Theory of deception judgments

Abstract

Thc purpose of this dissertation is to determine how people make deception judgments. I propose two theories of deception judgments, a cue theory and a discrepancy theory. According to the cue theory, perceivers infer deception from a fixed set of behaviors. According to the discrepancy theory, perceivers infer deception when they spot deviations from a message-specific expectation. The present research tests these theories. In two studies, perceivers' expectations about the content of a lie are experimentally manipulated. The findings of the research show that perceivers base their deception judgments on gaze aversion and deviations from message-specific expectation. On balance, the findings support discrepancy theory, rather than cue theory. However in light of the results, an integration of the two theories is proposed. In this integration, deception judgments reflect two factors: deviations from specific expectation and violations of general norms.