Sir John Simon and British diplomacy during the Sino-Japanese crisis, 1931-1933

Abstract

Although various quarrels had flared up during the post-war years, the Japanese invasion of Northern China in the autumn of 1931 represented the first major clash of arms since the end of the "Great War." It obviously threatened the viability of the League of Nations and of collective security and no one doubted that diplomatically the British role would be one of key importance. Unfortunately the attack caught Great Britain at a moment when the disorders of a depression diverted attention from a crisis which many historians subsequently termed the start of World War II. When news of the outbreak arrived in September, pressing domestic problems commanded the attention of the government. Not until November, with the electoral victory of the "National" coalition, could Britain give adequate consideration to the Far Eastern question. On November 6 when Sir John Simon took the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, he inherited a Sino-Japanese dispute in which the British position had already been seriously compromised. For the new Foreign Secretary the two most perplexing aspects of the crisis were the question of sanctions and of American cooperation. Could the League of Nations invoke sanctions without the assistance of the United States? With or without American support, he believed sanctions meant global war. He also felt the United States would never support such economic action. The only course open to Britain and the League, therefore was conciliation. He received the Japanese proposal for a League investigation as a step towards settlement. Before a Commission reached the Far East, however, the Japanese invaded Shanghai. Unlike that on Manchuria, the attack on Shanghai was a grave threat to British interests and Anglo-American unity was essential to check Japanese aggression. Unfortunately, Simon's efforts were hampered by misunderstandings with the American Secretary of State. Throughout the oriental crises Simon formulated priorities rather than policies. Hu must placate Japan, prevent Britain being isolated, and block sanctions. Britain's weakness forced him to seek a solution based upon reality. Throughout 1932, he urged moderation and refuted the use of coercion. The major powers looked for leadership but shunned responsibility. The small powers clamored for action but avoided danger or expense. The Soviet Union was indifferent and the American government seemed only to strike moral poses. Simon saw no way of stopping Japan and little to be gained by bluffing. Great Britain could not assume military leadership in a world war and Simon was unwilling to lead a crusade either on behalf of the League or on behalf of an Anglo-American alliance.