The hollow pact: Pacific security and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Abstract

John Foster Dulles regarded the creation of a powerful Western Pacific collective security organization as the cornerstone of America's East Asian policy, but the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) fell well short of his vision. SEATO never had the military might of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the alliance crumbled when the United States entered the Vietnam War. Even so, SEATO failed because the Eisenhower administration mismanaged its East Asian policy, not because of any perceived military inadequacy. The Department of State under Dulles had a dualistic approach to its East Asian relations. It sought to treat developing Asian nations as sovereign equals in order to disassociate the United States from charges of colonialism. At the same time, it rabidly opposed communism and sought to limit its spread throughout the nonaligned nations of Asia. The two policies competed with one another and kept Asian leaders from trusting American motives. Furthermore, Dulles pushed for the creation of SEATO in response to the 1954 French defeat at Dienbienphu. The time was not right for the creation of a multilateral alliance, but Dulles believed he had no other option available to halt the growth of communism in the region. The reactive nature of SEATO's creation combined with America's dualistic Asian policy kept nations in the region like Burma and Japan from joining, and as a result, SEATO never grew into the more powerful collective security organization that Dulles wanted.