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dc.contributor.authorBarth, Dylan
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-06T15:21:37Z
dc.date.available2018-11-06T15:21:37Z
dc.date.issued2018-05-19
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.tcu.edu/handle/116099117/22399
dc.description.abstractWithin the field of epistemology there exists a movement to formalize philosophical inquiry by appealing to probability calculus as a requirement for rationality concerning credences. Among a subset of formal epistemologists, the question of how to assign probability to propositions for which we have little evidence is of importance. In this paper I examine one of the principles that some philosophers claim bears on this issue, the principle of indifference, and issues surrounding its justification. I seek to evaluate the current literature and set forth a framework for future inquiry concerning the principle.
dc.subjectPhilosophy
dc.subjectPrinciple of Indifference
dc.subjectDylan
dc.subjectBarth
dc.subjectWilliam
dc.subjectRoche
dc.titleIS THERE A PLACE IN BAYESIAN EPISTEMOLOGY FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIFFERENCE?en_US
etd.degree.departmentPhilosophy


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