When Does Military Intervention Produce Democracy? The Determinants of Success for Democratization following Military Intervention

Abstract

This paper investigates why some interventions by the United States have resulted in democracy while others have not by examining the preconditions associated with successful democratization after military intervention. It employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine twelve different countries with unique instances of intervention from the period of 1982 to 2003 and two detailed case studies of US military intervention in Haiti (1994) and Panama (1989), highlighting the importance of economic growth, respect for the rule of law, and social homogeneity prior to the military intervention in the subsequent progress toward democracy. Through this mixed-method approach, this analysis finds support for the argument that economic growth, respect for the rule of law, and social homogeneity prior to intervention are important predictors of successful democratization after intervention. Case studies provide further partial support that growth in per capita GDP and a higher respect for the law in Panama produced a stable democracy after the US intervention in 1989, while in Haiti a stagnant economy and a lower respect for the rule of law resulted in a largely failed democracy after the US intervention in 1994.