CAPTAINS, CONSULS, AND KINGS:
THE INFLUENCE OF U.S. NAVAL OFFICERS ON HAWAI‘I, 1826-1851

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

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

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

For the College of Liberal Arts

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ABSTRACT

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American missionaries and merchants made their way to the Hawaiian Islands in the early nineteenth century, establishing a significant economic and religious presence. In 1826, the United States tasked the U.S. Navy with protecting these civilians. Over the next twenty-five years, The U.S. Navy strengthened the American presence in Hawaiʻi through law enforcement against maritime deserters, diplomacy with the Hawaiian Kingdom, and dispute resolution between Hawaiians and multiple American groups. U.S. naval officers built rapport with the Hawaiian government and created a culture of trust. In the 1840s and 1850s, British and French attempts to annex the Hawaiian Islands caused Hawaiʻi to look to the United States for protection. Using the implication of force, supported by the "Tyler Doctrine," the U.S. Navy successfully defended Hawaiian independence. These actions enabled the American missionary and merchant communities to expand their influence in Hawaiʻi, setting the stage for Hawaiian annexation four decades later.

INTRODUCTION
STARS AND STRIPES IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
(1789-1826)

On 24 August 1789, the Stars and Stripes appeared for the first time over the horizon of the Hawaiian Islands, known then to westerners as the Sandwich Islands. The merchant vessel *Columbia* had left Boston two years before as part of a multi-ship expedition in search of a solution to the young American republic's trade woes. The *Columbia* had explored the Pacific northwest from the mouth of the Columbia River to Nookta Sound in search of furs that they could trade for Chinese silver.[1] The ship dropped anchor in Kealakekua Bay on the islands of Hawai'i to find supplies for the next leg of their voyage, the journey to Macao.[2] Three months after their brief stay on Hawai'i, the *Lady Washington* captained by John Kendrick, the commander of the larger expedition landed near the same location. On Hawai'i, Kendrick met a local chief named Kamehameha who sought to unite the several warring islands. Kendrick noted that the chief and his companions did not seek beads or other common tokens westerners used to trade at islands they visited, but instead desired to trade for muskets and ammunition. The Hawaiian Islands left an impression on Kendrick as a place in transition, but also one with opportunity for American merchants following in his footsteps to China. Kendrick's expedition

[1] Scott Ridley, *Morning of Fire: John Kendrick's Daring American Odyssey in the Pacific* (New York: William Morrow, 2010), 16-17.
[2] S. E. Morrison, "Boston Traders in Hawaiian Islands, 1789-1823," *The Washington Historical Quarterly* 12, No. 3 (Jul. 1921), 167.

would complete its mission to Macao and demonstrated that China could provide a market for American merchants. Kendrick would return to the Hawaiian Islands twice and many other Americans would soon follow him.[3]

Two years later Kendrick discovered that the Hawaiian Islands, beyond simply being a good waypoint to China to stop for supplies, possessed sandalwood in great quantities, which was highly prized in Chinese markets for its use as incense. Sandalwood became the first major product the Hawaiians had to offer foreign traders, and Americans transported more than 600 tons to Canton annually by 1812. Kamehameha unified the Hawaiian Islands under his control in 1810 and sandalwood provided a certain amount of economic agency in which his kingdom could interact with passing western vessels.[4] The stabilization of the political situation under the Kingdom of Hawai‘i and the rise of the sandalwood trade made the Hawaiian Islands an ideal stop in the Boston to Canton trade.[5]

A new phase of the American presence in the Hawaiian Islands arrived in 1820 in the form of the Nantucket whaling vessel *Maro.* The ship had discovered new whaling grounds off the coast of Japan and the Hawaiian Islands provided a base of resupply as valuable as the sandalwood and fur trade. The Japan whaling basin exploded within a few years of its discovery, bringing another group of American mariners permanently to Hawaiian waters.[6] Another American group also arrived in 1820 who would leave their own lasting mark on Hawai‘i. Protestant New England missionaries had been inspired by a Hawaiian brought back from Kendrick’s original expedition and thereafter spent years planning a mission to the Hawaiian

[3] Ridley, *Morning of Fire*, 169-175.
[4] Ralph Simpson Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I, 1778-1854: Foundation and Transformation* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1938), 47-50.
[5] Morrison, “Boston Traders in Hawaiian Islands,” 170-171.
[6] Morrison, “Boston Traders in Hawaiian Islands,” 174-175.

Islands under the supervision of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (A.B.C.F.M). The mission's important role in strengthening the American presence in the islands will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter I, but in effect, they quickly found success in their original mission and gained favor in the Hawaiian royal court as advisors.

While private American citizens flourished in Hawai'i during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the United States government held no presence in the region. Few in the government even understood events in the Pacific and the young country faced far more pressing matters both foreign and domestic. Americans in the Hawaiian Islands survived on the rapport they built with Kamehameha I and his successors but remained open to the threats of foreign navies (who could impose treaties detrimental to both Hawai'i and the Americans) and desertion. Desertion, particularly among whaling crews, represented a dangerous issue in peacetime.[7] The culture of a violent profession, poor food, long hours, and especially harsh discipline aboard whaling ships made their crews prone to acts of lawlessness. Sailors commonly deserted whaling ships, especially when they could hide in a place with a good climate and far away from western law enforcement in the Hawaiian Islands.[8] Unable to interact with other westerners due to their status as outlaws, these deserters formed lawless gangs that preyed on merchants, missionaries, and indigenous Hawaiians alike. Mutineers also posed a risk not only to whaling crews, but other merchants and whalers they encountered as well.[9]

Thomas Jefferson became the first U.S. politician to look to the Pacific and recognize its potential. Inspired by the expeditions of the 1780s and 90s, Jefferson viewed the fur trade in the

[7] Robert Erwin Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn: The Story of United States Naval Forces on Pacific Station, 1818-1923*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1963), 37-38; Gene A. Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 60.
[8] Eric Jay Dolin, *Leviathan: The History of Whaling in America*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 282-284.
[9] Michael D. Toth, "Multifaceted Factories of Death: The Three Communities of the American Whaleship," MA Thesis, (Texas Christian University, 2020), 80, 90-91.

Pacific as vital to American economic competition with Great Britain and sought to use the Louisiana Purchase as a springboard from which to dominate the fur trade in the Pacific Northwest. Jefferson in turn inspired fur-magnate John Jacob Astor to build a settlement at Astoria in Oregon to direct the China fur trade in 1811, though the British thwarted his efforts and captured Astoria during the War of 1812.[10]

More than a decade later, John Quincy Adams followed Jefferson's lead and made the Pacific a permanent aspect of U.S. foreign policy during his tenure as Secretary of State. Negotiating a treaty with the Spanish in 1819 originally over Florida and the Gulf Coast region, Adams sacrificed portions in disputed areas of what is now Texas to ensure the United States held a recognized border with Spain that extended to the Pacific Ocean. Adams restored the American presence on the Pacific that had been lost by Astor's private enterprise. The support of private citizens like Astor marked an important development in U.S. interest in the Pacific. The private ventures in the fur trade and Jefferson's attempts to assess the area through the Lewis and Clark expedition also allowed for more accurate maps, a development Adams used to pursue a definitive border on the Pacific Coast.[11] Following the treaty, Adams kept both the British and Russians at bay over claims to the Oregon territory while debating those in Congress who did not want the United States to expand into the Pacific Ocean area. With a now permanent presence in the Pacific Northwest, the United States strengthened its traders' route to China by enabling them to trade for furs within American territory.[12]

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[10] John Denis Haeger, *John Jacob Astor: Business and Finance in the Early Republic*, (Detroit; San Francisco: Wayne State University Press, 2017), 94-114; Ridley, *Morning of Fire*, 362-363.
[11] Brooks, Philip C. Brooks, *Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1939), 47-53.
[12] Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy,* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1949), 523-526.

In 1819, the U.S. Navy joined American efforts in the Pacific and started to provide protection to American civilians. Though David Porter's famous whaler-raiding cruise aboard the *USS Essex* during the War of 1812 marked the first time a U.S. Navy vessel entered the Pacific, he had not been ordered to go there and did not focus on protecting American merchants but rather conducted a *guerre de course* against British shipping. In 1819, the impressment of American sailors by the Chilean Navy in their War for Independence required the presence of a U.S. Navy ship to protect Americans rounding Cape Horn. Captain John Downes and the *USS Macedonian* successfully navigated a delicate situation between the Chileans and Spanish and protected private American vessels on several occasions until he was relieved by a multi-ship squadron after two years.[13] The Pacific Squadron continued to patrol the Chilean coast but did not extend their operations to the Hawaiian Islands until 1826.

The State Department under John Quincy Adams appointed John Coffin Jones, Jr., the son of a former Speaker of the Massachusetts House, as their first official to the Hawaiian Islands. His title "Commercial Agent" (also referred to as Consul or Consular Agent) and the responsibilities associated with such a position officially restricted him to only reporting back to Adams on matters of American commerce. Though often pressed into service as a diplomatic courier, Jones held little to no decision-making power and foreign agents and the Hawaiian government knew this.[14] Even if Jones had held more official diplomatic power, the mere word of an American so far from home meant little without the implication of force to back up diplomacy.

[13] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn,* 4, 24-26.
[14] Ross H. Gast, *Contentious Consul: A Biography of John Coffin Jones, First United States Consular Agent at Hawaii,* (Los Angeles: Dawson's Books, 1976), 31-33.

In the 1820s, U.S. naval Officers often acted as diplomats abroad where the United States lacked a formal diplomatic corps. Even where U.S. Consuls existed, the advantage of military force often made naval officers superior negotiators in areas far from American and European shores like the Hawaiian Islands. These officers received no formal diplomatic training and a diplomatic role did not formally exist as part of their commissions. Because of their natural advantages in negotiations, Americans abroad often looked to an incoming U.S. Navy vessel for support in their disputes with local authorities or rival western groups.[15]

The U.S. naval officers visiting the Hawaiian Islands from 1826 to 1851 faced a number of dilemmas between American citizens and Europeans, Americans and the Hawaiian government, and among rival American factions. In 1826, the British held significant influence in the islands as they had supported Kamehameha I in his unification efforts during the three previous decades.[16] Some British officers and business interests even had long-term designs on bringing the Hawaiian Islands into the British Empire. The French also started exploring the Pacific further and would soon made claims in the region. Over a period of a quarter century, thirteen U.S. naval officers made fifteen notable visits to the Hawaiian Islands in which one or more groups called on them to intervene in a situation or mediate a dispute. Charged with protecting American citizens and interests abroad, these officers successfully advocated for both the American missionary and commercial factions within Hawai‘i while also gaining the trust of the Hawaiian government. They also thwarted British and French efforts to reduce American influence in the islands and even directly protected Hawai‘i from annexation attempts by the British in 1843 and the French in 1851. Though a few officers notably failed in some of these

[15] David Foster Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883,* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 5-8.
[16] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 21, 42-44.

efforts and some were more influential than others, as a whole they not only protected the American presence in Hawai‘i but aided it in becoming the dominant influence in the islands. This allowed American merchants and missionaries to initiate a quiet form of imperialism to bring the islands under their economic and social control without firing a shot. This diplomatic imperialism was in stark contrast to the "gunboat diplomacy" characteristic of western imperialism in the nineteenth century and went largely unnoticed by the Hawaiian government, setting the stage for later, more direct military intervention near the end of the century.

This study is by no means the first to recount the story of the early nineteenth century American influence in Hawai‘i or the diplomatic successes of U.S. naval officers, but rather offers an intersection of these two themes. This subject benefits from a wealth of secondary works that lay the groundwork for more specific research. The first part of Ralph S. Kuykendall's three volume *History of the Hawaiian Kingdom* outlines the American role in this period of Hawaiian history. Though Kuykendall does not make any assertions regarding the American influence in Hawai‘i, he does imply that the United States played a role in the independence that the Kingdom of Hawai‘i enjoyed in the 1850s at the end of his first volume.[17]

Arrell M. Gibson's *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier*[18] analyzed the development of American imperialism in Hawai‘i during the nineteenth century as a part of his broader look at the Pacific, but he did not connect the U.S. Navy to the success of American endeavors there during that time period. Gibson rather argued that the influence of missionaries and traders in Hawai‘i and elsewhere in the Pacific contributed to the United States' ability to keep a permanent naval presence in the area. While it is true that without the civilian pioneers the U.S. Navy would have had no purpose in the Pacific, the relationship is far more symbiotic

[17] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 426-427.
[18] Not to be confused with the Bradford Smith book of the same name.

than Gibson asserts. The U.S. Navy protected these civilian efforts as early as the 1820s and guided them through nearly three decades of uncertainty caused by British and French imperialism in the Hawaiian Islands.[19]

David Foster Long's *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883* studied U.S. naval officers conducting foreign relations from a wide geographical perspective but did not focus on the influence that the U.S. Navy had in Hawai'i beyond their immediate decisions. Long's conclusion from his chapter on Hawai'i is far more concerned with contrasting the officers who made decisive decisions in the best interest of the United States and those who failed to take such actions. He stops short of connecting the actions of the officers in the Hawaiian Islands with the preservation of the American community there.[20] Robert Erwin Johnson's *Thence round Cape Horn: The story of United States Naval Forces on Pacific Station, 1818-1923* focuses far more on the Pacific Squadron than Long, but also recognizes the Hawaiian Islands as a secondary priority of the squadron, first after the South American Pacific Coast and later after East Asia. Johnson details several U.S. naval missions to the Hawaiian Islands but provides less analysis of their diplomatic impact on the Kingdom of Hawai'i and the American communities within it.[21] Gene A. Smith's *Thomas ap Catesby Jones: Commodore of Manifest Destiny*, written on the exploits of the U.S. naval officer whose name the book bears, recounts in great detail Jones's multiple visits to the Hawaiian Islands during this time period. Smith argues that Jones made a significant positive impact on U.S.-Hawaiian relations and the stability of the American presence but covers the work of just one officer.[22]

[19] Arrell Morgan Gibson and John S. Whitehead, *Yankees in Paradise: The Pacific Basin Frontier* (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 411-415.
[20] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 284-285.
[21] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 39-40, 66-67.
[22] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 60-67, 117-118.

Long's, Johnson's, and Smith's works represent the core inspiration for this study. All three leave gaps regarding the overall influence of U.S. officer-diplomats on the American community in the Hawaiian Islands, but none of these were written to answer this question. Long focused on the entire U.S. Navy and could not possibly draw thorough conclusions on Hawai'i from this scope. Johnson wrote on the Pacific Squadron beyond Hawai'i and didn't focus specifically on U.S. naval officers' diplomatic roles. Smith focuses on one officer's Hawaiian exploits but naturally keeps to drawing conclusions on the influence of that one officer. The question of the U.S. naval officers' diplomatic influence on the rise of American power in Hawai'i has thus far remained unanswered.

This study proceeds chronologically in three chapters. The first chapter covers the period from 1824 to 1827, in which American merchants appealed to Presidents Monroe and Adams to send naval vessels to the Hawaiian Islands for their protection. The chapter explores the origins of these requests and takes a closer look at the American Protestant missionary community of Hawai'i. This sets the stage for the first two U.S. naval visits to the Hawaiian Islands and explores their role in shaping American and Hawaiian attitudes for naval visits thereafter. The first visit by Lieutenant John Percival quickly devolved into a violent incident that left the Hawaiian government and missionary community wary of future visits. Percival did satisfy the needs of the merchant community though and reminded all in the Hawaiian Islands of the threat a western warship could pose. Within a year, Master-Commandant Thomas ap Catesby Jones followed Percival's hostility to the missionaries by siding with them against the merchants. Jones also assisted the merchants in collecting debt from the Hawaiian government, but managed to do so without angering the Hawaiians, who were left with a good impression of Jones and the United States. Jones also signed a commercial treaty with the Hawaiian government, which,

though never ratified by Congress, was considered binding by the Hawaiian government for the remainder of the period. These two initial visits, especially Jones's, laid expectations for all future U.S. naval officers visiting the Hawaiian Islands.

The second chapter details the next five U.S. naval visits from 1829 to 1840, in which naval officers established a policy of limited or non-interference in Hawaiian affairs. From 1829 to 1836 these officers often faced many of the same issues as Jones: Hawaiian debt, desertion, and missionary influence on the Hawaiian government. These officers' reaction to disputes ranged from unwillingness to mediate or limited involvement that ultimately left decisions to the Hawaiian King. These officers stressed the importance of Hawaiian sovereignty as they had no orders to do anything to the contrary while in the Hawaiian Islands. The British and French took a different course of action in forcing treaties in their favor on the Hawaiian King in 1836 and 1839, leaving Hawaiian sovereignty in question and the Americans civilians at a disadvantage in comparison to their European counterparts. The French even challenged the U.S. naval policy in Hawai‘i by considering American Missionaries to be Hawaiian and not under U.S. protection. This forced U.S. officers to decide between intervening in Hawaiian affairs or leave Americans at risk to European adventurism. U.S. officers visiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1839 and 1840 decided on the latter course of action, not willing to risk an incident. This left the future of the American presence in Hawai‘i in question and the Hawaiian King scrambling to find an ally willing to offer his kingdom protection.

The third and final chapter examines the outcome of the uncertainty of the 1830s, played out in multiple incidents between 1843 and 1851. Starting in 1841 at the behest of the Hawaiian government and their American missionary supporters, President John Tyler announced the first U.S. foreign policy doctrine toward the Hawaiian Islands, promoting the sovereignty of the

nation and the protection of American citizens against potential foreign threats. In early 1843, a dispute between British and American merchants sparked an incident in which a British naval officer declared that he had annexed the Hawaiian Islands into the British Empire. A U.S. naval officer present in Honolulu at the time shied away from taking action against the annexation, leaving the Hawaiians with little hope of independence. Several months later, another U.S. officer, Commodore Lawrence Kearny arrived in Honolulu after word of the President's new policy reached the Hawaiian Islands. With a set policy of protecting American citizens to guide him and with the support of many American merchants and missionaries who desired Hawaiian independence, Kearny lodged a protest with the British officer, announcing that he would remain in port until the kingdom had been freed. Captain Jones also heard of the incident and sailed to Honolulu, forcing the commander of the British Pacific Squadron to follow suit to prevent his subordinate from being outgunned. The combined actions of Kearny and Jones convinced the British Admiral to disavow the annexation and return control of Hawai‘i to its King. The new Tyler doctrine called for an official U.S. Diplomatic Commissioner in the Hawaiian Islands who arrived in 1843, but the role of the U.S. Navy remained important into the 1850s and beyond. The French later attempted to enforce demands on the Hawaiian King in 1851 in a similar manner to the British but were thwarted when the U.S. Commissioner and a U.S. naval officer agreed that the latter would open fire on the French vessel should they take any action that might threaten Hawaiian sovereignty. The French relented and the United States secured its role as the most influential foreign power in the Hawaiian Islands.

Together these three chapters piece together a narrative in which U.S. naval officer-diplomats gave the United States an opportunity to expand its influence in Hawai‘i peacefully. This study draws four primary conclusions. First, the officers generally managed to both protect

and satisfy the requests of the American merchant and missionary communities and prevented the two rival groups from negatively affecting the other. Second, officers established themselves as a source for dispute resolution not only among Americans but also with the Hawaiian King. The respect that these officers showed Hawaiian sovereignty by refusing to challenge the King's authority caused him to seek the United States for protection when European powers revealed their designs on the Hawaiian Islands. Third, the actions of U.S. naval officers in the 1840s and 1850s directly prevented the British and French from sparking incidents that would justify an invasion or annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. Finally, the combination of these results convinced the Hawaiian government to entrust the United States with its security while allowing American influence to grow immensely powerful by the 1850s. This allowed the United States to embark on Hawaiian annexation when its foreign policy shifted away from a sovereign Hawai‘i and toward Pacific imperialism after the American Civil War. In 1824, no U.S. Navy vessel had yet visited the Hawaiian Islands, but violent events in the Pacific soon moved the Americans there to request naval protection, beginning the era of the U.S. officer-diplomat in Hawai‘i.

CHAPTER I

"MAD JACK" AND "THE KIND-EYED CHIEF"

(1824-1827)

On 26 January 1824, 22 year old harpooner Samuel Comstock organized a mutiny against the captain and officers of the American whaleship *Globe,* killing all four officers on board and taking control of the ship.[23] After sailing to Mili Atoll, over 2,000 miles west of Hawai'i, some of the crew stranded Comstock and several other mutineers on the island while sailing the ship to Valparaiso, where they were taken into the custody of the American Consul on 15 June 1824.[24] Word about the fate of the *Globe's* officers quickly spread throughout the Pacific and back to the whaling port of Nantucket, where 137 merchants and whalers wrote a petition to President James Monroe in December expressing general concern over the lack of security in the Pacific and specific grievances over the *Globe* incident. They requested that a U.S. naval force be stationed in the Pacific "where so much property and so many lives are exposed."[25]

Another petition of similar origin soon followed, addressed to the newly inaugurated President John Quincy Adams in April of 1825.[26] The 44 signers of this petition specifically wrote about their concerns over lawlessness in the Hawaiian Islands, from which several *Globe* mutineers had joined that ship's crew. The merchants believed that more mutinies could be

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[23] Cyrus M. Hussey and William Lay, *A Narrative of the Mutiny, on Board the Ship Globe, of Nantucket, in the Pacific Ocean, Jan. 1824, And the Journal of a Residence of Two Years on the Mulgrave Islands; with Observations on the Manners and Customs of the Inhabitants*, (New-London, CT: Wm. Lay and C.M. Hussey, 1828), 21-26; A. Grove Day and James A. Michener, *Rascals in Paradise*, (New York: Random House, 1957), 21-22.
[24] Hussey and Lay, *A Narrative of the Mutiny*, 49-50.
[25] "Petition to James Monroe," December 1824, United States Congress, House of Representatives, Report No. 108, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 16 January 1846.
[26] "Petition to John Quincy Adams," 5 April 1824, House Report No. 108.

staged from the Hawaiian Islands due to the general lack of western law enforcement efforts and the creation of a community of deserters. The *Globe* itself lost six crewmen to desertion on O'ahu, forcing the captain to take on several future mutineers in order to properly operate his vessel.[27] The merchants also desired a naval presence in the Hawaiian Islands "for the protection, not only of their commerce, but of American commerce generally" from the threat of lawlessness. A third petition coming from another whaling port of New Bedford, Massachusetts, complained to President Adams that the Hawaiians did not take Americans in the Hawaiian Islands seriously because they, unlike the British, had no naval escort for their merchant ships and whalers.[28]

In 1825, the U.S. Navy could not boast more than a small Pacific presence confined to the western coast of South America where the Chilean War for Independence created issues of impressment and privateering from which American merchant sailors needed protection. In August, the U.S. government reacted with a letter from Secretary of the Navy Samuel L. Southard to Pacific Squadron commander Captain Isaac Hull that ordered Hull to hunt down the *Globe* mutineers and also to "visit the Sandwich Islands, to protect [U.S.] interests, and acquire information respecting [U.S.] commerce in that quarter."[29] Hull could spare one ship in his squadron for the mission and ordered Lieutenant-Commandant John Percival to sail the schooner *USS Dolphin* for the Mulgrave Islands (of which Mili Atoll is a part) and then for the Hawaiian Islands to fulfill Southard's orders.[30]

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[27] Hussey and Lay, *A Narrative of the Mutiny*, 15.
[28] "Petition to John Quincy Adams," April 1824, House Report No. 108.
[29] Samuel L. Southard, *Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Showing the Condition of the Navy in the Year 1827*, United States Congress, 20th Congress, 1st Session, 4 December 1827, 51.
[30] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 37.

Known to many as "Mad Jack," Lt. Percival was an experienced sailor and naval officer, having served in the Quasi-War and War of 1812. Percival sailed to Mili Atoll and found the stranded mutineers. Only two remained alive, enslaved after skirmishes with the local inhabitants, who traded their prisoners to Percival in exchange for pigs and other goods. Percival left Mili with instructions for the indigenous people to respect future American mariners and sailed for the Hawaiian Islands, having successfully completed the first part of his task.[31] The *Dolphin* arrived at O'ahu on 16 January 1826, to the expectation and great delight of the American merchant community. The security force they had sought for over a year had finally arrived and they were eager to send a welcome party to greet the vessel. Percival's second-in-command Lieutenant Hiram Paulding reported on the excitement of the merchant community in his journal, but also noted that nobody from the missionary community on the island came to welcome them.[32] Paulding could not be blamed for his bewilderment of the missionaries' absence as they had established a significant presence in the islands over the course of the previous six years.

In October 1819, seven missionary families and three O'ahu natives formed a new mission to the Hawaiian Islands in Boston.[33] The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, a joint Presbyterian-Congregationalist endeavor to spread Christianity beyond the borders of the United States, organized the mission under the leadership of Reverends Asa Thurston and Hiram Bingham. The two New England preachers who had been ordained earlier that year arrived in O'ahu in April 1820, excited to take up their duties.[34] Arriving in a foreign

[31] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 37; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 272.
[32] Hiram Paulding, *Journal of a Cruise of the United States Schooner Dolphin Among the Islands of the Pacific Ocean and a Visit to the Mulgrave Islands in Pursuit of the Mutineers of the Whaleship Globe* (New York: G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1831), 196-197.
[33] Morrison, "Boston Traders in Hawaiian Islands," 166-168.
[34] Paul A. Varg, *United States Foreign Relations 1820-1860. (*East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1979), 158.

land and a several months journey from home the missionaries found their situation to be more fortunate than they could have imagined in regards to their mission. In 1819, Hawaiian King Kamehameha II had abolished the "Kapu" system, a restrictive series of rituals and traditions which Hawaiians used as a form of worship to their polytheistic religion and to enforce class distinctions. The King and the society at large dropped the Kapu system primarily due to the foreign influence of British and American merchants who regarded the religion as superstition. The fall of the Kapu system created a void in Hawaiian spiritual life which Bingham and Thurston eagerly tried to fill.[35]

Convincing the noble class to support their efforts represented the key to the missionaries' overall objectives as Hawaiian society remained heavily stratified due to the legacy of the Kapu system. One visitor to O'ahu in 1822 remarked that King Kamehameha said "that [the Hawaiian people] must all learn the good word, and worship Jehovah; but that the Missionaries must teach [the King] first, and themselves get well acquainted with Hawaiian."[36] The missionaries spent much of their time preaching to the King and his court, as well as creating a written form of Hawaiian in which they could print the Bible and any catechistic materials. By April 1824, the missionaries had established significant rapport with the royal family and Hawaiian nobility, with Queen Consort and Regent Ka'ahumanu (Kamehameha II traveled to England at the time and died of measles before he could return) requesting baptism and instruction in the Christian faith for her people.[37] By the end of the year, the missionaries

[35] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 65-67.
[36] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 104.
[37] Hiram Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands* (New York: H. D. Goodwin, 1847), 213-214.

were catechizing and teaching approximately 2,000 Hawaiians to read and write. By 1828, this number jumped to 37,000, with the *Dolphin* arriving during this religious boom.[38]

Beyond the religious efforts of the mission, several missionaries were able to secure advisory positions within the Hawaiian government.[39] Yet many in the merchant community accused the missionaries of overstepping their religious role and influencing the politics of a sovereign nation. The dispute between the two parties became heated during a meeting only a month before Percival's arrival in January 1826, in which several Hawaiian nobles recommended to King Kamehameha III and his Regent that the Ten Commandments be used as the basis for Hawaiian law. Though the missionaries did not appear to have directly suggested this legal change to anyone, the merchant community accused them of meddling in Hawaiian internal affairs.[40] This tense developing rivalry between the merchant and missionary communities may explain the latter's absence from the *Dolphin* welcome party in January 1826. Despite no initial welcoming, Bingham noted that he was happy to see the *Dolphin* visiting the islands after the *Globe* mutiny, and hopeful that the arrival of a U.S. warship would strengthen the appearance of the American presence there. He soon discovered that the visitors did not see eye-to-eye with his guidance of the kingdom.[41]

Percival and the crew of the *Dolphin* briefly aided the crew of the shipwrecked merchant ship *London,* an early example of the usefulness of a U.S. warship to American mariners in Hawai'i. Upon returning from the *London* rescue, Percival discovered that with the support of Bingham, Queen Regent Ka'ahumanu had enacted a "tabu," or restriction upon prostitution and

[38] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 106.
[39] Merzie Tate, *The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History,* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 1965), 10-11.

[40] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 124.
[41] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 284.

the solicitation thereof by incoming ships. The tabu was a practice related to the old Kapu system that had been Christianized. Much of the crew, including Percival and Paulding had received the affections of local women and were not at all pleased to give up the pleasures of shore leave. Percival initially tolerated the tabu, and other religious restrictions placed on the crew such as the inability to light a fire on the sabbath.[42] This changed when Percival learned that a British Warship had not been held to the same standards several months earlier. In May 1825, the *HMS Blonde*, captained by Lord Byron (cousin of the poet) arrived in Honolulu with the body of the late King Kamehameha II. Byron wanted to ensure that there was proper governance in Hawai‘i and interrogated Bingham about his intentions involving the Hawaiian legal system, extracting from him a promise not draw up any code of laws on behalf of the Hawaiian government.[43] The political turmoil and Byron's inquisitive nature about Hawaiian law likely kept Bingham from attempting to enforce a tabu on his sailors, but the unequal treatment of an American vessel enraged Percival.

Percival obtained a royal audience with the King and Regent on 22 February in which he demanded the tabu be lifted. Percival was highly offended that a British ship had received special rights and privileges that an American warship and the whalers in port did not. Ka'ahumanu defended the tabu, telling Percival that it originated from the law of God. According to Bingham, Ka'ahumanu argued that the Hawaiian women were under tabu and that if the Americans brought their own women, they would not prohibit them from entertaining the crew.[44] Percival's reply is not certain, but most sources agree that he lived up to the name "Mad Jack," angrily accusing the Regent of being ruled by Bingham and even suggesting that his crew

[42] Paulding, *Journal of a Cruise of the United States Schooner Dolphin*, 209.
[43] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 119-120.
[44] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands*, 286.

should pull down the missionaries' houses.[45] Interestingly, Percival used a similar argument to the merchants and whalers about the missionaries' influence, implying that the Regent and King had little to no agency in decision-making for the kingdom. Four days later the *Dolphin* put about 25 sailors ashore who quickly took to drinking and plotting with the equally deprived and upset whalemen. Apparently hearing that Bingham was the source of Percival's anger, the group interrupted one of his Sunday services and damaged several houses. Paulding recalled the incident as a minor squabble, while Bingham wrote that he feared for his life. According to the latter, a sailor from the Dolphin brandished a knife and attempted to strike him before several Hawaiians took the outnumbered sailors into custody. Percival and several officers of the whaleships also arrived on the scene and the officer used his cane to keep the rioters in order.[46]

Later that evening, Percival met with Bingham and the royal court in a more conciliatory manner. He admitted that his men should not have attempted violence or the destruction of houses and promised Bingham that the damages would be paid for, but he also reiterated that the tabu must be lifted or he would not leave port. For Percival, the combined deprivation of an easy way to boost morale and the insult of inferior treatment to British sailors meant he would not back off from his demands. The Hawaiians begrudgingly decided to lift the tabu and Percival allowed his men ashore again, though not before sentencing lashes to several of the rioters.[47] During the remaining three months of the *Dolphin's* stay, Percival managed to get into another physical altercation with a merchant with whom he had a personal disagreement. Despite the settlement between Percival and Bingham, the latter reported back to his superiors in the

[45] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 286; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 275.
[46] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 287-288; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 275; Paulding, 225-226.
[47] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 288-289; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 275-276.

American Board, who then alerted the missionary community in the United States. The uproar caused a court of inquiry into Percival's actions on O'ahu which nearly resulted in a court-martial.[48] Bingham wrote that he was pleased to find the U.S. Navy and government did not reflect their officer's views on Hawaiian affairs.[49]

Despite his diplomatic faux pas and personal outbursts, "Mad Jack" accomplished one of the additional goals of the merchants and whalers. Percival met with the King concerning the debt owed to American creditors, which was acknowledged by the royal court. By 1826, the royal family and many local chiefs and nobles managed to find themselves in extensive debts to American merchants under promissory notes, all while rapidly trading away their supplies of sandalwood, which represented their one of only valuable forms of capital in western eyes.[50] Percival demonstrated to these merchants that the United States maintained a vested interest in their economic well-being. In the eyes of the American merchant community in Hawai'i, Percival resoundingly succeeded in his mission. Additionally, the *Globe* mutineers were hunted down and brought to justice and the *Dolphin* showed the U.S. flag against any other potential mutiny or deserter uprising, fulfilling the requests for security made by the petitioners over the previous year. By making the Kingdom of Hawai'i aware of the debt issue when relations were already strained, Percival went above and beyond his responsibilities to the merchants. These actions and the successful endeavor to undo the tabu represented a great early success of the U.S. Navy in advocating for the issues of American merchants. Percival made such an impression on the merchant community that the U.S. Commercial Agent in Hawai'i John Coffin Jones,

[48] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 276.
[49] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 289.
[50] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 90-91.

recommended to Secretary of State Henry Clay that a U.S. warship visit the Hawaiian islands every year.[51]

The *Dolphin's* visit influenced the Hawaiian government and the missionary community quite differently. The presence of a western warship represented a great danger to the sovereignty of Hawai'i as would be demonstrated by future incidents involving British and French ships.[52] Though the outbursts of Percival's crew were brought under control, his actions meant that the Hawaiian government could not count on friendly relations with every ship that made port in Honolulu and temporarily gave the United States Navy in particular a bad reputation. Hawaiian power did not exist in a vacuum and they were vulnerable to attack if a foreign captain deemed their actions disagreeable.

Bingham and the missionaries also found themselves at great risk. The merchant community and Percival highly suspected that they were controlling the Hawaiian government and would thus have to face the consequences from Hawaiian actions, even if they were not directly responsible. Bingham wrote that he was already concerned with the British naval presence and competing interests and also hoped the visit of a U.S. naval vessel would "exert a high moral influence for good," demonstrating that he understood the potential influence a military presence in Hawai'i could have.[53] So far from home though, this presence answered ultimately to the ship's captain and his personality. The American missionaries on Hawai'i were at the mercy of passing warships and learned this firsthand through the riot of the *Dolphin's* sailors. Fortunately for them, before the end of the year another American warship would enter

[51] "John C. Jones to Henry Clay," *The Papers of Henry Clay*: *Volume 4, Secretary of State 1826,* ed. Hopkins, James F. (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1959), 345.
[52] See Chapters II & III
[53] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 284.

Honolulu and offer a fresh opportunity for the missionaries in Hawai‘i to build a relationship with the U.S. Navy.

Before the *Dolphin's* return to Pacific Station, Secretary Southard sent Hull another letter ordering him to sail on a Pacific island cruise to protect American trade and missionary communities. Hull, still concerned with the threat of piracy on the western coast of South America sent the sloop-of-war *USS Peacock* under the command of Master-Commandant Thomas ap Catesby Jones instead.[54] Hull tasked Jones with assessing the general situation in the Hawaiian Islands and several other island chains in the South Pacific, protecting Americans from mutineers and foreign powers when possible, solving the debt issue in the Hawaiian Islands, and establishing friendly relations with local governments. After first stopping at Nuka Hiva (part of the Marquesas Islands) and Tahiti where Jones conducted successful diplomatic missions, the *Peacock* arrived in Honolulu on 11 October 1826. The Hawaiians and Missionaries did not welcome the sight of another American warship so soon after Percival's departure, but the King and Boki, the Governor of O‘ahu did meet with Jones shortly after his arrival, offering him quarters on the island. Jones quickly proved that he was no Percival, requiring no removal of tabus or making any other demands of the Hawaiians.[55] Instead, Jones calmly gathered information on the situation of the American presence in Hawai‘i by building relationships in the royal court and among the missionaries.[56]

Commander Jones's first major action involved rounding up approximately thirty deserters and others who "did not support good character."[57] The Nantucket petitioners to the

[54] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 38.
[55] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 123.
[56] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 277; Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 38; Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones*, 59.
[57] Gast, *Contentious Consul*, 99.

President, at whose request Hull had sent Jones, listed desertion and the resulting lawlessness it created as a major problem that the U.S. Navy needed to end. Commander Jones met with American Commercial Agent John Coffin Jones,[58] an unpaid contact of the Secretary of State representing American commercial interests, along with British Consul Richard Charlton and Governor Boki to discuss the fate of those who had been taken into custody. Many of the deserters were whalemen and experienced sailors, so Commander Jones offered them the choice of serving on the *Peacock* or a whaleship in port at the time. Most of the men agreed to serve on one or the other, and Commander Jones suggested the collection of lawless Americans become an expected duty of U.S. warships visiting the islands thereafter.[59] Commander Jones found that both the Hawaiians and westerners on O‘ahu agreed with the Nantucket whalers’ assessment and greatly appreciated his efforts to enforce maritime discipline on the deserters. John C. Jones had asked Secretary Clay for aid with the desertion problem repeatedly since his original appointment to the islands in 1821. Charlton, since arriving in O‘ahu in 1825 had pressed Boki for action, but without a proper armed force who could remove the deserters from O‘ahu permanently, neither the American nor the Englishman could get more than half-measures out of the Hawaiian government such as tavern taxes, which slightly raised the price of alcohol.[60] Commander Jones’s initiative and decisive action on the issue that had plagued O‘ahu for years earned him the respect of all parties involved, especially the Hawaiian chiefs who had been wary of U.S. naval activities after the Percival debacle.

John C. Jones decided to press his good fortune after the desertion issue was solved and approach the Master-Commandant about the issue of Hawaiian debt to American creditors.

[58] No relation to Thomas ap Catesby Jones
[59] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 60.
[60] Gast, *Contentious Consul,* 97-98.

Percival had successfully convinced the kingdom to acknowledge its debt, but John C. Jones now wanted to establish a concrete number and begin the process of payment.[61] Much of the merchant community was frustrated by the unserious attitude with which the Hawaiians viewed their debt, and saw the U.S. Navy as the entity to approach the issue. One merchant, three months before Commander Jones's arrival, wrote his business partner that "a Ship of War must be sent here or I fear we shall not get all our debts."[62]

The merchants suggested to Commander Jones that the Hawaiians owed them upwards of $500,000.[63] The Hawaiians had only utilized a written language for less than a decade and had no concept of a capitalist economic system of interest. The idea that the debt from private American business agreements well beyond U.S. borders should be collected by a U.S. warship was diplomatically questionable at best and dangerously close to treading on Hawaiian sovereignty.[64] Commander Jones had orders to serve American commercial interests in this regard, however, and carried out his duty. He investigated the size of the debt by interviewing several merchants and decided on a figure closer to $150,000-200,000 before meeting with the Hawaiian government.[65] Commander Jones also often met with Bingham, who had the ear of the King and Hawaiian nobility and also offered Jones advice on the cultural subtleties of negotiating with the Hawaiians.[66] The two shared similar theological views and aided each other during the *Peacock's* stay.[67]

In December, Commander Jones, the King, and the merchants sat down to discuss the payment of the debt. Despite Jones's diplomatic niceties, the Hawaiian leaders did not appear to

[61] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 61
[62] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 90.
[63] Robert H. Stauffer, "Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 17, (1983): 50.
[64] Mark Rifkin, "Debt and the Transnationalization of Hawai'i" *American Quarterly* Vol. 60, No. 1 (Mar., 2008), 43.
[65] Rifkin, "Debt and the Transnationalization of Hawai'i," 43; Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 62.
[66] Stauffer, "Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 48.
[67] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 64.

take the problem seriously, and the Master-Commandant subtly reminded them that the *Peacock* was capable of collecting the debt by other means if a peaceful agreement could not be reached. This suggestion coming mere months after the *Dolphin* incident worked with great effect on the Hawaiian government, which agreed to raise between $120,000-$160,000 in sandalwood, straw mats, and Spanish dollars. At Commander Jones's suggestion, the Hawaiian government established a tax on its subjects, with all men providing sandalwood and women furnishing straw mats and other goods they could make.[68] The merchants were not disappointed by the amount they would be paid, a sign that Jones was correct in balking at their initial figure. Both sides appreciated the Master-Commandant's skillful negotiations and the Hawaiian government was open to signing a treaty with the United States, but Jones first needed to deal with one other issue brought before him by John C. Jones and the merchants.

The divide between missionaries and merchants only sharpened after the Percival incident, and John C. Jones, Charlton, Boki, and several others again accused the mission of politically meddling in Hawaiian affairs. They now added the charge of the mission distracting the Hawaiian people from commercial efforts.[69] The accusers asked Commander Jones to settle the matter in a meeting at Governor Boki's house, as he had thus far handled the desertion and debt issues with distinction. Likely expecting Jones to hold views similar to Percival, the merchants were surprised to find that Jones was much more religious than his predecessor. The merchants did no favors to their cause by relying on the British Consul Charlton to argue against the missionaries. Jones endured a British musket ball permanently lodged in his left shoulder from his service in the War of 1812, making him less than sympathetic to British concerns.[70]

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[68] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 92.
[69] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 301; Gibson, *Yankees in Paradise*, 134-135; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 277.
[70] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 30.

Charlton could not find any legal charges to bring against the mission and no chief except Boki sided with the merchants. Jones heard out both sides and then sided with the missionaries. According to Bingham, he rebuked Charlton, who supported "the most wealthy and hitherto influential residents and shipmasters in formidable array" against "some half a dozen meek and humble servants of the Lord."[71] The lack of serious legal issues the mission posed to American commercial interests coupled with Jones's personal beliefs and orders to support the mission left little doubt that the merchants ever had a chance at using Jones as an ally against their rivals.

With the merchant-missionary dispute settled, Jones set to work on drafting a treaty between the United States and Hawai'i that would conclude his business in the Hawaiian Islands. Charlton refused to be bested by Jones again and attempted to bully the Hawaiian court into withdrawing from any negotiations. As the meeting opened, He boldly announced that the Hawaiians were:

> Subjects of Great Britain, without power to treat with any other state or Prince, and that if they enter into treaty stipulations with the United States, Great Britain would soon assert her right by taking possession of the Islands, a right which his King [George IV] and country had never relinquished.[72]

Charlton's statement did not intimidate Jones in the least, who then calmly opened a line of questioning in which he lured the Englishman into admitting his position as a Consular Agent and that such a position did not receive appointments to ports within British territory. Jones reported that Charlton stood "dum-founded" upon realizing his gaff.[73] Far more than simply defending his position, Jones's argument caused an epiphany within the Hawaiian ruling class. High Chief Kalanimoku noted that they were not under the impression that the United States was

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[71] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 302.
[72] "Thomas ap Catesby Jones to James C. Dobbin, Secretary of the Navy," letter, 29 Dec. 1855, Captains' Letters, M125, National Archives.
[73] Frank Gapp, "'The Kind-Eyed Chief': Forgotten Champion of Hawai'i's Freedom," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 19, (1985): 106; Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 66.

a sovereign equal to Great Britain. Their realization of this allowed American merchants and missionaries even more influence in the Hawaiian government.[74] A defeated Charlton made no further attempts to outwit Jones, who started to negotiate the terms of "articles of arrangement."[75]

The treaty consisted of seven articles, the first of which introduced the document as "peace and friendship" between the two nations "declared to be perpetual." The second and third articles provided assurances that the Hawaiian government would keep their ports open to American trade and provide refuge for American ships so long as they behaved lawfully. In a similar vein, the fourth article required Hawaiians to offer aid to American shipwrecks. The fifth article included a right for Americans to sue the Hawaiian government by the vague standards of "civilized nations." The sixth article charged the Hawaiian authorities with the responsibility for apprehending deserters but also allowed them to collect bounties for each one caught as an incentive not to wait for the next U.S. warship to arrive. The final article gave the United States most favored nation status, forbidding the Hawaiian government from exercising duties and fees on American ships any higher than they would on another nation's vessels.[76]

Though Queen Regent Ka'ahumanu and several Hawaiian chiefs signed the document, Commander Jones had no authority from the State Department to draft a treaty and it was not binding without Senate approval. Jones knew this and carefully worded the document as an "agreement" to avoid its designation as a treaty.[77] Whether or not he expected the treaty to be taken seriously by the Senate is unknown, but the United States did not recognize the treaty as

[74] Gapp, "The Kind-Eyed Chief," 106.
[75] Stauffer, "Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 51.
[76] Stauffer, "Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 55-57.
[77] Stauffer, "Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 51.

part of Jones's actions.[78] President Adams even recorded that Southard and Clay mocked the document in his office.[79] The Hawaiians however, took the treaty seriously. Whether or not Jones could have anticipated the lasting effect of the treaty, the distance from the United States and lack of a U.S. foreign service presence in Hawai'i allowed the document to be binding by default. The opinion of the Senate or the State Department did not matter so long as the merchants, missionaries, and naval officers recognized the treaty. Future U.S. captains would refer to Jones's treaty and the King would remember the favored nation status that Jones established when French and British incursions in the following years left the Hawaiians scrambling to find an ally. With Jones's business concluded, the *Peacock* set sail in early 1827. Bingham remarked that the officer "secured for himself among the people the designation 'the kind-eyed chief' – a compliment falling on the ear of many of different classes in delightful contrast with that of 'the mischief-making man-of-war' [the *USS Dolphin*]."[80]

Jones's mission to the Hawaiian Islands was a showcase in conducting diplomacy thousands of miles from home. He entered a situation in which American merchants and missionaries disagreed, the merchants and Hawaiian government were at odds, and the British presence was committed to thwarting any attempts to expand American influence, all after the last U.S. naval officer created severe mistrust in the minds of multiple factions. Jones managed to satisfy both American groups and gain the favor of the Hawaiian government, all while handing British influence in the area a significant setback.

[78] "Captain Thos. Ap Catesby Jones, of U.S. Navy," United States Congress, House of Representatives, Report No. 920, 25th Congress, 2nd Session, 23 May 1838.
[79] "6. V:30.," John Quincy Adams, 6 November, 1827, Massachusetts Historical Society, *John Quincy Adams Digital Diary*.
[80] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands*, 303.

The lone criticism of Jones's efforts can be found in the debt settlement, in which the Kingdom of Hawai'i sold off most of its supply of sandalwood which made up the basis of its economy. One view argues that Jones contributed to a cooperated military and commercial enforcement of a western system of creating debtor nations, which would by design become subservient to a western power.[81] The lack of understanding about western economic systems by the Hawaiian royalty and nobility would suggest that the original accumulation of debt may have indeed reflected the design of several merchants. Placing Jones in this category is troublesome for two reasons though. The first is the aforementioned balancing act that he had to play during the entirety of his stay in O'ahu. The second reason reflects an earlier view that Jones legitimately believed that he was giving the Hawaiians a fair deal.[82] Jones worked within the framework he was born into. Jones operated within the western capitalist system of loaning on interest, so it is only natural that he viewed the concerns of the merchants as legitimate and wanted to help the Kingdom of Hawai'i navigate that framework. He also forced the issue on Hawai'i's debt because he was ordered to do so, but not before cutting the estimated amount owed by over half. Most of the damage done to the Hawaiian economy came in the years after 1826, a process primarily overseen by John C. Jones, to whom the largest debt was owed and whose ties to the merchant community concerned Commander Jones regarding his representation of the United States.[83]

Regardless of Jones's role, the sandalwood clearing to pay off the debt severely weakened Hawai'i's ability to maintain agency in its economic affairs, which would soon come to be dominated by competing American and British ventures. By contrast, both American

[81] Rifkin, "Debt and the Transnationalization of Hawai'i," 44-45.
[82] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones,* 62-63.
[83] Gapp, "The Kind-Eyed Chief," 107; Gast, *Contentious Consul,* 101; Stauffer, "Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 50.

factions benefitted greatly from the Jones mission. The mission received official U.S. support in its efforts, a distinction which Bingham and others could use to defend the influence they had in Hawaiian government. The merchants successfully solved debt issue with the help Jones and also received a commercial treaty, which the Hawaiian government viewed as binding. Both groups benefitted from the restoration of law and order on deserters. The Hawaiian people too were spared from lawlessness and the government, not aware of its impeding economic decline, viewed the visit favorably due to improved relations with its largest trading partner. Most importantly, Jones established the U.S. Navy as an arbiter between the various factions in Hawai‘i. Future naval officers would be able to use this role to influence Hawai‘i and the American communities toward U.S. views.

Percival’s influence cannot be entirely discredited despite Jones’s superior diplomatic performance. He set expectations for Jones as an enforcer of law by finding the *Globe* mutineers and started the dialogue over the debt issue. The tabu issue also reminded the Hawaiian government of the danger that a foreign warship could pose, a memory that may have come to mind in the royal court when Jones later implied that the use of force was an option to advance U.S. policy. While the *Dolphin* incident demonstrated the power of an American warship in a reckless manner, the visit by the *Peacock* showed the entire American community in Hawai‘i that this power could be used for their benefit. The Americans now had diplomatic and military support which they would need over the next two decades.

CHAPTER II
THE GATHERING STORM
(1828-1840)

Commercial activity continued to increase in the Hawaiian Islands during the late 1820s, with American merchants taking a larger role in the Hawaiian economy. Cash, especially U.S. Dollars, started to replace bartering as system of exchange, though the kingdom continued to use its dwindling supply of sandalwood to pay its debts. The Port of Honolulu also expanded near the close of the decade, adding a shipyard, proper wharves to receive cargo from abroad, and four American business enterprises selling supplies to passing ships. The American mission also continued to find new successes, especially in education. Nearly forty percent of the Hawaiian adult population attended reading and writing classes hosted by missionaries by 1831. The missionaries also turned their attention to educating Hawaiian youth, often employing their more exceptional Hawaiian adult pupils to operate children's schools. The American presence in the Hawaiian Islands steadily grew, as did its need for protection from deserters.[84]

The American flag again appeared on the O'ahu horizon on 14 October 1829 in the form of the sloop-of-war *USS Vincennes*. Secretary Southard ordered its captain, Master-Commandant William C. B. Finch, to the Society and Hawaiian Islands to protect American merchants, whalers, and missionaries, while paying special attention to the ongoing desertion issue.[85] Despite Jones's success in this matter, the isolated nature of Hawai'i made the desertion

[84] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 92, 94-95, 106-108.
[85] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn,* 40; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 278.

issue difficult to remove permanently. The voyage also included U.S. Navy chaplain Charles S. Stewart, who had been a part of the Protestant mission in Hawai‘i from 1823-1825. Stewart acted as a liaison between the U.S. government and the American Board in an effort to improve U.S. relations with the missionaries.[86] Stewart recorded the *Vincennes* mission in great detail and offers a unique insight into the missionaries from a U.S. Navy perspective.

The King and his court, as well as missionaries and John C. Jones were present for a formal ceremony in which Finch presented gifts from President Adams[87] and a letter from the Secretary of the Navy on the President's behalf. Southard's letter informed the King of Finch's mission and his responsibility to bring American deserters and outlaws to justice.[88] With Stewart easily able to understand the concerns of the missionaries, Finch reached out to Jones regarding the state of American commerce in the islands. Jones reported that the islands were indispensable for the American whaling fleet and other commercial endeavors trading in Asia. He recommended that a "sloop of war would be sufficient for every purpose required," requesting that one be posted in the vicinity in the late spring and late fall when the whaling fleets were in port recruiting and repairing.[89] Jones complained bitterly about the lawlessness he had witnessed in his near-decade role as a U.S. Commercial Agent, writing:

> I have been compelled to see the guilty escape with impunity: the innocent suffer without a cause, the interests of my countrymen abused: vessels compelled to abandon the object of their voyage, in consequence of desertion and mutiny: and men, who might be made useful to society, suffered to prowl amongst the different islands, a disgrace to themselves and their country, and an injury to others, whom they are corrupting, and encouraging to do wrong.[90]

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[86] Gast, *Contentious Consul,* 107.
[87] Andrew Jackson was President by the time Finch arrived in the Hawaiian Islands, but the letter was dated 20 January 1829, before his inauguration.
[88] Charles Samuel Stewart, *A Visit to the South Seas, in the United States Ship Vincennes, during the Years 1829 and 1830* (London: Colburn & Bentley, 1832), 124.
[89] Gast, *Contentious Consul,* 109-112.
[90] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 357.

The captain of one vessel could not do much to ease Jones's long-term issues except report his concerns back to his own superiors, but Finch soon found himself dragged into the center of multiple scandals before he could investigate lawlessness and desertion any further.

A few days after the *Vincennes's* arrival, Finch, Stewart, and Jones dined at the residence of American Merchant and business associate of Jones, William French. While discussing the now sixteen-year-old King who would soon reach a proper age to rule the country without the aid of a Regent, Finch asked Jones and French about a potential wife for the King. French remarked that the King's sister appeared to be the most likely option, a custom acceptable in Hawai'i but opposed by the American missionaries. French and Jones then suggested that they already participated in an incestuous sexual relationship. The remarks infuriated Stewart, who already disliked Jones from his time as a missionary and had developed a friendship with the young lady in question. Stewart reported the accusations to the royal court who then collectively sent a letter to Finch requesting him to oversee a trial of Jones and French for slander and another case involving Jones's apparent dragging of a Hawaiian man behind a horse for two miles who had been accused of killing an American cow.[91]

Finch refused to be dragged into a lengthy case of what he considered Hawaiian internal affairs. He wrote to the King defending his character and declaring the rumor unfounded. Finch ignored the cow incident entirely and assured the King that he would discuss the matter of the recent slander with Jones and French, implying that they were likely not serious accusations.[92] Neither Stewart nor Bingham wrote about this incident, reducing its importance in Hawaiian history to a mere footnote. The importance of this episode lies in the haste with which the Hawaiian government asked a U.S. naval officer to oversee a dispute within their country. The

[91] Gast, *Contentious Consul*, 114-115.
[92] Gast, *Contentious Consul*, 115-116.

Hawaiian government post-Jones treaty recognized the de facto authority of an officer to hold Americans accountable for their wrong doings.

Near the same time, a group of merchants wrote to Finch regarding the initial letter he bore upon his arrival. Southard had written that the President was pleased in the "rapid progress which has been made by your people, in acquiring of letters and of the True Religion – the Religion of the Christian's Bible," calling it the "only means by which the prosperity and happiness of nations can be advanced and continued."[93] This endorsement of the mission and their work upset several members of the merchant community, who referred to the letter as a "pernicious document."[94] They argued that the United States should send ships to the Hawaiian Islands to "the protection of commerce and industry" not for the "establishment of creeds of the enforcement of any religious doctrine on an ignorant and unsuspecting people."[95] Accusing the missionaries of meddling with the Hawaiian government represented a convenient argument for the merchant community intent on denying that the Hawaiian government had any agency in the establishment of a Christian legal code. If they could delegitimize these laws as not originating from the Hawaiian government and merely being forced upon "an ignorant and unsuspecting people," they could argue that their government had sided against the true American interests of "commerce and industry." Official U.S. approval of the mission's influence made that argument much more difficult to establish.

The letter also complained of the channel through which the President's opinions had been written. The merchants criticized the Secretary of the Navy for communicating with the King, as they considered this to be within the Secretary of State's purview. Secretary Clay barely

[93] Stewart, *A Visit to the South Seas,* 124.
[94] Gast, *Contentious Consul,* 113.
[95] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 278.

mentioned Hawai‘i in 1829 and the security-based nature of U.S. diplomatic priorities in the Pacific at the time made the Hawaiian Islands more Southard's concern than Clay's. This decision signaled to the merchant community that the U.S. Navy had taken a leading role in U.S.-Hawaiian relations. John C. Jones, who was not a career diplomat, admitted that his concerns were often not taken seriously by the State Department and had thus far been forced to use both Thomas ap Catesby Jones and now Finch as intermediaries to air his grievances to the U.S. government.[96] By not having a clear policy on the Hawaiian Islands and allowing the Navy Department to handle foreign relations there, the State Department had effectively relinquished control of U.S. foreign policy in the Hawaiian Islands to the U.S. Navy, to be carried out by officer-diplomats.

Finch, in the same vein as his reply to the King, did not investigate the merchants' concerns further. The inclusion of a former Hawaiian missionary in the *Vincennes* expedition sent a clear message about the U.S. government's view of the missionaries' efforts. The merchant community could not consider itself abandoned by the United States because Finch did agree to look into the continuing issue of Hawaiian debt. On 2 November 1829, He met with Boki and the King, drafting an agreement in which the Hawaiian government agreed to pay an amount near $48,000 to American creditors.[97]

Finch's time on O‘ahu soon came to an end in late November and he left with a letter from several missionaries, thanking him for government approval of their efforts. The King also gave him a letter addressed to the President which offered a bright outlook on future U.S.-Hawaiian relations. Finch believed that the Hawaiians were capable of "extending their own

[96] Gast, *Contentious Consul*, 98.
[97] Stewart, *A Visit to the South Seas*, 210-212; Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 97; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 278.

interests" and supported the influence of the mission over that of American commercial interests. Finch reported that the influence of whites on the Hawai'i government had fallen since the arrival of the missionaries, but if one group were to dominate the kingdom, the influence of the missionaries was preferable to that of the merchants.[98]

Another U.S. warship did not visit the Hawaiian Islands until Commodore John Downes and the frigate *USS Potomac* arrived off the coast of O'ahu on 22 July 1832. Downes, a capable officer who had been the first captain assigned to Pacific station in 1819, stopped in the Hawaiian Islands on a return trip from the East Indies. The usual diplomatic pleasantries were exchanged and Downes appeared to get along with both the merchants and missionaries. Unfortunately for the Commodore, the old rivalry would not rest, and several merchants brought a series of complaints before him (mostly concerning the missionaries) to discuss with the royal court. The most pressing of these issues regarded the recent ban on Roman Catholicism in the kingdom and its enforcement against a Jesuit mission the year before.[99]

Organized by John Rives, French businessman and close friend of the late King Kamehameha II, a Catholic mission consisting of three French Jesuit priests and a few dedicated laity arrived on O'ahu in 1826. Aware of the opposition they might face from the well-established protestant mission, the Catholics laid low for their first two years on the island, learning the local language and gathering information. In 1828 they opened their mission to the public and started to baptize interested Hawaiians. Both the protestant mission and the Hawaiian government quickly noticed their efforts and moved to end the Catholic influence in Hawai'i. The latter viewed Roman Catholicism as idol worship and a return to the religious practices of the Kapu system, one that they considered antiquated and in conflict with the protestant faith that

[98] Stewart, *A Visit to the South Seas,* 271, 277.
[99] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 279.

had essentially become the new state religion. Bingham and several other missionaries recommended that the government remove the mission directly, ordering the Catholic missionaries to leave the country and not to return. Ka'ahumanu decided on a different course of action, prohibiting Hawaiians from attending Catholic services in the summer of 1829. In 1830, Ka'ahumanu banned the priests from teaching their faith and in 1831 formally banished them to California, while also enacting harsh punishments on their Hawaiian followers.[100]

Why the merchant community complained on the Jesuits' behalf remains unclear, but they may have been attempting to demonstrate that the protestant missionaries spread un-American values inside Hawai'i as a way to force U.S. officials to take action against them. If merchants thought this complaint would force Downes to challenge the missionaries, their efforts proved successful. Downes, though polite, reasoned to the royal court that no free society emulating the United States would ban missionaries of a different faith. He stated that though the King had the right to expel foreigners from his country, the reason for doing so would be frowned upon by Catholic countries "and that all civilized nations were in favor of free toleration."[101] Bingham, who served as the interpreter for the meeting, fired back that Catholic nations such as the Italian states, Spain, and Portugal did not practice religious toleration. He also argued that Jesuits had been expelled by several European states and that their vows were foundationally at odds with the laws of free societies.[102] Bingham also expressed concern for the stability of the kingdom, arguing that the Jesuits could have potentially sparked a civil war if they caused enough religious divisions in the country.[103] Downes finished airing his concerns by

[100] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 138-142.
[101] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 445.
[102] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 445; Francis Warriner, *Cruise of the United States Frigate Potomac Round the World During the Years 1831-34*, (Concord, NH: Leavitt, Lord & Company, 1835), 236.
During the Years 1831-34 (Concord, NH: Leavitt, Lord & Company, 1835), 234.
[103] Warriner, *Cruise of the United States Frigate Potomac,* 236.

suggesting that Catholic Hawaiians be spared punishment for their beliefs to which the King replied that his subjects had been punished for "image-worship" rather than mere opinions.[104]

Additionally, the merchants again accused Bingham and the protestant mission of attempting to base the Hawaiian legal system on the Ten Commandments. Downes again sided with the merchants, suggesting that other sources of law should be used and questioning the influence of the missionaries upon the government.[105] Downes refused to take any action beyond suggestions, demonstrating to the Hawaiian government that the United States valued Hawaiian sovereignty. Bingham and the Hawaiians had dreaded the potential of another Percival if they were visited by a less religious-minded officer. Both Bingham and the King thought highly of Downes, who maintained a respectful and advisory approach to advancing U.S. foreign policy.[106] The royal court decided to remove the ban on Roman Catholicism shortly after the *Potomac's* departure, though the absence of the Jesuit mission made the decision much less of a risk. The Franco-Hawaiian missionary dispute would be reignited later in the decade and would not truly be settled for another two decades.

The first four U.S. naval officers to visit Hawai'i exhibited four distinct ways of interacting with local affairs. Lieutenant-Commandant Percival's methods were marked by confrontation, using a diplomatic stubbornness and suggestion of force to achieve his goals. Lieutenant-Commandant Jones made policy suggestions and implied the use of force to intervene in Hawaiian affairs but maintained a diplomatic tone. Commander Finch chose to avoid involving himself in Hawaiian affairs at all if possible while Commodore Downes discussed

[104] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 445.
[105] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 279; Warriner, *Cruise of the United States Frigate Potomac,* 236-237.
[106] Jeremiah N. Reynolds, *Voyage of the United States Frigate Potomac Under the Command of Commodore John Downes, During the Circum-navigation of the Globe, in the Years 1831, 1832, 1833, and 1834, Volume 1*, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1835), 414.

them on behalf of the American community but did not imply that he would attempt to enforce his opinions. The U.S. officers visiting Hawai‘i after 1832 would reflect one or another of the last three policies, which would heavily influence the state of Hawaiian sovereignty and the ways in which France and Great Britain attempted to influence Hawaiian affairs.

The actions taken against the French missionaries might have created a rift in Franco-Hawaiian relations, but the British also found issues with the independence and agency of the Hawaiian nation. Shortly after the departure of Downes and the *Potomac,* Bingham noted the discovery of a pamphlet originating in London, written by T. Horton James, an Englishman whom Bingham had recalled visiting the islands, addressing a "Noble Lord." In the pamphlet, James asked for support of an endeavor involving appointing a governor to the Hawaiian Islands and opening a joint-stock company to oversee British business ventures. James also planned for the forcible seizure of the Hawaiian Islands for the British crown. The pamphlet proposed turning Hawai‘i into a planting and trading center similar to the sugar growing islands of the West Indies. James appealed to British patriotism, declaring that it was "mortifying to an Englishman to walk upon the soil [of Hawai‘i], enriched by the blood of Cook, and not feel that it was his own," referring to a 1779 incident in the Hawaiian Islands in which the famous British explorer Captain James T. Cook was killed by Hawaiians. He also stated that all westerners in Hawai‘i would welcome British rule with open arms except the American missionaries, attempting to divide the mission from the American merchant community. Bingham noted that the pamphlet caused the Hawaiians great concern.[107] The Hawaiian Islands had become very profitable for Americans and some in Great Britain took notice. The American presence in Hawai‘i and the sovereignty of the nation were soon tested by both the British and the French.

[107] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 446.

Before foreign affairs dominated the U.S. Navy's role in Hawai'i, one more major issue arose between the King and the American merchant community. In September of 1836, a two ship American squadron under the command of Commodore Edmund P. Kennedy arrived in O'ahu while returning from an Asian cruise. In what had become almost tradition by this time, several American merchants expressed their complaints about the governance of Hawai'i to the Commodore. Kennedy agreed to bring the merchants' grievances before the King and a meeting was arranged with Kīna'u, a former Regent for the current King and wife of the previous King, as Kamehameha III was ill. The first issue related to transportation and production. The merchants in question argued that they had been prevented from trading in Maui without a reasonable explanation, violating the third article of Jones's 1826 Treaty. Kennedy sided with Kīna'u, who explained that the merchants violated a prohibition on the sale and manufacture of liquor on islands other than O'ahu.[108] The second issue brought into question whether or not Americans had the right to buy, sell, and transfer possession of property. Kīna'u argued "that it had been apparent to all that the King had never, in any instance, alienated his right in the soil, and when lots of ground were assigned to foreigners, it was always understood, either on the departure of the individual from the islands, or at his death, such ground reverted to the King, and that it must be cleared."[109]

The King Kamehameha III held a meeting the following day in which he renewed the debate on this issue. The King supported Kīna'u's argument the previous day, declaring to Kennedy that all land "owned" by foreigners within his kingdom was his property and would pass back into his control upon their departure or death. Hawai'i did not guarantee rights to

[108] William Samuel Waithman Ruschenberger, *A Voyage Round the World Including an Embassy to Muscat and Siam, in 1835, 1836, and 1837* (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1838), 495-496.
[109] Ruschenberger, *A Voyage Round the World,* 495.

property in an Anglo-American sense, and subjects and foreigners lived on the King's land at his discretion. Numerous Americans, including several successful sugar planting enterprises, argued that they had the rights to their land and that the King had received economic benefits from their operations. The King admitted this, stating that revenue from one plantation in question on the island of Kauai "is greater than that which he previously received from the whole island."[110] Nevertheless, the King would not back down from his position. The merchants yet again invoked the Jones Treaty, stating that it supported the rights of Americans to conduct trade, including the transfer of property. The King refused to accept the merchants' view. He worried that should he grant them property rights for services performed, his royal title would be useless as a result of how much land he would need to part with.[111]

The negotiations ultimately ended inconclusively, and Kennedy offered his own opinion in a letter to the King. Concerning the land dispute, he wrote "that although not expressly stated in the Treaty made by Captain Jones [the rights to transfer land] may be very easily inferred from it, and as it is equally necessary for the interests of these islands, that every foreigner right should be distinctly stated and carefully preserved."[112] He also made several other recommendations to the King. He offered that sugar plantations and other agricultural endeavors would become the best way to ensure future economic growth for the nation. He also recommended that American criminals be not forced into any unfair labor but instead detained and sent to the United States for trial. Though this point represented a bold departure from previous officers' opinions on Hawaiian legal matters, any implications of the enforcement of this idea does not appear in the letter. This way, Kennedy could support the merchants, but not

[110] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 146; Ruschenberger, *A Voyage Round the World,* 497.
[111] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 280.
[112] Ruschenberger, *A Voyage Round the World,* 498.

to the point where he jeopardized the Hawaiian government and the mission they protected. Kennedy also cautioned against the enforcement of any state religion, granting that though the King could set his own laws, other nations such as the United States would be more understanding of Hawai‘i if they allowed more religious freedom.[113]

Just as Downes had done four years prior, Kennedy had made strong suggestions on the King's policies but had not attempted to threaten or coerce him into decisions that were favorable to the American merchants and planters or any other foreign group in Hawai‘i. Though American merchants had been eroding Hawaiian economic independence, the U.S. Navy could not be accused of threatening their political independence. Without more direct military support, the Americans in the Hawaiian Islands needed to respect Hawaiian sovereignty. Multiple U.S. officers had promoted a style of governance similar to that of the United States but nevertheless recognized Hawai‘i as its own sovereign entity. As would be seen over the next few years, British and French officers considered no such restraint when advancing their nations' policy goals in Hawai‘i.

In 1835, the British community erupted in outrage over the confiscation of a property leased by Englishman George Chapman. The reason and details of the confiscation are unknown, but Consul Charlton and several others wrote to their government asking for a warship to settle the matter. Their help arrived shortly after Kennedy's departure in the form of Lord Edward Russel and the *HMS Acteon*. After meeting with Charlton to discuss the matter in more detail, Russel drafted a treaty that would secure the property rights of Englishmen in Hawai‘i.[114] Using the threat of force as a backdrop to negotiations, Russel extracted Kamehameha's signature on a three article treaty that enforced the British position. This treaty allowed British

[113] Ruschenberger, *A Voyage Round the World,* 499-500.
[114] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 147-148.

subjects to bring whatever possessions they desired to and from Hawai‘i. It also forbade the searching or collection of any British property upon the death of its owner, granting the British Consul authority over any unclaimed property. Most importantly, the treaty stated that: “The land on which houses are built is the property of the King, but the King shall have no authority to destroy the houses, or in any way injure the property of any British subject.” The treaty effectively granted British use of Hawaiian land while claiming that in name it remained within the King’s possession. While the treaty charged British subjects to “conform to the laws of these Islands,” Russel left this definition intentionally vague and the treaty’s enforcement violated the King’s stated land policy which had been the “laws of these Islands” since before the arrival of Europeans in Hawai‘i.[115] Russel placed Hawaiian sovereignty in severe jeopardy as British subjects, fueled by their economic rivalry with the Americans could now expand their commercial operations at will within the understanding that their government would militarily support their efforts while the U.S. Navy would not do the same for their American counterparts.

The French government also saw an opportunity to expand their influence in Hawai‘i, signing a similar treaty with the King in 1837.[116] The French captain who signed the treaty reported that the Hawaiian government renewed their ban on Catholicism in 1835. The French government, keen on representing itself to the world as the global defender of Catholicism, ordered Captain Cyrille Pierre Théodore Laplace, known for his heavy-handed diplomacy, and the frigate *l’Artemise* to the Hawaiian Islands to investigate the matter and send a message to the Hawaiian King that France would protect all Catholics within Hawai‘i. LaPlace arrived at his destination on 9 July 1839, landing in Honolulu and speaking to French Consul Jules Dudoit on

[115] “Articles made and agreed on at Honolulu, Island of O‘ahu the 16th of November, 1836,” November 16, 1836, *Punawaiola*.
[116] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 281.

the situation in O‘ahu. Shortly after this meeting, LaPlace sent a letter to the Hawaiian King and chiefs, listing numerous grievances over the treatment of Catholics in the islands, as well as demands which he made on the kingdom on behalf of the French government.[117]

LaPlace first demanded that all Catholics in Hawai‘i be given equal rights to worship as protestants, an echo of Kennedy and Downes’s suggestions. Several of the other demands took on a more retaliatory nature than the first, however. The second called for the construction of a Catholic church in Honolulu, funded by the Hawaiian government but ministered by French Catholic priests. The third demanded the release of all Catholics imprisoned for their religious beliefs. The fourth and most severe article demanded 100,000 francs from the Hawaiian government to be kept on board *l’Artemise* and brought to France until the King had agreed to the other demands. LaPlace’s fifth and final demand announced that a treaty would be signed between France and Hawai‘i aboard *l’Artemise* (negotiations customarily occurred on land at the royal court or Governor Boki’s residence) and full honors would be given by the Hawaiian garrison at Honolulu to the French ship.[118] LaPlace further announced that if the Hawaiian government did not meet his demands within two days, a state of war would exist between the two nations.[119] The Captain then wrote to the U.S. Commercial Agent, Peter Brinsmade, who had replaced John C. Jones, offering asylum for all American citizens aboard *l’Artemise* except the protestant missionaries, who he considered “the authors of the insults given by [King Kamehameha III] to France.” LaPlace declared that he counted the missionaries a part of the

[117] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 152-153.
[118] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands*, 537; Cyrille Pierre Théodore Laplace, *Campagne de circumnavigation de la frégate l'Artémise, pendant les années 1837, 1838, 1839 et 1840, sous le commandement de M. Laplace, Volume 5*, (Paris: Librairie de la Société de Géographie, 1853), 440.
[119] Samuel Northup Castle, *An account of the visit of the French frigate l'Artemise to the Sandwich Islands; July, 1839*, (Honolulu: 1839), 1.

native population and that they would not be protected from a war "which they shall have brought upon this country."[120]

Brinsmade warned the missionaries of LaPlace's classification of them and refusal for protection. The outraged missionaries responded by reminding Brinsmade that they were all American citizens and the three mission charters they possess all originated from American missionary organizations. They requested to be included under the American asylum. Brinsmade replied by offering them protection within his own compound which stood "under the protection of the American flag."[121] Without the support of a U.S. warship, the Commercial Agent could do little else for fear of invoking LaPlace's ire. Though five American merchants including former Agent John C. Jones offered to aid LaPlace in keeping law and order, the official position of the U.S. representative defended the mission. This marked a turning point between the commercial and missionary factions of the American community. The threats of foreign warships would only further unify these two rival groups in the years after 1839.

Desiring to avoid a war at all costs, the King acceded to LaPlace's demands and avoided potential chaotic situation on O'ahu. After a transfer of the amount of money LaPlace demanded, the two signed a treaty between France and Hawai'i on board *l'Artemise.* The treaty forbade the Hawaiian government from trying any French citizen of a crime, leaving all law enforcement against them in the hands of the French Consul and his authorities beyond the detainment of maritime deserters. France received most favored nation status and the Hawaiian government could not excise import duties on their ships at a rate higher than the next most favored nation. The treaty also prohibited the Hawaiian government from outlawing any French alcohol brought into the country, shattering a long-standing system of alcohol restrictions

[120] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 542.
[121] Castle, *An account of the visit of the French frigate l'Artemise,* 2-3.

originating from the missionaries' religious influence. LaPlace left soon after the treaty signing with the future of Hawaiian independence and the safety of the American community in question.[122]

Hawai'i had essentially lost its sovereignty in affairs of commerce within its own borders to the British and French treaties, both enforced by the implication or direct threat of war. U.S. officers taking the approach of Finch, Downes, and Kennedy would be forced to reckon with the changing political situation in the Hawaiian Islands. Unwillingness to intervene in Hawaiian affairs would no longer preserve Hawaiian sovereignty but allow the British and French to make policy decisions that directly affected American citizens. Commodore George C. Read would be the first officer to face this test.

Read's two ship squadron arrived in Honolulu in October of 1839, just three months after LaPlace's departure, on a return trip from Asia as several of the last U.S. Navy visitors had been. Bingham highly anticipated that a U.S. naval officer would intervene in their situation somehow to right the wrong that had been done to the kingdom.[123] Brinsmade too cared deeply about Hawaiian independence and hoped that U.S. military support might protect it from future intrusions.[124] Read and the officers of the Squadron conducted numerous interviews to report about the LaPlace incident to the U.S. government. Beyond this, Read took no action, declaring the incident a matter not suited for the U.S. Navy to act on. The missionaries pleaded with Read to make some effort to ensure their protection once the squadron left, requesting that he investigate their status as citizens. The King also asked Read to support the missionaries and one officer noted that he found opinions condemning the missionaries for LaPlace's actions almost

[122] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 546-551.
[123] Bingham, *A Residence of Twenty-one Years in the Sandwich Islands,* 551.
[124] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 147.

non-existent.[125] Even at the request of his own officers, Read refused to budge, and though he offered the missionaries protection while his squadron remained in port, this amounted to little once he left and another British or French warship might view them as enemies.

The missionaries intended to gather LaPlace's correspondence and publish it in a pamphlet for American public consumption, as they had strong advocates in their mission board sponsors. Every single one of Read's officers protested the Commodore's decision of inaction by signing a statement to the missionaries that they would include at the front of their pamphlet.[126] The officers clearly stated their support for the missionaries and the need for prompt action in their defense. One paragraph read:

> Being most decidedly of opinion that the persons composing the Protestant mission of these islands are American citizens, and, as such, entitled to the protection which our government has never withheld; and with unwavering confidence in the justice which has ever characterized it, we rest assured that any insult offered to this unoffending class will be promptly redressed.[127]

Shortly after the officers submitted their statement, Read's squadron sailed for Tahiti. Much to the disappointment of the missionaries and Brinsmade, their position remained as insecure as it had been before Read's arrival. As the U.S. Navy had thus far failed to act on behalf of American citizens, Brinsmade took matters into his own hands and expressed his concerns to the King. The King responded to Brinsmade by announcing that all special privileges granted to British and French citizens would also be granted to U.S. citizens for their protection. This meant that any attempt to criminally charge or harass American citizens by foreign governments would directly violate U.S. privileges within the Kingdom of Hawai‘i. The combined efforts of U.S. missionaries and naval officers such as Jones and Finch to gain the trust

[125] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations,* 280; Fitch Waterman Taylor, *The Flag-ship: Or, A Voyage Around the World in the United States Frigate Columbia* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1840), 310.
[126] Castle, *An account of the visit of the French frigate l'Artemise,* iii-iv.
[127] Taylor, *The Flag-ship,* 320-321.

of the King paid off. When Commodore Read failed to protect the American missionaries, the King stepped in and offered what little help he could give them. Hawaiian sovereignty had declined greatly over the previous three years, but the uncoerced status of the United States as the King's favored nation only strengthened.

Not every U.S. officer viewed the missionaries as innocent in the events of the 1830s. The U.S. Exploring Expedition under Lieutenant Charles Wilkes visited O'ahu in late 1840, the first U.S. naval presence since Read's departure. Wilkes echoed Read's attitudes toward Hawaiian affairs, refraining from any involvement, especially considering the nature of his exploration mission and the presence of French and British warships in Honolulu at the time. Though Wilkes befriended several missionaries during the expedition's stay in O'ahu, he privately commented that they had used their influence on the Hawaiian King and Regents in previous years and also influenced large congregations to unnecessarily interfere with government affairs. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions at least partially shared this assessment, as they had recalled Bingham to Boston earlier in the year for interference in Hawaiian government affairs. Wilkes viewed the increased French and British influence over Hawai'i a natural progression from the missionary influence, one which promoted "harmony" in the islands.[128]

Whether or not the missionaries interfered too much into Hawaiian affairs, their influence yielded two results in Hawaiian foreign relations. First, they improved the relations between the King and the United States. Second, the highly religious nature of the government angered the French government and may have also reflected poorly in the eyes of the British community. Great Britain and France permanently changed Hawai'i's interactions with the rest of the world.

[128] Charles Wilkes, *Autobiography of Rear Admiral Charles Wilkes, U.S. Navy, 1798-1877, (Washington: Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1978)*, 497-498.

Gone were the days of the Jones treaty in which the Hawaiian government could negotiate with a western power as two sovereign nations. The collapse of the sandalwood trade forced Hawai‘i to rely on western planters and whalers for their economic success. These westerners could now exploit Hawaiian trade with limited taxes and fees and only needed to legally answer to their own authorities. By 1840, a three-way race for control of the Hawaiian Islands was under way between the United States, Great Britain, and France.

The five U.S. naval officers to visit Hawai‘i after Jones set a precedent for non-interference in Hawaiian affairs. The hands-off approach to disputes worked initially for Finch, Downes, and Kennedy, as outside forces did not yet threaten Hawaiian sovereignty and the actors involved were either American or Hawaiian. The one notable success of these officers lay in the dwindling mentions of a desertion problem near the end of the decade, but far greater threats soon threatened the peace and stability of the islands. These officers noticed the potential for British or French intervention if the strong-willed Hawaiian King and his missionary advisors did not tread more carefully around foreign powers, but they did not enforce this position.[129] As a result, incidents between the Hawaiian government and foreign citizens sparked harsh reactions from the British and French governments, with some blaming the influence of American missionaries. Read and Wilkes' failure to slow down the rapid British and French intrusion only emboldened the powers to promote their interests further at the expense of Hawaiian sovereignty and the American community. The 1840s and 50s presented serious threats to Hawaiian independence, and only careful but decisive action in the mold of Thomas ap Catesby Jones could preserve the Hawaiian nation and everything Americans had built in the Hawaiian Islands.

[129] Ruschenberger, *A Voyage Round the World,* 499-500; Warriner, *Cruise of the United States Frigate Potomac,* 236.

CHAPTER III

THE DEFENSE OF HAWAIʻI

(1841-1851)

By the 1840s, Hawaiʻi represented the staging area for a massive American commercial empire in the Pacific Ocean. In 1843, 358 American whalers made port in Honolulu compared to just 82 British and 7 French vessels.[130] The next year, the value of 373 American whalers passing through the Hawaiian Islands was estimated at over $18,000,000.[131] Other American vessels used Hawaiʻi as an area for rest and resupply after the arduous journey around Cape Horn before bringing back a myriad of goods from China valuing roughly $9,000,000 per year.[132] The American protestant mission possessed 79 stations from which to preach, six schools, and two printing houses, which they used for translation, all in addition to the unquestionable influence they held in the Hawaiian royal court.[133] The United States held a clear economic and political advantage over any British and French attempts to control the Hawaiian Islands, but they did not commit the military capabilities to support these civilian achievements.

In 1843, four years after the LaPlace incident, the U.S. Navy still only kept a handful of vessels on Pacific station and rarely more than two of a frigate's size or greater. The security

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[130] *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1, 1841-1843*, Eds. Kenneth E. Shewmaker and Kenneth R. Stevens, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1983), 852.
[131] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 281.
[132] John Tyler, "December 30, 1842: Message to Congress Regarding US-Hawaiian Relations," Miller Center, February 23, 2017, https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-30-1842-message-congress-regarding-us-hawaiian.
[133] *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1*, 852.

concerns of the Pacific as a whole had brought a larger naval presence in the Pacific in the 1830s, but they were often spread far across the Pacific on specific missions (Downes and Read had both been on such missions to Sumatra before visiting O‘ahu). Even if the U.S. Navy sent a ship to the Hawaiian Islands, they rarely visited more frequently than 2-3 year intervals when they were a convenient stop on a longer cruise. Read and Wilkes’ inaction signified that U.S. naval officers were not willing to risk sparking incidents with foreign governments to ensure the security of the American community in Hawai‘i, as those decisions might reflect poorly on themselves. Without an explicitly stated foreign policy from the U.S. government, these officers had no reason to promote a policy themselves. As the 1830s demonstrated, Thomas ap Catesby Jones had been the exception to officer-diplomats rather than the rule.

Kamehameha III and Brinsmade felt discontented by Read and Wilkes’s refusal to intervene in the LaPlace crisis and agreed upon formal recognition by the United States as a potential solution to move forward. The United States, Great Britain, and France did not formally recognize the kingdom and exchanged no formal diplomatic officers, rather placing Commercial Agents and trade Consuls whose jobs pertained far more to commerce in Honolulu than to the establishment of relations with the King and his government. Brinsmade visited Washington in March of 1842 with a letter from Kamehameha III. The letter proposed a tripartite diplomatic system to President John Tyler which would allow the three major powers vying for influence in Hawai‘i to keep balance in the country. Should a dispute with one of the three powers arise in Hawai‘i, the other two would mediate the incident and find a reasonable outcome for all parties involved. Using the LaPlace affair as an example, Charlton and Brinsmade would have reported to their respective superiors who would have then sent envoys to Paris to settle the dispute. The system, though complicated and requiring agreement between all

three powers, proposed a solution to the rising tensions that gave the three an equal seat at the negotiating table. Tyler remained too unconvinced of the importance of such an endeavor to have his Secretary of State Daniel Webster approach the British or French about the issue. The other two powers rejected Kamehameha III's ideas a few months later as well and Brinsmade's mission concluded unsuccessfully.[134]

Despite Webster's inaction on the question of Hawaiian sovereignty, the King's letter found a notable sympathetic ear within the British Empire. Sir George Simpson, Governor of the Hudson Bay Company's North American territory, visited the Hawaiian Islands in early 1842 while on a global circumnavigation. Agreeing with the tripartite plan, Simspon suggested that the King send a diplomatic mission first to the United States and then meet Simpson in Great Britain near the end of the year. The King chose Chief Timoteo Haʻalilio and American missionary advisor William Richards (who had replaced Bingham's role in the mission) to send on this trip. Arriving in December of 1842, the pair contacted Secretary Webster who met with them and asked him to place their requests in writing.[135] The two wrote Webster stating the King's concern of the lack of U.S. governmental recognition of the Jones Treaty, by which the King "nevertheless during the last Sixteen years governed himself."[136] They argued that Hawaiʻi had civilized by western standards, creating a written language, adopting the Christian religion, and most recently adopting a formal constitution with a western-style judiciary in 1840. To Richards and Haʻalilio, these developments justified the recognition of Hawaiʻi as a sovereign

[134] *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 853-854.
[135] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 191-192.
[136] "Richards and Haʻalilio to Webster, 14 December 1842," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 866.

and independent state, which would in theory protect it from the gunboat diplomacy it had endured since 1836.[137]

Webster replied that the United States would not formalize relations or sign any treaty with the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, though he acknowledged the “numerous acts of hospitality to the citizens of the United States” that Hawaiians had bestowed. He also declared that the policy of the United States did not approve of any foreign interference in Hawaiian affairs and that the President would not rule out publicly declaring that the Hawaiian government “ought to be respected.”[138] Webster also wrote the U.S. Minister to Great Britain Edward Everett to alert him of the Hawaiian diplomats’ trip to London. Everett had been heavily interested in the Pacific, expressing his concerns about British expansionism there the month previous. In particular, Everett viewed the British annexation of New Zealand in 1840 as a precursor to similar potential actions in the Hawaiian and Society Islands. He also proposed a tripartite diplomatic system similar to Kamehameha’s possibly signifying a meeting with Brinsmade, who was in London at the time.[139]

Tyler addressed Congress on 30 December 1842, expressing his interest in establishing a policy on the Hawaiian Islands since they lay “much nearer to this continent than the other” and American vessels constituted “five-sixths of all which annually visit [the Hawaiian Islands].” Tyler declared that the United States had no intention of colonizing or controlling Hawai‘i in any way, highly valuing the independence of the kingdom. He added that the United States would be “dissatisfied … at any attempt by another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to

[137] “Richards and Ha‘alilio to Webster, 14 December 1842,” *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 868-869.
[138] “Webster to Richards and Ha‘alilio, 19 December 1842,” *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 870-871.
[139] “Webster to Everett, 29 December 1842,” *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 871.

take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government." Concerned about the future of the China trade due to the recent British victory in the First Opium War, Tyler did not want Hawai'i to slip into European hands in the same manner, especially since the United States held a larger share of commercial activity in the islands. Beyond rhetoric, Tyler recommended that Brimstead be given a moderate financial allowance so that "American citizens may have respectable authority to which to apply for redress in case of injury to their persons and property."[140] This likely referred to the LaPlace incident, as Bingham had written to the President on the matter in 1841 and Brinsmade included the terms of the LaPlace treaty in his own report.[141] Tyler also made several recommendations regarding the American presence in China and put forth a convincing argument that from the U.S. perspective, American commercial interests in the Pacific were under attack by France and Great Britain.[142] This speech marked the first real national policy toward Hawai'i from the U.S. government, which came to be known as the "Tyler Doctrine."

While Hawaiian and U.S. diplomats attempted to gather support for a tripartite-Hawaiian treaty, Anglo-American tensions in Hawai'i reached a boiling point. The commercial rivalry between the two powers created much animosity throughout the 1830s and by 1840, an American merchant claimed that "were the English superior in number to the Americans the latter would suffer a great deal or open war would ensue." A number of incidents between British citizens and the kingdom occurred, most notable of which involved Consul Charlton, who physically assaulted the American editor of a local publication in early 1841. The editor had made remarks on Charlton's complaints about British citizens being forced to give up their

[140] Tyler, "December 30, 1842: Message to Congress."
[141] *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 853.
[142] Tyler, "December 30, 1842"

servants for Hawaiian public works on O‘ahu. The Governor of O‘ahu fined Charlton $6, though the Consul complained that he had no such authority to do so (likely referring to the Russel Treaty of 1836). After the Departure of Richards and Ha‘alilio, Charlton determined that time was running out for British interests in the Hawaiian Islands. If the diplomats were able to successfully plead their case before the three powers, then the status quo of American-supported Hawaiian independence would keep British interests at a disadvantage.[143]

Worse yet for the British community in the Hawaiian Islands, the new Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen established a different policy regarding the Kingdom of Hawai‘i. In a letter written by his Under-Secretary Viscount Canning to the Second Secretary of the Admiralty, Canning stated that Aberdeen sought to promote Hawaiian self-governance by using the Royal Navy as a force for security and dispute resolution. He viewed an increased naval presence as both beneficial for Hawai‘i and Great Britain, but not for the annexation of Hawai‘i.[144] Charlton sailed for London on 27 September 1842 with the intent of pleading with his government for military intervention into the situation rather than acceptance of Hawaiian sovereignty, which he viewed as merely an American scheme. On his voyage, Charlton reportedly discussed his plans with passing captains, claiming to one that he expected the British annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and sharing his ideas with Royal Navy Captain Lord George Paulet.[145]

Before leaving the Hawaiian Islands, Charlton left Alexander Simpson (a distant cousin of Sir George Simpson) in charge of the British Consulate in Hawai‘i, though the Hawaiian government refused to recognize him as he had not been appointed by the Foreign Office but by

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[143] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 208-209.

[144] “Canning to Barrow, 4 October 1842,” *Report of the Historical Commission of the Territory of Hawaii,* (Honolulu: Honolulu Star-Bulletin Ltd., 1925), 34-35.

[145] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 210-211; Alexander Simpson, *The Sandwich Islands: Progress of Events Since Their Discovery by Captain Cook. Their Occupation by Lord George Paulet. Their Value and Importance,* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1843), 58.

Charlton. A few weeks after Charlton's departure, one of his political enemies brought a suit against him for around $10,000 regarding land that Charlton had claimed. Simpson complained bitterly about the case launched in Charlton's absence, sending word of the proceedings to a British Consul in Mexico who then forwarded Simpson's letter to Rear Admiral Richard Thomas, the commander of the British Pacific Squadron. Thomas ordered Lord Paulet to investigate the matter. Paulet had previously met with Charlton who influenced him to take aggressive actions against the Hawaiian government. Thomas had yet to receive Canning's directive on the nature of Royal Navy security missions in the Hawaiian Islands and sent Paulet there with no warnings about heavy-handed diplomacy.[146]

Paulet and the *HMS Carysfort* arrived in Honolulu on 10 February 1843 and soon welcomed Alexander Simpson aboard. Simpson brought before Paulet several documents regarding the Charlton case and several other grievances against the Hawaiian government, including their failure to recognize his consulship. Gerrit P. Judd, a longtime missionary doctor and minister in the King's government arrived to counter Simpson's narrative, but Paulet refused to speak with any Hawaiian official other than the King. Paulet also politely declined to speak with French Consul Jules Dudoit and Acting U.S. Commercial Agent William Hooper, who acted in place of Brinsmade while he negotiated the tripartite treaty in London. Paulet then sent word to the governor reiterating his intention to speak only with the King, only to find that he was away visiting other islands.[147]

On 13 February, the American sloop-of-war *USS Boston* commanded by Master-Commandant John C. Long arrived in Honolulu from China, initially much to the relief of many Americans in both the missionary and merchant communities. In the mold of Read and Wilkes,

[146] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 211-214.
[147] Simpson, *The Sandwich Islands*, 74-76.

Long refused to intervene in the situation, choosing to monitor the situation from his ship.[148] Kamehameha III arrived in Honolulu on 16 February and immediately received a letter from Paulet asking for an audience.[149] To Paulet's surprise, the King referred him to Judd, whom Paulet once again refused to meet.[150] In his reply, Paulet listed demands of the King he wished to make in person, giving Kamehameha III just one day to reply. The demands centered around several grievances Simpson had brought before Paulet. The Captain ordered the King to end the case against Charlton and prevent any confiscation of property associated with it. He also required the Hawaiian government to recognize Simpson as Consul until Charlton's return and, in response to criminal cases against British citizens in the 1830s, demanded that Englishmen could only be jailed if they had committed a felony by British law.[151] The last demand hurt Kamehameha III especially hard, as it overrode the nation's new legal system in place from the ratification of the constitution in 1840. Paulet also sent Long a message informing him that he would attack Honolulu the following day if his demands were not met. There is no record of a response from Long, who refused to intervene in the situation for the duration of his stay.[152] Long did hand the notice to Hooper, who spread word around Honolulu of a potential conflict.[153]

The King took the only diplomatically feasible course of action faced with a hostile western warship in his waters. He agreed to Paulet's demands under protest, while mentioning the Ha'alileo-Richards mission to London and stating that he would plead the kingdom's case

[148] Simpson, *The Sandwich Islands*, 76.
[149] "Paulet to Kamehameha III, 16 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers, Volume 31*, (H.M. Stationery Office, 1858), 1024.
[150] "Kamehameha III to Paulet, 17 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1024.
[151] "Paulet to Kamehameha III, 17 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1024-1025.
[152] "Paulet to Long, 17 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1026.
[153] "Hooper to Kearny, 11 July 1843," *Senate Documents, Otherwise Publ. as Public Documents and Executive Documents 14th Congress, 1st Session-48th Congress, 2nd Session and Special Session, Volume 4*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1846), 41.

before British government.[154] Simpson moved quickly with the King's acquiescence to Paulet and proposed a 299-year lease for Charlton's land claims, as well as the reversal of several judicial decisions against British citizens. This mockery of Hawaiian sovereignty created a situation in which the King governed in name only.[155]

Faced with an impossible dilemma in which he either started a war or faced a potential lawless situation with British semi-rule, the King announced on 25 February to Paulet that he would cede him the Hawaiian Islands to govern on behalf of Great Britain.[156] The King also sent a letter to Long, greatly distressed but hopeful that his rule would eventually be restored.[157] Paulet accepted the King's proposal and formally annexed the Kingdom of Hawai‘i. Later that day, he had the Union Jack raised over Honolulu and announced that all Hawaiians would be considered British subjects. He organized a government centered around the existing Hawaiian structure advised by a commission of British citizens until he received word from the British Foreign Office regarding the governance of the islands.[158]

Long left O‘ahu shortly after the annexation and the Hawaiian Islands remained loosely under British control for the duration of the spring of 1843. With a failure on the part of a U.S. Navy warship to intervene, it appeared Paulet had been spared a confrontation over his annexation. He soon encountered a more determined opponent in the frigate *USS Constellation* and Commodore Lawrence Kearny. Sailing to Hawai‘i on a return trip from China, Kearny arrived in Honolulu on 7 July 1843. Unlike his predecessors in Hawai‘i, Kearny's mission to China fell in the immediate aftermath of the Opium War, when the British had secured exclusive

[154] "Kamehameha III to Paulet, 18 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1026.
[155] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 214-215.
[156] "Kamehameha III to Paulet, 25 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1027.
[157] "Kamehameha III to Long, 25 February 1843," *Foreign relations of United States, 1894, affairs in Hawaii Appendix II*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1894), 51.
[158] "Paulet Proclamation, 25 February 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1028-1029.

commercial privileges by force.[159] Unable to secure a treaty with the Chinese himself, Kearny left Canton concerned about the future state of U.S. trade in the country.[160] Upon Kearny's arrival, Hooper informed the Commodore of the situation and sent him several documents relating to the incident, asking him to form an opinion as to whether "the United States will adopt any extraordinary measures to secure to his Majesty Kamehameha III the exclusive sovereignty of these islands." Among the documents included President Tyler's address to Congress which Secretary Webster had forwarded to the Hawaiian Islands in March.[161]

Kearny replied three days later, stating that the incident invited "the attention of the government of the United States" and attached a formal protest which he asked Hooper to publish on the island. The Commodore appeared to be especially concerned with Paulet's apparent lack of precautions for the safety of American citizens in the face of potential violence. In closing, Kearny wrote:

> It appears to me that when an act is to be attempted, regardless of the rights of others, especially a case involving great and certain distress, by letting loose the bonds of government, it becomes a duty to restrain it a reasonable time by force, to the extent of that force, be it ever so small. While the United States government refrains from entangling alliances with other nations, and grasps at no power or territory abroad, it would seem but reasonable, that, having no portion of the spoils at the cutting up of the world, it should allow no infringement upon the rights of its citizens.[162]

Though acknowledging U.S. policy to remain unentangled in foreign conflicts, Kearny departed from Read, Wilkes, and Long's views on how this interacted with American citizens abroad. Paulet's decision to give Kamehameha III just one day to respond before threatening to commence hostilities left American citizens little time to react and placed them in danger. Kearny viewed this as an act of force and felt that appropriate force could be used in response if

[159] *Papers of Daniel Webster,* 878.
[160] "Kearny to Sturgis, 19 May 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 37-39.
[161] "Hooper to Kearny, 7 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 39-40.
[162] "Kearny to Hooper, 10 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 40.

needed. For the first time since Master-Commandant Jones in 1826, a U.S. naval officer suggested that force could be used as a means of protecting American interests in the Hawaiian Islands, though this time against the most powerful empire in the world.[163]

Hooper published Kearny's protest and the Commodore sent a copy to Paulet as well.[164] The protest, addressed as a public letter to King Kamehameha III, held the British provisional government, including Paulet and the Hawaiian King, responsible for any injury or injustice done to American residents of the Hawaiian Islands.[165] In reality, Kearny did not hold the King accountable but simply recognized the state of shared rule between Paulet and Kamehameha III. The Commodore actually invited the King and several Hawaiian chiefs aboard *Constellation* on 14 July, raising the Hawaiian flag and honoring him with a royal salute from the ship's guns. The incident offended Paulet, who threatened the King that he would forfeit British protection if he allowed himself to be saluted under a flag other than the Union Jack again.[166]

The British tested Kearny's resolve the same day as the King's visit when they arrested a sailor from the *Constellation* for illegally horseracing, imprisoning him in the Honolulu fort over which flew the Union Jack.[167] Kearny wrote to the Governor Kekauluohi of O'ahu demanding American involvement in any trial of the sailor and complaining of his imprisonment in a British fort.[168] While his letter did not secure the sailor's freedom, the Governor disavowed the actions of the British occupation of the fort, signifying his own protest against Paulet's actions.[169]

On 19 July, Hooper sent Kearny a letter signed by an impressive number of American sugar planters, whalers, and other commercial interests in which they thanked him for his interest

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[163] "Kearny to Hooper, 10 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 40.
[164] "Kearny to Paulet, 11 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 42.
[165] "Kearny to Kamehameha III, 11 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 42-43.
[166] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 219; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 282.
[167] "Hooper to Kearny, 14 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 43.
[168] "Kearny to Kekauluohi, 14 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 43-44.
[169] "Kekauluohi to Kearny, 15 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 44.

in their protection and asked that he remain in Honolulu until he could be relieved by another U.S. warship or the incident had been resolved.[170] Upset with the U.S. Navy's relations with the missionary community in the previous decades, the merchants had now rallied behind Kearny when their own security was at stake. The letter represented a small victory for the work several officers had done to increase trust among the merchant community. Kearny agreed to remain in port, not sparking any incident that Paulet could use to commence hostilities but ensuring that the rights of American citizens would remain protected.[171]

As Paulet and Kearny engaged in a tense standoff in Honolulu, another American officer heard of the trouble in the Hawaiian Islands. Thomas ap Catesby Jones, now a Captain commanding the Pacific Squadron learned of Paulet's annexation in April or May.[172] Jones had only recently returned from his own incident in Monterey, Alta California. The previous September, Jones had received word while stationed in Peru that the United States and Mexico had either gone to war or were on the brink of hostilities. Jones and British Admiral Thomas had both been concerned about a possible French annexation of California and shortly after the news of war, Thomas sailed from Peru without revealing his intended destination. Jones met with U.S. diplomat James Pickett who discussed newspapers and diplomatic correspondence that seemed to confirm a breakdown of U.S.-Mexican relations and a possible British operation in California. He then conferred with the other officers in his squadron and they cited the Monroe doctrine as a justification for an operation in California.[173] The squadron sailed for Monterey, arriving on 19 October 1842. Jones found the port poorly defended but still under Mexican control, securing its

[170] "Hooper to Kearny, 19 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 45-46.
[171] Kearny to Hooper, 20 July 1843," *Senate Documents 14th-48th Congress, Vol. 4,* 47.
[172] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones*, 116.
[173] Gene A. Smith, "Thomas Ap Catesby Jones and the First Implementation of the Monroe Doctrine," *Southern California Quarterly* 76, no. 2 (1994), 139-140.

surrender a day after his arrival. Shortly afterward, Jones discovered more recent newspapers that mentioned no such hostilities between Mexico, the United States, or Great Britain. Neither the war nor British operation turned out to be true, and Jones had no choice but to accept his embarrassing position and return the port to Mexican control.[174]

Upon returning to South America, Jones received news that he would be replaced as Squadron commander, though not through official channels. He had expected to be relieved due to his diplomatic blunder and waited until June 1843 for his replacement or any orders from Washington. Now eight months removed from Monterey and over a month into his knowledge of events in Hawai‘i, Jones grew frustrated, knowing that he was well suited for a mission to Hawai‘i due to his prior experience there. He decided to sail for the Hawaiian Islands aboard the frigate *USS United States* on 21 June. Rather than sail directly for Honolulu, Jones arrived off the coast of the island of Hawai‘i on 22 July. There he used his missionary connections to gather accurate information before potentially charging into a second port without a proper grasp of the situation. After entertaining and discussing Paulet's annexation with several missionaries for eleven days, Jones sailed into Honolulu only to find that the situation had been resolved.[175]

The importance of Jones's cruise to the Hawaiian Islands may be easily overlooked in comparison to Kearny's actions in Honolulu, but Jones also played an important role in the defense of Hawai‘i without realizing he had done so. Around the same time Jones left Callao, Peru, for the Hawaiian Islands, Admiral Thomas also sailed his flagship, the *HMS Dublin* for the islands from Valparaiso, Chile. Thomas's knowledge of Jones's exact whereabouts cannot be certain, but the Admiral heard about Jones's actions at Monterey and his motives in great detail, expressing concern to the Admiralty about this potentially reckless anti-British presence in the

[174] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones*, 105-112.
[175] Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones*, 116-117.

Pacific. Jones's prioritization of checking British expansion in the Pacific and his interest in the Hawaiian situation likely caused Thomas to panic and put an end to Paulet's occupation.[176]

Thomas arrived in Honolulu on 25 July, nearly two weeks into a Kearny-Paulet standoff in the harbor. The next day he sought an audience with the King and on July 31, declared that the independence of the Kingdom of Hawai'i had been restored.[177] Thomas and the King then signed a treaty that solved the disputes leading to the annexation and established a legal solution suitable to both parties. Future cases against British citizens would be settled within the Hawaiian court system, but half of the jury would be made up of other British citizens named by the Consul.[178] After the arrival of Jones on 4 August, Thomas's timing appeared even more fortunate. A situation in which two U.S. warships, one of which was led by a thoroughly anti-British and pro-Hawaiian Jones, cornered a hot-headed Paulet in Honolulu harbor may have caused the latter to commit to a rash course of action that sparked hostilities. Regardless of the other possible outcomes, the two sides avoided bloodshed and exchanged invitations for dinners aboard Thomas's and Jones's ships.[179] In addition to Jones and Kearny's new goodwill mission with the British, Jones managed to secure support from the Hawaiian government for the permanent storage of naval supplies in Honolulu. He reported this success to the Secretary of the Navy and recommended that a naval depot be established on O'ahu.[180] On 15 August, Hooper wrote Secretary Webster declaring the crisis over.[181] He noted that both the King of Hawai'i and the American community greatly appreciated Kearny and the U.S. government's resolve.[182]

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[176] Gapp, "The Kind-Eyed Chief," 112-114.
[177] "Thomas to Kamehameha III, 31 July 1843," *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1029-1032.
[178] *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1032-1034.
[179] "Jones to Upshur, 9 August 1843," *Letters Rec'd SoN from Commanding Officers of Squadrons,* microfilm, National Archives, Reel 31.
[180] "Jones to Upshur, 21 November 1843," *Commanding Officers of Squadrons*, Reel 31.
[181] Daniel Webster was no longer Secretary of State by this time.
[182] "Hooper to Webster, 15 August 1843," *Foreign relations of United States, 1894*, 55.

From the perspective of the British government, the Paulet affair had simply been a major misunderstanding carried out by a single overzealous officer. The policy of the Foreign Office had been clearly stated as to not threaten Hawaiian sovereignty. Once the opportunity presented itself though, their plans changed significantly. A Foreign Office message to Ambassador to the United States Henry Fox dated 3 June 1843, stated that Paulet's seizure was unlawful and reiterated their support for Hawaiian independence, asking Fox to give the United States assurances of this policy. They also instructed him to "compel the Chief of the Hawaiian Islands to redress whatever acts of injustice may have been committed against British subjects by that Chief, or his Ministers or Agents, either arbitrarily, or under the false colour of lawful proceedings."[183] This letter shows that the British had been interested in Hawaiian independence to maintain good relations with the United States and France, but would have taken advantage of Hawai'i once given the chance. Even assuming Aberdeen's foreign policy truly promoted Hawaiian sovereignty, his predecessor Lord Palmerston, who had overseen the First Opium War and the annexation of New Zealand, would return as Foreign Secretary in 1846. U.S. diplomat in Peru James Pickett strongly warned against potential future British colonization attempts in Hawai'i in a letter to the Secretary of State in 1844, given the French annexations in the Pacific in previous years.[184] Kearny and Jones may not have prevented an annexation in 1843, but their actions demonstrated that the United States would use its naval forces to protect the sovereignty of Hawai'i and the American communities therein, dissuading future British governments from attempting to seize the islands.

[183] "Foreign Office to Fox, 3 June 1843," *Report of the Historical Commission,* 38.
[184] "Pickett to Upshur, 23 April 1844," Clyde N. Wilson, ed, *The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume XVIII: 1844,* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 317-318.

The most significant legacy of Kearny and Jones's actions lies in the treaty signed in Paris in November 1843. The British and French agreed to a bilateral commitment to Hawaiian sovereignty, each serving as a check on the intervention of the other. Notably the United States did not agree to support such a plan as had been originally intended by Richards and Haʻalileo.[185] The United States had successfully upheld the Tyler doctrine and convinced the other two powers interested in Hawaiʻi to swear against colonization of the islands. The King of Hawaiʻi did not forget the courtesy shown him by Kearny, and Jones secured a future with close Hawaiian-U.S. Navy relations. The Paulet episode concluded in a resounding diplomatic victory for the United States and the U.S. Navy Officer-diplomat.

Just after the Officer-diplomats' greatest triumph the necessity of the role disappeared. Before leaving office in the Spring of 1843, Secretary Webster appointed George Brown as the U.S. Commissioner to the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi, a full-time salaried diplomat. Brown did not arrive until well after the Paulet affair, but received detailed instructions on U.S. foreign policy regarding the Hawaiian Islands. Webster warned Brown that Hawaiian sovereignty could not be guaranteed and directed Brown to frustrate any foreign attempts to interact with Hawaiʻi in ways that were detrimental to the American presence there. Brown would also be responsible for the gathering of intelligence on foreign agents to be able to anticipate any potential attempts at colonization.[186] Though the presence of the U.S. Navy in Hawaiʻi was set to increase, the role of naval officers shifted away from diplomacy and now worked closely with the new State Department official in residence.

[185] Sylvester K. Stevens, *American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1898,* (Harrisburg, PA: Archives Publishing Company of Pennsylvania, 1945), 19-20.
[186] "Webster to Brown, 15 March 1843," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 1,* 873-876.

Despite the favorable outcome of the Paulet affair and bilateral treaty, Commissioner Brown reported in 1844 that the Hawaiians still feared the potential of a foreign warship to place heavy demands on them should a Consul and naval officer conspire to do so.[187] The need for the U.S. Navy as a foreign policy deterrent still remained. The Navy continued to fill its security role in less exciting circumstances than those in 1843. In 1845, a dispute between the American authorities and the Hawaiian government arose over a rape case, in which an American citizen had been charged and not granted a jury trial.[188] Secretary of State Calhoun wrote to Brown that the United States should receive most favored nation status in such cases, meaning a jury trial with significant American representation.[189] The Hawaiian government refused to negotiate the matter with Brown so Pacific Squadron commander, Commodore John D. Sloat, sailed for Honolulu, arriving in October of 1845 on the *USS Savannah*. Sloat found a situation in which Brown and Judd would not speak to one another and accusations of slander had been flying for weeks. Sloat met with both Americans and Hawaiian officials over the course of October before arriving at a decision that the Hawaiian government should allow American juries to try the U.S. citizens just as the French and British had secured for their own people. Despite their disagreements on the case, Sloat left a positive impression on the King, though Brown resigned from his position, leaving Hooper in charge of diplomatic affairs temporarily.[190]

Brown's replacement, Alexander Ten Eyck, arrived the following year aboard the *USS Congress* under the command of Commodore Robert F. Stockton, though nothing about this visit

[187] "Brown to Upshur, 16 January 1844," *The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume XVIII,* 4-9.
[188] "Brown to Calhoun, 9 September 1844," Clyde N. Wilson, ed, *The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume XIX: 1844*, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1990*)*, 722.
[189] "Calhoun to Brown, 20 January 1845," Clyde N. Wilson, ed, *The Papers of John C. Calhoun, Volume XXI: 1845*, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 157-158.
[190] "Sloat to Bancroft, 25 November 1845," *Officers of Squadrons*, microfilm, National Archives, Reel 33; Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 73.

is noteworthy beyond the new Commissioner.[191] In late 1846, Captain "Mad Jack" Percival returned to the Hawaiian Islands aboard the *USS Constitution.* Avoiding diplomatic disputes this time, Percival agreed at Judd's request to have Marine Lieutenant I.W. Curtis survey O'ahu for potential fortifications against foreign aggression. Curtis identified Pearl Harbor as an ideal location for a fort and naval base.[192] Shortly after Percival's departure, Commodore James Biddle aboard the *USS Columbus* stopped in Honolulu after being recalled from Asia to join operations in the Mexican War. Commissioner Ten Eyck sought Biddle's support in negotiating a treaty as harsh as the British and French treaties of the 1830s. Biddle gave Ten Eyck his verbal support before leaving for Valparaiso, Chile, to rendezvous with the Pacific Squadron. Ten Eyck's attempts insulted the Hawaiian government, a situation that the Commissioner then made when he published disparaging statements about the King. Kamehameha III dismissed him shortly after and Ten Eyck's successor negotiated a more reasonable and successful treaty in 1849.[193] The Mexican War pulled the Pacific Squadron away from the Hawaiian Islands and the reduced diplomatic role of the U.S. Navy meant fewer visits to the area. It appeared as though the need for the Navy's protection of the American community might cease, but renewed Franco-Hawaiian tensions boiled over in 1849.

The French government appointed a new Consul to Hawai'i, Guillaume Patrice Dillon, who arrived in February 1848. The government charged Dillon with protecting the Catholic mission in the Hawaiian Islands, building friendly relationships with Hawaiians and foreigners alike, and ratifying an 1846 treaty that French diplomats negotiated with the King concerning French juries in trials of French citizens. Dillon did ratify the treaty, which replaced the harsh

[191] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 283.
[192] Johnson, *Thence Round Cape Horn*, 72; Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 283.
[193] Long, *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations*, 283; Smith, *Thomas ap Catesby Jones*, 143.

LaPlace treaty of 1839, but he quickly failed his second objective and alienated himself from the Hawaiian government. The Consul complained bitterly about liquor restrictions in the country, namely the import prohibition and heavy taxes on internal trade. He also protested the Hawaiian policy of having official documents written only in Hawaiian and English. Dillon pressed these issues for over a year before the King decided to appoint American James Jarves as an envoy to France, to negotiate these issues with the French government directly. In response, Dillon reported to his superiors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as to the French Pacific Squadron. The former severely reprimanded him for failing to establish good relations in Hawai‘i and limited his role to advocating for the Catholic mission. The French Navy responded entirely opposite, as the Pacific commander Rear Admiral Legoarant de Tromelin arrived in the Hawaiian Islands with two frigates in August 1849.[194]

Dillon updated De Tromelin on his perspective of the situation and the Admiral reached out to the King for an audience. The King refused, having committed to negotiating with the French government in Paris. On 21 August, the U.S. sloop-of-war *USS Preble* commanded by Master-Commandant James Glynn entered Honolulu on a return voyage from China and Japan. Any hopes of aid from Glynn appeared to quickly evaporate, as the sloop's effective crew had been severely reduced by scurvy and Glynn sent many ashore to the hospital in Honolulu.[195] Not expecting American interference, Dillon and De Tromelin issued the King an ultimatum the next day, which gave the King the option to address Dillon's concerns or have Hawai‘i placed back within the LaPlace treaty.

Kamehameha III ignored the French demands and on 25 August, De Tromelin's frigates prepared to bombard Honolulu's fort. The hospital caring for Glynn's sailors was situated next to

[194] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 389-393.
[195] Warren Goodale, "Honolulu in 1853," *Papers of the Hawaiian Historical Society*, no. 10, (2 July 1897), 5.

the fort, causing the Commander to interfere with De Tromelin's plans. The *Preble* quickly maneuvered near one of the French frigates and prepared to give it as full a broadside as the shorthanded crew could muster. Glynn reportedly threatened that if the French fired on the fort, the *Preble* would "blow them out of the water."[196] Despite his likely inability to make good on the threat against two frigates, Glynn convinced De Tromelin to avoid an incident with the United States. The Admiral instead landed marines and sailors ashore and captured the Honolulu fort and several key government buildings, though he stopped short of annexing the kingdom. With the safety of his crew guaranteed, Glynn decided not to intervene against the French landing. The King agreed to negotiate but rejected most of Dillon's demands. Having been unsuccessful in the enforcing the demands, De Tromelin officially declared the Treaty of 1846 null and the LaPlace treaty to be in effect. The Admiral confiscated the Hawaiian schooner *Kamehameha* (worth a little over $100,000) as collateral for reparations involving French citizens in the Hawaiian Islands. De Tromelin left the King in an unsure position about his kingdom's future relations with France.[197]

Though the French government officially disavowed De Tromelin's treaty declaration, the British Foreign Office under Lord Palmerston, who under the bilateral treaty could have served as a check to French actions, viewed the De Tromelin incident as acting on legitimate French grievances.[198] The French had challenged the Tyler doctrine and the British did not appear to be interested in holding France to the standards of their own agreements. The U.S. victory in the Mexican War gave the United States a major presence on the Pacific coast of North America, making the Hawaiian Islands a much nearer concern than it had been

[196] Goodale, "Honolulu in 1853," 6.
[197] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 394-396.
[198] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 396.

previously.[199] Secretary of State John Clayton, aware of Hawai'i's importance in the growing U.S. presence in the Pacific, wrote his ambassador to France, asking him to reiterate the Tyler doctrine in case the French had designs on colonizing the Hawaiian Islands similar to their seizure of Tahiti a decade earlier.[200]

On 13 December 1850, the French warship *La Serieuse* arrived in Honolulu carrying French Commissioner Emile Perrin, who had negotiated the 1846 treaty. Perrin argued with Hawaiian officials that France would not allow the United States and Great Britain to mediate between the two nations and implied the use of force if negotiations did not commence. In February 1851, Perrin made several demands similar to Dillon's in 1849. The Hawaiian government, in despair, sought the protection of either Great Britain or the United States. The British Consul could not promise any aid to the Hawaiians as his country already had a treaty with France involving Hawai'i.[201]

The King and his Chiefs then approached the new American Commissioner Luther Severance and asked him to consider a temporary annexation of the kingdom so that the islands would be secure from French invasion.[202] The United States already possessed a sloop-of-war in port, the *USS Vandalia* under the command of Master-Commandant William H. Gardner. Neither Gardner nor Severance had the authority to annex the islands, but the latter did promise the Chiefs that if Hawai'i ended up under the U.S. flag, the *Vandalia* would defend it.[203] The next day, the King handed Severance a sealed envelope which contained a proclamation

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[199] Kenneth E. Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain': Daniel Webster and the Origins of American Foreign Policy toward East Asia and the Pacific, 1841-1852," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 129, no. 3 (1985), 244.
[200] "Clayton to Rives, 5 July 1850," *Foreign relations of United States, 1894*, 87-88.
[201] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I,* 399-400.
[202] "Severance to Webster, 11 March 1851," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 2, 1850-1852, Eds. Kenneth E. Shewmaker and Kenneth R. Stevens, (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1987), 259.*
[203] "Severance to Webster, 11 March 1851," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 2,* 260.

legitimizing a U.S. annexation if necessary.[204] Though the proclamation read that the annexation would last "until some arrangements could be made" to normalize Franco-Hawaiian relations, it also stated that "if such arrangements be found impracticable, then is our wish and pleasure that the protection aforesaid under the United States of America be perpetual."[205] This action by the King demonstrates how much trust had been built between the United States and Hawai'i, and how terrifying the threat of annexation loomed for Kamehameha III.

During the standoff, Gardner agreed to keep the *Vandalia* in port until the French left O'ahu first. While the French weighed their options, Severance and Gardner agreed that if the French should repeat their occupation attempt from the 1849 visit, the *Vandalia* would open fire on *La Serieuse.*[206] Perrin apparently overheard that the Americans were preparing for hostilities and agreed to an offer by the Hawaiian government that accomplished some of his goals. The Hawaiian government referred the question of Protestantism and Catholicism to the legislature while agreeing to compromise on French language documents and the relaxation of import restrictions.[207]

Secretary of State Webster expressed great concern to Severance regarding the decision to attack a French warship if needed.[208] He established that the power to declare war rested with the U.S. Congress and not a diplomat and naval officer, especially since both France and Hawaii were "equally independent" nations.[209] Despite the methods used, Webster was pleased that the situation had ended favorably for the United States. The State Department reiterated its support for the Tyler doctrine and convinced the French legation in the United States to admit that

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[204] "Severance to Webster, 12 March 1851," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 2*, 264.
[205] "Kamehameha III to Severance, 10 March 1851," *Foreign relations of United States, 1894*, 88-89.
[206] "Webster to Severance, 14 July 1851," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 2*, 278.
[207] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 402-403.
[208] Webster was Secretary of State in 1841-1843 during the Paulet affair and also in 1850-1852 during the *Vandalia* Affair.
[209] "Webster to Severance, 14 July 1851," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 2*, 276.

"neither [United States, Great Britain, nor France], has the right of ownership, over that country."[210] The crisis had been averted and Hawaiian independence secured.

As the *Vandalia* disappeared over the horizon on its return trip, a major era in the history of the U.S. Navy in Hawaii ended. The French and British both conceded that the American influence in and willingness to protect the Hawaiian Islands made them too risky to attempt to conquer or colonize. No foreign power would ever again pose a serious threat to Hawaiian sovereignty except the United States itself after the American Civil War.

The United States successfully accomplished its defense of Hawai‘i for two reasons. First, they finally set clear policy parameters regarding the Hawaiian Islands. President Tyler decided that the United States would not seek to annex the islands but would instead retain equality with the two other powers interested in Hawai‘i. This clear goal allowed him to set an expectation of other nations that American equality in Hawai‘i was prioritized. The violation of those rights, usually an indirect result of threatening Hawaiian sovereignty, represented a solid foreign policy line that would trigger a U.S. response if crossed. Without these clear policy goals, the captains of the U.S. warships in the 1830s had been left to guess the best course of action with only American neutrality to inform their decisions. Within this framework, their inaction in the face of aggressive French and British ships is not a surprise. A great example of this policy-informed decision making at work involves Long and Kearny. Each entered Honolulu on a return trip from China a few months apart, faced with the same dilemma in Lord Paulet. Kearny had the benefit of reading President Tyler's message to Congress though, which made his role in assessing the situation much easier. Kearny had national priorities in Hawai‘i to review, whereas Long did not.

[210] "De Sartiges to Derrick," *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers, Volume 2,* 281.

The second crucial factor to the defense of Hawai‘i can be found in the individual officers themselves. Regardless of how policies informed them, officers reacted differently based on their personalities and experiences. Thomas ap Catesby Jones's experiences in the War of 1812 made him wary of the British, as did his extensive experience in the Pacific. His blunder in Monterey informed his decision to approach Hawai‘i more cautiously and may have prevented a hostile action by Paulet.

As a result of the U.S. Navy repelling both British and French imperialism in the Hawaiian Islands, the United States gained the trust of the Hawaiian King and government, so much so by 1851 that they were willing to risk American annexation to avoid a similar fate from the French or British. This reliance on U.S. defense and diplomacy allowed Hawai‘i to slowly lose its political independence. Though the United States did not take an interest in annexing the Hawaiian Islands in the 1840s and 50s, the American community would use this trust from the Hawaiian government to undermine it in later decades.

CONCLUSION

The *Vandalia* Affair represented the last significant non-American effort to annex the Hawaiian Islands. Though the French did not achieve their desired goals, the incidents of 1849 and 1851 garnered the attention of American filibusters and ensured that the Hawaiian government could never step out of the shadow of American annexation. The new U.S. presence in California only increased American awareness of the Hawaiian Islands and established a mindset that Manifest Destiny extended into the Pacific. A post-*Vandalia* 1851 article in the San Francisco newspaper *Daily Alta California* asserted that "the native population are fast fading away, the foreign fast increasing. The inevitable destiny of the islands is to pass into the possession of another power. That power is just as inevitably our own."[211] Filibusters reinforced this new view toward Hawaiian sovereignty and attempted to undermine the government in early 1852, though Secretary Webster ordered U.S. officials in California to suppress the organization of such operations, causing the attempt to fall apart.[212]

U.S. foreign policy toward Hawai'i changed rapidly after the American Civil War as the nation expanded its presence in the Pacific and the influence of non-Hawaiians in the government continued to grow. U.S. tariffs on Hawaiian sugar placed the kingdom at a trade disadvantage as it had come to rely both on sugar and the United States for its economic success. In 1874, U.S. Marines enforced an election in which a pro-U.S. King had been elected. In 1887,

[211] "Acquisition of the Sandwich Islands," *Daily Alta California* (San Francisco, CA), 22 April 1851.
[212] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume I*, 409.

the U.S. began leasing Pearl Harbor as a permanent naval base in the islands, which brought a near constant U.S. naval presence to O‘ahu. The same year, a group of westerners unsatisfied with the extent to which Hawaiians still controlled their government led a rebellion and forced the King to sign a new constitution. Known as the “Bayonet Constitution” due to the threat of force used in its signing, the document transformed Hawai‘i into an American puppet government. The new constitution granted Americans the right to vote and hold office without renouncing their U.S. citizenship. It also limited the King’s power and disenfranchised many indigenous Hawaiians due to its establishment of sizeable property requirements to vote. This resulted in a government in which Americans could control the Hawaiian legislature and its elections, effectively governing the nation.[213]

When a new monarch, Queen Liliuokalani ascended to the throne in 1891, she started plotting an overthrow of the American regime with a new constitution. In turn, several Americans including descendants of the original protestant mission planned a coup d’état to end the monarchy and apply for annexation by the United States. The latter group executed their plans first on 17 January 1893. When government troops attempted to counter the rebels, they found that the United States was taking an active role in the insurrection. After representing the best hope for Hawaiian independence in 1843 and 1851, the U.S. Navy played an instrumental role in the coup of 1893. A total of 162 U.S. Marines and armed sailors from the *USS Boston* were put ashore at the behest of the U.S. Commissioner to restore order under the rebels.[214] They never fired a shot, but they also did not need to. The mere presence of U.S. troops dissuaded the Queen’s forces from fighting, knowing that U.S. involvement effectively made

[213] Ralph S. Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III, 1874-1893: The Kalakaua Dynasty,* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1967), 10, 47, 366-370.
[214] Kuykendall, *The Hawaiian Kingdom, Volume III,* 589-596.

their efforts pointless.[215] The rebels established a new Hawaiian Republic and the United States annexed Hawai‘i five years later in 1898.

Despite the United States' post-Civil War ambitions toward Hawai‘i, the actions of U.S. naval officers during the antebellum period demonstrated that the United States valued Hawaiian sovereignty from the 1820s to 1850s. The long-standing U.S. policy of Hawaiian neutrality stood in stark contrast with the British and French policy pre-1843. From Jones in 1826 to Gardner in 1851, U.S. naval officers repeatedly decided to prioritize neutrality or relative impartiality when interacting with the Hawaiian government. British and French naval officers established a practice of arriving in Honolulu after their nation's Consul had complained, hearing the Consul's grievances in port, and then making demands of the government, and often using the direct threat of force. U.S. officers could not take this option in solving American-Hawaiian disputes so easily because of the presence of the American missionary community. While American commercial interests often found themselves at odds with the Hawaiian government, especially during John C. Jones's tenure as Commercial Agent, the Hawaiian King's close interactions with the American missionary community meant that the United States could not consistently choose one side over another like the British and French did.

The American missionaries established themselves as dual citizens of the United States and Hawai‘i by 1830. While they became important advisors to the Kings and Regents of Hawai‘i and popular among the people, they also retained their connections to the United States through the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, who advocated on their behalf to the U.S. government. The Protestant mission had already become a powerful influence on the Hawaiian people and leadership by the time the first U.S. warship sailed into Honolulu,

[215] William A. Russ Jr., *The Hawaiian Revolution, 1893-1894*, (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1959), 350.

but naval support was critical in its long-term survival. The bans and restrictions on various activities common among sailors (drunkenness, alcohol importation, and sexual relations with the local population) that the missionaries convinced the Hawaiian government to enact quickly gained them the ire of the merchant community. The violence that stemmed from the *Dolphin's* visit only intensified the divide among Americans in Hawai‘i. Percival's visit proved unusual as the visits by Jones and later officers supported the mission as a moral influence on the islands and sought to remove dangerous deserters that threatened the missionaries. This support allowed the missionaries to be more comfortable with their controversial policies, leading to the Catholic restrictions and becoming the primary targets of French military intervention. The unwillingness of Commodore Downes to undo the missionaries' restrictions indirectly jeopardized the entire mission by 1839. Ultimately the missionaries' status as Americans protected them under the Tyler Doctrine, and U.S. naval officers defended their presence in 1843 and 1851.

The U.S. naval officers who visited the Hawaiian Islands also heavily influenced the American maritime and commercial communities. After the *Globe* mutiny threatened the security of American whaling operations in the North Pacific, Percival, Jones, and other officers cracked down on desertion primarily at the behest of American merchants and shipowners.[216] On multiple occasions, naval officers aided in negotiations over Hawaiian debt to Americans and Captain Jones drafted a treaty that ensured that Hawai‘i would remain commercially open to the United States. Commodore Kennedy argued in favor of sugar planters' rights in disputes with the King over land leasing. When Commodore Kearny lodged a protest against Lord Paulet's annexation of the kingdom, he did so at the request of the Acting U.S. Commercial Agent and

[216] "Petition to James Monroe, December 1824," United States Congress, House of Representatives, Report No. 108, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 16 January 1846.

with the support of many American whalers, planters, and merchants whose influence in the area and ability to trade free of British restrictions was saved by his actions.

Most importantly, the U.S. Navy kept a delicate balance between the business interests and missionaries, ensuring that neither group pushed the other out of Hawai‘i. The merchants could not harass the missionaries and the missionaries could not use their influence in the Hawaiian government to prevent the merchants from making a profit. Officers were rarely impartial in the merchant-missionary rivalry and their faction of preference often depended on their personalities. Percival valued the opportunities for entertainment that the commercial community could offer his crew while Jones was devoutly religious and sympathized with the like-minded missionaries. Finch had a missionary influence on board his ship in Navy chaplain Charles Stewart, while Downes's beliefs regarding the separation of church and state caused him to clash with the missionaries. Regardless of their personalities and beliefs, the officers after Percival did not allow one faction to gain excessive influence over the other, carefully assessing the situations they were presented with and trying to keep both sides content. When possible, they acted in both groups' interest, such as Jones's defense of the mission and his aid of the merchants on their debt issue.

While promoting American commercial and religious efforts in the Hawaiian Islands, U.S. officers also managed to respect Hawaiian sovereignty and build friendly relations between the United States and Hawai‘i. While Jones implied the use of force to collect the kingdom's debt on behalf of American merchants, he also compromised on the amount of money owed due to the probability that the Hawaiian chiefs did not understand the gravity of their situation. Actions taken that did negatively affect Hawai‘i such as the economic decline over the sandalwood debt payments organized by Jones and Finch were often unintentional. These

officers did not understand Hawai‘i’s long-term economic outlook and needed to balance Hawaiian and American interests.

In a global era of imperialism and heavy-handed diplomacy in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy protected free trade and rarely interfered in Hawaiian internal affairs. This policy could even be seen as detrimental to Americans. By 1839, both the British and French had enforced treaties on the Hawaiian government that granted their citizens and merchants special rights and privileges. The U.S. Navy enforced no such treaty and Americans were only able to secure one due to years of goodwill built by missionaries and naval officers. The officers visiting during the 1830s also took the principle of non-interference too far in the eyes of American citizens in the Hawaiian Islands regarding the intervention of foreign powers. While the non-intervention policies of Finch, Downes, and Kennedy all regarded American-Hawaiian disputes and built goodwill with the Hawaiian government, Read, Wilkes, and Long all faced dilemmas involving direct or implied threats from European naval officers to U.S. citizens. Without a coherent foreign policy toward Hawai‘i from higher authorities in the U.S. government, these officers shied away from taking any actions that could lead to military provocation with a foreign power. The establishment of the Tyler Doctrine in 1841 and presence of a U.S. diplomatic Commissioner in Hawai‘i in 1843, later officers like Kearny and Gardner had official U.S. policy to justify their protection of U.S. citizens and in the latter’s case, a State Department official to consult with on actions toward a foreign warship.

The non-interference into Hawaiian affairs did gain the United States significant trust from the Hawaiian government. In addition to aforementioned free offering of special privileges to Americans in Hawai‘i, the King often turned to the U.S. Navy for their protection against hostile European powers and respected the Jones Treaty of 1826 as binding, despite its

lack of ratification by the United States government. When the Hawaiian Kingdom's independence was in doubt, King Kamehameha III found refuge and support offered from Kearny and the quick actions of Captain Jones in defense of Hawai‘i may have caused Admiral Thomas to reverse Paulet's actions as quickly as he did before Great Britain could extract additional privileges and treaties from the Hawaiian government. The *Vandalia* affair demonstrated an even greater level of trust, as Kamehameha III offered the United States the opportunity to annex his nation to prevent French rule over the islands.

The influence of U.S. naval officers allowed several different groups of Americans to thrive and coexist while also gaining the trust of the Hawaiian government. They were far from the only reason why American influences flourished, as the missionaries were able to guide the Hawaiian government in a direction favorable to their aims, but the naval officers from 1826 to 1851 represented a key piece of the puzzle that positioned the United States to become the dominant influence in Hawai‘i. The actions of naval officers also stimulated a quieter form of imperialism than is normally considered during the nineteenth century. By promoting free trade and officially supporting Hawaiian sovereignty, the United States became the King's favored western influence in the Hawaiian Islands by virtue of its neutrality. While the United States may not have added Hawai‘i to its territory during the first half of the nineteenth century, its religious and economic influences completely remade the nation and profited in the process. When U.S. foreign policy shifted from neutrality to imperialism, Hawai‘i had no other protector to turn to. The nation's fate had been tied to the United States since the 1840s and 1850s. U.S. naval protection of American missionaries and merchants allowed these civilians to conquer Hawai‘i far more effectively than any warship could.

APPENDIX A: THE JONES TREATY OF 1826

Articles of Arrangement with the King of the Sandwich Islands (Hawaii), signed at Honolulu December 23, 1826[217]

Articles of arrangement made and concluded at Oahu between Thomas ap Catesby Jones appointed by the United States, of the one part, and Kauikeaouli King of the Sandwich Islands, and his Guardians, on the other part.

Art: 1st - The peace and friendship subsisting between the United States, and their Majesties, the Queen Regent, and Kaiukiaouli, King of the Sandwich Islands, and their subjects and people, are hereby confirmed, and declared to be perpetual.

Art: 2nd - The ships and vessels of the United States (as well as their Consuls and all other citizens within the territorial jurisdiction of the Sandwich Islands, together with all their property, shall be inviolably protected against all Enemies of the United States in time of war.

Art: 3rd - The contracting parties being desirous to avail themselves of the bounties of Divine Providence, by promoting the commercial intercourse and friendship subsisting between the respective nations, for the better security of these desirable objects, Their Majesties bind themselves to receive into their Ports and Harbours all ships and vessels of the United States; and to protect, to the uttermost of their capacity, all such ships and vessels, their cargoes, officers and crews, so long as they shall behave themselves peacefully, and not infringe the established laws of the land, the citizens of the United States being permitted to trade freely with the people of the Sandwich Islands.

Art: 4th - Their Majesties do further agree to extend the fullest protection, within their control, to all ships and vessels of the United States which may be wrecked on their shores; and to render every assistance in their power to save the wreck and her apparel and cargo; and as a reward for the assistance and protection which the people of the Sandwich Islands shall afford to all such distressed vessels of the United States, they shall be entitled to a salvage, or a portion of the property so saved; but such salvage shall, in no case, exceed one third of the value saved; which valuation is to be fixed by a commission of disinterested persons who shall be chosen equally by the Parties.

[217] Stauffer, "The Hawai'i-United States Treaty of 1826," 55-58. The original treaty included a parallel translation in Hawaiian, which has been omitted here.

Art: 5th - Citizens of the United States, whether resident or transient, engaged in commerce, or trading to the Sandwich Islands, shall be inviolably protected in their lawful pursuits; and shall be allowed to sue for, and recover, by judgment, all claims against the subjects of His Majesty The King, according to strict principles of equity, and the acknowledged practice of civilized nations.

Art: 6th - Their majesties do further agree and bind themselves to discountenance and use all practicable means to prevent desertion from all American ships which visit the Sandwich Islands; and to that end it shall be made the duty of all Governors, Magistrates, Cheifs of Districts, and all others in authority, to apprehend all deserters ; and to deliver them over to the master of the vessel from which they have deserted ; and for the apprehension of every such deserter, who shall be delivered over as aforesaid, the master, owner, or agent, shall pay to the person or persons apprehending such deserter, the sum of six Dollars, if taken on the side of the Island near which the vessel is anchored; but if taken on the opposite side of the Island, the sum shall be twelve Dollars; and if taken on any other Island, the reward shall be twenty four Dollars, and shall be a just charge against the wages of every such deserter.

Art: 7th - No tonnage dues or impost shall be exacted of any Citizen of the United States which is not paid by the Citizens or subjects of the nation most favoured in commerce with the Sandwich Islands; and the citizens or subjects of the Sandwich Islands shall be allowed to trade with the United States, and her territories, upon principles of equal advantage with the most favoured nation.

Done in council at Honolulu; Island of Woahoo [O‘ahu], this 23rd day of December in the year of our Lord 1826.

Thos. Ap Catesby Jones
Elisabeta Kaahumanu
Karaimoku
Poki
Howapili
Lidia Namahan

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