| dc.description.abstract | In the second half of the twentieth century a new trend in Latin American militarism has appeared in Brazil and Peru. The military regimes established in these nations in the 1960's, unlike their predecessors and those elsewhere, seized power not simply to restore constitutional government, or for any of the many justifications presented in the past, but with the intention of remaining in power in order to institute sweeping socio-economic changes. In both cases, the inspiration, doctrines, and programs were generated in advanced military academic institutions--ESG in Brazil, and CAEM in Peru. The Brazilian regime has been conservative in its attempts to change the economy and society, generally respecting private property and encouraging foreign investment. It also maintained the governmental institutions, in name if not in function. The Peruvian Junta, on the other hand, has been much less conservative, ruling without Congress, nationalizing private property, frightening off foreign investors, and undermining the economy. The armed forces in these countries have been unsuccessful in developing a permanent following among the urban and rural masses because their rhetoric does not go beyond nationalistic overtones to solve urgent needs such as housing, health, education, and food. Civilians view the military interventions as temporary solutions to governmental instability. Civilians, however, became unhappy when they realized that the military men had decided to remain in power indefinitely. The United States accepted the Castello Branco coup, while it showed deep concern for the nationalist government of Velasco Alvarado. American diplomats, however, decided to negotiate rather than to retaliate with economic sanctions for Peru's action against American companies, like the IPC. Before the decade had ended both Brazil and Peru were willing to cooperate with the United States. Unless civilian institutions and political parties in Brazil and Peru are strengthened in the immediate future, the armed forces seem willing to remain in power after staging coups. In both countries there is a new breed of generals and colonels who have broad designs for national development which go far beyond national security. | |
