Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorBrown, Matt
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-25T20:41:28Z
dc.date.available2019-09-25T20:41:28Z
dc.date.issued2019-05-19
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.tcu.edu/handle/116099117/27046
dc.description.abstractWhile many have studied the effectiveness of sanctions, few have researched the purpose of sanctions against the powerful. In this study, I examine the imposition and effectiveness of sanctions against the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council given their unique position to multilaterally impose sanctions on others without the fear of imposition of sanctions on themselves through the United Nations. In this study, I use an incomplete-information, sequential-move game theoretic model to produce concluding observations for further studying. My results indicate: sanctions are largely ineffective in producing the desired result due to reputation costs associated with the target country, coercing blocs can rationally impose sanctions with little confidence of producing success, and prolonged multilateral sanctions will be questioned for their effectiveness due to the high cost of the sanctioning effort. My analysis points to the rational imposition of sanctions despite a probable intolerant actor.
dc.subjectsanctions
dc.subjectsanction efficacy
dc.subjectgame theory
dc.subjecteconomics
dc.subjectpolitical science
dc.titleThe Art of Sanctions: A Game Theoretic Approach to Sanctions Against the Powerful
etd.degree.departmentPolitical Science


Files in this item

Thumbnail
This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record