Motivational determinants of decision-making in a triadic coalition game

Abstract

The purpose of the study was to show that individual differences in achievement motivation related to strategy variation in a triadic coalition game. Specifically, the study explored the value of the motivational variables contained in the Atkinson (1957) model of achievement motivation as predictors of coalition partner choices and final coalition formation. Affiliation motivation and sex were also considered as possible predictors of strategy variation. The game was structured as an achievement-oriented situation by the inclusion of an intellectual ability task with power reflecting the ability of players. A Caplovian Type V power distribution was used in all triads by means of manipulating the scores on the ability test. The process of coalition formation was viewed as a series of decision-making problems wherein players chose strategy options from available alternatives. Choices for strategy options were considered to be mediated by risk involved in the alternatives. Expectations for differences in strategy choices were based upon differential preference for risk levels found to be associated with individual differences in achievement motivation. To allow a precise examination of choice behavior, the game was divided into three decision points. Coalition partner preferences as a function of power differences was examined at the first decision point. Choices for division of intra-coalition responsibility were made at the second decision point. Players stated preferences for coalition partners at the third decision point with the knowledge that alliances would form on the basis of reciprocal choices made following a negotiation sequence. Individual differences in achievement motivation, success-orientation (Ms>Maf) and failure avoidant orientation (Maf>Ms) were related to variation in strategy choices and final coalition formation. Variation in strategy behavior was not related to affiliation motivation or to sex. The strategy differences observed between the Ms>Maf and Maf>Ms groups indicated that players in the Ms>Maf group preferred a moderate risk strategy while the Maf>Ms players preferred a low-risk strategy. Players in the Maf>Ms group consistently selected a failure-avoidant approach to game play.