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dc.contributor.authorVu, Hannah
dc.date2021-12-18
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-14T16:40:45Z
dc.date.available2022-01-14T16:40:45Z
dc.date.created2022
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.tcu.edu/handle/116099117/49873
dc.description.abstractThe free will debate is fundamentally grounded in asking whether people have the sort of control required for moral responsibility given physical facts about the universe and other causal factors involved with our actions. This paper surveys the main views in the contemporary free will debate and examines how Derk Pereboom argues that under any view, we never have the control required for moral responsibility. The final section of this paper examines the views of two prominent optimistic free will skeptics, Derk Pereboom and Gregg D. Caruso, who argue that we lack free will and that we would be better off if we accepted this fact and its implications. I will ultimately argue that features of these skeptical views have pragmatic and moral concerns that lead us to reject some of their implications.
dc.subjectFree Will
dc.subjectFree Will Skepticism
dc.subjectOptimistic Free Will Skepticism
dc.titleObjections to Optimistic Free Will Skepticism
etd.degree.departmentPhilosophy
local.collegeAddRan College of Liberal Arts
local.collegeJohn V. Roach Honors College
local.departmentPhilosophy


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