dc.contributor.advisor | Roche, William | |
dc.contributor.author | Barth, Dylan | |
dc.date | 2018-05-19 | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-11-06T15:21:37Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-11-06T15:21:37Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://repository.tcu.edu/handle/116099117/22399 | |
dc.description.abstract | Within the field of epistemology there exists a movement to formalize philosophical inquiry by appealing to probability calculus as a requirement for rationality concerning credences. Among a subset of formal epistemologists, the question of how to assign probability to propositions for which we have little evidence is of importance. In this paper I examine one of the principles that some philosophers claim bears on this issue, the principle of indifference, and issues surrounding its justification. I seek to evaluate the current literature and set forth a framework for future inquiry concerning the principle. | |
dc.subject | Philosophy | |
dc.subject | Principle of Indifference | |
dc.subject | Dylan | |
dc.subject | Barth | |
dc.subject | William | |
dc.subject | Roche | |
dc.title | Is There A Place In Bayesian Epistemology For The Principle Of Indifference? | |
etd.degree.department | Philosophy | |
local.college | AddRan College of Liberal Arts | |
local.college | John V. Roach Honors College | |
local.department | Philosophy | |