistences to the Park Service that it needed all of the available land, the company speedily sold the 1.5 acres required for the sewage treatment plant to the parish. The construction of the odorous plant would, in the hopes of Kaiser and St. Bernard Parish officials, encourage the African American residents of Fazendville to move and discourage preservationists in their efforts. After all, Jackson’s battlefield could only look so scenic with a sewage treatment plant on it.²⁴

Not only did the sewage facility’s construction not deter park proponents, but it also drove them further to action. Fortuitously for their cause, they received help from one new source and one old ally. The first came in the form of the Office of the President of the United States. Apparently, the Secretary of the Interior managed to use his cabinet position to gain the attention of President Dwight Eisenhower, whose subordinates made known Ike’s desire for some sort of compromise to occur.²⁵

The second fortuitous ally came in the form, once again, of Hollywood and Cecil B. DeMille. In 1957, DeMille began production on a Technicolor remake of his 1938 The Buccaneer. As in 1938, New Orleans hosted the world premiere of the film. This time, in addition to the expected festivities in New Orleans proper, several hundred Boy Scouts reenacted the Battle of New Orleans on the Chalmette battlefield for the entertainment of onlookers. This activity had already become an annual event held in

²⁵. New Orleans Times, July 12, 1957
connection with the anniversary, but the local scout troops provided a special performance just for the film’s release.\textsuperscript{26}

Several people involved with the film, including some of the principal actors, toured the battlefield and learned of its struggles. They and preservationists began an all-out effort to bring Kaiser to the table. With public attention fixed on the Battle of New Orleans because of the movie’s release and advocates with more clout backing the idea of a park, Kaiser agreed to the negotiate.\textsuperscript{27}

Negotiations with Kaiser centered on its ability to find a suitable tract of land with which the company could replace with its portion of the battlefield. Eventually, Kaiser officials and park proponents worked out a land swap between Kaiser, the National Park Service, and a third party that owned land on the east side of the Kaiser faculties. Kaiser agreed to give a portion of the requested land to the park, but only in installments, so that it could generate the greatest tax deductions from the donations. Once Kaiser donated all the land, the NPS would be in possession of all the former Kaiser Aluminum land between the national cemetery and the park’s current eastern boundary.\textsuperscript{28}

Park Service officials ecstatic with the rapid pace of progress during the past two years soon faced a number of new concerns and issues. Given the difficulty in acquiring the land, officials decided to abandon efforts for an even further expanded park. The Park Service focused all future planning strictly on the property it would soon possess. The second issue stemmed from the staggered nature of the Kaiser donation. The

\textsuperscript{26} Variety Magazine, 17 December 1958.


\textsuperscript{28} New Orleans Times Picayune, 17 April 1959.
primary interpretive item the park wanted to construct was an automotive tour road that visitors could use to quickly traverse the battlefield’s main features. Even though construction on the loop could not begin until the park possessed all of the land, officials made the necessary preparations so that efforts could begin as soon as possible. With the 150th anniversary of the battle only a few years away, the park wanted to make sure it had the site completed for the big event. The park now faced the last issue for completing its footprint -- land negotiations with the residents of the Fazendville community.

The NPS had delayed negotiations with the Fazendville residents, because, if the agency could not acquire the industrial land on either side of the neighborhood, the residents’ property would be useless to the park anyway. Though individual negotiations with roughly 35 property owners would take time, the government officials did not feel the acquisition of the property would be overly challenging. Most of the properties lacked running water and electricity, meaning without that infrastructure the NPS could acquire the plots for relatively little money. Also, as a government agency, the NPS could invoke eminent domain, if necessary order the residents off the land as long as the residents’ removal was for the general welfare of the public and as long as the government paid a fair market value.²⁹

Accordingly, in 1962, Congress passed legislation that allowed officials to begin negotiations for the Fazendville land and authorized $165,000 for the expenses. The park requested “disinterested, experienced, and reputable appraisers” to estimate the

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²⁹ Ibid.
value of the land so that negotiations could begin. Whatever good intentions the park may have had, though, it had to operate in the realities of the 1960s Deep South. 30

Just a few decades before, when the park first moved to NPS control, the editors of the St Bernard Voice wrote an editorial about the realities the Fazendville community faced. “The situation which the inhabitants of Fazendville must eventually face is apparent to the more intelligent colored folks,” the editors wrote. “They must bear segregation in mind – that is to say, the new village must be on a site that will meet with the approval of adjoining property holders.” The writer continued: “The question of price is an important element and may be a deciding factor in the consideration of a new colored village. Then, again, the lump sums received by the negro property holders for their homes may so charm them that they will go to renting in New Orleans instead of building, and in a short time ‘the coin of the realm’ shall have vanished.” The article ended with the closing observation that “the more intelligent and thrifty would like to found a new village, but whether they will succeed remains to be seen.” 31

Though the editorial appeared in 1939, for African Americans in St. Bernard Parish, the situation had not improved but it had actually gotten worse in some ways. By 1965, St Bernard’s white population had steadily risen as white families fled to the suburbs. White flight from the New Orleans proper raised property values in St. Bernard and decreased the chances the Fazendville residents could move as a group and remain within their home parish. Further, since Fazendville was one of the few

30. Joint Resolution to Establish the Sesquecentenial Commission for the Celebration of the Battle of New Orleans, to Authorize the Secretary to Acquire Certain Properties within the Chalmette National Historic Park, and for other Purposes, 87th Congress, 2nd Session (9 October 1962).

Concentrated African American groups in St Bernard, many whites in the parish welcomed the opportunity to encourage black residents to move out of the area.32 Consequently, the residents of Fazendville, many of whose families had owned their property since just after the Civil War, moved into the 9th Ward of lower New Orleans and began renting homes. For families that had never possessed a substantial income, the necessity of monthly rent quickly drained the lump sum of money the Park Service provided them for their original properties. With little education, few job opportunities, and a desperate economic reality, the removal of the Fazendville community crippled those families for many years. Many New Orleans area African Americans became aware of the Fazendville residents’ plight. Consequently, the NPS’s actions also soured many African Americans to the park and negatively affected their attitudes towards the Battle of New Orleans in general.33

Business and government played a significant role in the development of the Battle of New Orleans’s memory during the mid-twentieth century, but no event makes that connection more clear than the planning and execution of the sesquicentennial celebration in 1965. One hundred and fifty years afterward, and with Great Britain an important ally, the United States government had little trouble suggesting that the event


should not focus on British military defeat. In fact, during initial planning, one member of the organizing committee repeatedly lobby that events should focus on peace in general and not glorify war. With the United States already sending troops into Vietnam, many saw the glorification of armed conflict as distasteful. Instead, the organizing committee decided to make the sesquicentennial an enormous ad campaign for the City of New Orleans and surrounding area. Considering the committee consisted of representatives from Avondale Shipyards, American Sugar, Sears, Maison Blaunche, AT&T, Mississippi Shipping, Coca Cola, and Louisiana Power and Lighting, the focus on business was hardly surprising.34

Noticeably absent from the initial committee was a trained historian of the battle, or indeed anyone prominently representing education. The presidents of Dillard University, Grambling College, and Southern University, the most prominent historically black universities in the state, did eventually gain seats on the committee, but only after the NAACP threatened trouble. The committee, as originally organized, lacked any African American representation, but the groups hoped the inclusion of the university presidents would “prevent trouble that would cause bad publicity for New Orleans.” Clearly focused on image and business rather than history, the planning committee began its work.35

35. Quote from Martha G. Robinson to Henry Z. Carter, October 26, 1964, Records of the Battle of New Orleans Sesquicentennial Celebration Commission, Record Group 79, National Archives and Records Administration II. See also Deputy Secretary of the Interior George E. Robinson to J. Francis Pohlhaus, December 2, 1964
In an effort to top the centennial celebrations, the 150th anniversary events lasted a week. Most events bore little connection to the Battle of New Orleans, but they did promote New Orleans tourism. A Saturday afternoon tour of the French Quarter featured numerous houses that did not exist in 1815 and which event organizers had selected for architectural reasons or only because of who had resided in the property. On Monday, visitors could travel on a special tour up the Mississippi river, visiting post-War of 1812 plantation homes, then stop at the governor’s mansion in Baton Rouge. On Wednesday, tourists departed for a bus excursion to St. Bernard parish from 1-5 p.m., yet organizers limited time at the battlefield to only one hour.36

Unlike the centennial anniversary, the sesquicentennial featured a significantly diminished American military presence. In 1915, the 7th Infantry Regiment and other U.S. military units presented a grand spectacle and paraded in numbers through the streets of New Orleans. Fifty years later, the Royal Highland Regiment of Canada provided the largest contingent of troops. The U.S.S. Newport News and the Keesler Air Force Base marching band represented the only federal troops attending the commemoration. In the military parade, the Canadians received the honor of leading the procession even though their nation did not participate in the Battle of New Orleans, and Crown forces had lost the engagement. Event organizers wanted to be good hosts.

Other events also highlighted the target audience of the sesquicentennial committee. The Roosevelt Hotel, one of the city’s most prominent, served as the central

registration area and the official host hotel of 150th anniversary. Numerous restaurants around the city hosted special Battle of New Orleans themed menus featuring such items as “Filet Mignon a la Pakenham, Crevettes Baratarienne, Demi Tasse au General Coffee, and Baked Alaska Flambe Jackson.” The city’s most elite restaurants offered this select fare, intentionally given a francophone name to make the dishes seem more exotic. This naming convention facilitated the New Orleans business interest’s carefully crafted public relations campaign for city tourism37.

Many of the official events the sesquicentennial commission planned also required significant amounts of money to attend. The banquet, for example, required $12.50 per person or $25 a couple, a substantial amount of money at a time when more than half Americans made less than $500 a month. Further, the tours up and down the Mississippi and around the French Quarter catered mostly to moneyed tourist rather than educating locals or preserving the memory of the battle. The official pamphlet for activities at the Chalmette Battlefield on January 8, 1965, reinforced the connection between business and commemoration: “The rewards of our investment will come back to us for years to come ... in terms of tourism whetted by the celebration ... of Anglo-American military spectacle ... of industry reminded pleasantly of our areas resources (the richest of which, and the least noted of which, is its historic heritage).”38


Income information from "Consumer Income, Income in 1965 of Families and Persons
Even before the invention of the automobile, culture tourism generated significant sums of money in the United States. With the invention of the automobile, though, tourism became a major part of the urban area’s commercial health. During the early 1910s, in recognition of they trend, New Orleans embarked on a careful and thoughtful campaign to develop what made New Orleans unique. To accomplish this goal, city fathers placed particular emphasis on the city’s jazz and antebellum qualities.

The viability of the Battle of New Orleans’ memory to make huge profits also provided dividends. Cecille B. DeMille and Johny Horton had proven that the battle itself still retained some significance in American historical memory. Further, the success of rural parks like Gettysburg, Saratoga, and Shiloh suggested that Chalmette, much closer to an existing tourist destination than many other famous battlefields could make a profit. Unfortunately for park boosters, a competing financial interest and industrialization threatened the viability of a Chalmette battlefield park.

Parks like Gettysburg thrived precisely because of their rural nature. With little development near them, these battlefield parks became important facets of the local economy and spurred preservation efforts. Chalmette, resting on half a million dollar’s worth of riverfront property, represented a potential hindrance to the local economy as a preserved battlefield site. Though a park might make money, little chance existed that it would generate the tax revenue or employ the number of people a full-scale factory complex could. Thus, the development of the Chalmette National Historical Park

differed from how many of the nation’s other prominent battlefield parks came into existence.39

The influence of business and tourism in the site’s development affected not only whether the largest tangible piece of the battle’s memory continued to exist, but also the memory of the Battle of New Orleans itself. The most prominent groups to advocate for a preserved battlefield consisted of upper-middle and upper class white Americans. To them, the economic realities of the Fazendville community remained subordinate to the imperative of the battlefield’s preservation. In the best of circumstances, this belief represented a naïve understanding of the situation. Fazendville residents, extremely undereducated and desperately poor, had little concept as to why park advocates intended to use their land. Many, upon returning in later years, did not understand why they had to move just so that their homes could become empty plots of mowed grass. Parks had slides. Parks had ball fields. Parks served a tangible purpose for communities. Why had the government forced them into even worse economic circumstances just so that a tour road could traverse their old neighborhood?40


The Fazendville residents’ lack of understanding stemmed from the education “separate but equal” denied them and from the consistent whitewashing of the Battle of New Orleans’ memory. Most of the neighborhood’s residents probably did not know that more than 500 African Americans had fought shoulder to shoulder with whites only 200 yards from where their neighborhood once stood. If they had learned of the African American participation, Southern society most likely presented them with an interpretation that depicted happy and compliant blacks gratefully upholding the status quo in the face of British suggestions of cultural reform. Indeed, as late as 1965, a locally produced television documentary on the battle presented just such a version of history, even noting that famed African American “drummer boy of the Battle of New Orleans,” Jordan Noble, had latter raised a black unit in defense of the Confederacy. It also failed to note the Noble also later helped raise a regiment for the Union after it captured New Orleans in 1862.41

The 1965 sesquicentennial consisted of a massive public relations campaign for the City of New Orleans and its surrounding area. Compared to the centennial anniversary, the sesquicentennial celebrations, though twice as many days, had only half the number of events that directly related to the Battle of New Orleans. In the face of domestic racial unrest and international military conflict, city boosters wanted to promote New Orleans as a relaxing and vibrant place to get away from the troubles of

41. The Battle of New Orleans was not the only historic event to feel the effects of the segregation and the Civil Right Movement. The centennial of the Civil war lasted from 1961-1965 at the same time commemorations were underway for New Orleans and the War of 1812. For a detailed discussion of the Civil War’s memory in this same period see: David W. Blight, American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011)
the world. For many members of the planning committee, the Battle of New Orleans and its memory represented a source of potential profit.

Not all of the park’s promoters were as economically driven and their alliance with the business interests in the city and surrounding area ultimately helped preserve the Chalmette battlefield. Guaranteeing the safety of the site had been a long and arduous process, but, in the years that followed, the Chalmette National Historical Park became the epicenter of the Battle of New Orleans’ memory.
Chapter 8: A "Rustic and Factual" Appearance

The staccato ripple of musket fire surprised them. Leaping from their campfire, the red-coated soldiers reached for their own weapons to defend themselves. Officers darted about, trying to get the troops into line. Suddenly a haggardly looking Tennessean took aim at one of the British officers and fired. After his body convulsed, the British soldier slowly crimpled to the ground, and the crowd went wild with cheers and applause.1

In an effort to increase tourism, St. Bernard parish began hosting a reenactment of the Battle of New Orleans during the early 2000s. The National Park had conducted “living history” encampments for years, but local officials feared the events had stalled and the public had lost interest. The Parish officials had good reason to think this.2

Since the sesquicentennial, public interest in the Battle of New Orleans had waned. A variety of factors resulted in this decreased public commemoration. Traditionally, local advocacy groups had lobbied for the promotion of the battle’s memory. With the establishment of the national park, though, these groups trusted the park to be the caretaker of the memory. The bureaucracy of the National Park Service, combined with its struggle to find a viable message in the modern age, diminished the memory of the Battle of New Orleans in the late twentieth century.

After the centennial celebrations in Nashville, commemorations connected with the Battle of New Orleans declined. Instead, the Ladies Hermitage Association (LHA) increasingly focused on Jackson rather than on the battle that made him

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famous. The most elaborate event connected to the Battle of New Orleans continued to be the LHA’s annual Jackson Day Ball. The soirée remained one of the high points of the Nashville social scene for many years and often served the same purpose debutant balls did in other cities around the United States. During the late 1980s, the Ladies began hosting the “Hermitage Gala,” which replaced the old Jackson ball and moved the group’s biggest event to an April date not connected with the Battle of New Orleans.³

The events organized by the Ladies remained rooted in historical education, but they began to focus on Jackson’s life in general. The interpretive decision resulted from the organization having possession of property that clearly emphasized the man rather than the battle. As the Hermitage’s educational programs developed, they endeavored to explore the complicated persona of Andrew Jackson and the nuances of the home and its other residents. Some programing explored Rachel, Jackson’s wife, while other exhibits explored Jackson’s time as president.⁴

During more modern times, the Hermitage’s interpretation has responded to the field of social history by including exhibits the Ladies would never have considered in 1915. Museum panels study Jackson’s treatment of his slaves and their lives on his plantation. Other exhibits question Jackson’s relationship with Native Americans and offer visitors the chance to form an opinion of the general.⁵

⁳ http://www.thehermitage.com/events/calendar/2013/04/19/hermitage-gala.580524, accessed 20 April 2013
⁵ Author’s visit to The Hermitage, August 7, 2012
The evolution of the Hermitage’s interpretative programing represented a critical factor in keeping the site educationally relevant, but it also affected the memory of New Orleans. Once a central facet of the Ladies’ narrative about the general, the Battle of New Orleans also became just another event in Jackson’s life. Where, in 1915, Nashville and New Orleans had led the nation in Battle of New Orleans commemoration, by 1965, the scale of the LHA’s celebrations diminished significantly. A wreath-laying ceremony at the Nashville and Washington, D.C. Jackson equestrian monuments, was all the Ladies arranged.\(^6\)

The LHA’s decreased focus on the Battle of New Orleans meant that New Orleans stood alone as the last area in the country to commemorate the event in any notable way. What had been a large-scale national celebration in 1825 had evolved into a regional commemoration by 1915 and a local event by 1975. While most Americans still learned of the battle through their high school textbooks, relatively small decisions in New Orleans came to have a disproportionate effect on the battle’s memory and commemoration.

At Chalmette, the National Park Service looked for ways to increase public interest in the battle. As a federal agency, the NPS strove to include as many people as possible in its interpretive planning efforts. Although the park resided in the segregated Deep South, park officials tried to generate public interest in the site from across the region’s socioeconomic and racial spectrum. The other reason for the park’s large target audience resulted from the uncertain future of the site. In the

1940s and 50s, when the park struggled to attain a viable footprint of land, the Park needed especially large amounts of popular support. Consequently, it behooved park officials to generate as much public awareness about the battlefield as they could.

The formation of the “Little Colonels,” a volunteer group of teenage girls named after the mascot of the local high school represented one of these early efforts. These young ladies developed brief interpretive programs about the Battle of New Orleans and took visitors on tours of the battlefield and the Malus-Beuregard house. While working at the park, the girls wore anachronistic ante-bellum gowns in an effort to “add a quaint charm” to the park.7

While well intentioned, the Little Colonels presented a number of challenges to a proper memory of the battle and to efforts at teaching the history of the event to the larger community. The antebellum outfits worn by the volunteers consisted of hoop skirts rather than Empire or Georgian-era dresses appropriate to the era of the battle. At first glance the historically inaccurate dresses might seem like a slight error, but politically and interpretively the dresses presented a serious issue.8

The hoop skirt long served as a shining symbol of the “moonlight and magnolias” myth of Southern history. Moreover the distinctly Civil War-era feel of the organization did not encourage African American participation in the group, despite the club’s charter which specifically prohibited race-based admissions

8. The Louisville [KY] Courier, June 28, 1964 has a colorful full-page layout dedicated to the group that depicts the dresses the wore.
standards. In addition, the club’s participation in events such as the Confederate Ball in Natchez, Mississippi, further alienated blacks from participating in interpretive efforts.  

Despite these shortcomings, the Little Colonels club logged more than 3,000 volunteer hours during its first eighteen months of existence. The colorful nature of the girls’ dresses and their group generated considerable attention in travelogues across the country and undoubtedly helped promote visitation to the site. By 1964, the club had 64 members (all white) and performed a combined 22,000 volunteer hours. One newspaper even reported that “these attractive southern belles” had become “a unique nationally known organization” within the Park Service.  

Park officials also made efforts to include boys in their Battle of New Orleans interpretive programing. In January 1957, the park inaugurated the first of many annual “reenactments” of the battle featuring scout troops from the New Orleans area. The events quickly grew in size and elaborateness.  

At first, the Boy Scouts’ costumes were limited to blue or red sweatshirts to represent either Americans or the British, eventually parents developed more creative options. Within a few years, local scout troops competed with each other to field increasingly “authentic” costumes. Soon British Highlanders took the field

9. Superintendent, Chalmette to Regional Director, Southwest Region, 16 September 1974, Jean Lafitte National Park and Preserve Archives, Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans.  


wearing plaid schoolgirl skirts. Opposing them, behind the remnants of Jackson’s original rampart, stood brave American regulars adorned in cardboard shakos and eye-patch wearing pirates manning homemade cannons. Firecrackers and bottle rockets simulated the thunderous reports of Jackson’s artillery and little boys threw themselves to the ground in the agony of fake death.¹²

While part of a creative effort that generated public attendance to the anniversary celebrations, the reenactments represented shallow efforts at interpretation. These endeavors promoted a fallacious, mythological understanding of the Battle of New Orleans that detracted from the greater job of the park site. Moreover, the Boy Scout reenactments, like the Little Colonels program, suffered from a whitewashing of history.

The park superintendent did try to encourage the participation of African American Boy Scout groups in the reenactments, and even offered to assist in the formation of a local chapter for the Fazendville community. In the 1950s and 60s, though, few African Americans in the New Orleans area would risk allowing their children to partake in the reenactments. If a black scout group participated, white groups might refuse to join in, opening the chance for whites to blame the black children for the event being canceled that year. African Americans simply did not

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feel welcome at the Battle of New Orleans anniversaries; a situation that only grew worse after the Park Service pressured the Fazendville residents to sell their land.\textsuperscript{13}

Ultimately, as the National Park Service’s interpretive standards matured during the 1970s, and the park abandoned the scout reenactments. The scale and scope of the scout reenactments at their height, though, had provided a major source of public reminiscence concerning the Battle of New Orleans. The event also drew large numbers to the battlefield and gave the public a chance to monitor the site’s improvements over time. Once the scouting events stopped, the number of attendees for the park’s January 8 event diminished significantly. This lack of public interest decreased the local community’s sense of ownership in the site and hindered efforts to develop a substantive interpretive program at the park. Though many visitors still came to the park every year, their opportunities to learn the true history of the battle as opposed to the myths or counterfactual information they learned in their youth diminished.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14} Jean Laffite National Park and Preserve visitation statistics, https://irma.nps.gov/Stats/SSRSReports/Park%20Specific%20Reports/Annual%20Park%20Visitation%20Graph%20(All%20Years)?Park=JELA, Accessed April 24, 2012. This statistics show a decrease is park attendance following the disbanding of the Boy Scout reenactments. Park numbers after are troublesome for a number of reasons. In 1979, the Chalmette park joined with the larger Jean Laffite Park and Preserve causing an artificial jump in the statistics. Further, numbers for the Chalmette Unit on its own are also complicated by the fact that hundreds of visitors weekly “visit” the site as the Creole Queen riverboat docks on its tour of the Mississippi River. These visitors are included in park visitation statistics whether they are actually there to learn about the battlefield or not. Finally, Chalmette park is an urban green space that attracts numerous joggers and bicyclists. These
The lack of scholarly attention towards the Battle of New Orleans also hindered the public’s understanding of the event. Numerous popular histories of the battle existed, but those works rarely challenged the accepted narrative of events or used new sources. This popular attention also discouraged scholars from pursuing the topic and adding their voice to a repetitive interpretation. Further, any attempt to seriously reexamine the battle would have to ultimately question the existing understanding and many Americans enjoyed the traditional history of the battle. The old interpretations had endured for so long, few scholars felt the need to question them.15

Fortunately, during the sesquicentennial a number of young scholars and amateur historians reinterpreted the event. Two of the most influential books to appear included Charles B. Brooks’ *The Siege of New Orleans* and Wilbert S. Brown’s *The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana*. These works peeled back the veneer of the battle’s popular myth and suggested that something more occurred than just dumb luck or American Providential success. Brown’s book especially highlights the logic behind Jackson’s disposition of forces and places more importance on the employment of artillery than other writers.16

visitors are also not necessarily in the park to learn the history and so their visitation for purposes of tracking interest in the site from a cultural standpoint also presents a challenge to methodology.


The Park Service’s interpretation during the mid-twentieth century failed to keep pace with these scholarly developments. Institutionally, the NPS administration of the site faced a number of challenges in this regard. Originally founded as a nature conservation organization, the Park Service attracted many fantastic rangers with backgrounds in science, but these same rangers often had little training in history. What interpreters the Park Service did attract with history degrees often had specialties or interest in the Civil War rather than the War of 1812. Only in cities like New Orleans and Baltimore and regions like northern Ohio and western New York did substantial interest arise in what historian Don Hickey later called “The Forgotten Conflict.” With few rangers who stayed up to date on the latest scholarly developments concerning the Battle of New Orleans, interpretive efforts at the park suffered. The rangers that did take the initiative to improve the park’s educational programing had a number of options for where to conduct that research by the 1960s. Earlier, though, the availability of Battle of New Orleans related documents and artifacts had not been easy to come by.17

The popularity of the nineteenth century event created a huge market for Battle of New Orleans-related items. From paintings to snuff boxes, from plays to sculpture, Americans thirsted for items related to the battle. The highest value items had been artifacts that played a part in the great event or could be directly associated with individuals who participated in the engagement. Consequently, 

many of the relics related to the Battle of New Orleans ended up in private hands, and remained so for some time.\textsuperscript{18}

The Louisiana Historical Society made considerable efforts at collecting items during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The owners of these items, members of the society, collected them out of antiquarian interest and gathered monthly to show their latest finds. With the centennial of the battle approaching in 1915, the group discussed the idea of putting the most valuable items on permanent public display. This collection became the foundation of the Louisiana State Museum and many of these items still remain on display at the Cabildo in Jackson Square.\textsuperscript{19}

Aware of the funding difficulties that public institution faced in collecting documents, native Louisianans Lewis Kemper Williams and his wife Leila Williams embarked on their own collection effort. The president of a lumber company in south central Louisiana, Kemper had access to considerable wealth. Starting in 1938, Kemper used that fortune to acquire documents related to New Orleans history in general, and to the Battle of New Orleans specifically, for the express purpose of eventually making them available to the general public. In 1966, the Historic New

\textsuperscript{18} Examples of many of these items now exist in the collections of the Louisiana State Museum and the Historic New Orleans Collection.

\textsuperscript{19} The members of the Louisiana Historical Society have collected items relating to the battle and Louisiana history since the mid-nineteenth century. B. F. French, \textit{Historical Collections of Louisiana, Embracing Translations of Many Rare and Valuable Documents Relating to the Natural, Civil and Political History of That State} (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846); Louisiana Historical Society. \textit{Catalogue of the Exhibit of the Historical Society Opened February 20th, 1900, at the Fisk Free Public Library in New Orleans, La.} (New Orleans: Palfrey-Dameron co., ltd, 1900);
Orleans Collection opened to the public, and since then it has continued its collecting efforts.\textsuperscript{20}

Even as research materials became more available and increasingly consolidated into centralized repositories, though, the NPS continued to struggle with its interpretation for Chalmette. The first interpretive feature the park wanted to complete was an automotive tour loop around the battlefield. Built two years before the passage of a federal law that required archeological work prior to construction, the tour loop breached the remains of Jackson’s lines in two locations. Unfortunately, for the memory of the battle, that lack of archeological effort caused the layout of the entire tour road to be wrong.\textsuperscript{21}

For decades, students of the Battle of New Orleans believed that the Mississippi River had eroded a significant portion of the ramparts. Indeed, initial Park Service estimates relied on the idea that the extreme right of Jackson’s line rested as much as one hundred and fifty yards into the Mississippi River in 1954. Accordingly, when the Park Service built the tour road and the interpretive signs that went with it, the organization informed the public that a significant portion of the battlefield had succumbed to erosion.\textsuperscript{22}

The lack of archeological work also affected how Americans continued to understand the construction of Jackson’s rampart. For more than one hundred and

fifty years Americans believed that the American soldiers threw up crudely fashioned defensive works in front of their position along the Rodriguez Canal. Indeed, the Park Service itself perpetuated this myth through a reconstruction of the rampart that it built.23

From 1955 to 1957, the NPS constructed a 100-foot section of Line Jackson. By 1958, they had increased the interpretive feature to more than 400 feet in length. In preparation for the 150th anniversary, some park supporters lobbied for the completion of the entire 1200-feet available to the park. The NPS’s efforts generated considerable attention in the world of wood preservation and historic construction, but, unfortunately, their structure had little historical basis. The interpretive effort depicted a flimsy mud rampart braced by thin vertical strips of wood. Though the park intended for a “rustic and factual” appearance, it only achieved the former. The rampart did not attain a height the primary sources almost universally discuss, nor would the construction, as depicted, have offered any substantive protection from artillery fire.24

The park claimed that the variety of source descriptions made an exact reconstruction difficulty. Normally, the next step would be to use archeological evidence to aid in verifying the various sources’ reliability. As a result of almost one hundred and fifty years of historical memory, though, park officials fallaciously believed that Jackson’s men had constructed the ramparts so crudely that

archeological investigation would not turn up any new knowledge. Instead they proceeded with a construction that fit their preconception about what the rampart must have resembled. Further, through the use of heavy equipment to build the reconstruction, they potentially endangered any archeological evidence that existed underground.\textsuperscript{25}

The last, and most controversial, feature of the reconstructed rampart was the infamous cotton bale. The park spent $7,000 on replica cotton bales after considerable debate between park officials and local boosters. NPS officers felt that not enough definitive information existed to warrant the replication of the feature. Park boosters had considerable clout in Washington, and through petitions to both of Louisiana’s senators, pushed for the cotton bales’ installation.\textsuperscript{26}

The use of cotton bales presented a number of issues. First, the cotton bale of popular imagination did not exist in the same form as in 1815. Rather than a neat block of cotton pressed firmly into burlap squares, early nineteenth century cotton bales consisted of tube-like sacks. Numerous sources indicated that, while the Americans may have initially used the cotton bales, soldiers removed them by the time of the January 8 battle because they caught fire and hindered the soldiers’ sight. The only use of cotton bales along Jackson’s line by the final battle seems to have been in supporting the artillery pieces from sinking into the soft mud.

\textsuperscript{25} General Bres to Regional Director, Southeast Region, March 25, 1964, Records of the Battle of New Orleans Sesquicentennial Commission, Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection.

\textsuperscript{26} Edwin S. Bres, Notes on the Establishment and the Development of the Chalmette National Historical Park (1964), Sesquicentennial of the Battle of New Orleans Collection, Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection; Blythe 68.
underfoot. The NPS’s use of the cotton bales in the rampart’s reconstruction only perpetuated a myth that, by the mid-twentieth century, serious historians already knew to be false. Fortunately for the memory of New Orleans, during the September 1965 Hurricane Betsy destroyed the reproduced cotton bales and because of the expense, the park did not replace them. Even so, interpretive personnel continued to mention their use along Line Jackson.27

The problems associated with the reconstruction of Jackson’s line were not the only issues to hinder accurate battlefield interpretation, and by extension, the battle’s memory. The biggest concerns resulted from the lack of a purpose-built visitor’s center. Whereas even Civil War battlefields of secondary rank such as Stones River National Battlefield obtained a visitor’s centers, at Chalmette the Malus-Beuregard House served the same purpose. The use of the house, made sense in 1965 when the park had recently assumed control over the entirety of the site, but efforts to construct a purpose-built interpretive center dragged along for many years. Aside from budgetary reasons, Park Service documents provide no clear indication why efforts to construct a visitor’s center at Chalmette lagged. For visitors who had been to other national park sites, the deficiency of a proper visitor’s center gave the appearance that the Battle of New Orleans lacked importance. After all, how could they consider the Battle of New Orleans on par

with Gettysburg and Saratoga when the federal government did not believe the commemoration of Jackson's victory deserved the same facilities?28

For interpretation at Chalmette, the situation only got worse. This time the Baratarians and their bayou waterways worked against the Battle of New Orleans. In 1963, residents of that region began petitioning for the establishment of a nature preserve. Their solicitations to the federal government stemmed from forward thinking attitudes towards wetlands conservation. Even during the mid-60s, residents noticed the erosion of the wetlands and the effect overactive efforts at land reclamation had on the local environment. Unfortunately, nothing from an environmental standpoint made the Louisiana wetlands in Barataria unique compared to similar spots on the Gulf Coast.29

To help, the Park Service suggested that the proposed park focus on the culture of the area rather than environmental preservation. By the 1970s, all Park Service properties paid close attention to environmental impact and conservation. Consequently, a specific designation as an environmental park would be superfluous for what the residents desired. Rather, the Park Service recommended establishing a park to explore the unique cultural milieu of south Louisiana. The Park Service would establish a series of sites across the area that would each tell the narrative of a specific ethnic group native to the region. Having a half dozen or more small parks in such close proximity each with their own administrative structure would be


29. Times Picayune, October 24, 1993; Blythe, 92.
organizationally inefficient. As such, an overall Jean Laffite National Historical Park and Preserve would manage the numerous scattered locations, including Chalmette. Not only did the Battle of New Orleans not rate a visitor’s center, it did not even rate its own park administration.30

By the early 1980s, residents of St. Bernard clamored for the Park Service to finally finish constructing a visitor’s center. The parish had long hoped that the Battle of New Orleans would be a source of tourism and revenue. Rural locations around the country made millions of dollars annually off of battles and events far less important than Jackson’s victory. Chalmette, only six miles from one of the nation’s most popular travel destinations, should have had higher attendance than any of these locations. Some residents felt that the lack of Park Service attention negatively affected the memory of the battle, and consequently their bank accounts.31

In 1984, the Park Service drew up a number of sketches for possible interpretive centers, but the organization could not decide on one. Eventually, local park officials pressed the issue enough to get a temporary visitor’s center built until the park could develop plans for a more permanent structure. In 1986, Marogne Electric Company built the park’s first museum. While the company did commendable work structurally, the Marogne Electric had never built a museum before and the facility lacked for educational quality. The temporary structure built


in 1986 operated as the site’s primary interpretive facility until Hurricane Katrina destroyed it in 2005. In 21 years, the park never could reach a decision on a purpose-built, professionally planned museum for Chalmette.\footnote{Concept Sketches, Chalmette Interpretive Center (1984), Jean Lafitte National Park and Preserve Archives, Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans.}

The construction of the first visitor’s center represented part of the reason the park had trouble proceeding with a permanent replacement. By the 1980s federal law mandated that, before construction on the structure could begin, park officials had to conduct an archeological survey of the site the building would rest on. While doing the excavations, they discovered a portion of the Rodriguez plantation house a considerable distance from where it should have been. To confirm this finding, archeologists also excavated a section of the rampart. Based on the location of what they believed to be the old plantation home, they expected to find battery 3. Sure enough, almost one hundred and fifty yards from where people had for decades believed it to be, lay the gun position the Baratarians had fought from in 1815.\footnote{John E. Cornelison, Tammy D. Cooper, and David Lowe. \textit{Archeological Survey of the Chalmette Battlefield at Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve} (Tallahassee: National Park Service, Southeast Archeological Center, 2002).}

On its face, the revelation might seem to lack significance. The Mississippi River had not eroded as much of the battlefield as many believed, but the discovery also encouraged park officials to hold off on any future changes to facility construction, and, consequently, improvements to museum interpretation. The archeological work asked more questions than it answered and highlighted the need
for more physical investigation of the battlefield, something that the Park Service had not previously done.34

During the next twenty years, the Park Service developed a number of plans for improving the Chalmette battlefield. The common theme among all of them highlighted the need for an interpretive center worthy of the topic and the need to do more archeological work on the site. Forensic investigation could answer many of the myths surrounding the Battle of New Orleans, but, like a professionally designed visitors center, the site lacked the budget to fund these projects. Park funding went first to the Jean Laffite Park and then to the Chalmette unit. Physical improvements to the battlefield park simply did not rank that high on the list.35

After August of 2009, the NPS had no choice but to improve the old visitor’s center. Hurricane Katrina had destroyed the aging facility prompting the construction of a new one. While from a design standpoint the new visitor’s center, completed in 2011, is a great improvement over its predecessor. The new construction perpetuates a number of myths, the most egregious of which is its discussion of cotton bales in the construction of Jackson’s rampart. A diorama within the museum features a cross-section of the rampart that indicates a 20-foot-thick by five-foot-tall base made entirely of cotton bales upon which an additional 15 by 4 foot shield of cotton and mud rests. Not only is the model inaccurate based

on 2004 archeological work done by the Army Corps of Engineers on behalf of the Park Service, but it may by the most ridiculous depiction of the rampart to emerge during the past two centuries.\textsuperscript{36}

Other exhibits in the museum are far less troubling and give an excellent example of the Park Service’s current interpretive philosophy for Chalmette. The panels around the visitor’s center describe a Battle of New Orleans that is one of unity in the face of adversity. The exhibits emphasize the multi-racial multi-ethnic background of Jackson’s army as it confronted the British assault. They do not dwell on some over dramatized suggestion that the battle saved the United States, but they do put the visitor in the place of New Orleanians during 1815. Whatever historians may know almost two hundred years later about British intentions, Americans did not know it at the time. The panels explain that in the face of what they thought to be an impending disaster for New Orleans, Americans of various racial and ethnic backgrounds unified in the nation’s defense.\textsuperscript{37}

The exhibits also treat the British more gingerly than Andrew Jackson would have probably preferred. Filmmakers shot the video describing the final battle of January 8 almost entirely from the British perspective. A bell slowly tolls as the camera pans across a field of dead British soldiers and a voice actor reads Andrew


\textsuperscript{37} Commentary on the exhibit labels is based on this author’s visit to the site as of March 19, 2012.
Jackson’s description of the battlefield after the guns fell silent. It does not glorify the victory nor does it suggest that the battle lacked importance.\textsuperscript{38}

If the exhibit provides any sort of suggestion for the Battle of New Orleans’ importance, it places it squarely in the memory of the battle rather than its military effects. “The victory inspired a wave of patriotic nationalism,” one panel proclaims. “Americans became more confident in their country’s future,” at the same time that, “foreign governments began to view the United States as a legitimate power capable of defending its own territory.” The exhibit concludes with the final statement that “the battle also established Jackson as the ‘Hero of New Orleans’ paving the way for him to become the seventh president of the United States.” By 2013, for the Park Service, the lasting impact of the battle had become the memory of the battle.\textsuperscript{39}

Interpretation of a historic site does not require purpose-built exhibits, and, starting during the 1960s, many parks and museums began experimenting with living history programs. Indeed, Chalmette became among the first national park sites in the country to do so and evidence suggests that the program had been quite popular. During the sesquicentennial, the \textit{Times Picayune} carried an intriguing story of reenactors firing their cannon off the Tolouse Street Warf just outside the French Quarter. When questioned about their activities, the reenactors described themselves as the “Garde Grenadiere d’Orleans.” The sound of simulated gunfire had its desired effect and aroused public interest in their activities. The group talked to passers-by about their uniforms, the role of the city’s militia in the defense of New Orleans, and the artillery drill used by soldiers in Jackson’s army one

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
hundred and fifty years earlier. When reporters of the local newspaper arrived to investigate the impromptu commemoration, the commander of the organization explained that they were not part of the official ceremonies, but “thought that New Orleanians need[ed] something more authentic and colorful. We think we’re providing it – and it’s free.”

Their point about their activities being free and unofficial reveals much. During the 150th anniversary, officials strove to downplay an event that smacked of martial triumphalism. The Sesquicentennial Committee’s official report to Congress mentioned the activities of Garde Grenadiere d’Orleans. However, from the reenactor’s interview with the *Times Picayune*, it appeared the committee only made the cannon firing official after the fact and because of its popular notability.

The growing trend of reenacting has also represented an important part of keeping the Battle of New Orleans alive. While groups like the Sons and Daughters of 1812 hold annual wreath-laying ceremonies and commemorative balls in New Orleans, those events are often closed to the general public or are very formal affairs. In contrast, since 1990, the Chalmette battlefield has witnessed great success with its annual living history weekend featuring reenactors from around the United States and Canada in attendance. With multiple school districts in the New

40. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Chalmette Unit’s office had pictures of these 1960s-era reenactors hanging on the wall. Other photographs of them also exist in the Jean Lafitte National Park and Preserve Archives, Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans; *New Orleans Times Picayune*, January 4, 1965.

Orleans area bussing in children and other locals attending every year, the event attracts thousands of extra visitors to the battlefield annually.⁴²

Museums that rely on reenactors for extensive interpretation are limited to the demographics of the living history volunteers. Across the United States, most reenactors are white middle-aged men. While, interpretively, a middle-aged man playing the role of a soldier in the prime of his life possess its own issues, for a battle like New Orleans, the lack of African American representation appeared more troubling. The park for years fought against the notion that it was a “white park” and tried to make inroads into the local African American community.⁴³

When Geraldine Smith took over as superintendent in 1998, she wanted to rectify this fallacy. She used $55,000 in Park Service funds to outfit Orleans Parish high school junior ROTC cadets in period garb so that they could portray Lacosste and Daquin’s free men of color battalions for the annual reenactment. The program won NPS awards for creativity and interpretive spirit. Since the program’s founding, the park also expanded it to include high school students from Choctaw reservations in Mississippi and Oklahoma. These students participate alongside

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⁴² New Orleans Times Picayune, 7 January 2013, 10 January 2013, 7 April 2008; 7 February 2013, 5 February 2009.
other volunteers from around the country to educate the public about the Battle of New Orleans and keep its memory alive.\textsuperscript{44}

Commemoration of the Battle of New Orleans faded considerably during the middle and late twentieth century. The inability to generate more public interest in the battle stemmed from a number of different factors. In Nashville, as the Ladies Hermitage Association updated its historic site’s interpretative programing, they devoted less space to Jackson’s victory. While the organization continued to hold the annual Jackson Day ball, the event evolved into a social gathering rather than a commemorative effort. It became, in effect, a soiree that happened to be on January 8 rather than an event held because of January 8. Eventually, the Ladies did away with the Jackson ball all together.

In New Orleans, the place where one would expect the battle to receive the most attention, the area also lost interest in celebrating the battle. When the National Park Service established the Chalmette battlefield, many locals believed the site would generate the kinds of cultural tourism that made other battlefields around the country such desirable destinations. Unfortunately for those boosters, the small size of the park, and its eventual inclusion as a subunit of a larger park, hindered the Park Service’s efforts. Lack of substantial interpretive facilities and a limited budget hindered the park’s impact in the local community and its draw as a tourist attraction. While many Americans make pilgrimages to the nation’s battlefields every year, the Chalmette is rarely one of them. The job of the National Park Service is to make the informed decisions for its parks’ maintenance based on

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{New Orleans Times Picayune}, 13 January 2013, 6 January 2010, 11 January 2013, 11, January 2002; Blythe, 89.
need and visitation. Because Chalmette did not generate high visitation, it did not get more money. Since the site did not get enough money to build up facilities, it did not receive more visitors.

Further, the local political boundaries also hinder development and coordination of events outside the federal park grounds. The Chalmette battlefield rests within the borders of St. Bernard Parish, while most tourism occurs in Orleans Parish, which includes the City of New Orleans. Similarly, commemoration of the battle in the French Quarter often requires the coordination of the Louisiana State Museum, City of New Orleans, Historic New Orleans Collection, and National Park Service. The bureaucracy involved in this coordination has traditionally stalled efforts for large-scale events and encouraged the various institutions to hold their own, smaller, commemorations. These smaller commemorations attract fewer crowds because they are less noteworthy.45

Traditionally, groups like the Daughters of 1812 played an important role in battle memorialization in the New Orleans area. Since the Daughters gave up control of the battlefield, though, their commemorations, and similar events by the Sons of 1812, have consisted largely of social gatherings and wreath-laying ceremonies. These events are sometimes closed to non-members or small affairs that do not generate public interest.46

45. These comments are based on conversations the author has had with senior leaders in interpretation at the Louisiana State Museum and the Historic New Orleans Collection.
46. See New Orleans Times Picayune, April 7, 2008 and January 10, 2013 for examples.
The history of segregation in the New Orleans area also had a lasting affect on commemoration efforts and the memory of the battle. The exclusion of African Americans from the celebrations and the oftentimes-bigoted interpretation of African American participation during the battle diminished that segment of the populations' interest in commemoration. In the field of museum studies and public history, scholars pay considerable attention to the notion of “buy in,” the extent to which the community cares about its history and its cultural resources. Almost 200 years of segregation has resulted in the African American community having almost no buy in to the memory of the Battle of New Orleans.47

The National Park Service sought to rectify this by getting African American high school students to participate in the anniversary celebrations through its living history program. The programs expansion to include Choctaw children indicates Park Service official’s feels it is succeeding in those efforts.48

The final factor that has decreased the Battle of New Orleans’ memory in the late twentieth century is the question of just how important the battle had been. Even in the 1910s and 30s the Ladies Hermitage Society argued against those that contended the battle lacked meaning since it occurred after the signing of the peace treaty. The Ladies felt that that interpretation would diminish public interest in the event. Ultimately, they may have been right. The NPS’s official museum closes with


the opinion that the memory of the battle came to be more important than the battle itself. That interpretation hardly generated significant interest compared to popular battles like Gettysburg and Yorktown, battles that remained larger in the American public’s imagination than New Orleans did.
Closing: “What is Past is Prologue”

As the bicentennial of the Battle of New Orleans approaches, planning for how that commemoration should take place is already underway. In 2010, the Louisiana state legislature created the Battle of New Orleans Bicentennial Committee. It is a large and complex board authorized to consist of up to fifteen members appointed by a variety of political officials.\(^1\) As of April 2013, the committee currently had only eleven of the fifteen possible committee members in place. The State of Louisiana had also failed to provide any funding for the group to conduct operations.\(^2\)

This state of affairs has already begun to worry some people. Watchdog groups fear that the various government entities will make their appointments on political grounds rather than professional reasoning. With the bicentennial expected to be a high-profile event, the committee will most likely invite the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the ceremonies. The opportunity for committee members to “rub elbows” with such important figures makes a position on the panel a tempting opportunity for those

\(^1\). Appointments are made by the governor, the lieutenant governor, the president of the state Senate, the speaker of the state House of Representatives, congressmen whose districts include the battlefield, the City of New Orleans, the Parish of St. Bernard, the Parish of Jefferson, and the New Orleans Multicultural Tourism Network.

seeking political advancement. The failure to appoint adequate members knowledgeable of history and interpretive event planning could lead to a commemoration that is educationally questionable as it did during the sesquicentennial.³

A number of individuals have already emerged as prominent figures in the planning for the bicentennial. Tim Pickles is a long-time volunteer at the Chalmette battlefield and part of the impetus behind the site’s revival of a living history program in 1990. Because what will occur in 2015 is “still rather up in the air as to what the local communities are interested in supporting,” Pickles is struggling to convince living history volunteers from around the country to make travel plans for the event. He even reports that: “We have interest from international bodies including historical societies and the British Army but as yet it has not been possible to move forward with” them. Pickles’ proposals for the event range from single-day spectacles to a “month-long series of recreations and historical events ... including the naval Battle of Lake Borgne” and “a Grand Victory Ball in mid-January.” Further, his “idea would be that the site for the recreated battles could remain as a permanent ... Southern version of Colonial Williamsburg.”⁴

The notion of the anniversary as a tourist attraction also has been on the mind of Bill Hyland, the St. Bernard Parish Historian. “It is necessary to use this occasion to educate Louisiana and the rest of the United States about the significance of this piece of history,” Hyland said, and, to guarantee “the event be presented to ensure repeat cultural tourism.” He also stated that, “there are people all over the world interested in the efforts intended to take place, and it’s difficult to get them excited about it when the commission has not met in over a year.”

Committee members are convinced that “without those travelers coming in to New Orleans, local business owners would lose out on a possible uptick [in] sales, and the local governments would forgo a sizable amount of sales tax revenue. A major event could provide a generous economic benefit to the city from all the myriad of tourists eager to see the commemoration.”

One new feature of the bicentennial’s planning that previous iterations did not have is Internet social media. Both the National Park Service and the Louisiana Bicentennial Commission are trying to harness the power of the Internet to generate public interest in the 2015 event. The Park Service features a special section on the Chalmette battlefield’s website where visitors can make their own suggestions for


what should occur at the commemoration. It has also established a Facebook page to promote the event. The page informs its visitors that:

Although the War of 1812 officially ended with the stroke of a pen in Washington, D.C., the men and women of 1815 saw the American victory on a field in Chalmette as the war’s true end. It was also the beginning of a true American identity: no longer would Americans think of their country as a collection of states with different interests, but rather as a nation which drew its strength from its differences. *E pluribus unum*—"Out of many, one."

The Louisiana Bicentennial Commission also established a Facebook page.

On that site, the commission explains:

At dawn on the morning of January 8, 1815, a diverse force of soldiers, sailors and militia, including Indians and African Americans, defeated Britain’s finest white and black troops drawn from Europe and the West Indies in a battle that determined the course of Louisiana and American history.

The American victory in the Gulf region forced the British to recognize United States claims to Louisiana and West Florida and to ratify the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the war. The Battle of New Orleans also marked the state’s political incorporation into the Union.

While the response to these social media attempts has been less-than-stellar, the self-descriptions of their respective pages provides some insight into what the interpretation of the two hundredth anniversary might entail.

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9. As of this writing, both pages had only around 115 “likes” each. On this particular social media website a “like” means that an individual is actively following the messages the organization disseminates from its account. In comparison, on the same day, the “Star Spangled 200,” which is the official event for the Fort McHenry bicentennial sponsored by the State of Maryland had 3,788 “likes.”
It appears event planners will continue the late-twentieth century focus on the multi-cultural aspect of the battle and use it as a unifying message for modern American society. At the same time, the insistence that the battle “forced the British to recognize United States claims to Louisiana and West Florida and to ratify the Treaty of Ghent” reiterates the old need of defending Jackson’s victory against criticism that it lacked tangible importance and relevance.10

The Battle of New Orleans’ memory has always been affected by and a product of the generation of Americans retelling the event. Through an examination of these iterations, later generations can gain insights into the preceding cultures and societies that created each reimagining of the British invasion of south Louisiana.

In the immediate aftermath of the battle, Republicans used the event as a way to distract the American public from the party’s failings during the War of 1812. The United States struggled considerably during the war. Republican reliance on state militias, lack of a substantive financial system, and a poor national logistical structure all had hindered American success in the conflict. For many years, the Republican Party had championed each of


10. The Bicentennial Commission also established a website, but, at the time of this writing, it was still under construction. http://www.battleofneworleans2015.com, accessed April 24, 2013.
these items in the face of their political opponent’s criticisms. The War of 1812 highlighted the correctness of many Federalist Party policy goals.\textsuperscript{11}

As the guns fell silent at New Orleans, Republicans had a victory that showcased many of their political ideals. Jackson’s army, largely composed of militia, defeated a stronger and better-equipped force of professional soldiers. They did it in defense of hearth and home and against long odds. Further, the scale of the British defeat only fueled public interest and generated attention towards discovering how the Americans had won the unlikely victory. Republicans across the United States informed the country that Jackson’s army won precisely because of the political ideals that Republicans espoused.\textsuperscript{12}

During the spring of 1815, the Federalist Party had to contend with the embarrassing situation of holding the Hartford Convention and talking secession only months before the peace agreement. Republicans used the Battle of New Orleans and the Hartford Convention to rally centralist voters into the Republican camp. This political firestorm hindered the effectiveness of the Federalist Party and doomed the organization’s future. The lack of any


\textsuperscript{12} For some views on the role of militia see: Samuel Woodworth, \textit{The Hunters of Kentucky or the Battle of New Orleans} (New York: Brown, [1818]); \textit{Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle}, February 3, 1818.
tangible opposition to the Republican’s narrative of the battle also allowed many of the myths surrounding the event to grow into fact.  

By the 1820’s, the anniversary of New Orleans became a national holiday celebrated on par with the Fourth of July and Washington’s Birthday. Westerners especially took pride in the January anniversary because they had manned Jackson’s ramparts in the greatest numbers. The legend of the battle also aided a shift towards the west in the United State’s political center of gravity geographically.

The Republican Party’s version of the battle and its corresponding political message highlighted the frontier farmer, a rugged individualistic man with a by-the-bootstraps mentality. That political message, meant to court and retain Western voters, bolstered the political ascension of the victory’s architect, Andrew Jackson.

Jackson’s boosters, masters of the new electoral campaigning, harnessed the preexisting popular culture surrounding the Battle of New Orleans to further their champion’s run for the White House.


Correspondingly, Jackson’s opponents grew to detest the anniversary as commemorating the victory became too much like celebrating the man. The hagiography of Jackson created the first substantive weakening in the memory of the battle as the memorialization turned into a Democrat versus Whig issue.\textsuperscript{15}

The 1840s and 50s also witnessed the rise of a new sectional component to Battle of New Orleans commemoration. Political and cultural divisions between North and South over the issue of slavery began to dominate American society. Southerners refined the memory of the battle to exclude the North. Westerners in general did not stop the British forces in 1815, these sectional firebrands contended. Rather, what became the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Texas did. These soon-to-be secessionists asserted that the Battle of New Orleans highlighted the martial prowess of the South. Let the North invade with its better equipped and more numerous armies. Southerners trounced the British in 1815 and they would also defeat the North should political debate turn to war.\textsuperscript{16}

This politically motivated interpretation, like the Jacksonian Democrat’s version before it, alienated many people that had vociferously commemorated January 8\textsuperscript{th} and kept the memory of New Orleans alive.


\textsuperscript{16} For early uses of the battle as an example of Southern and Western state’s military prowess see: Norfolk American Beacon and Commercial Diary, December 13, 1816; Baltimore Patriot, January 8, 1822; Charlestown Franklin Monitor (MA), March 18, 1820; Boston Patriot and Daily Chronicle, February 3, 1818.
Opponents contended that celebration of the Battle of New Orleans only fueled secessionist propaganda, and some communities halted their January 8th celebrations altogether.\textsuperscript{17}

The northern portion of the Democratic Party strove throughout this era to combat the Southern interpretation of New Orleans with its own political message. Northern Democrats tried to use the battle as a way to showcase the strength of the United States. Jackson had fought to preserve the union. If Southerners cared about the general and his greatest military victory they should help keep the nation together.\textsuperscript{18}

Those efforts changed once the Civil War began and after the conflict. Northern Democrats again attempted to use the battle as a symbol of party unity and to bring their Southern counterparts back into the fold. Actions of individuals such as Union General Benjamin Butler during the war hindered the party’s efforts at unity after the peace. During his time as commander of occupied New Orleans Butler had ordered defacing of the city’s most prominent memorial to the battle: the general’s statue in Jackson Square. There after, many prominent January 8th celebrations featured former Union Army generals such as Butler, Philip Sheridan, and Joseph Hooker discouraging Southern participation in the commemorations.\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{17} Concord New Hampshire Patriot and Daily Gazette, March 7, 1850; Pittsfield Massachusetts Sun, February 28, 1850.
\textsuperscript{18} William M. Leftwich, \textit{Anniversary Address Delivered by Rev. W. M. Leftwich, in the Capitol of Missouri, on the Eighth Day of January 1859; by Invitation of the General Assembly.} (Jefferson City [Mo.]: C. J. Corwin, 1859).
\textsuperscript{19} James Parton, \textit{General Butler in New Orleans: History of the Administration of the Department of the Gulf in the Year 1862 With an Account of the Capture of New}
\end{flushleft}
Eventually, Southerners again memorialized the Battle of New Orleans. The efforts of groups like the Daughters of 1812 provided a forum for southern male military celebrations that did not focus on the Lost Cause or the embarrassment of the Civil War. Southerners could again relish in their martial achievements. The same blood of New Orleans’ victors flowed through the Civil War veteran’s veins. Their ancestors had defeated one of the most powerful military forces in the world at that time. Surely, that triumph of Southern military prowess must be reason to celebrate.\(^{20}\)

The white-dominated commemorative efforts in the Jim Crow era downplayed the role African Americans Southerners in the battle.

Commemoration during the first half of twentieth century paid little attention to the fact that roughly fifteen percent of the troops manning Jackson’s line had been people of color. When interpretive efforts did mention African American participation it did so as a presentation of blacks assisting in the maintenance of the status quo against outside intervention.\(^{21}\)

While American culture downplayed African Americans’ participation in the Battle of New Orleans during the early twentieth century, a different group of the battle’s participants received a reappraisal and renaissance.

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\(^{20}\) Nashville Banner, 8 January 1915.

\(^{21}\) The Battle of New Orleans, Official Programme (New Orleans: Louisiana Historical Society, 1915) 8-9. Indeed, the narrative of the happy African American fighting implicitly for the preservation of slavery consisted well into the twentieth century and the sesquicentennial of the battle. See WDSU Special Projects Unit, “The Battle that Missed the War: 150 Years of Peace, 1815-1965” Telecast 7, 1965, Narrated, written, and produced by Mel Leavitt and Paul Yacich
Jean Laffite and his pirates became an integral part of the Battle of New Orleans’s narrative through American film and song. Those same mediums reignited interest in the battle and aided the memory of the event through public awareness concerning the original battlefield’s plight.\textsuperscript{22}

Preserving the Chalmette battlefield came with difficulties the nation’s other prominent martial sites did not face. Many structures such as Fort McHenry stayed under War Department control well into the twentieth century. When the Army did release its jurisdiction over these sites, preservationists had an easier time arguing against their demolition. To build over a historic structure required the action of its demolition. Building on a battlefield only required construction. The symbolism of those differences aided forts. Further, most battlefields targeted for preservation have existed away from major urban areas. Rather than a rural landscape, the Chalmette battlefield rested on valuable riverfront property that numerous commercial interests desired. In addition, a long-established minority community resided on the location. Keeping the battlefield safe for future generations required dealing with several urban planning issues the United States had just started developing modern policies.\textsuperscript{23}

Eventually the federal government assumed control the site and the National Park Service began handling the commemorative efforts.

\textsuperscript{22} The Buccaneer, directed by Cecil B. DeMille (Paramount Pictures, 1938); Radio conversation between Cecil B DeMille and Lyle Saxon, 10 January 1938, Lyle Saxon Papers, Tulane University.

Previously, private groups of interested citizens around the country formed committees and raised funds for battle’s celebratory events. With the Park Service in charge, a single organization financed by the federal government directed the most elaborate memorializations of the battle. That singular control meant that the bureaucracy and dynamics of an individual organization thereafter played a much greater factor in affecting the Battle of New Orleans’ memory.

The latest iteration of the battle’s narrative has focused on the diversity of the forces arrayed against the British in 1815. The National Park Service, and numerous American history textbooks, highlight the rag-tag multi-cultural multi-racial force that stood shoulder to shoulder against a common opponent. There is no way to tell if this interpretation of the battle’s memory will resonate with twenty-first century generations, but if history is any indication, it will not be the final version of the story.24

For almost two hundred years, the memory of the Battle of New Orleans has inspired generations of Americans. Each of those generations conveniently chose a narrative of the battle that fit the political, social, and cultural needs of the group retelling the story. The decline in the Battle of New Orleans’ memorialization over the past two centuries might give the impression that Americans have forgotten the event. This is not the cultural amnesia of a traumatic group experience or an embarrassing fact of the past often pointed to in cases of de-remembrance. Rather,

the decline in Battle of New Orleans memorialization resembles a slowly fading notion of which the mind of American cultural memory has no need for anymore. In fact, though, the memory of New Orleans is an event which current American politics and culture only does not feel there is a use for only at present. Numerous times throughout the past two hundred years various groups have shaken the dust of the memory of Jackson’s victory and used it to their own ends. Jackson’s victory is not as divisive a piece of American historical memory such as the Civil War, slavery, or Vietnam. Rather, the memory of the Battle of New Orleans is sufficiently apolitical, yet well enough known, for Americans to continuously recycle and reshape the interpretation as needed. As almost two centuries of commemoration have shown, the memory Andrew Jackson’s victory is not forgotten, merely on hold for its next reimagining in the public eye.
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### Vita

**Personal**

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Abstract

“A VICTORY AS NEVER CROWNED THE WARS OF THE WORLD”
THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS IN AMERICAN HISTORICAL MEMORY

by Joseph Frederick Stoltz III, Ph.D., 2013
Department of History
Texas Christian University

Dissertation Advisor: Gene Allen Smith, Professor of History

The year 1816 witnessed Americans around the country celebrating the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans with enthusiasm rarely paralleled in the early United States’ young history. Over the next two centuries the idea of the battle became the tool of numerous politicians, social groups, and cultural movements each defining their version of the events legacy. Each successive generation of Americans have learned a new discriminate version of the narrative that met the socio-cultural needs of that time and place in the United States.

Those individual iterations not only shaped the memory of the battle in the contemporary time of its development, but also influenced the iterations developed by later generations. Depictions of the battle as the triumph of the frontier farmer in the earlier national period set the stage for the rise of Andrew Jackson to the presidency. Jacksonian renditions of the battle alienated Whigs and forced them to cease commemorating the event. Almost two centuries of African-American exclusion from the battle’s main narrative limited the ability of National Park Service personnel to reach out to that community even into the late twentieth century.
Understanding these popular versions of the battle's narrative gives new insight into the generations of Americans that developed their version of their national history. Also, examining the consequences of the individual versions of history offers the chance to learn how historical commemoration effects the public's understanding of its history. This is especially timely as the two hundredth anniversary of the battle approaches and various agencies are already at work developing the latest version of this important time in American history.