William R. Castle and Japanese-American relations, 1929-1933

Abstract

The question of how a democracy can cope with aggression is one with Which we still live. In 1931-1932 the administration of Herbert Hoover was forced to deal with this problem in the face of Japanese attacks on China in Manchuria and Shanghai. Initially there was little disagreement within the administration as to what United States policy should be. President Hoover recommended and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson formulated and implemented a policy of nonrecognition of changes wrought by force of arms. But soon a difference of opinion arose concerning what nonrecognition entailed. Stimson felt that economic sanctions might be appropriate and that at least the threat of sanctions should be maintained. Conversely Hoover regarded an embargo as an act of war, and opposed any move likely to involve the United States in a conflict with Japan. Aligned with the President on this issue was the number three man in the American foreign policy apparatus, Under Secretary of State William R. Castle. Castle, a career diplomat and thoroughly familiar with the Japanese, was a friend and confidant of President Hoover. During the spring of 1932, while Stimson was in Europe, Hoover requested that castle include in a speech which was soon to be delivered a once-and-for-all denial that the United States would employ economic sanctions against Japan. Stimson who regarded such a disclaimer as unwise was furious when he learned of the speeches, but Castle was protected from any official rebuke since the President maintained it was done under his orders. In the past historians had seemed all too willing to accept the claim that Castle acted under orders and simply noted that he was in sympathy with the President's stand on the matter anyway. Such a view overlooks Castle's own strong opposition to a war with Japan which he foresaw as a disaster even in the event of a United States victory. Furthermore, it ignores his special relationship with Hoover and assumes that at a time when the two men were discussing all sorts of foreign policy problems that they did not share their views on the Sino-Japanese conflict. Also ignored is the fact that Castle willingly accepted the assignment, resisted all efforts to dissuade him, delivered the addresses with conviction, and thus earned the Secretary of State's personal, if not official, enmity. This dissertation examines Castle's background, education, and career development as well as his role in the formulation of United States policy during the Sino-Japanese dispute. Eventually he saw most of his work in the period between the world wars undone. But in 1932 when he stood with the President against risking an unwanted war with Japan, he was true to his highest loyalty.