VENTURES IN EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY: THE WESLEYAN QUADRILATERAL AND
THE HEIDEGGERIAN LENSES OF JOHN MACQUARRIE, RUDOLF BULTMANN, PAUL
TILLICH, AND KARL RAHNER

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PROLEGOMENA: TASK AND METHOD OF EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY

What is Existential Theology?
Existential theology is not simply a synthesis of theology and existential philosophy. Such a synthesis is an important place to begin, but it is certainly only a superficial understanding of what existential theology is and does. Rather, existential theology is chiefly concerned with expressing theology by way of existential errands.¹ This term “existential errands” does two kinds of work, which must be explained straight away. First, suggesting that existential theology expresses theology by way of existential errands means that existential theology is preoccupied with meaning-making. This meaning-making is “existential,” since it is a process of stripping away superficial meaning to uncover a meaning that is more intrinsic, pure, and innate. Existential theology’s mission, then, is to uncover a theological meaning—it is an “errand” that must venture beyond traditional theological frameworks and conventional thinking. For this reason, an “errand” does a second kind of work—it denotes the extent to which meaning-making, as a process, is not straightforward, but requires venturing off the beaten track.²

Together, the “existential errands” of existential theology attempt to work out the problem of being through the meaning-making of existence and theologically pursuing what I

¹ I have taken this term from the title of a 1972 collection of essays by Norman Mailer.
² I have borrowed “off the beaten track” from the English translation to the German title of Heidegger’s collection of essays entitled Holzwege. Heidegger uses “holzwege” to describe a path that both leads somewhere and nowhere—in effect, Heidegger is essentially describing a “cul-de-sac” path that leads somewhere but has the potential to lead back to the path’s beginning. Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, Edited and Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), ix.
will call “pathmarks.” In other words, existential theology, at its most fundamental, must pursue existence wherever existence is—it must trace existence as being. To do so, existential theology’s task is to establish two very important duties: it centers itself upon a theological stance oriented towards “the existential,” while it constructively critiques being as a teleological grundle. That is to say, it means theologizing with issues of existence in mind—it is about taking a theological stance oriented towards “the existential” and looking to decidedly existential concepts to conceive, grasp, and explain the way that theology can work epistemologically.

The way that existential theology works epistemologically is by an episteme—that episteme is deliberately fashioned for and around issues of existence. From that distinct system of knowing, existential theology speaks existential language, and that language, at its core, focuses on existence in terms of being. Through this kind of language, though undeniably theological in its ends, being becomes the ultimate concern of existential theology’s underlying philosophy. When speaking of existential theology’s concern with being, existence is viewed as containing both ontical being and primordial being—for anything to exist, be existing, or have existence, its ontics and primordiality are two sides of the same proverbial coin. These two sides are respectively expressed in appearance and actuality of being itself—to this end, being that, on one hand, reveals itself, while, on the other, hides itself. It is through these two manners of

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3 I have also borrowed “pathmarks” from the English translation of another collection of essays by Heidegger entitled, Wegmarken. In the preface to the German edition of Wegmarken, Heidegger describes the term as “marks” in a path that “seek to bring to attention something of the path that shows itself to thinking only on the way: shows itself and withdraws.” Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xiii.

4 I have used this German word for “groundwork,” or “foundational ground.”

5 “Two sides of the same proverbial coin” has an important connotation worth mentioning for clarity. It is rooted in Ferdinand de Saussure’s “signifier” and “signified” as “the sign.” In this sense, the “signifier” is about primordiality and the “signified” is about ontics. If I take the signifier-signified relationship to mean the relatedness between primordiality and ontics respectively, then the concept of “the sign” is a concept about being. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course on General Linguistics, Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye (New York, NY: Philosophical Library, 1969), 65.
being—which can also be called modes⁶—between which existential theology, in the general sense, seeks to make a firm distinction.

To be clear, up to this point, existential theology has only been discussed in a general sense. The intent has been to lay down the foundational structure where theory and practice will intersect in a prolegomena. At that intersection, any discussion of existential theology must be accomplished—if it is to be pure, practical, and aesthetic—by not just defining what existential theology is as a qualifier, but what it does quantitatively.⁷ This means it is important to take an approach which expresses existential theology’s praxis, in order to effectively quantify what existential theology can look like, rather than simply objectifying it and assigning a body of knowledge to it.⁸ But, such praxis is only the beginning of the two-part task of this thesis.

That task, in its preliminary part, involves establishing a theoretical understanding of existential theology so that the intention proceeding from that basic understanding moves beyond denoting what existential theology is in the general sense. What arises from these preliminaries is the possibility of outlining a more specialized approach that is not limited to the synthesis that the term “existential theology” implies. Though this is a very important place to begin, remaining there will prove to be only a one-dimensional understanding of existential theology itself.

⁶ I use the term "modes" to consider that “being,” like Heidegger, can be represented in different forms. These “modes” are, essentially, manners in which “being” chooses to disclose itself. In other words, the “modes of being” are often manners in which “being” conceals and hides itself to prevent itself from “unconcealment.” For Heidegger, “being,” particularly through “modes,” likes to hide and prefers to conceal itself. This is the problem of metaphysics, as Heidegger argues. Any attempt at overcoming metaphysics must be founded on overcoming the “modes” of “being” to disclose “being” in a state of “unconcealment.” See Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Translated by Richard Taft (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997). For information, see also Paul Weiss, Modes of Being (London, UK: Ferrer and Simons, Inc., 1958).

⁷ By saying “pure, practical, and aesthetic,” I am thinking specially of Kant’s Three Critiques that examine reason respectively as “pure reason,” “practical reason,” and “aesthetic judgment.” I offer this to suggest, then, that existential theology should—and must—follow “reason,” especially as an Kantian analytic, so to speak.

⁸ In other words, rather that objectifying “existential theology” as a term, my intent is to examine what it actually looks like in “praxis.” In other words, I want to examine how it works in action, or its performativity. Objectification only gets to what it is qualitatively, in the general sense—I wish to explain what it can do quantitatively, in the narrow sense.
Speaking about it in the general sense—as in purporting the existential-theological dialogue explicit in its nomenclature—only qualifies “what it is” as something that requires, by necessity, to describe “what makes it there” in quantitative terms.9

The second, and most important part of the task of this thesis is to discuss and explain existential theology in a narrow sense, which means expressing only a specific kind of existential theology. What that means, then, is that there is not one, monolithic existential theology, but various existential theologies. There are many ways to do existential theology, since, just as there are various views of existential philosophies, there are many theological stances. To recognize this is to make certain disclaimers up front for clarity—these disclaimers must be specific and specialized if for no other reason than to prevent us from being limited to simple preliminaries, or qualifying existential theology in only a general sense.

With this in mind, this thesis seeks to quantify what existential theology can be in a narrow sense. In effect, this thesis will offer a kind of existential theology construed through a specific kind of “theology” and a certain type of “existential” philosophy—what I will call ventures in existential theology. To do so, let us consider these two parts separately—first, the “theology” and then the adjectival “existential” part—in order to define what kind of existential theology this thesis intends to present.

“The Wesleyan Quadrilateral” as a Theological Stance

The “theology” offered in this thesis is based on the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, which is named for the Anglican theologian John Wesley (1703-1791). As coined by Albert Outler (1908-1989), the Wesleyan Quadrilateral is a conceptual framework used to construct John Wesley’s theology around the four tenets of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience—this theological

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9 See note 8.
“quadrilateral” forms an important “marrow of Christian truth” for the evangelical movement known as Methodism. Not only has the Wesleyan Quadrilateral become an essentialist way to categorize Methodist theological thinking into a relationship between scripture, tradition, reason, and experience, but Outler’s contribution of this framework has had cross-denominational influence, specifically as a traditional way to conceive of, grasp, and explain what theology is and what it does.

To some extent, there is “…a crucial methodological question as to whether in the sprawling array of [Wesley’s] writings and editings there are consistent interests that amount to a coherent self-understanding.” The “crucial methodological question,” then, is if a framework can be applied to Wesley’s theology—in particular, is there a “coherent self-understanding” or any “consistent interests” to the way Wesley worked as a theologian? Outler suggests that there is a “coherent” framework. It becomes “instructive,” in Outler’s view, “…to notice the reiterative pattern in [Wesley’s] doctrinal formulations [where] basic themes appear repeatedly…” So, as further explained by Outler, “[Wesley’s] thought was consciously organized around a stable core of basic coordinated motifs.” From these “basic coordinated motifs,” in Outler’s view:

…we can see in Wesley’s a distinctive theological method, with Scripture as its preeminent norm but interfaced with tradition, reason and Christian experience as dynamic and interactive aids in the interpretation of the Word of God in Scripture.

Clearly, for Outler, Wesley’s thought incorporates “basic coordinated motifs” that have scripture

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10 This is taken from the 2012 Book of Discipline, which states the following: “…there is a marrow of Christian truth that can be identified and that must be conserved. This living core, as [Methodists] believed, stands in revealed Scripture, illumined by tradition, vivified in personal and corporate experience, and confirmed by reason.” 2012 Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church (Nashville, TN: The United Methodist Publishing House, 2012), 55.


13 Ibid., 27.

at their core. Scripture, then, becomes not just the basis for Wesley’s sense of a theological norm, but is pivotal to Wesley’s theological method itself.\textsuperscript{15} That method, as Outler argues, revolves mainly around what is “interfaced” between scripture and “tradition, reason, and Christian experience.” By way of this “interface” or what I would call intersectionality, Outler believes that Wesley’s understanding of tradition, reason and Christian experience become “dynamic and interactive aids in the interpretation of the Word of God in Scripture.” Consequently, Outler suggests that, though there are four elements to Wesley’s theological method:

This complex method, with its four-fold reference, is a good deal more sophisticated than it appears, and could be more fruitful for contemporary theologizing than has yet been realized. It preserves the primacy of Scripture, it profits from the wisdom of tradition, it accepts the disciplines of critical reason and its stress on the Christian experience of grace gives it existential force.\textsuperscript{16}

To be sure, Outler describes Wesley’s “complex method” as a “four-fold reference,” which, ultimately, exudes an “existential force.” The key to Outler’s conception of Wesley’s theological method is through that conception’s “existential force.” This “existential force,” if attending to Outler’s understanding of the “Quadrilateral,” means that the “four-fold reference” of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience contain—both as four individualized concepts and through their conceptual, four-fold intersectionality—the possibility of meaning-making.

Outler presents the Wesleyan Quadrilateral as a framework of four essentialist parts that should not be situated as equivalents, as the geometric dimensions of the “quadrilateral” would suggest. With this in mind, as a disclaimer, Outler offers the “quadrilateral” as something that should not be “taken too literally.”\textsuperscript{17} Instead, Outler proposes that the “quadrilateral” is “intended as a metaphor for a four element syndrome, including the four-fold guidelines of authority in

\textsuperscript{15} Scott J. Jones, \textit{John Wesley’s Conception and Use of Scripture} (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995), 11-16.


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 11.
Wesley’s theological method.” The “quadrilateral,” as Outler understands it, is simply a way to conceptualize Wesley’s theological method. Granted, Outler views scripture, tradition, reason, and experience working in conjunction with one another in a “quaternity.” However, he is careful to emphasize that scripture is at the center of the “quadrilateral,” since, as Outler puts it, “Holy Scripture is clearly unique.” This uniqueness of scripture, when taken within the confines of the quadrilateral, leads directly to what Outler denotes as the “primacy of scripture” over tradition, reason, and experience.

What becomes particularly essential about Outler’s framework is that it provides an important episteme about theology, one that adds issues of history, logic, and phenomenology to sola scriptura and the ever-evolving discourse between doctrine, humanity, and God.

“Heideggerian Being” as an Existential Lens

While Outler’s Wesleyan Quadrilateral framework provides the theological stance for this thesis, its lens will be existential in genre. More specifically, that existential lens will be Heideggerian in its approach—it is a lens based on the “existential-ontological” concepts of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) first introduced in Sein und Zeit in 1927, and first translated into English in 1962 as Being and Time.

However, before going any further, there are two prefaces that must be made up front. The first is this: Heidegger never completed Being and Time. In its current form, Being and Time

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 16.
22 This term denotes the kind of philosophy Heidegger was engaged in, particularly in Being and Time. Though Heidegger’s task can be (and is often) described as existential philosophy, it is, in fact, “existential-ontological,” meaning that the ultimate task is to make meaning out of “the ontological.” To be more specific, this means making meaning out of ontics, with the intent of deconstructing all of metaphysics and arriving at an “existential” understanding of the meaning of Being.
is only a fraction of the work that Heidegger initially conceived—as inarguably a fragment, the work does not completely represent what Heidegger envisioned the work would be. This fact is evident by the outline Heidegger offers at the end of the work’s “Second Introduction,” and, in turn, is noted by the 1962 translators.\textsuperscript{23} In my view, what this preface poses is an important, first problem when discussing “Heideggerian Being” in reference to Being and Time. The question that must be asked is this: \textit{where would Heidegger’s argument about being have ultimately gone, if he had finished Being and Time as planned?} I do not intend to answer that question, but to simply ask it, for now. Not only does this question require that Heidegger’s unfinished argument be worked out in a fashion adequate enough to call anything a “Heideggerian lens” or “Heideggerian Being,” but another question must be asked in conjunction. That second question is related to the years shortly after the original publication of Being and Time, when it has been argued that Heidegger makes a change in his thinking—it is a shift known in a sector of Heideggerian scholarship as the ‘\textit{die kehre},’ or “the turn.”\textsuperscript{24} This second preface leads to a second question that can be expressed as the following: \textit{does Heidegger’s understanding of the problem of being truly change at all?} I do not intend to answer this question either, since such an answer, as with a possible answer to the first, will only prove to take the definitions of \textit{Heideggerian lens} and \textit{Heideggerian Being} too far afield.

In lieu of an answer to either preface’s question, I propose that there is little doubt that

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{24} This “turn,” as it has been called, was first argued by William J. Richardson. For Richardson, this “turn” in Heidegger’s understanding of the problem of being is best exemplified in Heidegger’s most important work after the 1927 publication of Being and Time entitled \textit{Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)}, which was written from 1936 to 1938, but not published until 1989 as \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)}. Though, in the decade or so before \textit{Beiträge zur Philosophie}, Heidegger produces three other works that recapitulate his understanding of the problem of being—\textit{Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik}, (1929), \textit{Was ist Metaphysik?} (1929), and \textit{Einführung in die Metaphysik} (1935)—it is especially with \textit{Beiträge}, as Richardson argues, that Heidegger’s “turn” is the most apparent. See William J. Richardson, \textit{Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought} (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1963).
\end{itemize}
being is Heidegger’s main, overarching preoccupation. In effect, I believe that there is no “turn” in Heidegger’s thought. To say that there is a “turn” supposes that there is a fundamental change in Heidegger’s philosophizing. I do not think this is so. Instead, if there is any “turn” in Heidegger, it is towards a more primordial understanding of being—and inevitably towards the ground of primordial being in ἡλθεία. Any ‘die kehre,’ so to speak, is not so much about Heidegger’s concern with redefining “what being is”—or, “turning” away from the fundamental conceptualization of Being and Time—but, rather, with refining the very essence of the language used to describe what being is. In Heidegger’s view, to determine what being is means thinking a new kind of thought about what being is, which would be based on learning what being is.²⁵ Such thinking requires a Heideggerian lens. To this end, a Heideggerian lens will be chiefly concerned with disclosing what being is, adequately working out Dasein through deconstructing being-in-the-world, and understanding human existence beyond the ontical.

This lens utilizes a Heideggerian form of existentialism—considering, of course, that this is merely a categorization, of which Heidegger himself would question and refute. Nevertheless, I feel it is important to denote a “Heidegger’s existentialism” as a distinct brand of existential philosophy from those of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre.²⁶ This Heideggerian kind of

²⁵ Heidegger makes this argument at the outset of his lecture entitled “What is Called Thinking?” In it, he begins by drawing a connection between learning and thinking, suggesting that the former must precede the latter. Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, Translated by J. Glenn Gray (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), 3.

²⁶ Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are considered as “founders” or “fathers” of existentialism that were mainly reacting to the philosophical systemization of Hegel, while Heidegger and Sartre develop existential philosophy into different modernized brands. Setting aside the fact that Heidegger resisted the “existentialist” label and Sartre embraced that moniker, I have presented a relatively broad survey of the roles of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre within a rather fractured field of existentialism. There is some consensus in this matter, which can be found in the following eight sources: William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1958); William Barrett, What is Existentialism? (New York, NY: Grove Press, Inc., 1964); H.J. Blackham, ed., Reality, Man, and Existence: Essential Works of Existentialism (New York, NY: Bantam, 1965); H. J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1959); Ernst Breisach, Introduction to Modern Existentialism (New York, NY: Grove Press, Inc., 1962); James Collins, The
existentialism has, within itself, two strains of thought directly related to ‘die kehre’: they have been referred to as “early Heidegger” and “later Heidegger.” This thesis will mostly employ “later Heidegger,” but it will also refer to the “early” period frequently, particularly as a foundational starting point to what Heideggerian Being is in that “early” period and what it becomes in “later Heidegger.” Moreover, it is by way of that “early” period that I will ground my interpretation of a Heideggerian lens. Though Heidegger’s “early” period is mainly argued in Being and Time, essential echoes of this seminal text reverberate throughout the corpus of Heideggerian thought as re-articulations and recapitulations up to and including the later period: Heideggerian Being has primordial significance reaching beyond superficial ontics and the whole of metaphysics itself.

By taking up the thought of Heideggerian Being, this thesis intends to apply that thought to theological thinking about the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. The assertion is that existential theology can be focused on the possibility that being can be recovered, discovered, or uncovered—or, as later Heidegger calls it, “unconcealed”—respectively from the four tenets of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience. In effect, each tenet contains being at their primordial cores. At those primordial cores, truth, or άληθεια, must be unconcealed, since scripture, tradition, reason, and experience are all “concealments” of άληθεια.

To do theology through a Heideggerian lens means, first and foremost, adhering to a theological stance—that stance, as previously defined, is with Outler’s Wesleyan Quadrilateral.


27 See note 22.
28 The term “truth” is a very crude, albeit problematic, translation of the Greek term άληθεια. As a term, “truth” carries a lot of unnecessary hermeneutical baggage and that baggage diminishes or reduces any essentialist meaning of the original Greek term. In order to follow in a Heideggerian approach, it is important to utilize άληθεια as the better, more accurate term.
From that theological situatedness, one must engage in thinking a thought focused on excavating \( \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\alpha \) from the ontics of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience, in order to essentialize existential meaning inherent, but suppressed within them. This means carefully stripping away the ontical structures in each and, subsequently, deconstructing the metaphysics of those ontics to allow \textit{being} to reveal itself as it already is.

Once disclosed, \textit{being}, as it respectively exists in scripture, tradition, reason, and experience, opens the possibility to examine existence along two lines of inquiry: primordially and ontically. Though both embark on a study of \textit{being}, the former is concerned with \textit{being} in the narrow sense, while the latter is devoted to \textit{being} in the general sense. In other words, perhaps that difference can be respectively explained as \textit{being} at the micro-level and \textit{being} at the macro-level. In the former, \textit{being} is expressed in an innate, inherent fashion, with the intent of interpreting \textit{being} as the most fundamental groundwork from which an object of understanding exists at its lowest denominator. To be sure, what \textit{being} is at this primordial level is analogous to Gottfried Leibniz’s “monad.”\(^{29}\) In another sense, primordiality can be likened to Aristotle’s “unmoved mover.”\(^{30}\) In other words, similarly to the “monad” and “the unmoved mover,” \textit{primordial being} is the most indivisible entity that all objects of understanding share as Kantian

\(^{29}\) As Gottfried Leibniz describes in an essay entitled “The Principles of Philosophy, or the Monadology” in 1714, “monads” are the “true atoms of nature” and “the element of all things.” The “monad” is critical to how Leibniz conceives of the truth as being either one of “reasoning” or one of “fact.” In either case, truth is contingent on the monad, as a “simple substance, which goes to make up composites.” Gottfried W. Leibniz, \textit{Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology}, Translated by George R. Montgomery (La Salle, IL: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1968), 251; Gottfried W. Leibniz, \textit{Philosophical Essays}, Translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 213.

\(^{30}\) Aristotle’s concept of “the unmoved mover” occurs in two texts: \textit{Metaphysics} and \textit{Physics}. In the latter, \textit{Physics}—the text that scholars believe predates \textit{Metaphysics}—Aristotle describes “the unmoved mover” as “the first mover” which is “eternal,” in Book Theta, Lines 258b-259a. In the former, \textit{Metaphysics}, Aristotle suggests that “the unmoved mover” is “changeless” while it affects change in other beings, in Book Lambda in 1071b. See Aristotle, \textit{Physics}, Translated by Richard Hope (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), and Aristotle, \textit{Metaphysics}, Translated by Richard Hope (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1960).
things-in-themselves, representing what I will henceforth denote as “is-ness.”

This is-ness must be encased in what I will call “there-ness,” or something that can be objectified beyond perception or justified belief, but as something that can be explained with a rational account. To explain with a rational account involves formulating being at an ontical level. In this way, ontical being is there-ness at this ontical level—there-ness is how being expresses itself through the temporality of its everydayness. In this sense, what makes this level different from the primordial level is that being is materialized as Frege’s “reference,” or bracketed with Husserl’s “phenomenological epoche.”

“Is-ness” and “There-ness”

At an ontical level, the four theological tenets of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience are tangible representations of there-ness that are connected to primordial is-ness. That is-ness is analogous to Heidegger’s notion of the constant presence of “what-ness.” Through either case, is-ness is translated into there-ness as a referent and there-ness points back to is-ness. Or, in other words, if continuing for just a moment through a Platonic framework, is-ness is “the

31 To be clear, my term “is-ness” utilizes the same conceptualization of the primordial as Leibniz’s “monad.” My notion of what is “is” is formulated, in part, through “monadology.” See note 29.
32 Though “there-ness” is operating in the Heideggerian sense of “Dasein,” I must note that my understanding of “there-ness” and “being-there” derives from the Platonic understanding of knowledge. See Line 210B Plato, Theaetetus, Translated M. J. Levett (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 92.
34 I use Frege’s “reference” and Husserl’s “phenomenological epoche” as complementary concepts, when materializing “being” from its primordial level. Both are constituted by “sense” or an “idea.” But, in keeping in mind the continuity in the thinking between Husserl and Heidegger, the Husserl’s “phenomenological epoche” and the necessity of bracketing contains a more important relationship between the primordial level and the ontical level. Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York, NY: Humanities Press, Inc., 1931), 107-111
whole,” while “the parts” of the whole are delineated into four kinds of there-ness.\textsuperscript{36} To be sure, as far as scripture, tradition, reason, and experience are concerned, they are four different forms of construed is-ness translated as four representations of there-ness. Each has “being-in-the-world” in what can be described as authentic existence.\textsuperscript{37}

For now, I will use authentic existence rather loosely, since it will prove to be problematic as I proceed. At this point, what must be said about authentic existence is that it is our main focus, particularly if that focus should be on being at the primordial level. However, at present, let us continue with authentic existence loosely before deconstructing it. Authentic existence, rather loosely, is a way of understanding what existence is—in another sense, what existence is equates to what being is. To say what existence is means differentiating existence as either primordial is-ness or ontical there-ness. The latter is a manifestation of the former. If there-ness at the ontical level is only translation of is-ness at the primordial level, it becomes possible to recognize that there-ness is not authentic existence, especially if a focus on being should occur at the primordial level.

First, an explanation of authentic existence must be given. In brief, what I mean by the term is that each of the four theological tenets has real meaning in the world, is shaped by time and space, and authentically engages with human understanding for the sole purpose of concretizing is-ness into there-ness. For instance, when suggesting that scripture has authentic existence, its there-ness can be referenced as a single biblical text, or even the collection of biblical texts canonized as the Bible. In turning to tradition as another example, when asserting

\textsuperscript{36} Through Socrates, Plato describes the relationship between “the whole” and “the parts” in The Republic. One example of this is in Lines 434d-441c with the explanation Socrates provides of the composition of the soul, as a whole, which is delineated between the rational, spirited, and desiring parts. Plato, The Republic, Translated by Raymond Larson (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1979), 101-110.

\textsuperscript{37} That is, “being-in-the-world” that is superficially authenticated in the everydayness of being and its explication in the world.
that tradition has an *authentic existence*, its *there-ness* can be referenced in the history of Christianity, the historical Jesus, or even the historical development of the Church up to the present day. Similarly, reason and experience have *authentic existence* since they allow human faculties to think rationally and experientially about the authenticity of scripture and tradition and then, by extension, position human epistemology by thinking theologically.

But, when using the term *authentic existence*, what is authenticated is only at the ontical level with *there-ness*. I believe that this is a very important way to define *authentic existence*—it is only an ontical representation of being as *there-ness*. When considering scripture, tradition, reason, and experience as having *authentic existence*, each of them and their respective *there-ness* merely conceals the *primordial being* in each of them, and that concealed being is truly *authentic existence*.

Such a claim does not mean to imply that *there-ness* is inauthentic existence. Any claim in that fashion is misunderstanding what *there-ness* is, and assuming that *there-ness* is not true existence. Rather, *there-ness* is only ontical *being* and, as such, is only the most superficial level of inquiry about *being*. To be sure, there is nothing inauthentic about *there-ness*, since the human capacity to reference “being-there” is an essential part of the human epistemological process.\(^{38}\) *There-ness is being* as it is most readily disclosed in the world to us, through what Heidegger refers to as “being-in-the-world” and “ready-to-hand”—it is referenced, or referential *being* in everydayness.\(^ {39}\) Nevertheless, to examine *being* through an existential lens means examining *is-ness*. This sort of inquiry allows for a primordial assessment of each of our four theological tenets by first presupposing that they are each comprised of *primordial being*, or an *is-ness*, and

\(^{38}\) “Being-there” is a reference to Heidegger’s “Dasein.”

then acknowledging that an existential lens—a Heideggerian lens, to be exact—must deconstruct any assumptions about there-ness as authentic existence. There-ness may be what is there, but there-ness is not what being is. On the contrary, is-ness is what being is. But, again, there-ness must be deconstructed so that, by way of that deconstruction, is-ness yields itself “as it already is.”

To do this, as Heidegger argues in the introduction to Being and Time, it means fundamentally changing the way we currently think in order to learn how to think a new kind of thought about there-ness, is-ness, and the categorical, existential difference between them. In short, what this means, first and foremost, is resigning to the notion that there-ness is not being in the authentic sense.

Essentially, if there-ness is not authentic existence, then it is only what I would describe as concealed existence. In other words, there-ness is existence that is “being-in-the-world.” Simply put, there-ness is a way through which being chooses to reveal itself in the world—that choice is based, as Heidegger posits, on being preferring to hide itself, instead of showing itself as it already is. When being situates itself as there-ness, it becomes essentially a stand-in is-ness—if the ultimate concern for being is to disclose what being is “as it already is,” then that concern is with authentic existence, which can only occur, as such, as is-ness.

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40 “As it already is” is drawn from Heidegger’s notion that “being,” as such, must disclose, unmask, or reveal itself as it already is. To be clear, when “being” unconceals itself “as it already is,” this kind of unconcealment in invested the essence of freedom and “letting beings be.” Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” in Basic Writings, Edited by David F. Krell, 111-138 (San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco, 1992), 125.

41 Though Heidegger argues for a new way of thinking about the concept of being in Being and Time, he speaks more specifically about the task of thinking in the lecture entitled “Was Heisst Denken?” Thinking a new kind of thought requires fundamentally restructuring how thinking happens. In that lecture, Heidegger states that “in order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first.” That is, of course, assuming that we do not know how to learn which, in turn, has affected what we call thinking. Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1976), 4.

42 “Concealed existence,” as I have called it, is a kind of existence that is not authentic, since it conceals “is-ness.” In other words, “concealed existence” is “there-ness,” or “what is there” at only the most superficial understanding of “being.”

43 See Note 38.
For Heidegger, *is-ness* is “ek-sistence”—it is nothing more than an existential manner in which *being* allows itself to be perceived, grasped, and explained through what Heidegger denotes as “standing out.” This manner is ecstatic, since *being* discloses its *is-ness* through an ecstatic essence. As Heidegger coins it, “ek-sistence” expresses not only the extent to which “there-ness” is different from “is-ness”—an explicit distinction made in the term from the implied term—but the extent to which the latter embodies a “dwelling in the nearness of Being.” To this end, “is-ness,” as the ek-sistence of humanity’s *being*, has a “nearness of Being” because it “stands ek-sistingly in the destiny of Being.” What Heidegger is arguing, then, is that “ek-sistence”—what I have referred to as authentic existence, or even what might be furthered with my Heidegger-hypnennated “being-authenticated-in-the-destiny-of-Being”—is an analytic possibility of *Dasein*, which leads *being* towards “the destiny” of becoming “as it already is.” The authentic existence of *being*—“ek-sistence,” or “is-ness”—becomes critical to how Heidegger wishes to examine *being* itself, especially as what I would like to henceforth refer to exclusively as “primordial being.”

“Primordial Being,” the Existential Theologian, and ἀληθεία

As with Heidegger’s examination of primordial *being* as an analytic possibility of *Dasein*, the same examination preoccupies the philosophical thought of the existential theologian. If such a
theologian views their existentialism through a Heideggerian lens, the main concern is with differentiating is-ness from there-ness. This differentiation is made in order to uncover and isolate primordial being from the “concealedness” of its everydayness.\(^{50}\)

Though Heidegger’s stance is not explicitly theological, it is possible to tease out what might be referred to as a “Heideggerian theology.”\(^{51}\) *Being and Time*, for example, begins on philosophical footing, but proceeds in a theological manner. Clearly, Heidegger begins his examination of being by situating his philosophical argument as an extension of Plato’s *Sophist*.\(^{52}\) What follows, essentially, is a careful, albeit tedious, deconstruction of how the history of philosophy after Plato has incorrectly conceptualized what being is.\(^{53}\) This deconstruction, or what Heidegger denotes as ‘destruktion,’ is the task (‘aufgabe’) of *Being of Time*, particularly the work’s Part II.\(^{54}\) But, I as mentioned earlier, Heidegger never completed *Being and Time*, and only approximations can be made about what Heidegger’s ‘destruktion’ would have looked like. However, what *Being and Time* makes clear is this: there is a distinction that Heidegger creates between ontical there-ness and primordial is-ness. In my view, this distinction moves from the philosophical (issues of ontics) to the theological (issues of primordiality).

The incomplete sections of *Being and Time*—though they can, again, only be

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\(^{50}\) This sort of differentiation, as I have argued, can be linked to one of the first two directives Heidegger outlines in his *Parmenides* lecture. The first directive, as such, involves approaching the terms “unconcealedness” and “concealedness” as respectively “aletheia” and “lethe.” Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, Translated by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 15-16.

\(^{51}\) I must be careful with this term, since, at face value, it seems nonsensical. However, if we are looking at what Heidegger’s investigation in the meaning of Being is—that is, what the primary goal of that investigation is—then Being does carry a divine quality to it that requires interpretation and meaning-making. Theology, then, is about the study of the divine. Sure, theology can be referred to as “the study of God,” but “theos” is also something divine. Heidegger’s *Being* is something divine, something that is like “theos.”


\(^{53}\) Ibid.

approximated from the outline offered and reconstructing claims made subsequently in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, An Introduction to Metaphysics, and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, not to mention from other works such as Contribution to Philosophy (From Enowning), Logic: The Question of Truth, Being and Truth and The Event—would have likely forged into theological territory about primordial being. What I mean, then, is that the argument in Part II of Being and Time is pointing towards a concept of primordial being which can only be theologically explained, especially if the theological influences upon Heidegger’s primordial being are rooted in medieval theology and scholasticism of the High Middle Ages.

Nevertheless, it is important to be careful about suggesting that Heidegger intends to theologize about primordial being. When I offer “theologize,” I do so in a very narrow sense. Any such “theologizing,” for Heidegger’s Being and Time, would involve a kind of thinking that questions and attempts to “overcome” the categorizations of Christian theology, by “following Nietzsche.” Though Heidegger is inarguably “following Nietzsche,” it is, in fact, unfair to suggest that Heidegger’s approach to “overcoming metaphysics” and, by extension, an

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55 The lectures/notes that were eventually published as Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, An Introduction to Metaphysics, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Contribution to Philosophy (From Enowning), Logic: The Question of Truth, Being and Truth, and The Event are all considered as drafts of the incomplete Part II of Being and Time. In each of these “lectures/notes,” Heidegger is concerned with “primordial being”—this is a path towards primordiality and “what being is.”

56 To be clear, my term “primordial being” is equivalent to Heidegger’s “Being.” To this end, like Heidegger, the Scholastics of the High Middle Ages—such as Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure—consider “Being,” as Judith Wolfe notes in Heidegger and Theology, as “...nothing less than another name for God himself.” Judith Wolfe, Heidegger and Theology (New York, NY: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014), 81.


58 Though, on one hand, I am referring to the task Heidegger sets forth in the Introduction of Being and Time, which is the necessity of the question of Being in relation to a history of inadequately asking that question that begins with Plato, on the other, I am pointing to Heidegger’s more explicit notion of “overcoming metaphysics” in the aptly titled essay that appears in The End of Philosophy. In this essay, Heidegger traces the History of Being to, among others, Nietzsche, to which Heidegger ascribes a kind of metaphysics by which “philosophy is completed.” Martin Heidegger, “Overcoming Metaphysics,” in The End of Philosophy, Translated by Joan Stambaugh, 84-110 (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), 95.
understanding of the influence of Neoplatonism upon Christian thought,\textsuperscript{59} is based on an atheistic perspective. Certainly, that perspective is manifested “in the wake of Nietzsche’s declaration of the death of God,”\textsuperscript{60} but, rather than labelling Heidegger an atheist, he simply refuses to assume a theological voice. That refusal, as Laurence Hemming proposes, is “a way of taking up a position with regard to the whole of the history of Western philosophy and the way in which it has articulated God.”\textsuperscript{61} As a result, Heidegger’s “position” is not necessarily based on a view of faith, but, instead, “springs from a strictly philosophical motive.”\textsuperscript{62} Yet, Heidegger is deeply invested in the problem of God, however implicit that investment may be in \textit{Being and Time}.

Even if he approaches the problem of God by way of the necessity of “the question of the meaning of \textit{Being}” (‘\textit{die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein}’),\textsuperscript{63} Heidegger’s \textit{Dasein}, in my view, gestures towards understanding \textit{being} theologically. This is the task of the incomplete Part II of \textit{Being and Time}—the necessity (‘\textit{die Notwendigkeit}’) of the question of the meaning of \textit{Being} through overcoming metaphysics, adequately working out the problem of \textit{being}, and forming a theological-like doctrine on primordiality.\textsuperscript{64} Absent from this task, as Hemming has rightly pointed out, is a theological voice—to be sure, there is a refusal to use a theological voice in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} Laurence P. Hemming, \textit{Heidegger’s Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological Voice} (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 44.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Sein und Zeit} (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), 1.
\item \textsuperscript{64} I believe Heidegger operates from an implied “theological doctrine of primordiality,” since he explains, early in the First Introduction to \textit{Being and Time}, the following: “Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of man’s \textit{Being} towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it.” What Heidegger recognizes, of course, is what theology is and how theology operates “by the meaning of faith and remaining within it.” Heidegger does not wish to “remain” within faith, particularly if his concern is theological and that concern is focused on “a more primordial interpretation of man’s \textit{Being} towards God.” So, I believe that part of the task Heidegger set for \textit{Being and Time}’s incomplete Part II was to find a way to speak about primordiality and \textit{Being} (in the sense of something more primordial to humanity’s \textit{being}) without “remaining within” faith. Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 30.
\end{itemize
"Being and Time." Because of this, Dasein is a stand-in for speaking theologically, without actually speaking theologically—and yet it is based on Heidegger’s belief in theology as a positive science.65 The concept of Dasein, as Heidegger presents it, becomes the means by which Heidegger brings us to the problem of God by placing us in the role of an “interlocutor” to the problem.66 What undergirds this, then, with Dasein always in the backdrop, is an “unclarified” relationship that Heidegger makes between his notion of Being and the problem of God.67 This becomes especially apparent, as Robert Gall seems to agree in the following:

…if we understand the description of Dasein in Sein und Zeit as pointing to some greater reality, a ground of beings, beyond the thrownness, contingency, and conditionedness of beings as a whole, a creator who is author of man’s being. Such an understanding is usually coupled with the criticism that Heidegger needs to go farther than he does in Sein und Zeit in order to avoid pessimism and nihilism.68

Heidegger’s “description of Dasein” does, indeed, point “to some greater reality, a ground of beings.” That “greater reality” is more theological than it is philosophical. Since Dasein points to “a creator who is the author of man’s being” on the way towards overcoming metaphysics and isolating what being is, the incomplete Part II would have been the most theological part of Being and Time—this seems especially so, particularly given what Heidegger’s ‘die kehre’ becomes chiefly focused on.69

I am making this sort of argument about Being and Time in order to make clear what

69 If we are to argue that ‘die kehre’ is focused not just on “what being is,” but on the “unconcealment” of being as “aletheia,” then it is perhaps possible to suggest that Heidegger’s preoccupation with “aletheia” is devoted to a theological understanding of it. That is, to say that the only way to know “what being is” is through an unconcealment of it, as well as being exposed to the openness of the clearing, so that “what being is” can be as it already is.
Being and Time does and what it does not do. That is to say, what must be addressed is where the argument of Being and Time begins and where that argument ends—Heidegger begins his argument about primordial being, but that argument falls short. Even if, as Gall argues, “[he] needs to go farther than he does,” Heidegger’s argument ends with a stance. Though it may be an incomplete argument, Heidegger has developed a stance, just the same. My concern, then, is to suggest that this stance—even if being derived from an incomplete argument—must function through theological dispositions about the concealment of primordial being. If Heidegger’s intent in the incomplete section of Being and Time is for a phenomenological “destruktion” of the history of ontology, certain theological dispositions are necessary and critical.  

With these theological dispositions in mind, there are four representative existential theologians that theologize from a Heideggerian stance that fundamentally seeks to “unconceal” primordial being from the concealment of everydayness. These theologians are John Macquarrie (1919-2007), Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976), Paul Tillich (1886-1965), and Karl Rahner (1904-1984), all of which are deeply influenced by Heidegger. This Heideggerian influence serves two purposes. First, each of these existential theologians has set for themselves the task of searching for primordial being by completing the incomplete Part II of Heidegger’s Being and Time—each chiefly accomplishes this through a respective systematic theology that assumes Heideggerian existential categories. Moreover, though each existential theologian’s corpus of writings is extensive, each ultimately centralizes the argumentative hub of their theological approach to primordial being in a respective magnum opus. Now, the second purpose, as each presents a different systematic theology expressed in a respective magnum opus

71 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, Translated by Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 15-16.
meant to complete and extend *Being and Time*, is to radicalize how each approaches an understanding of *primordial being* as theological deconstructionists pushing back against their respective traditional theological lineages.

Despite these lineages, each theologian is overwhelmingly indebted to Heidegger’s existentialism in their distinct brands of existential theology. As decidedly “existential” theologians, Macquarrie’s Anglicanism, Bultmann and Tillich’s Lutheran-Protestantism, and Rahner’s Jesuit-Catholicism utilize Heidegger’s two-fold task in working out the question of *being* in the “Second Introduction” to *Being and Time*. Consequently, the existential theologies of Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner embody four theological stances using *Heideggerian lenses*. Their respective dedication to uncovering and isolating *primordial being* from its everydayness can be best investigated by the Wesleyan Quadrilateral, with the respective relationships between *being* and scripture, *being* and tradition, *being* and reason, and *being* and experience explicated separately.

For each of the aforementioned existential theologians, the primordiality of *being* is respectively situated in nominative constructions of *λογος* (logos), *κηρυγμα* (kerygma), *καιρος* (kairos), and *χάρις* (charis). These nominative constructions, rather than how they appear in other cases, provide a much more existentially-accessible meaning, especially when using that meaning to point towards the primordiality of *being*. From each of their nominative

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72 I am using the nominative constructions of each since, in themselves, I believe they represent a primordial understanding of their respective meanings. When each assumes the genitive, the dative, or the accusative case, they are ontically construed in reference to other words within a given sentence. Only in the nominative case do these words present meanings that are at their most primordial. In the nominative case, these words have stand-alone meanings. Since I am concerned with “primordial being,” or “*being*” in primordiality, I find that nominative constructions are more helpful than the other cases—in my view, the nominative cases of each word more accurately disclose their individual meanings, which are oriented more exclusively towards *άληθεια*, or “unconcealment.”

73 As I have stated in the previous note, I consider nominative cases as the primordiality of being in *λογος* (logos), *κηρυγμα* (kerygma), *καιρος* (kairos), and *χάρις* (charis).
constructions, their individual primordialities lead towards άληθεία. In other words, to focus on these nominative conceptions means focusing on the primordiality of being and the extent to which that primordial being leads to the “unconcealment” of being, or άληθεία.

Like later Heidegger’s focus on the etymological roots of the original Greek meaning of “unconcealment,” each existential aforementioned theologian conceptualizes primordial being in an individualized, existential way, but ties each conception to άληθεία. To do so, I would like to define the term άληθεία through a Heideggerian lens.

For Heidegger, άληθεία is defined as “that which has already come forward into appearance and has left concealment behind.” What this stands to suggest, then, is that, when being is in a state of unconcealment—or a condition in which primordial being is unconcealed in primordiality—that state is an existential mode in which being already exists as it is, despite “that which” has been in concealment (‘ληθε’). More importantly, it is essential to describe άληθεία as “that which” has been constituted on the unconcealment of previously concealed (‘ληθε’) primordial being—άληθεία is what primordial being looks like when it is unhidden, empowered, and allowed to be original and teleological. In other words, primordial being is what Heidegger calls “the truth of Being,” and this “truth of Being” is inevitably oriented

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74 In a 1943 lecture course entitled “Aletheia,” Heidegger traces the etymological roots of άληθεία to the Fragment B-16 of Heraclitus. Heidegger traces άληθεία back to άληθεια and, then, to another form λάθοι, both of which contain a relatedness to the term “conceal,” or “hide.” Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy, Translated by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1984), 103.
75 Ibid., 104
76 From here forward, I will simply use ληθε to refer to “conceal,” “concealment,” “concealed,” and “concealedness.” For Heidegger, there are subtle variations to ληθε, with respect to the different versions of the aforementioned words. I have presented some of Heidegger’s variations in Note 69.
77 This is drawn from Heidegger’s lecture “The Essence of Truth” where he discusses, in one of two parts, Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. At one point in that discussion, Heidegger looks at Book VI of Plato’s Republic, before Plato’s presentation of The Cave allegory, suggesting that Plato’s “Idea of the Good” is focused on the empowerment of being and unhiddenness. Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, Translated by Ted Sadler (New York, NY: Continuum, 2002), 69-72.
towards ἀληθεια as an object of “sovereign knowledge.”78 Primordial being is based on having “sovereign knowledge” about what being is. This can only occur when the everydayness of being is unhidden—that is to say, being must be unhidden as it already is in primordiality. When being is unhidden, ἀληθεια can be accessed in the openness of clearing.79

In order to conceive of and grasp λόγος, κηρύγμα, καιρός, and χάρις as conceptions of primordial being that have each been unhidden in the openness of clearing, each embody what Heidegger describes as “the correctness of representation.”80 This philosophical notion, then, becomes the grounding question (what is being?) and the guiding question (what is Being?)81 of the existential theologian—each respectively takes what I would describe as a “Heideggerian pathmark,” in order to explain what ἀληθεια is in Greek correlations of scripture (λόγος), tradition (κηρύγμα), reason (καιρός), and experience (χάρις). Along this Heideggerian pathmark,82 each theologian uses their respective Greek correlations of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience to locate primordial being—being as it exists in primordiality—to arrive at ἀληθεια.

Chapter 1 will discuss Macquarrie’s existential theology as devoting itself to primordial being in the concealment (‘ληθε’) of scripture. This “existential theology of scripture,” as I will label it, is culminated in Principles of Christian Theology (1966), not to mention in lectures and

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78 Heidegger begins the lecture course entitled Basic Questions by questioning “the truth of Being,” which involves, as he explains, “not of this or that being or even of all beings, but of Being itself.” This sort of questioning is about seeking “sovereign knowledge”—or knowing the sovereignty—about “the truth of Being.” Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,” Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 6-7.

79 The relationship between “openness” and “the clearing” is situated on what Heidegger describes as the “vacillating self-concealment” of Being itself. Ibid., 177-180.


82 See note 3.
essays collected in *Studies in Christian Existentialism* (1965) and *God-Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology* (1967), and the aptly titled *An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann* (1955). In Macquarrie’s existential theology, \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \varsigma \) is a stand-in for *being*. Through a *Heideggerian lens*, Macquarrie conceives of scripture as \( \lambda \sigma \omicron \varsigma \), or “word,” since it reveals \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha \). As a result, the “Heideggerian pathmark” Macquarrie takes is what I will refer to as a “linguistical-existential” venture, on the way towards *unconcealment*, or \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha \).

Chapter 2 will take a look at Bultmann’s existential theology which concerns itself with *primordial being* in the *concealment* (‘\( \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \)’) of tradition. This “existential theology of tradition,” as it will be denoted, in the 2-volume *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (1948-1953), translated as *Theology of the New Testament* (1951-1955), but is further recapitulated in lectures and essays collected, such as in *History and Eschatology* (1955) and *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (1958). In Bultmann’s existential theology, \( \kappa \eta \rho \gamma \mu \alpha \) is a representation of *being*. Through his “demythologization” process, Bultmann’s *Heideggerian lens* seeks excavate \( \kappa \eta \rho \gamma \mu \alpha \), or “proclamation,” from Christian mythology, in order to find \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha \). To this end, Bultmann’s “Heideggerian pathmark” is what I refer to as a “historical-existential” venture, on the way towards *unconcealment*, or \( \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \iota \alpha \).

Chapter 3 will consider Tillich’s existential theology as oriented towards *primordial being* in the *concealment* (‘\( \lambda \eta \theta \epsilon \)’) of reason. This “existential theology of reason,” as I have named it, is rooted in his 3-volume *Systematic Theology* (1951-1963), as well as several shorter works, especially those written after the publication of his *Systematic Theology*. In Tillich’s existential theology, \( \kappa \alpha \rho \omicron \varsigma \) is a manifestation of *being*. Tillich’s *Heideggerian lens* places emphasis on \( \kappa \alpha \rho \omicron \varsigma \), or “event,” in relation to humanity’s issue of thrownness, so that all
empirical facts are ultimately concerned with ἀληθεία. Because of this, Tillich’s “Heideggerian pathmark” is what I will refer to as a “rational-existential” venture, on the way towards unconcealment, or ἀληθεία.

Chapter 4 will appraise Rahner’s existential theology through a consideration for primordial being in the concealment (‘ληθε’) of experience. This “existential theology of experience,” as I intend to call it, is expressed in Rahner’s systematic work Grundkurs des Glaubens: Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums (1976), translated as Foundations of Christian Faith in 1978, and further elucidated in several volumes of his 23-volume Theological Investigations (1961-1992) and his rejected 1957 philosophy dissertation Geist in Welt. In Rahner’s existential theology, χάρις is an expression of being. Rahner’s transcendental slant is a Heideggerian lens that envisions χάρις, or “grace,” as a representation of ἀληθεία. In this regard, Rahner’s “Heideggerian pathmark” is what I refer to as an “experiential-existential” venture, on the way towards unconcealment, or ἀληθεία.
CHAPTER 1: “BEING” IN SCRIPTURE AND JOHN MACQUARIE’S “λογος”

John Macquarrie’s existential theology is devoted to *primordial being* in scripture, which is expressed as “logos.” With a *Heideggerian lens*, Macquarrie conceptualizes *being* in scripture as λογος, or “word,” since, at a primordial level, it reveals ἀληθεία. The primordiality of λογος suggests, first and foremost, that λογος in an articulation of being—in other words, λογος is what being looks like when it is unhidden, or *unconcealed*. In order to address what λογος is at its primordial level, it is essential to confront what λογος is at an ontical level: scripture. In this regard, scripture adheres to the interrelationships between words and how, in the context of a sentence or a proposition, a string of words expresses a multiplicity of meaning. The extent to which any one sentence, statement, or proposition can be interpreted a variety of ways underscores the Heideggerian problem of language: a problem that is taken up by Macquarrie. The problem arises from the understanding that what is interpreted from any given sentence, statement, or proposition is not only the best approximation of what that sentence, statement, or proposition might mean to any given interpreter, but the best possible approach an interpreter can take to truly grappling with the λογος within. To be clear, especially if applying a Heideggerian understanding to language, it is a hermeneutical problem—it is a problem that strives for unhiddenness, when that *unconcealment* is surrounded by layers of *concealment* (‘ληθε’).

For Macquarrie, scripture is the ontical representation of λογος—the ontology of

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84 I use the term “scripture” in a monolithic fashion, and even as a generalization. I am referring to any text that requires hermeneutical cultivation, in order to conceive of, grasp, and explain ἀληθεία.
scripture hides and conceals λογος in a language that requires constant primordially-oriented interpretation.\textsuperscript{85} Through concealment (‘ληθε’), any hermeneutical activity seeks to venture beyond the technical or grammatical layers of the way language works in order to get to the metaphysics of language.\textsuperscript{86} With Macquarrie’s Heideggerian lens, language, at its most primordial, contains λογος—furthermore, such a claim stands to suggest that scripture, or written language, is only ontical language. That is to say, the ontics of language is represented by scripture and, accordingly, making-meaning from scripture is an act that involves the roles of two horizons: a “fusion” between a horizon of the text and a horizon of the reader.\textsuperscript{87} Essentially, the goal of the meaning-making process—the hermeneutical act, or any active, existential engagement in the systematic interpretation of a text for the purposes of uncovering hidden meaning in it—is to excavate λογος as άληθεια from ontical scripture’s concealedness (‘ληθε’).

**Macquarrie and Heidegger**

John Macquarrie was never a student of Heidegger’s at the University of Marburg, or the University of Freiburg, nor did he ever hold a professorship at either university—the two universities at which Heidegger held teaching positions during his career.\textsuperscript{88} Because of this,

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\textsuperscript{85} To this end, I am referring to the task of hermeneutics, particularly as an activity that calls for the breaking down of language from its ontical representation (words and sentences) into something more primordial (the meaning behind the word and sentences).

\textsuperscript{86} I am using the terms “technical” and “grammatical” as Friedrich Schleiermacher does. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, Translated by James Duke and Jack Forstman (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997), 69.


\textsuperscript{88} This is in contrast to Bultmann, Rahner, and Tillich, all of which established academic relationships with Heidegger, to some extent, as either a student (Rahner) or a colleague (Bultmann and Tillich) at either Marburg or Freiburg.
Macquarrie’s Heideggerian influence is not as direct or first-hand as Bultmann’s, Rahner’s, or Tillich’s. Even if some influence can be derived from his contribution to the *Makers of Contemporary Theology* series with a slim volume on Heidegger as well as his being one of two translators to first translate Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* into English in 1962, Macquarrie’s connection with Heidegger is not obvious. 89 Instead, Macquarrie’s experience of Heidegger comes by way of two important academic intermediaries at the University of Glasgow: Charles Arthur Campbell and Ian Henderson. Charles Campbell was Glasgow’s Professor of Logic and Rhetoric, and served as a mentor to Macquarrie during Macquarrie’s graduate philosophy studies at Glasgow. Leading up to his M.A. degree in philosophy in 1940, Macquarrie studied, especially from Campbell, “the roles of philosophy and theology in relation to the centrality of experience in religion.” 90 Campbell exposed Macquarrie to the work of Bultmann and Heidegger, as examples of the intersectionality of philosophy and theology. As a result, Campbell provided “a receptive yet critical framework for Macquarrie’s reading of Bultmann and Heidegger,” which are the two major influences on Macquarrie’s existential theology. 91

Following his philosophical studies, Macquarrie pursued theological studies at Glasgow, which eventually led to the completion of a B.D. degree in 1943. A decade later, while serving as a lecturer in systematic theology at Trinity College at Glasgow, Macquarrie studied for the Ph.D. degree under the direction of Ian Henderson. Like Campbell, Henderson became a conduit through which Macquarrie could read Bultmann’s Heideggerian approach to New Testament exegesis—Henderson published *Myth in the New Testament* in 1952, as the first introduction to

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89 The other 1962 English translator of *Being and Time* is Edward Robinson.
91 Ibid.
the English-speaking world to the controversy over Bultmann’s program of demythologizing. This played a part in Macquarrie’s 1954 dissertation, which was subsequently published in 1955 as An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann. The primary goal of An Existentialist Theology was “to contribute to the understanding of the influence of existentialist philosophy on contemporary theological thought.” More importantly, rather than just a straightforward comparative study of Bultmann and Heidegger, Macquarrie respectively offers criticisms of Bultmann and presents his own Heideggerian analysis of human existence. Macquarrie’s analysis, then, is based on a Heideggerian understanding of a “range of human or existential possibilities.” For Macquarrie, this is the task of philosophy—his Heideggerian task, to be clear—a task that Macquarrie describes as ontical or pre-theological.

Though the subtitle of An Existentialist Theology denotes a “comparison” between Bultmann and Heidegger, the term can be a bit misleading. Macquarrie seems more interested in staking a Heideggerian position that differs from Bultmann’s, rather than offering an even-handed, objective study of Bultmann and Heidegger. In other words, An Existentialist Theology is more about Heidegger than it is about Bultmann—just as Macquarrie used Campbell and Henderson as intermediaries to Heidegger, Bultmann is used in the same regard. Furthermore, Macquarrie uses Bultmann’s demythologizing program to construct his own existentialist program. While not explicit in An Existentialist Theology, Macquarrie’s program is more explicit in his second book, The Scope of Demythologizing, published in 1960. Macquarrie considered

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92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 4.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 This second book is based on lectures Macquarrie delivered at Union Theological Seminary in March 1957. For the book, Macquarrie revised and expanded the original lectures. Ibid., 5.
this second book to be a companion to *An Existentialist Theology*. As an extension of his criticisms of Bultmann’s demythologizing program, *The Scope of Demythologizing*, according to Eugene Long, “evaluates what [Macquarrie] takes to be the central problem in Bultmann’s theology, the limits inherent in the program of demythologizing.” These “limits,” in Macquarrie’s view, are weaknesses in Bultmann’s program, especially in Long’s assessment. Moreover, Long makes the following assertion:

In his discussion of Bultmann’s program of demythologizing, Macquarrie also insists, in a way that Bultmann does not, that there must be a ‘minimum core of factuality’ in the Christian faith. Faith as authentic understanding must be supplemented by an appeal to the historical Jesus…Macquarrie, however, does not intend to make theology dependent on historical research or to argue that historical research may provide a proof of faith.

Long’s point is well made. What Long asserts is about what Macquarrie insists upon in relation to what Bultmann does not—as Long quotes, Macquarrie insists “that there must be a ‘minimum core of factuality’ in the Christian faith.” But, unfortunately, Long omits a very important part of what Macquarrie insists upon over Bultmann.

To be more precise, in *The Scope of Demythologizing*, Macquarrie suggests that Christian faith contains “a minimum core of *historical* factuality.” There is a big difference between this quote, and what Long has incorrectly quoted. I feel it is imperative that this distinction be made and settled, before moving on. The “historical” aspect to Macquarrie’s quote offers further insight not just into an existential connection Macquarrie makes between history and “factuality,” but is contingent on the degree to which Macquarrie’s connection is Heidegger-influenced. Macquarrie’s understanding of “historical” and “factuality” are grounded

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97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 5-6.
99 Ibid.
Macquarrie’s definitions of Heideggerian terms: 1.) “temporality,” which involves dimensions of the past, present, and future, as “the most basic characteristic of human existence,” and 2.) “facticity,” which denotes all the elements that are simply given, not chosen, in a human existence. Yet, through these two terms, what remains “a minimum core of historical factuality” is language and existence. Long agrees with this, suggesting that:

…[Macquarrie] is primarily concerned with outlining Heidegger’s analysis of the relation between language and existence. With [The Scope of Demythologizing], Macquarrie also begins a dialogue with analytical philosophers and lays the groundwork for his later efforts to develop a logic of the language of religion.

The relation between language and existence, for Macquarrie, is about trying “to understand language as the expression of existence [and] to allow for possibilities of interpretation which are ruled out where empirical referring is taken to be the standard function of language.” In other words, in order “to allow for possibilities of interpretation,” any hermeneutical activity must move beyond “empirical referring”—that is, it must transcend the referent facts of what is being interpreted. This “empirical referring” becomes inaccurately defined as “the standard function of language,” because it involves simply taking a superficial approach to interpretation. That is to say, superficially-interpreting from a technical or grammatical level. Macquarrie views this, through his Heideggerian lens, as the problems of language and hermeneutics. To this end, theological hermeneutics should be about “understand[ing] language as the expression of existence,” especially when equating scripture with λόγος. To accomplish this kind of

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103 John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 54-55.
104 I am using the terms “technical” and “grammatical” as Friedrich Schleiermacher does. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts, Translated by James Duke and Jack Forstman (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997), 69.
105 This is one of the four topics into which Macquarrie organizes Heidegger’s Being and Time. John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1968), 52.
106 Ibid., 54.
theological hermeneutics, Macquarrie follows Heidegger’s correlation between language analysis and existential analysis to construct an existential theology of scripture.

**Macquarrie’s Existential Theology of Scripture**

If λόγος is the object of Macquarrie’s *Heideggerian lens*, then his accompanying existential theology of scripture is centralized on the problem of the relationship between theology and language. That juncture, as such, contains the existential situatedness of λόγος, as a stand-in for God. In other words, Macquarrie views this problem of conceiving, grasping and explaining λόγος by how it is grounded in the theology-language relationship. To be clear, this problem is not only with how theology can be expressed through language, but how language can accurately express what theology is—or, the issue at hand is with what might be referred to as theological language. Such language, when decidedly theological, arises out of the need to apprehend God to a certain degree, to make affirmations about God, and suggest “that God must be such and such, if he is a reality at all.” This is precisely where the problem with theological language lies—it lies in using language to explain who God is, what God does, and how God functions, within an overarching framework of a conceptual, interpretative reality about God.

However, even when suggesting that there is a “reality about God,” Macquarrie contends, and appropriately, that “human language invariably objectifies God [since God’s] reality lies beyond the objectification.” This sort of objectification poses a problem. In this regard,

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107 Macquarrie suggests that “it was not God himself who had spoken to Moses at the burning bush, as explained in Exodus, but the “Logos.” John Macquarrie, *In Search of Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism* (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1984), 24.
110 Ibid., 161.
Macquarrie notes the following:

We cannot discuss the question of the reality of God by asking whether there exists an entity corresponding to the concept. The method must rather be as follows. The concept of God is an interpretative concept, meant to give us a way of understanding and relating to reality as a whole.111

To “discuss the question of the reality of God” means, as Macquarrie proposes, attempting to provide a language that “can articulate and bring into intelligible relations the swirling chaos of experiences only because there is some order there to be discovered…”112 In doing this, it becomes possible to develop a working, conceptual understanding of “the reality of God.” That conceptualization must develop without resorting to “asking where there exists an entity corresponding to the concept” itself. In effect, when discussing “the reality of God,” as such, that reality is being discussed in juxtaposition to humanity’s reality. From this, the role of human language is to place not only humanity’s reality in order, but to project “some order” upon God’s reality, since any interpretative understanding of the latter concretizes—or, even, what I might call “existentializes”113—the former.

Language about “the reality of God,” then, is meant, first and foremost, to “bring what we talk about out of its hiddenness into light.”114 According to Macquarrie, once “what we talk about” is “into light,” language “isolates and brings to notice that about which the speaker wishes to say.”115 This is an unmasking. It allows what is isolated and brought to notice to be unhidden as ἀλήθεια. Furthermore, when connecting “what we talk about” to what is brought into the light

111 Ibid., 29.
113 Even though this is my term, I think it captures the extent to which the meaning-making process is an existential endeavor. I see “concretizes” and “existentializes” as analogous terms. However, in moving forward, I will chiefly use the latter.
115 Ibid.
as ἀληθεία, Macquarrie explains the following:

…at least one characteristic of saying anything, and perhaps even the fundamental characteristic, is that what is talked about is brought into the light. That is to say, what is talked about is made to stand out from the undifferentiated background of all that may be vaguely present to our minds at any given time, or even what may be in our memory or our anticipation. It is brought into the focus of attention and is shown for what it is. To put it in another way, that which is talked about is manifested and made unhidden; and, as Heidegger never tires of pointing out, ‘unhiddenness’ or aletheia is precisely the expression which the Greeks used to express the notion of ‘truth.’ We speak truly if we make what we are talking about unhidden.\(^\text{116}\)

In this respect, “what we talk about” is always focused on bringing something into the light. In other words, “what we talk about” is “made to stand out” from an “undifferentiated background” of concealment. The task of saying anything, then, is edified by “speak truly” in order to “make what we are talking about unhidden”—for Macquarrie, “what we talk about,” or the way of language itself, is a process based on ἀληθεία.

When discussing “what we talk about” in this manner, Macquarrie carefully notes how important language is to the theologian’s ability to talk about the reality of God. What Macquarrie suggests is that:

…[the theologian] must have some idea, explicit or implicit, of what language is. If [the theologian] is wise, [the theologian] will pay attention to what has been said on the subject by those who have made language the specific theme of their researches.\(^\text{117}\)

As a theologian, there is no doubt that Macquarrie has “some idea” about “what language is.” However explicit or implicit that idea may be, Macquarrie has a presupposition about language and carries that presupposition forward in his task as a theologian—in fact, as a theologian, Macquarrie does indeed make “language the specific theme of [his] researches.” To be sure, Macquarrie’s “researches” into “what language is” is attached to an existential understanding of


\(^{117}\) Ibid., 54.
what theology is in reference to what language is, and vice versa. The intersectionality of theology and language is evident in what theological language is. What Macquarrie is concerned with is the scope and limits of theological language, particularly, as he suggests, if “we can acknowledge that theology is rather a strange kind of language [and] is a special form of God-talk.”

In the aptly titled work *God-Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology*, Macquarrie defines God-talk as “a form of discourse professing to speak about God.” With this in mind, Macquarrie contends that God-talk is fundamentally different from common discourse about everydayness. Because of this, God-talk presents a unique problem that is not especially evident in the common discourse of everydayness—Macquarrie proposes that “this problem is to show how in a human language one can talk intelligibly about a divine subject-matter.” Yet, what underlies this problem and this existential theology of scripture, as Macquarrie rightly references, is more than just asking what theological language is—it is about a more fundamental question: what is language?

For Macquarrie, when approaching the scope and limits of theological language—a relationship between “what theology is/does” and “what language is/does”—it is important to ask the question *what is language*, as a highly peculiar question, since:

> …in order to ask the question, we have to use of the very language about which we are asking. This implies that before we ask the question, we must already have some understanding of language in order to be able to ask the question at all. So perhaps the answering of the question consists in no more than making explicit and clarifying as far as possible the understanding of language which we already have. To ask the question of language is possible only for one who, so to speak, exists linguistically. This question about language might be compared with Heidegger’s question, “What is the meaning of being?” …

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118 Ibid., 11.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 33.
122 It must be noted that Macquarrie continues with comparing the question of language to Frege’s question of the number one. Ibid., 55.
If, as Macquarrie argues, the question about language “might be compared” with Heidegger’s question about the meaning of being, then this comparison is associated with the relatedness between language and being. This comparison must be explicitly made. Like Heidegger, Macquarrie seems to view this relatedness as the extent to which the former is “the house” of the latter. Though Macquarrie is operating from a Heideggerian lens and positioning himself with a Heideggerian-like question, his intellectual duty is not solely about thinking the thoughts of Heidegger. In other words, it can be argued that Macquarrie is not a staunch Heideggerian, or “even a thoroughgoing existentialist [since] his intellectual integrity holds him back from any uncritical or superficial identification with Heidegger’s position.” Nevertheless, Macquarrie grounds his intellectual duty as a philosophical theologian, by using a Heideggerian lens to construct a style of philosophizing about the relationship between language and being.

Macquarrie’s “style” is that of an existentialist, operating within the framework of a kind of existential theology—a theology that takes an existential approach. That point must be clearly made. Though Macquarrie might disagree and resist such a label, because, as Charles Brown argues, Macquarrie “seeks on many occasions to distinguish his theology from what he calls existential theology,” the kind of work Macquarrie is doing ventures into existential theology nonetheless. While it may be possible to justify that Macquarrie philosophizes in a “style” that is “existential without labeling it as such, or even denoting it as existentialist,” Macquarrie’s

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125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
style requires such a label and denotation. Sure, we may justify against applying the terms “existential” and “existentialist” to Macquarrie, but any justification in this direction would prove unhelpful and ultimately do a great disservice to Macquarrie’s Heideggerian lens. Just as Brown points out, Macquarrie’s “style” is decidedly existential, since it involves philosophizing in a way that “is directed towards analyzing human existence in terms of a secular language accessible to everyman.” Brown rightly proposes, then, that this “secular language [that is] accessible to everyman” is what Macquarrie calls “existential-ontological”—a language capable of describing the universality of structures and experiences. This, of course, is based on Macquarrie’s belief that:

Language has to be understood as both an existential and an ontical phenomenon; interpretation demands both questioning and listening, a sense of direction and a willingness to be directed.

If language is “both an existential and an ontical phenomenon,” then interpretation is more than just about overcoming the ontology of language. When adhering to the existential requirements of understanding what language means, interpretation also makes it possible to uncover “what language is.” The interpretation of language—as a demand of both questioning and listening—is a task oriented towards λόγος and ἀλήθεια.

Macquarrie’s task of interpretation becomes more than just the interpretation of language

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129 Charles Brown seems to suggest that a justification can be made against Macquarrie’s role as an existential theologian. Brown conceives of the work of existential theology as something that is in contrast to Macquarrie’s work. I do not agree with this. If Macquarrie’s “style” is devoted to human existence—even if it is predicated on issues of theology and human language—and that devotion is theologically-oriented towards what is existential. Essentially, I believe that Macquarrie is concerned with what meaning can be made from theology through language, and from language through theology. Nevertheless, Brown does seem to agree with this, especially since Brown does not shrink from aligning Macquarrie with Heidegger, and, in turn, calling Macquarrie a “Heideggerian.” Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

as “statements about human existence,” but transitions to theological language as “statements about God”—this is what Eugene Long calls Macquarrie’s “central problem.”\(^{133}\) That problem is with finding “how one can talk about God within an existentialist framework,”\(^{134}\) when finding meaning in talking about God is about finding existential meaning in scripture. That is, the being in scripture at being’s most primordial. In order to approach scripture as a kind of language capable of lending existential meaning and pointing towards the primordiality of being, Long suggests that Macquarrie develops “a theory of the truth of religious language,” which is dependent on Heidegger’s definition of truth—it is a notion that scripture, as a religious language, “may be said to be true to the extent that it lights up or discloses reality as it is given.”\(^{135}\) I agree with Long’s assertion. Clearly, Macquarrie’s “theory of the truth of religious language” is based on the degree to which the ontics of language (physical descriptions of reality), once lighted-up or disclosed as the primordial being in scripture, or λόγος (existential descriptions of reality), can point to ἀλήθεια.

**Λόγος in Scripture and the “Linguistical-Existential” Venture**

Macquarrie’s venture in existential theology searches for λόγος in scripture—this venture pursues a Heideggerian pathmark of “logos” as an object of primordiality. Through Macquarrie’s existential theology of scripture, *what we talk about* must be translated from its ontic state into what it already is\(^ {136}\) as *primordial being*—that is, *what language is*. Macquarrie’s λόγος is “linguistical-existential,” since *what language is* gets to *what being is*, at its most

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\(^{134}\) Ibid.

\(^{135}\) Ibid., 100.

\(^{136}\) “What it already is” is what primordial being is when it is disclosed, unmasked, or unhidden in a state of unconcealment. It is, in fact, a state where “beings” are allowed “to be as they are.” See Note 40.
primordial.

What I mean by “linguistical-existential” is that λόγος, as a Dasein-like analytical possibility, makes meaning out of what we talk about in order to unconceal what language is as ἀληθεία. To be clear, the linguistical-existential is predicated on the meaning-making of linguistics—the extent to which meaning must be made out of what we talk about, through a foundational, grounding knowledge of what language is. For Macquarrie, λόγος is a linguistical entity that differentiates what we talk about in its concealedness (ληθε), from the primordiality of what language is as ἀληθεία. In using a Heideggerian lens and an understanding of λόγος in scripture, Macquarrie excavates the ontics of scripture (what we talk about) in order to unmask primordial being (what language is) on the way toward ἀληθεία.

The linguistical-existential venture Macquarrie takes is a specific approach to language on the way towards ἀληθεία. Macquarrie’s approach does not come by way of an analytic philosophy, but more accurately through Continental philosophy—the latter, in particular, is where he situates his Heideggerian lens, his “theological inquiry,” and how he understands language in a theological setting with respect to the question of human existence. Though Macquarrie is a philosophically-oriented theologian concerned with the philosophy of language, he is more concerned with a specific kind of language, or discourse: theological language, or

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137 See note 46.
138 In other words, λόγος is a “Dasein-like” entity, but it is narrowly devoted to working out issues of “linguistical” existence—where language and existence intersect.
139 Macquarrie’s “linguistical-existential” venture, as I have called it, is “on the way towards ἀληθεία,” just as Heidegger’s understanding of language is on the way towards “Being.” In this respect, I think that Macquarrie’s “Heideggerian pathmark” is the same path that Heidegger takes in On the Way to Language, through proposing that “language is the house of Being.” See note 103.
scripture. From this, Macquarrie’s existential theology of scripture is based on the abiding idea that scripture, which he refers to as Christian vocabulary:

…stands in continual need of being reinterpreted if it is to remain meaningful, but at any given time there may be several ways of doing this. At the present time, however, it may be claimed that existentialism is making a powerful contribution towards renewing some basic Christian words.

As “a powerful contribution” to the hermeneutics of scripture, Macquarrie views existentialism as a style of philosophizing. The existentialism, as Macquarrie appropriates it in his existential theology, does, in fact, attempt to renew “some basic Christian words.” This sort of renewal is steered towards those “basic Christian words” that are deemed existential to scripture and must “remain meaningful.” Macquarrie’s linguistical-existential venture is predicated on the belief that scripture “stands in continual need of being reinterpreted” is a decidedly existential belief grounded on an ontical understanding of scripture. This is part and parcel of Macquarrie’s Heideggerian lens and his notion of the linguistical-existential. That is to say, the ontics of scripture must be continually reinterpreted, so that the λόγος within it can “remain meaningful”—meaning is made when λόγος in scripture, λόγος in its primordiality, can be unconcealed in άληθεια.

At the ontic level, when λόγος is concealed, this extent of άληθε makes what we talk about in scripture lose its fundamental meaning. In effect, what we talk about—especially once it is concretized in the written form—limits what language is. Such a limiting concretization and concealment turns λόγος into “what language does,” or the grammatical/technical. When this occurs, the ontics of scripture reduces the hermeneutic possibilities of λόγος, and what we talk

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about, then, becomes a technical embodiment of the relationship between words and their usage. As a result, the existential meaning of what we talk about and λόγος contains a low hermeneutic and linguistic-existential.  

Macquarrie certainly agrees with this assessment, suggesting that, when confronting the words that make up the ontics of scripture:

…we may say that they have been made into technical terms, and that they now constitute a kind of esoteric vocabulary which is still in regular use only within the Christian community and which even there is imperfectly understood.

Essentially, when the ontics of scripture as what we talk about “constitute a kind of esoteric vocabulary,” the meaning made from λόγος is, in fact, reduced to the meaning-making of a specific group or community. But, as Macquarrie rightly points out, when λόγος consists of “technical terms,” the meaning made out of those words are not existential, but are meanings restricted to the esoteric opinions and beliefs of a specific group or community. This kind of esoteric vocabulary correlates to an esoteric meaning—this kind of meaning, again, is not existential, but is a concealment (ληθε) of λόγος in scripture, which makes it difficult for λόγος to “remain meaningful.”

In light of Macquarrie’s desire for scripture to “remain meaningful,” that focus on the necessity of meaning—that is, venturing beyond esoteric meaning—is rooted in Macquarrie’s appropriation of Heidegger’s view of άληθεια. That appropriation is steered towards λόγος in scripture, or λόγος in its primordiality—or what I would refer to as λόγος as exoteric meaning.

It is only at such a primordial level that the scripture can be truly evaluated in terms of its

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143 What I mean by “low hermeneutic” is that what we talk about is only the ontics of scripture. In other words, “what we talk about” and the ontics of scripture is merely a low, or superficial interpretation of λόγος. I consider this a “low hermeneutic” of λόγος, in contrast to assessing the primordiality of λόγος, which would be, in turn, a “high hermeneutic.”


145 In contrast to what Macquarrie proposes to be “esoteric meaning,” I am using the term “exoteric meaning” to propose the opposite: meaning that has existential influence outside of a specific community in a narrow sense, so that that meaning has general, existential value.
primordial being, or as what language is. Eugene Long suggests this too. With respect to what I have called Macquarrie’s existential theology of scripture, λόγος in scripture, and λόγος in its primordiality as an articulation of ἀληθεία, Long proposes that:

Macquarrie is appealing… to Heidegger’s view that truth consists in making unconcealed what is being discoursed about, suggesting that religious statements are intended to disclose the being of human existence and its relation to Being itself…

As Long points out, Macquarrie’s view of ἀληθεία, like Heidegger’s, is based on unconcealing “what is being discoursed about,” or what I have called what we talk about. What that means, then, is that what we talk about should be oriented towards ἀληθεία. To this end, “religious statements,” as the ontics of scripture, should “disclose the being or human existence and its relation to Being itself.” This is the task of Macquarrie’s linguistical-existential venture—a venture must understand the existential difference between the ontics of scripture, the primordiality of λόγος, and what ἀληθεία is.

The ontics of scripture is what we talk about in the general sense. In other words, what we talk about is always encased in Christian vocabulary and theological language about God—in this general sense, God is what we talk about. Though scripture is the ontics of what we talk about when referring to God, it is only language in the general sense—it is the everydayness of λόγος. What this means, then, is that what we talk about—even in the general sense, as the ontics of scripture, as the everydayness of λόγος—must be a kind of discourse that is meaningful. As such, meaningfulness leads the way to the primordiality of λόγος, and what ἀληθεία is. That is to say, meaningfulness in the everydayness of λόγος is Macquarrie’s linguistical-existential venture—that venture is predicated on the linguistical-existential necessity of the meaning-making of λόγος. To this end, Macquarrie’s venture follows the Heideggerian pathmark where:

…discourse is meaningful if it brings what is talked about into the light, that is, if it says something, in what we took to be the original significance of ‘saying.’ Perhaps the notion of meaning has to do also with ‘placing’ the language in some frame of reference that we already have, and indeed this seemed to be implied in what was said about communication. In any case, what we understand here by ‘meaning’ is closely related with the notion of truth as ‘unhiddenness.’ We could say that truth is the ideal or limiting case, in which that which is talked about has been fully manifested for what it is.  

The meaningfulness of discourse—making meaning out of the ontics of scripture, or what we talk about—is only meaningful if, as Macquarrie argues, “it says something.” Essentially, when the ontics of scripture “says something,” the meaning that is made “place[s] language in some frame of reference that we already have”—the linguistical-existential meaningfulness of λόγος is the unconcealment, or disclosing of λόγος.

The linguistical-existential venture Macquarrie employs is focused on disclosing λόγος in a narrow sense: the unconcealment of what language is. Macquarrie’s Heideggerian pathmark utilizes the Dasein-like analytic possibilities of the linguistical-existential to locate the primordiality of λόγος—that is, what is primordial to the everydayness of λόγος—in order to unmask άληθεια. To this end, the unconcealment of λόγος is the task of Macquarrie’s existential theology of scripture—that unconcealment is devoted to a linguistical-existential venture.

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Rudolf Bultmann’s existential theology concerns itself with \textit{primordial being} in tradition. This kind of \textit{being} is exemplified as “kerygma,” or “proclamation,” in κηρυγμα.\footnote{Holst Balz and Gerhard Schneider, eds., \textit{Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament: Volume 2} (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 288.} For Bultmann, κηρυγμα holds the whole of Christian tradition together as a foundational concept—it is through this κηρυγμα that the history of Christianity develops from the ministry of Jesus and sustains itself theologically. But, Bultmann asserts that κηρυγμα has been suppressed by the superstructures of history, until κηρυγμα becomes buried in what Bultmann denotes as mythology. To this end, though Bultmann views mythology as something that prevents κηρυγμα from unfolding itself to us in modernity, he, nevertheless, believes that “myth” is a very important aspect of the history of Christianity, the historical Jesus, and the development of Christology.

Conceptually, \textit{myth} has its purpose, not just historically, but anthropologically and theologically.\footnote{Rudolf Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” In \textit{Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate}, Edited by Hans W. Bartsch, 1-44 (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1961), 10.} Bultmann openly acknowledges this, particularly when \textit{myth} works in tandem with κηρυγμα within Bultmann’s existential theology. Yet, \textit{myth} creates a large hermeneutical rift between the New Testament world and our present day—this rift makes the message of Jesus all the more difficult to grasp with the modern mind, and the κηρυγμα itself ungraspable. This rift opens historical distance between then and now—between κηρυγμα and today—until \textit{myth} encases the original gospel in layer upon layer of hermeneutical excesses. Excesses of this sort
must be stripped away, if the κηρυγμα of the original gospel is ever to be accessible and the truth can ever be confronted directly.

Through what Bultmann calls “demythologization”—that is, stripping myth away from “the message of Jesus,” but not doing away with the essentials of myth entirely—Bultmann uses a Heideggerian lens to see through the excesses of mythology. To be clear, the term demythologization is an unfortunate and problematic misnomer. What it suggests, as a process, is that myth is being taken away, delimited, or negated, to the point that no myth remains. This is certainly not true. For Bultmann, demythologization, just as Paul Ricoeur rightly surmises, is not a “purely a negative enterprise.” Demythologization is not so much about completely taking away myth through negation, but, instead, is more about reducing—not exactly “stripping away” in the strictest sense of the term—myth so that the κηρυγμα of the original gospel conveys a more graspable truth, or άληθεια. This means that the act of demythologizing “strips away” only what is necessary, while leaving behind what is essential in myth. But, more importantly, to demythologize, as Bultmann argues, means recognizing that the Christian myth has concealed (‘ληθε’) the κηρυγμα of the original gospel. To accomplish these ends, Bultmann uses a Heideggerian lens that seeks to excavate κηρυγμα from myth, in order to uncover άληθεια.

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150 I must make a note here, for sake of clarify and specificity. My contention that demythologization means to “strip away myth” is in disagreement Morris Ashcraft, who argues the opposite. In light of Bultmann’s project, my view is that to “strip away myth” means not stripping away myth entirely, but, instead, leaving behind some essential layers of myth. In other words, I use the term “strip away” to mean that we are not doing away with myth completely, but are recognizing that there are “excesses” to myth that must be stripped away, though not completely eliminating. In Ashcraft’s view, “…to demythologize the New Testament does not mean that one strips away the myth. Rather, it means that the New Testament must be interpreted existentially.” I feel Ashcraft is missing what “strip away” denotes. “Strip away” is similar to deconstruction, which means interpreting existentially—if following Bultmann’s argument in “New Testament and Mythology” about what it means to demythologize, it means peeling back the excess layers that surround myth by deconstructing myth, in order to “interpret existentially.” Morris Ashcraft, Rudolf Bultmann (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1972), 14.

Bultmann and Heidegger

Bultmann first met Heidegger in 1923 at the University of Marburg. While Heidegger had just begun his professorship there, Bultmann was already a member of the Marburg faculty for two years. Not long after Heidegger’s arrival, the two established a collaborative friendship over the next five years, with their friendship continuing long after Heidegger’s 1927 departure from the University of Marburg when Heidegger accepted a faculty position at the University of Freiburg in 1928. There, at Freiburg, Heidegger was appointed chair of Professor of Philosophy, ultimately succeeding his mentor Edmund Husserl who had retired. However, before settling in Freiburg—the university at which Heidegger would remain for the rest of his academic career, including the brief period when he was elected rector on April 22, 1933—Heidegger publishes *Sein und Zeit* in 1927.

The publication date of *Sein und Zeit* affects any discussion of the relationship between Bultmann and Heidegger. First, *Sein und Zeit*, as Heidegger’s first academic book, was written and published with the intent of qualifying Heidegger for Husserl’s vacated chair at the University of Freiburg. In fact, though the book’s publication was rushed, the ideas Heidegger argues in what became the final unfinished draft of *Sein und Zeit* are introduced and honed in Heidegger’s seminar courses while at Marburg, most notably courses such as *Platon: Sophistes* of 1924 and *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs* of 1925. This leads to a second reason for the relationship between Bultmann and Heidegger through the publication of *Sein und Zeit*.

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153 Ibid.
154 The later of these two, especially, is considered by Theodore Kisiel, a prominent Heidegger scholar, as an early draft of *Sein und Zeit*. Kisiel offers this claim in the epilogue to his 1985 translation of *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs as History of the Concept of Time*. Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, Translated by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1985), 321.
Zeit. Secondly, Bultmann would have certainly been familiar with the aforementioned seminar courses that Heidegger taught and, subsequently, was influenced by the ideas in them. These ideas leave an “indelible imprint” on Bultmann’s theology.155

Bultmann’s contact with Heideggerian thought is a clear, specifically when recognizing that his experience is rooted in the “genesis” of Sein und Zeit.156 That kind of “indebtedness,” as it has been pointed out, helps Bultmann develop a specialized theological concept of being utilizing Heidegger’s categories.157 The concept of being, as Bultmann suggests, “must be the methodical starting-point of theology [which] grow[s] out of my dependence on Heidegger’s existential analysis of an in my effort to explicate existence in faith in a theological or conceptual way.”158 Bultmann makes this assessment quite unapologetically to critics of his Heideggerian influences in the following from “New Testament and Mythology” in Kerygma and Myth:

Some critics have objected that I am borrowing Heidegger’s categories and forcing them upon the New Testament. I am afraid this only shows that they are blinding their eyes to the real problem. I mean, one should rather be startled that philosophy is saying the same thing as the New Testament and saying it quite independently.159

For Bultmann, the “critics [who] have objected” to his borrowing of “Heidegger’s categories and forcing them upon the New Testament” are precisely the kind of “critics” to which Bultmann

156 Theodore Kisiel suggest in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time—from which I have rather deliberately taken the term “genesis”—that the first two early drafts of Being and Time were written in 1924 and 1925. These two drafts were composed while Heidegger was still at Marburg, both of which would have been presented as “talks” to Marburg theologians such as Bultmann. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1933), 9.
158 Bultmann actually uses the term “concept of existence.” I have substituted this with “concept of being,” which is relatively analogous, since I would argue that “existence” and “being” are one in the same thing. They are both linked to issues of ontology and metaphysics, especially in the manner that Bultmann functions through Heideggerian existentialism. Rudolf Bultmann, “The Historicity of Man and Faith,” In Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, Edited and Translated by Schubert M. Ogden, 92-110 (New York, NY: The World Publishing Company, 1960), 92.
intends to defend his “Heideggerian” approach. By addressing these “critics,” Bultmann’s “apologia” here, or so to speak, is focused on what he believes the “real problem” is. That “real problem” must be confronted not just theologically but philosophically, since, as Bultmann argues, “philosophy is saying the same thing as the New Testament and saying it quite independently.” This means, then, that, though philosophy and theology are different voices expressing different concerns—and they are, as Bultmann explains, doing this “quite independently”—they are ultimately oriented towards the “real problem.” So, speaking philosophically, albeit through “Heidegger’s categories,” should be a part of speaking theologically, as with the New Testament. Not only is Bultmann defending the appropriateness and meaningfulness of his “borrowing [of] Heidegger’s categories,” but he is explicitly denying that he is “forcing them upon the New Testament.” Instead, Bultmann believes that “Heidegger’s categories,” more than any other method of categorization, makes it possible to truly analyze what the “real problem” is in the New Testament. That problem, in Bultmann’s summoning of Heidegger, is the problem of being. More precisely, as it pertains to Bultmann’s Heideggerian lens, the problem is with primordial being as it is represented as κηρυγμα—consequently, κηρυγμα is the focus of what I intend to refer to as Bultmann’s existential theology of tradition.

Bultmann’s Existential Theology of Tradition

Since Bultmann’s existential theology decidedly uses a Heideggerian lens, κηρυγμα is the object of that lens. Κηρυγμα is being at is most primordial. Through Bultmann, a Heideggerian existential analysis is the only method that can completely evaluate κηρυγμα and explicate it theologically from tradition. In this regard, Bultmann states:

…the method is determined by its object; and therefore when I take over the concepts of Heidegger’s existential analysis, I also in fact take over the object of his analysis. Thus the object of my theological research is in truth not existence in faith, but rather the
If, as Bultmann suggests, “the method is determined by its object,” then existential theology is that “method,” a “method” that is determined by what is “existential.” Tradition is the object that requires an “existential analysis.” What Bultmann offers is a kind of “theological research” that is not geared towards “existence in faith,” but towards, as he argues, “the natural man.” That means, I would suggest, that his understanding of the problem of being as κηρυγμα is not founded on “existence in faith”—that is, looking for κηρυγμα in faith—but is situated in “the natural man” or, as I have denoted, primordial being. This, then, is Bultmann’s Heideggerian lens. Accordingly, Bultmann recognizes that κηρυγμα is in the primordial being of human existence, and extends the following:

Heidegger’s existentialist analysis of the ontological structure of being would seem to be no more than a secularized, philosophical version of the New Testament view of human [existence]. For him the chief characteristic of man[kind]’s Being in history is anxiety. Man[kind] exists in a permanent tension between the past and the future. At every moment he is confronted with an alternative. Either he must immerse himself in the concrete world of nature, and thus inevitably lose his individuality, or he must abandon all security and commit himself unreservedly to the future, and thus alone achieve his authentic Being. Is not that exactly the New Testament understanding of human [existence]?161

Bultmann’s answer to this question is yes. Clearly, the New Testament understanding of human existence is grounded on “authentic Being.” Note that “authentic Being” is about Being, which is oriented toward “the existential.” I want to make this distinction clear. Human existence, especially in a New Testament framework, is not so much focused on the here and now, but on

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161 Here, it must be noted that I have substituted Bultmann’s term “human life” with “human existence.” I do so, because I feel that “human existence” is a more philosophical term than “human life” and, if we are to sustain the philosophical language of Bultmann’s Heideggerian lens, “human existence” would be a more preferable term. Rudolf Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” In Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, Edited by Hans W. Bartsch, 1-44 (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1961), 24-25.
something beyond the temporal, something that is fundamentally atemporal. “Authentic Being” is that atemporal object, which existentially connects human existence to the past and the future. “Authentic Being,” as described, allows human existence to make meaning within itself and further meaning beyond itself. Human existence, as Bultmann argues, is predicated on “a permanent tension between the past and the future.” This tension is precisely the problem of being for the New Testament view of human existence—it is a tension that is laden with anxiety.\(^{162}\) The permanence of this tension, with the presence of that associated Kierkegaardian two-fold concept of anxiety, wedges mankind between inauthentic and “authentic Being.”\(^{163}\) Despite the proliferation of the former in what Bultmann calls “the concrete world of nature,” it is the latter that must be truly “achieved.” The latter, as Bultmann contends, is more important, especially, when following Bultmann’s thinking, if κηρυγμα is to lead to primordial being as “authentic Being.”

Bultmann’s understanding of “Heidegger’s existential analysis of the ontical structure of being” underscores Bultmann’s philosophical preoccupations with the New Testament view of human existence. This is how he intends to theologize through a Heideggerian lens. But, what must be drawn out of this Heideggerian lens is the extent to which Bultmann’s exposure to Heidegger influenced Bultmann’s understanding of the philosophical question of what being is.

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\(^{162}\) Another way to consider “anxiety” is as “angst.” In either case, Heidegger provides an interpretation of anxiety, from which Bultmann is certainly drawing his “anxiety.” Heidegger sees “anxiety” as a “basic state-of-mind” of Dasein, especially if Bultmann’s notion of “tension” is steeped in Dasein working itself out through the problem of being. Heidegger analyzes “anxiety” along three lines of fear: (1) that in the face of which we fear, (2) fearing itself, and (3) that about which we fear. Bultmann’s “anxiety” about the “tension between the past and the future” is a culmination of these. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 179.

Also, to a greater extent, that philosophical exposure leads Bultmann to wrestle with the theological question of *what being is* in an assessment of κηρυγμα. More importantly, in order to theologically assess *what being is*, what remains integral to Bultmann’s Heideggerian lens is how κηρυγμα is essential to his conceptualization of two theological concepts: the New Testament view of human existence and the definition of history.

Bultmann’s New Testament view of human existence is the starting point of his theology.164 There, Bultmann employs an “existentialist understanding of man [that] deals with the structure of man’s existence,” in order to theologically assess *what being is*.165 That assessment is based on “a basic understanding of human existence” and the acknowledgment that “the New Testament includes the mythologies of Jewish apocalyptic and Gnostic redemption religions.”166 The latter adds hermeneutical layers to the former, until any conceptualization of New Testament human existence is shrouded in a mythical world picture.167

So, to move beyond this and actually determine *what being is*, it becomes necessary to devise an existentialist interpretation of the New Testament view of human existence, in order to say, with any shred of certainty, that the New Testament embodies a truth which is all-together independent of its mythical setting.168 That truth is in *what being is*, and where κηρυγμα resides. But, also, in order to disclose κηρυγμα from the mythical setting that encases it, Bultmann concludes that “theology must undertake the task of stripping the Kerygma from its mythical

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165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., 54.
framework, of ‘demythologizing’ it.”\(^{169}\) As a result, through his demythologizing, “Bultmann’s theological aim is nothing less than the rescuing of the kerygma from the consequences of historical criticism.”\(^{170}\) But, an important part of the task of “stripping the Kerygma from its mythical framework” is through engaging in a very different kind of historical exegesis. That historical exegesis, as Bultmann asserts, “…asks about meaning, but in such a way that all history is sketched on one plane, one map.”\(^{171}\) Such a sketch is brought together by two questions: (1) when historical exegesis asks about what is said, and (2) when we ask about what is meant.\(^{172}\) But, what arises from these questions, and any subsequent answers, is an exegesis that ventures too far afield from historical exegesis. To this end, Bultmann makes the following assessment of the inadequacy of historical exegesis and calls for another kind of exegesis altogether in “The Problem of a Theological Exegesis of the New Testament” (1925):

> The presupposition of every exegesis should be recognition of the uncertainty of our existence, the knowledge that our existence is occasioned in our free act of decision; add to that an attitude toward history which acknowledges it as authoritative and thus sees it not with the detachment of the spectator but in the light of present decision.\(^{173}\)

Here, Bultmann envisions a kind of exegesis that does not interact with history “with the detachment of the spectator,” but with a kind of reciprocal interaction, always referencing the “present decision” of human existence and, by extension, the necessity of what being is. To determine what being is, being itself must be teased out with an exegesis focused exclusively on the primordiality of being—that is, the only way to compartmentalize what being is from all that

\(^{169}\) Ibid.


\(^{172}\) Ibid.

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 134.
surrounds, submerges, and encases it is by engaging in a new kind of exegesis. That kind of exegesis has the exegetical task of uncovering what being is.

Though Bultmann first attempts to articulate what this new kind of New Testament exegesis would look like in History of the Synoptic Tradition (1921) through form-criticism, he concedes the following near the end of the book’s introductory section:

The aim of form-criticism is to determine the original form of a piece of narrative, a dominical saying or parable. In the process we learn to distinguish secondary additions and forms, and these in turn lead to important results for the history of the tradition.\(^\text{174}\)

The “original form of a piece of narrative,” as Bultmann defines, is about reaching for what being is in a narrative, since “the original form” is what being is. This means, just as Bultmann explains, “distinguish[ing] secondary additions and forms” from what he calls “the original form.” The only way to accomplish this is by recognizing that the exegetical task is to filter out “secondary additions and forms,” in order to isolate “the original form” as something of primordiality—that is, something of primordial, existential resonance. This part of the exegetical task is mainly practical, since it results from beginning with a theoretical understanding about the difference between “the original form of a piece of narrative” and the “secondary additions and forms.” For Bultmann, uncovering “the original form of a piece of narrative” means assuming a theoretical understanding about what is “history” and what is “tradition.”

Bultmann’s theoretical understanding—a Heideggerian understanding, to be certain—is based first on a reconceptualization of history. What that means is re-conceptualizing history through Heideggerian categories. To this end, Bultmann’s definition of history is contingent on Bultmann’s unique theological stance about tradition, especially as “the permanent tension

between the past and the future.” Bultmann’s view of tradition is not strictly as a historian, or even in terms of historiography. Instead, Bultmann’s view of tradition is a philosophical-historical view. Tradition, for Bultmann, is a specialized term that contains existential meaning in it—its meaning arises from not only recognizing the “tension” inherent in the term itself, but through the differentiation between what is “original” and what is “secondary.” The meaning inherent in tradition is linked to κηρυγμα and, then, κηρυγμα connects to primordial being—the means by which Bultmann aligns tradition with κηρυγμα and κηρυγμα with primordial being is, then, the means by which Bultmann does his existential theology.

Bultmann’s existential theology of tradition is chiefly situated in how he conceptualizes the message of Jesus. This message of Jesus is the ontical κηρυγμα—it is the “proclamation” from which Christian tradition proceeds and is ultimately sustained. Not only does the whole of Christian tradition spring forth from the message of Jesus, but, for Bultmann, a specific focus on the κηρυγμα primordially inherent in the message of Jesus undergirds his notion of the primordality of being, especially as a way to do theology of the New Testament. The manner in which Bultmann conceptualizes kerygma and the primordiality of being become essential to a brand of New Testament theology that is not necessarily systematic in nature.

For example, in the first volume of his Theology of the New Testament, Bultmann opens with the following about his understanding of the message of Jesus and kerygma:

The message of Jesus is a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself. For New Testament theology consists in the unfolding

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176 The term “tradition” contains “tension” mostly because it solicits questions whenever it is used. The first question is: Whose tradition? That is, I am asking about to whom does that tradition belong? Next, there is the following question: What kind of tradition? By that, I mean, how is that tradition being described and defined, and to what ends does that description and definition serve?

177 That is to say, Bultmann’s Theology of the New Testament is not a systematic theology, but, rather, a work of New Testament exegesis. For that matter, Bultmann is not a systematic theologian in the strict sense, but is a New Testament exegete.
of those ideas by means of which Christian faith makes sure of its own object, basis, and consequences. But Christian faith did not exist until there was a Christian kerygma; i.e. a kerygma proclaiming Jesus Christ—specifically Jesus Christ the Crucified and Risen One—to be God’s eschatological act of salvation. He was first so proclaimed in the kerygma of the earliest church, not in the message of the historical Jesus, even though that Church frequently introduced into its account of Jesus’ message, motifs of its own proclamation. Thus, theological thinking—the theology of the New Testament—begins with the kerygma of the earliest church and not before.\(^{178}\)

For Bultmann, there is a difference between the message of Jesus and κηρυγμα. That difference hinges on what he calls “a presupposition,” or the notion that something is already implicit in a supposition, such as the message of Jesus (‘die Verkündigung Jesu’).\(^{179}\) Christian faith is this “presupposition” (‘Voraussetzungen’)\(^{180}\)—that is, that faith is a presupposed entity with an existence that is dependent solely on itself. However, as Bultmann points out, “…Christian faith did not exist until there was a Christian kerygma,” which means, then, that he is aware of the primordiality of κηρυγμα. That primordiality is not just about describing what is primordial about κηρυγμα, but also about denoting what is primordial to the message of Jesus. In other words, the message of Jesus is simply an ontical ends to a primordial means: the kerygma at its most primordial.

If, as Bultmann proposes, “theological thinking—the theology of the New Testament—begins with the kerygma of the earliest church and not before,” then kerygma is the most primordial aspect of the “earliest church,” as the most primordial representation of what tradition is.\(^{181}\) So, when considering this at prima facie, in order to truly understand what the message of


\(^{180}\) Ibid.

\(^{181}\) I am thinking about “what tradition is” as Bultmann’s notion of the “earliest church,” particularly from the standpoint of Bultmann’s understanding of what he calls “primitive Christianity” in an eschatological community that “arose from the band of Jesus’s disciples. Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity: In Its Contemporary Setting, Translated by Reginald H. Fuller (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1956), 175.
Jesus is, it is important to first unfold, as Bultmann argues, “[the] ideas by means of which Christian faith means sure its own object, basis, and consequences.” The only way to “unfold those ideas” is by hermeneutically-reducing “Christian faith” to κηρυγμα. Such a reduction is phenomenological in the Husserlian sense. Moreover, any such reduction, if focusing exclusively on Bultmann’s κηρυγμα, is at the heart of the existential task of interpreting the ontics of tradition.

Κηρυγμα in Tradition and the “Historical-Existential” Venture

Bultmann’s venture in existential theology is focused on κηρυγμα in tradition. The demythologization program that Bultmann undertakes is a venture that pursues a Heideggerian pathmark of κηρυγμα as an object of primordiality. In this regard, Bultmann’s demythologizing task—what I have referred to as an existential theology of tradition—is concerned with isolating κηρυγμα by utilizing the “historical-existential.” To do this, Bultmann’s program deconstructs what tradition does, or how tradition operates, at the ontic level, in order to disclose what tradition is as άληθεια. Demythologization as deconstruction is about unmasking the primordiality of tradition. To demythologize means to deconstruct tradition in order to unmask the primordiality of κηρυγμα, since tradition has concealed κηρυγμα in ληθε. The underlying intent, then, is to conceptualize what being is in unconcealment, or as άληθεια—that is, conceptualizing κηρυγμα in tradition as the primordiality of tradition.

For Bultmann, there arises an existential need to venture beyond the ontics of tradition towards the primordiality of tradition. Bultmann first conceives of this need in History of the

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182 This reduction, as Edmund Husserl calls it, is a “phenomenological epoche,” which is an intentional act of limiting the universality of something, so that that “something” can be better comprehended with specificity. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Translated by F. Kersten (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), 107-111.
Synoptic Tradition and reiterates this concern in Theology of the New Testament. Though Bultmann’s approach to the ontics of tradition is by way of a New Testament scholar, perhaps working from the perspective of a pseudo-historian. To be more exact, Bultmann’s sense of history—and tradition, for that matter—is based on Heidegger’s notion of the historical. This influence is behind Bultmann’s Heideggerian understanding of what history is and what tradition is. Even though the former is important, the latter is a more critical, existential concept to Bultmann’s demythologizing program—in Bultmann’s view, tradition has become so mythologized that it requires deconstructing—demythologizing, as he calls it—if there is ever to be any hope of grasping ἀλήθεια (unconcealment). Essentially, Bultmann’s goal is to grasp tradition’s Heideggerian being “in the sense of the true” through unconcealment. In this sense, the only way to truly make unconcealed meaning out of tradition is by not focusing on what it looks like at the ontic level (the message of Jesus), but the primordial being (the κηρυγμα of the earliest church) within it. Bultmann’s historical-existential venture, as such, seeks to translate the ontics of tradition into what tradition is at its most primordial—it is the determination of the earliest church as an unconcealment of the primordial mode of being for κηρυγμα.

As a Dasein-like entity with analytic possibilities, the historical-existential is the focal point for what Bultmann calls “theological thinking—theology of the New Testament.” This kind of “theological thinking” is akin to Heideggerian thinking, which is situated in the kind of thinking necessary to pose the question of the meaning of Being. Similarly, Bultmann’s

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184 Ibid.
185 Like Heidegger, Bultmann’s notion of being “in the sense of the true” is derived from Brentano’s idea of “truth in the proper sense.” Franz Brentano, The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong, Translated by Cecil Hague (London, UK: Archibald Constable and Co. Ltd., 1902), 69-70.
186 See note 46.
“theological thinking” about “what tradition is” and the New Testament poses the question of the meaning of κηρυγμα. Heidegger’s *Being* is embodied in Bultmann’s notion of the primordiality of tradition, as the primordiality of κηρυγμα in tradition. Moreover, just as Heidegger conceives of *Being* as one of two analytic possibilities of *Dasein*, κηρυγμα, as the primordiality of tradition, is an analytic possibility of the entity that I have called *historical-existential*.

By utilizing the *historical-existential*, Bultmann makes a careful, existential distinction between two elements in tradition: the existentiality of the message of Jesus and the existentiality of the κηρυγμα of the earliest church. In this sense, Bultmann’s distinction—a distinction between existentialities—is based on the everydayness of the former and the primordiality of the latter. That is to say, this distinction is respectively made between the ontics of tradition and the primordiality of tradition. Only by tracing *primordial being* through the primordiality of tradition is it possible to *unconceal*, disclose, or reveal κηρυγμα as what being is—what this means, then, is that only the primordiality of tradition is on the way to ἀληθεία. The purpose of Bultmann’s demythologizing program is to provide a “clearing”187 for ἀληθεία—Bultmann’s act of stripping away the layers of myth means to *unconceal* the primordiality of tradition as κηρυγμα.

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187 See note 72.
CHAPTER 3: “BEING” IN REASON AND TILLICH’S “καιρος”

Paul Tillich’s existential theology is oriented towards primordial being in reason—that is to say, Tillich uses a Heideggerian understanding of reason to explore the primordiality of being. The concept of reason, as such, is an ontical construction that conceals what being is at a primordial level. In this way, reason is only superficial, and is only concerned with being-in-the-world: being in an ontical state, not what being is. Tillich’s Heideggerian lens places emphasis on καιρος, or “event,” as a critical element of addressing what being is, so that all ontical facts, as they are revealed to human existence, are oriented towards ἀληθεία.

When conceptualizing what being is, then, Tillich’s notion of καιρος becomes inextricably linked to the phenomenon of “thrownness”—as an “event,” “being-thrown” is the Heideggerian facticity of “being-thrown-into-the-world,” so to speak, and recognizing that being, in itself, is ultimately contingent on a world initially shrouded in existential mystery.

“Thrownness” is not just a particular event in the life of human existence, it is an existential event that defines what being is. Accordingly, human existence must make meaning out of “thrownness,” in an effort to unconceal καιρος.

In effect, Tillich’s “thrownness” is the first facticity in a series of facticities that human

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189 “Thrownness” is a Heideggerian term adopted by and appropriated into Tillich’s existential theology. The term, as Tillich endeavors to use it, is about being “thrown into existence” in such a way that an entity exists as it has to be and as it can be. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 321.
being must existentially work out, when making meaning from the human situation, as a whole.\textsuperscript{190} This kind of situation is not only existential, but it is epistemological, since it is grounded on a subjective rationalism that leads towards \(\άληθεια\). It is only through καιρος—a stand-in for \textit{what being is when being} undergoes \textit{unconcealment}—that \(\άληθεια\) is even possible.

In other words, the event of human existence itself is purely ontical, because that event merely refers to what being has become—therefore, “what being has become” is not \textit{what being is}.\textsuperscript{191} Again, \textit{what being is} must be \textit{unconcealed} in its most primordial state. “What being has become” is an ontic state that layers καιρος in \textit{concealment} (‘\(ληθε\’”), through the imminence of the event of “being-thrown” into human existence.\textsuperscript{192}

Even though καιρος is an imminent event, Tillich situates that imminence within an existential stream of historicity and temporality—in that historical-temporal stream, καιρος refers to the past and the future from the positionality of the present.\textsuperscript{193} What this means is that, when καιρος is \textit{unconcealed} as \(\άληθεια\), that \textit{unconcealment} reveals so much more than just the present existential situation of \textit{what being is}. To this end, Tillich’s ultimate concern is about how “what being has become” ontically can be reasoned into \textit{what being is} primordially. This approach to the concept of reason undergirds Tillich’s Heideggerian approach to “the event” as καιρος—Tillich’s \textit{Heideggerian lens} reasons through the ontics of “being-thrown” into human existence, in order to rationalize the καιρος within and further expose \(\άληθεια\).\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{190} “Thrownness” as what I call “the first facticity” can be derived from Heidegger’s following statement: “The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over.” What makes “thrownness” a facticity is, as Heidegger suggests, the extent to which it is “that it is.” Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time} (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 174.

\textsuperscript{191} As a note, I am drawing a distinction here between “what being has become” and “what being is.” That distinction aligns respectively with “the ontical” and “the primordial.”

\textsuperscript{192} Here, when I say “ontic state,” I am rearticulating Heidegger’s term “ontical.” In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger explains that an ontical “is made to underlie the ontological.” Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time} (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 127.

\textsuperscript{193} Since καιρος is about the immediate present, it is situated between concepts of the past and future.

\textsuperscript{194} “Being-thrown” is based on ontics, since it is the groundwork of what is ontical.
Tillich and Heidegger

Tillich was a professor of theology at the University of Marburg from 1924-1925—he came at a time when Bultmann and Heidegger had both joined the Marburg faculty in 1921 and 1923, respectively. However, before coming to Marburg, Tillich carried with him an extensive teaching background, having previously taught philosophy as a “Privatdozent” of Theology at the University of Berlin from 1919-1924. In addition, Tillich’s academic background included a Doctor of Philosophy degree from University of Breslau and a Licentiate of Theology from Halle—the latter, at the time, being the highest theological degree that could be earned in Germany. For both degrees, Tillich’s dissertations focused on the German philosopher Friedrich W. F. Schelling, who is one of the two key philosophers during the critical German Idealism period post-Kant and pre-Hegel. From the work on these two dissertations, Tillich developed an understanding and approach to the philosophy of existence from a Christian perspective. As Tillich describes them, the two dissertations “dealt with Schelling’s philosophy of religion.” More importantly, Tillich discovered in Schelling a way to synthesize “philosophical and theological impulses” since both could “enrich one another in Christian

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195 “Privatdozent” is the German word for “lecturer.” Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 41.
197 The other philosopher is Johann Fichte. But, perhaps it is worth noting that, in addition to Fichte and Schelling, there is a third philosopher during this generation of thinkers that is often considered as important, even if only tangentially: Karl L. Reinhold. See “Preface” to the collection entitled Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, Translated by George Di Giovanni (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), vii-xi.
thought.” Yet, as Mark K. Taylor notes in the “Introduction” to a selected works of Tillich entitled *Paul Tillich: Theologian of the Boundaries*:

[The vision of philosophy and theology enriching one another] even permeated his early years of ministry, when, just after ordination in his twenty-sixth year, Tillich sought to communicate the Christian message to the poor of the Moabit workers’ district in Berlin. Tillich found the traditional languages of church and theology not sufficient to convey the meaning of Christian terms, even those as familiar as ‘faith.’

Clearly, if Tillich found “the traditional languages of church and theology” insufficient, especially if he was concerned with “convey[ing] the meaning of Christian terms,” then, as Tillich remembers in his autobiographical *My Search for Absolutes*, “a new way had to be found.” Tillich found that “new way” at Marburg.

Though Tillich’s time at Marburg lasted only a year, it left “a mark” on Tillich’s thought—it was during that brief Marburg period when Tillich was introduced to existentialism in its twentieth-century form. Heidegger was at the center of that introduction into what was a new way of thinking—the “new way” that Tillich had been searching for before coming to Marburg. But, as J. Heywood Thomas aptly points out in *Paul Tillich*:

In some ways it was not a new way of thinking—at any rate, Tillich regards himself as having been prepared for it by three things—his familiarity with Schelling, his knowledge of Kierkegaard and the contact he had had with ‘the philosophy of life.’

Not only did Tillich’s “familiarity with Schelling” prepare him for constructively working with the issues brought forth by existentialism in its twentieth-century form, his “knowledge of Kierkegaard” certainly played just as prominent a role, if only as a means of comparison between Kierkegaard’s early nineteenth-century version and Heidegger’s existentialism. Tillich’s encounter with the latter proved to be more impacting for his thinking and the first volume of his

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202 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
Systematic Theology. Tillich recalls this encounter at Marburg with Heidegger’s existentialism in the following way:

In Marburg, in 1925, I began work on my Systematic Theology, the first volume of which appeared in 1951. At the same time that Heidegger was in Marburg as professor of philosophy, influencing some of the best students, existentialism crossed my path. It took years before I became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn, [and] I accepted the new way of thinking more than the answers it gave.\footnote{205 Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 42.}

This “new way of thinking” presented Tillich with a new way to ask questions, particularly from a theological standpoint. Using the existential categories of Heidegger’s Dasein-analytics, Tillich’s influence by Heideggerian thought “required that he state the problem of God in a new way.”\footnote{206 James M. Edie, “The Absence of God,” in Christianity and Existentialism, Edited by John Wild, 113-148 (Ivanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 136-137.} That is, for Tillich to approach the problem of God in a “new way,” he had to engage that problem through a “new way” of thinking about God. Though, as Tillich concedes, “I accepted the new way of thinking more than the answers it gave,” the means by which he approached the problem of the meaning of God is constructed similarly to Heidegger’s “question of the meaning of Being,” as expressed in the outset of Being and Time.\footnote{207 Though Tillich’s chief interest is in the problem of God and Heidegger’s is with the problem of Being, Heidegger conceptualizes “Being” with the same teleological framework as Tillich’s “God.” Nevertheless, I do not wish to claim, here, that Heidegger’s “Being” is equivalent to Tillich’s “God.” I do not find that such a connection is prudent, at this time. However, like Heidegger’s confrontation with “the question of the meaning of Being,” Tillich confronts the problem of God by working out the question of meaning of God “concretely.” Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 1.}

Tillich’s time at Marburg, though brief, was not only an immensely important time for Tillich, but was also critical in Heidegger’s career: Tillich’s three semesters at Marburg\footnote{208 Paul Tillich, My Search for Absolutes (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 42.} parallels Heidegger’s initial drafting and writing of Being and Time. In fact, Tillich’s short professorship at Marburg coincides with Heidegger’s first draft of Being and Time—Heidegger scholar Theodore Kisiel names this early draft as “The Dilthey Draft,” which he dates between
July 1924 and April 1925.” In that draft, Heidegger wrestles with the concept of time, in which he investigates the intersectionality of temporality and historicality. This intersection between “the temporal” and “the historical” are critical to Heidegger’s “treatment of the question of Being.” As Heidegger explains at the end of the “Second Introduction” to Being and Time, “the temporal” plays a role in the interpretation of Dasein, while “the historical” is among the “basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology, with the problematic of Temporality as our clue.” Both “the temporal” and “the historical” must be reckoned with when asking “the question of the meaning of Being”—in order to ask such a question, the meaning of Being must be situated within the parameters of “the temporal” and “the historical.” These parameters of situatedness is precisely what Heidegger is concerned with, especially on the way towards ἀληθεία, even if at a Husserlian categorical-intuitive level. Tillich takes up this same concern, employing a Heideggerian lens focused on uncovering ἀληθεία—Tillich utilizes καρος as an “existentiell” in his existential theology of reason.

Tillich’s Existential Theology of Reason

The centerpiece of Tillich’s “existential theology of reason” is καρος, since it grounds Tillich’s conceptualizations of “reason” and “revelation” in an inextricable, meaning-making relationship. To this end, I will defer any discussion of καρος for the moment and discuss, instead, as a very


211 Ibid.


213 Heidegger describes the “existentiell” as an interpretation that “can demand an existential analytic,” which directly leads to what is “possible and necessary” within which is existential. Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 37.
important frame of reference, the dialectical, interdependent connection Tillich makes between “reason” and “revelation”—these two concepts shape Tillich’s existential theology of reason.

Though both have individualized existential concerns, the connection between “reason” and “revelation” is one of existential interdependence—for Tillich, “reason” is just as much existentially-oriented towards “revelation” as “revelation” is toward “reason.” This interdependence, which is predicated on mutual meaning-making, is, as Alexander McKelway explains, “a relationship in which both sides affect each other, and at the same time remain independent.”214 Moreover, the means by which “both sides affect each other” is through a question-answer relationship. In McKelway’s view, Tillich’s understanding of “reason” and “revelation” is undergirded by the notion that “the questions affect the answer, and in the light of the answer the questions are asked.”215 In other words, “reason” proposes questions that seek answers in “revelation,” and “revelation” presents questions that seek answers in “reason”—what arises from this question-answer relationship is a correlation between the two. It is a correlation that can be likened to Aristotle’s correspondence theory.216 McKelway assesses Tillich’s correlation as a “method” that:

…begins with the human question and proceeds in this way: first the human situation is analyzed in order to determine the existential questions which arise from it. Then the Christian message is presented in a way which demonstrates its answer to those questions. The questions are ‘existential,’ meaning that they express man’s deepest and ultimate concern. The analysis out of which the questions arise is also ‘existential.’217

215 Ibid.
216 For Aristotle, this “correspondence theory” was about referring to truth, or that which is true. Aristotle explains this “theory of truth” in the following way in Line 1011b from Metaphysics: “…nothing truly is in [the sense of truth], that anything must be true for something else, and that necessarily all things are relative to each other…” Aristotle, Metaphysics, Translated by Richard Hope (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), 82.
Tillich’s “method of correlation,” as it has been coined, begins with the human existential situation, which “yields questions which theology must answer.”\(^{218}\) That “answer,” of course, is in “the Christian message.” What makes “the human situation” existential is “the existential questions which arise from it”—those “existential questions” attempt to locate meaning for “the human situation” by locating meaning in the existential answers of “the Christian message.” This “correlation,” then, as Leonard Wheat explains, “is a process whereby philosophical questions are correlated with theological answers derived from the traditional Christian message.”\(^{219}\)

In order to truly understand Tillich’s method of correlation, it is important to consider it as a two-fold correlation: two correlated existential elements correlating to two correlated existential elements. In effect, Tillich’s notion of “reason” is tied to “the human situation,” while his concept of “revelation” is linked to “the Christian message”—this is part and parcel of Tillich’s “method.”

From what I have called a “two-fold correlation,” McKelway suggests that “existential analysis and the questions which arise from it are one side of the correlation [and] the other side is the theological answer derived from revelation.” George F. Thomas agrees with McKelway, describing Tillich’s “method of correlation” as a question-answer between “the ‘question’ of Reason with the ‘answer’ of Revelation.”\(^{220}\) In other words, questions spring forth from “reason,” while “revelation” provides the answers for “reason.” There is a “sort of relation” between the questions and answers “reflects a genuinely dialectical process.”\(^{221}\) This question-

\(^{218}\) Ibid., 46.
answer “method,” which John Clayton describes as “questioning and being questioned; answering and being answered,” is a method that is dialectical at its essence.\textsuperscript{222} Tillich’s dialectical method—the method of correlation—between questions and answers, indeed, inarguably determines the systematic structure of his whole theological system.\textsuperscript{223} Nevertheless, even if Tillich’s “method” is obvious, McKelway is careful to note the following:

The method of correlation is implied in Tillich’s definition of theology. When he states that the nature of theology is apologetic, and its function is to answer the questions implied in the human situation, his method can only be to correlate those questions with that answer.\textsuperscript{224}

Though Tillich’s “method” may be implied, it is an extension of Tillich’s explicit apologetics of “the nature of theology.” That is because, in the particularities of his “method,” Tillich wishes to use “the nature of theology” to supply the theological answers to the philosophical questions inherent in “the human situation.” While Tillich situates “the nature of theology” in a theological understanding of revelation and God, “the human situation” is predicated on a philosophical understanding of reason and \textit{being}—it is a theological-philosophical framework with which Tillich begins the first volume of his \textit{Systematic Theology}, subtitled \textit{Reason and Revelation: Being and God}.\textsuperscript{225} As such, McKelway explains:

Paul Tillich’s \textit{Systematic Theology} begins with an analysis of reason and the doctrine of revelation. Thus, from the first, he establishes the criteria, basis, and verification of his philosophical and theological assertions, and shows the rationality and intelligibility of revelation.\textsuperscript{226}

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 131.
\textsuperscript{225} When considering the subtitle of Tillich’s first volume of \textit{Systematic Theology}, there are two things I wish to suggest for further clarity. The first is this: when I suggest “a theological understanding of revelation and God,” this stands to suggest “a theological understanding of revelation \textit{through} God.” Secondly, when I suggest “a philosophical understanding of reason and \textit{being},” this stands to suggest “a philosophical understanding of reason \textit{in} \textit{being}.”
To this end, Tillich’s “analysis of reason” and “the doctrine of revelation” are based respectively on “philosophical and theological assertions.” These “assertions,” as such, as filtered through Tillich’s Heideggerian lens—it is by way of this Heideggerian lens that Tillich “establishes the criteria, basis, and verification of his philosophical and theological assertions” about being.

Like Heidegger’s task that is devoted to the question of the meaning of Being, Tillich’s “method” is devoted to the meaning of “the human situation”—or, as the first volume suggests, it is the situational, meaning-making juncture between the existentialities of being and God—but his is a question of the meaning of being in “the human situation” and to what extent “revelation” through God holds the answers to what “the human situation” means. As Heidegger’s outlines his own question, Tillich’s question is, like Heidegger’s, rooted in humanity’s “situation”—though Heidegger seeks answers in the “revelation” of Being, Tillich seeks answers in the “revelation” of God. In other words, Heidegger and Tillich have the same philosophical starting point, as each formulates their questions in search of theological answers.

Though it may seem that Heidegger’s task is not analogous to Tillich’s “method,” both are, in fact, working from the same “philosophical and theological assertions.” Of course, if there is a difference, it is in how they individually balance their fundamental “assertions” between “the theological” and “the philosophical.” Obviously, Heidegger tilts more to “the philosophical” and Tillich leans more towards “the theological,” since they respectively prefer to be called a

227 I use the plural term “existentialities” in reference to the singular “existentiality,” which I have endeavored to call something that has the potentiality of containing meaning. Hence, “existentiality” is a juxtaposition of the terms “existential” and “potentiality.”

228 Heidegger does not use the specific term “revelation” in Being and Time. Yet, it is clear that “Being,” as the capitalization of the word obviously implies, serves a revelatory purpose for Heidegger. This is because “the question of the meaning of Being” involves revealing “what being is.” This especially comes to bear on Heidegger’s Dasein and the use of the term “revealed”—in this regard, Heidegger argues that: “As a resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factual potentiality-for-Being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), 355.
philosopher and a theologian. That is not to say, then, that neither is fixed in “the philosophical” or “the theological.” With this in mind, “the theological” is not totally absent from Heidegger’s assertions any more than “the philosophical” is missing in Tillich’s assertions. Especially for Tillich, his “method of correlation” is not fixed exclusively in “the theological” or “the philosophical.” This is precisely because, like Heidegger’s task, there is more to Tillich’s “method of correlation” than simply corresponding philosophical questions with theological answers. Wheat agrees with this in the following:

…there is more to correlation than Tillich spells out. When we examine his thought carefully it is evident that he is attempting something far more ambitious than correlating philosophical questions with theological answers. Indeed, in their orientation the questions are as much theological as philosophical. And Tillich’s answers, once understood, are as much philosophical as theological. In fact, the answers are 100 percent philosophical, only the language belongs to theology.

If Tillich is, indeed, “attempting something far more ambitious than correlating philosophical questions with theological answers,” as Wheat suggests, it is something that undoubtedly uses a Heideggerian lens. The fact that Tillich’s questions and answers are both “as much theological as philosophical” means, then, that his “method” is also “as much theological and philosophical.” In fact, Wheat argues that Tillich’s “method,” as such, “involves the creation of triangular analogies [with] three concepts—theological, philosophical, and humanistic—[that] are joined by a three-way analogy.” This means that, along with concerns rooted in both “the theological” and “the philosophical,” Tillich’s “method” incorporates “humanistic” concerns. The triangularity between Tillich’s understandings of “the theological,” “the philosophical,” and “the humanistic” is rooted in the existential interconnectedness of the three concepts, particularly

229 See note 59.
231 Ibid., 85.
since Tillich’s “method” begins with human life—this is where Tillich’s questioning begins.

Tillich’s concept of human life is derived from Schelling’s positive philosophy.\textsuperscript{232} It is based on the notion that, according to Jerome Stone, “human life involves a separation from the divine ground, [and] a resulting polarization within human life…”\textsuperscript{233} The manner in which Tillich conceptualizes “human life” is through positive philosophy—Schelling’s, of course—in order “to think philosophically about the divine activity in myth and revelation.”\textsuperscript{234} Stone goes so far as to suggest that Schelling’s positive philosophy parallels “Tillich’s notion of a theonomous philosophy, a philosophy which unites the autonomy of reason with an ultimate concern for the divine ground and activity.”\textsuperscript{235} Through Schelling’s brand of positive philosophy, Tillich’s “autonomy of reason” is at the heart of what he calls his “theonomous philosophy,” and it is punctuated with working out “theonomous” issues of “ultimate concern” along with “divine ground and activity.”

Essentially, “theonomous philosophy” is an existential compromise Tillich’s makes between Schelling’s positive philosophy and Heideggerian philosophy—it becomes the means by which Tillich’s “method” keeps a foothold in both. However, Tillich’s self-proclaimed “theonomous philosophy” is his response to and re-appropriation of Heideggerian philosophy—a philosophy that Tillich views as containing “emphatic atheism”\textsuperscript{236}—even though Tillich’s brand

\textsuperscript{232} This should be relatively apparent, even on a holistic level, since Tillich’s wrote two dissertations on Schelling, and both involved analyses of Schelling’s positive philosophy.

\textsuperscript{233} To prevent myself from going too far afield into Schelling’s philosophy, I have omitted the following from Stone: “...between the First and Second, and a movement toward reconciliation of the polar elements with each other and with the divine, resulting in an enrichment of the divine life.” Jerome A Stone, “Tillich and Schelling’s Later Philosophy,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of Tillich’s Theology, Edited by John J. Carey, 3-35 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1978), 20.

\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., 29

\textsuperscript{235} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{236} Bernard Martin quotes Tillich, when Tillich describes his “theonomous philosophy” as a method that “establishes a doctrine of man, though unintentionally, which is both the doctrine of human freedom and human finiteness; and which is so closely related with the Christian interpretation of human existence...in spite of Heidegger’s emphatic atheism.” I do disagree with Tillich here. I do not believe that Heidegger’s atheism, if we can
of “theonomous philosophy” is filtered through Schelling’s positive philosophy and ultimately assumes a stance with a Heideggerian lens. Tillich’s task of “theonomous philosophy” is to establish a relationship between his distinct brands of theonomy and autonomy,237 which becomes foundational to Tillich’s Heideggerian lens and accompanying “method.” In light of what Tillich’s “method” proposes through “theonomous philosophy,” Bernard Martin describes Tillich’s “theonomous philosophy” as a kind of philosophy that “turns towards the unconditional for its own sake, using the conditioned forms to grasp the unconditional through them.”238 For Tillich, the unconditional and the conditional are respectively issues of Being and being—like Heidegger, Tillich’s sense of Being is “unconditional” and, therefore, being is “conditional” upon Being.239 What this stands to suggest, then, is that Tillich’s “method,” while dialectical, is also “theonomous,” since it existentializes reason’s “autonomy” at the level of being in relation to revelation’s “theonomy” at the level of Being. In other words, being is “conditional”240 since

call it that, is especially “emphatic.” Instead, I believe, as George Hemmings argues in Heidegger’s Atheism, that Heidegger just refuses to use a theological voice in Being and Time (as with the rest of his corpus). That refusal, as such, is not really “emphatic” as much as it is about Heidegger needing to be elusive about what he means by Being. I believe Heidegger’s elusiveness is connected to his unwillingness to be penned down theologically, in an effort to work from a strictly philosophical standpoint. Mostly this is due to Heidegger’s belief that, like the history of western philosophy, Christian theology is bogged down with Platonism. To this end, I do not believe Heidegger truly has an “emphatic atheism.” Though in all likelihood, Tillich’s assertion of Heidegger’s “emphatic atheism” may be rooted in Tillich’s belief that Heidegger does not go far enough in Being and Time, especially with Heidegger’s explication of the meaning of Being, and the degree to which it is possible to argue that Being is, in fact, a stand-in for God. Bernard Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich (New Haven, CT: College and University Press, 1963), 18.

239 If following Martin’s assessment of Tillich’s “theonomous philosophy,” it seems quite apparent that Martin is making the same connection as I am. For Tillich’s “theonomous philosophy” to, as Martin explains, “turn towards the unconditional for its own sake,” Tillich’s approach to philosophy is turning towards something that is beyond the here and now. In light of his assessment, Martin certainly believes that Tillich is “turn[ing] toward” Being. I certainly agree with that, as well as the fact that “conditional forms” refer to being.
240 As I have discussed in my Introduction, Robert Gall seems to suggest this, proposing that there is a “conditionedness of beings as a whole.” Robert S. Gall, Beyond Theism and Atheism: Heidegger’s Significance for Religious Thinking (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 25.
its autonomy of reason must existentialize “unconditional” *Being* through a theonomy of revelation.

While *Being* is Heidegger’s notion of “the theological” and *being* is Tillich’s notion of “the philosophical,” Tillich’s *Heideggerian lens* assumes both his own notion of “the philosophical”—as a “theonomous philosophy”—and Heidegger’s notion of “the theological.” Not only does Tillich use *being* to formulate philosophical questions about the “autonomous” meaning of “the human situation,” but he uses *Being* to conceptualize Heideggerian theological answers\(^\text{241}\) about the “theonomous” meaning of “revelation.” What results from this is a dialectical existentiality between them at the critical point of Tillic’h’s conceptualization of καιρος—this is Tillich’s existential theology of reason.\(^\text{242}\)

**Καιρος in Reason and the “Rational-Existential” Venture**

Tillich’s venture in existential theology is devoted to καιρος in reason—this venture pursues a *Heideggerian pathmark* of “kairos” as an object of primordiality. As the primordiality of *being*, καιρος discloses what *being* is on the way to άληθεια. That is to say, καιρος is what *being* looks like when it is in a state of primordiality and, then, opens the possibility for *unconcealment*, or άληθεια—in effect, primordial *being*, once disclosed, makes it possible for *being* to be *unconcealed* as what it already is.\(^\text{243}\) By way of Tillich’s *Heideggerian pathmark*, the “rational-existential” venture he takes attempts to translate “what being has become,” or *being* in its ontic state into what *being* is, or the primordiality of *being* on the way to άληθεια.

\(^{241}\) When I say “Heideggerian theological answers,” I am referring to where the argument in *Being and Time* does not go—that is, the incomplete Part II which, as I have aforementioned in my Introduction, is meant to be Heidegger’s most theological part of *Being and Time*. It is the territory that Heidegger does not venture far enough into, as Tillich argues.

\(^{242}\) I use the term “dialectical existentiality” to refer more explicitly to two things that share a dialectical relationship so that, from that relationship, mutual meaning is exchanged.

\(^{243}\) See note 40.
In Tillich’s existential theology of reason, the rational-existential is a Dasein-like entity with two analytical possibilities: the ontics of reason and the primordiality of reason. The former is “what being has become,” and the latter is what being is—these two modes of being, then, must be existentially-distinguished from one another, in order to point towards ἀληθεία, as the unconcealment of being. This latter mode is the focus of Tillich’s Heideggerian lens and his use of the rational-existential—that “lens” is devoted to unconcealing, disclosing and revealing primordial being that has become hidden beneath the ontics of reason.

Reason, at the ontic level, is not what being is any more than it is ἀληθεία—instead, it is, as I have endeavored to call it, “what being has become.” When encountering reason at the ontic level, what is encountered, then, is simply “being-in-the-world”—that is to say, reason, in a form of ontical being, must adjudicate the ontical state of existence. For Tillich, then, the ontics of reason is predicated on “thrownness,” the Heideggerian term for “being-thrown” into existence—another way to consider “thrownness” is as being-thrown-into-the-world, or as Tillich terms “estrangement.” To this end, Tillich finds in “estrangement” a separation of freedom from destiny. Like Heidegger’s term “thrownness,” Tillich’s “estrangement” refers to a series of facticities: the fact of “being-thrown,” the fact of recognizing that being is inextricably tied to “worldliness” or bonded to “worldhood,” and the fact that, when being is “thrown,” being that must be “in the world.” All of these facts—though ontical—make up the facticity of estrangement as “thrownness” within Wittgenstein’s case. Moreover, Tillich’s theological

245 Ibid., 62.
246 Ibid.
247 I am considering the term “facticity” in terms of the logical atomism of Wittgenstein. As Wittgenstein suggests in the first few propositional statement from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the world is made up of facts and those facts, when collected, make up “the case.” Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Translated by C. K. Ogden (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922), 1.
sense of “thrownness,” through “estrangement” as a facticity of what it means to be human in relation to the Fall and the concept of sin, is about “being-thrown” into the human situation as an “event”—Tillich proposes that “the state of existence is the state of estrangement.”  

In such a situation of “estrangement,” humanity (existence) must account for the ontics of their being by orienting the meaning of being towards a primordial meaning made in primordial being. In this regard, the “event” is all about orienting being toward primordiality. This means, then, that humanity’s “event” cannot consider ontical being as a point of existentiality, but, instead, must seek existentiality in the primordiality of being—the existentiality of the latter is rationalized through the rational-existential on the way to ἀληθεία.

The existentiality of primordial being is made possible with καιρός, or “the event.” As such, when speaking about “the event”—especially if defining it in a prefatory fashion as an “immanent event”—Tillich has a particular, specialized definition of καιρός as “a historical moment.”

For Tillich, καιρός has a “unique and universal sense” for Christian faith, which is “the appearing of Jesus as the Christ.” To this end, καιρός has a special significance that is “decisive for our present situation.” As such, in Tillich’s view, καιρός has an “ethics” to it that is understood in terms of “ethics in a changing world.” In order to understand “the ethics of καιρός,” it is prudent to begin first with defining Tillich’s καιρός in the general sense, before going any further with my narrower definition of καιρός as an analytic possibility of the rational-existential—in this regard, I will momentarily table the latter to discuss the former.

252 Ibid., 47.
In *Gilkey on Tillich*, Langdon Gilkey, who was a student of Tillich’s at Union Theological Seminary, describes καιρός in the following manner: “*Kairos* represents the unity in a specific time of the eternal and the unconditioned with the historical, the finite, the particular, the concrete, and so the relative.”²⁵⁴ What Gilkey describes is the extent to which Tillich’s καιρός is an “event,” since it “represents the unity in a specific time”—as an “event,” Tillich’s καιρός is the embodiment of “a specific time of the eternal and the unconditional.” Moreover, Gilkey seems to suggest that Tillich’s καιρός unifies “the eternal and the unconditional,” “the historical, the finite, the particular, the concrete,” and “the relative” into a singular moment of what I would call “existentiality.” Existentiality is about the unification of various temporal elements into a Deleuzean event of immanence. In effect, Tillich’s καιρός unifies the ontics of reason with the primordiality of reason—it is a point of existentiality that unifies all concepts of time into an “event” capable of translating the ontics of reason into the primordiality of reason, on the way to ἀλήθεια. In other words, the situatedness of Tillich’s καιρός as a unifying “event” leads directly to the *unconcealment of primordial being*. On a more fundamental level, though I am going a bit further than Gilkey, he seems to agree with this, offering the following assessment about Tillich’s καιρός:

…*Kairos* unites, first of all, past and future, old and radically new, origin and demand, being and the fulfillment of being. It also unites in temporal fashion the universal and the particular, the absolute and the relative; its coming represents the appearance of the Eternal Now in our particular historical moment, a coming that manifests the new possibilities of creation (origin) in that time… a new appearance leading toward fulfillment.²⁵⁵

As both “being and the fulfillment of being,” which is predicated on “a new appearance leading toward fulfillment,” καιρός leads the way to ἀλήθεια—this is “a new appearance” and the

²⁵⁵ Ibid.
“fulfillment.” What Gilkey is describing, then, is the existentiality that is made possible through καιρος. Because καιρος is both “being and the fulfillment of being,” it is respectively the existentialities of being at the ontic and primordial levels—καιρος makes meaning out of not just ontical being, but also primordial being.

To be clear, καιρος is not ontical—καιρος is always concerned with the primordial. In other words, καιρος operates strictly in primordiality, and not in the ontical. However, for καιρος to be “being and the fulfillment of being,” as Gilkey proposes, it is important to not confuse Gilkey’s description with suggesting that καιρος contains ontical being. Instead, καιρος has what I would call “transitional being,” or a mode of being that is in transition between ontic and primordial levels. This is because καιρος itself is transitional, since its own existentiality is chiefly concerned with providing “a new appearance leading toward [the] fulfillment” of ἀλήθεια, un concealment, and the “fulfillment of being.” To this end, “a new appearance leading toward fulfillment” is not just the “fulfillment” of primordial being, but, more importantly, the “new appearance” of being in un concealment. That is to say, καιρος leads the way to ἀλήθεια. What this means, then, is that, by focusing on the unification of the “past and future, old and radically new, origin and demand,” καιρος is devoted to the analytical possibility of not what being looks like “in the world,” but what being is. Essentially, since καιρος leads away from “being-in-the-world,” its focus on the primordiality of being is meant to move beyond “the ontical” restrictions of “worldhood.” In this sense, James Adams suggests the following:

Only in the Kairos may one escape the toils of spatialization, for the Kairos demands time-thinking rather than space-thinking. This insight becomes decisive not only for Tillich’s philosophy of history but also for his theory of truth.256 Adams recognizes that “the toils of spatialization” is “worldhood”—these “toils,” as such, are in

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what Tillich calls “the ethics of a changing world.” But, the fact that καιρος “demands time-thinking rather than space-thinking” means that it grounds its “ethics” more in the temporal than the spatial. The “demands” of the former over the latter is Tillich’s Kantian “moral imperative,” which is “the demand to become actually what one is essentially and therefore potentially.”257 Like Kant, Tillich adjudicates his “moral imperative” through his concept of reason. In this respect, Tillich “…deals with the concept of reason and the categories belonging to it and leads to the existential problem implied in reason, to which the answer is: revelation.”258 Just as Adams suggests, the “demands” of καιρος through the concept of reason leads to Tillich’s “theory of truth,” as ἀλήθεια, unconcealment, and the “fulfillment of being”—to be precise, Tillich’s “ethics” of καιρος and the “ethics” inherent in his concept of reason is a critical point of existentiality, adjudication, unconcealment, and the “fulfillment” of primordial being. Gilkey notes this by arguing that:

…Tillich introduces his understanding of reason, of creative thinking and doing, and the essential relation of these to their divine depths, in presenting his understanding of theology and its method in part one of his *Systematic Theology*… Reason to Tillich is the creative, culture producing power of human being (and so of being).259

Tillich’s approach to and understanding of reason, as Gilkey argues, is, in fact, “the creative, culture producing power of human being.” Though Tillich describes this power as historical,260 any historicity to Tillich’s understanding of reason is linked to the historicality of καιρος. What I mean, then, is the historical positionality261 of the “event” of “estrangement” or “thrownness”—

261 When I speak of “historical positionality,” I am speaking not about Bultmann’s sense of “the historical,” but a different sense of “historical” in Tillich, one that is related more to Tillich’s καιρος than any understanding Tillich may have that aligns with Bulmann’s κηρυγμα. Put more simply, Tillich is more concerned with “the event” of human existence, as it relates to revelation, rather than “the message of Jesus” as it relates to revelation.
what I shall coin in short as simply “historicality,” as an amalgamation of the terms “historical” and “positionality”—is existentialized by empowering the everydayness of being as *primordial being*. This empowerment is accomplished, as Richard Grigg proposes in *Symbol and Empowerment*, through the extent to which “being itself can be symbolized”

262 as the *unconcealed* answer to the question of being as ἀληθεία. In other words, Tillich asserts that:

> The question of being is not the question of any special being, its existence and nature, but it is the question of what it means to *be*. It is the simplest, most profound, and absolutely inexhaustible question of what it means to say something *is*. 263

To this end, “what it means to say something *is*” is the goal of Tillich’s *rational-existential* venture into the concept of reason, using καρός to point to *primordial being* and ἀληθεία.

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Karl Rahner’s existential theology investigates *primordial being* in experience. With a transcendental slant utilizing a *Heideggerian lens*, Rahner envisions experience as contingent on χάρις, or “grace,”264 as a representation of άληθεια. In this way, experience is only an ontical representation—it is the means by which χάρις constitutes its “being-in-the-world.” But, when considering χάρις in its most primordial as *what being is*, Rahner’s concept of experience is rooted on *concealment* (‘ληθε’) and “being-there.” That is, experience, at its ontical level, is simply “what is there”—this there-ness conceals *what being is*, or the “is-ness” of χάρις.

To be clear, Rahner’s conceptualization of χάρις is a conceptual understanding about the difference between *what experience is*, and what experience does. Of course, what experience does—as in denoting that something experienced has an experiential quality to it—is the everydayness of experience.265 Experience, as it has happened, is referred to as *what is experienced*. Yet, as Rahner seems to suggest, *what is experienced* is the ontical aftermath of “what experience is.” In other words, *what is experienced* is the “there-ness” of experience, even if it may appear to be *what experience is*. As such, *what is experienced*, then, is not *what being is*. Moreover, *what is experienced* is only a second-hand awareness of *what experience is*, since *what experience is* an articulation of χάρις and, in turn, *what being is*. Again, *what is experienced* is not άληθεια, and Rahner’s existential theological task is to disclose *what experience is* and the

265 See note 30.
άληθεια of experience in its most primordial form.

Through a Heideggerian lens, Rahner apperceives a primordiality to experience, something primordial enough to perceive what is experienced as a concealment (‘ληθε’) of what experience is. Rahner’s Heideggerian lens engages in this kind of thinking about the concept of experience—it is based on the extent to which what is experienced is something that is not immediately knowable in itself, in a Kantian manner. This cannot happen until there is an active engagement in thinking a kind of thought about what experience is, particularly if what experience is, as χάρις, is unmasked as the existentiality of primordial being.

Rahner and Heidegger

Rahner was a doctoral student at the University of Freiburg from 1934 to 1936, where he attended seminars taught by Heidegger. By this time, Heidegger had been at Freiburg for six years, having left Marburg in 1928 to occupy the Professor of Philosophy chair vacated by the retired Edmund Husserl. Also, by the time Rahner was a student of Heidegger’s, Heidegger had just completed a disastrous year as rector at Freiburg, ultimately ending in Heidegger resigning from the position the same year as Rahner first attended his seminars.

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266 As a note, I think it is important to explain what I mean by “immediately knowable itself.” I am adopting Kantian language about things-in-themselves to describe what I mean by the term “what experience is.” As Kant argues in Critique of Pure Reason, though objects of understanding, such as what I have called Rahner’s concept of experience, are not immediately knowable, “we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves.” Kant makes this claim in the Preface to the Second Edition of Critique of Pure Reason of 1787. What Kant means here is that we cannot allow the unknowable aspects of things to adjudicate our ability to reference the “thinghood” of something. That “thinghood,” or something that as a “thing-in-itself,” is its “is-ness.” This kind of Kantian thinking is in the background of Heideggerian thinking and, in turn, a foundational component of Rahner’s Heideggerian lens. But more importantly, Kantian language about “things-in-themselves” is implied in Rahner’s Geist in Welt, especially as a means of understanding transcendental knowledge: “what experience is,” as such, is about experience itself and, subsequently, it is a presupposition of transcendental knowledge. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1929), 27.

267 See note 23.

The first two Heidegger seminars Rahner would have attended in 1934 were likely “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” in the winter semester 1933/1934 and “Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache” in the summer semester of 1934. Respectively, both seminars definitely provided Rahner with insight into Heidegger’s investigations into truth and logic—both of which prove to be influential to Rahner’s Heideggerian lens. The former seminar, especially, would have been more influential to Rahner’s theology than the latter, since the former surely shaped Rahner’s theological perspective of not just truth, but the intersectionality of truth and being. By the time Rahner attended the “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit” seminar, it was part of a larger lecture called “Sein und Wahrheit,” which included “Die Grundfrage der Philosophie” that Heidegger taught in the summer of 1933.

As Rahner witnessed, in “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit,” Heidegger presents an analysis of “the essence of truth.” This “essence” is the very essence of being itself—that is, there is an existential intersectionality between essences of truth and being. What this means, then, is that where there is “the essence of truth,” there resides what being is, and where the essence of what being is there resides “truth.” To be sure, the “essence of truth” is primordial being, where Heidegger’s intent is to establish a “Grundfrage” for a philosophy of “truth,” through a narrow conceptualization of authentic being. In other words, authentic being is what being is at its most primordial. This issue of primordiality is particularly important to Rahner’s early theology, because it marks a transitional period—perhaps even a kind of ‘die kehre’ for him, in a way—

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269 The titles and dates of these seminars are accordance with the chronology in Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe.

270 I must make a note here that I am using the term “truth” with some reservations, and will regretfully do so in five instances following this one. My intent is to simply use this term as a more literal translation of Heidegger’s “wahrheit.” However, “truth” is not an adequate translation for ἀληθεία, which is the chief focus of this thesis.

271 In other words, “the essence of truth” is “what being is.” It is at this juncture where it is possible to find ἀληθεία and, then, being at its most primordial.
that shifts his theological studies into philosophical-theological studies, which don a decidedly
Heideggerian lens.

In addition to the aforementioned seminars, Rahner attended two other Freiburg seminars
by Heidegger, both of which certainly influenced Rahner’s theology: “Einführung in die
Metaphysik” in the summer semester of 1935 and “Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre
von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen” in the winter semester 1935/1936. In these seminars,
Rahner was respectively presented with Heidegger’s take on the fundamental problem of
metaphysics and the question of metaphysics as it is argued in Kant’s doctrine of
transcendentalism. As with Rahner’s previous seminars, these two seminars shape Rahner’s
Heideggerian lens. In the former, in “Einführung in die Metaphysik,” Rahner experienced
Heidegger’s views on the fundamental destruction of the conventional—albeit, historical, or
traditional—examination of metaphysics. This destruction is predicated on how Heidegger
conceives of the constructive apparatus that is called the history of metaphysics. That is, in other
words, the history of the understanding of being, if it is to be interpreted as a constructive
framework. Constructively, then, “for Heidegger the whole history of human thought and
existence has been dominated and characterized by [humankind]’s understanding of being.”

Just as Heidegger previously argues in Being and Time, “the whole history of human thought,”
beginning from Plato and carrying forward through the Western philosophical tradition, has
incorrectly approached the question of being. Not only is this case made in the “Einführung in
die Metaphysik” seminar, but the case is also asserted with respect to Kant’s “transcendental” in

\[\text{272} \] The titles and dates of these seminars are accordance with the chronology in Heidegger’s
Gesamtausgabe.

\[\text{273} \] In the 1959 English translation of Einführung in die Metaphysik, the translator makes this excellent
summative assessment at the outset of the “Translator’s Note.” Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics,
Translated by Ralph Manheim (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959) vii.
Heidegger’s “Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen
Grundsätzen.” In this latter seminar, Heidegger examines Kant’s metaphysics, especially with
respect to Kant’s “Lehre” of transcendental principles—these “transcendental” principles
become, for Heidegger, a way to understand Kant’s system of reason, which Kant delineates in
the three Critiques.274

With Rahner’s Freiburg doctoral studies taken as a whole, the four Heidegger seminars
greatly influenced Rahner’s overall approach to philosophy. More specifically, too, Rahner’s
Heidegger seminars influenced his philosophy of being, particularly as a distinctly Heideggerian
philosophy of the relationship between metaphysics, “truth,” and the transcendental. Coming
from a theological background, Heidegger’s seminars helped Rahner confront what being is,
when conceptualizing that primordial being is situated in concepts of “truth,” metaphysics, and
the transcendental. These three concepts, especially as Heideggerian elucidations, provide the
theoretical framework from which Rahner’s theological investigations become philosophical in
nature. This is especially evident in Rahner’s philosophy dissertation entitled Geist in Welt: Zur
Metaphisik der endichen Erkenntnis bei Thomas von Aquin, which is a culmination of his
philosophical study during those Freiburg doctoral years.

Rahner’s Existential Theology of Experience

Geist in Welt—despite being considered as philosophical/theological juvenilia in comparison to
his more mature Foundations of Christian Faith and the Theological Investigations volumes—is
the cornerstone of the Heideggerian lens that Rahner applies to his ventures into existential
theology of experience. Though not explicitly focused on “grace” as χάρις, Geist in Welt still

274 Immanuel Kant’s three Critiques: Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique
of Judgment.
exhibits Rahner’s interests in the transcendental, the ontical, and the primordial—these three interests are focused, then, on what being is, or the primordiality of being. To be clear, what makes Geist in Welt important is that it contains “the basic philosophical position developed [in the work] in dialogue with modern philosophy provid[ing] the unifying principle and presupposition of Rahner’s whole theology.”²⁷⁵ In this regard, then, Geist in Welt represents an important point in Rahner’s theology, and a jumping off point from which his existential theology ultimately takes shape.

In the introduction to the 1968 translation of Geist in Welt entitled “Karl Rahner and the Kantian Problematic,” Francis Fiorenza observes:

…[Spirit in the World] represents Rahner’s attempt to confront the medieval scholastic philosophy of Thomas Aquinas with the problems and questions of modern philosophy, especially as formulated by Immanuel Kant in his critical and transcendental philosophy.²⁷⁶

Rahner’s “attempt to confront” the thought of Aquinas with “the problems and questions of modern philosophy” denotes that Rahner is concerned with deconstructing Aquinas in the same manner that Heidegger is with deconstructing the Plato and Platonism. Like Heidegger, Rahner’s awareness of “the problems and questions of modern philosophy” is rooted in an understanding that something is out of joint in philosophical modernity—it is the sense modern philosophy’s “problems and questions” can be explained, somehow, and even answered through a reassessment of the medieval scholasticism of Aquinas. That much is clear. But, for Rahner, to go back to Aquinas—just as Heidegger goes back to the Plato—there are intermediate points along the way that must be reckoned with. These are unavoidable points that must be explained, in themselves, if there is ever to be any substantive reckoning with Aquinas. One of those such

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²⁷⁶ Ibid.
points is Kant, and interpreting Kant’s critical and transcendental philosophy. However,
Rahner’s Kantian interpretation is only tangential and implicit, operating mainly in the periphery,
since, as Fiorenza suggests:

…*Spirit in the World* does not contain an explicit interpretation of Kant. It does not
indicate to what extent Rahner would have avoided the misunderstanding of other
students of Marechal insofar as he would have followed the more adequate later
interpretation of Heidegger. The influence of Heidegger is nevertheless important for
Rahner’s understanding of the objectivity of human knowledge…

To say that Rahner “would have followed the more adequate later interpretation of Heidegger”
seems to rightly suggest that Rahner mainly based his Kantian interpretation on Heidegger’s
lecture course on Kant. That course was likely Heidegger’s “Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants
Lehre von den transzendentalen Grundsätzen,” which, as mentioned in my “Rahner and
Heidegger” section, Rahner attended in the winter semester 1935/1936. From that course, Rahner
would have developed a Heideggerian “understanding of the objectivity of human knowledge,”
particularly through Heidegger’s own existentialist lens. It is through this lens that Rahner
interprets Kant and, then, uses that Heideggerian-influenced lens on reading Question 84 Article
7 from Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae*.

In Question 84 Article 7, Aquinas posits the following question:

Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species which it is
possessed, without turning to the phantasms?278

This question is, on one hand, concerned with metaphysics, but, on the other, questioning
metaphysics in terms of epistemology—it is not only an individual question of being, or even an
exclusive question of knowing, but it is a critical question of knowing and being. This question,
as such, along with its objections, its counter-objection, its solution, and its answers to the

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277 Ibid., xl-xl.
objections, in their totality, are the focus of Rahner’s *Geist in Welt*.279

Though the chief task of *Geist in Welt* is to provide an interpretative study of Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics and epistemology, Rahner focuses that analysis, at least in part, through Heideggerian existentialism, rather than Maréchal’s Thomism.280 Just as it has been rightly noted, *Geist in Welt* has major Heideggerian influences, particularly from Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* and *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*.281 From these two early works of Heidegger, Rahner’s *Geist in Welt* attempts to, through an analysis of Aquinas, “ground transcendental epistemology in a new reading of human being influenced by Heidegger.”282 Rahner’s “new reading,” as it is, ultimately develops from Rahner having located an intersectionality between Heidegger’s concept of *Dasein* and Aquinas’ concept of the dynamism of the human mind.283 This connection is especially crucial not just to the way in which Rahner does theology, but critical to his synthesis of philosophy and theology—it is an intersectionality that is as much theological as it is philosophical. What consequently results from this intersectionality is Rahner decidedly venturing into transcendental-existential territory in *Geist in Welt*, with Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge seated in his philosophical notions of “the transcendental” and “the existential.”284

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279 It must be noted that Rahner translates Aquinas’ Latin “Utrum intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata” slightly differently than Kreeft does, which has been cited in note 191. Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, Translated by William Dych (New York, NY: Continuum, 1994), 3-11.

280 Other than Heideggerian existentialism, Rahner’s dissertation is influenced by two Jesuit philosophers: Pierre Rousselot (1878-1915) and Joseph Maréchal (1878-1944).


282 Ibid.


Published as *Spirit in the World* in the 1968 English translation, Johannes Metz describes Rahner’s “transcendental and existential philosophy” in the following from the “Forward” to the 1994 edition of *Geist in Welt*:

_Spirit in the World_ uses a Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge explained in terms of transcendental and existential philosophy to define [humankind] as that essence of absolute transcendence towards God insofar as [humankind] in [its] understanding and interpretation of the world respectfully ‘pre-apprehends’ (‘vorgreift’) towards God.  

As Metz points out, the “Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge” that Rahner explains in _Spirit in the World_ is linked to a conceptualization of understanding. Rahner is not just concerned with humankind’s interpretative understanding of itself, but humankind’s “understanding and interpretation of the world.” In this latter sense, Rahner contends that that “understanding” and that “interpretation of the world” is an act teleologically-oriented towards the “essence of absolute transcendence towards God,” as such.

Clearly, in _Spirit in the World_, Rahner recognizes that human knowledge is limited whenever that knowledge is encased in human being, or compartmentalized in human existence—human knowledge, when anchored to human being’s worldliness, cannot fully comprehend the God’s “absolute transcendence,” as such. In other words, humankind may comprehend God and, perhaps, apprehend God, using all the tools of humankind’s existential situation—that is, with the use of what I will call situational ontology. If human being can comprehend/apprehend anything of existential value from what amounts to an ontical situation,

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285 Ibid.  
286 I use “as such” here to denote that “God’s absolute transcendence” is, altogether, always different from anything conceivable, graspable, or even explainable by humankind. God’s embodiment as “absolute transcendence” becomes what Rahner refers to as a “holy mystery” in his *Foundations of Christian Faith*. Though I wish to make a quick note of it now, I will discuss this with more detail later.  
287 This term represents a combination of human being and the human being’s existential situation. Together, humankind is encased in “situational ontology,” since it must make-meaning of itself as a human being, as well as make-meaning from the situation that human being is confronted with at the very point of recognizing existence.
strictly speaking then, that meaning does not contain enough transcendental value to conceive, grasp, and explain God’s “absolute transcendance.” Rather, humankind is only able to comprehend/apprehend what I would call an “ontology of knowledge”—the existential situation of physical humanness in all its practical, moral and ethical worldliness—instead of a metaphysics of knowledge: a kind of knowledge which lies beneath human ontology but is hidden within it.

Rahner’s use and interpretation of “Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge” is meant to express a need to transcend any ontology of knowledge. These two kinds of knowing are based on either an ontology of knowledge as apprehension, or a metaphysics of knowledge as the ability to “pre-apprehend.” To be sure, Rahner is concerned with the latter, especially as a way for humanity to “know” God. If, as Metz argues, Rahner’s *Spirit in the World* is concerned with how humankind “pre-apprehends towards God,” then that concern with epistemological metaphysics is also a concern with *what being is*. To “pre-apprehend towards God” means systematically embarking on a kind of metaphysics that “pre-apprehends” *what being is*. That is, of course, any pre-apprehension aligns “what God is” to *what being is*. Not only is it clear that Rahner is making this essentialist connection in *Spirit in the World*, but his entire system of metaphysics288 is rooted in a Heideggerian-influenced understanding of *what being is* and, then, what ἄληθεια is. To this end, Rahner’s early concern in *Spirit in the World* with the human ability to “pre-apprehend towards God” is a philosophical-theological examination of *what being is* as *primordial being* and ἄληθεια.

If the possibility of pre-apprehension “towards God” is predicated on the possibility of pre-apprehending *primordial being* and ἄληθεια, then humanity must apprehend the relationship

288 See note 100.
between nature and grace. That is, this relationship provides the scope and limitations of what it means to be human in relation to the world and to God. This relationship, though not explicit in Spirit in the World, is certainly at the heart of Rahner’s study of Aquinas’ metaphysics and epistemology. While “nature” is an issue of epistemology, metaphysics is oriented toward “grace”—both embody Rahner’s understanding of the existential situation humanity finds itself in when searching for primordial being and ἀληθεία. Not only do these terms “nature” and “grace” play important roles in Spirit in the World, but they recur as the hallmarks of Rahner’s theology thereafter. More specifically, “grace” or χάρις, for Rahner’s Heideggerian lens, encompasses the means through which humanity’s being can pre-apprehend God’s Being, through primordial being and ἀληθεία.

χάρις in Experience and the “Experiential-Existential” Venture

Rahner’s venture in existential theology searches for χάρις in experience—this venture pursues a Heideggerian pathmark of “grace” as a supernatural object of the primordiality of experience.289 Through Rahner’s existential theology of experience, what is experienced must be translated from its ontic state into what it already is 290 as primordial being—meaning, as the existential embodiment of what experience is. What this means is that Rahner’s χάρις is related to the “experiential-existential” as one of its Dasein-like analytical possibilities.291 As Rahner argues, χάρις “penetrates our conscious life, not only our essence but our existence too.”292 In this regard, when utilizing a Heideggerian lens, χάρις is a particular, conditional, and affective

290 See note 40.
291 See note 46.
Dasein-like entity\textsuperscript{293} by which humanity pre-apprehends the ontics of experience (our existence) and unmasks primordial being toward ἀληθεία (our essence).

The “experiential-existential” venture that Rahner takes is devoted to pre-apprehension (‘Vorgriff’). For Rahner’s purposes of philosophizing within theology,\textsuperscript{294} pre-apprehension is that which discloses χάρις in its primordial transcendence and, then, reveals ἀληθεία. To pre-apprehend not only means differentiating what is experienced from what experience is, but drawing an existential distinction between “there-ness” and “is-ness.” When engaged in pre-apprehension, it becomes possible to divide the ontics of experience (what is experienced) from experience itself, or experience at its most primordial (what experience is)—to be clear, while the former places primordial being in concealment with “there-ness,” the latter unconceals the primordial state of “is-ness” and χάρις. To this end, pre-apprehension is the meaning-making key to Rahner’s existential theology of experience—it is part and parcel of his Heideggerian pathmark and the Heideggerian lens through which he searches for ἀληθεία.

Pre-apprehension, as Rahner argues, is not self-explanatory.\textsuperscript{295} In other words, though pre-apprehension allows for the experiential-existential conceptualization of χάρις and ἀληθεία, it is not self-edifying or even self-revelatory. There may be a supernatural given-ness to the communicativeness of χάρις,\textsuperscript{296} but ἀληθεία is not a given. That is, since ἀληθεία prefers to exist

\textsuperscript{293} I use the term “entity,” since Rahner proposes that “grace is not a thing, but a particular condition of a spiritual person.” What seems to underlie this description of “grace” is its Dasein-like analytic possibilities (which I will discuss in more detail). Especially, to the extent that “grace,” as Rahner continues to describe, is “the determination of a subject” even though it is “formally distinct from this subject.” Accordingly, the same can be said of Heidegger’s Dasein, and the degree to which Dasein’s analytical possibilities—as with “grace” as χάρις—are “affective” and “conditional” upon the ontics of experience, or human existence. Karl Rahner, “Philosophy and Theology,” in Theological Investigations: Volume VI: Concerning the Vatican Council, Translated by Karl-H and Boniface Kruger, 71-81 (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1969), 72-73.


\textsuperscript{296} Karl Rahner, Nature and Grace: And Other Essays (New York, NY: Sheed and Ward, 1963), 21; 26; 32.
in a state of *concealment* or ληθε, pre-apprehension requires working out χάρις as a Dasein-like possibility of the *experiential-existential*. For Rahner, pre-apprehension “must be understood as due to the working of that to which man is open, mainly, being in an absolute sense.”

Furthermore, in his systematic work *Foundation of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, Rahner explains pre-apprehension as:

...[the] subjective, non-objective luminosity of the subject in its transcendence is always oriented towards the holy mystery, the knowledge of God is always present unthematically and without name, and not just when we begin to speak of it.

By defining pre-apprehension as “subjective, non-objective luminosity of the subject,” Rahner is clearly separating his definition from any Husserlian subject-object connotation of the term.

Similarly to Heidegger’s argument in *Being and Time*, Rahner’s *Heideggerian lens* must move beyond such subject-object relations. Yet, situating subjectivity with respect to objectivity becomes Rahner’s critical move of foundational, existential necessity—it involves conceptualizing what transcendence is for subjectivity, and how any conceptualization of transcendence is based on some objectified understanding of the primordiality of χάρις on the way toward ἀληθεία. That is to say, *what is experienced* is subjective and *what experience is*, in the primordiality of experience as χάρις, is meta-subjective, or what Rahner calls “non-objective.” Again, though rather thinly-veiled, Rahner is treading in the very territory that his *Heideggerian lens* attempts to deconstruct (‘*destrukt*’).

Like Heidegger, Rahner is certainly

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299 When I refer to “subject-object relations,” I am referencing Husserl’s constitutive notion of intersubjectivity, which Husserl explains as “we as human beings, and we as ultimately functioning-accomplishing subjects.” Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, Translated by David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 182-183.
300 See note 54.
aware of the inadequacies of subject-object relations and, as Jack Bonsor rightly observes:

…each avoids the subject-object division of the Cartesian problematic by beginning with the human existent as always already involved in the world, with other entities. Subjectivity arises precisely through commerce with what is other. For [Heidegger and Rahner], the human existent becomes through involvement in the world and, thus, all knowledge is intrinsically existential.301

In light of Bonsor’s point, “the human existent” is Rahner’s concept of subjectivity.

By carefully using “non-objective” as a way to convey the orientation of transcendence “towards the holy mystery, the knowledge of God.”

Knowledge of God as a “holy mystery” is crucial to conceptualizing the experiential-existential—it allows for the “experiential” to be what is experienced and the “existential” to be what experience is. Essentially, what is experienced is based on an epistemological situation and an abiding existential orientation. From both, human knowledge must grasp the “holy mystery” of God as a way of experiencing/knowing God and experiencing/knowing ourselves.302 Rahner understands “holy mystery” as “something with which we are always familiar,” and, though it may be initially incomprehensible, it is “self-evident in human life.”303 This self-evidence (‘Selbstverständlichen’)304 is grounded on a kind of knowledge that Rahner calls “transcendental knowledge”—Rahner defines it as a “basic and original orientation towards absolute mystery, which constitutes [humankind’s] fundamental experience of God, is a permanent existential of

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man as a spiritual subject.”305 Rahner’s “permanent existential of man as a spiritual subject” (‘ein dauerndes Existential des Menschen al seinen geistigen Subjektes ist’)306 is equivalent to what I have coined experiential-existential. I wish to make that connection clear, if my intent is to express what I believe to be Rahner’s experiential-existential venture. Like Rahner, I view the experiential-existential as permanently situated in the intersectionality of what experience is and primordiality of χάρις, when humanity encounters ἀληθεία in the clearing.

The experiential-existential is constituted upon transcendental knowledge. What I mean, then, is that transcendental knowledge represents a fore-structure307 upon which experience/knowledge of God and experience/knowledge of ourselves become experiential-existential. Transcendental knowledge, as such, is the extension of the pre-apprehension of “…all the individual movements and experiences [that] are borne by an ultimate and primordial movement.”308 That “ultimate and primordial movement,” as Rahner describes, is a Heideggerian pathmark along the primordiality of experience as χάρις, on the way towards ἀληθεία. In this sense, pre-apprehension is a compass that is calibrated by χάρις and guides transcendental knowledge in the direction of ἀληθεία. In this way, when understanding the role that pre-apprehension plays in transcendental knowledge—what I have equated to experience/knowledge of God and experience/knowledge of ourselves, particularly as Rahner’s

307 This is Hans-Georg Gadamer’s term to describe the “fore-understandings” or “fore-meanings” that undergird what can be known about the world around us. Speaking strictly in terms of hermeneutics, Gadamer is addressing, through Heidegger, is the “hermeneutical circle” problem of reading texts and how our “fore-structure” of understanding prevent us from delving any deeper than the ontical meaning of a text. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Translated by Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1985), 235-240.
argument in *Geist in Welt* suggests—Rahner describes transcendental knowledge in the following way:

> The concept ‘God’ is not a grasp of God by which a person masters the mystery, but it is letting oneself be grasped by the mystery which is present and yet ever distant. This mystery remains a mystery even though it reveals itself to [humankind] and thus continually grounds the possibility of [humankind] being a subject.  

What Rahner suggests is that transcendental knowledge is not just about “the concept God,” but also the ability to “master the mystery” (‘*Geheimnisses bemächtigt*’) of God’s *Being*. On one level, transcendental knowledge is the extent to which human knowledge can conceptualize what God does epistemologically. However, on a deeper, existential level, human knowledge must connect to what God is. In effect, transcendental knowledge is a two-part knowledge of God: God as concept and God as mystery. In addition, that two-part knowledge of God as a “mystery” opens up the possibility of knowing ourselves, since, as Rahner argues, “[the mystery of God] reveals itself to [humankind]” and grounds humanity as “a subject.” That is to say, humanity is a “transcendent subject” in the presence of the mystery of God.

When experiencing the presence of the mystery of God, χάρις and ἀλήθεια “coincide in God.” If, as Bonsor further proposes in *Rahner, Heidegger, and Truth*, “God is the source of all finite beings and truths,” then it is in that presence that humanity experiences in the finitude of the primordiality of experience as χάρις, on the way towards ἀλήθεια.

Though Bonsor believes that “this conception of truth, and being, is excluded by Heidegger in his understanding of the ontical distinction and fundamental ontology,” I disagree

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309 Ibid., 54.
with him.\textsuperscript{313} From \textit{Being and Time} forward, Heidegger constantly advances a concept of truth as \textit{άληθεια} and \textit{being} by utilizing Brentano’s “being in the sense of the true.”\textsuperscript{314} With this in mind, I also take issue with Bonsor’s assertion that there are differences between Rahner and Heidegger concerning truth as \textit{άληθεια}, even if it is accurate to suggest that there is a difference “in the task each sets for himself in his fundamental ontology and in the resulting conception of being.”\textsuperscript{315} I believe that Rahner’s sense of truth as \textit{άληθεια} is aligned with Heidegger’s. Though Heidegger’s task is certainly different from Rahner’s, both unquestionably adhere to a relatedness between \textit{άληθεια} and \textit{being}—it is extent to which the latter conceals \textit{άληθεια}. This relational concept of “truth” and \textit{being} is how Heidegger, as well as Rahner, differentiate “there-ness” from “is-ness,” in order to divide \textit{being} in its everydayness from \textit{άληθεια}.

In my view, Rahner’s \textit{Heideggerian lens} certainly appropriates Heidegger’s conception of \textit{primordial being} and “truth”—especially, as the primordiality of experience as \textit{χάρις} and \textit{άληθεια}, respectively. Such an appropriation becomes even more apparent in Rahner’s notion of the mystery of God as “a mystery which constantly reveals itself and at the same time conceals itself.”\textsuperscript{316} However, the means by which the mystery of God reveals (or \textit{unconceals}) itself to humanity is how God communicates with humanity. This is precisely because, as Rahner contends, “God communicates [God’s self] to [humankind] in his own reality [which] is the mystery and the fullness of grace.”\textsuperscript{317} There is an existential situatedness between humanity’s

\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{314} Brentano describes “being in the sense of the true” in the following manner: “...a thing that had no beginning and will always be, a thing that is continuously undergoing changes and producing changes in everything outside itself, thus making indirectly necessary the uniformity of the temporal process of things.” Franz Brentano, \textit{The Theory of Categories}, Translated by Roderick M. Chisholm and Norbert Guterman (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 18; 21.


“own reality” and “the mystery and fullness of grace.” To this end, grace—in its most fundamental sense, as the primordiality of experience as χάρις—is God’s self-communication.318

The primordiality of experience as χάρις, God’s self-communication, and ἀληθεία are all forms of transcendental knowledge that take humanity beyond being in its finite everydayness. These are entities of infinitude “about which we always know on account of the absolute range of the Vorgriff.”319 Though there is a Husserlian intentionality320 to ‘Vorgriff’ or pre-apprehension, Rahner concludes that:

…in the present state of our knowledge, we cannot reach by ourselves a positive knowledge of what is ‘beyond’ the domain of the finite world, although the anticipation of this beyond is the condition of our knowledge of things in the world. But this seems to establish only a de facto hiddenness of the infinite being.321

What Rahner is describing is the relationship between the finite nature of being and the infinitude of grace. To be exact, it is between the everydayness of human existence and the supernatural primordiality of experience as χάρις. An existential understanding of the latter brings about an experiential understanding of the former, due to the experiential-existential relatedness between the two.322 Yet, as S. Paul Schilling notes in Contemporary Continental

320 Husserl describes “intentionality” in the following manner: “...the world as it is for us becomes understandable as a structure of meaning formed out of elementary intentionalities. The being of these intentionalities themselves is nothing but one meaning-formation operating together with another, ‘constituting’ new meaning through synthesis.” Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, Translated by David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 168.
322 I call this “experiential relatedness” from Rahner’s following explication: “For the essence of man is such that it is experienced where “grace” is experienced, since “grace” is only experienced where the spirit naturally is. And vice versa: where spirit is experienced in the actual order of things, it is a supernaturally elevated spirit.” Karl Rahner, “Nature and Grace,” in Theological Investigations Volume IV: More Recent Writings, Translated by Kevin Smith, 165-188 (Baltimore, MD: Helicon Press, 1966), 184.
“...though Rahner preserves the distinction between nature and grace, he sees them as interpenetrating.” To this end, with respect to “nature” and “grace,” Rahner’s negotiation between their distinction and interpenetration is his Heideggerian pathmark and, subsequently, his experiential-existential venture.

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The “ventures” that Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner take in existential theology follows Heideggerian pathmarks towards the primordiality of being on the way to unconcealment, or ἄληθεια. By way of each “venture,” each existential theologian assumes a specific theological “stance” that utilizes an existential “lens”—while the former certainly grounds them fundamentally, the latter, by way of Heideggerian influences, allows them to “venture” beyond traditional theological framework with the use of philosophical propositions.

In an effort at explaining the relationship between humanity and God, each existential theologian examines what it means to be human, not strictly in terms of theology, but as it is tied inextricably to an understanding of the philosophy of existence—the concept of being. In other words, being becomes the means by which each existential theologian theologizes from a philosophical point of view. To this end, being is a critical, hermeneutical component in the existential theologies of Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner—due to their respective Heideggerian influences, each of them is particularly invested in locating primordial being (what being is) and isolating “truth” (ἄληθεια as unconcealment) in their respective meaning-making conceptualizations of scripture, tradition, reason, and experience.

Though it would be difficult to label Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, or Rahner as “Heideggerians,” especially since their chief interests are in “the theological” and Heidegger’s

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324 I use this term rather cautiously. The term itself is a bit problematic, since labeling any thinker a “Heideggerian” poses unavoidable problems. One problem, of course, is if a so-called “Heideggerian” is influenced by “early” or “later” Heidegger. With this in mind, another problem is if there is really an “early” or “later”
are not, each still employs a distinctively *Heideggerian lens*. The degrees to which they each utilize Heidegger to *question of the meaning of God* do certainly vary in ideas and content, but there remains, in each of them, a purposeful manner of asking the question itself, which follows Heidegger’s own approach in *Being and Time*. Like Heidegger, each is concerned with the relationship between *being* and God, as well as between philosophy and theology, especially since Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner alike consider Heidegger’s question of the meaning of *Being* analogous to their *question of the meaning of God*. It is possible, then, to consider each of them as “Heideggerian,” if only in a general sense, because the term itself is likely an impossible label in the narrow sense.

Nevertheless, in each of their respective cases, Heidegger plays a significant role in their theological thinking about the *question of the meaning of God*—for each of them, in light of Heidegger’s projected task in *Being and Time*, it is important to “reawaken an understanding for the meaning of [the] question.” This is what I have called the *Heideggerian lens*. For each, this “lens” is situated mainly in terms of their individual exposure to *Being and Time*—how they understand *being*, primordiality, and *unconcealment* is rooted exclusively in “early Heidegger.” As a result, each approaches their own theological projects as philosophical-theological continuations of the incomplete philosophical project Heidegger began in *Being and Time*. If it can be argued that Heidegger’s incomplete Part II was meant to be “the most

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325 See note 56.
326 See note 323.
328 Heidegger is more explicit in writings and lectures after *Being and Time* about his meaning of “unconcealment.”

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theological part” of *Being and Time*, it is certainly possible to argue that Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner are each attempting to “venture” into that “incomplete” territory—this territory, as such, is an existential theology.

To be clear, I argue that each “venture” made by Macquarrie, Bultmann, Tillich, and Rahner charts a different path into the “incomplete” territory of *Being and Time*. The different path each takes—that is to say, each “venture” made—is based on their own theological preoccupations and the extent to which those individual preoccupations can be thematically and hermeneutically buttressed to the incomplete Part II of *Being and Time*. Each finds in this incompleteness an opportunity go where Heidegger does not—because Heidegger refuses a theological voice, each never refuses theirs. By fully embracing their own theological voice, each existential theologian’s “pathmark” undoubtedly “ventures” into a kind of territory that is parallel to the course Heidegger takes after *Being and Time*.

Consequently, each attempts a systematic theological work—Macquarrie’s *Principles of Christian Theology*, Bultmann’s *Theology of the New Testament*, Tillich’s *Systematic Theology*, and Rahner’s *Foundations of Christian Faith*—that is a summative expression of their theological understanding of primordiality and *unconcealment* through their respective *Heideggerian lens*. For all, a Dasein-like entity figures into how each perceives primordiality as a means to grasp *unconcealment*—Macquarrie’s λόγος, Bultmann’s κηρυγμα, Tillich’s καιρος, and Rahner’s χάρις embody Dasein-like analytics towards the possibility of *primordial being* and ἀληθεία. Essentially, Macquarrie’s *linguistical-existential* venture, Bultmann’s *historical-existential* venture, Tillich’s *rational-existential* venture, and Rahner’s *experiential-existential* venture are all “pathmarks” into the incomplete Part II of *Being and Time*. 
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APPENDIX A: “λόγος”

As a term, λόγος appears in the New Testament a total of 330 times in various iterations—129 in the Gospels (33 in Matthew, 24 in Mark, 32 in Luke, 40 in John), 65 in Acts, 48 occurrences in the undisputed Pauline letters, and the remaining occurrences distributed among Colossians (7), Ephesians (4), 2 Thessalonians (5), Hebrews (12), the Pastorals (20), Revelation (18), James (5), First and Third John (7), and First and Second Peter (10), and only in Philemon, Second John, and Jude does “logos” not appear. Since λόγος has so many variants in the New Testament—not just between the Gospels and the Pauline letters, but between the Gospels themselves and among Pauline letters—the term can be defined as “word,” “speech,” “account,” or “sermon.”

Even still, depending upon its semantic context, λόγος might also be translated as the following: language, narrative, statement, pronouncement, question, report, teaching, call, and sense, all of which become hermeneutically contingent on either philological or theological grounds. In recognizing this variety of meaning, it is important to be clear about how I wish to specifically present λόγος—that is, my intent is to focus narrowly on λόγος in its nominative case.

Let us begin by examining how λόγος is first presented in the Pauline letters. For example, in 1 Thessalonians 1:8, Paul presents λόγος as:

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\text{ἀφ. ὑμῶν γὰρ ἐξήχνισα ὁ λόγος τοῦ κυρίου οὖν ἡμονόντη Μακεδονία καὶ ἐντῷ Ἀχαΐᾳ ἀλλὰ ἐν παντὶ τούτῳ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἐξελήλυθεν, ὡστε ἡ χρείαν ἔχειν ἡμᾶς λαλεῖν τι.}
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330 Ibid., 357.
331 Novum Testamentum Graece, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 532.
Here, when Paul writes of the “ὁ λόγος τοῦ κυρίου,” he means, literally, “the Word of the Lord.” What this means is that Paul considers λόγος as more than just a speech, an account, or sermon. Those terms offer a relatively low hermeneutics of λόγος—they are simply representations of λόγος in its everydayness. Instead, when Paul uses λόγος, he considers the term in a metaphysical manner, one that extends beyond its everyday usage. In saying “the Word of the Lord,” it is an imperative to capitalize “Word,” rather than use “word,” since the latter is still an everyday usage. The “Word” denotes something different in God than in humankind—this difference is what Paul taps into, in order to suggest the transcendental power in “the Word of the Lord” over that of, for instance, “the word of humankind.”

Like Paul’s use of λόγος, the Gospel of John appropriates λόγος as “Word” similarly. Of course, λόγος appears in the Synoptics before it appears in John, since John is written later. But, only John offers λόγος in its fullest Christological power and hermeneutical intent—John 1:1 offers the best example of how λόγος is used to denote the “absolute logos of the historical appearance of Jesus, the eternal and divine giver of life on earth.” Not only does John 1:1 provide an example of λόγος in the nominative case, but how it expresses “the Word of God” in a way that “stands out sharply” from all other aforementioned occurrences. As a case in point, consider the following passage:

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ ὁ θεός ἦν ὁ λόγος.336

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332 See note 36.
335 Ibid.
336 Novum Testamentum Graece, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 247.
Though it is a long sentence, in its entirety, this passage can be translated as “in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with (the) God, and God was the Word.”

In light of 1:1, the Gospel of John “opens with a hymn that celebrates God’s revelation of himself to the world.” More importantly, the author of John suggests that God has existed alongside God’s λόγος, and that λόγος is God’s mind, as well as the purpose and the agent of God’s self-disclosure. From this eternal preexisting connection between God and λόγος, John proceeds to discuss λόγος as having an all-encompassing function in creation and, in turn, the specific function of identifying Christ himself as the personal λόγος.

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338 Ibid.

APPENDIX B: “κηρυγμα”

In the New Testament canon, κηρυγμα appears as two alternate versions, both of which carry hermeneutical meanings and etymological roots: “keryx” and “kerysso”—while the former takes the pronoun form of “proclaimer,” the latter assumes the verb form of “proclaim.”340 As a version of κηρυγμα, “kerysso” appears a total of 61 times in the New Testament: 9 in the Gospel of Matthew, 14 in the Gospel of Mark, 9 in the Gospel of Luke, 8 in the Book of Acts, 17 in the Pauline letters, 2 in Paul’s Pastoral letters, and once each in First Peter 3:19 and Revelation 5:2.341 However, the term κηρυγμα itself occurs only in Matthew 12:41, Luke 11:32, Mark 16:8 (with a shorter Markan ending), and has 4 occurrences in the following Pauline letters: Romans 16:25, the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:21, 2:4, and 15:14), Second Timothy 4:17, and Titus 1:3.342 In that nominative case, κηρυγμα holds the most significance, especially for Bultmann’s existential theology. When translated as “proclamation,” κηρυγμα, as a distinctly existential term, “corresponds to the faith that exudes achievement, in which the believer, who has been affected by the word that addresses him, becomes enlisted in the liberating service on the basis of the proclamation.”343 With this in mind, κηρυγμα denotes active participation between the proclaimer and the hearer, especially as described by Paul as the act of “proclaiming.”344

In terms of its nominative case and the dating ascribed to Paul’s corpus, κηρυγμα first

341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid., 289.
344 Ibid.
appears in 1 Cor. 2:4 in the following:

καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κῆρυγμά μου ὕμνησεν πειθοῖς σοφίᾳ ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως.

Here, the segment “καὶ τὸ κῆρυγμά μου” can be translated as either “and my preaching” or “and my proclamation.” There appears to be no significance difference between the two, since both are describing an act that, as aforementioned, require both a proclaimer and a hearer—“and my preaching” or “and my proclamation” are synonymous. In either case, Paul uses κῆρυγμά to describe his “preaching” to the Corinthians, especially as a κῆρυγμά that provides a kind of wisdom and instills a sort of power that cannot be accomplished by humankind. But, more importantly, Paul sees his preaching as a “proclamation” of the mystery of God and Jesus Christ crucified. This sentiment is repeated in Paul’s Letter to the Romans, which is often dated after the Letter to the Corinthians. Towards the end of the letter to the Romans, Paul discusses κῆρυγμά in 16:25:

Τῶς δὲ δυνάμεις ὕμνησεν κατὰ τὸ ἐναγγελίαν μου καὶ τὸ κῆρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνους αἰώνιος σεσιγήμου...

Here, the segment “καὶ τὸ κῆρυγμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ” is translated as “and the proclamation of Jesus Christ.” Clearly, Paul maintains the “proclamation” meaning of κῆρυγμα, even if, on occasion, he lends that meaning towards “preaching”—again, the two terms can be viewed synonymously, but a subtle difference can be offered when comparing use in Paul’s letters to use

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345 *Novum Testamentum Graece*, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 443.
346 The literal translation is closer to “preaching,” but the NRSV assumes “proclamation.”
348 1 Corinthians 2:1-2
350 *Novum Testamentum Graece*, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 440.
351 In this verse, “proclamation” is both a literal translation and a translation in the NSRV.
in the Gospels.

If moving chronologically from Paul’s letters to the Gospels, Matthew provides the earliest example of κήρυγμα in the Synoptics. Matthew 12:41 expresses the following:


The segment “εἰς τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰωνᾶ” is literally translated as “into the preaching of Jonah,” with the preposition “of” added for possessive clarity. Of course, translating κήρυγμα as “preaching” makes sense, if Jonah is relating “his experience within the whale [where] his preaching [is] in response to which the people of Nineveh repented.” Though it is surely hermeneutically possible to substitute “proclamation” for “preaching” in Matthew 12:41, it appears that the author of Matthew intends to reserve the term “proclamation” for Jesus Christ, in order to differentiate between Christ’s “preaching” and Jonah’s “preaching.” Only Christ can proclaim—that is, particularly if “proclaiming” points to Christology, more so than “preaching” does.

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352 Not only is the Pauline corpus dated before the Gospels, but, within the Synoptics, Mark is the earliest followed by Matthew and Luke (which are often argued as being written in the same period of time, due to their similar content). See Joseph B. Tyson, The New Testament and Early Christianity (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), 158.

353 Novum Testamentum Graece, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 32.

354 I have added “of” to denote a kind genitive use, even though κήρυγμα is in the nominative.

APPENDIX C: “καιρος”

Καιρός has a total of 85 occurrences in the New Testament Canon in varying cases: 5 in Mark, 10 in Matthew, 13 in Luke, 3 in John, 9 in the Book of Acts, 17 in the undisputed Pauline letters, 6 in the disputed Pauline letters (Second Thessalonians, Ephesians, and Colossians), 7 in the Pastorals, 4 each in Hebrews and First Peter, and 7 in Revelation. In the New Testament, the term καιρός is used as partial synonym of “chronos”—they are only partially synonyms, because “chronos” designates “a period of time” in the linear sense, while καιρός frequently refers to “eschatological filled time, time for decision.” The latter contains more hermeneutical meaning, not just the authors of the Gospels, but for Paul particularly.

If looking for where καιρός first occurs in the nominative in the New Testament, Paul’s letters provide the first historical occurrence. Paul’s use of the term καιρός “has a wide spectrum of meaning,” which varies greatly depending upon Paul’s intended audience and the purpose of his letter. This becomes especially apparent when Paul utilizes καιρός to refer to “the coming moment of judgment and/or parousia.” By conceptualizing καιρός in this way, Paul, indeed, has an eschatological bent for the term, not just as “a time,” but “the time”—for Paul, καιρός is certainly “the event.” Therefore, Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians contains

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357 Ibid.
358 Ibid., 233.
359 Ibid., 233.
360 Ibid., 233.
Paul’s eschatological understanding of καιρός. Consider 7:29 as an example:

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\text{τοῦτο}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\delta\text{φημι}_\δέ_φηµι_αδελφοί, \delta_καιρός_συνεσταλµένος\_\text{ἐστίν}_\text{τὸ}\_\lambdaοιπὸν\_\ίνα\_\καὶ\_\οἱ\_\ἐχοντες\_\γυναῖκας\_\ὸς\_\μὴ\_\ἐχοντες\_\ὁ\_ς\_]\_\σιν\ldots^{361}
\]

Here, the segment “ὁ καιρός συνεσταλµένος ἔστιν” is translated literally as “the season straightened is.” However, a more sensible construction would be “the season is straightened,” since the segment’s verb ἔστιν comes at the segment’s end, rather than between καιρός (noun) and συνεσταλµένος (adjective). Nevertheless, for Paul, καιρός as “season” suggests that Paul recognizes the imminence of καιρός, especially as an eschatological event.

Like Paul’s use in the first letter to the Corinthians, the Gospel of Mark uses καιρός similarly: it is not “time” in humanity’s sense of the word, but a specific “eschatological time” in relation to God. For example, the author of Mark uses καιρός in the following from 1:15:

\[
\text{kai}_\lambdaεγων\_\δι_πεπληρωται_\δι_καιρος_και_ηγηκεν_η_βασιλεια_τοι_θεου}_\text{μετανοειτε_και_πιστευετε_ἐν_τοι_ευαγγελιω}.^{362}
\]

The segment that reads “και λέγων, δι πεπλήρωται ὁ καιρός καὶ ἡγηκεν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ” can be literally translated as “and saying that has been fulfilled the time and has drawn near the kingdom of (the) God.” This must be rearranged more sensibly as “and saying that the time has been fulfilled”—the time, then, is what “has drawn near the kingdom of God.” Clearly, even when rearranged, the author of Mark shares Paul’s eschatological concept of καιρός. But, with more muscular language, the author of Mark suggests that καιρός, when fulfilled, ushers in “the kingdom of God.”

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361 Novum Testamentum Graece, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 452.
362 Ibid., 89.
APPENDIX D: “χάρις”

χάρις appears a total of 156 times in the New Testament in varying cases, carrying the meanings of “grace,” “gratitude,” or “esteem.” In the Gospels of Luke and John, χάρις occurs 8 and 4 times respectively, as well as 17 times in the Book of Acts. But, χάρις can be found in its “highest frequency” in the Pauline letters: 24 in Romans, 10 in First Corinthians, 18 in Second Corinthians, 7 in Galatians, 3 in Philippians, 2 each in First Thessalonians and Philemon, in addition to 12 in Ephesians, 5 in Colossians, 13 in the Pastorals, 8 in Hebrews, and 10 in First Peter. In each of these occurrences, χάρις is conceptualized as “the opening of access to God in the larger sense of precisely God himself.” What this means, then, is that χάρις makes it possible for God’s existence to be accessed openly by human existence—it allows for the being-Being dialectic to the possible. In this respect, χάρις can be conceptualized in the Aristotelian sense, since God’s “Being” consists of a gratuitous nature, one that is bestowed upon humanity’s “being.” Accordingly, “grace” as χάρις has a “special significance for Christian existence [to the extent that] existence in grace is…thought of as a process of growth for which the initial proclamation has provided enduring standards in the form of doctrine.” To this end, χάρις is

364 Ibid.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid., 458.
367 If considering the being-Being dialectic as the relatedness of humanity’s “being” to God’s “Being,” then χάρις is what grounds that dialectic in existential relatedness.
368 See Aristotle, Rhetorics, 2.7.1385
something that makes an encounter with God all the more experiential and existential—χάρις situates human existence as Christian existence in relation to God’s existence and, in turn, edifies what it means to be human and have a connectedness to God.

In 1 Thessalonians 1:1, Paul presents the earliest nominative example of χάρις as an “experiential-existential” encounter in the following passage:

Παῦλος καὶ Σιλουανὸς καὶ Τιμόθεος τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ Θεσσαλονικεῶν ὑπὲρ πατρὶ καὶ κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη.\(^{371}\)

The segment “χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη” can be translated as “grace to you and peace.” Though this segment is at the end of Paul’s salutation to the Church of Thessalonia, Paul’s notion of χάρις is connected to his notion of peace. That is, the possibility of “peace” comes from the actuality of χάρις. For Paul, χάρις is something that makes “peace” possible—and, for the budding Thessalonian Church, χάρις was assuredly an essential component of ensuring the survival of the church and the congregants. In this way, when Paul wishes χάρις to the audience of the first Thessalonian letter, he is wishing for God to grant that χάρις, since, once that χάρις is bestowed upon them, it will allow them to be at peace with God.

Like Paul, the Gospel of Luke presents χάρις as something that grants peace with God through the experiential-existential. Consider Luke 2:40 contains this earliest, nominative example of χάρις.\(^{372}\) The author of Luke uses χάρις in the following:

Τὸ δὲ παιδίον ἦν ἵππανεν καὶ ἐκραταιοῦσαν πληροῦμενον σοφίαν καὶ χαρίς θεοῦ ἦν ἐπ αὐτό.\(^{373}\)


\(^{371}\) *Novum Testamentum Graece*, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 159.

\(^{372}\) It must be noted that there is, in fact, another example of “charis” within the Gospel of Luke that occurs earlier than 2:40. This case is in 1:30, but “charis” takes the accusative case, rather than the nominative.

\(^{373}\) *Novum Testamentum Graece*, Edited by Eberhard Nestle and Erwin Nestle (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1979), 531.
When considering the segment “καὶ χάρις θεοῦ ἐν ἑπ αὐτῷ,” the best translation would be “and (the) grace (of) God was upon him,” when inserting the article “the” and the preposition “of” in places for reading clarity. Still, in terms of meaning, the author of Luke believes χάρις to be something that is placed “upon” humanity, through the experience humanity has with God.

374 The word θεοῦ is taking the genitive case, which warrants the preposition “of.”