A test of five theories of coalition behavior in a probabilistic mixed-motive context

Abstract

Experimental paradigms utilized in studying coalition behavior may be divided into two general types, deterministic and probabilistic. With deterministic formats, once a controlling coalition forms, it automatically receives a payoff. In probabilistic formats, the formation of a controlling coalition does not guarantee receipt of the payoff. A major weakness with recent research and theoretical developments is that most of the efforts have been limited to deterministic formats. This is a problem because in most instances outside the laboratory, the success of a coalition is not certain. Extensions of four social-psychological theories (minimum power theory, minimum resource theory, bargaining theory, and equal excess theory) to take into account probabilistic situations were proposed utilizing Gamson's expected value concept. The theories were then tested employing probabilistic as well as deterministic formats. In addition, the predictions of the CEU model, a theory developed specifically to deal with probability of success, were also examined in the probabilistic situations. In general, the results were most in line with bargaining theory, though the support for bargaining theory was not unequivocal. It was suggested that bargaining theory's predictions could be improved if it were modified to include individual difference variables and how different situational factors affect the saliency of the equality and parity norms.