| Abstract | This paper addresses the philosophical question of whether the act of punishing those who commit criminal wrongdoings is morally permissible or not. In addressing this question, I explore various theories in order to demonstrate that to properly value the victim of a crime, it is necessary for the state to appropriately express disapproval of the action through censure. I also argue that the infliction of hard treatment onto the wrongdoer is necessary in order to appropriately convey the message that the victim has moral value. These features of a justification of the moral permissibility of punishment also serve to form a solution to the problem of punishment that David Boonin describes in his work, The Problem of Punishment. Through use of censure, value, and victim-centered approaches found in existing literature on punishment, as well as a unique view on the ability to value victims that are absent in a significant way, I attempt to form a view that successfully challenges the claim that it is not permissible to inflict punishment on those who commit wrongdoings. |
