Small States, Big Victories: Expropriation and Subaltern Power

Abstract

It seems like common sense that weaker states are destined to lose in engagements with stronger states. After all, stronger states enjoy larger militaries, richer economies, and greater resources. Despite these advantages, however, it is not uncommon for strong states to suffer unexpected losses at the hands of their weaker counterparts. Previous studies have identified guerilla tactics in military engagements and the formation of weak-state coalitions within international organizations as two strategies that can lead to weak-state benefits in unequal state interactions. Yet few scholars have studied this phenomenon from a political and economic standpoint. Instances of expropriation provide case studies that involve highly political and economic issues. By examining these expropriation cases, this study works to uncover the fundamental factors that underpin asymmetric state interactions. Specifically, this study explores the conditions under which successful expropriation occurs. I draw on the principles of bargaining theory to create a theoretical explanation for successful expropriation and identify six factors that I argue contribute to successful expropriation specifically, and weak-state power generally. To test these factors, I compare four expropriation cases using Mill's method of agreement and difference. Additionally, I employ process tracing to better highlight the causal mechanisms that especially advantage weaker nations.