

A ROWDY PARTY: INTRAPARTY COMPETITION WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES REPUBLICAN PARTY
SINCE 2008 AND ITS ADVERSE EFFECT
ON GOVERNANCE

By: Austin Marple

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for Departmental Honors in
the Department of Political Science
Texas Christian University
Fort Worth, Texas

May 2, 2014

A ROWDY PARTY INTRAPARTY COMPETITION WITHIN
THE UNITED STATES REPUBLICAN PARTY
SINCE 2008 AND ITS ADVERSE EFFECT
ON GOVERNANCE

Project Approved:

Supervising Professor: Joanne Green, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science

Vanessa Bouche, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science

Peter Szok, Ph.D.

Department of History

Abstract

Intraparty competition weighs heavily on a party, particularly one as large as the Republican Party in the United States. Intraparty competition is defined, measured, and analyzed in a number of different studies by both American and comparative scholars, but generally focuses on the impact (either positive or negative) of intraparty competition on the political party itself. This study will go a step further and evaluate its effect on governing, asking whether an increase in intraparty competition can lead to irregular party unity and electoral shifting.” In order to answer this question, this study examines Republican intraparty competition since 2008 by evaluating candidates who have encountered or are expected to encounter primary opponents in the past and if their unity to the party leadership has been affected. The implications are substantial, including a greater understanding of the relationship between intraparty competition and primary elections, and their consequent effects on governing.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	2
EXPANDING PARTISANSHIP	5
IDEOLOGICAL ALINGMENT.....	5
INTRAPARTY COMPETITION	6
WHY NOT THE TEA PARTY?	9
RESEARCH DESIGN	9
FINDINGS.....	11
CASE STUDIES.....	13
Christopher Smith.....	15
Frank LoBiondo	16
David Reichert	17
Charlie Dent	18
Tim Murphy	19
Ileana Ros-Lehitnen.....	20
Jeff Fortenberry.....	21
Candice Miller	22
Peter King	23
Michael Simpson	24
CASE STUDY TRENDS	25
CONCLUSIONS.....	28
REFERENCES	30

Introduction

The United States Congress is a branch of the government tasked with being responsive to its citizenry and procuring the future of the nation. Troublingly, Congressional approval amongst the citizens is at an all-time low and is continuing to trend in a negative fashion. This paper seeks to explain if Congress is experiencing expanding polarization and what role if any intraparty competition has played on it. Beginning in 2008 the United States has witnessed the emergence of a far right faction within the Republican Party, which has significantly impacted both the party and the nation's ability to govern. The extent to which this faction continues to effect governance is the primary concern of this study. In other words, what is the relationship between the intraparty competition within the Republican Party in the United States and the recent increase in Congressional polarization since 2008?

Congressional governance is predicated on the citizen's ascent and approval of Congress to dutifully carry out their obligations as demonstrated by periodically needing the approval of the people to have the ability to govern (through campaigns and elections). The ascent of the populous and the ability of Congress to legislate are not tied to one another yet the citizenry's confidence in its government and their willingness to adhere to governance is crucial. Measures of Congressional success are not limited to opinion polls, but if the American people disapprove with their elected governing body it may be a cause for concern for representatives who need that approval or popularity to get elected. Furthermore if Congressional legitimacy is built upon the ascent and approval from the American voting body, than a lack of faith in Congress may over time result in a lack of legitimacy.

During the 1990's Congressional approval averaged 41% approval ratings and then in 2001 reached a high point of 84% approval. (Gallup Congress 2014) Since 2001 Congressional approval has steadily declined to 12% as of February 2014.¹ Beginning in 2007, the start of the 110th Congress, Congressional approval has fallen from 37% to a low of 9% in November of 2013 after the shutdown of the government. The American people

¹ 2001 Congressional Approval was taken months after 9/11 leaving many scholars to believe it was a rally around the flag affect where citizens wanted to view their government in the best way possible

have vehemently displayed their discontent for the actions of Congress or the lack thereof. When evaluating why people disapproved of Congress the number one reason given was “party gridlock/ bickering/ not compromising” with 28% of respondents citing that as the primary issue.² (Gallup Congress 2014)The role intraparty competition, or competition or conflict which takes place amongst party members, has considerably affected the way the American people view their Congress and is the primary focus of this study.

Contrary to the public opinion polls, this study realizes intraparty competition is not inherently unhealthy for political parties that intend on continually evolving, especially in a large nation full of competing interest like the United States. Intraparty competition can be positive when used to advance ideas, update ideology, and continually push to bring forth the best in party members. Intraparty competition can be detrimental though when it becomes a tool of fear and causes divide by imposing minority ideas or voices on the majority of the party. When party members feel they are pressured by the party or members within the party to vote a certain way it can be detrimental for the party itself and the nation as a whole. This type of party behavior is not conducive to governing via compromise or to a nation of diverse opinions where parties may attempt to incorporate all ideas under their party title. By imposing minority ideas, outlying or extreme members are capable of hijacking the party and moving it towards a more extreme ideological identity.

Examining recent American congressional history, it is easy to see parties struggling to reign in fringe members or ideas which have been detrimental to the government’s ability to legislate. Evidenced by the 2010 midterm elections, House Republicans have experienced a collective “run or force to the right” where members of the party who were proverbial moderates in the party are being pressured into aligning further to the right of their ideological stances. Furthermore these far right fringe groups are capable of raising enormous sums of money and are capable of spending against candidates nearly blindly with independent expenditures. The emergence of these fringe groups began in 2008 as a response to a stagnating economy and in 2010 exploded in membership due to the changes in campaign finance.³ Following the economic recession

² Other responses included, but are not limited to, not getting anything done/ not making decisions- 21%, care too much about politics and not about the country- 11%, and etc...

³ Citizens United vs. FEC 2010 and McCutcheon v. FEC 2014. Both of these cases changed campaign finance reforms with regards to independent expenditures, personal caps on spending, and the inclusion of monetary donations under the protection of the first amendment. These decisions have helped fund and facilitate the growth and may be a cause for the growth of far right faction success.

another boost in the far right's popularity took place after the passage of the Affordable Care Act and the deeply divisive nature of the law. This law allowed another policy issue to serve as a wedge where the far right could further attract supporters to their cause. Therefore this study will have 2008 serve as the demarcation line because of the emergence of far right Republican factions that responded following the Democrat's victory in the House of Representatives and the subsequent change in the political landscape after the change in campaign finance rules.

These far- right factions ran under the Republican name beginning in 2007 through 2008 and came into power on a promise to return to true conservative values. The far right movement was successful in a number of House and Senate elections and their members joined the Congressional ranks. Once in office these more conservative members created a partisan divided Congress absent of moderately minded compromise which has historically served to pass the most complex pieces of legislation. These far right members may have successfully influenced moderate members from both parties, moderately minded members who have typically served as mediators for complex compromises which took place in Congress. The far right's influence and silencing of moderates within their own party has been accomplished with the threat of a primary opponent or in actual primary opponents. Republicans running on the campaign of being "true conservatives," against other Republicans who are viewed as not "true to their party" took place across the nation. This idea of being "primaried," or having a primary election opponent, is a real threat to Republican members of Congress seeking reelection since 2008. Furthermore, these far right factions continue to fundraise against, vocally oppose, and publicly ridicule these more moderate members until allegiance with the Republican establishment is undeniable. Yet even leaders of the Republican Party do not wish to absorb the extreme policies of these factions but the members of these factions run and campaign as conservatives and assert minority values on the majority in some cases. This study will examine what effect the changing intraparty landscape has on Congressional partisanship based on an evaluation of intraparty competition amongst particular members of Congress.

Expanding Partisanship

Prior to any research, the primary question must be is America more polarized since 2008 than before in terms of political ideology? The reason this question is the first concern is because it will help explain if and how legislators are reacting to either the increase or decrease in ideological polarization. Scholars have found the answer to be overwhelming yes (Abramowitz and Stone 2006, Rehm 2011, Bowling and Pickerill 2013). The American electorate is more polarized ideologically today than it was at any point in the past forty years. Yet the data does not reflect the harsher polarization taking place in Congress as Americans are consistently asking for more compromise. As of September of 2013, 53% of Americans believe it is better to compromise than to stick to personal beliefs. (Gallup Americans' 2014) Referring back to the aforementioned Gallup Congressional poll, American's biggest complaint of Congressional members is "party gridlock/ bickering/ not compromising." Furthermore, with the American electorate's expanding divide it is easy to see how the parties can become more segregated and therefore lead to internal divisions. This expanding American partisanship and geographical divide may be a leading factor in intraparty competition since Democrats in New York are different than Democrats in California. This type of regionalism is conducive for large populations and geographically diverse parties as different portions of the parties behave differently than others (Pearson- Merkowitz and McTague 2008). Yet with a clear cut two party system, the American electorate's polarization creates more ideologically cumbersome parties where all types of liberalism and conservatism must be incorporated in order for the parties to cater to the citizens. This phenomenon creates a favorable atmosphere for intraparty competition to develop as candidates face an ideological dilemma as to who they are to represent: their party, their general electorate, their primary electorate, or their own beliefs.

Ideological Alignment

Once a candidate declares for a public office he or she may have an immediate challenger for the seat, in their own party. Candidates are faced with a strategic alignment dilemma as to who to align themselves with for an election cycle, their general or primary constituencies. Primary constituents are typically more extreme in their own beliefs and

therefore the voters in primaries are more prone to vote for the more ideologically extreme candidate (Ladd 1978 and Polsby 1983). This alignment becomes more important not only in elections but in times of governing as moderate candidates are more likely to attract primary opposition than ideological candidates (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). Furthermore, moderate Republican incumbents who were more liberal than their primary constituencies were beaten in most cases from 1956-1998 and these moderately minded incumbents are more likely to find ideologically partisan challengers who will attack them during a primary election (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007). Therefore, a representative may not find it advantageous to hold moderate views during a governing session because it will increase the likelihood of drawing a primary opponent.

Furthermore, as prior research demonstrates, candidates who align with their primary electorates often have a distinct pull to the ideological extremes, which may have an adverse effect on their ability to govern in a responsive way when confronted with legislation necessitating compromise. The strategic alignment dilemma that candidates face may lead to aligning with the far right factions making compromise unsustainable. Thus when getting elected is predicated on being a “true” party member competition among the party may become damaging to the party as opposed to the opposite party. The types of intraparty competition found here can be in found in a number of different forms.

Intraparty Competition

Scholars have found intraparty competition to typically arise in three different forms with varying degrees of positive and negative effects: cooperative, competitive, and degenerative (Boucek 2009). Although it may be beneficial to identify which of these types the current Republican Party may be identified as it is more beneficial when attempting to identify trends and adequately classify them. These types of intraparty competition will lend itself to identifying trends as they emerge and serve as a lens through which intraparty competition can be viewed for the purpose of the study. These types of intraparty competition are outlined in the table below.

Table 1: Boucek's Types of Intraparty Competition

	Cooperative	Competitive	Degenerative
Factionalism as a process of	Partitioning under centripetal incentives	Splitting under centrifugal forces	Fractionalization/segmentation from excessive focus on factional interests
Factions are	Separate	Opposed	Self-serving
Conditions for existence of factionalism	Transition to democracy. Party formation, splits, mergers, party system realignment	Intra-party conflict/dissent/ rivalries. Polarized party opinion. Fragmentation- inducing incentives	Privatized incentives. Clientel-ism Machine politics
Function of factionalism	Consensus building. Aggregates separate groups; blurs cleavages; articulates subparty group preferences and interests; facilitates party consolidation and district- level electoral coordination	Diffuses conflict internally; facilitates elite circulation; widens voter choice; moderate leaders and policies; empowers party followers. <i>Dangers:</i> growth in number of factions; factional veto games; fragmented party vote	Promotes rent-seeking and the exchange vote; structure the division of the spoils; encourages factional jockeying; shifts focus away from party collective goals
Outcomes	Intra-party harmony Integrated party Preservation of subgroup identities in "big- tent" parties	Intra-party democracy; balance of internal power; moderate change; party renewal; rejuvenated politics. <i>Dangers:</i> churning; unstable factional coalitions; intra-party gridlock; policy drift	Factional capture; instability; decisional stalemate; wasted public resources; corruption → value- destroyed brand/ Potential party break- up or collapse
Examples	Italy's Christian Democrats (DC) 1940s-1950's; Japan's Liberal Democrats (LDP) 1955- mid 1970's; French Socialist 1970s; Spain's PSOE; Australian Labor (ALP); American 104 th Congress	DC 1960s- 70s; LDP mid 1970s; British Labour (1970s- 80s) and Conservatives (1990s)	DC from late 1970s until implosion in 1994

Intraparty competition is an important component for parties to be responsive to their voters. Scholars argue intraparty competition allows parties to distance themselves and not collude in their policies, as new factions arise and "blow the whistle on them," or rise up and state they are not behaving as a member (Gere and Shere 1992). Yet studies demonstrate political parties weaken themselves during the primary election season, a crucial time for intraparty competition as more ideological extremes speak on behalf of the party. During the election season viable candidates face a number of challengers who are running often as a damaging force to the incumbent and the party (Epstein 1986). These

individuals can misrepresent a party's ideas or principles and damage a candidate by forcing him or her to alter their beliefs in order to be elected over a more extreme candidate. Furthermore, intraparty competition can be degenerative and result in individuals or factions within the party undermining party goals for the advancement of their faction (Boucek 2009). This type of intraparty competition coupled with the literature about the strategic alignment dilemma candidates face during election season, the growing American polarization, and the nature of intraparty competition alongside the supposed increase in congressional polarization leads me to hypothesize:

Hypothesis: The emergence of an intraparty competition within the Republican Party has created the increased threat of primary opponents. This perceived threat has shifted party unity irregularly and ultimately created a more partisan ridden Congress than would be present otherwise.

The first part of the hypothesis is reliant on the idea that more moderate candidates attract primary opponents at a higher rate than more ideologically partisan candidates. Furthermore primary electorates tend to be more ideological in nature and have a higher tendency to align to with ideological candidates than general electorates. The second part of the hypothesis asserts an increase in party unity because of the emergence of far right factions which have created threat of primary opponents where candidates may be unseated. This threat has altered party unity and ultimately increased it so representatives are less likely to draw primary opponents.

Scholars are not in complete agreement about intraparty competition, as some believe there is not a correlation between primary elections and the byproducts of primary elections (pull to the ideological extreme, misrepresentation of the party, and other issues previously identified) with congressional roll call votes on major policy issues (Hirano, Snyder, Ansolabehere, Hansen 2010). Unfortunately these findings examine politics prior to 2006 which is before a large rise in partisanship caused not only by the United States recession but by the emergence of strong conservative faction. This portion of congressional history is volatile and continues today which makes this time period important to study as it demonstrates a deviation from the previous scholarly literature.

Why not the Tea Party?

The Tea Party is a common explanation for the emergence of an increasing partisan divide in Congress. The impact of the Tea Party on the Republican Party since 2008 is especially large when considering fundraising, the image of the party, and electoral outcomes of certain conservative candidates (Williamson, Skocpol, Coggin 2011). A logical research question would be to examine the effect of the Tea Party on Congressional polarization. However, I rejected this focus. The Tea Party may be a component of intraparty competition which will be evaluated in the course of this study, but to say that the Tea Party alone is responsible for the intraparty competition is narrowing the research. Without evaluating the more moderate members of the party and identifying their political ideology, it would be a disservice to associate these members automatically as people who were influenced by the Tea Party. Furthermore, the role of Tea Party is inconclusive at this point with regards to their actual capabilities, so in an effort to avoid pigeon holing the research, this faction will not be a guiding factor.

The importance of an efficient and cooperative legislative body has been demonstrated in a multitude of way. The current literature regarding intraparty competition and its ability to produce a primary opponent or the threat of an opponent is incomplete. Furthermore the relationship between this threat and a more divisive government is incomplete when accounting for the rise of far right factions in 2008. The literature provides ample definitions in order to operationalize both gridlock and intraparty competition and in the following section, these definitions and how they will be measured will be definitely stated.

Research Design

In order to determine if individuals were influenced by intraparty competition the initial step was to determine if party unity scores had changed since the 110th Congress (2007-2009).⁴ Party unity scores are measured when either 50% or more of Democrats or Republicans vote for or against a bill. Then the score is determined by how often a member

⁴ 109th Congress began in 2005, 110th Congress began in 2007, the 111th in 2009, 112th in 2011, and the 113th in 2013

falls into the majority of their party members when voting.⁵ After compiling the 110th Congressional party unity scores for House Republicans the party unity scores for the 111th, 112th, and 113th Congresses were compiled for the same individuals who remained in Congress during this time in order to determine whether or not the Republican House members' party unity scores changed. After ranking unity scores, Congressional Republicans were ordered from smallest party unity score to highest and broken into quartiles. After examining the quartiles an average score for each quartile was created in order to understand where the most change had occurred during this time. After the quartiles were examined all individuals from the 110th Congress with a party unity score of 89% or below were compiled.⁶ Then the average change in party unity score from the 110th to the 113th Congresses were calculated for these individuals yielding an average increase of 5% during that time with the median change between 6 or 7%.⁷ All individuals who had over 5% change in their party unity scores from the 110th to the 113th Congresses were accumulated and all members who were intending to announce or had announced for reelection in the House of Representatives were selected for use for a case study.⁸

Context

By tracking the overall change of party unity scores from members who were a part of Congress during the 110th through the 113th Congress, the change over time could be measured and plotted to see if Republican House member's votes had changed. This is crucial to see if there was any change in voting unity, where the change occurred amongst the Republican members, and which members could serve as case studies to examine further. Ultimately the case studies will serve the study as it tries to understand how individual representatives have dealt with the increasing intraparty competition within Congress.

⁵ Party unity scores were determined from a number of different sources in order to incorporate all years of study but they come from the Washington Post Open Congress Database


⁶ There were 58 Republicans in the 110th Congressional session that had a party unity score of 89% or below, of these members there were 24 who remained through the 113th Congressional session. Granted there was one mid-session retiree along with two other members who declared for Senate seats.

⁷ Removing three outliers (individuals who had their scores either decrease from the 110th to the 113th Congresses or those individuals who had no change in their scores) out of the total 24 members, the mean grows to nearly 7%.

⁸ Three members had elected not to run out of the 15 individuals who had over 5% increase after having a party unity score at 89% or lower. As well, two members of the 15 elected to run for a Senate seat and were thus eliminated.


The disappearing moderates have been a point of intrigue for a number of political science scholars who are attempting to understand why voting patterns have changed. Unfortunately it is not possible for this study to ascertain why individual voting patterns have shifted. The number of variables would be far too great to account for and study with the parameters of this research.⁹ So the primary concern of this inquiry is to understand how and why party unity has shifted amongst Congressional Republicans using case studies of selected members.

Findings




Graph 1 depicts the change in party unity scores from the 110th through the 113th Congress beginning with 91% and climbing to 94% through 2013. A three percent increase is not a remarkable increase when evaluating recent Congressional history. So in order to better understand how this change occurred the party unity scores were aligned from lowest to highest score and broken up by quartiles. By evaluating the different quartiles, the study can determine where the largest increase in party unity scores took place. Examining the bottom quartile of the 110th Congress who remained in Congress through the 113th session yielded the largest increase.

⁹ In order to understand voting patterns shifting it would require the evaluation of which bills are proposed, comparative bills in the past and how they voted on them, their public stances on issues and how it changed over time. It would require a much more in-depth analysis



The bottom quartile of the 110th Congress party unity score jumped from 85% to 92%, a seven percent increase. The seven percent increase is over double the increase of all members of Congress over the same amount of time. This jump is notable and indicates that a large percentage of the overall increase can be found in the in bottom quartile’s change. These members can be considered the moderates of the Republican House members because of their likelihood to vote against their party in moments where the majority of the party was voting one way. As these members move further towards higher party unity score, I hypothesize that legislation requiring moderation is subjected to an increasingly partisan Congress. In order to determine why these members increased their votes with the majority of their party, this study will utilize case studies of ten individuals who met the aforementioned criteria. Graph 3 demonstrates the overall change these Republican House members had from the 110th to the 113th Congress in their party unity scores in order to demonstrate their change over time and why the 2008 year will serve as the demarcation line.



Case Studies

The members of study were determined by a set criteria and standards. Those ten members are Christopher Smith (NJ 4th), Frank LoBiondo (NJ 2nd), David Reichart (WA 8th), Charlie Dent (PA 15th), Tim Murphy (PA 18th), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL 27th), Jeff Fortenberry (NE 1st), Candice Miller (MI 10th), Peter King (NY 2nd), and Michael Simpson (ID 2nd). These representatives are being studied to better understand how individuals who could be reasonably considered the moderates of their party are now voting more conservatively. The understanding of trends and characteristics identified during the case studies will serve to explain how voting patterns shift and what extent intraparty competition has had on voting changes. Furthermore by evaluating these tenured members of Congress, we can reasonably assume that if they are being targeted their more junior counterparts and peers will see this as a possible warning to vote more conservatively. All of these individuals have served in Congress for at least 9 years and many of them hold prominent committee assignment or chair positions within the House. Therefore the rest of the Republicans who witness their change in party unity may see it as a sign that moderate ideology and compromise is not in their best interest. The findings of these case studies have nearly significant and varied implications on the Republican Party and Congressional capability.

Since 1994 these members of Congress have averaged having a primary opponent roughly 39% of the time. Then beginning in 2004 when all of the case study members were in Congress, these same members have averaged a primary opponent nearly 40% of the time and the frequency has been increasing. Since 2008 the frequency of primary opponents has increased to 50%. Furthermore since 2010 the frequency of primary opponents amongst this group has grown to 53% of the time. So the number of primary opponents has been increasing for these representatives over time and during this same time their party unity has been increasing. This may be evidence of intraparty competition and the case study will serve to explain the shift and what role these primaries may have had on increasing party unity scores. (FEC Elections)

Finally the inclusion of the 2012 Presidential Election Results by Congressional district may be able to shed some light as to why some moderate Republicans are receiving primary opponents as opposed to others. It will be interesting to contrast the immense rhetoric of the far right factions against the election results to see if the PACs and the Republican Party leaders will continue their opposition against the moderate members of their party or when faced with a more pragmatic decision, will take the alternative.

Table 2: Case Study Findings

	Change in Party Unity Scores (110 th to the 113 th)	Vote to Reopen the Government (House Clerk)	2013 ACU Rating	ACU Lifetime Rating (ACU)	2012 Presidential Election Results (Percentile for Romney)	Independent Expenditures which Oppose the Candidate (FEC)	Primary Opponent
Christopher Smith	13%	X	54	59.67	54.2%	-	None
Frank LoBiondo	6%	X	44	63.13	45.4%	-	Mike Assad
David Reichert	7%	X	48	55.85	48.1%	-	None
Charlie Dent	6%	X	56	64.11	50.8%	-	None
Tim Murphy	11%	X	68	72.91	57.9%	-	None
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	7%	X	61	71.08	46.4%	-	None
Jeff Fortenberry	6%	X	63	82.07	57.4%	-	Dennis Parker
Candice Miller	7%	-	76	78.05	55.3%	-	None
Peter King	7%	X	36	72.68	47.2%	-	None
Michael Simpson	6%	X	46	81.96	64%	\$356,740	Bryan Smith

CASE STUDIES:

Christopher Smith

Christopher Smith is Republican House member out of New Jersey's 4th Congressional District and has served for 32 years thus far. A long tenured member of the House, he sits on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and is a member of a number of different and diverse caucuses.¹⁰ A self-coined social conservative and fiscal moderate, in 2013 Smith received a score of 54% from the American Conservative Union, the oldest conservative lobbying organization in the United States.¹¹ Smith does have the luxury of being from a more conservative district in New Jersey though it is not overwhelmingly conservative in nature so he can also demonstrate some of his moderate tendencies. Christopher Smith was one of the Republican members who voted to reopen the government in 2013 and yet his interactions with primary opponents seem to be very different from his other Republican moderates.

Christopher Smith does not have a primary opponent currently declared against him for the upcoming 2014 election despite his continued moderate tendencies. Smith's party unity score through the first half of the 113th Congress was at 91%, not a particularly high number considering during this time the average member votes with the Republican majority 94% of the time. Smith may then be viewed as a quiet moderate yet he, alongside other GOP moderates such as Peter King and Frank LoBiondo, is currently petitioning Speaker Boehner to allow a Senate bill which would reinstate some unemployment benefits for vote in the House. (Star Ledger 2014) Furthermore Smith has a long history of supporting unions and their rights in the workplace, supporting amnesty, and voted in 2013 to reopen the government after the shutdown. Yet Smith has only had two primary challenges (2012 and 2010) since 1994 both of which he won easily, with an average of 76.24% of the vote. (FEC 2014) Smith has been a continual moderate in the Republican Party with a lifetime party unity score of 85% and an ACU Lifetime rating below 60. When all of these factors are considered it is difficult to understand how he failed to garner

¹⁰ All committee positions and titles come from the Office of the Clerk in the United States House of Representatives

¹¹ Their scale ranges from 100% to 0% from Republican to Democrat based on 25 key congressional votes that were highly divisive in nature. As a point of reference some notable members in 2013 such as Rand Paul and Marco Rubio both scored a 100% with Smith being the 11th lowest scoring Republican along with members like Chris Gibson and Richard Hanna.

more primary elections and avoided intraparty competition when put in the context of the far right factions' vehement rhetoric about moderate Republicans.

Frank LoBiondo

Frank LoBiondo is currently serving as a representative from the 2nd Congressional District in New Jersey for his 19th year. LoBiondo is currently serving on the Armed Force committee, the Transportation and Infrastructure committee, and is chair of the subcommittee on Aviation. Originally a member of the Newt Gingrich led Congress, LoBiondo was one of the freshmen representatives who signed on to the Contract with America¹². Although he comes from a slightly more liberal district on paper, LoBiondo has won reelection with at least 59% of the vote each year. A member of the Main Street Partnership, LoBiondo is generally considered a moderate Republican as evidenced by the ACU giving him a score of 44% on their evaluation of conservatism for representatives.

This upcoming primary season Frank LoBiondo faces Mike Assad, a young man who first came to the public eye after being elected for the Absecon New Jersey Board of Education when he was only 18 years old. (Red Alert) Although technically a primary opponent Mike Assad stands little chance of having success running against LoBiondo. In his last three primary elections spanning from 2008 to 2012, LoBiondo has won each race with an average of nearly 85% of the votes. (FEC 2014) Furthermore LoBiondo has currently raised roughly 1.1 million dollars thus far compared to Assad who has raised a little over half a percent of that number.¹³ LoBiondo district may be one of the key factors for his continual dominance over primary opponents.

New Jersey's 2nd Congressional District comprises the southern portion of New Jersey including Atlantic City and constitutes over 730,000 people. In the past two presidential elections the district voted for the Democratic ticket by an average of 5% and the state in general has a history of supporting Democratic candidates. (U.S Census) Further complicating the situation, LoBindo faces a legitimate Democrat challenger in Frank Hughes Jr., son of the man who formerly held the 2nd Congressional seat. LoBiondo

¹² A campaign time document that stated reforms Republicans were seeking during the 1994 campaign which included an external audit of the federal government, cutting the number of committees in the House, opening committee meetings to the public and more. The document was signed by all but two Republicans once the 104th Congress began

¹³ Roughly 1.11 million versus \$7,040

seems to be responding to the formidable Democratic challenger by changing some of his positions or publicly broadcasting his stances more so than in the past.

LoBiondo has recently come out in opposition to the House's refusal to extend unemployment benefits, has cited the need for a more prepared natural disaster aid package for states, and was vocally opposed to the new Paul Ryan GOP budget plan. Yet he has drawn an extremely underfunded and unsupported primary opponent. This lack of a competitive primary may be due to the New Jersey 2nd Congressional district much more than politics. (Tamari 2014) The fact that Republican fundraisers or PACs have yet to give to Mike Assad or to spend against LoBiondo shows a more pragmatic nature than the fiery rhetoric those same groups displayed only a few short months ago. The number of stories speaking about LoBiondo breaking ranks with the party is growing and should have made him a prime target for a competitive primary election, yet it did not.

David Reichert

David Reichert is a member of the House of Representative from Washington's 8th Congressional District and has served the district for 9 years. He is currently serving on the always influential Ways and Means committee and is the chair of the Human Resources subcommittee. Although not openly vocal, Reichert is considered to be a more moderate member when it comes to social issues evidenced by his ACU score of 48% for 2013. This makes sense when considering his districts 2012 Presidential returns which showed they supported President Obama over Governor Romney by a slight margin.

Representative Reichert is another moderately minded Republican House member who is not facing a primary opponent for the upcoming 2014 election. Reichert is a member of the Main Street Partnership whose mission is to "develop and advocate for pragmatic common sense solutions to the challenges our country faces." (Main Street) This group comprises roughly fifty House members and a few Senators who state they are advocating for centrist solutions to ever complicated global nation. Reichert has followed rank with a number of the Main Street members as he voted to repeal "Don't ask Don't tell," he voted for carbon emission caps, and has consistently voted against the expansion of fossil fuel and nuclear energy expansion in favor of more environmentally and technologically advanced solutions. (New York Times)

This is not to take away from Reichert's conservative background. He signed a taxpayer pledge where he assured voters he would not vote to raise taxes or take away from tax deductions. Furthermore he voted in support of the Ryan Budget Plan multiple times and with Republicans to create a balanced budget amendment. (Reichert) Reichert is though similar to LoBiondo in that he finds himself a Republican in a more Democrat voting area, with regards to the Presidential elections at least. Reichert gives another case of how pragmatically the Republicans are treating the 2014 elections. By coming from districts which are not safely Republican districts, these members may be avoiding the direct attacks of intraparty competition. However, as their increasing party unity scores suggest, their voting records seemed to shift regardless and may suggest that all Republicans are on watch for intraparty attacks. These more moderate members may be escaping primary opponents because of the composition of the district.

Charlie Dent

Charlie Dent is the representative for Pennsylvania's 15th Congressional district and has been for the past nine years. His district is a moderate one in terms of political ideology as they voted for Governor Romney with a slight margin in 2012 and in 2008 voted for President Obama by nearly eight percent. This district's moderate nature may be the reasoning behind the ACU's score for Dent in 2013 which was 56%. He is also co-chair of the Tuesday Group, a loose collection of fifty or so Republicans who both advocate and legislate on the idea of centrist Republican ideology- personal independence, state level decision making, and economic longevity at its core.

Dent is not facing a primary opponent for the 114th Congressional session. Dent is a lifetime self-named center-right conservative in a center-right district. Dent has recently garnered attention as being a moderate solution and a return to a different era of legislating. He actively worked to help prevent the fiscal shutdown of the government, Dent also worked to aid those people affected by Hurricane Sandy, and voted for the Violence against Women Act which included support for the LGBT community. (Parker 2013) Dent is considered by many to be an open advocator for compromise and although some of his

plans may run further to the right, such as his House proposal for extending unemployment benefits, he has on the whole been capable of entertaining both political parties.¹⁴

One may expect then that Dent would be at the forefront of the far right attacks for the upcoming 2014 election. Yet he is relatively secure considering his seat was barely carried by Governor Romney and indicating he has a soft Republican leaning district. This sort of political middle ground affords Dent to vote in support of repealing “Don’t ask Don’t tell,” and to come forward and rebuke his Republican colleagues for their attempt to pass legislation regarding the specific week ban for an abortion. Dent is yet another Republican moderate who seems to be protected against attacks by the far right because of his district. His district is not a clear cut Republican seat and the more pragmatic Republicans may argue that a Republican in Congress is still far better than a Democrat in Congress and may have resisted any intraparty attacks on Dent. Granted Dent’s lifetime party unity is at 88% and since Republicans retook the House in the 112th session he has increased his party unity score 5% which may have served to demonstrate to his colleagues his conservative background.

Tim Murphy

Tim Murphy is an 11 year veteran of the Pennsylvania’s 18th Congressional district serving on the Committee on Energy and Commerce where he is the vice chairman for two committees. Murphy received a 68% score from the ACU in 2013 even with his 96% party unity score. Tim Murphy has dealt with issues with the Republican Party after he was named one of the most corrupt legislators in 2010 by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington D.C. Murphy comes from a conservative district in Pennsylvania and is not facing a primary opponent this upcoming year.

Murphy faced a challenging opponent last year in Evan Feinberg yet Murphy won with 68% of the vote. During that election Feinberg openly criticized Murphy about his Republican-in-name-only (RINO) tendencies while gaining support from and endorsements from Senators Rand Paul and Tom Coburn. Furthermore Murphy had upwards of \$200,000 spent in opposition of him by two major PACS who chastised

¹⁴ His House proposal would extend unemployment benefits while cutting down the number weeks one can be on the benefits from 73 weeks to 40 weeks. Furthermore included in his bill are some measures to repeal certain portions of the Affordable Care Act, fund the Keystone Pipeline, and more.

Murphy's liberal policies. (FEC) An interesting evolution took place after this hotly contested primary election.

Prior to the 2012 primary election was announced Murphy's party unity score in the previous two Congressional sessions averaged at 86%. Then following the announcement of the primary opponent and the subsequent victory his average jumped to 95%. Although not proven to be causal it is extremely interesting to note that his score has elevated so highly. Murphy is in a secure Republican district which may have warranted more competition had his votes not shifted the way they did. By increasing his party unity score Murphy may have been attempting to prove to his district that he was the true conservative for the job. Another approach may have been that as he escaped a difficult primary opponent he decided to ensure his tenure in Congress by aligning with the Republican majority more so than he had in the past. Either way, the sudden shift in party unity after an intense primary season seems to be an effect on governing as a direct result of intraparty competition.

Ileana Ros-Lehitten

A 24 year veteran of Congress, Ileana Ros-Lehitten has served Florida's 18th Congressional District for nearly 23 years until her recent move during redistricting to the 27th district. She was the first Cuban American elected to Congress and is the most tenured Republican woman in the House today as well as being one of the few minority women in Congress. She also serves as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and serves on a number of notable caucus' including the LGBT, Pro-Life, and Congressional Vision groups. Her new home in the 27th Congressional district is more liberal than her previous district evidenced by supporting Governor Romney by only 46% of the vote in 2012. Her ACU score reflects her moderately inclined conservatism with a score of 61% in 2013.

Ileana Ros- Lehitten is not facing a primary opponent for the upcoming 2014 election. Furthermore she has not faced a primary opponent since 2002 where she won with 88% of the vote. (FEC 2014) Although she finds herself in a new district she has been incredible visible for a number of years in Florida and recently gave a response to the state of the union on behalf of the Republican Party. Additionally, her Republican credentials have been established for decades as she too signed the Taxpayer Protection Pledge, she

has supported the Ryan budget plan, and has voted against the Affordable Care Act. (New York Times) She is more moderate on some social issues as opposed to her Republican counterparts.

She has been an active advocate for LGBT rights. She vote to repeal “Don’t ask Don’t tell,” she has urged the Olympics to seek locations which practice non-discrimination. She has also asked the Internal Revenue Service to aid LGBT members filing their taxes and supported multiple hate crime pieces of legislations. Furthermore for a long time Congresswoman her party unity has been much more of a rollercoaster than the other representatives of study. (Reilly 2011) Beginning in 1991 through 1999 her party unity score stayed below 90% then from 1999 to 2007 her party unity score stayed above 90%. Ros-Lehiten then may be a deviate study for this study as she has not has the same type of exposure with intraparty competition as some of the other members.

Jeff Fortenberry

Jeff Fortenberry out of Nebraska’s 1st Congressional district has served Congress since assuming office 9 years ago. His role in Congress has been beneficial to his state serving on the Committee on Agriculture and chairing one of its subcommittees¹⁵. He also serves on the committee on Foreign Affairs where his role had him named as one of the Republican nuclear “power-brokers” back in 2010. (Rogin 2010) His district has been a solidly Republican district for the past decade and he scored at 63% on the ACU scoreboard for conservatism in 2013.

Jeff Fortenberry is facing Dennis Parker for the 2014 Republican nominee for Nebraska’s 1st Congressional District. Parker has run against Fortenberry the past two election cycles and has been defeated both years with Fortenberry gaining 84 and 87 percent of the vote consecutively. So although Fortenberry has a primary opponent, it would be difficult to constitute it as a competitive election. (Project 2014) Fortenberry seems to have escaped a large part of intraparty competition, which considering his ACU lifetime rating, seems to make sense.

Fortenberry has the highest lifetime ACU rating amongst all of the members of study with a score of 82.07. His drop in party unity score during the 110th session seems to

¹⁵ Chairman of the subcommittee on Department Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry

be then a fluctuation in his voting patterns as opposed to a committed move to a more moderate approach. His safe Republican district, his popularity amongst voters, his recent support and co-sponsorship of the Ryan Budget Plan, the opposition to the Affordable Care Act, and his current party unity score of 94% keep Fortenberry as a safe Republican supporter. (New York Times) He may be considered a deviate member of the study and amongst the trends we have seen but his narrative may impact others.

Candice Miller

Candice Miller is an 11 year veteran of Congress serving the 10th Congressional District in Michigan. She serves on the committees for Homeland Security, Transportation and Infrastructure, and on the Administration committee where she is the chairwoman. Her Congressional district has a distinct conservative lean and Miller boast two other departures from the rest of the members of the case study. She has the highest ACU rating at 76% percent and was the only member of this group who did not vote to reopen the government. She could be considered one of the more conservative members in the 113th Congress in this case study.

Candice Miller is not facing a primary opponent in 2014 nor has she in her entire tenure in Congress. In fact Miller's lowest general election victory was back in 2002 when she carried 63.3% of the vote. (FEC 2014) Miller's home district is safely Republican and her ACU lifetime rating places her in the upper tier of the case study. Furthermore her lifetime party unity score is at 93% and she has been viewed by colleagues as the model of the American dream.

Congresswoman Miller is one of the few Congressional representatives whose education stopped after high school. She was one the only member of the group who voted against reopening so her 110th Congressional session party unity score may be more of an exception to her voting record than a trend. (New York Times) So although Miller may not confirm the hypothesis it is interesting to see her track record versus other members in the study who demonstrated similar trends while garnering different types of intraparty competition.

Peter King

Peter King has served New York's in Congress since 1993 in both the 2nd and 3rd Congressional District.¹⁶ He serves on the committees for Homeland Security, Permanent Select on Intelligence, and on the Financial Services and formerly as a chair for the Homeland Security committee. King drew partisan critics while he was chair of the Homeland Security committee as he held hearings from 2010 to 2012 on Islamic Americans participation with law enforcement officials. (Stolberg 2011) This incident took place after nearly a decade of positive Muslim relations. (Wan 2011) However more recently King has drawn criticism for not complying with the Republican leadership with the ACU giving him a score of 36% while his 2013 party unity score was 96%.

Peter King does not have a primary opponent for the 2014 election cycle. A rare occurrence for King considering he drew a primary opponent from 1994 to 2010 where he won each election with an average of 83% of the vote. (FEC 2014) Although King has not drawn a primary opponent this session his role in increasing intraparty competition within the Republican Party has been immense.

King has called out Ran Paul as perpetuating paranoia amongst voters, has stated that Paul's foreign policy ideas will lead to American deaths, and said that Senator Paul would be a "disastrous" president. (McCalmont 2014) King's criticism of vocal Republicans does not stop there as he has referred to far right favorite Ted Cruz as a fraud and even started a new PAC in opposition of these two far right favorites. (Dwyer 2013) King has gone as far to state Paul may not be capable of "intelligent debate." (McCalmonst 2014) This lambasting of well-known Republicans is incredibly bold considering Paul and Cruz's relative popularity amongst groups within the Republican Party, yet more interestingly King did not draw a primary opponent.

King has a history of defeating primary opponents and his district seems to lean more liberally than most of the other members of the study. The composition of his district politically may allow for more latitude than his counterparts yet it is interesting to note that amongst these members only Christopher Smith and Frank LoBiondo were found to openly criticize other Republicans as much as King did, granted not with the same ferocity

¹⁶ Peter King served the 3rd Congressional District from 1993 until 2013 and then was reelected in the 2nd Congressional District

as King. These three men hail from different districts with two being from liberally inclined districts and Smith being from a much more Republican area. Yet all three are capable of speaking out in opposition of the party, even with their increasing party unity scores, and escape primary elections. The argument could be made that they are hypocritical in their governing styles as the three men have collectively average party unity score is 87% with an average increase from the 110th Congress to the 113th Congress at 9%. Some those assertions may be true, but how three men with vocal opposition towards the Republican Party and some of their most known members can escape primary elections during a time where members who have been far less vocal, like Michael Simpson, were unable to do so.

Michael Simpson

Michael Simpson hails from Idaho's 2nd Congressional District and has served in Congress since 1999. Simpson is a member of the influential Committee on Appropriations and serves on the House Republican Steering Committee. In the 111th Congress Simpson became the ranking member in his subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies where he is the chair. Known as a pragmatic Republican, Simpson received a 46% in 2013 from the ACU on their scale from Republican or Democrat.

Michael Simpson has garnered a serious Republican challenger on for his 2014 election. Bryan Smith, a Republican attorney, is currently being endorsed by the Club for Growth and has been since July of 2013. The Club for Growth is a right wing political action committee which primarily concerns itself over tax reform and the minimizing of taxes in the United States. This group has given over \$50,000 dollars to Bryan Smith already and continues to fund and advocate on his behalf and to the detriment to fellow Republican Michael Simpson. (Open Secrets) They have spent an additional \$400,000 opposing Michael Simpson's incumbent reelection. Michael Simpson is being attacked for his vote for the Wall Street bailout; the goal of the Club of Growth by supporting Bryan Smith who is to attempting to "send a shiver down the spine of the party establishment." (Club 2014)

This type of public attack is extremely suspect considering Simpson is now voting with the Republican majority at a 95% rate and has a lifetime party unity score of 94%. In

the 110th Congress Simpson's party unity score had fallen to 89% and since 2008 he has faced a primary opponent every year. During that time his party unity score jumped to its current standing at 95%, and increase of 6% coinciding with the first primary elections of his career. So although it is difficult to ascertain why his voting record changed it is interesting to see that as his primary opponents increased in number and competitiveness his party unity score increased as well. This change could be evidence of intraparty competition and its ability to alter party unity especially for individuals who are in safely Republican districts where the party can strive for the ideal conservative representatives. Furthermore for a member who seems to be aligned well with the Republican majority like Michael Simpson who is in a Republican district it may be a message to other representatives that any member may draw primary opponents or may be the target of intraparty competition if it is in the betterment of the far right's objectives.

Case Study Trends

In conducting these case studies trends emerged which may serve to explain some of the findings of the research. First and foremost the amount of competitive primaries, one, fell far below my expectations for this study. I believed the number would have been much higher due to the rhetoric taking place in the media between Republicans and the amount of supposed money being spent on these races. Yet while examining the primary elections only one incumbent has had money spent against them thus far via independent expenditures. Bryan Smith is the only primary challenger who can be considered serious due to the money raised and the support garnered amongst Republicans. This lack of primary opponents may be due in part to the districts where these incumbents as well as the changing nature of party unity scores which have already taken place.

The ten districts of study in 2012 voted for Governor Romney at an average of 52.7%. This number is not exceedingly high considering 2012 is considered by many to be a weak year for Democrats and Republican strength in the House maintained from the 112th to the 113th Congress. So it is interesting to note how pragmatic it appears the Republicans are being in terms of their Congressional support for primaries. With the exception of Frank LoBiondo's primary opponent, all of the primaries are taking place in relatively strong Republican districts as opposed to some of the more moderates districts

which seems in contrast to the widely circulated national rhetoric among far right conservatives. This type of strategic decision making may be evidence that although Republicans are partaking in-fighting with one another, having a Republican in the seat is still better than having a Democrat. However simplistic it may seem it shows that the far right's publicly stated assault on all of the moderate members of the Republican Party assault seems to be more of a campaign maneuver as opposed to an actual movement. The rhetoric may still be impactful enough though as an explanation for the increasing nature of the party unity scores.

Party unity scores on average increased from 85% to 93%, a jump of eight percent for these ten Republican Congressional leaders. In examining the reasoning why these jumps occurred it is difficult to grasp how and why they happened. Pressure from within the party may have caused it, personal ideological shifts may have taken place, or individual districts may have changed and necessitated more conservative values. No matter the reasoning the fact remains that by increasing their loyalty to the party, these individuals in some facet relented to intraparty competition and became more conservative. If the primary goal of intraparty competition for the Republican factions arising in 2008 was to ascertain a more unified party centered on conservatism- the goal was accomplished. This increase in party unity may have led to a lack of primaries as they were not required anymore once voting changes had shifted. In examining the data between 2010 and 2012 these 10 representatives experienced a primary opponent on average 65% of the time. The competitiveness varies but the point is their frequency dramatically increased and may have played a role in altering their votes. By garnering more primary opponents representatives may succumb to the primary pull to the right and begin to shift their ideological alignment either to prevent another primary opponent or they may view the primary as a signal from the district to vote more conservatively.

Scholars have stated one of the positive effects of intraparty competition is the ability of the party to "blow the whistle," on one another in order to "toe the party line" (Gere and Shere 1992). If that is the case then the effect could have occurred in a negative fashion as the party line shifted to a more conservative one and resulted in a more partisan Congress than would be present otherwise.

Some may argue increasing party unity scores are positive and are beneficial to the party as members are determined to abide by their ideological beliefs. In an effort to not put a normative statement to this argument, the increasing nature of party unity regardless of their party affiliation will change the nature of politics and how America governs. By having the moderates of the Republican Party begin to shift their voting to align more with the majority of the party, governing may develop into much more of a pendulum of power than a compromising body. The reason being is that by voting more with their party, these moderates are losing their centrist nature and without any centrist, moderately-minded pieces of legislation and compromise will become rarer than it is today. This will mean that as Congress switches power, dominated by either Republican or Democrat, so too will the pendulum of power and therefore create a much more partisan ridden legislator. Legislation will no longer be contingent on being the best possible version for the American populous, rather it will be far more contingent on who is in power and if they can pass it. The way in which Congress has worked may change forever if our representatives continue to abandon dissention with their party in favor of increasing party unity.

Further Research

The most difficult part of understanding intraparty competition is the way in which it is operationalized and measured. A more expansive study may want to undertake the role the media plays in broadcasting the Republican infighting. In conducting this study a great deal of political sparring and verbal attacks took place through the media and was highly prevalent amongst a few members. By evaluating who all is being called out publicly and why certain members were called out and identifying any commonalities may shed light on the Republican intraparty competition. Furthermore future studies may choose to look at commentary on the House and Senate floor. Debate and rhetoric over bills such as the continuing resolution which reopened the government, the Affordable Care Act, the Ryan Budget Plan and more may be able to depict a fuller picture of how representatives allow the infiltration of intraparty discourse into the legislator.

Also with the change of campaign finance both for PACS, advocacy groups, parties and individuals, further studies may want to evaluate how the spending trends have changed over time and how the changes have hurt or benefited Republican moderates.

Changes in campaign finance have drastically altered the formation of PACS, their functions, and their power. Independent expenditures were difficult to ascertain for this group but may not be the case for others. As well, by identifying who is spending and donating in opposition of moderate Republicans further research can better understand the platform and reasoning behind attacking moderates. In order to understand the change to a more centrist approach at one point in their career the evaluation of the 110th Congress would provide a wealth of clarity as a number of the members of the case study changed most dramatically during this time. The 2007 to 2009 party unity scores were for most members the lowest of their careers and yet the Republicans did not have a majority and understanding why Republicans chose then to switch their voting trends may shed light on why voting trends continue to shift now.

Ultimately the operationalization of intraparty competition could be defined in a number of different ways outside of a case study which may yield further results. Finally a more expansive vantage point of Republicans in Congress would yield a more accurate picture to all studies as the findings of these representatives were limited in both quantity and comparative value due to the limited number of cases.

Conclusions

In analyzing the case studies throughout the course of the study my original hypothesis was deemed inconclusive. As mentioned before, the operationalization of intraparty competition became a cumbersome and abstract definition and one that yielded complicated results. In some instance such as Frank LoBiondo, Peter King, or Michael Simpson the intraparty competition was extremely clear to even the most passive observer. These individuals were attacked for moderate or more centrist opinions and publicly defamed for their stances. In doing so they were forced to either retaliate verbally or in Michael Simpson's case rewrite the narrative as more than a Republican in name only. These individuals also have a history of primary opponents, political enemies, or small subgroups which vehemently attacked them with the purpose of demonstrating their lack of conservative ideals.

Yet seven other members of the study were much more complicated to understand as their vote shares may have dropped for only a session of Congress, the members may be insulated due to their Congressional districts liberal or conservative nature, or a change

may have occurred outside the scope of this study. These members are extremely complicated to understand and ascertain reasoning for but some of the general trends still hold value to the hypothesis. Without accounting for any causation, party unity scores did increase during this time period and have showed little indication of reversing. To what extent primary opponents played in this change is unfortunately difficult to ascertain without further research. Yet the trends so still hold true for these members and may be the underlying findings of this research. Regarding the 2014 elections, Republicans seem to be much more pragmatic than their rhetoric from October of 2013 through now suggest. Furthermore the unpopularity of House Republicans suggests that they may still find it difficult to distance themselves from the issues and problems which have plagued and upset the American people. Therefore they cannot afford to position Republican against Republican when this is a challenging time for the party.

The second underlying and more important factor is that party unity has increased. To scholars who argue that this is merely a rollercoaster trend Congressional history finds itself on from generation to generation, this study would state that this time may be different. Money has flooded politics with recent Supreme Court cases unlike ever before and the negative side effects of intraparty competition (lack of compromise, factional jockeying for power, the minority speaking on behalf of the majority) seems to be far more entrenched in this most recent emergence of intraparty competition. These factors may play a part in perpetuating internal party conflict and peer pressure like Congress has never seen and may make the negative side effects much more impactful and prevalent than ever before in our history.

References

- Abramowitz, Alan and Stone, Walter. (2006). *The Bush Effect: Polarization, Turnout, and Activism in the 2004 Presidential Election*. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, 141-154.
- American Conservative Union. (2013). *2013 Ratings of Congress*. Retrieved from <http://www.conservative.org/legislative-ratings/2013-congress>
- Binder, Sarah A. (2003). *Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Blake, Aaron. (2012, March 30). The Next Jean Schmidt? The top 10 House incumbents who could lose their primaries. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/the-next-jean-schmidt-the-top-10-house-incumbents-who-could-lose-their-primaries/2012/03/30/g1QA5dOalS_blog.html.
- Boucek, Françoise. (2009). *Rethinking Factionalism: Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics, and Three Faces of Factionalism*. *American Political Science Association*, 15, 455-485.
- Bowling, Cynthia and Pickerill, Mitchell. (2013). *Fragmented Federalism: The State of American Federalism 2012-2013*. Oxford: The Annual Review of Federalism, 43, 315-346.
- Brady, David, Han, Hahrie and Pope, Jeremy. (2007). *Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?*. University of Iowa: Legislative Studies Quarterly.
- Club for Growth. (2014). *Bryan Smith (ID- 02)*. Retrieved from <http://www.clubforgrowth.org/pac-candidates/?subsec=0&id=1217>.
- Daily Kos. (2012). Presidential Results by Congressional District for the 2012 and the 2008 election. Retrieved from <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/11/19/1163009/-Daily-Kos-Elections-presidential-results-by-congressional-district-for-the-2012-2008-elections#>.
- Dwyer, Jim. (2013, September 24). A Republican Calls Another a 'Fraud'. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/nyregion/a-republican-glad-to-label-cruz-a-fraud.html?_r=1&.
- Epstein, Leon. (1986). *Political Parties in the American Mold*. Madison WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

- Federal Elections Commission. *2014 Independent Expenditure*. Retrieved from <http://www.fec.gov/data/IndependentExpenditure.do>.
- Federal Elections Commissions. (2014). *Election Results*. Retrieved from <http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/electionresults.shtml>.
- Gallup. (2014). *Americans Desire for Government Leaders to Compromise Increases*. Retrieved from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/164570/americans-desire-gov-leaders-compromise-increases.aspx>.
- Gallup. (2014). *Congress and the Public*. Retrieved from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1600/congress-public.aspx>
- Geer, John and Shere, Mark. (1992). *Party Competition and the Prisoner's Dilemma: An Argument for the Direct Primary*. Cambridge: Journal of Politics.
- Hirano, Shigeo Snyder, James Anasolabehere, Stephen and Hansen, John. (2010). *Primary Election and Partisan Polarization in the U.S Congress*. Harvard, U.S: Quarterly Journal of Political Science.
- House of Representatives of the United States. (2014). *Committee Membership*. Retrieved from http://clerk.house.gov/committee_info/oal.pdf
- Israel, Josh. (2014, April 7). Where Have All The Moderate Republicans Gone?. *Think Progress*. Retrieved from <http://thinkprogress.org/election/2014/04/07/3420087/house-moderates-pac/>.
- Jones, David. (2001). *Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock*. University of Utah: Political Research Quarterly.
- Layman, Geoffrey, Carsey, Thomas, and Horowitz, Juliana. (2006). *Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences*. Annual Review Political Science.
- Ladd, Everett. (1978). *Where have all the Voters Gone?*. New York: Norton.
- Main Street Partnership. (2014). *About the Main Street Partnership*. Retrieved from <http://www.republicanmainstreet.org/about-us/>
- McCalmont, Lucy. (2014, April 16). Peter King: Rand Paul 'feeding into paranoia'. *Politico*. Retrieved from <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/peter-king-rand-paul-105747.html#ixzz2z3S3TzPK>.

- Open Secrets. (2014). Independent Expenditures. Retrieved from <http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/otherdata.php?cycle=2014&cid=N00006263&type=I>.
- Parker, Ashely. (2013, October 7). A GOP Moderate in the Middle... of a Jam. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/us/politics/a-gop-moderate-in-the-middle-of-a-jam.html?pagewanted=all>.
- Pearson- Merkowitz, Shanna and McTague, John. (2008). *Partisan Mountains and Molehills: The Geography of U.S State Intraparty Factionalism*. *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 8, 7-31.
- Peterson, Kristina. (2014, March 25). Jobless Aid Wins Few Fans in GOP House. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303949704579461742174520068>.
- Polsby, Nelson. (1983). *Consequences of Party Reform*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Project Vote Smart. (2014). *Dennis Parker Biography*. Retrieved from <http://votesmart.org/candidate/biography/119285/dennis-parker#.U2fpMvldWLM>.
- Red Alert Politics. (2012). *Mike Assad*. Retrieved from <http://redalertpolitics.com/thirty-under-thirty-2013/mike-assad/>.
- Rehm, Philipp. (2011). *Risk Inequality and the Polarized American Electorate*. Cambridge: *British Journal of Political Science*, 41, 363-387.
- Reilly, Ryan. (2011, September 23). Ros- Lehtinen First GOPer To Sponsor Bill Repealing Doma. *Talking Points Memos*. Retrieved from <http://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/ros-lehtinen-first-goper-to-sponsor-bill-repealing-doma>.
- Rogin, Josh. (2010, October 25). Who Will Stand Between Obama and the World: 10 Republicans who are about to become the new foreign-policy power brokers. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/25/who_will_stand_between_obama_and_the_world.
- Saeki, Manabu. (2009). *Gridlock in the Government of the United States: Influence of Divided Government and Veto Players*. Cambridge: *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Star- Ledger Editorial Board. (2014). Restoring Unemployment benefits, with a push from NJ. *New Jersey.com*. Retrieved from

http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/04/njs_level-headed_congressmen_push_to_restore_unemployment_benefits_editorial.html.

Stolberg, Sheryl. (2011, March 10). Domestic Terrorism Hearing Opens with Contrasting Views on Dangers. *The New York Times*. Retrieved by http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/us/politics/11king.html?_r=0.

Tamari, Jonathan. (2014, April 12). GOP Budget divides Republicans from this region. *Philly.com*. Retrieved from http://articles.philly.com/2014-04-12/news/49061636_1_lobiondo-bill-hughes-jr-other-local-republicans.

The New York Times. *Politics- Inside Congress*. Retrieved from <http://politics.nytimes.com/congres>.

United States Census Bureau. (2014). *Data Access Tools*. Retrieved from <https://www.census.gov/main/www/access.html>.

United States House Clerk Office. (2013). *FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 550*. Retrieved from <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll550.xml>.

United States Representative David Reichert. *Issues*. Retrieved from <http://reichert.house.gov/issues>

Wan, William. (2011, January 24). N.Y Muslims fear congressman's hearings could inflame Islamophobia. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/23/AR2011012304448.html>.

Washington Post. (2014). U.S Congress Votes Database. Retrieved from <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/113/>.

Williamson, Vanessa Skocpol, Theda and Coggin, John. (2011). *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism*. Harvard, U.S: Perspectives on Politics.