The effects of Machiavellianism and locus of control on bargaining behavior in a triadic coalition situation

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of Machiavellianism and locus of control on bargaining behavior of individuals in a single sex, triadic, probabilistic situation using achieved power. Three specific hypotheses were investigated. The first hypothesis predicted that (a) high Mach-external individuals would prefer a less powerful individual as a partner in an alliance and (b) low Mach-internal individuals would prefer a more powerful individual as an alliance partner. The prediction made by hypothesis 2 was that (a) high Mach-external individuals would form an alliance between the middle and low power individuals and (b) low Mach-internals would form an alliance between middle and high power individuals. Hypothesis 3 predicted that (a) high Mach-externals would prefer to receive an equal division of the reward if they were weak and a parity division of the reward if they were strong and (b) low Mach-internals would prefer to receive an equal share of the reward regardless of their relative strength. Participants consisted of 45 high Mach-externals and 45 low Mach-internals. Chi-square and ANOVA were used to analyze the data. In general, the results of this study indicated that the high Mach-external and low Mach-internal combination of personality variables have no effect on alliance partner preference, alliance formation, or money division preference.