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“Deconstruction of *Being*: the Economy of Estrangement in Oppression”

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Abstract

From antiquity the human *being* of humanity are understood as a divided *Being*. Despite some 2000 years and more, this division has repeated itself in the form of consciousness and the phenomena, concretely objectifying *Being* within our very *epistemology*. It is the initial argument of this paper that on the one hand human *beings* of humanity are indoctrinated in descriptors that are nominal and those nominal descriptors are an indicator of the "I" of which are reinforced by their external Social Market Value (SMV). On the other hand, human *beings* of humanity through this continual external reinforcement of Social Market Value are further indoctrinated in suppressing their own subject *self*. This initial argument arises from the primary argument of this paper, the deconstruction of *Being*, where on the one hand *Being* is the singular subjective self, and on the other hand Non-*being* is metaphysics capitalistic privatization of the body. Wherein through the capitalistic colonization of metaphysics the "I" of Non-*being* is estranged from the subjective *self*.

“Deconstruction of *Being*: the Economy Estrangement in Oppression”

Introduction: “Dichotomy” of *Being*

As I completed my last semester within what American political reference would be called a “liberal” seminary, multiple forms of oppression were widely discussed, and not just in the sense of how the Church might assist society, but also how the Church functioned to perpetuate a fair degree of oppression, including support and reinforcement of slavery, puritan ideals that fuel sexism, not to mention the inherent patriarchy and hierarchy that initiated most, if not all, oppressive structural forms of society of which remain continually reinforced. At this place and during this time it became more and more evident that forms of oppression had a great deal in common, and the systems that perpetuated them too had a fair amount in common. Which is more than simply suggesting that oppression is merely oppression. It is to explicitly state that oppression, while it experienced on a personal level, functions at a systemic level, and most, if not all, oppression at the individual level is rooted in it’s systemic perpetuation and reinforcement. With that said *each* system: racism, sexism, classism, and so on, has its *own* root problem and/or cause. Yet, they all share a base commonality, which is what gave rise to the research for this final thesis. Now, to be clear this is not to suggest that what follows is the beginning grand meta-narrative, but instead suggests there is a system(s) or a base function(s) that adheres to specific mode of critique.

Systemic oppression is a controversial term, as it is a departure from, at the very least, the enlightenment era’s and too modernity’s liberal standard of essentialized individualism, of which renders speaking of systems as ineffectual. David Theo Goldberg describes this essentialized individualism in this way, “[b]asic to modernity’s self

conception, then, is a notion not of social subjects but of a Subject that is abstract and atomistic, general and universal, divorced from the contingencies of historicity, as it is from the particularities of social and political relations and identities¹.” Enter *race*, Goldberg’s specific discourse, but I would add any other ethnic or defining social specificity, and the once universal Subject becomes social subject. As the issued identity is colonized by its own connotations, it subjects said identity to the applicability of *Reason* in an effort to define what or who is to be excluded and included². The list: enlightenment era, modernity, and Reason rightly indicate what Goldberg emphasizes is the move toward systemic oppression, in his example: racism, is developed, or at least functions, in modernity’s move toward Liberalism. However, this move was functioning before modernity’s Liberalism, and, indeed Liberalism is the capitalization of essentialized individualism, which historically began much earlier.

Returning to Goldberg’s point of exclusion and inclusion, and considering Allan G. Johnson’s argument, he helps to further define systemic oppression through the lens of privilege or mass specific inclusion. Johnson writes, “individuals receive privilege only because they are perceived by others as belonging to privileged groups and social categories,” and therefore it only matters what others think and the social categories others place us in, and not what we think of ourselves³.” Accordingly since privilege is an action by the other, it is impossible to remove privilege, thus one is always stuck within the system. The converse of privilege is oppression, where those who are not privileged, precisely because they are again held to the applicable standard of *Reason*, are excluded, holding

¹Goldberg, David Theo., *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, (Oxford; Blackwell Publishing, 1993) 4.

²*Ibid.*

³Johnson, Allan G., *Privilege, Power, and Difference*, 2nd ed., (New York; McGrawHill, 2005), 34.

them down or back while, the privileged proceed ahead. Both privilege and oppression are systems, though oppression, by way of the very exclusion situated by privilege, excludes, oppresses, and restrains persons according to the social specificity of the category of their subjectivity. Again, just as the markers that connote privilege cannot be escaped, neither can the markers of oppression. One is always in the system.

This above exposition is best understood as looking at systemic oppression from above. In which case it may indicate that systemic oppression functions according to who it benefits- non-discursive powers or the privileged. In the current political arena, especially considering, to say the least, the gerrymandering of predominately white counties over and against predominately African American counties, it is too often used to swing votes for the former against the latter. I share the opinion of Cornel West that the emergence of white supremacy, white systemic oppression, and all other non-white androcentric identifying specificities, arise (more and/or before) from discursive powers. To better articulate what is meant by discursive powers, West writes, “white supremacy emerges partly because of the powers (Foucault) within the structures of modern discourse—powers to produce, prohibit, develop and delimit, forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity which set perimeters and draw boundaries for the intelligibility, availability, and legitimacy for certain ideas⁴.” It is not simply an enforcement of power from above, such as non-discursive powers or kings and class elites, but (too) oppressive powers are grounded in the very discourse of society.

Up until this point, the topic of systemic oppression has been discussed within the context of race. Yet, I reiterate my foregrounding comments that systemic oppression is

⁴West, Cornel., *Prophesy Deliverance!*, (Philadelphia; Westminster Press, 1982), 49. My parentheses.

always the case when in the context of ethnic or defining social specificity *deviates* from western normative standards. There are a multitude of these normative standards and consequentially an even greater possibility of *deviation*, thus at this point I will only scratch the surface of what is at stake here.

Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza has coined the term *kyriarchy*. Namsoon Kang, rightly summarizes Fiorenza's concept and justifies its use when she writes, "[b]y adopting the term *kyriarchy*, instead of patriarchy, I want to reveal the enormously complex structure of oppression-subordination, not only between genders but also between and across different races, ethnicities, classes, abilities, sexual orientation, religion and so forth⁵." *Kyriarchy* provides, at the base level, a list of the specificity of social identities—the categories open to *deviations* from normative standard of the western white male. Similarly, *kyriarchy* provides a framework to understand and discuss oppression from both the discursive and non-discursive level. It addresses the non-discursive level as it directly translates as "the rule of the emperor/master/lord/father/husband over his subordinates⁶." At the discursive level Schüssler Fiorenza stretches the term to *kyriocentric*, which addresses the "ideological articulations that validate and are sustained by *kyriarchal* relations of domination," as such "it is best understood as an intellectual framework and a cultural ideology that legitimates and is legitimated by *kyriarchical* social structures and systems of domination⁷."

⁵Kang, Namsoon, *Diasporic Feminist Theology: Asia and Theopolitical Imagination*, (Fortress Press; Minneapolis, 2014), 153.

⁶Schüssler Fiorenza, Elizabeth, *Jesus, Mariam's Child, Sophia's Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology*, (Continuum; New York, 2004), 14.

⁷*Ibid.*

These categories or specificities in identities, as they are considered *deviations*, indicate the discursive power within our epistemology or the system by which we know of and about the world and the people in it. There is little, if any, question that oppression exists. These categories, the specificities beyond the Universal Subject: genders, races, ethnicities, classes, abilities, sexual orientation, religion and so forth indicate the location of oppression. And this location resides within the system by which we know of and about the world and the people in it—epistemological and discursive then, logic dictates that the oppression is systemic.

Here, then, we must consider this western, white, male normative standard, and in so doing, we have a *real* idea of what Goldberg is referencing as the Universal Subject of Western Liberalism, and a *real* idea of how any specificity of social identities beyond that norm is a *deviation* from it. However, the use of the term *real* becomes convoluted. In terms of systemic oppression these two *identities*: normative—western white male, and non-normative, specificity of social identities—or as we can see in the term *kyriarchy*, and the categories of genders, races, ethnicities, classes, abilities, sexual orientation, religion and so forth, are in *reality* effectual in the functions of the system of oppression and in the systems of society. Yet, do they affect a person's actual mode of being? Perhaps the phrase *species* might help to draw the contrast. In an individual's *species-being* (not Feuerbach) is either the normative and the non-normative *specificity*, in reality, effectual⁸? Is any *specificity* that indicates a change in an individual's *species-being*? The above-indicated specificity of social identities along with the normative standards of the Universal Subject are nominal connotations, or they exist only upon the naming of the specificity—the difference, which

⁸As this text proceeds, I will introduce the use of Karl Marx. Marx relied upon Feuerbach's defined *species-being*. However I am not here referring to that particular use.

has no real effect on the *species-being* of the individual. In more explicit terms, having the identity marker of black, Asian, or even being female does not change the fact that these individuals are human beings or *homo sapiens*. Accordingly, these nominal connotations are and function as social constructs—an attribute of our epistemology, which does not indicate any real difference to the individual as subject. This must be understood in reference to the domination inherent in systemic oppression, wherein these nominal connotations—nominal values function and are given power from the top down—from a place of privilege and consequently enforce oppression. As in *kyriarchy*, “the rule of the emperor/master/lord/father/husband over his subordinate,” the language of accepting and assimilating these categories, dominates and subordinates any *deviation*⁹. As this is an indictment of epistemology, the domination occurs again on a discursive level. Cornel West indicates that these nominal connotations “emerges partly because of the powers within the structures of modern discourse—powers to produce, prohibit, develop and delimit, forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity which set perimeters and draw boundaries for the intelligibility, availability, and legitimacy for certain ideas¹⁰.” The effectuality of these nominal connotations—the social descriptors, in relation to the power inherent to the systemic domination of systemic oppression located in our epistemology necessitates that the nominal connotations have a use-value in the system—it has an associated or an attributive *value*. This attributive value associated with these identity specificities or nominal connotations correlate with the degree of *deviation* from the norm, or the Social Market Value (SMV). The Social Market Value does not indicate the actual value of *species-being* or *Being*—the subject, but instead is the value attributed to the social construction of

⁹Schussler Fiorenza, 14.

¹⁰West, 49.

the nominal connotations—the markers have use value. While this point can be and deserves to be expanded upon, what it most effectively indicates—makes explicit at this point is that the *species-being* or *Being* has no inherent *value*—no inherent subjectivity beyond the body, which is only useful—has use-value in the terms of the socially constructed nominal connotations can be attached, attributed, associated, and therefore function to define the body itself. Black, Asian, woman, gay, straight; these are all attributes of the body that arise from the discursive powers to define the individual *beings*. Thus one says, “I am a white woman.” Or “I am a black man.” Or even “I am a man.” And “I am a woman” These names that we call ourselves do not arise out of our own subjective *selves*, but are given to the “I” associated with the object—body—according to an externally reinforced subjectivity.

Therefore, on the one hand we have singular *Being*, the *self* as subject, which is real and exists without the attached nominal connotations of social construction and determines one’s own subjectivity. On the other hand is the “I” of social construction, which does not exist without the nominal connotations attached to the body, this is the *Non-being*. The division of *Non-being* is a metaphysical philosophical construction of which is subjectivity that capitalizes and privatizes the body as social property, while suppressing the *self* as subject, such that the *Non-being* as Beings have no power within their subjectivity, therefore the social construction of the “I” is estranged from the *self*.

Methods

The overall method to accomplish this end will be to use a neo-Marxist critique utilizing historical materialism at the discursive level to show the estrangement of the “I” from the *self* and how this estrangement causes the privatization of the body as the “I.” However, I

will first investigate, on the one hand, the metaphysics of *Non-being* and the Platonic dualism that contrast the body to the *soul*-mind. This particular argument will be grounded in and qualified by the use of *ousia* on the Nicene Creed, as established in the First Ecumenical Council, the Council of Nicaea in 325 CE. Establishing the reach of this dualism to the present day, as evidenced by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the ontology of Martin Heidegger.

On the other hand, I will offer the premise of the singularity of *Being* and too the subjectivity of alterity arises from it, offered by Namsoon Kang, according to Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. With this contrast, I will turn to Jacques Derrida's *Specters of Marx* to qualifying the use of Marx and Marxism. As well this text will also establish the means to talk about the privatization of the body but also how the estrangement functions according to the previously established Platonic dualism. Accordingly, I will draw out Marx's original argument for historical materialism on the non-discursive level to the discursive level. Upon isolating the dynamic function of Marx's argument, I will indicate how historical materialism functions on the discursive level according to metaphysics, the platonic dualism therein, and utilizing Derrida's *spirit* and *specter* from the *Specters of Marx* to establish the estrangement of the "I" from the *self*, the privatization and commodification of the body in the use-value functional in the nominal descriptors attached to it.

I. Metaphysics and *Non-being*

Similar to my observations of the connections between different forms of oppression, my theological explorations in both protestant and catholic theologies yielded a number of commonalities, in particular the relationality between G*d and people, between G*d and the Church, between the Church and G*d, and between people. How One

and the Other are hierarchally conditioned in one way or another, which is related to the transcendental nature attributed to G*d¹¹. The creed from the Catholic Church's First Ecumenical Council is the first codified indicator of this relationality and the transcendental G*d functions.

The Creed of Nicaea (325)¹²

We believe in one G*d the Father All-sovereign, maker of all things visible and invisible;

And in one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of G*d, *begotten of the Father*, only-begotten, *that is, of the substance of the Father*, G*d of G*d, Light of Light, *true G*d of true G*d*, *begotten not made* (consubstantial or *homoousios*), *one of substance with the Father*, through whom all things were made, *things in heaven and things on earth*; who for us men and our salvation *came down* and was made flesh...

Note here, the androcentric language—the “Father,” the “Son,” and “men,” are all demonstrate the systemic oppression previously discussed. Note, too, both *Father* and *Son*, but not *men*, are preceded by “the.”

The initial concern here is with the words: “sovereign” and “*substance*.” The sovereignty of G*d is conditioned by the “*substance*,” and so too is the case of the *Son* as one is *begotten* from the other. *Substance* and too consubstantial were the very source of the Arian conflict, which the First Ecumenical Council (325 CE) met to resolve, and provide the answer to the question of how Jesus as Christ could be both human and divine-literally. Therefore, the word *substance* and too consubstantial requires some etymological deconstruction, in which case we must look to the patristic fathers.

¹¹ I have chosen to indicate “G*d” in this way so that, while what I may write will attribute *qualities* for the sake of clarity and understanding, it is not my personal intent to actually attribute anything to G*d, for I can only speak of what G*d is not.

¹² Bettenson Henry and Chris Muander, *Documents of the Christian Church*, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2011), 27-28. Note: the Creed does not Change the spelling of G*d. My parentheses.

In the Second and Third Centuries, the Roman Empire controlled the Mediterranean and beyond, consequently controlling the vast majority of philosophy and scholarship, and what is now termed Western theology. While Greek was a prevalent language of the time, the Empire maintained society in Latin. This presented a problem for early philosopher theologians since the Latin language lacked a present active participle for the verb "to be." Tertullian and other Latin authors rendered the Greek noun "ousia" (being) as "substantia," and the Greek adjective "homoousios" (of the same being) as "consubstantialis." Both *ousia* and *substantia* herald from the work of Aristotle and translate as *being*. Yet, as Aristotle's "primary substance," it was changeless, transcendental, and all other substances were dependent upon it.

Both Aristotle and Plato claimed that *non-divine substances*, such as human beings, were characterized as having the ability to change. Aristotle defined it this way, "[a] thing is a substance if, and only if, it is both individual (a 'this so-and-so', something capable of being designated by a demonstrative phrase), and also a separable item (something non=parasitic, a thing whose existence is not a matter of some other thing's being modified in some way or other)¹³." Quite simply we might say that a *substance*, again different from the divine substance *ousia*, was for Aristotle a material object. Whereas, if something was "separable," it indicated something attributed to the object.

Plato's philosophical move was a bit different as he had an apparent teleology to bring everything into right order. Accordingly, G*d was only associated with *Good* and *goodness* of which was *Reason (Logos)*. Thus this highest Form for Plato was universal, changeless, immaterial and "represented" that which was abstract and beyond perception.

¹³Barnes, Jonathan, *Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2001), 70.

For Plato this was the transcendental *true reality* because it was *Good*, and that which is and happens upon earth is but a shadow of this *true reality* or *perfect reality*. This indicates the initial dualism associated with the cosmos, and this dualism extends beyond the celestial level.

In Plato's in *Timeaus*, "Forms function as patterns for the Craftsman as he makes our world¹⁴." Thus, the Forms are absolutely constrained by *Reason (Logos)* and human beings while not among the Forms, must still adhere to Plato's teleology of the rightly ordered world. While it would be simple to say here that Plato argued that human beings were endowed with reason. The basis of this argument is in how Plato thought human beings were constructed. He argued that the Craftsman [sic] G*d fashioned human beings in two parts—the body and the *soul*. Plato illustrates these two parts in the *Phaedo* (115c-116a) where Socrates on his deathbed¹⁵:

Socrates prepares to drink the hemlock:

'How shall we bury you?' asked Crito.

'However you like,' Socrates said, '-if you catch me and I don't get away from you.' He laughed quietly and said, looking at us, 'See, I can't convince Crito that what I am, is Socrates here, the person talking to you now, and drawing up the arguments. He thinks that I am what he will shortly see as a corpse, and asks how he shall bury me. I seem to have wasted my words on him, though consoling both you and myself, in the argument I have long been making, that when I drink the poison I shall no longer remain here with you, but will go away to some kind of happiness of the blessed. ... You must cheer up, and say that you are burying my body, and bury it however you like and in what you think is the most customary way.'

Poignant here are two points; Socrates states, "...when I drink the poison I shall no longer remain here with you, but will go away to some kind of happiness of the blessed."

¹⁴Annas, Julia, *Plato: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford; (Oxford University Press, 2003), electronic, 1284

¹⁵Ibid, 1008-21.

Juxtaposed with, “say that you are burying my body, and bury it however you like.” This is precisely the division of *Being* indicated above. Yet, it maybe foreign to many as it is the articulation of an all too common duality that not only is within the language of our daily lives but is the very existential understanding of ourselves.

Plato theorized that, while the *soul* could be unified with the perfected body free of desire for the use of a *good life*, upon death it was separated from the body, thus Plato inherently contrasted the *soul* over and against the body. The *soul* itself was made up of three parts: desire, *reason*, and *thumos* or passion and emotion. Most disparaging to unification was desire, as Plato attributed it to be primarily concerned with the most immediate or instant gratification with the least concern for the long-term fruition of life. The *thumos* intuitively adhered to ideals of *reason* but without using said *reason*, accordingly we might attribute it as *spirit*. *Reason (logos)* was the very function of the Craftsman [sic] G*d, and was therefore the only part of the *soul* fully capable of articulating the ideal perfection, providing for the unification and too “willingness” of the individual to achieve said ideal. Accordingly, “[i]n the *Republic* the main function of the theory of the soul’s parts is to show that the good life is one in which reason rules the whole soul, allowing each part to flourish as it should¹⁶.” The “good life,” guided by reason meant too the rightly ordered society. “This is one reason why his [Plato’s] ideas appealed to the ascetic Church Fathers, who interpreted the scriptural contrast of spirit and flesh as the Platonic contrast of sharply opposed soul and body, thus having a drastic effect on Western Christianity’s attitude to the body¹⁷.” In so contrasting, the body with the *soul*, it is my argument that the body is detached from it’s *Being*, similar to Aristotle, and it is objectified.

¹⁶Ibid, 1052.

¹⁷Ibid, 1081.

This is not simply metaphorical or philosophical, but is an embodied actuality within human beings. It is the objectification of *Being* by metaphysics, and results in neither wholeness nor the *totality* of *Being* nor does *Being* have it's own subjective value and consequently, the metaphysical *being* is Non-*being*.

A. Repetition

The dualism of the detachment between the body and the *soul* is a long held belief and indoctrinated within children of the Christian faith¹⁸. If this is the very condition of our understanding—an *embodied reality*, today nearly 2500 years after Plato wrote the *Republic*, why does it remain? A simple answer may well be that Christianity has spread far and wide and colonized extensive parts of the world since it's early 3rd Century inception. That answer is not entirely wrong. However, it is it is far more complex than simply the colonization of land and the people of those lands (or property).

Taking a linear historical look at the movement of metaphysics from its further development in the 3rd and 4th Centuries into late antiquity, even the Medieval period, and too the Dark Ages would be tedious and a departure from the primary issues at stake here. As would parsing the events of the Reformation in order to situate the theological argument around the shift from catholicism to Protestantism. Instead, let it suffice to say that all major church denominations in the year 2015 continue to confess the Nicene Creed as a constitutive part of their church doctrine¹⁹. Yet, while the Church did not depart from this practice nor was there a shift in the understanding of this metaphysical Non-*being*,

¹⁸Baptism

¹⁹The Nicene Creed in comparison to the Creed of Nicaea listed above does not change the part that I have quoted and adds space for the Holy Spirit as well as the Virgin birth by Jesus' mother Mary.

steps in philosophy were made to better understand the nature of *Being* and in many ways attempts to unify this *Non-being*, or the division of the body and *soul*.

Both the works of Jacques Derrida and Emanuel Levinas have gone to great lengths to explain these philosophical shifts, which they both situate around the end of the 19th Century and beginning of the 20th Century with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Husserl is credited with the work of phenomenology; While Heidegger is credited with what Derrida calls Heideggerean “ontology.” Derrida writes of the two, “The archeology to which Husserl and Heidegger lead us by different paths entails, for both, a subordination or transgression, in any event a *reduction of metaphysics*²⁰.”

This is a discursive level investigation the *substance* or *ousia*, while simply translated it means *being*. In the Creed of Nicaea, with the influence of both Aristotle and Plato, the philosophical construction of the term *ousia* “represents” the transcendental divine or in Plato’s terminology the Craftsman [sic] G*d. Then the two roots of ontology and phenomenology are *ontic* and *phenomena*. The adjectival tense of *ousia* is *ontic*, thus it is a direct reference to *being*, yet more specifically it is that which “is physical, real, or factual existence²¹.” We must be cautious not to confuse this with the former transcendental *ousia*.

Phenomenon, as devised by Immanuel Kant, arises out of its contrast to *noumenon* or that which is not directly observable. *Phenomenon* is that which manifests as *real* and observable. Husserl’s *phenomena*, is a derivative of the former and defined as the appearances of things, or things as they appear in our experience, or the ways we experience things wherein these “things” are the manifestation of what Husserl terms as

²⁰Derrida, Jacques, Alan Bass, trans. *Writing and Difference*, (The University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1978), 81. It is for this reason of “archeology” that I will attend to Husserl rather than Hegel in regards to phenomenology, despite the Hegelian “influence” on Karl Marx.

²¹<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontic>

consciousness. Husserl has two relevant presuppositions to his phenomenology: 1. “The World is the totality of objects that can be known through experience, known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct present experience²².” 2. “The acts of cognition which underlie our experiencing posit the Real in individual form, posit it as having spatio-temporal existence, as something existing in this time-spot, having this particular duration of its own and a real content which in its essence could just as well have been present in any other time-spot; posits it, moreover, as something which is present at this place in this particular physical shape²³.”

Levinas, as Derrida notes in the “Violence of Metaphysics” takes issue with the primordially of theoretical consciousness. Where the primacy of objectivity is not confused by the primacy of the theoretical attitude,” but the result is “of new and irreducible ontological structure” of axiological objects²⁴. This accounts for Husserl’s first presupposition and is problematic precisely because it relies upon a transcendental guide, and its reliance upon an *apparent* or “present” subject *being*. Then in the case of presupposition two, this conditions that the *phenomena* is held as “present” and brought to the forefront by non-theoretical consciousness, here as cognition in varying degrees through the “sign.” Derrida rightly critiques, “one cannot simultaneously maintain the primacy of the objectifying act and the irreducible originality of non-theoretical consciousness²⁵.” Accordingly, Derrida, quoting Levinas, concludes that this, for Husserl’s phenomenology, is a *real* world of only knowledge and representation, wherein, “a thought

²²Husserl, Edmund and Dermont Moran, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, (New York; Routledge, 1931, reprint 2012), 10.

²³Husserl, 10

²⁴Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, 86.

²⁵Ibid, 87.

rejecting the excellence of theoretical rationality will have to resign itself later, especially in that it never ceases to appeal to the most uprooted rationalism and universalism against the violences of mysticism and history, against a ravishing of enthusiasm and ecstasy,” leading a progression of the metaphysics of reduction²⁶.

Phenomenology is the collapse of the metaphysical *Non-being* in upon itself as “present.” Consciousness, theoretical or non-theoretical resides with the presence of the body, the reduction. This is also repetition, as the primordially of theoretical consciousness relies upon a transcendental guide, indicating a division of being regardless of the collapse. It is precisely these two points where Martin Heidegger took issue with Husserl.

Heidegger contends, that Husserl’s premise of consciousness is dictated by the *ontic*, or being and specifically according to the first and second presupposition the “presence” of that *being* in time. Husserl’s *being* functions within the constraints of “time;” which is according to Aristotle is determined by that which comes before and after. For Heidegger “this Greek interpretation of Being comes without any explicit knowledge of the guideline functioning in it, without taking cognizance of or understanding the fundamental ontological function of time, without ground of the possibility of this function²⁷.” The transcendental is groundless²⁸.

Heidegger’s “destructuring sees itself assigned the task of interpreting the very basis of ancient ontology in light of the problem of Temporality” wherein the “Being” of “beings”

²⁶Ibid

²⁷Heidegger, Martin. “Being and Time: Introduction” in *Basic Writings*, (Harper Perennial; London, 1927, 1972), 70.

²⁸The *a priori* of the *logos* is groundless

is oriented outward to the “world” and it gains its understanding in “time²⁹.” Therefore, Heidegger argues both against Husserl and too in his own ontological move that the “determination of the meaning of *Being* as *parousia*,” is ontologically and temporally “presence.” Beings are grasped in their Being as “presence;” that is to say, they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time, the *present*³⁰.” Which then implies that consciousness in Husserl, while thought *present* by metaphysics, but in *actuality* cannot be known as the *bounds* of time are without any “explicit knowledge.” Consciousness and thus *being* are inherently displaced—separate.

However, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger could not entirely escape the metaphysical framework. The initial indication of maintaining the transcendental—*soul -reason* in Plato, is in the introduction to *Being and Time*. Heidegger writes, “*Being is the transcendens pure and simple*. The transcendence of the Being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical *individuation*³¹.”

B. Presence

The roots *ontic* and *phenomena* indicate what Heidegger might describe as “present at hand.” While it may require manifestation or projection to comprehend or to *know* an *object*, for both Husserl and Heidegger, they remain concrete or substantive objects and as a result in contrast to the *ousia*, they are *parousia* or present- always already present.

Husserl’s manifestation via consciousness and Heidegger’s projection, or the way in which the body *knows* is necessarily un-substantive. What we might now call the mind, or as Plato

²⁹Ibid 69. “Greek ontology and its history... still determine the conceptual character of philosophy today, are proof of the fact that Dasein understands itself and Being, in general, in terms of the “world.” This is the historicity of Dasein. 65.

³⁰Ibid 69-70.

³¹Ibid, 85.

referred to as the *soul* according to its capacity for *reason*, is contrasted with the object—body. Thus, while the body is *theoretically* “unified” with the mind-soul in the “present,” it remains that it is dependent upon the transcendental at which point we can conclude that the Platonic dualism continues as a constitutive of constructed *reality*. To further illustrate this point as well as the power “behind” or within this constructed *reality*, what it is to be “present” must be complexified.

Christopher Norris states that metaphysics denotes “that particular branch of philosophy that raises certain distinctive issues concerning the *conditions of possibility* for thought, knowledge, and experience in general,” which is to say that it is always involved in some version of that claim “to deduce those conditions from a rigorous enquiry into the *a priori* structures and modalities of human understanding³².” Then we must consider the *Logos* as it is a direct extension, if not synonymous with *Reason* and furthered implied within the *a priori* categories of the constructed ontological *reality*. The *a priori* is of the *logos* and imports or sets the conditions for thought, knowledge and experience. Derrida calls into question the *a priori* of presence. In “The Violence of Metaphysics” Derrida writes,

[T]he necessity of speaking [seeing] of the other as other, or to the other as other, on the basis of its appearing-for-me-as-what-it-is; the other (an appearing which dissimulates its essential dissimulation, takes it out of the light, stripping it, and hiding that which is hidden in the other), as the necessity from which no discourse can escape, from its earliest origin—these

³²Reynolds, Jack and Jonathan Roffe, ed. *Understanding Derrida*, (Continuum; New York, 2004), 16.

necessities are violence itself, or rather the transcendental origin of irreducible violence...³³

On this we can draw this conclusion first that “presences” is inherently a metaphysical construction of *reality*. Wherein, the presumption of *presences* and indeed the acting on that presumption was for Derrida a distinct “irreducible violence,” because, in the simplest of terms, it inherently draws/pulls/insists the Other into the *imperialism of sameness*.

C. Reason, Sameness and Non-Being

The imperialism of sameness is the very function of *Reason*; as such *reason (logos)* remains the primary operative function of the *soul*-mind. Accordingly, to better understand the complexity of “presence,” so too must we complexify *Reason* or *Logos*.

The metaphysics of presences and how it relates to *reason* is best explained with Derrida’s logocentrism. Logocentrism then, is the sociocultural and even sociopolitical necessity of drive to draw to the center of sameness, of which the sameness is the *logos* or reason in both the Platonic and Enlightenment sense³⁴. We see this very kind of logocentric development in the patristic fathers’ Christology and not just theologically, as noted above, but also politically. Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza notes that Constantine is quoted in his address before the Council of Nicaea (325) and insisted that the council’s function was to “banish all dissension” and too they should “impose standards of uniformity that could be

³³Derrida, Jacques, Alan Bass, trans. “Violence of Metaphysics” in *Writing and Difference*, (The University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1978), 128. My bracketing: that draws upon previously made statements within the text. As well, this is the middle of a sentence of which is a response to the work of Levinas, thus I excluded that context.

³⁴And as I will show later moves much further than beyond these constructs.

enforced by the state³⁵.” Within the Christological discourse of the patristic fathers, is undoubtedly metaphysical, the two natures of Christ served the purpose of uniting humanity with the *Logos*. This is particularly problematic from feminist perspective as Rosemary Radford Ruether notes that association of the particular maleness of the historical figure of Jesus with the maleness of *Logos* reinforces the patriarchalization of Christology³⁶. This is an excellent example of the force of logocentrism or sameness on the metaphysical level to the level of the lived experience as both Schüssler Fiorenza and Ruether note the inherent problem of an androcentric Christ figure for women. The whitewashing of Jesus has the similar effect for all other non-white, non-European persons.

Accordingly, logocentrism provides for heterocentrism, androcentricism, and kyriarchal forms of society and operates as the *imperialism of sameness*. Within the *imperialism of sameness* all “othering” or what is considered outside of normative truth claims and normative social claims, according to the *logos*, as the *a priori* categories of *reason*, is concealed or enclosed upon- the tension of and with the “other” dissolves within the sameness.

Derrida, argued for the “end of metaphysics” or “closure of metaphysics” and at least, accomplishes the suspension of metaphysics in defining difference between writing and speaking. Derrida contends that behind speech and too behind the *encounter* is a performative, as in performance, “yes.” In the performance of this “yes” is the inherent *acknowledgement* of the presumption of presence. Speech-acts acquire their conventional force in their “iretability” or “their capacity – to function to carry that force – across a vast

³⁵Schüssler Fiorenza, Elizabeth, *Jesus, Mariam’s Child, Sophia’s Prophet: Critical Issues in Feminist Christology*, (Continuum; New York, 2004), 20.

³⁶Ruether, Rosemary Radford, *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology*, (Beacon Press; Boston, 1993), 117.

and theoretically limitless range of varying contexts³⁷.” In speech-acts there is a performance, a repetition and a concealment between the signifier, to include the divine signifier of the *Logos* and the signified or Creation, where “the formal essence of the signified is *presence*, and the privilege of its proximity to the *logos* as *phonè* (caller/signifier) is the privilege of presence³⁸.” Then in speech-acts and the encounter, *presences* is an illusion or the *irreal*, and thus it must be written; “presence has always been and will always, forever, be the form in which we can say apodictically, the infinite diversity of contents is produced³⁹.”

That which is produced, “the infinite diversity of contents,” takes the form of the *epistemè*—self-knowledge, constructed *consciousness*, and is thus a movement of idealization: “an algebrizing, de-poetizing formalization whose operation is to repress—in order to master it better—the charged signifier or the linked hieroglyph⁴⁰.” Then the *epistemè* is the very act of producing the “I” as the signified of the divine *Logos*—*perceived transcendental* and the signifier in speech-acts—*logos*. Which is to say the “self” is bound to a “metaphysical epistemology,” and thus the presumption of presence (becomes a means or a mode of production) structures the very mode of *being* for which we must briefly turn to the idea of a “metaphysical epistemology.”

Metaphysical Epistemology

First it must be understood “the extent to which our everyday beliefs, practices, language-games, cultural ‘forms of life,’ and so forth are themselves bound up with all

³⁷Reynolds and Roffe, 19.

³⁸Derrida, Jacques and Gayatri Spivak, trans. *Of Grammatology*, (Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1998 (corrected edition))18. My translation in parentheses.

³⁹Derrida, Jacques, *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs*, (Northwestern University Press; Evanston, 1973), 6.

⁴⁰*Derrida*, 285. Derrida is alluding here to the defacement of the *Logos* as signifier and too the defacement of

manner of deep laid metaphysical presuppositions⁴¹.” In this sense “metaphysical epistemology” is analogous to Karl Mannheim’s “sociology of knowledge;” the way in which both our lives and thinking are socially constructed, is much like “metaphysical epistemology,” as it is impossible to escape and is arguably philosophically and socially constructed⁴².

In understanding the full impact of metaphysical epistemology, consider how Derrida accounts for Husserl’s “sign” in its “two-fold sense” as “expression” and “indication,” wherein Husserl, in what appears to be an attempt to get *behind* the “sign” through phenomenological reduction proposes that the “sign” is without mental foreground-metaphysical, psychological or otherwise, but nevertheless maintains “epistemological value” regardless of language or even the existence of human beings⁴³. Here then, as Heidegger asked if the ontology concealed Being, Derrida asks, “do not phenomenological necessity, the rigor and subtlety of Husserl’s analysis, the exigencies to which it responds and which we must first recognize, nonetheless conceal the metaphysical presuppositions⁴⁴?” To this point and to the larger point that Derrida is alluding to what Heidegger writes, “the Greek expression *phainomenon*, from which the term “phenomenon” derives comes from the verb *phainesthai*, meaning to “show itself,” and thus the “meaning of the expression “phenomenon” is *established as what shows itself in itself*, what is manifest.

⁴¹Reynolds and Roffe, 15.

⁴²Kang, Namsoon, *Diasporic Feminist Theology: Asia and Theopolitical Imagination*, (Fortress Press; Minneapolis, 2014), 145.

⁴³Ibid, 5. I see *traces* of Husserl in Heidegger’s own Language as *existential* here and yet that should not be confused with Husserl as Heidegger purposes that the *existential* of Language arises in the *difference* as opposed to standing on its own such as Husserl purposes. However, I do wonder if Heidegger’s account of Language also runs too close to an ontological understanding or at least expression. With that, I wonder if that is why Derrida went back to Husserl, as is presented above, instead of attending to Heidegger’s attempt.

⁴⁴Derrida, 4.

The *phainomena*, “phenomena,” are thus the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light⁴⁵.”

In turn, Derrida is asked, is not the “sign” in Husserl’s “principle of principles,” “the original self giving evidence, the *present* or *presence* of sense to a full primordial intuition,” despite its phenomenological vigilance and rigor “already controlled by metaphysics itself⁴⁶?” Derrida further concluded “[i]s not the idea of knowledge and of the theory of Knowledge in itself metaphysical?” The presumption of presence in our everyday beliefs, practices, language-games, cultural ‘forms of life,’ or our very mode of knowing the “self” and the world, the One and the Other, and the very mode of being is bound to the *epistm e*. Given that the knowledge for which one is to know one’s *self* of the *self* is defined and thus constrained by the *a priori* categories of the *Logos—Reason*, and the *logos—reason*; the only *self* that can be know is in the produced “I,” and consequently indiscernibly bound to it.

This “I” is the production of the *private beings*. Metaphysical epistemology, like capitalistic privatization of property, is the privatization of being, in that the *self* becomes only a *means* to the production of the “I⁴⁷.”

II. Positive Antithesis

The text up until this point has provided a deconstruction of the metaphysical Non-*being*. In effort to carry through the process of deconstruction in the fullness of the paper this section will detail on the other hand, the positive antithesis of the *Singular Being*.

⁴⁵*Basic Writings*, 73.

⁴⁶Derrida, 5.

⁴⁷Without a doubt private salvation is the best explicit example of the way that this functions. Which is not to say that I would argue for “corporate salvation.”

Part and parcel of how systemic oppression functions is through what Namsoon Kang and others have called “identity politics.” Identity politics, Namsoon Kang’s point of entry in the discussion of singularity, highlights the discursive attributive *values* or nominal characteristics that overshadow the singularity of *Being*. Race, gender, ethnicity, and so on function as markers of the body, which is to say that there is an *actual* distinguishable difference between bodies. However, identity politics provides that the unique differences within these categories are homogenized over and against these unique differences. Kang notes the inherent *double bind* through homogenization in these categories, where on the one hand it provides the *necessary* individual and collective affirmation of identity for the basis of issues such as human rights activism among others.

On the other hand this homogenization of identity politics also holds the *impossibility* of articulating the uniqueness within these categories. Kang writes, “Any type of identity is always provisional, partial, unstable, and elusive because in one’s unique singularity one is never static, comprehensible, and fixable⁴⁸.” Thus, as one is *forced* to make an identity claim, it is also a claim to an inherent binary oppositionality of superior-inferior, as identity is always measured against the *a priori* of the category (imperialism of sameness). Such that, in the case of the categories of gender and ethnicity “[t]he gendered-ethnicization of the I in the process of claiming one’s identity against the destructive binary lens of inferior- superior is an ironic consequence of ethnic-gender identity⁴⁹.” It is as well the consequence of claiming any other inherently supposed static identity marker.

⁴⁸Kang, 45.

⁴⁹Kang, 65. Dr. Kang goes on to indicate that this I is dissolved within the master identity stipulated by the social categories. I want to contest this particular point on the bases of the power dynamic within identity. While it has not yet been explicitly stated, part of my contention throughout the text is that one’s identity is issued or given, which is to say that it is not a choice made as subject, such as “dissolve” might suggest but is a choice, if it can be called that, out of subjectivity, of which one has little no power or control. I will address this more in the discussion on historical materialism.

Consequential is this binary oppositionality: superior-inferior that grants one Minority status. Then as Kang quotes Gayatri Spivak, “[b]ecoming minor’ is not a question of essence (as the stereotypes of minorities in dominant ideology would want us to believe), but a question of position: a subject-position that in the final analysis can be defined only in ‘political’ terms—that is, in terms of the effect of economic exploitation, political disenfranchisement, social manipulation, and ideological domination on the cultural formation of minority subjects and discourses⁵⁰.” Society is discursively dictated by identity politics and prevents the *actualization* of one’s *Being* as singular or *Singular Being*—their *Beinghood*. Spivak’s point, ‘indicates that not only is actualization of singularity prevented but the alternative is capitalized on and exploited.

A. *Singular-Being*

What can be said of the *Singular-Being*? An identity claim, is not a claim, but by the very terms of identity politics, is externally imposed, and categorically imposed. It is not a subjective claim but a condition of subjectivity, which is static and fixed in relation to the categories enforced by the provisional subjectivity. Alternatively, *Being* as singular is not an identity claim, it is neither categorical nor un-categorical, it is heterogeneous and thus is never static, comprehensible, and fixable, it is always-already *becoming*. This provides that the *Singular-Being* has subject value in and of *itself*, which in and of *itself* provides for its own subjectivity as alterity.

One’s own commitment, as subject *self*, *self*-subject, *Singular-Being*, to their own heterogeneity and thus commanding their own subjecthood, relinquishes both the One and the Other from the relation economy of imposed subjectivity. Accordingly, “[o]ne’s being as

⁵⁰Kang, 67. I would not use the word essences here as it is a metaphysical derivative.

such and becoming as singular plural is in a spiral relationship that does not have a fine divided line in a binary way⁵¹.” Each, both the One and the Other exist in the multiplicity of *Being*, that is *Singular-Being* within the homogeneity of the multiplicity of *Alterity*.

B. Alterity

Alterity may best be understood as the human condition of *Singular-Beings*. Noted briefly was the issue of subjectivity, or the explicit argument that in order to open up the *space* necessitated for *Being* as singular requires the removal of the imposed subjectivity of the metaphysical *Non-being* of which dictates the estrangement of body from the mind or in Platonic terms the body from the soul, relegating both to a transcendental subjectivity. Emmanuel Levinas articulates *Alterity* well and explains how it accounts for the above noted relationality.

The alterity, the radical heterogeneity of the other, is possible only if the other is other with respect to a term whose essence is to remain at the point of departure, to serve as entry into the relation, to be the same not relatively but absolutely. *A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of relationship only as I. . .* The I is not being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing consist in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification⁵².

Levinas gets it spot on with one exception; I would not use the word “essences” as it is a metaphysical derivative. This point is of particular importance as it highlights the

⁵¹Ibid 68.

⁵²Levinas, Emmanuel and Alfonso Lingis, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, (Norwell; Kluwer University Press, 1969), 36 (italics original).

difference of subject and subjectivity. That is because *essence* is a metaphysical derivative, and this is problematic as it implies the transcendental subjectivity that I noted before. Specifically, it may serve well to reread Levinas with the phrase *species-being* or *Singular Being* in place of “essence.”

C. Complementary Critique

Namsoon Kang articulates well the function of discursive oppression in identity politics and clearly distinguishes both singularity and alterity, eloquently bringing together her work and the work that has come before her. I am appreciative this work as it gives way for me to further it. Entangled in the discussion immediately above, I have included additional commentary on how the subject and subjectivity fit into the critiques of Kang and Levinas, among others. In considering identity politics within this scope of subjectivity what becomes evident is that while the explained discursive function of identity politics in systemic oppression provides tools to discuss these issues, and even isolates and points to the power that is exerted through oppression, it does not reach far enough to get at the power that drives the discursivity. I’ve already illustrated that the dominance of the *a priori* categories reinforces power at a non-discursive level. The power of this dominance resides in the capitalistic function of the discursivity, of which is made possible on the individual level by the estrangement in the privatization of the metaphysical non-*being*.

III. Privatization of Non-Being

Bernd Mangus and Stephen Cullenberg introduce Jacques Derrida’s *Specters of Marx* by recalling the fall of the Berlin Wall and the massacre at Tiananmen Square. Surely this move was to situate the text around the current circumstances, released in French 1993 and in English in 1994, the *fall* of communism or rather the repetitions of communism is

one of the major guiding themes. Yet, it also reveals something a bit more complex as does Derrida's return to Marx itself. Both the Berlin Wall and the Tiananmen Square in communist China reveal a communism grounded in an ideology. Hannah Arendt in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* writes of the Chinese Communist Party, "The Chinese Communist Party after its victory had at once aimed at being 'international in organization, all-comprehensive in its ideological scope, and global in its political aspiration,' that is, its totalitarian traits have been manifest from the beginning⁵³." In Germany, Stalin, a communist, manifested said communism into a dictatorship, again, by ideology. This very history of totalitarianism, as foregrounded by the editors, is the reason for the question of the colloquium that called for this text, *Specters of Marx*; "Whither Marx?" This asks, at the very least, "Which Marx?" or perhaps it might be better to ask, "Marx, which one?" Yet, as this is not simply a text on Karl Marx, "Whither Marx?" is also to ask, "Whither Marxism?" and again it is perhaps better to ask "Marxism, which one?" Which is to say that Marxism as a tool of critique in this historical perspective of communism may well look and/or seem ineffectual to say the least. For that reason the first section of this last part reviews the *Specters of Marx* by Jacques Derrida. This point of entry serves both to qualify Karl Marx and Marxism, but also to further articulate how a neo-Marxist critique developed out of Marx's historical materialism defines the force and power behind the estrangement within the metaphysical Non-Being.

A. *Specters of Marx*

Marx's motive was the relief and liberation of the oppression of a classed society. For Derrida, the motive was justice beyond justice, an undeconstructionable justice where

⁵³Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, (New York; Harverst Books, Harcourt Inc., 1973), xxvii.

there is a necessary disjointure, a de-totalizing condition of justice that “is where deconstruction would always begin to take shape as the thinking of the gift of undeconstructible justice, the undeconstructible condition of any deconstruction, to be sure, but a condition that is itself in *deconstruction* and remains, and must remain in the disjointure,” otherwise it rest on doing one’s duty and thus loses the chance of the *future*⁵⁴. This undeconstructible justice is the singularity of each *Singular-Being* in the condition of alterity. Then the remainder of this section will highlight Marx through the lens of Derrida in the *Specters of Marx* and will reveal how these two passions come together.

The iterability or repetition of the differing manifestations of communism functions as the overarching theme of the *Specters of Marx*, wherein Derrida in asking the question “Whither Marx?” contends that upon each repetition there is a “conjuring trick.” This “conjuring trick” will out of necessity include, at least three different *parts*: specter, spirit and *time*. The conjurations of Marxism, etymologically has four possibilities, two French and two German. In French and in German, *On the one hand* first designates: “the conspiracy of those who promise solemnly, sometimes secretly, by swearing together an oath to struggle against the superior power⁵⁵. In French, *on the other hand* signifies “the magical incarnation destined to *evoke*, to bring forth with the voice, to *convoke* a charm or a spirit⁵⁶. Lastly in German again, Conjurations as “conjurement” is “the magical exorcism that, on the contrary, tends to expulse the evil spirit which would have been called up or convoked” of which is composed of either an alliance or an alliance to conjure away⁵⁷.” By

⁵⁴Derrida, Jacques, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning & the New International*, 1st ed. Routledge; New York, 1994, 33. My parenthesis.

⁵⁵Ibid 49-50.

⁵⁶Ibid 50.

⁵⁷Ibid 58.

differing these modes of conjuration within the “conjuring trick” Derrida indicts the totalitarian regimes that arose after Marx, the regimes of his present time, and differentiates Marx and Marxism.

In the attention to these conjurations of Marx and Marxism Derrida was asking, how to do justice [*justement*] to Marx in the shadow of these the conjurations of Marxism that followed as totalitarian regimes and misappropriations of Marx, Marxism and Marx’s communism. In this vain Derrida writes of this justice, “[n]ot for calculable equality, therefore, not for the symmetrizing and synchronic accountability or imputability of subjects or objects,” and was not for merely *rendering justice*, but for justices as incalculability of the gift that arises from giving that which one has not to give and thus the singularity of the an-economic ex-position to others⁵⁸.

In this incalculable justice Derrida’s ventured to protect the possibilities of Marxism, by drawing Marxism out of the “conjurations” of both the later totalitarian regimes and its misappropriated use in much later propaganda. Derrida notes for example here we can see the forth conjuration or second German understanding— “the magical exorcism that, on the contrary, tends to expulse the evil spirit which would have been called up or convoked,’ which is composed of “either an alliance or an alliance to conjure away” in Francis Fukuyama’s “conjurment” in *The End of History and the Last Man* and his *teleos* of progress⁵⁹. While these past apparitions of “Marxism” manifested as totalitarian regimes and future false apparitions, Derrida commended Marx for leaving Marxism open for critique and transformation. Accordingly, Derrida to further protect “Marxism” purposes

⁵⁸Ibid 26 and 33.

⁵⁹Ibid 58. *Teleos* of progress or that the end of communism was eventual in the political progress towards a liberal capitalist democracy.

perhaps an up-to-date version of the *Communist Manifesto*, with his own program: “the New International” which is a link, affinity, suffering, and hope that is discreet—almost secret link that is “out of joint” (time), without coordination, without party, without country, and without national community. It calls to the “friendship of an alliance without institution” in order to ally themselves, as a kind of counter-conjuration in the theoretical and practical critique of the State and international law—the concept of the State and the nation—in order to radicalize it⁶⁰.

In effort to accomplish this counter-conjuration, which one must be careful not to re-appropriate or enlist a reappearance of the “conjuring trick,” Derrida offers two interpretations of the plagues of the current “new world order:” 1. All that is going badly in the world today is but a measure of the *gap* between an “empirical reality” and a regulating ideal. For example, for Fukuyama, the “empirical reality” is that not all *things* are in line with the regulating ideal of capitalist liberal democracy, and this thus represents the extreme of Fukuyama’s “conjurement.” 2. That the very concept of the said ideal (capitalist liberal democracy) must be put into question. This is to include and/or would extend to the economic analysis of the market, the law of capital, of types of capital (financial, symbolic, and therefore spectral), liberal parliamentary democracy, modes of representation and suffering, the determination of the content of human rights, the rights of women and children, the current concepts of equality, liberty, and fraternity (the most problematic), dignity, the relations between man [sic] and citizen, and therefore between animal and divine. Therein Derrida’s proposed alternatives are: 1. If the Marxist critique is adapted to the conditions of the “empirical reality,” then it remains poignant in order to reduce the

⁶⁰Ibid 106-7.

gap between the empirical reality and the regulating ideal as much as possible⁶¹. 2.

Complete fidelity to a certain Marxist spirit must remain a *duty*⁶².

In effort to further guard against this reappearance of Marxism, to *do justice* to Marx, Derrida contends these two alternatives must be intertwined—implicated in each other, in a complex and constantly re-evaluated strategy, or else each one could lead back to a fatalist idealism (such as totalitarianism) or abstract and dogmatic eschatology (such as Fukuyama's teleos of progress) in the face of the world's evil.

The “conjuring trick” of the conjuration—the apparition, and the justice of revealing it is not without the specter and (of) the spirit nor is it understood without them. Derrida writes, “[t]he specter is *of the spirit*, it participates in the latter and stems from it even as it follows it as a ghostly double⁶³.” The difference between the two is what tends to disappear in the ghost effect (product of conjuration). The ghost effect or the production of the ghost “is not simply a spiritualization or even an autonomization of the spirit, idea, or thought as happens *par excellence* in Hegelian idealism⁶⁴.” It is only when the autonomization is affected with the corresponding expropriation or alienation, does “the ghostly moment *come upon it*, adds to it a supplementary dimension, one more simulacrum, alienation or expropriation,” which is namely the body- in the flesh⁶⁵.” To be a ghost insists upon return to a body—a body more abstract than ever. The “conjuring trick” or “spectrogenic process corresponds to a paradoxical *incorporation*⁶⁶.” A paradoxical incorporation proceeds that “once ideas or thoughts are detached from their substratum, one engenders some ghost by

⁶¹Ibid 107-8.

⁶²Ibid 108-9.

⁶³Ibid 156-7.

⁶⁴Ibid 157.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

giving them a body that is “neither perceptible nor invisible, but remains flesh, in a body without nature, in an *a*-physical body” as a technical body or institutional body, which remains always “under tough institutional and cultural protection of some artifact”- the ideologem or the fetish⁶⁷. The “conjuring trick” thus repeats only this time the first is “negated, integrated, and incorporated by the very subject of the operation who, claiming the uniqueness of its *own* body” becoming absolute ghost, “the ghost of the ghost of the specter-spirit, simulacrum of simulacra without end⁶⁸.” Accordingly, the conjuring trick multiplies itself. It is “Eskamotage,” a sleight of hand (Fukuyama) in which the illusionist makes the perceptible body disappear (communism); it knows how to make inapparent. This paradoxical incorporation- the repetition- the negation and interiorization corresponds with the “constructed corporeality of man [sic]⁶⁹.” Derrida further articulates Marx on this point, “the self is what takes it back within: “I” incorporates the initial incorporation by negating or destroying, by deposing the previous position from its objective exteriority, by de-objectifying the ghost⁷⁰.” The body proper of the “I” is ghost. As Derrida writes, “in the desert of the spirit, the whole history of spirits, ghosts, or *revenants*: first the pure history of spirits, then the history of the possessed [the first “trick”] as impure history of phantoms, then the impure impure history of spirits [the second “trick”]⁷¹.”

In distinguishing between the specter and the spirit Derrida concludes, “the apparition-form, the phenomenal body of the spirit, that is the definition of the specter. The

⁶⁷Ibid 157-158.

⁶⁸Ibid 158-9.

⁶⁹Ibid 160.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid 151. Derrida is surely indicating the close parallels between Marx and St. Max (Stirner)

ghost is the phenomenon of the spirit⁷².” Here the specter has a body (due to the “conjuring trick”), but the spirit is without. Accordingly are two points: 1) the phenomenal form of the world itself is spectral; 2) the phenomenological *ego*, the “I” is the specter⁷³.” The Ego— “this *living individual* would itself be inhabited and invaded by *its own specter*,” is then constituted by specters as host of a haunted community of specters in one body⁷⁴. The specter suffers what Derrida calls, the vertiginous asymmetry or the technique for having visions, for *seeing* ghosts is in truth a technique to *make oneself seen by ghosts*⁷⁵.” In following the gaze of the specter we lose sight of it; disappeared into a hall of mirrors, this conceived truth as specter invades every place, it comes from everywhere and proliferates the *a priori*⁷⁶. “The living ego is auto-immune, which is what they do not want to know⁷⁷.” The phenomenal form of the world itself is spectral, and the phenomenological *ego*, the “I” is the specter⁷⁸. The difference between the specter and the spirit is *differance*. “The specter is not only the carnal apparition, its phenomenal body, its fallen and guilty body, it’s also the impatient and nostalgic waiting for redemption, namely, once again, for spirit. The ghost would be the deferred spirit, the promise or calculation of an expiation⁷⁹.”

Then, “If the ghost is disseminated everywhere, the question becomes a distressing one: where does one *begin* to count the progeniture?⁸⁰” The possession of the specter is at the head and comes from capital (at least for Marx), the capital representation; the oldest Son is Man [sic]. As such all of humanity is a collection of a series of ghosts. “For the

⁷²Ibid 169.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid 166.

⁷⁵Ibid 168.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid 177.

⁷⁸Ibid, 49.

⁷⁹Ibid 170-1.

⁸⁰Ibid 172.

singular ghost, the ghost that generated this in calculable multiplicity, the arch-specter, is a father or else it is capital. Both are abstract bodies, visible-invisible, apparitions without anybody⁸¹.”

“Which Marxist Spirit?” to the question of the colloquium, “Whither Marx?” It is not simply a matter of Derrida isolating Marx from his iterability, his conjurations—the totalitarian regimes, and the misappiritions such as Fukuyama, but it is that Derrida through Marx points directly to Marx’s own conjurations—his own specter and the conjurations or spectralizations of humanity. Derrida’s passion returns to Marx, and points to Marx to illustrate the injustice unjustly accorded to Marx and Marxism. In so doing Derrida further exposes the injustice to humanity that Marx himself tried to resolve. Derrida, such as Marx, illuminates the *place*—the location of liberation and justice, an undeconstructable justice that may be a *gift*.

In conclusion, here, my initial venture in deconstructing this text resulted in the all too brief summary: *The Genealogy of the Marxist Conjuring Trick: A Critique of Phenomenology*. Then, the *Specters of Marx* was at first a campaign for Karl Marx, at second it was undoubtedly an indictment of phenomenology, which Derrida, in using Marx, traces back to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the German Idealism. This phenomenological trace is not only that which draws Marx and Derrida together, it bonds my preceding discussion on the metaphysical *Non-Being* in direct connection with Marx and Marxism.

To further articulate this vital point I return to the definition of the “conjuring trick” or perhaps more politically palpable, the paradoxical incorporation, that “once ideas or thoughts are detached from their substratum, one engenders some ghost by *giving them a*

⁸¹Ibid 173, my emphasis.

body.” Both Derrida and Marx hold this directly in relation to the Christic moment or when the metaphysics of philosophy in both Plato and Aristotle is removed from that substratum—as philosophical science and *attached* to Jesus’ body. This is seen in the first place with patristic fathers insistence of the two natures of Jesus⁸². With the attachment of metaphysical language to Jesus in the Christic moment, Jesus the spirit becomes Christ the specter, an autonomization, an institutional body. Thus Jesus the spirit remains in the *differance*, an always-deferred presence, and therefore the Christ *figure* is the most spectral of specters. Derrida writes, “to what gives body to the idea, but a body with a lower ontological content, a body that is less real than the idea itself⁸³.” It is the very anachrony of *time*, it is “out of joint,” metaphysics, ontology, phenomenology, the specter spectralizes without end. Then it is the ideology that carries from body to body with the paradoxical incorporation of the specter, in the “conjuring trick” until what was, the non-dualistic body and soul—body and mind, has disappeared into only what can be seen and thus spoken—*phonè*⁸⁴.

The Christic moment is the exemplar par excellence of the estrangement between the “I” and the “self.” As, “the self is what takes it back within: “I” incorporates the initial incorporation by negating or destroying, by deposing the previous position from its objective exteriority, by de-objectifying the ghost⁸⁵.” In this way singularity is abandoned for iterability—repetition, such is the case with Jesus as well as humanity.

B. Historical Materialism

⁸²Now Derrida makes a reference to communion, or transubstantiation; in Latin, *transsubstantiatio*, and Greek, *Metousiosis*, which later is part and parcel of the insistence upon the two-natures of Christ.

⁸³Ibid 184.

⁸⁴ Here again, baptism.

⁸⁵Tucker, Robert C., ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd edition, (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.; New York, 1978), 160.

Karl Marx began to write in the middle of the 19th Century to address the German Ideology and the Young Hegelians⁸⁶. Marx was originally apart of the Young Hegelians in their advance of a political campaign attacking Christianity in order to undermine the Prussian government. Marx did not entirely depart from Young Hegelians in this regard but instead took the critique further to claim that it is not only Christianity or religion, but ownership of capital that undermines government and society. The Young Hegelians, as wanted to maintain an egalitarian society of the bourgeoisie, while Marx argued the divisions of labor were maintained in their proposal. Upon this foreground, Marx developed his critique of political economy through a materialist concept of history or historical materialism.

Then, species-being is the foremost ground of Marx's entire argument⁸⁷. Marx understood the notion of Species-Being, proposed first by Feuerbach, as the "full humanity" of human beings, whereby human beings are, *essentially* or in accordance with *nature*, social-beings⁸⁸. Therefore, human beings act most authentically and deliberately provided their species-*consciousness*- social *consciousness*, which is the fundamental element in the human power of reasoning⁸⁹. Otherwise stated human beings are only as such, individually, when they are social beings in full community. The notion of private-

⁸⁶The Young Hegelians, or Left Hegelians, were a group of German intellectuals who, in the decade or so after the death of [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel) in 1831, reacted to and wrote about his ambiguous legacy. The Young Hegelians drew on his idea that the purpose and promise of history was the total negation of everything conducive to restricting freedom and reason; and they proceeded to mount radical critiques, first of religion and then of the Prussian political system. They ignored anti-utopian aspects of his thought that some have interpreted to mean that the world has already essentially reached perfection.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Young_Hegelians

⁸⁷I note again, that this is different than what I have purposed above. Marx and Feuerbach attribute qualities or characteristics to species-being. Where as my *species-being* might well be understood in Darwinian terms. As well, Marx's species-being is defined by the above critiqued metaphysics.

⁸⁸Tucker, Robert C., ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2nd edition, (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.; New York, 1978), footnote 1 pg34.

⁸⁹This is Marx's own adherence to metaphysics. To highlight this point, I will italicized the words that indicate it.

being is against the very *essential* nature of human beings as it sets humanity against itself. This understanding of private-being is what develops with the establishment of private property.

Marx writes, “the anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy⁹⁰.” Accordingly, Marx’s critique of political economy and his materialist conception of history begin with the establishment of private property. The *creation* or establishment of private property occurs when humanity (historically) becomes civilization/civilized, moving from tribal arrangements to civil entities⁹¹. This shift can be seen in the evolution of private property as once only landed property to then also moveable property, such as enslaved human beings and later the tools of mechanization or civilized instruments of production. In the ancient world, the possession of movable property was only permitted to *citizens*. Accordingly, Marx distinguishes this tribal shift to civilization as the shift from town to country, whereby private property necessitates sovereignty through the creation of municipalities (politics) or governance of said property of which holds inherent the ascribing of citizenship, and thus social classes, which holds inherent the division of labor.

Yet, this is the later evolution of the division of labor. The beginning or nucleus of private property is in the family, “where wife and children are the slaves of the husband” of which “perfectly corresponds to the definition of modern economist who call it the power of disposing of labor-power of others⁹².” Comprehensively, the division of labor is the forces of production, the state of society, and where human *consciousness* is in contradiction to one another, such that “as long as man [sic] remains in natural society, that

⁹⁰ Ibid, 4.

⁹¹Ibid, 151.

⁹²Ibid 159-160.

is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's [sic] own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him [sic], which enslaves him [sic] instead of being controlled by him [sic]⁹³."

Marx levels his critique against Hegel, German Idealism and the Young Hegelians on the bases of this materialist conception of history. Marx writes, "Hegel transforms the predicates, the objects, into independent entities, but divorced from their actual independence, their subject," and thus "the actual subject appears as the result⁹⁴." Consequently, where the family and civil society should be the premise of the state, in the speculative philosophy of Hegel, this is inverted. This inversion inherently creates a conflict or schism between public interest and private interest. For each individual lives a double existence—public community as a communal being and civil society as a private individual, that treats other persons as a means and too the degradation of self to a mere means. Marx draws the conclusion that this is not emancipation but consumption and consummation⁹⁵.

The Hegelian configuration "starts from the state and makes man [sic] the subjectified state⁹⁶." Hegel then proposed that subjectivity gave rise to the subject or the state gave rise to the people of civil society. Marx argues that this equation, subjectivity → subject, is the very privatization of society and thus creates the conditions of historical materialism. Then the State (subjectivity) making subject the people gives the illusion of sovereignty, and provides for the infiniteness of the State and the finiteness of the people

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid, 18.

⁹⁵Ibid 35.

⁹⁶Ibid, 20.

of civil society. This dynamic creates or gives rise to the private-being that is not species-being but is instead alienated and estranged from society. Thus, while the body must be communal in labor, that labor contradicts the *soul-mind's* own private *self-interest*, which then must be suppressed or repressed to maintain the communal *presence* of the body—it is *spectralized*⁹⁷. In the infiniteness of the State, power, through the illusion of sovereignty, is given to the state over and against the people of civil society—it is transcendent.

C. Economy of Non-Being

Here I want to isolate this last paragraph and explicate the dynamic between the State and the people of civil society or the equation: subjectivity → subject for the narrow first level neo-Marxist critique⁹⁸. Then in terms of metaphysics, if we understand the above equation to represent, State → civil society, where the sovereignty of the state divides the individual into public-being and private-being, or State → public-being + private-being and thus privatizing the individual and invalidating a species-being of a communal society, we can advance the following equation: metaphysics (subjectivity) → Non-being (subject), and to make this more explicit: metaphysics → body + *soul-mind*, whereby metaphysics (ontology and phenomenology) exercise sovereignty over the *Being*, instituting the paradoxical incorporation, where the metaphysical idea is detached from their substratum of the philosophical sciences, and is engendered as some *ghost* by *giving* the idea a *body*. This instituting, indoctrination, the paradoxical incorporation of the “conjuring trick” divides making *ghost* or metaphysical Non-being, indoctrinating the very dualism of the

⁹⁷I have begun at this point to depart from Marx's non-discursive level to the discursive level, and too begun to read Derrida from the *Specters of Marx* into this discursive level.

⁹⁸Marx and Marxism heralding from Karl Marx's actual work, and not the totalitarian repetitions, question non-discursive forms of power. This then is an explicitly Neo-Marxist critique as I am extending historical materialism to discursive modes of power.

body and the *soul-mind*, and thus dividing them into the “Self” and the “I.” Where the “Self” is the interiority of *being* and the “I” is the performative exteriority of *being*. In the terms of historical materialism the division is perhaps best understood in the following schematic: metaphysics (subjectivity) → body or “I” + *soul-mind* or *Self* (subject). Where, in the schematic: State → civil society, the labor of the body was the mode of capitalist material production. The near exact is true of the schematic: Metaphysics → *non-being*, but in this case the labor of the body—the “I” is the mode of capitalist social production, thus engendering the “I,” against the body with a Social Market Value. Accordingly, it is the performativity (which is production) of the “I,” the body—or the exteriority of *non-being*, that is a commodity of production. The *spectral* body of the “I” represses and suppresses the interior *Self* until it disappears in the conjuration, leaving only a *ghost* to be commodified in the social market of systemic oppression.

The estrangement of the *self* from the “I,” the privatization of *being*, and its attachment to the body renders it material and thus commodifies the “I” by *transforming* the nominal characteristics and specificities from the *use-value* of it to an exchange-value in the Social Market of which adheres to and is defined by the *a priori* categories of *reason* or the transcendental *Logos*⁹⁹. It is precisely this *move* of defining these categories in relation to the transcendental that grants the privatization of *being* its power as the transcendental has an undefined sovereignty and thus authority. However because the authority of the transcendental is claimed by a sovereign non-discursive power, it is a further exertion of subjectivity over and against the subject. This provides for the actual capitalistic force behind the power. The non-discursive power, here the *Church*, the *Empire*, the colonizer,

⁹⁹While I am using Marx’s “use-value;” I’ve placed it in italics as I want to challenge it as he defines it.

gains more power and more capital— the “I”s and their bodies through the discursive force of the perpetuation of metaphysical non-*being*, which is the indoctrination of the Platonic duality—the Christic moment (or is it the salvific moment?). As each private specter goes out and spectralizes more specters, the body count increases, the method of profit is revealed. The non-discursive power controls the capital—the “I”s—the bodies, gained by defining and situating the *a priori categories* according to the *Reason* of the transcendental *Logos*.

The power dynamic inherent here is the intersectionality of Michel Foucault’s “knowledge power” and “sovereign power.” “Knowledge power” is that there are mechanisms of power that produce different types of knowledge, by collating information on people's activities and existence. This is similar to what I have described here as discursive power. Foucault’s “sovereign power” is obedience to the law of the king or central authority figure or here non-discursive power. The intersectionality, perhaps most strikingly is revealed in Constantine’s lording over the First Ecumenical Council. Otherwise stated, the State, as sovereign power, the non-discursive power exercised its authority over and against knowledge power, as discursive power, and we might even call it “subject power.” Yet, while the attachment of metaphysics was an action of the Church, at this point in history, it did not have the extent of sovereignty that it was later granted in its adoption by the State¹⁰⁰. Then explicitly, the State has the authority over discursive functions and this is not just the case of the Roman Empire but also of any kind of State or dictatorship.

¹⁰⁰Historically, I have situated this around the First Ecumenical Council in 325 CE. While the Edict of Milan would decriminalize Christian worship in 313 CE, it is not until 380 that Christianity becomes the State religion. The First Council of Constantinople in 381 then codified the Nicene Creed from the First Ecumenical Council, the Council of Nicaea, that I have used here but again maintaining the language of *substance* and *consubstance*.

The State's authority over and often against discursive functions is through the very nature of the claim to sovereignty (private property), and thus sovereignty itself is capitalistic—it functions for the sake of profit—like the specter functions to further *spectralize*.

Therefore the force and the power behind the discursive functions of identity politics and systemic oppression is in their inherent sovereignty. This sovereignty is afforded by the metaphysics of the Platonic duality, and just as the specter spectralizes, it too is inherently capitalistic. That is to say, by the mere enactment—"performativity" of the "I" is its continual accumulation of the power and it is privileged by and through the *a priori* categories of value stipulated by the non-discursive authority.

Conclusion: The Specter's Cloak

What we look at, we do not see. The human gaze is always-already skewed. The Specter's Cloak is not simply worn upon the body but is situated in the eyes. The Specter's Cloak reaches far and wide, from non-discursive forms of power to the subject's own *being*. So vast is its reach that it conditions our gaze. It renders the gaze, a question unto *itself*. For this we must ask, are we wearing it? Is it external? Or is it I? Is it the Other? Is it internal? Whither Specter?

Our species-being is not changed by the commodified value of the Social Market "I" that is issued by the imposed subjectivity. Yet, it, the "I," and its attached exchange-value is like a cloak, *The Specter's Cloak*, the veil of a ghost that wonders about in the light of day. We do not know what we are looking at. Is it living or dead?

The metaphysical duality provides for the dominance of the *a priori* categories. These categories according to the *Logos of Reason* are instituted, indoctrinated, and codified by the sovereignty of the transcendental. The transcendental is unknown, un-

nameable, undefined and most importantly its sovereignty is infinite. So that whom ever makes a claim to the transcendental also lays claim to the infiniteness of it and thus has the power to define the terms of the ideology, the discursivity, attached to it. Sovereignty is capitalistic. It functions for the profit of more land, more bodies and more souls. Infinite sovereignty of the transcendental is boundless, and thus functions not to gain just a share of the profit, the bodies, the souls, the minds, but to gain as much profit possible.

The estrangement of *Being* renders oppression as absolute *reality*. For as long as sovereignty is claimed, subjectivity is imposed, the interior *self* is repressed, the external “I” is commodified and glorified according to its performativity and thus one’s value in society increases. As well, the *less deviant* the “I” is from the *a priori* categories, the higher the exchange-value, and the higher the exchange-value, the more privilege.

Where there is privilege—the very connotation of a power disparity—a superior-inferior existent reality, there is oppression. The “I” is the body, it is material and it is commodified on that very basis. As material, the *a priori* categories make a truth claim about the actual bodies of human beings. Then the further the *deviation* the more *inferior* the exchange-value. Accordingly, black bodies, female bodies, intersex bodies, brown bodies the list goes on, can only garner as much value, as much freedom as the non-discursive powers will allow through the shifting market values of the *a priori* categories¹⁰¹.

¹⁰¹Perhaps this seems a bit convoluted so for in an example on how this works, take for instance currency, say the American dollar, when the dollar is the dominant currency, everything is measured against it. The Euro, the Yen, and so on, the value each has in the global market, its very buying power, is defined by the buying power of the dollar. So if the American dollar can buy a volume ton of crude oil at say .75 per gallon, then it cost one Euro to buy a gallon. The inferior currency must pay more to acquire the same amount. The same is true when African American go to buy a car or a house. Then of we look at the shifting market values of the *a priori* categories, say for instance America wants to increase their trade with China, they increase the value of the Yen in relation to the american dollar by increasing exports, and not just American exports, to China, and

Whither Specter? The sovereignty and the estrangement operate discursively. The estrangement is in the epistemology of being. The estrangement is **in** how one looks at *oneself*. The estrangement is **in** how One looks at the Other. The estrangement is **in** the embodied *reality of Being*, such that each specter upon the *encounter* spectralizes, it is covert and it perpetuates violence.

Whither *justice*? Whither *liberation*? Derrida notes in the *Specters of Marx*, that Marx cannot and should not be detached from his rebellion. Marx cannot and should not be sanitized for academia or for society to make his rebellion more palatable. It is in this *spirit* of rebellion that I here call out the ghost of metaphysics that lurks about in the light of day, such that we know it not as something else but as ourselves. *Justice* and *liberation* are heralded from non-violent rebellion, the rebellion of Marx, to name, to identify, and to reveal the functions of the oppressor. Rebellion is big, such as the end of British occupation in India, and small, such as an tired old woman refusing to take one more step towards the back of a bus. To answer the questions: “Whither *justice*?” and “Whither *liberation*?” requires much further deconstruction than there is space for here. Yet, the non-violent rebellion started here, to include further deconstruction of justice and liberation, must and will continue.

The Specter’s Cloak has only been named here. Where it was once non-existent, it is now known, and must be made more and more visible. This critique of how the economy estrangement is oppressive reaches much further than what has been illustrated here, and

China has more global buying power. The same is true of African American athletes. African American performativity for the sake of entertainment was adjusted for in the market of the *a priori* categories so that now the black gentleman that could once only flip burgers or plow fields can now make millions throwing a ball. This is because throwing a ball increases the exchange-value, as well as the bank account of the *less deviant* white owner. This is just one of many examples.

as an ethic it must. Similarly, this is only one use of a neo-Marxist critique at the discursive level. Upon beginning my doctoral studies, I intend to demonstrate how Marx's *Das Kapital* in a developed neo-Marxist critique can also be used at the discursive level to address the way in which sin in Antiquity functioned to reinforce the platonic duality both on a cosmic level and the level of *Being* and further codify both discursive and non-discursive forms of powers.

Deconstruction is always-already incomplete. Non-violent rebellion for *justice*, for *liberation* must persevere as long as economy remains the human condition.

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