

PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND IMMIGRANT  
ASSIMILATION: INCOMPATIBILITY  
AND THE OTHERING OF  
IMMIGRANT GROUPS

by

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## INTRODUCTION

The issue of immigration incorporation in Europe has become increasingly relevant and problematic since 1980. This paper examines how a state's public discourse, which the majority group of the society dominates, affects the assimilation of immigrant groups with a significantly different cultural identity. The analysis of the relationship between public discourse and the process of assimilation, which has not been studied in the context of France and the Netherlands, reveals the strong role of public discourse as one of the many factors that affect the process of assimilation.

While several scholars have examined public discourse regarding immigrant groups, and others have studied various factors affecting assimilation, there are few studies that examine the effect that public discourse has on immigration assimilation. Most of the literature on immigrant assimilation is set in the context of economic contribution and involvement in the labor market. While these studies are certainly pertinent to the issue of immigration assimilation, they do not adequately take into account the influence of cultural elements.

## REVIEW OF LITERATURE

### **Definitions and models of assimilation**

The term 'assimilation' is sociological, dynamic and a bit vague. Consequently, many sociologists and political scientists have proposed a variety of definitions for it. Assimilation, which is a process, not a singular result, is to become more similar, or increase in likeness. American sociologist Robert E. Park defines assimilation as the "disappearance of ethnic differences, [and] the disappearance of ethnic groups" that occur after the interactional processes of contact, competition, conflict and accommodation

(Heisler, 1992). Alba and Nee define assimilation as “the decline of an ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences” (Alba & Nee, 2003). Bardin H. Nelson and Raymond H. C. Teske, Jr. add (emphasis added) to Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess’s definition of assimilation: a process “in which persons and groups acquire memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups; and by sharing in their experience and history, *are incorporated with them in a common cultural life*” (Nelson and Teske, 1974, p. 359).

The idea of assimilation has changed and developed over the last 30 years. The older conception of assimilation was the somewhat basic idea of an individual or group of persons becoming homogenous with the majority group. This idea of assimilation has since incurred negative connotations. In the 1980s, when a new wave of immigrants hit countries across the globe, such concepts of assimilation lost relevance, and a surge of multiculturalism graced the stage of immigration incorporation (Brubaker, 2001). Brubaker claims that in the 1980s, much of immigration discourse and policies became differentialist as a result of immigrant groups that failed to, as Glazer and Moynihan put it, ‘melt’ (Brubaker, 2001). Towards the end of the 1990s, multiculturalist discourse began to slowly swing back to a more assimilationist stance (Brubaker, 2001). Most scholars claim that assimilation is inevitable, but not a singular or uniform result. Furthermore, Brubaker states that assimilation now signifies “direction of change” rather than “degree of similarity.” As assimilation is a process, a model of assimilation better portrays *direction* instead of *degree*.

Susan K. Brown and Frank D. Bean break down assimilation models into three major categories: the classic model of assimilation, the racial/ethnic disadvantage model,

and the segmented assimilation model (Bean & Brown, 2006). The theories of scholars such as Milton Gordon (1964), Richard Alba (2003), and Victor Nee (2003), fall into the classic assimilation model. Classic assimilation supports the idea that the longer an immigrant group is in a society, the further assimilated it becomes, showing more similarities to the majority group. Gordon breaks down the process into several steps: acculturation>structural assimilation>large-scale intermarriage> ethnic identification with the host society>end of prejudice, discrimination and value conflict. The racial/ethnic disadvantage model, which is supported by theorists including Glazer (1963), Moynihan (1963) and Portes (1993), claims that racial distinctiveness blocks or slows the assimilation process for certain immigrant groups. Although a group of immigrants may learn the host language and culture, institutional barriers and discrimination keep them from employment and other opportunities. The racial/ethnic disadvantage model is critiqued for placing too much emphasis on racial/ethnic barriers, failing to adequately explain evidence of socioeconomic mobility. Scholars including Portes (2005), Fernández-Kelly (2005), and Haller (2005) discuss the segmented assimilation model, which is a combination of the classic assimilation and racial/ethnic disadvantage models. This model proposes that there is not a straight line of assimilation, as the classic model suggests, but rather a “bumpy” path, which looks different for immigrants generally based on their race and socioeconomic position (Bean & Brown, 2006). The most disadvantaged immigrants often receive limited access to opportunities, particularly employment, and as a result are blocked from continuing on the path of assimilation. This limited access usually leads to the rejection of assimilation, and a more “oppositional stance” (Bean & Brown, 2006). At the same time, other less disadvantaged



members of the immigrant group take a more straight-line path of assimilation. They participate in selective acculturation, using the process of assimilation to succeed.

Bean and Brown conclude that assimilation is a curvilinear relationship between social class and identification. While Bean and Brown develop a theory on assimilation for an American context, this study applies their theory to European countries.

Racial/ethnic identification has the strongest effect among the lowest and highest classes. The lowest classes tend to experience racial discrimination, while the highest classes use their racial/ethnic identity as a way to achieve (the highest classes are usually already economically incorporated into mainstream society) (Bean & Brown, 2006). The middle classes seem to benefit the most from assimilation (Bean & Brown, 2006). Overall, Bean and Brown conclude that identification assimilation is increasingly autonomous from Gordon's model of assimilation.

Assimilation models are often criticized for focusing almost entirely on labor market incorporation and the economic immigrant-host society interaction, thereby limiting their explanation of the phenomenon (Heisler, 1992). Many studies show that the assimilation of immigrants is largely dependent on their relationship to the labor market and their economic influence. Assimilation tends to occur at a faster rate if the host state and the state of origin are similar in economic development, and if migrants move for economic reasons, and become permanent residents (Bauer & Lofstrom & Zimmerman, 2000). In addition, scholars have found that the design of an immigration policy could influence immigrant assimilation, or labor market success, as well as the development of the host society's attitude towards immigrants (Bauer & Lofstrom & Zimmerman, 2000). Immigration policy can have an impact on the assimilation process through its influence

on the procedures immigrants must undergo once they arrive. Yet how long assimilation takes to occur is dependant on the cultural and racial characteristics of the immigrants (Heisler, 1992). In short, the way for an immigrant to achieve ‘parity of life chances’ with the ethnic majority is assimilation (Alba, 2005).

The assimilation model used in this study to examine success of integration contains aspects of a few of the previously described models and theories. This study assumes that assimilation is not always a classic, straight-line model as Gordon suggests. Rather the degree to which an immigrant group generally assimilates is impacted by the host society’s definition of successful integration. For instance, is the type of assimilation required by the host society traditionally assimilationist, or multicultural?<sup>1</sup> The degree of assimilation, as defined by the host society, depends on the similarity between the identities of the host society and the immigrant group. The more different the two identities, the more slowly the progression of degree of assimilation takes place.

### **Attitudes of Host Society Towards Immigrant Groups**

The ethnic majority of a state imposes a social distinction between immigrants and natives, or nationals, as claimed by Max Weber (Alba, 2005). In order to sustain this social distance, the ethnic majority maintains its culture and characteristics as the core values in its key institutions (Alba, 2005). For an immigrant group to assimilate into mainstream culture, its members must adopt the institutionalized, core values of the majority. The initial attitude of a host society towards an immigrant group often depends on the type of immigrant and the reason for migration. States that receive mostly refugee immigrants are usually more concerned with the impact of immigrants on social issues

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<sup>1</sup> Multiculturalism is further explained later in this study.

like crime (Bauer & Lofstrom & Zimmerman, 2000). States that receive mostly “economic migrants” tend toward one of two reactions: Concern for loss of jobs to immigrants, or welcome immigrants because they have been selected according to the needs of the labor market (Bauer & Lofstrom & Zimmerman, 2000). If a host society possesses an attitude of “othering,” the process of assimilation is influenced at least from the position of the host society (Schain, 2005). If the host society labels the immigrant group as an “other,” the assimilation process slows down.

Many suggest that a state’s immigration policy, in addition to the actual assimilation of immigrants, influences the public discourse and general attitude towards immigrants, and not the other way around (Bauer & Lofstrom & Zimmerman, 2000). However, as will be discussed later, the examination of the values that shape both the host society’s public discourse and that of the immigrant group proves necessary in order to better understand the relationship between public discourse and assimilation.

### **Factors that Affect the Process and Timing of Immigrant Assimilation**

Politics exists and functions within the realm of culture (Norton, 2004). The examination of particular cultural values of both the host society and the immigrant group is vital in understanding the process of assimilation. Political culture informs a society’s understanding of immigration integration policy-making and policy (Schain, 2005). Political culture sets the framework within which discourse and policy-making function.

Wayne E. Baker and Ronald Inglehart claim that a society’s “cultural heritage” remains an influencing element despite modernization (Baker & Inglehart, 2000). Max Weber argues that traditional values have an enduring influence on the institutions of a society (Baker & Inglehart, 2000). Samuel P. Huntington claims that there are eight

major “cultural zones” that are based on cultural differences and shaped by religious traditions, which have survived modernization and remain a significant character of society (Baker & Inglehart, 2000).

The levels of tolerance, intolerance and acceptance in a society are also factors that affect the speed of assimilation. Riva Kastoryano and Angéline Escafré-Dublet define these terms: *tolerance* occurs when the “majority population [allows] the beliefs and practices of a minority population”; *intolerance* occurs when the “majority population [rejects] the beliefs and practices of a minority population”; *acceptance* occurs when the ‘majority population considers the others as equal and admits them as normal’ (Escafré-Dublet & Kastoryano, 2011).

Multiculturalism, which can also be termed as ethnic pluralism, pluriculturalism and multiethnicity, has become a core concept in the current discourse on immigrant incorporation (Heisler, 1992). It is a vague term that originated with intellectuals and immigrant sympathizers, and has become more common since the 1980s in Europe (Heisler, 1992). Multiculturalism can be seen as a strategy for dealing with particular social and political problems involving immigrants (Schain, 2005). The amount of multiculturalism in public discourse on immigration shapes both immigration policy and the process of assimilation itself.

Overall, there are several aspects to assimilation, which is a complex process. This study focuses on one aspect of the process of assimilation (civic assimilation), and treats it as an indicator of the progress of overall assimilation.

## METHOD

### **Theory and hypotheses**

The definition of assimilation used here is *the process of a group adapting to and adopting the same basic cultural values, language, and historical memory of another group*.<sup>2</sup> The immigrant group(s) examined in each case study hold the largest percentage of immigrant inflow, and include 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation adults (18+). These immigrants make up the largest immigrant group(s), which have a basically different identity than the host society (non-Western). The difference between legal and illegal immigrants is not made due to the lack of access to information on legality status.

To begin examining how public discourse relates to immigrant assimilation, this study looks at the identities of the host society and the immigrant group. Figure 2.1, which can be found in the Appendix, depicts the theoretical process of how host/immigrant compatibility affects public discourse, which in turn directs the path of immigrant assimilation. Figure 2.2 is a more basic representation of the model, which may be a useful reference while reading the cases studies. The cultural heritage, religious values, and colonial legacy of the host society and each immigrant group are referred to as an identity assessment. The identity assessment of the host society shapes the general public attitude regarding immigrants, and can be seen in the country's public discourse. Since the host society's public discourse is dominated by the voice of its ethnic majority, it is examined by looking at news article and politicians' speeches and interviews. These

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<sup>2</sup> Drawn from Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess's definition of assimilation, while including Brubaker's idea of 'direction of change', rather than 'direction of similarity'. This definition reflects the assimilation that occurs in states with increasingly diverse immigrant populations.

two forms of public discourse tend to be dominated by the ethnic majority. By examining the identity assessment and public discourse of the host society, the host society's definition of societal values and an acceptable citizen, as well as its vision for the future of its society, is determined. Drawing from these conclusions about public discourse, the levels of tolerance, intolerance and acceptance<sup>3</sup> in the language of public discourse is revealed. The results of this assessment along with conclusions from public opinion polls<sup>4</sup> help show how open the host society is to the assimilation of the immigrant groups. The identity assessment of the immigrant group reveals how compatible they are with the host society. The immigrant group's identity assessment includes reason for migration. This fourth factor significantly influences the immigrant group's overall mentality upon arrival, as well as how the host society receives them. For example, an immigrant group which seeks asylum tends to be seen as a group that will raise crime rates. It is important to note that several theories, which seek to explain the migration decision-making process, exist and consider various factors such as economic stability, colonial history, and immigration policy (Jennissen, 2007). For the purpose of this study, these theories and factors are not explored at length, and the reasons for entry (family reunification, asylum, academic study, etc) are considered. A comparison of the identity assessments of the immigrant groups and the host society results in the estimation as to what degree the immigrant group will progress in the process of assimilation. Using sources such as the country profiles provided by the CIA World Factbook, a basic identity of the immigrant

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<sup>3</sup> Based on Escafré-Dublet and Kastoryano's definitions of tolerance, intolerance and acceptance.

<sup>4</sup> Public opinion is included due to the significant influence public discourse has on it.

groups examined is deduced based on its country of origin's ethnic groups, languages, religions, and previous colonial status.

Based on the host society's definition of societal values and an acceptable citizen, and its vision for the future of its society, there is either othering or tolerance of the immigrant group in their public discourse. Two major paths of incorporation exist for the immigrant group based on whether the public discourse is assimilationist or multiculturalist. In the first path, an immigrant group takes the path of a more straight-line assimilation from the phase of acculturation. Othering then blocks the immigrant group from proceeding to the next phase of structural assimilation, consequently preventing them from ultimately becoming fully assimilated into the host society. In a host society with a multiculturalist public discourse, the immigrant group moves from a phase of acculturation to structural incorporation, resulting in a multicultural society with multiple communities of different identities. Overall, by assessing the cultural values and identity of a host society and an immigrant group, I test their compatibility, and predict which path of incorporation the immigrant group will be directed towards.

H1. The more the identity assessment of the host society is significantly different from or oppositional to the identity assessment of the immigrant group, the more likely the othering of this immigrant group will occur in the public discourse of the host society.

H2. The more othering of an immigrant group occurs, the more it delays or blocks the assimilation of this immigrant group.

H3. The more supportive of multiculturalism a host society is in its public discourse, the more likely straight-line assimilation of all immigrant groups will occur.

In the case of France, I expect to find the converse of hypothesis three due to France's assimilationist policy, which views multiculturalism as detrimental to an indivisible nation. In contrast, hypothesis three is tested in the case of the Netherlands to examine if a multiculturalist society facilitates an uninterrupted assimilation process for immigrant groups. I expect that immigrant groups will assimilate more smoothly into a multiculturalist host society, such as the Netherlands, than in an assimilationist host society, such as France.

### **Most Similar Case Study Comparison: France and the Netherlands**

Due to the dynamic and changing nature of assimilation, it is best to use a case-study approach when examining public discourse's effect on the process of assimilation. A most similar case study comparison of France and the Netherlands during the last 30 years provides an in-depth look at if and how the discourse on immigrant incorporation has an effect on the process itself. France and the Netherlands share several characteristics that lend well to their comparison. They are both members of the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), revealing similar and/or shared political and economic interests. Former colonial powers, France and the Netherlands had colonies with significant Muslim populations,<sup>5</sup> and each country currently has a 5-10% Muslim population (BBC Muslims in Europe: Country Guide)<sup>6</sup>. Roman Catholicism is the largest religion in France (83-88%) and in the Netherlands (30%) (CIA World Factbook). Although there is a large gap in the percentage of Roman Catholicism in each country, France and the Netherlands

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<sup>5</sup> (FR) Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso; (NL) Indonesia, Suriname

<sup>6</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm>



share a similar religious heritage, which has manifested itself differently as will be seen in each case study. Additionally, although the percentage of the French and Dutch populations that identify as Roman Catholics differs substantially, the percentage of those who *practice* Catholicism is quite similar. According to a study conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) from 2005 to 2009, of the individuals in France who self identified as Roman Catholic, approximately 23% declared themselves to be “practicing,” 77% “non-practicing.”<sup>7</sup> The Dutch civil law system is based on France’s civil law system (CIA World Factbook). As two countries with considerable similarities, French and Dutch public discourses on immigration have differed significantly. France has traditionally promoted an assimilationist immigration policy that calls for immigrants to conform to a specific idea of the “Frenchman.” On the other hand, the Netherlands has traditionally used a multiculturalist, more tolerant public discourse on immigrant incorporation. It ought to be noted that since September 11, 2001, and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, by a radical Islamist in 2004, some Dutch discourse has shifted blame for unemployment and high crime onto Muslim immigrants (BBC Muslims in Europe: Country Guide). This discourse has led some scholars to suggest that the Netherlands should consider altering incorporation policy to become more French assimilationist.

### **Methodology**

In each case study, public discourse consists of and is measured by politicians’ speeches and interviews, news articles and public opinion surveys. Othering is an act of subtle discrimination that weakens a group in a power relationship through marginalizing

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<sup>7</sup> <http://honau.free.fr/catholicisme-ifop.pdf>

them based on difference of race, ethnicity, religion, or geographic origin. In many European countries since the 1950s (including the Netherlands and France), othering has shifted into an implicit process, in which certain immigrant groups are labeled problematic due to their culture considered incapable of assimilation into European, liberal, democratic, individualistic, Judeo-Christian dominated culture (Garner, 2007). The immigrant group's major physical and ethnic differences from the majority are no longer explicitly expressed as the problem (Garner, 2007). Othering in public discourse is identified by language that separates a particular immigrant group from the majority by mentioning and/or discussing cultural differences that do not blend well, or assimilate, into the host culture. Assimilation is a broad and complex process to operationalize. Consequently, I measure civic assimilation by looking at the voting participation of immigrants, as well as their presence in legislative positions. In addition to this, public opinion surveys are used to look at the attitudes of immigrants and their perspective of immigration. These measures of assimilation do not grasp the process in its entirety, but for the purpose of this study, they adequately show signs of immigrant incorporation. Since the politicization of immigration increased significantly in the early 1980s, an examination of assimilation within a mainly political domain is appropriate. The political measures demonstrate whether immigrants participate in their country of destination as active citizens or guests. Public opinion surveys provide a glimpse into the social aspect of assimilation. Overall, if news articles and politicians' speeches and interviews use language that makes a distinction between 'us' and 'them' when discussing an immigrant group, othering is signified. If they use open, inclusive language concerning immigration, this points to a multicultural public attitude. If immigrants' voting participation and

legislative presence are low, this indicates a delay or block in assimilation, while if immigrant voting participation and legislative presence are high, assimilation is more fully developed. If news articles and politicians' speeches and interviews use negative, racial language, and immigrant voting participation and legislative presence are low, this indicates that public discourse affects the assimilation process of immigrants.

## RESULTS

### **France: To Be Truly 'French'**

#### *Cultural Heritage and Recent Immigration Background*

The concept of French citizenship, established during the French Revolution, is the sharing of sovereignty, full participation in a social contract, and a common concern with the public interest (Safran, 1991). The French community is defined in political terms, and in order to become a member of it, one must identify with France's political values and common interests (Safran, 1991). The ideas of nationality and citizenship are intertwined for the French (Safran, 1991). Anyone can become a French citizen as long as they ascribe to the French identity and value system.

The National Office of Immigration (ONI) was created by the Ordinance of November 2, 1945 (DeLey, 1983). In 1980, when socialist François Mitterrand became president of the Republic of France, the issue of immigration underwent politicization, rising as a major topic of public debate. France had accumulated a substantial population of immigrants, most of whom had been recruited (legally and illegally) for work. In general, immigration policy under Mitterrand was generous towards established immigrants (DeLey, 1983). Aspects of immigration policy during this time include limited expulsions and detention, guaranteed due process of law for undocumented

foreign persons, and easier access to “privileged” residence permits (10 years) (DeLey, 1983).

The Commission de la Nationalité, appointed in June 1987, has duties, which include to uphold *jus soli*, and to maintain the fusion of *nation* and *Etat* (Safran, 1997). The Commission de la Nationalité rejects the idea of a multicultural society, viewing it as divisive and weakening, a hindrance to integration, and an instigator of discrimination (Safran, 1997).<sup>8</sup> The High Council of Integration (Le Haute Conseil de l’Intégration) was created by the decree of December 19, 1989, its mission being to advise and make any appropriate proposal at the request of the Prime Minister on all matters relating to the integration of foreign residents or residents of foreign origin.<sup>9</sup>

The immigration and integration law of July 24, 2006 states that the reception and integration contract (CAI) be proposed to all foreigners of ages 16 and up, except for those from the European Economic Area and Switzerland (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). The purpose of the CAI is to prepare a migrant for integration into French society. The CAI is signed between the State, which is represented by the Prefect, and the migrant (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). As of April 2009, the French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII) administers the CAI (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). By this contract the State provides an information session on life in France, a day in civic training, language training (if necessary), and a social accompaniment (if the personal or familial situation of the signatory justifies it), all of which is free (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). The purpose of these trainings is to develop and engage in respect for the French

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<sup>8</sup> On February 10, 2011 Nicolas Sarkozy declared the failure of multiculturalism. (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html>)

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.hci.gouv.fr/>

Constitution, the laws of the Republic, and the values of French society. The law of November 20, 2007 supplements the reception aspect of CAI. Migrants wishing to join their families or French national partners will be assessed for their knowledge of the French language and values of the Republic (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). If seen as necessary, they will undergo training for up to two months (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). Such training was used for less than 15% of migrants in 2009, 73% of who were from the Maghreb (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). As soon as two partners, who have migrated to rejoin family, have children of their own, a contract of reception and integration for the family (CAIF) must take place between the partners and the state (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). The parents under question must attend a training day on the “rights and duties of parents”, which focus on equality of men and women, parental authority, the rights of the child and schooling. Finally this immigration law created a professional skills audit (Domergue & Régnard, 2011). In April 2009, the French Office of Immigration and Integration (OFII) was officially created by decree no. 2009-331.<sup>10</sup> OFII became the sole state organization in charge of legal immigration.

### *Colonial Legacy*

Othering is not a recent phenomenon in France, and it has been particularly strong towards Africans. During the years between the World Wars (interwar years), the status of the members of the French empire varied. France declared the possibility of French citizenship for the majority of people in its empire, including the colonized in North Africa and Southeast Asia. However, a distinction existed between the superior Frenchman and the colonized African. The French state withheld French citizenship from

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<sup>10</sup> [www.ofii.fr](http://www.ofii.fr)

most colonized persons considered to be inferior. The peoples of France's colonies, especially Africans, were racialized and otherized through images of the 'inferior native' that pervaded advertisements, magazines, art, and films in France. The superiority of whiteness and the traditionally *français* contrasted the inferiority of the exotic, simple indigenous peoples of the colonies. After World War II, France becomes more open toward the political membership of immigrants from its former colonies (Safran, 1997). While an increase in the naturalization of immigrants and the application of *jus soli* occurred, the influx of North African Muslims (Maghrebis) brought into question whether or not all immigrants could become 'true citizens' (Safran, 1997). The French saw Islam as more than a religion and many questioned if a Muslim could devote his or her entire loyalty to the values and interests of France (Safran, 1997). This mentality has persisted, and can be seen through public debates on *laïcité* (French secularism).

### *Religious Values*

While a strong presence of Roman Catholicism characterizes the French population (83-88%), religion is considered highly private (CIA World Factbook). French secularism holds an almost sacred value in government and society. The government does not recognize religion as an act of tolerance toward religious diversity and equal treatment of citizens (Escafré-Dublet & Kastoryano, 2011). Public debate on the implementation of secularism has intensified in recent years, particularly in the setting of public schools (Escafré-Dublet & Kastoryano, 2011). Largely in response to young girls wearing Islamic veils to school, a law banning the conspicuous display of religious symbols was implemented in 2004 (Escafré-Dublet & Kastoryano, 2011). Controversy over the law revealed a widespread concern among the French that Muslims would not

embrace French secularism, and thus be unable and unwilling to fully assimilate into society. In September 2010 Madame Alliot-Marie, the Minister of State, Attorney General and Minister of Justice and Liberties addressed President Sarkozy and the Senate on the covering of the face in public.<sup>11</sup> Alliot-Marie opened the speech with the claim that the bill on covering the face in public is a response to radical practices, which are contrary to the values of the Republic. She emphasized the unity of the Republic, stating that the bill was not about security or religion, but about social public order to which secularism is key. Alliot-Marie sums up a popular view of France as a host society in her claim that the covering of the face in public calls into question the model of French integration, based on acceptance of French values, and expresses a desire to implement *communautarisme*. Therefore, Alliot-Marie concludes, the covering of the face in public is not compatible with France's constitutional principles. While the general French population highly favors the privatization of religion, especially when it comes to Islam, there is a Catholic nuance to public life in France, which is visible through aspects such as official Catholic holidays (Escafré-Dublet & Kastoryano, 2011).

*Societal Values, Acceptable Citizen, and Vision for the Future*

The foundation of the Constitution of the 5<sup>th</sup> Republic of France is made up by three core principles: liberty, equality and fraternity. Based on these societal values, civic activity is the primary characterization of a model citizen. With a strong emphasis on the secular public sphere, France looks to remain a global player as an indivisible nation.

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.presse.justice.gouv.fr/archives-discours-10093/archives-des-discours-de-2010-11742/projet-de-loi-interdisant-la-dissimulation-du-visage-20822.html>

*Immigrant group identity assessment*

France's National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) took a survey on the population of foreigners residing in France for the years 1999 and 2006. Those of European nationality composed 40.3% of the total foreign population in 2006, while those of African nationality made up 42.9%. 30.7% of the total foreign population came from the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), making the Maghrebi population the largest, non-European foreign population in France in 2006. When INSEE surveyed for the countries of birth of France's immigrant population in 2009, 42.7% of immigrants were from Africa, while 37.7% were from Europe.<sup>12</sup> Overall, 29.9% of immigrants came from the Maghreb (Algeria (13.3%), Morocco (12.2%), Tunisia (4.4%)), making up the largest immigrant group in France for 2009. INSEE took another survey of the nationalities of the immigrant population in France in 2009.<sup>13</sup> The immigrant population is broken down into four major groups: European (39.4%), African (40.7%), Asian (13.8%), and American and Oceanian (6.2%). In 2009, 27.9% of immigrants in France had a Maghrebi nationality (Algerian (12.4%), Moroccan (11.7%), Tunisian (3.8%)). The National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) reported that from 1994 to 2001 Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians composed the largest group of non-European Economic Area (EEA) immigrants in France (Andreyev & Prioux, 2003), and that as of 2006 they remained the largest non-EEA immigrant group (Mandelbaum & Prioux, 2006). According to an INED survey of immigrants by country of origin in 2009, Maghrebi immigrants made up the largest immigrant group in France (30.4%).<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> [http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg\\_id=0&ref\\_id=immigrespaysnais](http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=immigrespaysnais)

<sup>13</sup> [http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg\\_id=0&ref\\_id=etrangersnat](http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=etrangersnat)

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.ined.fr/fr/pop\\_chiffres/france/immigres\\_etrangers/pays\\_naissance/](http://www.ined.fr/fr/pop_chiffres/france/immigres_etrangers/pays_naissance/)



Consequently, immigrants from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are analyzed as the immigrant group, and are referred to as Maghrebis.

*Cultural Heritage, Colonial Legacy, Religious Values and Reason for Migration*

The Arab Maghreb Union (L'Union du Maghreb arabe) consists of the five states in North Africa: Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania.<sup>15</sup> Islam is the majority or official religion in each of these countries, which are former French colonies (CIA World Factbook). Arabic is at least one of the official languages in each country as well (CIA World Factbook). An Arab-Berber ethnicity dominates the Maghreb: Algeria (Arab-Berber 99%), Morocco (Arab-Berber 99%), Tunisia (Arab 98%), Libya (Berber & Arab (97%), and Mauritania (mixed Moor & black 40%, Moor 30%, black 30%) (CIA World Factbook). France's Maghrebi immigrants come mainly from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The use of the term 'Maghrebi immigrants' throughout this article refers to persons whose country of origin is one of these three countries, or who are of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian descent. The countries of the Maghreb have a different cultural and historical heritage than the Arab countries of the Near and Far East, however many Maghrebis share linguistic, and some religious ties to Arab peoples in the Near and Far East. Algeria and Morocco hold ethnic claims to the Berbers, who are an indigenous people of North Africa (Levinson, 1998). While the Berbers largely adopted Sunni Islam after Arabs invaded North Africa, they maintained some of their own traditions (Levinson, 1998). While many, if not most, of Maghrebi immigrants are ethnically Arab-Berber, European countries often refer to them simply as Arab. Consequently, the terms 'arabe' and 'maghrébine' were used when searching French news sources and political

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<sup>15</sup> [www.maghrebarabe.org](http://www.maghrebarabe.org)

speeches. In terms of reason for migration, the Maghreb has “cultural links” to France, largely rooted in colonial history, that make France a desirable choice for a host country (Jennissen, 2007). In today’s post-colonial world, the major reason for migration to France from the Maghreb is family reunification. According to the National Institute of Demographic Studies, family immigration is the largest reason for non-EEA migration (55%) (Mandelbaum & Prioux, 2006). Academic study is the second-largest reason for migration to France, students making up 25% of non-EEA immigration (Mandelbaum & Prioux, 2006). The idea that economic prosperity is the major motivation for migration to countries such as France often appears in discussion of reason for migration. However, while economic promise may be a factor in an immigrant’s reason for migration, cultural, political and historical connections are generally considered more heavily in the decision-making process (Fassmann & Munz, 1992).

### *Results and Analysis*

When asked the question, “When you hear about people of another nationality, whom do you think of?” in the 1989 Eurobarometer on Racism and Xenophobia, nearly 55% of the French spontaneously answered ‘North Africans’ (the Maghreb makes up most of North Africa). Fifteen percent of the French when asked ‘When you hear about people of another culture, whom do you think of?’ spontaneously responded ‘North Africans’. ‘No Reply’ was the only answer with a higher response percentage. Over 40% of French said there are ‘too many’ people of both another race and nationality in France when asked about their country’s diversity.

*Communitarisme* has become a major part of the public debate about the integration of immigrants, particularly those from Muslim cultures such as Maghrebi

countries. *Communitarisme* is a movement of thinking that supports the reconstruction of communities into groups of similarity and familiarity. Communitarian acts are seen when a subpopulation withdraws from mainstream society and lives within its own community (Brouard & Tiberj, 2011). *Communitarisme* is viewed as a negative solution to the difficulties of integration because it contradicts two of the most important principals of the Republic: unity and indivisibility. The *banlieues* dominated by a Maghrebi community pose issues not only of crime and discrimination but also of anti-Republic values.

To test for the presence of othering of Maghrebi immigrants in France in news articles, and to examine the overall public opinion of them, I entered various key word combinations into Lexis Nexis Academic for years 1980 to 2012 under Foreign Language News<sup>16</sup>, then browsed the results for relevant articles. I coded the relevant articles on a scale of acceptance<sup>17</sup>, for which there were three possible scores: -1: Maghrebi immigrants discussed as an ‘other’, 0: neutral, 1: Maghrebi immigrants viewed as French, and a positive part of community. It is important to note that articles that received a -1 score did not necessarily portray the immigrant group in question as inferior, or even in a negative light. Rather these groups were viewed as a “they” and not as persons with a mentality in accordance with basic French values. A larger variety of French newspapers resulted from the Lexis Nexis Academic search engine if I selected ‘Foreign Language News’ as my source, rather than searching newspapers separately. The key word searches

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<sup>16</sup> Used instead of specifically searching a group of major newspapers, because some of the major papers, including Le Monde, didn’t appear unless indirectly through Foreign Language News

<sup>17</sup> Based on Kastoryano and Escafré-Dublet’s definition of acceptance: ‘majority population considers the others as equal and admits them as normal’

used include “Maghreb and France,” “Maghreb and sécurité and problème and France,” “Maghreb and sécurité and problème and France” + “intégration” and “assimilation” (within search), “immigration and assimilation and Maghreb and arabe and musulman and France,” “intégration and maghrébin and France” + “raciste” (within search), “intégration and maghrébin and identité and France.” Throughout the browsing and coding process, articles were taken from about 15 different newspapers, including two of the most prominent papers in France, Le Figaro and Le Monde.<sup>18</sup> Table 1.1 displays the results of 50 coded news articles that were selected based on relevance from close to 200 articles. The results suggest that the discourse in French newspapers is increasingly and highly othered, and simultaneously decreasingly tolerant and accepting.

Table 1.1 Results of acceptance scale for Maghrebi immigrants in France as seen in French newspapers\*

	2000-2004 (15)	2005-2009 (12)	2010 (6)	2011 (8)	2012 (7)
Score by %					
-1	53.33	75	66.66	62.5	85.7
0	26.67	8.33	16.67	37.5	14.3
1	20	16.67	16.67	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*\*Total number of news articles are located in parentheses by time period*

The coded speeches and interviews of French politicians were taken from a state-official online archive of public political speeches and interviews.<sup>19</sup> Table 2.1 represents the coded discourse of 15 politicians ranging across five categories of political orientation: left, center, right, far right, and no affiliation. In terms of political direction, the discourse of politicians in their speeches and interviews tends to be more evenly distributed in

<sup>18</sup> All articles used were saved, and marked by newspaper, author, and date.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/>

value on the scale of acceptance as seen in Table 1.2. The left favors slightly to a positive and accepting view of Maghrebi immigrants, while the far right entirely racializes them.

Table 1.2 Results of acceptance scale for Maghrebi immigrants in French as seen speeches and interviews\* of French politicians

	Left (6)	Center (3)	Right (12)	Far Right (2)	No Affiliation (2)
Score by %					
-1	16.67	33.33	33.33	100	100
0	50	33.33	33.33	0	0
1	33.33	33.33	33.33	0	0
Total	100	99.99	99.99	100	100

*\*Total number of speeches/interviews is located in parentheses by time period*

In order to register and vote, immigrants must hold French nationality. Although the usual residency requirement is five years, the naturalization rate for France is relatively slow, (Vidgor, 2011). In a 2011 civic report by the Center for State and Local Leadership, a little over 30% of immigrants in France were citizens (Vidgor, 2011). According to a survey on the civic life and political participation of immigrants and descendants of immigrants in France, 40% of 1<sup>st</sup> generation immigrants (ages 18-50), and more than 97% 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants (ages 18-50) hold French nationality (Simon & Tiberj, 2010). The survey shows that the electoral registration rate for persons with French nationality does not significantly vary with origin; overall, percentage of persons registered to vote ranged from 75 (Turks) to 90 (mainstream population) percent (Simon & Tiberj, 2010). Other ethnic groups ranged from 80 to 90 percent (Simon & Tiberj, 2010). Presidential elections saw strong participation and mobilization of voters of all origins (average 89%), while participation in municipal elections had more variation (Simon & Tiberj, 2010). Since 1992 EU citizens residing in France have been allowed the right to vote in European and municipal elections (Strudel, 2004, as cited in Simon & Tiberj, 2010). Only 20% of this group of EU citizens is registered to vote and are active citizens (Simon & Tiberj, 2010).

According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), in 2010 France scored a 44 on the political participation of migrants, which measures the equality of opportunity for political participation of third-country legal nationals in comparison to nationals.<sup>20</sup> The political participation section is divided into four strands and sixteen sub-strands. The four major strands are electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies, and implementation policies. Electoral rights measures whether legal third country nationals can vote and stand as candidates in elections like EU and French nationals. The political liberties strand examines if migrants can join political parties, form associations, and own media like EU and French Nationals. Consultative bodies looks into the presence of strong and independent advisory bodies made up by migrant representatives and associations. Finally, the implementation policies strand examines whether campaigns and funds encourage immigrants and their associations to participate politically. France scores 0 in electoral rights, meaning migrants do not receive the right to vote in national, regional, or local elections; nor do they have the right to stand for elections at a local level. In political liberties, France scores a 67, setting no governmental restrictions on the right to association, and the membership of and participation in political parties for third-country nationals. It does not, however, extend the right to create media to third-country nationals. In the third strand, consultative bodies, France scores a 28 overall. No consultation of foreign nationals exists at the national and regional levels. However, on a local level in Paris (capital city) structural consultation of foreign nationals exists. The members of these consultative bodies, which

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<sup>20</sup>[http://www.mipex.eu/play/table.php?chart\\_type=bar&countries=18,29&objects=106&periods=2010&group\\_by=country](http://www.mipex.eu/play/table.php?chart_type=bar&countries=18,29&objects=106&periods=2010&group_by=country)

are each chaired by a national authority, are elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents with special state intervention.

Institutionalism (as either right or duty of body in law) in France guarantees that its consultative bodies have either the right of initiative to make its own reports and recommendations, even when not consulted, or the right to a response from the national authority to its advice or recommendations. For consultative bodies that are not in Paris, but have the highest proportion of foreign residents, only ad hoc bodies exist that are composed of members elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents with special state intervention. France scores 100 for representativeness, which is measured by the existence of laws or statutes that require the presence of both genders and all nationalities/ethnic groups in its consultative bodies. Leadership, institutionalism, and representativeness of these non-Parisian, local level bodies are the same as the bodies in Paris. For France's implementation policies, public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national, regional, local (capital city) levels exists. However, no active policy of information or political rights for immigrants exists.

France extends voting rights only to EU nationals, but not to *all* non-nationals residing in France (Groenendijk, 2008). In order for a person of Maghrebi origin to vote, they must become a French citizen, which requires the often lengthy and difficult processes of integration and naturalization. According to a report by the Continuous Reporting System on Migrations (SOPEMI), the largest number of third-country nationals in France from 2003 to 2008 has come from the Maghreb (Régnerd, 2009). In

2010's SOPEMI report on migration in France, immigrants from the Maghreb are shown to be the largest group of those to become 'New French', or naturalized (Breer, 2011).

Table 1.3 Percentage of Maghrebi 'New' French according to 2010 SOPEM Report

	1998	2000	2003	2005	2009	2010
New French of Maghreb Origin	48, 301	68, 185	68, 535	75, 224	56, 024	57, 098
Total New French	123, 761	150, 026	144, 649	154, 643	135, 842	143, 275
Maghrebi New French (%)	39.02764	45.44879	47.38021	48.64365	41.24203	39.85982

\* 'New French'- recently naturalized third-country nationals residing in France

France has almost 38, 000 communes, and in each commune is municipal council (Kesselman, 1996). According to Geisser's survey, about 150 municipal councilors of Maghrebi origin were elected from 1989 to 1995 (Geisser, 2001). The majority of these councilors identified with leftist parties (Socialist Party, Communist Party), and represented municipalities of regions with significant Maghrebi immigrant communities, (Geisser, 2001). Whether by their choice or not, the agendas of municipal councilors of Maghrebi origin tended to focus on immigration, especially regarding those from the Maghreb, and the debate on Islam and laïcité<sup>21</sup> (Geisser, 2001). Any mistakes made by Maghrebi councilors were quickly and publicly criticized, reflecting the skepticism of many at their political capability (Geisser, 2001).

Overall, France has tended to other Maghrebi immigrants. Since 2000, over 50% of the coded news articles othered Maghrebi immigrants, the percentage rising to 85.7% in 2012. Not only is the French population increasingly consuming a negative stereotype

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<sup>21</sup>French secularism



of Maghrebi immigrants, but also news editors are approving the use of othering language. The fact that articles regarding immigrants in the Maghreb appear in French news is not surprising or negative. It is natural that a significant new population of immigrants be discussed in news and magazines. The issue is the language used to portray Maghrebi immigrants. If most of the articles coded were rated at 0 (neutral) or 1 (positive/accepting) for discourse concerning Maghrebi immigrants, they would not signify an “othering” of this group. The same logic applies to how politicians talk about the Maghrebi immigrant community. The coded speeches and interviews of French politicians were more evenly distributed on the scale of othering, as well as across the political spectrum. However, official political leaders, especially from the far right, hold positions of authority, which influence the thinking of their constituents. Furthermore, they have the power of mobilization, which can be used to rally citizens against certain ideas and groups of people. The far right party, Front National, has done just this by using extreme anti-immigrant, anti-Islam rhetoric. The presence of political leaders and politically active citizens of Maghrebi descent is relatively low in France. According to the 2011 MIPeX, France scored 44 in political participation, falling within ‘somewhat favorable’ range for the political participation of migrants.<sup>22</sup> The voting participation and legislative presence of immigrants from the Maghreb has been limited due to difficulty of naturalization, and the lack of belief in the political capability of Maghrebis.

To return to the hypotheses, different or oppositional identity assessments between the host country and immigrant group seems to increase the likelihood that the immigrant group will be othered in the public discourse of an *assimilationist* host society,

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<sup>22</sup> Reference MIPeX political participation scale in Appendix 2.3

as expected in hypothesis one. In the case of France, Eurobarometer surveys indicated that the French thought of Maghrebis as foreign, and the language in news articles and in politicians' speeches pointed to the Maghrebi immigrant population as other than truly French. Furthermore, Muslim practices, such as wearing a burqa, have hindered many Muslim Maghrebis from acting as 'acceptable French citizens', who highly value secularism. The political participation of Maghrebi immigrants is relatively low, pointing to a delay in their civic assimilation. Maghrebi immigrants experience blocks to their civic assimilation institutionally and as a result of public discourse, as expected in hypothesis two. France's idea of an acceptable citizen is inextricably tied to active civic involvement, of which voting is a key aspect. The lengthy and complex naturalization process, which typically requires about five years of residency, postpones immigrants' ability to vote, leaving them unable to become an acceptable French citizen. French public discourse also contributes to a general distrust of the leadership of politicians of Maghrebi heritage, of which there are few.

As immigrants from the Maghreb continue to migrate to France, and make up a larger more permanent part of society, the demand for their political voice will rise. Either a shift to a more accepting attitude towards Maghrebi immigrants or a violation of their civil rights will occur in the near future as a result of this tension.

### **The Netherlands: Challenge to a Tradition of Multiculturalism**

#### *Cultural Heritage and Recent Immigration Background*

Traditionally, the Netherlands has been characterized by a multicultural, tolerant society and immigration policy. Arend Lijphart describes the Netherlands as a fragmented but stable democracy, or a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1969).

Respect for cultural and religious diversity has been treated as essentially sacred until the early 2000s. One of the ways Dutch multicultural ideas have been put into practice is ‘pillarisation’ (*verzuiling*), which came about during the nineteenth century (Vasta, 2007). Pillarisation is the formation of separate communities based on cultural, ideological or religious identities; it can be thought of as intentional *communautarisme*, or “living apart together” (Entzinger, 2006). Ghettoisation has not been a major issue because of the Dutch social housing system’s essentially ‘color-blind’ distribution mechanism (Entzinger, 2006). A strong welfare state, the Dutch government funds each community so that it can build its own institutions such as school systems, hospitals, political parties, newspapers and media programs (Entzinger, 2006). Beginning in the late 1960s, pillarisation slightly weakened as mainstream Dutch society became more unified as a result of secularization and an increase of the population’s level of schooling as a whole (Entzinger, 2006). For immigrants, however, the pillarisation system continued to be used (Entzinger, 2006).

An influx of ‘guest workers’ from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Morocco, as well as immigrants from Surinam and the Antilles, arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s (Vasta, 2007). A large and steady flow of refugees and asylum-seekers, particularly from the Former Yugoslavia and various countries in Africa, has been migrating to the Netherlands since the late 1980s (Vasta, 2007). In 1983, after it became clear that the Netherlands’ immigrants were to stay permanently, the *Ethnic Minorities Policy* was created (Vasta, 2007). Viewed as a welfare policy building on pillarisation, the *Ethnic Minorities Policy* was applied to the immigrant groups considered to be minorities (Turks, Moroccans, Southern Europeans, Moluccans, Surinamese, Antillians,

refugees, Roma and Sintis, and caravan dwellers) (Vasta, 2007). The policy was active in the legal-political and socio-economic domains, but left culture, language and religion to immigrants (Vasta, 2007). Two examples of the policy's work include the introduction of voting rights in local government for non-citizens, and the creation of labor market programs (Vasta, 2007). In the early 1980s after the restructuring of Dutch industry and the consequential rise in unemployment among low-skill workers, especially immigrants, the Dutch government did not encourage immigrants to return to their countries of origin, as was done by other European countries in a similar situation (Entzinger, 2006). As a result, the increasing amount of immigrants in need of state assistance became a burden on welfare and social policy programs (Entzinger, 2006). While this immigrant-associated stress on welfare was an issue, it was considered politically incorrect, if not racist, to discuss it in public (Entzinger, 2006).

### *Colonial Legacy*

In 1579, the Dutch United Provinces declared independence from Spain, and after a 20-year French occupation the Kingdom of the Netherlands was created in 1815 (CIA World Factbook). The Netherlands formed a massive colonial empire in the 17<sup>th</sup> century that spread from the Caribbean to Southeast Asia, and included Suriname, the country of origin for one of the immigrant groups under observation. The Dutch East India Company and the Dutch West India Company were the Netherlands' two major arms that dominated trade throughout its empire. While the Netherlands experienced phases of subjugation, its history is largely one of domination and commercial power.

### *Religious Values*

Since 1880, non-denominationalism (not belonging to any church congregation) has steadily increased in the Netherlands, marking the secularization of Dutch society (Knippenberg, 1998). The 1930s-1960s saw a substantial rise in pillarization, particularly amongst Catholic and Protestant pillars (Knippenberg, 1998), an indicator of this surge being the proportion of students attending Catholic and Protestant elementary schools increased from 42% in 1920 to 72% in 1965 (De Kwaasteniet, 1990, as cited in Knippenberg, 1998). Beginning in the 1960s, a period of prosperity and secularization grew and led to individualization and a sort of depillarization (Knippenberg, 1998). The Dutch began to value religion and membership at churches less, as geographical mobility (cars, tourism), media participation (television), and higher education became significantly more common (Knippenberg, 1998). Since the Catholic pillar was the most internally cohesive, the Roman Catholic Church experienced mass resignation later than the various Protestant pillars in the 1960s and after (Knippenberg, 1998). The introduction of a strong welfare state decreased reliance on churches and religious institutions for needs in the political, economic and cultural realms, and socialism emerged as an alternative to religion (Knippenberg, 1998). As of the 1990s, church members became a minority in the Netherlands (Knippenberg, 1998). After the individualism that took hold in the 1960s, two counter-movements to secularism arose; the first came from the Netherlands' Muslim and Hindu populations, growing due to immigration and high fertility, and the other was born from a religious revival amongst the Protestant population (Knippenberg, 1998). Although small groups in Dutch society

still highly value religion, the general society has a secular mentality that tolerates religious organizations and practice.

*Societal Values, Acceptable Citizen, and Vision for the Future*

The Netherlands values a society that is democratic and stable, but also multicultural and fragmented. Dutch citizens and immigrants are encouraged to maintain their cultural and religious heritages and preferences, including language. Abidance with Dutch law is the major expectation of Dutch citizens. The Netherlands's future, however, seems to be heading in a slightly more unified direction since a few cases of radical Islam in the 2000s rattled Dutch society whose Muslim population has been steadily increasing since 1975. A recent emphasis on the ability to speak Dutch also marks this shift in attitude. The future of the Netherlands seems uncertain in terms of whether it will transition to a more uniform integration or maintain its tradition of multiculturalism.

*Shift in Dutch Immigration Ideology and Policy*

In the 1990s, the Netherlands' ideology of communal care and state protection shifted to an ideology of self-sufficiency and responsibility (Blok Report Netherlands, 2004, as cited in Vasta, 2007). In 1991, Liberal Party member Fritz Bolkestein declared that Islam, the religion of a high percentage of the Netherlands' immigrants, was not compatible with Western values (Entzinger, 2006). While Bolkestein's argument was almost immediately shot down as intolerant and "unDutch", he introduced the debate concerning the 'non-integrating migrant' to Dutch public discourse (Vasta, 2007).

Parliament underwent a party shift in 1994, and new head of Parliament, Wim Kok, began to promote and emphasize the social participation of immigrants, rather than the respect of cultural diversity (Entzinger, 2006). A new *Integration Policy* was

introduced this same year that encouraged the equal participation and mutual cultural respect of both native and immigrant Dutch (Vasta, 2007). In 1998, ‘civic integration’ courses (*inburgering*) were introduced as mandatory and free for all migrants outside of the EU with the *Civic Integration of Newcomers Act* (WIN) (Vasta, 2007; Entzinger, 2006). The purpose of these courses, which familiarized students with Dutch culture, was to have immigrants integrate just enough so that they could find and qualify for more jobs, thus lessening the rate of immigrant unemployment and heavy dependence on state welfare. In general conservative and populist Dutch called for a more cultural integration (assimilationist-leaning), while social democrats tended to focus on the success of immigrants in level of education and the labor market (Vasta, 2007).

Two major discourses on immigration incorporation emerged in the early 2000s:

1. Preserve multicultural values as immigrants are institutionally integrated (official).<sup>23</sup>
2. Issue of the social cohesion and functioning of a Dutch liberal democracy as a large immigrant group doesn’t identify with Dutch culture, and segregates itself (oppositional) (Entzinger, 2007). Paul Scheffer, a member of the Labor Party, published “The Multicultural Tragedy” in 2000, declaring the failure of multiculturalist immigration policy, and calling for a more coercive, integrationist immigration policy (Entzinger, 2007). The language that Scheffer uses when he discusses Muslim immigrants contributes significantly to the othering of this immigrant group.

#### *Immigrant Group Identity Assessment*

The Netherlands groups immigrants by ethnicity, rather than country of origin. A member of an ethnic group includes individuals born abroad or having at least one parent

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<sup>23</sup> Immigrants’ cultural values are respected, but they must participate in courses in order to learn basic Dutch values.

born abroad (van Heelsum, 2008). Consequently, ethnically grouped immigrants include individuals with foreign passports, nationalized first-generation immigrants, and second-generation immigrants with one or two foreign-born parents (van Heelsum, 2008). The largest non-Western immigrant groups in the Netherlands come from Indonesia, Turkey, Suriname, and Morocco.<sup>24</sup> Since the Turks, Surinamese, and Moroccans are labeled ‘ethnic minorities’ under the *Ethnic Minorities Policy*, and arrived in the Netherlands during the same time period, they are examined as the immigrant group (Vasta, 2007).

The identities of Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans vary but all generally differ from the Dutch identity. A look at the ethnic groups, languages, religions, and colonial legacy of these three countries according to the CIA World Factbook provides a basic idea of their identities. Turks come from a culture where the majority ethnic group is Turkish (70-75%). Turkish is the official language, and Islam (mostly Sunni) is by far the majority religion (99.8%). Though not a former colony of the Netherlands, Turkey, as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, was defeated in World War I by a collection of European powers. As mentioned in the French case study, Arab-Berber is the majority ethnic group in Morocco, making up 99% of the population. Arabic is the official language, and Islam is the official religion, practiced by 99% of the population. A former colony of France, Morocco gained its independence in 1956. Suriname is a much more diverse state. It has a variety of ethnic groups: Hindustani (37%), Creole (31%), Javanese (15%), “Maroons” (10%), Amerindian (2%), Chinese (2%), white (1%). The official language is Dutch, however English is widely spoken, and Sranang Tongo (Surinamese), Caribbean Hindustani, and Javanese are also spoken. No one religion dominates the rest

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<sup>24</sup> <http://focus-migration.hwwi.de/The-Netherlands.2644.0.html?&L=1>



in Suriname. 27.4% of the population is Hindu, 25.2% is Protestant, 22.8% is Roman Catholic, 19.8% is Muslim, and 5% hold indigenous beliefs. Roughly one-fifth of Surinamese immigrants to the Netherlands are Muslim (Knippenberg, 1998). Suriname is a former Dutch colony, and gained its independence in 1975. Suriname's recent independence influences many of its emigrants' reason for migration to the Netherlands. The "cultural links" formed during the period of colonization, as with France and the Maghreb, make the Netherlands an appealing host country for the Surinamese. Furthermore, they speak Dutch, contributing to a potentially smoother transition into Dutch society. After decolonization the second major wave of Surinamese immigrants arrived in the Netherlands during 1979 and 1980 due to a treaty between the Netherlands and Suriname that allows Surinamese to choose Dutch or Surinamese nationality until five years after independence (De Beer, 1997, as cited by Jennissen, 2003). In contrast to the Surinamese reason for migration, Moroccans and Turks do not have colonial or language ties to the Netherlands. They initially migrated to the Netherlands in the 1960s as male guest workers (van Tubergen, & van de Werfhorst, 2007). When Turkish and Moroccan guest workers transitioned into permanent workers in the 1970s, family reunification became the primary reason for migration from Turkey and Morocco to the Netherlands (van Tubergen, & van de Werfhorst, 2007). In the 1980s, the Turkish and Moroccan reason for migration shifted primarily to family formation, or marriage migration (Jennissen, 2003). Overall each immigrant group was colonized, and is dominated by non-white ethnic groups. Turkey and Morocco are heavily dominated by Muslim cultures, which is not the case in Dutch religious culture. Suriname seems to be the least different from the Netherlands due to its diversity, and official Dutch language.

However, the fact that Suriname is a former Dutch colony places it in a dominated position in relation to the Netherlands.

### *Results and Analysis*

To test for the presence of othering of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands, and to examine the overall public opinion of them, I entered various key word combinations into Lexis Nexis Academic for years 1980 to 2012, then browsed the results for relevant articles. I coded the relevant articles on a scale of acceptance, for which there were three possible scores: -1: Turkish and/or Moroccan and/or Surinamese immigrants othered as an ‘other’, 0: neutral, 1: Turkish and/or Moroccan and/or Surinamese immigrants viewed as Dutch, and a positive part of community. It is important to note that articles that received a -1 score, did not necessarily portray the immigrant group in question as inferior, or even in a negative light. Rather these groups were viewed as a ‘they’, and not as persons with a mentality in accordance with basic Dutch values. I searched five major, national newspapers in the Netherlands: NRC Handelsblad, Metro, and Trouw. The keyword searches used include “immigration and the Netherlands”, “Surinaams and the Netherlands”, “Turkic and the Netherlands”, “Marokkaan and the Netherlands.” In order to translate from Dutch to English, I used Google’s translation machine.

No articles before 2002 were found in the LexisNexis search. Table 1.2, which represents 74 coded articles, shows a tendency towards othering since 2002. However in from 2010 to 2011, there is a shift from othering to a slight majority of the view of the

immigrants in question as true Dutch.<sup>25</sup>

Table 1.4 Results of acceptance scale for Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands as seen in Dutch newspapers\*

	2002-2004 (12)	2005-2009 (31)	2010 (14)	2011-2012 (17)
Score by %				
-1	41.67	45.16	50	29.41
0	41.67	35.49	35.71	29.41
1	16.66	19.35	14.29	41.18
Total	100	100	100	100

*\*Total number of news articles are located in parentheses by time period*

In general when the Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese communities in the Netherlands were in Dutch public discourse, the subject of the article was related to art or society. Even when these groups were discussed as ‘other’ than the indigenous Dutch, the tone was usually not hateful or demeaning. Negative othering of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese Dutch was not so evident, but rather a strong suspicion of Islam was present.

As the debate on immigration has risen to the forefront of political discourse in the Netherlands, politicians across the spectrum have tended to use the terms ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Western’ in reference to immigrant groups facing difficulty living in the Netherlands. In order to assess the language and attitudes of Dutch politicians, a key word search in Lexis Nexis Academic was used to find articles containing politicians’ statements. I used the names of ten major politicians ranging across four political orientations (left, center, right, far right) in order to narrow my search. The key word combinations used include, “Hans Hoogervorst and immigrants and the Netherlands (NL)”, “Mark Rutte and Turks”, “Jan Pronk and immigrants and NL”, “Jan-Peter

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<sup>25</sup> 2010 is singled out in the table because it was an election year, and the topics of immigration and integration, therefore, received more attention.

Balkenende and immigrants and NL”, “Henk Nijhof”, “immigration and multiculturalism and NL”, and “Ahmed Marcouch and immigrants and NL.” Also used was the web site of radical rightist Geert Wilders, who has gained fame for his hateful, anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant rhetoric. I browsed these articles for relevance and coded them according to the scale of acceptance. Of the articles coded, 61.5% were neutral towards Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants, 30.8% othered them, and 7.7% specifically discussed these immigrant groups as a positive part of the Dutch community. It is important to note that in many of the articles scored as neutral, politicians used anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim language, but did not name specific immigrant groups. Of the discourse that othered Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese in the Netherlands, 50% were categorized as far right.

In the 1989 Eurobarometer on Racism and Xenophobia, when asked, ‘When you hear about people of another nationality, whom do you think of?’, roughly 28% of the Dutch spontaneously answered ‘Turks’, and about 21%, ‘North Africans’ (Morocco is in North Africa). In response to the question ‘When you hear about people of another culture, whom do you think of?’, roughly 25% Dutch said ‘Turks’, and just under 16% said ‘North Africans’. When surveyed, roughly 30% of Dutch said that they felt there was ‘too many’ people of another nationality in the Netherlands, and only about 20% said ‘too many’ people of another culture were living in the Netherlands. Not only is the percentage of Dutch, who think of Turks and North Africans when they think of another nationality and culture, relatively low, so is the percentage of Dutch, who think there are too many people of *any* other nationality and culture in the Netherlands. These low percentages indicate a significantly high Dutch tolerance of peoples of other nationalities

and cultures.

The naturalization process in the Netherlands is considerably fast, the typical time of residence before citizenship being five years (Vigdor, 2011). According to a civic report by the Center for State and Local Leadership in 2011, over 60% of immigrants in the Netherlands were citizens (Vigdor, 2011). According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), in 2010 the Netherlands scored a 79 on the political participation of migrants.<sup>26</sup> The political participation section is divided into four strands and sixteen sub-strands. The four major strands are electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies, and implementation policies. Electoral rights measures whether legal third country nationals can vote and stand as candidates in elections like EU and Dutch nationals. The political liberties strand examines if migrants can join political parties, form associations, and own media like EU and Dutch Nationals. Consultative bodies refer to strong and independent advisory bodies, and this strand examines whether migrant representatives and associations compose them. Finally, the implementation policies strand examines whether campaigns and funds encourage immigrants and their associations to participate politically. The Netherlands scores 100 in electoral rights, although the right to vote in national elections is not given. Scoring a 100 in political liberties, the Netherlands does not put any restrictions on an immigrant or group of immigrants' right to association, membership of and participation to political parties or right to create media. The overall Dutch score on consultative bodies is a 28. No consultation of foreign residents exists on a national or regional, or local level in Amsterdam (capital city). Ad hoc consultation on a local level in cities with the highest

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<sup>26</sup>[http://www.mipex.eu/play/table.php?chart\\_type=bar&countries=18,29&objects=106&periods=2010&group\\_by=country](http://www.mipex.eu/play/table.php?chart_type=bar&countries=18,29&objects=106&periods=2010&group_by=country)

proportion of foreign residents exists. The members of these consultative bodies, which are chaired by a national authority, are elected by foreign residents or members appointed by associations of foreign residents but with special state intervention. On a local city level, there is no guarantee in any laws or statutes that consultative bodies have the right of initiative to make its own reports and recommendations, even when not consulted, or the right to a response from the national authority to its advice or recommendations. No criteria exist for representativeness in the laws and statutes on a local city level. Scoring an 88 on its implementation policies, the Netherlands has public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national and local (capital city/city) levels, as well as information campaigns for foreign residents.

Immigrants with Dutch nationality have the right to vote in national elections in the Netherlands (van Heelsum, 2008). Immigrants, who have legally resided in the Netherlands for at least five years but do not have a Dutch passport, have the right to vote in local elections (van Heelsum, 2008). In the 2006 Dutch parliamentary elections, voter turnout for Turks was 71.5%, for Morroccans it was 69.1%, and for Surinamese, it was 74.0% (Foquz Etnomarketing, 2006; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; Michon, van Heelsum & Tillie, 2007, as cited in van Heelsum, 2008). The overall voter turnout of the Dutch population for this election was 80.4% (Foquz Etnomarketing, 2006; Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; Michon, van Heelsum & Tillie, 2007, as cited in van Heelsum, 2008). The voting participation of these three major immigrant groups is relatively high, particularly for the Surinamese, whose voting turnout is only 6.4% less than the overall percentage. Tillie, Michon, van Rhee and van Heelsum assembled a table of the voter turnout of immigrants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Arnhem from 1994 to 2006 (van

Heelsum, 2008). Overall, voter turnout has slightly decreased, except for in Rotterdam where it has steadily increased. In a few cases the voter turnout has been higher than the voter turnout of the entire population: Turks, Amsterdam, 1994; Turks, Amsterdam, 2006; Moroccans, Rotterdam, 2006; Turks, Arnhem, 2006; Moroccans, Arnhem, 2006 (van Heelsum, 2008). In general, Turk immigrants have had higher voter participation in the Netherlands compared to other immigrant groups (Groenendijk, 2008).

From 1986 to 2006, the amount of members of parliament of an immigrant origin has increased by 11% (1/150 to 17/150) (van Heelsum, 2008).<sup>27</sup> By 1998, each major party had at least one representative of immigrant origin (van Heelsum, 2008). The number of municipal councilors of foreign origin in the Netherlands steadily increases beginning in 1994 (van Heelsum, 2008). Van Heelsum organizes a table portraying the number of municipal councilors of foreign origin in the Netherlands from 1994 to 2006, separating them by country of origin (van Heelsum, 2008). In the 2006 Dutch municipal elections more than 300 councilors of foreign origin were elected, making up 4 percent of the total councilors (Groenendijk, 2008). 157 of these municipal councilors were Turkish, and 66 were Moroccan (Groenendijk, 2008).

Overall, Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants have not been directly othered in Dutch public discourse. While approximately 42% of the coded news articles from 2002 to 2012 received a -1 score, the way in which the immigrant groups were discussed was generally not hateful. The subjects of many of the articles were art and film, not politics or immigration. Even when the discourse made a distinction between Turks/Moroccans/Surinamese and traditional Dutch, it was more of an acknowledgement

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<sup>27</sup> 2006-2010 parliament: 12 members of immigrant origin

of the culture that they had brought with them to the Netherlands. While negative othering did not have a strong presence in Dutch news or politicians' discourse, Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants were associated with the recent distrust of Islamic principles. Since 2000 immigrants that come from countries with a dominant Muslim presence have been indirectly 'othered'. A movement of anti-Islam and anti-non-Western rhetoric has emerged in newspapers, and politicians' speeches and interviews, largely fueled by political parties of the radical right. Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese are usually not discussed racially, but are implied as an 'other' when "Muslims" are discussed. The *principles* of Islam are discussed as incompatible with Dutch values. Even the most extremist politicians, such as Geert Wilders, do not claim that the people themselves are the problem.

According to the 2010 MIPeX, the Netherlands scored a 79 in migrant political participation, ranking in the category of 'fairly favorable', missing by just one point the highest category of 'favorable' towards the political participation of migrants.<sup>28</sup> With a fast naturalization process, the percentage of immigrants that become citizens is relatively high, and the voter turnout for the immigrants in question is even higher. As seen in the 2006 Dutch parliamentary elections, Turks, Moroccans, and Surinamese trailed the overall voter turnout by an average of only 8.9%. While they certainly do not comprise the majority, minorities are appearing more and more in positions of political authority. People of Turkish and Moroccan origin make up a significant section of minorities in office. Overall, Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants have been incorporated into Dutch society like immigrants of other origins. Although an apprehension

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<sup>28</sup> Reference Table 2.4 in Appendix for migrant political participation comparison of several countries.



concerning Islam has recently raised some questions as to the compatibility of Muslim immigrants, Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese have been able to largely maintain their cultural and religious traditions, as is Dutch custom.

In revisiting hypothesis one, the identity assessments of Dutch society and Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrant groups differ significantly and seem to increase the likelihood of othering, as some othering occurs in the public discourse. However, in a multiculturalist society such as the Netherlands, different or oppositional identity assessments do not necessarily pose a problem. Eurobarometer surveys indicate that only a relatively small percentage of Dutch consider Turks and North Africans as another nationality and culture, and that there are too many people of another nationality and culture. In contrast to French society, tolerance of cultural and religious diversity seems to be a source of pride for the Dutch. The examination of hypothesis two in the case of the Netherlands reveals that only when othered in association with Islam, do Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese experience some delays in assimilation. A fairly favorable MIPEx score<sup>29</sup>, fast naturalization process and increasing presence of political leadership suggest that these immigrant groups, particularly Turks and Moroccans, experience relatively straight-line civic assimilation in Dutch society, which is supportive of multiculturalism. While Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese assimilate fairly smoothly into Dutch society, as suggested in hypothesis three, their path does not mirror the classic straight-line assimilation model because they largely maintain their language, religion and other cultural traditions. These immigrant groups do not assimilate in a homogenous

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<sup>29</sup> The Netherlands ranked third in political participation of the 33 countries examined under MIPEx in 2010.

sense, but they become acceptable Dutch citizens, who highly value tolerance and maintenance of cultural heritage.

### **Recap of Case Study Results**

In Europe today, the identities of nations are increasingly complex, as more diverse groups of people transmigrate. When a host society and an immigrant group have substantially different identities (i.e. Western vs. non-Western), the intermixing of these two groups into a peaceful, congruent society tends to be difficult. The ways in which France and the Netherlands discuss and receive immigrant groups of a different identity contrast.<sup>30</sup> French public discourse has increasingly othered immigrants from the Maghreb since 2000, particularly in newspapers. Politicians of the far right, such as Marine Le Pen, have used highly discriminatory language to other immigrants from the Maghreb. The civic participation and leadership of Maghrebis has been limited, reflecting a hindrance of their assimilation into France as active French citizens. These findings suggest that othering in public discourse hinders assimilation. Ghettoisation, youth riots and the shootings in Toulouse by Algerian Mohammed Merah have perpetuated resistance to the acceptance of Maghrebi immigrants. In the Netherlands, immigrant groups, such as Turks, Moroccans and Surinamese are *indirectly* othered through the anti-Islam movement of the right, and through the discussion of Muslims and principles of Islam as incompatible with Dutch values. The language used in newspapers and by politicians was more tolerant than that of the French. Despite the recent anti-immigrant, anti-Islam language of far right politicians, the Netherlands' tradition of multicultural acceptance remains evident in its public discourse, and specific racial groups are usually

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<sup>30</sup> Reference Table 2.5 in Appendix for identity assessments of each host society and immigrant group.

not singled out. Dutch politicians, such as Geert Wilders, specify Islam, and Islamic culture, as incompatible with Dutch culture, not Muslims as individuals. Although the Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrant groups were assimilated into the Dutch multiculturalist society relatively quickly, the process did not resemble Gordon's classic, straight-line model. Since Dutch society does not require immigrants to conform to a specific Dutch ideal, as is the case in France, but encourages the preservation of cultural and religious identity (i.e. the pillar system), assimilation in the Netherlands often means maintaining one's identity.

## DISCUSSION

### **Islamophobia: The New Othering**

While French public discourse clearly discussed Maghrebi immigrants in othering terms, and the Netherlands had a more neutral public discourse, language suspicious of Islam and Muslim practices was evident in both. The Netherlands, a country known for its tradition of tolerance and multiculturalism, has recently begun to move towards integrationist policy, which would require immigrants to assume a more 'traditional Dutch' identity upon citizenship. While a difference in race seems to be a point of tension for the French, religion seems to be the larger issue for both France and the Netherlands. Fear of radical Islam, or Islamophobia, has led to the resistance of Muslim immigrants and immigrants from countries that are dominantly Muslim. Radical right wing politicians have politicized the fear of Islam, using demagogic speech to mobilize people in hate against immigrants associated with Islam. Events such as 9/11 in the United States, the assassinations of Theo Van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands by radical Islamists, and the shootings in Toulouse, have greatly contributed to

Islamophobia. This fear has in turn influenced the incorporation of immigrants from Muslim-dominated countries. As long as discourse suspicious of Muslims and fear-driven anti-Islamic rhetoric have a major presence in public discourse, the assimilation process for immigrants from Muslim-dominated cultures, whether they themselves are practicing or not, will be inhibited. An interesting and relevant direction in which to take this research would be to examine how anti-Islam rhetoric and politics of fear influence the assimilation process for immigrants from dominantly Muslim cultures.

APPENDIX

2.1 Incompatibility & Othering Theory Model





Figure 2.2 Simplified Theory Model



### 2.3 MIPEX Political Participation Scale

80-100	Favorable
60-79	Fairly Favorable
41-59	Somewhat Favorable
21-40	Slightly Unfavorable
1-20	Unfavorable
0	Very Unfavorable

### 2.4 MIPEX Political Participation by Country (2010)

1. Norway: 94 2. Finland: 87
<b>3. Netherlands: 79</b> 4. Ireland: 79 5. Luxembourg: 78 6. Sweden: 75 7. Portugal: 70 8. Germany: 64 9. Denmark: 62
10. Australia: 59 11. Switzerland: 59 12. Belgium: 59 13. Spain: 56 14. UK (Great Britain): 53 15. Italy: 50 16. United States: 45 <b>17. France: 44</b>
18. Greece: 40 19. Canada: 38 20. Austria: 33 21. Hungary: 33 22. Slovenia: 28 23. Estonia: 28 24. Japan: 27 25. Cyprus: 25 26. Lithuania: 25 27. Malta: 25 28. Slovakia: 21
29. Latvia: 18 30. Bulgaria: 17 31. Czech Republic: 13 32. Poland: 13 33. Romania: 8

2.5 Identity Assessment Table

<b>FRANCE</b>		<b>THE NETHERLANDS</b>	
<p><u>Cultural Heritage</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Active French citizen</li> <li>• Assimilation</li> <li>• Highly values an indivisible state</li> </ul>	<p><u>Colonial Legacy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Colonial Power</li> </ul>	<p><u>Cultural Heritage</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Multiculturalism</li> <li>• Pillar system</li> <li>• Tolerance as a virtue</li> </ul>	<p><u>Colonial Legacy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Colonial Power</li> <li>• Dutch East India Company &amp; Dutch West India Company</li> </ul>
<p><u>Religious Values</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• French Secularism (laïcité)</li> <li>• No official religion</li> <li>• Roman Catholicism as majority religion</li> </ul>	<p><u>Religious Values</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No official religion</li> <li>• Increasing non-denominationalization since 1880</li> <li>• Increasing secularization during 20<sup>th</sup> century</li> <li>• Church members a minority by 1990s</li> </ul>	<p><u>Societal Values</u>: Democratic society that is multicultural &amp; fragmented, but stable  <u>Acceptable Citizen</u>: Foster individuality and cultural heritage under Dutch law  <u>Vision for the Future</u>: Beginning to emphasize a more unified Dutch identity in order to maintain stability</p>	
<b>MAGHREB</b>		<b>TURKEY, MOROCCO, SURINAME</b>	
<p><u>Cultural Heritage</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Majority Arab-Berber ethnicity</li> <li>• Arabic as official language; Berber dialects &amp; French commonly spoken</li> </ul>	<p><u>Colonial Legacy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Colonized by France</li> <li>Independence: <b>Algeria</b>-1962 <b>Morocco</b>-1956 <b>Tunisia</b>-1956</li> </ul>	<p><u>Cultural Heritage</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Turkey</b> Ethnic majority/official language: Turkish</li> <li>• <b>Morocco</b> 99% Arab-Berber ethnicity</li> <li>• <b>Suriname</b> Ethnic diversity: Hindustani, Creole, Javanese, "Maroons", Amerindian, Chinese, white</li> </ul>	<p><u>Colonial Legacy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Turkey</b> Defeated by European powers in WWI</li> <li>• <b>Morocco</b> French colony</li> <li>• <b>Suriname</b> Dutch colony until 1975</li> </ul>
<p><u>Reason for Migration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cultural links</li> <li>• Family reunification</li> <li>• Students</li> </ul>	<p><u>Religious Values</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Islam as official or majority religion</li> </ul>	<p><u>Religious Values</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Turkey</b> 99.8% Muslim (Sunni majority)</li> <li>• <b>Morocco</b> Islam as official religion</li> <li>• <b>Suriname</b> Hindu 27.4% Protestant 25.2% Roman Catholic 22.8% Muslim 19.6%</li> </ul>	<p><u>Reason for Migration</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Turkey &amp; Morocco</b> Guest worker&gt;family reunification&gt; marriage migration</li> <li>• <b>Suriname</b> Cultural links &amp; treaty</li> </ul>



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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines how a state's public discourse affects the assimilation process of immigrant groups with a significantly different cultural identity from the host society. The examination of the relationship of these factors, which has not been studied in the context of France and the Netherlands, reveals the strong role of public discourse as one of the many factors that affect the process of assimilation.