| dc.description.abstract | Throughout the Truman administration American Near East policy was contradictory. On the one hand, the United States was pulled to the area by the need for oil, the desire to contain Soviet expansion, domestic pressure to aid the Jews in Palestine, and the decline of British power. On the other, America endeavored to remain aloof from military or political commitments to regional defense. American preoccupation with events in Europe and the Far East, left Great Britain responsible for area defense. However, circumstances forced the United States time and again into the complex world of Near East politics. These included Britain's arming of the Arab states and America's refusal to sell arms to Israel, the rise of Arab neutralism in the wake of the Korean War, the possibility that Turkey would abandon the West for an accommodation with the Soviet Union, and the intensifying Anglo-Egyptian crisis that threatened Western access to the military facilities in the Suez Canal Zone. America's response to these crises included the May 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the Mutual Security Program of 1951, the admission of Turkey to NATO, and the Middle East Command (MEC). These actions affirmed American's desire to remain aloof from military or political involvement and to uphold Britain's position there. They also demonstrated a lack of understanding of regional politics, and the Tripartite Declaration and Mutual Security Program confirmed the Arab's belief that the United States was pro-Israel and anti-Arab. Until late 1951 and early 1952, the United States followed a policy of upholding Britain as the primary power responsible for regional defense and remaining aloof from military or political commitments. However, the failure of the Tripartite Declaration, the Mutual Security Program of 1951, and MEC, coupled with the inflexible attitude of the British Conservative government toward Egypt, led the United States to chart a separate course from its British ally--a course that would eventually supplant Britain as the region's primary power. But American efforts to bring to power in Egypt a government with which the West could deal only served in the long run to destablize the region further. | |
