dc.description.abstract | Political polarization has become a central topic of discussion for observers of United States politics in recent decades. Over the past fifty years, political scientists have observed a steady increase in polarization, especially among members of the United States Congress. Many studies claim that this phenomenon has caused factors in Congress such as divisive rollcall voting and legislative gridlock. However, some studies neglect to analyze its indirect, long-term effects on legislative productivity and cooperation on the formulation of legislation in Congress. In an effort to address these issues, this paper begins by discussing the standard perspectives of polarization and its impacts on the legislative branch. It then looks at legislative norms and the tradition of co-sponsorship as a baseline of congressional cooperation. Next, it gathers original co-sponsorship and party affiliation data from three sessions of the Senate from 1991 to 2016 to analyze the prevalence of co-sponsorship and to test whether a growth in polarization affects original co-sponsorship levels within a twenty-five-year period. The essay then concludes by suggesting that an increase in polarization does cause a change in co-sponsorship trends, showing divisiveness through an increase in single-party co-sponsored legislation. However, bills that are co-sponsored across party lines are more likely to pass through the Senate than bills without bipartisan support during these periods, so senators may be able to overcome legislative gridlock through seeking original bipartisan cosponsors. | |