Treaty Expressions or Contract Obligations? How Treaties do or do not Mitigate Conflict

Abstract

The concept of international law is vague. Concepts like anarchy and state sovereignty prevent international law from taking on the same meaning of law as is meant in the context of individualized states. Nevertheless, it is there, and it is important to know the ramifications of it. This thesis attempts to provide an empirical analysis to a legal argument, that treaties should be viewed as contracts. In applying this framework, this paper then examines what type of treaties are unstable treaties, those that end as a result of conflict between the states or an unfulfilled obligation, as well as what types of treaties lead to a mitigation of war. To accomplish this, the paper conducts a Cox proportional hazard model examining the hazard rates of treaties becoming unstable and treaties leading to war. Through this analysis, the paper adds to the current literature on how security treaties work and provides foreign policy advice as to what type of treaty would best lead to peace.