| dc.description.abstract | The aim of this paper is to argue that intuitionism is a plausible alternative to Utilitarianism and Kantianism as an ethical theory. It argues that common objections to intuitionism also undermine justification for both Utilitarianism and Kantianism, and neither ethical theory can justify itself except in reference to the sorts of intuition they claim to reject in intuitionism. The multiplicity of self-evident principles proposed by intuitionism should also not be assumed to be a weakness of intuitionism. It is plausibly preferable to both on a foundational and epistemic level to both discussed alternatives due to the coherence of its basic principles (which are mutually reinforcing and justifiable in a way that neither Kantianism or Utilitarianism's principles can be) and because a reasonable error theory exists to fix its mistakes (which both Kantianism and Utilitarianism lack).
The paper begins by introducing the basic framework of ethics and defining intuitionism. It disputes some common arguments against intuitions holding epistemic weight in ethics. A discussion of Utilitarianism and Kantianism follows which aims to show how each depends on intuition. The paper concludes with a discussion of the plausibility of error correction under each of these three normative theories, an argument that having multiple basic moral principles is not a fault of intuitionism, and a brief conclusion summarizing this paper's findings. | |
